Latest / Challenges of Faith Radio Program / Y ru tracking me? Ep 2816

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Y ru tracking me? Ep 2816 · Challenges of Faith Radio Program

• 0:01
  Speaker 1: Welcome back to Challenges of Faith Radio program. I'm Gary mckinns.
• 0:05
  Speaker 1: Thank you for joining, Thank you for joining, like to
• 0:09
  Speaker 1: acknowledge God and our listeners. And the topic today is
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  Speaker 1: why are you tracking me? To r ac KI n
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  Speaker 1: G episode twenty eight hundred and sixteen. According to cyber News,
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  Speaker 1: when you ask an app not to track, it tracks
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  Speaker 1: you anyway and the data is sold. Even if you
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  Speaker 1: installed just a single app on your factory reset iPhone
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  Speaker 1: and ask it not to track, you still expose yourself
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  Speaker 1: to a vast tracking ecosystem and anyone willing to purchase
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  Speaker 1: your location and other sensitive data. Apple has an option
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  Speaker 1: to ask apps to stop tracking your activity. But what
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  Speaker 1: does the app not to track button actually do? Not much. Apparently,
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  Speaker 1: the app developers won't get your advertising identify, which is IDFA,
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  Speaker 1: a unique number attributed to the user, and that's basically it. However,
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  Speaker 1: the app will still be able to collect any data
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  Speaker 1: has access to. As a security researcher known as Tim Demonstrator,
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  Speaker 1: there are multiple other IDs and ways to track you down.
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  Speaker 1: In the blog posts currently making waves on ye Combinator,
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  Speaker 1: Tim detailed and experiment in which he installed a single
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  Speaker 1: app tracked US Communications and uncovered shadow we use the
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  Speaker 1: data selling practices. Apple support page states if you choose
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  Speaker 1: ask app not to track, the app developer can access
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  Speaker 1: as the system advertising identifier, which is often used to
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  Speaker 1: track the app is also not permitted to track your
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  Speaker 1: activity using other information that identifies you or your device,
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  Speaker 1: like your email address. Regardless of users' choices, the free
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  Speaker 1: apps you install and use collect your precise location with
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  Speaker 1: a timestamp and send it to some third party companies.
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  Speaker 1: The researcher warns do a complicated scheme. Advertisers and data
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  Speaker 1: brokers obtain extremely detailed data, including screen brightness, memory amount,
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  Speaker 1: battery level, of whether a user is wearing headphones. They
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  Speaker 1: may not get to advertise an ID, but the data
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  Speaker 1: beams included over twenty other IDs, such as identifier for Vendor,
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  Speaker 1: Transaction ID, Session ID, device ID, or user one. There's
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  Speaker 1: so much data in the request that I'd expect ad
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  Speaker 1: Exchanges to find some newpoid that would allow cross app
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  Speaker 1: tracking without the need for IDFA. A steep haywall stopped
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  Speaker 1: him from finally buying back his own and millions of
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  Speaker 1: other people's location laws. I don't have a big enough
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  Speaker 1: company to take a trial, or spend ten to fifty
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  Speaker 1: thousand dollars to buy a huge database with the data
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  Speaker 1: of millions of people and me. The security researcher posted
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  Speaker 1: on tim timsc dot org. App developers may not even
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  Speaker 1: be aware of user data collection. The experiment included a
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  Speaker 1: single app when an old factory reset iPhone eleven and
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  Speaker 1: a proxy to record all traffic. The app was game
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  Speaker 1: made by catch App, which has published more than two
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  Speaker 1: hundred games in the app Store, but this part was
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  Speaker 1: not exceptional. Once the app was installed, it initially sent
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  Speaker 1: requests every split second. The requests, which included geolocation data
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  Speaker 1: and two hundred other data points, were sent directly to
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  Speaker 1: the provider of the software development kit used to create
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  Speaker 1: the game, in this case, the three D engine Unity.
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  Speaker 1: The researcher noted that the shared location was not precise
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  Speaker 1: because the iPhone had no SIM installed and was connected
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  Speaker 1: to wy fi. Facebook was another receiver requests with ips
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  Speaker 1: and timestamps, despite not having any meta apps installed or
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  Speaker 1: direct consent from the user. Because Tim asked the app
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  Speaker 1: not to track the advertising track tracking ID, one among
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  Speaker 1: the other two hundred keys was set to all zeros
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  Speaker 1: before reaching a final advertiser. The data flowed to a
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  Speaker 1: demand side platform, which in this case was Mollico Moloco.
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  Speaker 1: On its website, the company boasts an expensive reach of
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  Speaker 1: six point seven billion wild devices across more than one
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  Speaker 1: hundred and ninety countries. Many advertising solutions companies that offer
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  Speaker 1: real time bidding do the same. They connect advertisers with
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  Speaker 1: banner spaces, were also aggregating massive amounts of user data
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  Speaker 1: for better targeting. Need Bitter can then access parts of,
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  Speaker 1: even all of this data. Imagine a real ad exchange
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  Speaker 1: that bid normally and collects all the data along the
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  Speaker 1: way as a side gig. Basically, this is how intelligence
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  Speaker 1: companies and data brokers get their data. The researcher said.
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  Speaker 1: A quick search also reveals hundreds of data brokers to
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  Speaker 1: sell the collected data. Some even offer to match the
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  Speaker 1: advertising identifiers and provide real time updates. But my goal
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  Speaker 1: is to track and start people like myself or anyone else,
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  Speaker 1: So I need some way to exchange mace m aids,
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  Speaker 1: which is advertising IDs for the actual personal information name, address,
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  Speaker 1: phone number. No problem. The researchers shared that another company
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  Speaker 1: that provides this service was discovered. The provided data sample
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  Speaker 1: includes full names, emails, phone numbers, physical addresses, and other
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  Speaker 1: personal information linked to advertising IDs. What is your motive
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  Speaker 1: for tracking me,