Latest / Philosophy / 019 - XIX The Introspective Analysis of Perception
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter nineteen of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The Sleeperfox recording
- 0:05Speaker 1: is in the public domain. The Introspective Analysis of perception.
- 0:11Speaker 1: We have considered perception already from the behaviorist standpoint, and
- 0:15Speaker 1: also from that of physics. In the present chapter, we
- 0:18Speaker 1: are to consider it from the standpoint of self observation,
- 0:22Speaker 1: with a view to discovering as much as we can
- 0:24Speaker 1: about the intrinsic character of the event in us when
- 0:27Speaker 1: we perceive. I shall begin with certain traditional doctrines as
- 0:32Speaker 1: to mental events, and shall thence pass to the doctrines
- 0:36Speaker 1: that I wish to advocate. The words mind and matter
- 0:40Speaker 1: are used glibly, both by ordinary people and by philosophers,
- 0:45Speaker 1: without any adequate attempt at definition. Philosophers are much to
- 0:50Speaker 1: blame for this. My own feeling is that there is
- 0:53Speaker 1: not a sharp line, but a difference of degree. An
- 0:57Speaker 1: oyster is less mental than a man, but not wholly unmantal.
- 1:02Speaker 1: And I think mental is a character, like harmonious or discordant,
- 1:06Speaker 1: that cannot belong to a single entity in its own right,
- 1:10Speaker 1: but only to a system of entities. But before defending
- 1:14Speaker 1: this view, I wish to spend some time on the
- 1:17Speaker 1: theories that have been current in the past. Traditionally, there
- 1:21Speaker 1: are two ways of becoming aware that something exists, one
- 1:25Speaker 1: by the senses, the other by what is called introspection
- 1:29Speaker 1: or what Kant called the inner sense. By means of introspection,
- 1:34Speaker 1: it is maintained we become aware of occurrences quite different
- 1:38Speaker 1: in kind from those perceived through the outer senses. Occurrences
- 1:43Speaker 1: known through introspection are traditionally called mental, and so are
- 1:48Speaker 1: any other occurrences which intrinsically resemble them. Mental occurrences are
- 1:53Speaker 1: traditionally of three main types, called knowing, willing, and feeling.
- 1:59Speaker 1: Feeling in this connection means pleasure and unpleasure. We do
- 2:04Speaker 1: not say pleasure and pain because pain is an ambiguous word.
- 2:09Speaker 1: It may stand for painful sensation, as when you say
- 2:13Speaker 1: I have a pain in my tooth, or it may
- 2:16Speaker 1: stand for the unpleasant character of the sensation. Roughly, pleasure
- 2:21Speaker 1: is a quality which makes you want an experience to continue,
- 2:25Speaker 1: and unpleasure is the opposite quality, which makes you want
- 2:28Speaker 1: an experience to stop. However, I am not concerned to
- 2:32Speaker 1: enlarge upon feeling at present. As for the two other
- 2:37Speaker 1: kinds of mental occurrence, knowing and willing are recognized as
- 2:41Speaker 1: too narrow to describe what is meant. Philosophers wish to
- 2:45Speaker 1: include not only knowledge but also error, and not only
- 2:49Speaker 1: the sort of knowledge that is expressed in beliefs, but
- 2:53Speaker 1: also the sort that occurs in perception. The word cognition
- 2:57Speaker 1: or cognitive state is used to cover everything that could
- 3:01Speaker 1: possibly be described as either knowledge or error. Perception is
- 3:06Speaker 1: prima facie included, but pure sensation is more debatable. Willing
- 3:12Speaker 1: again is too narrow a term. A term is required
- 3:16Speaker 1: which will include desire and aversion, and generally those states
- 3:20Speaker 1: of mind which lead up to action. These are all
- 3:24Speaker 1: included under the head of conation, a technical term invented
- 3:29Speaker 1: for this special purpose. Cognition and conation both have in
- 3:34Speaker 1: the Orthodox theory, the property of being directed to an object.
- 3:39Speaker 1: What you perceive or believe, what you desire or will
- 3:43Speaker 1: is something different from your state of mind. To take instances,
- 3:48Speaker 1: you remember a past event, but your remembering occurs now.
- 3:53Speaker 1: Therefore your remembering is a different occurrence from what you remember.
- 3:58Speaker 1: You will to move your arm, but the movement is
- 4:00Speaker 1: a physical occurrence and therefore obviously different from your volition.
- 4:06Speaker 1: Many psychologists have taken this relation to an object as
- 4:10Speaker 1: the essential characteristic of mind, notably the two Austrians Brentano
- 4:15Speaker 1: and Manong. Sometimes feeling is also regarded as having an object.
- 4:21Speaker 1: It is held that we are pleased or displeased at something.
- 4:26Speaker 1: This view, however, has never won general acceptance, whereas the
- 4:30Speaker 1: view that cognition and conation are directed to objects may
- 4:34Speaker 1: be regarded as orthodox. It is undeniable that this characteristic
- 4:39Speaker 1: of being directed to objects is in some sense a
- 4:44Speaker 1: property of cognition and conation. But there is room for
- 4:47Speaker 1: great difference of opinion as to the proper analysis of
- 4:51Speaker 1: the property. I think we cannot hope to understand the
- 4:55Speaker 1: word mental until we have undertaken this analysis, and I
- 4:59Speaker 1: shall there therefore proceed to address myself to it. I
- 5:03Speaker 1: shall confine myself to cognition, which is more important for
- 5:07Speaker 1: our present purposes than conation. As regards cognition, though philosophers
- 5:13Speaker 1: have disagreed widely, I think that until recently most would
- 5:18Speaker 1: have assented to at least the following paragraph. Cognition is
- 5:23Speaker 1: of various sorts. Take as important kinds perception, memory, conception,
- 5:29Speaker 1: and beliefs involving concepts. Perception is the ordinary awareness of
- 5:34Speaker 1: sensible objects, seeing a table, hearing a piano, and so on.
- 5:40Speaker 1: Memory is awareness of a past occurrence. When this awareness
- 5:44Speaker 1: is direct, not inferred or derived from testimony, conception is
- 5:50Speaker 1: more difficult to characterize. One may say as a way
- 5:53Speaker 1: of pointing out what is intended that we conceive whenever
- 5:58Speaker 1: we understand the meaning of an an abstract word, or
- 6:01Speaker 1: think of that which is in fact the meaning of
- 6:04Speaker 1: the word. If you see a white patch of snow,
- 6:08Speaker 1: or recall it by means of images, you do not
- 6:10Speaker 1: have a concept. But if you think about whiteness, you
- 6:14Speaker 1: have a concept. Similarly, if after seeing a number of coins,
- 6:19Speaker 1: you think about roundness as a common characteristic of all
- 6:23Speaker 1: of them, you have a concept. The object of your
- 6:27Speaker 1: thought in such a case is a universal or platonic idea.
- 6:32Speaker 1: Every sentence must contain at least one word expressing a concept,
- 6:37Speaker 1: and therefore every belief that can be expressed in words
- 6:40Speaker 1: contains concepts. Each of these kinds of cognitive attitude involves
- 6:46Speaker 1: its own problems. In the present chapter, we are concerned
- 6:49Speaker 1: with perception. This has to be treated both introspectively and causally.
- 6:55Speaker 1: It is the introspective treatment that we now have to undertake.
- 7:00Speaker 1: When you have the experience called seeing a table. There
- 7:04Speaker 1: is a certain amount of difference between your unreflecting judgment
- 7:08Speaker 1: and what careful examination reveals as to the nature of
- 7:11Speaker 1: your experience. You judged that the table is rectangular, but
- 7:16Speaker 1: the patch of color in your visual field is not
- 7:19Speaker 1: a rectangle. When you learn to draw, you have to
- 7:22Speaker 1: draw the table as it really seems, and not as
- 7:25Speaker 1: it seems to seem. You have images of sensations of touch.
- 7:31Speaker 1: If you were to try to touch the table and
- 7:33Speaker 1: it turned out to be an optical illusion, you would
- 7:36Speaker 1: get a violent shock of surprise. You also have expectations
- 7:40Speaker 1: of a certain degree of permanence and weight. If you
- 7:44Speaker 1: went to lift the table, you would find your muscles
- 7:47Speaker 1: quite wrongly adjusted, if the table were much lighter than
- 7:50Speaker 1: it looked. All these elements must be included in the perception,
- 7:55Speaker 1: though not in the sensation. Sensation as opposed to is
- 8:01Speaker 1: more or less hypothetical. It is supposed to be the
- 8:04Speaker 1: core in the perception, which is solely due to the
- 8:08Speaker 1: stimulus and the sense organ not to past experience. When
- 8:12Speaker 1: you judge that the table is rectangular, it is past
- 8:16Speaker 1: experience that enables and compels you to do so. If
- 8:19Speaker 1: you had been born blind and just operated upon, you
- 8:22Speaker 1: could not make this judgment, nor would you have expectations
- 8:26Speaker 1: of hardness, et cetera. But none of this can be
- 8:29Speaker 1: discovered by introspection. From an introspective point of view, the
- 8:34Speaker 1: elements due to past experience are largely indistinguishable from those
- 8:39Speaker 1: due to the stimulus alone. One supposes that past experience
- 8:44Speaker 1: modifies the brain and thereby modifies the mental occurrence due
- 8:49Speaker 1: to the stimulus. The notion of sensation as opposed to
- 8:53Speaker 1: perception belongs therefore to the causal study of perception, not
- 8:58Speaker 1: to the introspective study. There is, however, a distinction to
- 9:03Speaker 1: be made here. You can discover by mere self observation
- 9:07Speaker 1: that visual objects are accompanied by expectations or images of touch,
- 9:13Speaker 1: and similarly, if you touch an object in the dark,
- 9:16Speaker 1: you will probably be led to form some visual image
- 9:19Speaker 1: of it. Here you can arrive at a certain degree
- 9:22Speaker 1: of analysis of your perception through the fact that images,
- 9:26Speaker 1: as a rule feel different from the immediate results of
- 9:30Speaker 1: a sensory stimulus. On the other hand, no amount of
- 9:34Speaker 1: introspection alone will reveal such things as the blind spot,
- 9:39Speaker 1: the filling in of a sensation by elements belonging to
- 9:43Speaker 1: the same sense is much less discoverable by introspection than
- 9:47Speaker 1: the filling in by associated images belonging to other senses. Thus,
- 9:52Speaker 1: although by introspection alone we could discover part of the
- 9:56Speaker 1: influence of experience on perception, there is another part whe
- 10:00Speaker 1: which we cannot discover in this way, remaining in the
- 10:04Speaker 1: introspective attitude, it is evident that the contents of our
- 10:08Speaker 1: minds at any given moment are very complex. Throughout our
- 10:13Speaker 1: normal waking life, we are always seen hearing and touching,
- 10:18Speaker 1: sometimes smelling and tasting, always having various bodily sensations, always
- 10:25Speaker 1: feeling pleasant or unpleasant feelings, usually both, always having desires
- 10:31Speaker 1: or aversions. We are not normally aware of all these items,
- 10:36Speaker 1: but we can become aware of any of them by
- 10:38Speaker 1: turning our attention in the right direction. I am not
- 10:42Speaker 1: at present discussing unconscious mental states, because they obviously can
- 10:48Speaker 1: only be known causally, and we are now considering what
- 10:52Speaker 1: can be known introspectively. There may be any number of
- 10:56Speaker 1: perceptions that cannot be known by introspection. The point for
- 11:00Speaker 1: us at the moment is that those that can be
- 11:03Speaker 1: discovered by introspection at any one time are many and various.
- 11:09Speaker 1: I do not wish just now to discuss the nature
- 11:12Speaker 1: of attention. I only wish to point out that it
- 11:15Speaker 1: enables us to take the first steps in abstraction. Out
- 11:20Speaker 1: of the whole multiplicity of objects of sense, it enables
- 11:24Speaker 1: us to single out a small selection, which is an
- 11:27Speaker 1: indispensable preliminary to abstraction. For example, attention will enable us
- 11:34Speaker 1: to discriminate a colored pattern which we are seen, and
- 11:37Speaker 1: to separate it from the other things we see, and
- 11:40Speaker 1: from images and other objects of sense and thoughts which
- 11:44Speaker 1: may exist simultaneously. For the sake of simplicity, let us
- 11:49Speaker 1: suppose that we discriminate a black and white pattern in
- 11:52Speaker 1: the form of a triangle. Within this pattern, we can
- 11:55Speaker 1: further discriminate sides and angles, and an inside and out. Said,
- 12:01Speaker 1: of course, the sides are not mathematical lines, nor the
- 12:04Speaker 1: angle's mathematical points. We now come to a question of
- 12:08Speaker 1: very great importance upon which our views of the relations
- 12:12Speaker 1: of mind and matter largely depend. The question is this,
- 12:18Speaker 1: what difference is there between the propositions? There is a
- 12:22Speaker 1: triangle and I see a triangle. Both these statements seem
- 12:28Speaker 1: as certain as any statement can be at least if
- 12:31Speaker 1: rightly interpreted, as always happens. In such cases, we are
- 12:36Speaker 1: quite certain of something, but not quite certain what it
- 12:40Speaker 1: is that we are certain of. I want to ask
- 12:43Speaker 1: whether this something that we are certain of is really
- 12:46Speaker 1: different in the above two statements, or whether the difference
- 12:49Speaker 1: between them is only as to surroundings of which we
- 12:52Speaker 1: are not certain. Most philosophers hold that there is a
- 12:56Speaker 1: difference in what we are certain of mock James Dewey,
- 13:00Speaker 1: The American realists, and I hold that the difference is
- 13:04Speaker 1: in the uncertain context. Let us examine this question. The
- 13:11Speaker 1: suggestions of the two statements I see a triangle and
- 13:15Speaker 1: there is a triangle are obviously different. The first dates
- 13:20Speaker 1: an event in my life and suggests its possible effects
- 13:23Speaker 1: upon me. The second aims at stating an event in
- 13:27Speaker 1: the world supposed to be equally discoverable by other people.
- 13:32Speaker 1: You might say there is a triangle if you had
- 13:35Speaker 1: seen it a moment ago, but now had your eyes shut.
- 13:38Speaker 1: In this case, you would not say I see a triangle.
- 13:42Speaker 1: On the other hand, one sometimes under the influence of
- 13:46Speaker 1: indigestion or fatigue, sees little black dots floating in the air.
- 13:51Speaker 1: In such circumstances, you would say I see a black dot,
- 13:55Speaker 1: but not there is a black dot. This illustration shows
- 14:00Speaker 1: that when you say there is a black dot, you
- 14:03Speaker 1: are making a stronger assertion than when you say I
- 14:06Speaker 1: see a black dot. In the other case, when you
- 14:09Speaker 1: say there is a triangle, because you saw it a
- 14:12Speaker 1: moment ago, though not now, you have three stages. First,
- 14:18Speaker 1: memory assures you of the proposition I saw a triangle,
- 14:22Speaker 1: and then you pass on to there was a triangle,
- 14:25Speaker 1: and then further to there is a triangle, because nothing
- 14:29Speaker 1: can have happened to destroy it so quickly. Here we
- 14:33Speaker 1: have obviously passed far beyond the region of immediate certainty.
- 14:38Speaker 1: It seems clear, therefore, that of our two statements, the
- 14:42Speaker 1: one which comes nearest to expressing the fact of which
- 14:45Speaker 1: we are immediately certain is I see a triangle, because
- 14:49Speaker 1: the other makes inferences to something public and thus goes
- 14:52Speaker 1: beyond the bare datum. This is on the assumption that
- 14:56Speaker 1: we should not say there is a black dot when
- 14:59Speaker 1: we see a black dot, which we attribute to eye trouble,
- 15:02Speaker 1: and therefore suppose that no one else can see it.
- 15:06Speaker 1: Let us therefore concentrate upon I see a triangle and
- 15:10Speaker 1: ask ourselves whether the whole of this or only part
- 15:13Speaker 1: can be accepted as a primitive certainty. A moment's reflection
- 15:18Speaker 1: shows that both eye and C are words which take
- 15:22Speaker 1: us beyond what the momentary event reveals. Take I to
- 15:26Speaker 1: begin with. This is a word whose meaning evidently depends
- 15:30Speaker 1: upon memory and expectation. I means the person who had
- 15:35Speaker 1: certain remembered experiences and is expected to have future experiences.
- 15:41Speaker 1: We might say I see a triangle now, and I
- 15:44Speaker 1: saw a square a moment ago. The word I has
- 15:48Speaker 1: exactly the same meaning in its two occurrences in this sentence,
- 15:52Speaker 1: and therefore evidently has a meaning dependent upon memory. Now,
- 15:57Speaker 1: it is our object to arrive at the contribution your knowledge,
- 16:00Speaker 1: which is made by seeing the triangle at the moment. Therefore,
- 16:05Speaker 1: since the word eye takes you beyond this contribution, we
- 16:09Speaker 1: must cut it out. If we want to find a
- 16:10Speaker 1: correct verbal expression for what is added to our knowledge
- 16:14Speaker 1: by seeing the triangle, we will say a triangle is
- 16:18Speaker 1: being seen. This is, at any rate, one step nearer
- 16:22Speaker 1: to what we are seeking. But now we must deal
- 16:26Speaker 1: with the word seen as ordinarily used. This is a
- 16:30Speaker 1: causal word, suggesting something dependent upon the eyes. In this sense.
- 16:36Speaker 1: It obviously involves a mass of previous experience. A newborn
- 16:40Speaker 1: baby does not know that what it sees depends upon
- 16:43Speaker 1: its eyes. However, we could eliminate this. Obviously all objects
- 16:49Speaker 1: of sight have a common quality which no objects of
- 16:53Speaker 1: touch or hearing have. A visual object is different from
- 16:57Speaker 1: an auditory object, and so on. There, instead of saying
- 17:01Speaker 1: a triangle is being seen, we should say there is
- 17:05Speaker 1: a visual triangle. Of course, the meanings of the words
- 17:09Speaker 1: visual and triangle can only be learnt by experience, but
- 17:13Speaker 1: they are not logically dependent upon experience. A being could
- 17:18Speaker 1: be imagined which would know the words at birth. Such
- 17:21Speaker 1: a being could express its datum in the words there
- 17:24Speaker 1: is a visual triangle. In any case, the problems remaining
- 17:29Speaker 1: belong to the study of concepts. We will therefore ignore
- 17:33Speaker 1: them at present. Now, in English, the words there is
- 17:38Speaker 1: are ambiguous. When I use them before saying there is
- 17:42Speaker 1: a triangle, I meant them in the sense of voila
- 17:46Speaker 1: or da east. Now I mean them in the sense
- 17:49Speaker 1: of ilia or esgueept. One might express what is meant
- 17:55Speaker 1: by saying a visual triangle exists, but the word exist
- 18:00Speaker 1: as all sorts of metaphysical connotations that I wish to avoid.
- 18:05Speaker 1: Perhaps it is best to say occurs. We have now
- 18:09Speaker 1: arrived at something which is just as true when your
- 18:11Speaker 1: perception is illusory as when it is correct. If you
- 18:16Speaker 1: say a visual black dot is occurring, you are speaking
- 18:20Speaker 1: the truth. If there is one in your field of vision.
- 18:23Speaker 1: We have eliminated the suggestion that others could see it,
- 18:26Speaker 1: or that it could be touched, or that it is
- 18:28Speaker 1: composed of matter in the sense of physics. All these
- 18:33Speaker 1: suggestions are present when one says in ordinary conversation, there
- 18:37Speaker 1: is a black dot. They are intended to be eliminated
- 18:41Speaker 1: by the addition of the word visual and the substitution
- 18:44Speaker 1: of is occurring. For there is by these means we
- 18:48Speaker 1: have arrived at what is indubitable and intrinsic. In the
- 18:52Speaker 1: addition to your knowledge derived from a visual datum. We
- 18:56Speaker 1: must now ask ourselves once more, is there still a
- 18:59Speaker 1: distinction within what is immediate and intrinsic between the occurrence
- 19:04Speaker 1: of a visual datum and the cognition of it. Can
- 19:08Speaker 1: we say, on the basis of immediate experience, not only
- 19:12Speaker 1: a visual black dot occurs, but also a visual black
- 19:17Speaker 1: dot is cognized. My feeling is that we cannot. When
- 19:23Speaker 1: we say that it is cognized, we seem to me
- 19:26Speaker 1: to mean that it is part of an experience, That
- 19:29Speaker 1: is to say, that it can be remembered, or can
- 19:32Speaker 1: modify our habits, or generally can have what are called
- 19:36Speaker 1: mnemic effects. All this takes us beyond the immediate experience
- 19:41Speaker 1: into the realm of causal relations. I see no reason
- 19:45Speaker 1: to think that there is any duality of subject an
- 19:48Speaker 1: object in the occurrence itself, or that it can be
- 19:51Speaker 1: properly described as a case of knowledge. It gives rise
- 19:56Speaker 1: to knowledge through memory and through conscious or uncon conscious
- 20:00Speaker 1: inferences to the common correlates of such data, but in
- 20:04Speaker 1: itself it is not knowledge and has no duality. The
- 20:08Speaker 1: datum is a datum equally for physics and for psychology.
- 20:12Speaker 1: It is a meeting point of the two. It is
- 20:15Speaker 1: neither mental nor physical, just as a single name is
- 20:19Speaker 1: neither in alphabetical order nor in order of precedence, but
- 20:23Speaker 1: it is part of the raw material of both the
- 20:26Speaker 1: mental and the physical worlds. This is the theory which
- 20:30Speaker 1: is called neutral monism, and is the one that I
- 20:34Speaker 1: believe to be true. End of Chapter nineteen