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12 - Phaedrus - Plato · Logic Library

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  Section twelve. M Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul. And therefore
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  he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls.
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  They are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the
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  differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he
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  will next divide speeches into their different classes. Such and such persons, he
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  will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or
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  that way, And he will tell you why. The pupil must have a
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  good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them
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  in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about
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  him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But
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  when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person
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  about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that
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  it is he, and can say to himself, this is the man,
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  or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him
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  in order to convince him of a certain opinion. He who knows all this,
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  and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and
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  when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all
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  the other modes of speech which he has learned. When I say he knows
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  the times and seasons of all these things, then and not till then he
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  is a perfect master of his art. But if he fail in any of
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  these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares
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  that he speaks by rules of art, he who says I don't believe you
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  has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this
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  fidrous? And Socrates, your account of the so called art of rhetoric?
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  Or am I to look for another? He must take this, Socrates,
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  for there is no possibility of another. And yet the creation of so an
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  art is not easy, very true. And therefore let us consider this matter
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  in every light, and see whether we cannot find a shorter and easier road.
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  There is no use in taking a long, rough roundabout way if there
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  be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try,
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  and remember whether you have heard from Lysias or any one else, anything which
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  might be of service to us. If trying would avail, then I might
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  But at the moment I can think of nothing. Suppose I tell you something
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  which somebody who knows told me certainly may not the wolf, as the proverb
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  says, claimer hearing, do you say what can be said for him?
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  He will argue that there is no use in putting a solemn face on these
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  matters, or in going round and round until you arrive at first principles.
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  For as I said at first, when the question is of justice or good,
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  or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good,
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  either by nature or habit, he who would be a skillful rhetorician has
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  no need of truth, for that in courts of law men literally care nothing
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  about truth, but only about conviction. And this is based on probability,
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  to which he who would be a skillful orator should therefore give his whole attention.
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  And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts,
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  if they are improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should
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  be told, either in accusation or defense, and that always in speaking the
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  orator should keep probability in view and say goodbye to the truth. And the
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  observation of this principle throughout a speech vurnishes the whole art. That is what
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  the professors of rhetoric do actually say. Socrates, I have not forgotten that
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  we have quite briefly touched upon this matter already with them. The point is
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  all important. I dare say that you are familiar with Tissias. Does he
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  not define probability to be that which the many think? Certainly he does.
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  I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort. He
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  supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one,
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  and to have robbed him of his coat, or of something or other.
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  He is brought into court, and then Tissias says that both parties should tell
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  lies. The coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one.
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  The other should prove that they were alone, and should argue, thus,
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  how could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him?
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  The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore
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  invent some other lie, which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting.
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  And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in
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  the system. Am I not right Fidrus, certainly bless me. What a
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  wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisseias, or some other gentleman in whatever name
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  or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him?
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  Or not? What shall we say to him? Let us tell him
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  that before he appeared you and I were saying that the probability of which he
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  speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth.
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  And we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always
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  know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything
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  else to say about the art of speaking, we should like to hear him.
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  But if not, we are satisfied with our own view that unless a
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  man estimates the various characters of his hearers, and is able to divide all
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  things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas, he will never be
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  a skillful rhetorician, even within the limits of human power. And this skill
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  he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man
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  ought to undergo, not for the sake of speak, seeking and acting before
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  men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable
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  to God, and always to act acceptably to Him, as far as in
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  him lies. For there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that
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  a man of sense should not try to please his fellow servants. At least
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  this should not be his first object, but his good and noble masters.
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  And therefore, if the way is long and secuitous, marvel not at this,
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  For where the end is great, there we may take the longer road,
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  but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may
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  say, tisse Us, that if you do not mind, go so far,
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  rhetoric has a fair beginning here. I think Socrates that this is admirable,
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  if only practicable. But even to fail in an honorable object is honorable
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  true. End of Section twelve.