Latest / ACLED Audio / REPORT: The US’ Donroe Doctrine is reshaping conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Transcript

REPORT: The US’ Donroe Doctrine is reshaping conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean. · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_00: The US's Donro Doctrine is reshaping conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
• 0:11
  SPEAKER_00: The US has escalated its use of direct military force with governments it perceives as failing to meet its policy objectives.
• 0:19
  SPEAKER_00: But direct military interventions are less likely during the remainder of President Donald Trump's administration, which favors bilateral agreements or forced negotiations secured through pressure and threats.
• 0:31
  SPEAKER_00: U.S.
• 0:31
  SPEAKER_00: pressure on organized crime is accelerating the spread of militarized security approaches in the region, which has had knock-on effects.
• 0:39
  SPEAKER_00: The number and lethality of clashes between security forces and armed groups have surged, and the approach has fostered an environment of impunity for security forces.
• 0:49
  SPEAKER_00: Violence has decreased in areas where criminal groups have more limited resources, but gangs have responded by relocating, scaling back visible activities, and turning to selective forms of violence.
• 1:01
  SPEAKER_00: Armed groups have fragmented, increasing competition in countries where organized crime groups' revenue sources are more diversified.
• 1:09
  SPEAKER_00: The spread of militarized security policies is likely to continue in 2026, as governments pursue symbolic victories over criminal networks and hardline security strategies continue to feature prominently in electoral promises in countries holding elections this year.
• 1:25
  SPEAKER_00: Growing volatility in the organized crime ecosystem will likely fuel an increase in violence throughout the rest of Trump's term, potentially undermining any short-term improvements achieved through hardline approaches.
• 1:37
  SPEAKER_00: Since the start of President Donald Trump's second term, the United States has stepped up its diplomatic and military engagement with Latin American and Caribbean countries.
• 1:46
  SPEAKER_00: After removing Maduro from power in January 2026, the U.S.
• 1:51
  SPEAKER_00: has been threatening Cuba's Raúl Castro with a similar military intervention.
• 1:56
  SPEAKER_00: The Trump administration's activity in the region has been underpinned by its national security strategy, which outlines how the U.S.
• 2:03
  SPEAKER_00: plans to protect itself from threats such as hostile foreign influence and drug trafficking, and how it can secure access to strategic resources, operationalizing the so-called Donro Doctrine.
• 2:15
  SPEAKER_00: In its essence, the National Security Strategy reasserts the Western Hemisphere as the U.S.'s priority sphere of influence.
• 2:23
  SPEAKER_00: It describes a set of principles that shape Washington's relationships with governments across Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as its instruments of influence, which range from cooperation with ideologically aligned governments to direct military force.
• 2:38
  SPEAKER_00: Yet more than a year since Trump assumed office for the second time, this strategy is yielding mixed results and is unlikely to dismantle organized crime groups' operations and curb drug trafficking flows sustainably.
• 2:51
  SPEAKER_00: Militarized security policies throughout the region, further encouraged by the Trump administration, have contributed to the fragmentation and growing resilience of criminal groups.
• 3:01
  SPEAKER_00: While these policies are likely to generate short-term gains, they also risk making criminal threats more dispersed and harder to contain as groups spread to new areas, including across borders, lower the visibility of their operations, or resort to remote violence to minimize losses.
• 3:18
  SPEAKER_00: These criminal groups' adaptation points to context-specific conflict patterns that cannot be addressed with military force alone.
• 3:26
  SPEAKER_00: It also risks heightening civilians' exposure to violence, including by security forces, as militarized security policies weaken human rights oversight mechanisms and enable states' excessive use of force.
• 3:39
  SPEAKER_00: From Collaboration to Coercion, the U.S.
• 3:42
  SPEAKER_00: toolkit of influence in the region.
• 3:44
  SPEAKER_00: Since the beginning of Trump's second term in January 2025, the administration has relied on a three-pronged approach to advance its strategic priorities.
• 3:54
  SPEAKER_00: First, it has fostered security cooperation with ideologically aligned governments.
• 3:59
  SPEAKER_00: Second, it has projected its influence through multilateral bodies and non-traditional actors such as private military companies.
• 4:06
  SPEAKER_00: Finally, it has escalated to threats of economic sanctions and using direct military force on governments perceived as strategically important but unwilling to align with U.S.
• 4:16
  SPEAKER_00: strategic priorities.
• 4:18
  SPEAKER_00: In line with the National Security Strategy's principles of burden sharing and burden shifting, the U.S.
• 4:24
  SPEAKER_00: has made use of non-coercive interventions by delegating security responsibilities to ideologically aligned governments whenever possible, while increasing U.S.
• 4:34
  SPEAKER_00: military presence on the ground and signing bilateral security agreements across the region.
• 4:40
  SPEAKER_00: For example, on March 3rd, Ecuador and the U.S.
• 4:43
  SPEAKER_00: announced the launch of joint military operations, although thus far, the U.S.
• 4:48
  SPEAKER_00: has mainly provided logistical and intelligence support to Ecuadorian ground operations.
• 4:54
  SPEAKER_00: The Trump administration has further sought to enlist stability champions, actively endorsing like-minded political leaders during electoral processes and creating the Shield of the Americas on March 7th, a multinational coalition aimed at fostering security cooperation across the Western Hemisphere.
• 5:12
  SPEAKER_00: In parallel, the U.S.
• 5:13
  SPEAKER_00: has indirectly influenced security developments, promoting the establishment of the gang suppression force in Haiti, while paving the way for defense contractor and Trump supporter Eric Prince's ongoing or prospective operations in Haiti, Ecuador, and Peru, and even considering using private companies to protect oil infrastructures in Venezuela.
• 5:34
  SPEAKER_00: Yet the Trump administration has also used direct military force to coerce governments that failed to meet its demands.
• 5:41
  SPEAKER_00: In Venezuela, Washington proceeded with a military operation to remove Maduro after oil sanctions, a blockade on oil exports, and the seizure of six oil tankers failed to coerce the government into accepting Trump's requests, which included regime change, greater U.S.
• 5:57
  SPEAKER_00: access to critical Venezuelan resources, and a reduced presence of competing powers such as China and Russia.
• 6:04
  SPEAKER_00: While the intervention in Venezuela highlighted the U.S.'s readiness to use military force, the swift nature of the operation also suggests that the Trump administration is willing to pursue military action when it perceives them as low-cost push-and-pull interventions.
• 6:20
  SPEAKER_00: The same calculus has likely driven the decision to carry out over 50 strikes against boats suspected of trafficking drugs in the Caribbean and Pacific waters that killed around 190 people.
• 6:32
  SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
• 6:35
  SPEAKER_00: These operations have allowed the U.S.
• 6:37
  SPEAKER_00: to project steadfast counter-drug actions against criminal groups it has defined as foreign terrorist organizations, without sustained engagement or significant risks, while boosting the credibility of U.S.
• 6:50
  SPEAKER_00: military threats.
• 6:51
  SPEAKER_00: Yet the use of direct military force in Venezuela remains an outlier thus far.
• 6:57
  SPEAKER_00: The Trump administration has leveled threats of military interventions at several countries since taking office, and some governments in the region have managed to temporarily defuse them by conceding to U.S.
• 7:08
  SPEAKER_00: demands.
• 7:09
  SPEAKER_00: The Cuban government's engagement in backchannel negotiations with Washington, which has pressured the island to introduce economic reforms and curb foreign influence through a blockade on oil imports to asphyxiate the country's economy, has thus far delayed prospects for military intervention.
• 7:26
  SPEAKER_00: U.S.
• 7:27
  SPEAKER_00: pressure is effectively prompting local government's compliance.
• 7:31
  SPEAKER_00: The Trump administration has been successful in ensuring that many governments meet its demands to rein in the footprint of other foreign powers.
• 7:38
  SPEAKER_00: To wit, Panama has canceled port concessions to a Hong Kong-based company to scale down China's presence in its canal, while Venezuela's Delcive Rodriguez has put the country's oil and mineral resources at the U.S.
• 7:51
  SPEAKER_00: disposal, curtailing China's influence in these sectors.
• 7:55
  SPEAKER_00: Most governments also heeded Washington's call to share the burden and step up military confrontations with organized crime groups.
• 8:03
  SPEAKER_00: This tendency is likely to continue in 2026, as hardline security policies remain politically attractive.
• 8:11
  SPEAKER_00: They have featured as a recurrent electoral promise in countries with elections in 2026, including Costa Rica, Colombia, and Peru.
• 8:20
  SPEAKER_00: These policies also allow governments to claim symbolic victories against criminal organizations, even as they demonstrate compliance with U.S.
• 8:28
  SPEAKER_00: demands.
• 8:29
  SPEAKER_00: A militarized security approach is likely to lead to a drop in gang violence during the remainder of Trump's term in countries where executive powers are highly centralized, judicial constraints are weak, and gangs are less sophisticated and scattered around smaller territories.
• 8:46
  SPEAKER_00: However, it will also lead to deadlier clashes between security forces and criminal groups, along with more leeway for security forces to target civilians, increasing populations' exposure to conflict in the immediate term.
• 9:00
  SPEAKER_00: Even before Trump began his second term, a growing number of Latin American and Caribbean countries were resorting to emergency measures and militarized responses to fight organized crime in the region, largely drawing on the popularity and apparent success of President Naeb Bukele's policies in El Salvador.
• 9:17
  SPEAKER_00: Under these measures, which usually involve suspending some civil rights, military forces are often more involved in public security operations and prison management, contributing to an increase in confrontations between security forces and criminal groups.
• 9:32
  SPEAKER_00: The Trump administration's push for a steadfast response to drug trafficking organizations only accelerated this pre-existing trend, swaying some governments, particularly those with greater ideological affinity, into aligning with Washington's approach.
• 9:48
  SPEAKER_00: For example, Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru have designated certain gangs and cartels as terrorist organizations.
• 9:56
  SPEAKER_00: Meanwhile, conservative forces in Brazil have been lobbying Washington to include Brazilian gangs such as First Capital Command and Red Command in the U.S.
• 10:05
  SPEAKER_00: list of foreign terrorist organizations.
• 10:08
  SPEAKER_00: Some countries have even offered their territory as an operating ground for the U.S.
• 10:12
  SPEAKER_00: military.
• 10:13
  SPEAKER_00: Trinidad and Tobago allowed the U.S.
• 10:16
  SPEAKER_00: to install radar that supported the operation to arrest and extract Maduro.
• 10:21
  SPEAKER_00: Facing U.S.
• 10:22
  SPEAKER_00: threats of tariffs or even direct intervention, countries with progressive governments have also intensified military operations against armed groups, even if they had previously favored addressing violence through prevention initiatives or negotiations.
• 10:37
  SPEAKER_00: As a result, state-led offensives in Mexico and Colombia and the subsequent armed groups' retaliation drove an 18% uptick in clashes between security forces and armed groups across Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025.
• 10:53
  SPEAKER_00: Refer to the graph in the report for details.
• 10:56
  SPEAKER_00: In fact, Colombia's president Gustavo Petro had resumed military pressure against groups that had not made progress in negotiations since mid-2024.
• 11:08
  SPEAKER_00: But after a meeting with Trump in February 2026 amid heightened bilateral tensions, Petro further intensified military operations and airstrikes against armed actors both governments identified as priority targets, including the general central staff dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, and the National Liberation Army, ELN.
• 11:31
  SPEAKER_00: Similarly, Mexico's president Claudia Scheinbaum had already shied away from her predecessor's hugs not bullets policy since taking office in October 2024.
• 11:41
  SPEAKER_00: In 2025, she stepped up the military deployments, extraditions, and operations against cartels to appease Washington, prompting over 1,000 clashes between security forces and criminal groups that year, the most since 2019.
• 11:56
  SPEAKER_00: Scheinbaum has also accepted greater coordination with U.S.
• 12:00
  SPEAKER_00: forces, as long as operations remained under Mexico's leadership, as happened in the February 2026 operation that led to the killing of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel's leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho.
• 12:16
  SPEAKER_00: This strategy has helped Mexico avoid direct U.S.
• 12:19
  SPEAKER_00: strikes on its soil.
• 12:21
  SPEAKER_00: However, the reported death of two CIA agents participating in a raid alongside Chihuahua police forces in April has opened the debate about suspected CIA operations bypassing agreements with Mexico's federal authorities.
• 12:36
  SPEAKER_00: Not only is Trump fostering a hardline response to crime across the region, but his apparent disregard for international law and human rights standards is breeding a climate of impunity that has contributed to an overall rise in the lethality of state interventions.
• 12:51
  SPEAKER_00: The deadliness of security operations across the region has been rising significantly, totaling almost 6,900 people reportedly killed in 2025, the highest since 2018.
• 13:03
  SPEAKER_00: Refer to the graph in the report for details.
• 13:06
  SPEAKER_00: Forms of remote violence, namely aerial bombardments and, in the case of Haiti, the use of drones by a special task force, have exposed civilians to shelling and caused the number of people killed from clashes between security forces and gangs to skyrocket.
• 13:23
  SPEAKER_00: Organized crime groups adapt to U.S.
• 13:25
  SPEAKER_00: sponsored military pressure.
• 13:27
  SPEAKER_00: In some countries, the implementation of militarized security policies in states of emergency has coincided with a decrease in violence levels in 2025, including in Jamaica, Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago.
• 13:40
  SPEAKER_00: Domestic authorities have been quick to interpret reductions in violence as decisive blows to criminal groups.
• 13:47
  SPEAKER_00: However, patterns across the region indicate that rather than being dismantled, criminal groups have adapted to their new environment, including relocating across borders, opting for less visible forms of violence, or selective targeting through the use of explosives and weaponized drones.
• 14:03
  SPEAKER_00: In Haiti, gangs in Port-au-Prince have avoided direct confrontations with security forces who have gained a tactical advantage by increasingly using drones.
• 14:12
  SPEAKER_00: However, the gangs have also stepped up kidnappings for ransom, a practice they had scaled down in recent years, and spread into new territories to accumulate more resources before the gang suppression force is fully deployed.
• 14:26
  SPEAKER_00: In countries where organized crime groups' revenue sources are most diversified, the spread of militarized security strategies has led to counterproductive results, such as group fragmentation and intensified competition.
• 14:39
  SPEAKER_00: One significant case is Ecuador, where the capture or killing of gang leaders has led to the atomization of gangs, with 37 active groups in 2025, up from 24 in 2023.
• 14:52
  SPEAKER_00: Furthermore, the weakening of Los Choneros after the extradition of its leader, Jose Adolfo Macías Villamar, known as Fito, in mid-2025, was exploited by Los Lobos Gang to make inroads in its rival strongholds, contributing to an escalation of violence.
• 15:09
  SPEAKER_00: In Mexico, the killing of El Mencho risks reshaping the country's criminal landscape by triggering intra-cartel infighting, similar to what happened to the Sinaloa cartel after the capture of El Mayo, and altering the cartel's alliances in conflict settings such as Michoacan.
• 15:26
  SPEAKER_00: At the same time, armed groups in Mexico and Colombia have turned to weaponized drones to target security forces, in an effort to maximize the impact of their attacks while minimizing the costs of a direct confrontation.
• 15:39
  SPEAKER_00: In Mexico, attacks with drones have spiked since 2024, and in Colombia, ECLED records at least 107 drone attacks by FARC dissidents and the ELN against security forces in 2025, a more than 200% increase compared with 2024.
• 15:57
  SPEAKER_00: Refer to the graph in the report for details.
• 16:01
  SPEAKER_00: Mounting military pressure from the U.S.
• 16:03
  SPEAKER_00: and regional governments may also have unintended consequences.
• 16:07
  SPEAKER_00: First, accusations of abuse and corruption are eroding citizens' trust and security forces, particularly regional militaries.
• 16:16
  SPEAKER_00: In 2025, ACLED records 495 cases of civilian targeting by state forces across the region, with rising reports of extrajudicial killings, particularly in Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil, as well as of abductions and sexual abuses.
• 16:33
  SPEAKER_00: This, combined with prison overcrowding and gangs' efforts to grow or at least minimize losses, can push ever more youngsters, particularly minors, into the hands of criminal organizations, in search of power, opportunities, and protection.
• 16:49
  SPEAKER_00: Second, it is diverting illicit revenue flows to new areas.
• 16:53
  SPEAKER_00: Some reports suggest that U.S.
• 16:54
  SPEAKER_00: strikes against suspected drug trafficking vessels have indeed dented the maritime cocaine trade in the Caribbean, but intensified the drug flow along the Amazon basin, from Colombia to Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil.
• 17:08
  SPEAKER_00: Although the route is not new, this ever more thriving drug corridor risks further fueling violence in northern Brazil.
• 17:15
  SPEAKER_00: In Ecuador, criminal gangs have continued to ship drugs to Central America through co-opted fishermen, but they have also increased the rate of shipping to compensate for the heightened risks fishermen face amid deliberate U.S.
• 17:27
  SPEAKER_00: strikes along the route.
• 17:29
  SPEAKER_00: In addition, a large portion of the cocaine that reaches U.S.
• 17:32
  SPEAKER_00: and European shores is shipped through cargo vessels, whose operations have been left unscathed by U.S.
• 17:38
  SPEAKER_00: engagement in the region.
• 17:40
  SPEAKER_00: Finally, the U.S.
• 17:41
  SPEAKER_00: focus on interdicting drug trafficking activities overlooks the fact that illegal gold mining has become the primary source of revenue for many organized crime groups in South America.
• 17:52
  SPEAKER_00: Undoubtedly, the Trump administration will continue to prioritize security matters in Latin America and the Caribbean throughout the rest of its term, using direct military force or relying on strategic partners across the region to curb drug trafficking flows, secure strategic resources, or oust foreign powers.
• 18:11
  SPEAKER_00: However, while kinetic actions may yield some tactical results in scaling down gang and drug trafficking activities in the Caribbean, criminal organizations are unlikely to be dismantled.
• 18:22
  SPEAKER_00: Instead, they will continue to adapt and innovate their illicit activities, diversifying their economic portfolio, diverting their trafficking routes, and with it expanding their operations to new areas, and resorting to more covert and remote forms of violence.
• 18:39
  SPEAKER_00: Thus, we expect that security pressure and militarized approaches alone will do little to curb violent competition over illicit economies across Latin America and the Caribbean, while significantly raising the cost on the civilian population, who are caught not only in between armed group warfare, but also in the expanding use of extrajudicial violence and abuses by security forces.
• 19:03
  SPEAKER_00: This report was written by Sandra Pellegrini and Tiziano Breda, Acclaid's senior analyst for Latin America and the Caribbean.