Latest / Philosophy / 021 - XXI Emotion Desire and Will
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twenty one of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The sleeprivox
- 0:04Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain emotion, desire, and will
- 0:09Speaker 1: hitherto in our investigation of man from within. We have
- 0:13Speaker 1: considered only the cognitive aspect, which is in fact the
- 0:17Speaker 1: most important philosophy. But now we must turn our attention
- 0:20Speaker 1: to the other sides of human nature. If we treat
- 0:24Speaker 1: them more briefly than the cognitive side, it is not
- 0:27Speaker 1: because they are less important, but because their main importance
- 0:30Speaker 1: is practical and our task is theoretical. Let us begin
- 0:35Speaker 1: with emotions. The theory of the emotions has been radically
- 0:39Speaker 1: transformed by the discovery of the part played by the
- 0:42Speaker 1: ductless glands. Cannon's Bodily Changes in Pain, hunger, fear, and
- 0:48Speaker 1: Rage is a book whose teaching has come to be
- 0:51Speaker 1: widely known, though not more so than its importance warrants.
- 0:56Speaker 1: It appears that certain secretions from the glands into the
- 0:59Speaker 1: blood ud or the essential physiological conditions of the emotions.
- 1:04Speaker 1: Some people say that the physiological changes correlated with these
- 1:08Speaker 1: secretions are the emotions. I think this view must be
- 1:12Speaker 1: received with some caution, as everyone knows the adrenal glands
- 1:17Speaker 1: secrete adrenin, which produces the bodily symptoms of fear or rage.
- 1:23Speaker 1: On one occasion, my dentist injected a considerable amount of
- 1:27Speaker 1: this substance into my blood in the course of administering
- 1:30Speaker 1: a local anesthetic. I turned pale and trembled, and my
- 1:34Speaker 1: heart beat violently. The bodily symptoms of fear were present,
- 1:39Speaker 1: as the book said they should be, but it was
- 1:41Speaker 1: quite obvious to me that I was not actually feeling fear.
- 1:46Speaker 1: I should have had the same bodily symptoms in the
- 1:48Speaker 1: presence of a tyrant about to condemn me to death,
- 1:51Speaker 1: but there would have been something extra which was absent
- 1:55Speaker 1: when I was in the dentist's chair. What was different
- 1:58Speaker 1: was the cognitive part. I did not feel fear because
- 2:02Speaker 1: I knew there was nothing to be afraid of. In
- 2:05Speaker 1: normal life, the adrenal glands are stimulated by the perception
- 2:09Speaker 1: of an object which is frightful or enraging. Thus there
- 2:13Speaker 1: is already a cognitive element present. The fear or rage
- 2:17Speaker 1: attaches itself to the object which has stimulated the glands,
- 2:21Speaker 1: and the full emotion arises. But when adrenain is artificially administered,
- 2:26Speaker 1: this cognitive element is absent, and the emotion in its
- 2:30Speaker 1: entirety fails to arise. Probably if it were administered in sleep,
- 2:35Speaker 1: it would produce a dream of terror, in which the
- 2:38Speaker 1: dreamer's imagination would supply an object for fear. The same
- 2:43Speaker 1: thing might happen on waking life with animals or young children,
- 2:47Speaker 1: but with an adult of average rationality, the knowledge that
- 2:51Speaker 1: there is nothing to be afraid of inhibits the full
- 2:54Speaker 1: development of the emotion. Fear and rage are both active emotions,
- 3:00Speaker 1: demanding a certain kind of behavior towards an object. When
- 3:04Speaker 1: this behavior is obviously not called for, it is impossible
- 3:08Speaker 1: to feel either emotion fully. There are, however, other emotions,
- 3:13Speaker 1: such as melancholy, which do not demand an object. These,
- 3:18Speaker 1: presumably can be caused in their entirety by administering the
- 3:22Speaker 1: proper secretions. A disordered liver may cause melancholy, which is
- 3:26Speaker 1: not relieved by knowledge of its source. The emotions which
- 3:31Speaker 1: do not require an object are those which do not
- 3:34Speaker 1: call for any appropriate line of action. Emotions are subject
- 3:38Speaker 1: to conditioning, so that the stimuli which call them out
- 3:42Speaker 1: become more various. As a result of experience, Doctor Watson
- 3:47Speaker 1: has found only two original stimuli to fear in young infants,
- 3:51Speaker 1: namely loud noises and lack of support. But anything associated
- 3:56Speaker 1: with either of these may become terrifying. The separation of
- 4:01Speaker 1: an emotional element in our integral reaction to a situation
- 4:05Speaker 1: is more or less artificial. No doubt, there is a
- 4:09Speaker 1: definite physiological concomitant, namely stimulation of a gland. But fear,
- 4:15Speaker 1: for example, involves a mode of action towards an object,
- 4:19Speaker 1: for which mode of action the secretion of a dreamin
- 4:22Speaker 1: is helpful. There is, however, something in common among a
- 4:26Speaker 1: number of occasions that have a given emotional tone. This
- 4:30Speaker 1: may be seen from the fact that they are associated.
- 4:34Speaker 1: When we are feeling some emotion strongly, we tend to
- 4:37Speaker 1: think of other occasions when we have had similar feelings.
- 4:41Speaker 1: Association by means of emotional similarity is a characteristic of
- 4:45Speaker 1: a great deal of poetry, and this accounts for the
- 4:49Speaker 1: fact that if our blood is in a state usually
- 4:52Speaker 1: associated with terror, we shall, if our critical faculty is
- 4:56Speaker 1: in abeyance, be very likely to imagine some cause of
- 5:00Speaker 1: so vividly as to believe that it is really present
- 5:04Speaker 1: In the night imagining some fear, how easy is a
- 5:08Speaker 1: bush supposed to bear? But in a rational man if
- 5:12Speaker 1: he is not drunk or sleepy. Other associations are too
- 5:16Speaker 1: strong for this production of imaginary terrors. That is why
- 5:21Speaker 1: it is possible to show the physical symptoms of fear
- 5:24Speaker 1: under the influence of adrenin without actually feeling the emotion.
- 5:29Speaker 1: The emotions are what make life interesting and what makes
- 5:32Speaker 1: us feel it important. From this point of view, they
- 5:36Speaker 1: are the most valuable element in human existence. But when,
- 5:40Speaker 1: as in philosophy, we are trying to understand the world,
- 5:44Speaker 1: they appear rather as a hindrance. They generate irrational opinions.
- 5:49Speaker 1: Since emotional associations seldom correspond with collocations in the external world.
- 5:56Speaker 1: They cause us to view the universe in the mirror
- 5:58Speaker 1: of our moods as now bright, now dim according to
- 6:02Speaker 1: the state of the mirror. With the sole exception of curiosity,
- 6:06Speaker 1: the emotions are on the whole a hindrance to the
- 6:09Speaker 1: intellectual life, though the degree of vigor required for successful
- 6:14Speaker 1: thinking is likely to be correlated with a considerable susceptibility
- 6:18Speaker 1: to emotion. If I say little about the emotions in
- 6:22Speaker 1: this book, it is not from underestimating their human importance,
- 6:27Speaker 1: but solely because the task upon which we are engaged
- 6:30Speaker 1: is theoretical rather than practical to understand the world, not
- 6:35Speaker 1: to change it. And if emotion determines the ends we
- 6:39Speaker 1: shall pursue, knowledge is what gives us the power to
- 6:42Speaker 1: realize them. Even from the practical point of view, the
- 6:47Speaker 1: advancement of knowledge is more useful than anything else that
- 6:50Speaker 1: lies within human power. I come now to the subject
- 6:55Speaker 1: of desire, which we considered from a behaviourist standpoint in
- 6:59Speaker 1: chapter three. I want now to ask whether there is
- 7:02Speaker 1: anything to be added from an introspective point of view.
- 7:07Speaker 1: Let us again remind ourselves that there is an element
- 7:10Speaker 1: of artificiality in isolating elements within the one process leading
- 7:15Speaker 1: from stimulus to reaction. Whenever a stimulus produces a reaction,
- 7:21Speaker 1: we may consider the reaction as the effect of the
- 7:23Speaker 1: stimulus or as the cause of further effects. The former
- 7:28Speaker 1: is the natural way of viewing the reaction when we
- 7:31Speaker 1: are concerned with knowledge. The latter is the natural way
- 7:35Speaker 1: when we are concerned with desire and will. In desire,
- 7:39Speaker 1: we wish to change something in our selves or in
- 7:42Speaker 1: our environment, or both. The question is what can we
- 7:46Speaker 1: discover introspectively about desire. I think that here, as in
- 7:52Speaker 1: the case of knowledge, The purely behavioristic account is more
- 7:56Speaker 1: important causally than the introspective account and applies over a
- 8:00Speaker 1: much wider range. Desire is a characteristic of behavior, as
- 8:06Speaker 1: considered in Chapter three, begins very low in the scale
- 8:09Speaker 1: of evolution, and remains even in human beings the whole
- 8:13Speaker 1: of what can be discovered in a large number of instances.
- 8:17Speaker 1: The Freudian unconscious desires give a formula which is useful
- 8:22Speaker 1: as explaining causally a number of acts. But these desires
- 8:27Speaker 1: do not exist as anything except ways of behaving. Some desires,
- 8:32Speaker 1: on the other hand, are conscious and explicit. What exactly
- 8:37Speaker 1: is added in these last that is not present in
- 8:40Speaker 1: the others. Let us take some stock instance, say Demosthenes
- 8:45Speaker 1: desiring to become a great orator. This was the desire
- 8:49Speaker 1: of which he was conscious and in accordance with which
- 8:52Speaker 1: he deliberately molded his actions. One may suppose to begin
- 8:57Speaker 1: with a merely behavioristic tendency to do such things as
- 9:01Speaker 1: seemed likely to impress his companions. This is a practically
- 9:06Speaker 1: universal characteristic of human nature, which is displayed naively by children.
- 9:11Speaker 1: Then come attempts, just like those of rats in mazes,
- 9:15Speaker 1: to reach the goal wrong turnings leading to derision, right
- 9:20Speaker 1: turnings leading to a brief nibble at the cheese of admiration.
- 9:24Speaker 1: Self observation, still of a behaviorist kind, may lead to
- 9:29Speaker 1: the formula I want to be admired. At this point,
- 9:33Speaker 1: the desire has become conscious. When this point has been reached,
- 9:38Speaker 1: knowledge can be brought to bear on the problem of
- 9:40Speaker 1: achieving the desired end. By association, the means come to
- 9:45Speaker 1: be desired also, and so Demosthenes arrives at the decision
- 9:49Speaker 1: to subject himself to a difficult training as an orator,
- 9:53Speaker 1: since this seems the best way of achieving his end.
- 9:57Speaker 1: The whole development is closely analogous to that out of
- 10:00Speaker 1: explicit knowledge out of mere sensitivity. It is indeed part
- 10:04Speaker 1: of the very same evolution. We cannot, in our integral
- 10:09Speaker 1: reaction to a situation, separate out one event as knowledge
- 10:13Speaker 1: and another as desire. Both knowledge and desire are features
- 10:18Speaker 1: which characterize the reaction, but do not exist in isolation.
- 10:23Speaker 1: In explicit conscious desire, there is always an object, just
- 10:28Speaker 1: as there is an explicit conscious perception. We desire some
- 10:32Speaker 1: event or some state of affairs, but in the primitive condition,
- 10:36Speaker 1: out of which explicit desire is evolved. This is not
- 10:40Speaker 1: the case. We have a state of affairs which may
- 10:43Speaker 1: be said to involve discomfort and activities of various sorts
- 10:48Speaker 1: until a certain different state of affairs is achieved, or
- 10:51Speaker 1: fatigue supervenes, or some other interest causes a distraction. These
- 10:56Speaker 1: activities will be such as to achieve the new state
- 10:59Speaker 1: of aae affairs quickly if there has been previous experience
- 11:03Speaker 1: of irrelevant kind. When we reach the level of explicit
- 11:07Speaker 1: conscious desire, it seems as if we were being attracted
- 11:11Speaker 1: to a goal, but we are really still being pushed
- 11:14Speaker 1: from behind. The attraction to the goal is a shorthand
- 11:18Speaker 1: way of describing the effects of learning, together with the
- 11:21Speaker 1: fact that our efforts will continue till the goal is achieved,
- 11:25Speaker 1: providing the time required is not too long. There are
- 11:29Speaker 1: feelings of various kinds connected with desire, and in the
- 11:33Speaker 1: case of familiar desires such as hunger, these feelings become
- 11:37Speaker 1: associated with what we know will cause the desire to cease.
- 11:41Speaker 1: But I see no more reason in the case of
- 11:43Speaker 1: desire than in the case of knowledge, to admit an
- 11:46Speaker 1: essentially relational occurrence such as many supposed desire to be
- 11:51Speaker 1: only experience memory and association. So I should say confer
- 11:57Speaker 1: objects upon desire which are initially blind tendencies to certain
- 12:02Speaker 1: kinds of activity. It remains to say a few words
- 12:07Speaker 1: about will. There is a sense in which will is
- 12:10Speaker 1: an observable phenomena, and another in which it is a
- 12:13Speaker 1: metaphysical superstition. It is obvious that I can say I
- 12:18Speaker 1: will hold my breath for thirty seconds and proceed to
- 12:21Speaker 1: do so, that I can say I will go to
- 12:24Speaker 1: America and proceed to do so, and so on. In
- 12:28Speaker 1: this sense, will is an observable phenomenon, but as a faculty,
- 12:33Speaker 1: as a separate occurrence, it is, I think, a delusion.
- 12:38Speaker 1: To make this clear, it will be necessary to examine
- 12:41Speaker 1: the observable phenomenon. Very young infants do not appear to
- 12:46Speaker 1: have anything that could be called will. Their movements at
- 12:50Speaker 1: first are reflexes and are explicable where they first cease
- 12:54Speaker 1: to be reflexes. By the law of conditioned reflexes, one
- 12:59Speaker 1: observes how something that looks very like will when the
- 13:02Speaker 1: child learns control over fingers and toes. It seems clear
- 13:07Speaker 1: in watching this process that after some experience of involuntary movements,
- 13:12Speaker 1: the child discovers how to think of a movement first,
- 13:15Speaker 1: and then make the movement, and that this discovery is
- 13:18Speaker 1: exceedingly pleasurable. We know that in adult life, a deliberate
- 13:23Speaker 1: movement is one which we think of before we make it. Obviously,
- 13:28Speaker 1: we cannot think of a movement unless we have previously
- 13:31Speaker 1: made it. It follows that no movement can be voluntary
- 13:35Speaker 1: unless it has previously been involuntary. I think that, as
- 13:40Speaker 1: William James suggested, a voluntary movement is merely one which
- 13:44Speaker 1: is preceded by the thought of it, and has the
- 13:47Speaker 1: thought of it as an essential part of its cause.
- 13:50Speaker 1: When I say this, I do not mean to take
- 13:52Speaker 1: any particular view as to what constitutes thinking. It may
- 13:57Speaker 1: consist almost entirely of talking, as doctor watts And holds,
- 14:01Speaker 1: or it may be something more. That is not the
- 14:04Speaker 1: point at present. The point is that whatever philosophy one
- 14:08Speaker 1: may adopt, there certainly is an occurrence which is described
- 14:12Speaker 1: by ordinary people as thinking of getting up in the morning,
- 14:16Speaker 1: or thinking of any other bodily movement. Whatever the analysis
- 14:21Speaker 1: of this occurrence may be, it is an essential part
- 14:23Speaker 1: of the cause of any movement which may be attributed
- 14:26Speaker 1: to the will. It is true, of course, that we
- 14:30Speaker 1: may think of a movement without performing it. This is
- 14:33Speaker 1: analogous to imagining a state of affairs without believing in it.
- 14:38Speaker 1: Each is a rather sophisticated and late development. Each will
- 14:42Speaker 1: only happen when we think of several things at once
- 14:45Speaker 1: and one of them interferes with another. It may, I think,
- 14:49Speaker 1: be assumed that whenever we think of a possible movement,
- 14:53Speaker 1: we have a tendency to perform it, and are only
- 14:56Speaker 1: restrained if at all, by some thought or circumstance having
- 15:01Speaker 1: a contrary tendency. If this is the case, there is
- 15:05Speaker 1: nothing at all mysterious about the will. Whatever may constitute
- 15:10Speaker 1: thinking of a movement, it is certainly something associated with
- 15:14Speaker 1: the movement itself. Therefore, by the usual law of learned reactions,
- 15:19Speaker 1: we should expect that thinking of a movement would tend
- 15:22Speaker 1: to cause it to occur. This, I should say, is
- 15:26Speaker 1: the essence of will. Emphatic cases of volition, where we
- 15:31Speaker 1: decide after a period of deliberation, are merely examples of
- 15:35Speaker 1: conflicting forces. You may have both pleasant and unpleasant associations
- 15:41Speaker 1: with some place that you are thinking of going to.
- 15:44Speaker 1: This may cause you to hesitate until one or other
- 15:48Speaker 1: association proves the stronger. There may be more than this
- 15:52Speaker 1: in volition, but I cannot see any good ground for
- 15:55Speaker 1: believing that there is. End of Chapter twenty one