Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 020 - The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter nineteen of Vietnam the Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:04Speaker 1: five by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a
- 0:08Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:12Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:18Speaker 1: Chapter nineteen the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. President Johnson had
- 0:23Speaker 1: intimated shortly after taking office that he was inclining toward
- 0:27Speaker 1: expanded covert operations against North Vietnam with the least risk.
- 0:32Speaker 1: He wanted to put pressure on Hanoi to force lesson
- 0:35Speaker 1: support for the Viet Cong. The President early in January
- 0:39Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four approved additional resources for covert actions, including
- 0:44Speaker 1: beach landings and air drops of Vietnamese intelligence and commando teams.
- 0:50Speaker 1: Closely managing this work were the Office of the Special
- 0:53Speaker 1: Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities of the Joint Chiefs
- 0:57Speaker 1: of Staff, headed by General Anthony Now in Washington, and
- 1:01Speaker 1: the MACV Special Operations Group in Saigon. As in other
- 1:06Speaker 1: international waters, U S Navy patrols were routinely operating in
- 1:10Speaker 1: the Gulf of Tonkin to monitor various North Vietnamese activities
- 1:15Speaker 1: by visual and electronic sightings. In February, U two aircraft
- 1:20Speaker 1: from Strategic Air Command resumed their reconnaissance missions, averaging one
- 1:25Speaker 1: or two sorties a day. They photographed the border areas
- 1:28Speaker 1: of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. In March, more naval
- 1:33Speaker 1: patrolling was deemed necessary, done by air as well as sea.
- 1:37Speaker 1: It focused on naval movements. By April, the sum of
- 1:41Speaker 1: this intelligence suggested that Hanoi was ready in forces to
- 1:45Speaker 1: invade South Vietnam through Laos, so General le May's repeated
- 1:50Speaker 1: announcements to the Joint Chiefs seemed to be sound. There
- 1:53Speaker 1: could be no satisfactory solution to the situations in Laos
- 1:57Speaker 1: and South Vietnam without military action against North Vietnam. At
- 2:02Speaker 1: the end of June, the President selected General Taylor to
- 2:05Speaker 1: succeed Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador to Vietnam. In recognition
- 2:10Speaker 1: of Taylor's prior role as one of the major architects
- 2:13Speaker 1: of the war, Johnson entrusted the entire military effort to
- 2:17Speaker 1: his hands. He authorized the new ambassador to wield whatever
- 2:21Speaker 1: command control he thought proper. If Taylor acted independently of
- 2:26Speaker 1: sink Pack, he would infringe on the command prerogatives of
- 2:29Speaker 1: Admiral Sharp, the newly installed commander in chief. He might
- 2:33Speaker 1: also split the unity of air power into three packages,
- 2:37Speaker 1: operations of Vietnam and in Laos, plus those planned against
- 2:41Speaker 1: North Vietnam. Hunter Harris Junior, picked to head PACKALF on
- 2:46Speaker 1: August first, would find that possibility frustrating. After talking with
- 2:51Speaker 1: Admiral Sharp in Hawaii, Ambassador Taylor reached Saigon on July seventh.
- 2:56Speaker 1: He told General Westmoreland that he would not interfere with
- 2:59Speaker 1: mac VI's day to day business. To Taylor, the Khan
- 3:04Speaker 1: government seemed weak, As he later wrote, we lived dangerously
- 3:09Speaker 1: in this period, never sure from night to night when
- 3:12Speaker 1: a new coup might overthrow another feeble government, or when
- 3:16Speaker 1: we might lose some important town to a surprise attack,
- 3:19Speaker 1: or a military base to mortar fire. The weakness of
- 3:23Speaker 1: the Saigon government, heavy deliveries of modern weapons by North
- 3:28Speaker 1: Vietnam to the Vietcong An infiltration of North Vietnamese army
- 3:32Speaker 1: units into the South called for greater American effort. Since January,
- 3:37Speaker 1: the JCS had been advocating a shift from advisory assistance
- 3:41Speaker 1: to more direct aid. Now in May they proposed assigning
- 3:45Speaker 1: US Special Forces teams to provinces and districts as advisors
- 3:50Speaker 1: to regional and popular forces. General Westmoreland opposed flooding the
- 3:55Speaker 1: country with American servicemen. He believed the key to success
- 3:59Speaker 1: was hony the cutting edge of the small fighting units. Hence,
- 4:04Speaker 1: on June twenty fifth and again on July sixteenth, he
- 4:07Speaker 1: recommended that US military strength in Vietnam be expanded by
- 4:11Speaker 1: about forty two hundred men to work as advisers at
- 4:14Speaker 1: the district level. Admiral Sharp agreed. On July eighteenth, General
- 4:20Speaker 1: Khan delivered an emotional address at a rally to mark
- 4:23Speaker 1: Vietnam's Day of Shame, the anniversary of the country's division
- 4:27Speaker 1: in nineteen fifty four. He asserted that his government was
- 4:32Speaker 1: unwilling to remain indifferent in the face of firm determination
- 4:36Speaker 1: of the people who wanted a push northward as an
- 4:39Speaker 1: appropriate means to fulfill our national history. The next day,
- 4:44Speaker 1: a government statement declared, if communist China and communist Vietnam
- 4:48Speaker 1: obstinately continue their way of aggression, the government and entire
- 4:53Speaker 1: people of Vietnam will step up the war with determination
- 4:57Speaker 1: until total victory liberates the whole of our national territory.
- 5:02Speaker 1: One week earlier, a detachment of C one thirties from
- 5:05Speaker 1: the USAF sixty ninety first Reconnaissance Squadron, recently moved from
- 5:10Speaker 1: Japan to Don Moong near Bangkok, had begun flying communication
- 5:15Speaker 1: intercept missions off the North Vietnamese coast. On the twenty eighth,
- 5:20Speaker 1: a Navy DeSoto patrol consisting solely of the destroyer Maddox
- 5:25Speaker 1: also commenced sailing close to the coast to collect radar
- 5:28Speaker 1: and communications intelligence and to make a show of force.
- 5:33Speaker 1: Hanoi broadcasts revealed that the North Vietnamese knew of the
- 5:36Speaker 1: burgeoning covert activity. In a talk with newsmen in July,
- 5:41Speaker 1: Air Commander Wen Ko Key admitted that troops were being
- 5:45Speaker 1: parachuted into North Vietnam. He said training was in progress
- 5:49Speaker 1: for bigger special missions entailing ground attacks and airborne operations
- 5:54Speaker 1: beyond the confines of South Vietnam. Conferring with Ambassador Taylor
- 5:59Speaker 1: on July twenty one, Third General Kah insisted that the
- 6:02Speaker 1: war had entered a new phase. South Vietnam needed to
- 6:06Speaker 1: be on the offensive, but the next day he asked
- 6:09Speaker 1: Taylor whether he should resign. In a cable to the
- 6:12Speaker 1: State Department The ambassador said that if the United States
- 6:16Speaker 1: opposed a march to the north, the Vietnamese might break
- 6:19Speaker 1: with American policy. A single Maverick pilot taking off for
- 6:24Speaker 1: Hanoi with a load of bombs could touch off an
- 6:27Speaker 1: unwarranted extension of hostilities. This would cloud the chances for
- 6:31Speaker 1: internal pacification in Vietnam. The chief need, Taylor felt was
- 6:37Speaker 1: a stable Vietnamese government, and that required time to gain
- 6:41Speaker 1: this time. He suggested that the Vietnamese military make contingency
- 6:46Speaker 1: plans for heightened actions against North Vietnam, but the Vietnamese
- 6:51Speaker 1: chafed for action. Four of their patrol boats, operating under
- 6:55Speaker 1: US guidance, left Danang on July thirtieth and sailed north.
- 7:00Speaker 1: That night. They shelled a radar station on Hammee Island
- 7:03Speaker 1: and a radio transmitter on Hannu Island. Both installations were
- 7:08Speaker 1: off the North Vietnamese coast near vinn and both were
- 7:11Speaker 1: deeply involved in Hanoi's sea infiltration. During late afternoon on
- 7:16Speaker 1: August second, three high speed North Vietnamese Swatau patrol boats
- 7:21Speaker 1: fired on the destroyer Maddox, which was in international waters
- 7:25Speaker 1: twenty eight miles off the enemy's coast. The Mattos and
- 7:29Speaker 1: planes from the carrier Taekwonderoga returned the fire. At first,
- 7:34Speaker 1: Defense Secretary McNamara thought that the attack was either a
- 7:37Speaker 1: miscalculation by the government or an impulsive act of a
- 7:41Speaker 1: local commander. In any event, President Johnson immediately dispatched a
- 7:46Speaker 1: note of protest to Hanoi. He made public his orders
- 7:50Speaker 1: that the Navy continued patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin
- 7:53Speaker 1: and had a second destroyer. On August third, the Mattox,
- 7:57Speaker 1: now accompanied by the sea turner Jui Joy, Re, entered
- 8:01Speaker 1: the gulf. Air patrols from the Taekwonderoga covered both destroyers
- 8:05Speaker 1: by day. That night, South Vietnamese forces raided a radar
- 8:10Speaker 1: station on Cape Vinsone and a security station near quah
- 8:14Speaker 1: Ran after dark and in bad weather. On the fourth,
- 8:18Speaker 1: the Mattox reported that it was being fired upon. Admiral
- 8:22Speaker 1: Sharp sink Pack asked the JCS for a new rule
- 8:25Speaker 1: of engagement allowing US aircraft to pursue planes into hostile
- 8:30Speaker 1: airspace instead of stopping at a three mile line off
- 8:33Speaker 1: the North Vietnamese coast. He also sought authority to launch
- 8:37Speaker 1: instant punitive air strikes on North Vietnam. As retaliations for
- 8:41Speaker 1: the attacks on the Mattox. President Johnson shared this reaction
- 8:46Speaker 1: the United States had to show it meant business. He
- 8:50Speaker 1: stressed in a radio and television address to the American
- 8:53Speaker 1: people that the US response to the hostile action would
- 8:57Speaker 1: be limited and fitting. Even so, he directed the Pacific
- 9:01Speaker 1: Fleet on August fifth to make a single, all out
- 9:04Speaker 1: assault on the North Vietnamese Swatau boat bases and their
- 9:08Speaker 1: supporting p O L storage at vinn together with a
- 9:11Speaker 1: reprisal attack. The President approved and the JCS ordered emergency
- 9:16Speaker 1: actions to move additional forces to the Pacific, especially into
- 9:20Speaker 1: Southeast Asia. Saigon had previously agreed to positioning more USAF
- 9:26Speaker 1: units in the country, and on August fifth planes began
- 9:29Speaker 1: to arrive. Six F one O two jet interceptors of
- 9:34Speaker 1: the five oh ninth Fighter Squadron flew from Clark Air
- 9:37Speaker 1: Force Base to Danang. Six others from the sixteenth Fighter
- 9:41Speaker 1: Squadron at Naha Air Base, Okinawa touched down at tonsonnut
- 9:46Speaker 1: eight F one hundreds of the six hundred and fifteenth
- 9:49Speaker 1: Tactical Fighter Squadron, still on rotational deployment at Clark, went
- 9:53Speaker 1: to Danang on the evening of August fifth, thirty six
- 9:57Speaker 1: B fifty sevens of the eighth and thirtie eighteenth Bomber
- 10:00Speaker 1: Squadrons had trouble getting into Beinhoi. The rain obscured the
- 10:05Speaker 1: pilot's view and made the runway slick. One plane during
- 10:09Speaker 1: approach crashed in Vietcong territory, and two suffered damage upon landing.
- 10:15Speaker 1: Six R F one O ones out of Kadina and
- 10:17Speaker 1: Misawa Air Base, Japan augmented the able mabel reconnaissance planes
- 10:22Speaker 1: at Tansanjut. The four hundred and fifth Tactical Wing set
- 10:27Speaker 1: ten F one hundreds from Clark to Tokli, Thailand. Eight
- 10:31Speaker 1: KB fifties from PATCAFFS. Four hundred and twenty first Air
- 10:35Speaker 1: Refueling Squadron moved from Yokota to Tansonjut and Takli. Eight
- 10:39Speaker 1: F one O five jet fighters of the thirty sixth
- 10:42Speaker 1: Tactical Fighter Squadron flew from Yokota to Clark, then to
- 10:46Speaker 1: Korat in Thailand. On August ninth, under JCS direction, the
- 10:51Speaker 1: Commander in Chief United States Strike Command deployed a tack
- 10:55Speaker 1: composite Air Strike Force F one hundreds of the five,
- 10:59Speaker 1: twenty six second and six fourteenth tactical fighter squadrons landed
- 11:03Speaker 1: at Clark on August eighth and ninth. Six r F
- 11:07Speaker 1: one oh one's of the three hundred sixty third Composite
- 11:10Speaker 1: Reconnaissance Unit reached Kadena on the thirteenth. Forty eight C
- 11:15Speaker 1: one thirty transports from the three hundred fourteenth, four hundred
- 11:19Speaker 1: and sixty third, and five hundred sixteenth troop carrier wings
- 11:23Speaker 1: arrived at Clark and Kadena between the ninth and twenty
- 11:26Speaker 1: first of August for in flight refueling. The Strategic Air
- 11:30Speaker 1: Command furnished forty eight KC one thirty five jet tankers
- 11:34Speaker 1: that operated mainly from Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii
- 11:38Speaker 1: and Anderson Air Force Base on Guam. Sak further formed
- 11:42Speaker 1: a task force of eight KC one thirty fives at Clark.
- 11:47Speaker 1: General Moore on August sixth created a second Air Division
- 11:51Speaker 1: Command Post at Tomson, Njut separate from the combined Vietnamese
- 11:55Speaker 1: USAF Air Operations Center. Using just the US side of
- 11:59Speaker 1: the tactical Air Control system, he began to tie together
- 12:03Speaker 1: all the USAF units in that area. On August fifth,
- 12:07Speaker 1: General Westmoreland had met with General Kahan and Vietnamese commanders
- 12:11Speaker 1: to outline the purpose for the retaliatory strike on the
- 12:14Speaker 1: Swatau boat bases and oil storage sites. West Moreland advised
- 12:20Speaker 1: and Kahn agreed to place the Vietnamese on maximum alert
- 12:24Speaker 1: against Vietcong reprisals. The MACV commander added that if the
- 12:29Speaker 1: North Vietnamese or Chinese attacked South Vietnam, he would loose
- 12:33Speaker 1: air strikes on targets of his choice without requiring a
- 12:36Speaker 1: green light from Washington. Ambassador Taylor afterwards called on Khan.
- 12:42Speaker 1: He handed him a letter from President Johnson underlining the
- 12:45Speaker 1: need for the closest bilateral consultation. Kahn assured Taylor that
- 12:50Speaker 1: he fully understood and accepted this requirement. The U s
- 12:55Speaker 1: retaliatory attack on August sixth involved sixty four aircraft launched
- 13:00Speaker 1: in two waves from the carrier's Taekwonderoga in constellation. The
- 13:05Speaker 1: strikes on five boat bases and the vin oil storage
- 13:09Speaker 1: destroyed eight boats and damage twenty one, put the oil
- 13:12Speaker 1: reservoirs ninety percent out of commission, and lost two planes
- 13:16Speaker 1: to anti aircraft fire. Shortly thereafter, at the request of
- 13:20Speaker 1: the United States, the Canadian member of the International Control
- 13:24Speaker 1: Commission visited the North Vietnamese premier in Hanoi. The Canadians
- 13:29Speaker 1: said that the United States viewed Hanoi's role in Laos
- 13:33Speaker 1: and South Vietnam as critical and threatening. He warned that
- 13:37Speaker 1: if North Vietnam persisted in its aggression, it would expect
- 13:41Speaker 1: to suffer the consequences. The Premier was utterly unintimidated and
- 13:46Speaker 1: calmly resolved to pursue his course. His indifference might have
- 13:51Speaker 1: reflected a recent increase in air strength. North Vietnamese aircraft
- 13:56Speaker 1: had included thirty trainers, fifty transport sorts, and four light helicopters,
- 14:02Speaker 1: but on August seventh, aero photos of Fukien Airfield near
- 14:07Speaker 1: Hanoi showed thirty nine MiG fifteen seventeen jet fighters, apparently
- 14:12Speaker 1: just flown in from China. More of these jets were
- 14:15Speaker 1: on Hainan Island in South China bases. General Harris Pacaffe commander,
- 14:21Speaker 1: saw that the MiGs on Fukien posed a direct threat
- 14:25Speaker 1: to his forces in Southeast Asia. He proposed to Admiral
- 14:29Speaker 1: Sharp that destroying the communist jet aircraft would be a
- 14:33Speaker 1: sharp lesson to China and would deter any fresh enemy
- 14:36Speaker 1: plans for attack. The USAF F one O fives at
- 14:41Speaker 1: Karat could conduct the operation, but the F one hundreds
- 14:45Speaker 1: on alerted DNAEG were closer to the target. With Cluster
- 14:49Speaker 1: Bomb Unit CBU two A munitions, the planes could prosecute
- 14:53Speaker 1: a low level, high speed surprise attack on the parked aircraft. Then,
- 14:59Speaker 1: using AGA twelve B missiles as well as rockets, flack
- 15:03Speaker 1: suppression missions and strikes against individual surviving aircraft could be
- 15:08Speaker 1: carried out, but Sharp needed to go ahead from higher
- 15:11Speaker 1: authority and it was not given. On August seventh, General
- 15:16Speaker 1: Westmoreland suggested that MACV in the Vietnamese government make General
- 15:20Speaker 1: More the combined Air Commander with the Vietnamese Deputy More
- 15:25Speaker 1: could exercise operational control over US Vietnamese air power for
- 15:30Speaker 1: all missions. These would encompass air strikes into North Vietnam
- 15:34Speaker 1: and Laos, defensive actions in South Vietnam, and air support
- 15:39Speaker 1: of mobile ground forces in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.
- 15:44Speaker 1: Assisted by MACVE, the Vietnamese armed forces were to have
- 15:47Speaker 1: the primary task of controlling the counterinsurgency inside the country.
- 15:52Speaker 1: Admiral Sharp made it clear that he as sink Pack,
- 15:56Speaker 1: would manage the air activities against North Vietnam through Pack
- 15:59Speaker 1: half and the Pacific Fleet PACAF would work through Thirteenth
- 16:03Speaker 1: Air Force in second Air Division. Since the latter reported
- 16:07Speaker 1: to both MACV and PACAFF, coordination would be easy. As
- 16:11Speaker 1: for the MACV commander, he was to center on purging
- 16:15Speaker 1: the Viet Kong and pacifying the country. Although events in
- 16:20Speaker 1: Laos disturbed policymakers, during the summer of nineteen sixty four,
- 16:24Speaker 1: intelligence officers looked for the most serious escalation of the
- 16:28Speaker 1: conflict to occur in Vietnam. P King and Hanoi evidently
- 16:32Speaker 1: felt there was a better chance to gain power by
- 16:35Speaker 1: dentify collapse of the Saigon government. Ambassador Taylor estimated the
- 16:40Speaker 1: chance of such a collapse at about fifty percent. The
- 16:44Speaker 1: Khan government had been unable to rebuild the political control
- 16:48Speaker 1: structure between Saigon and the Hamlets, which had disappeared following
- 16:52Speaker 1: the overthrow and death of DM in November nineteen sixty three.
- 16:57Speaker 1: Morale had plummeted, assisted in its draw by the constant
- 17:01Speaker 1: threat of assassination or another coup. To Taylor, the most
- 17:05Speaker 1: valid and realistic objectives were to bolster Sigon, pressed the
- 17:10Speaker 1: campaign against the Vietcong, and be prepared to act against
- 17:13Speaker 1: North Vietnam by January first, nineteen sixty five. At President
- 17:18Speaker 1: Johnson's request, the Senate and House on August tenth enacted
- 17:22Speaker 1: a joint resolution giving him authority to prosecute military operations
- 17:28Speaker 1: as he saw fit tied to the North Vietnamese attacks
- 17:31Speaker 1: on the destroyer Mattox in the Gulf of Tonkin. The
- 17:35Speaker 1: resolution read, in part consonant with the Constitution of the
- 17:39Speaker 1: United States and the Charter of the United Nations, and
- 17:43Speaker 1: in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective
- 17:47Speaker 1: Defense Treaty, the United States is prepared, as the President determines,
- 17:52Speaker 1: to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force,
- 17:57Speaker 1: to assist any member or Protocol state requesting assistance in
- 18:01Speaker 1: defense of its freedom. Yet there was a nagging doubt
- 18:06Speaker 1: as to whether the Mattocks had actually been attacked on
- 18:09Speaker 1: the night of August fourth. High speed naval operations at
- 18:13Speaker 1: night made precise observation and rapid and accurate reporting difficult.
- 18:19Speaker 1: In September, Hanoi would publish a lengthy white paper to
- 18:23Speaker 1: justify the August's second attack as proper defense against a
- 18:26Speaker 1: covert operation, but it declared that none of its naval
- 18:30Speaker 1: craft was in the area two nights later. William P. Bundy,
- 18:35Speaker 1: Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was impressed
- 18:39Speaker 1: by Ambassador Taylor's assessment of the Khan government's weakness. He
- 18:44Speaker 1: therefore drafted a policy memorandum for the National Security Council
- 18:49Speaker 1: entitled Next Courses of Actions in Southeast Asia. There was
- 18:53Speaker 1: to be an initial short holding phase for the remainder
- 18:56Speaker 1: of August to avoid actions that might intensify the war.
- 19:01Speaker 1: Then would come a limited pressure phase lasting through the
- 19:04Speaker 1: rest of the year to maintain the morale of the
- 19:07Speaker 1: Khan government without risking escalation. This phase would witness covert
- 19:12Speaker 1: operations against North Vietnam, training of Vietnamese pilots to fly
- 19:17Speaker 1: jet aircraft, moves across the border into the Laotian Panhandle,
- 19:21Speaker 1: reinstatement of naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkan, and
- 19:25Speaker 1: Tit for Tat reprisals. Finally, more serious pressures were to
- 19:30Speaker 1: start on January first, nineteen sixty five. For example, initial
- 19:35Speaker 1: measures to destroy enemy infiltration routes and facilities would progress
- 19:40Speaker 1: to the bombardment of military targets in North Vietnam. Exactly
- 19:45Speaker 1: how unstable the Kan government was became clear. On the
- 19:48Speaker 1: sixteenth of August, the Military Revolutionary Council elected Khan President
- 19:54Speaker 1: and may General Duang Van Minh Supreme Adviser. Student and
- 19:58Speaker 1: Buddhist demonstrations instantly erupted in Hawaii, far from the turmoil
- 20:04Speaker 1: in Saigon. Admiral Sharp thought that the United States could
- 20:07Speaker 1: not afford to lose the momentum that the Tonkin Gulf
- 20:10Speaker 1: response had created. He wanted to exert more pressure against
- 20:15Speaker 1: the Communists in Laos, both on the Plane of Jars
- 20:18Speaker 1: and in the Panhandle. He also wanted to expand and
- 20:21Speaker 1: continue covert operations and naval patrols. Because the USAF units
- 20:27Speaker 1: at Danang, Benois, and Tansannut were vulnerable to Vietcong attack,
- 20:32Speaker 1: he suggested that US ground troops be brought to Vietnam
- 20:36Speaker 1: to defend the bases. He further advocated that the United
- 20:40Speaker 1: States set up a major base at Danang to show
- 20:42Speaker 1: that Americans meant to stay in Southeast Asia until American
- 20:46Speaker 1: aims were attained. In the midst of the rioting in Saigon,
- 20:51Speaker 1: Ambassador Taylor recommended that the United States try to gain
- 20:54Speaker 1: time for the Khan government. He opposed getting deeply involved
- 20:58Speaker 1: with North Vietnam and possibly China. Like Bundy, he thought
- 21:03Speaker 1: that Hanoi should be checked in its infiltration by limited
- 21:06Speaker 1: pressure until January fifth, nineteen sixty five. Then such measures
- 21:11Speaker 1: as covert operations, extensive patrolling, U two flights over North Vietnam,
- 21:17Speaker 1: air and ground strikes in Laos, and bombing of the
- 21:20Speaker 1: North should be stepped up. On August twenty fourth, Ambassador
- 21:25Speaker 1: Taylor shared a long session of the Mission Council he
- 21:28Speaker 1: had formed to include General Westmoreland. The members discussed alternative
- 21:32Speaker 1: options in Vietnam, but found it difficult to define an
- 21:35Speaker 1: incident that warranted American reprisal. On the same day, the
- 21:40Speaker 1: Joint Chiefs of Staff were reviewing a list of ninety
- 21:43Speaker 1: four possible bombing targets in North Vietnam compiled in June
- 21:47Speaker 1: and July. The targets fell into five categories air fields,
- 21:52Speaker 1: lines of communication, military installations, industrial facilities, and armed reconnaissance routes.
- 22:00Speaker 1: President Khan resigned on the twenty fifth of August. Two
- 22:04Speaker 1: days later, the Military Revolutionary Council named a triumvirate of
- 22:08Speaker 1: provincial leaders as an interim ruling body. Undeterred by these developments,
- 22:14Speaker 1: the JCS sent the list of bombing targets to sink
- 22:17Speaker 1: Pack and directed that strike plans be devised for four
- 22:20Speaker 1: patterns of attack in an ascending order of severity. The
- 22:25Speaker 1: Joint Chiefs informed Secretary Macnamara of their disagreement with Ambassador
- 22:29Speaker 1: Taylor's position. They considered much stronger military pressures on North
- 22:34Speaker 1: Vietnam to be needed, in particular to provide a psychological
- 22:38Speaker 1: boost to the Saigon government. The Chiefs urged bombing the
- 22:43Speaker 1: listed targets in North Vietnam at once. Secretary Macnamara on
- 22:48Speaker 1: August thirty first asked the Joint Chiefs to answer three
- 22:51Speaker 1: questions about the ninety four targets. After a full scale
- 22:56Speaker 1: assault on the targets, would enough ordnance in p O
- 22:59Speaker 1: l be left to defend Southeast Asia from Chinese attack?
- 23:04Speaker 1: What would be the effects of each of the four
- 23:06Speaker 1: patterns of attack on the North Vietnamese economy, on its
- 23:09Speaker 1: capacity to support the Patet Lao and the Viet Kong
- 23:13Speaker 1: and on its ability to enlarge North Vietnamese military forces
- 23:17Speaker 1: in South Vietnam and Laos. And Finally, if the destruction
- 23:21Speaker 1: of the ninety four targets failed to stifle Hanoi's will
- 23:25Speaker 1: to wage war, what course of action was feasible. These
- 23:29Speaker 1: were tough questions, indeed. In Saigon. On September three, a
- 23:34Speaker 1: fifteen man leadership committee replaced the ruling triumvirate and picked
- 23:39Speaker 1: Khan as acting Premier and Men as chairman. A short
- 23:43Speaker 1: time later, Ambassador Taylor, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of
- 23:47Speaker 1: Defense macnamara, and JCS chairman Wheeler gathered to weigh courses
- 23:52Speaker 1: of action for the United States. The group sharply revised
- 23:56Speaker 1: Bundy's prior outline of graduated pressures. The members agreed that
- 24:01Speaker 1: the Saigon government would be too weak for two or
- 24:04Speaker 1: three months for the United States to take any major
- 24:07Speaker 1: and deliberate action, risking escalation. The Communists were not likely
- 24:12Speaker 1: to provoke the United States, but Saigon should be assisted
- 24:16Speaker 1: to show that the United States was serious in its
- 24:19Speaker 1: aims while keeping risks low and under control. American naval
- 24:23Speaker 1: patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin suspended after the Mattock's
- 24:27Speaker 1: affair could be resumed. The patrols ought to stay outside
- 24:31Speaker 1: the twelve mile limit and be clearly divorced from the
- 24:34Speaker 1: South Vietnamese covert operations, which should concentrate on maritime raids
- 24:40Speaker 1: South Vietnamese air and ground operations linked to air strikes
- 24:44Speaker 1: by Laotian pilots in the Panhandle should begin. Lastly, the
- 24:49Speaker 1: United States should be alert to answer an attack upon
- 24:52Speaker 1: American personnel or a special enemy action against Vietnam, Yet
- 24:57Speaker 1: it should not deliberately provoke an incident to justify a retaliation.
- 25:02Speaker 1: These proposals went to the President into the Joint Chiefs
- 25:05Speaker 1: of Staff. On September eighth, General Leamy told the chiefs
- 25:10Speaker 1: that the courses of action did not convey a clear
- 25:13Speaker 1: and positive signal to Hanoi of US resolution. General Wallace M. Green,
- 25:19Speaker 1: Junior Marine Corps Commandant, sided with le May, for he
- 25:23Speaker 1: also thought that the ninety four targets should be bombed.
- 25:27Speaker 1: The next day, McNamara and Wheeler talked about the Joint
- 25:30Speaker 1: chief's feelings. They saw the danger to be drastic American action,
- 25:35Speaker 1: triggering a strong reaction that the Saigon regime could not meet.
- 25:40Speaker 1: President Johnson accepted the more cautious course. On September tenth,
- 25:45Speaker 1: he ordered US naval patrols to be resumed, covert operations
- 25:49Speaker 1: to be reviewed, and talks with the Laotian government to
- 25:52Speaker 1: be opened on limited air and ground operations in the Panhandle,
- 25:57Speaker 1: but the first order of business was shoring up the
- 25:59Speaker 1: Saigon government. American attempts to do so met with slight success.
- 26:05Speaker 1: On September thirteenth, the Four Corps commander started a coup,
- 26:10Speaker 1: proclaiming that Khan had capitulated to Buddhist and student demands.
- 26:15Speaker 1: He led armored elements into Saigon, occupied public buildings, and
- 26:19Speaker 1: disarmed the national police. The Vietnamese Air Force stayed loyal
- 26:24Speaker 1: to Khan and made a show of force against the coup.
- 26:28Speaker 1: The U. S State Department announced firm support for Khan.
- 26:32Speaker 1: The rebellious forces then withdrew. Khan carried out sweeping changes
- 26:37Speaker 1: among his military commanders and appointed a High National Council
- 26:42Speaker 1: of seventeen civilians to draft a constitution and designate a
- 26:46Speaker 1: civil Chief of State. Outwardly, this seemed a step towards
- 26:50Speaker 1: stabilizing the government. By October first, however, American intelligence estimated
- 26:56Speaker 1: scant improvement. Meanwhile, pacification efforts virtually collapsed because the paralyzed
- 27:03Speaker 1: military staff in Saigon could not reach decisions. As President
- 27:07Speaker 1: Johnson desired US destroyers, Morton and Edwards entered the Gulf
- 27:12Speaker 1: of Tonkin on patrol during the night of September seventeenth. However,
- 27:16Speaker 1: the ships reported and fired on radar contacts. At Joint
- 27:21Speaker 1: Chief's direction, Sinkpak called for sizeable reprisal air attacks on
- 27:26Speaker 1: North Vietnam. Targets and weapons were changed several times, and
- 27:30Speaker 1: the Second Air Division Command Post was swamped with orders
- 27:34Speaker 1: and counter orders. In the end, the air attacks were
- 27:37Speaker 1: canceled because the Navy could not be absolutely sure that
- 27:41Speaker 1: North Vietnamese action had actually occurred. The Joint Chiefs next
- 27:47Speaker 1: and enjoined Sinkpack to be ready to execute immediate air
- 27:50Speaker 1: strikes against pre selected targets. When naval patrols were in
- 27:54Speaker 1: the gulf. Sinkpak dictated that US jets at Danang and
- 27:59Speaker 1: Binhois be alerted for attacking Fukian Airfield. When a sak
- 28:03Speaker 1: Arb forty seven was committed to weakly electronic intelligence flights
- 28:08Speaker 1: over the Gulf of Tonkin, the naval patrols were abandoned.
- 28:12Speaker 1: It began to appear that unless the United States assumed
- 28:16Speaker 1: a more direct role in the struggle, the situation would
- 28:19Speaker 1: go out of control. End of Chapter nineteen