Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [1999] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:061999 was $358 million, which increased the per share book
- 0:11value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%.
- 0:17Over the last 35 years, that is, since present management took
- 0:20over, per share book value has grown from $19.00 to $37,987, a
- 0:27rate of 24% compounded annually. All figures used in this report
- 0:32apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock
- 0:36that the company had outstanding before 1996.
- 0:39The B shares have an economic interest equal to 130th that of
- 0:43the A. The numbers on the facing page
- 0:45show just how poor our 1999 record was.
- 0:49We had the worst absolute performance of my tenure and
- 0:52compared to the S&P, the worst relative performance as well.
- 0:56Relative results are what concern us.
- 0:58Over time, bad relative numbers will produce unsatisfactory
- 1:02absolute results. Even Inspector Clouseau could
- 1:05find last year's guilty party. Your chairman.
- 1:08My performance reminds me of the quarterback whose report card
- 1:11showed for FS and AD, but who nonetheless had an understanding
- 1:15coach son, he drawled. I think you're spending too much
- 1:19time on that one subject. My one subject is capital
- 1:23allocation and my grade for 1999 most assuredly is AD.
- 1:28What most hurt us during the year was the inferior
- 1:30performance of Berkshire's equity portfolio and
- 1:33responsibility for that portfolio, leaving aside the
- 1:36small piece of it run by Lou Simpson of GEICO, is entirely
- 1:40mine. Several of our largest investees
- 1:43badly lagged the market in 1999 because they've had
- 1:46disappointing operating results. We still like these businesses
- 1:50and are content to have major investments in them, but their
- 1:53stumbles damaged our performance last year and it's no sure thing
- 1:56that they will quickly regain their stride.
- 1:59The fallout from our weak results in 1999 was a more than
- 2:02commensurate drop in our stock price in 1998.
- 2:06To go back a bit, the stock outperformed the business last
- 2:10year. The business did much better
- 2:12than the stock, a Divergent that has continued to the date of
- 2:15this letter. Over time, of course, the
- 2:18performance of the stock must roughly match the performance of
- 2:21the business. Despite our poor showing last
- 2:24year, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my
- 2:27partner and I expect that the gain in Berkshire's intrinsic
- 2:30value over the next decade will modestly exceed the gain from
- 2:34owning the S&P. We can't guarantee that, of
- 2:37course, but we are willing to back our conviction with our own
- 2:40money. To repeat a fact you've heard
- 2:42before, while over 99% of my net worth resides in Berkshire,
- 2:47neither my wife nor I have ever sold a share of Berkshire, and
- 2:51unless our checks stop clearing, we have no intention of doing
- 2:54so. Please note that I spoke of
- 2:56hoping to beat the S&P modestly. For Berkshire.
- 3:00Truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the
- 3:03past. They existed then because we
- 3:05could buy both businesses and stocks at far more attractive
- 3:09prices than we can now, and also because we then had a much
- 3:12smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to
- 3:15consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than
- 3:18are available to us today. Our optimism about Berkshire's
- 3:22performance is also tempered by the expectation.
- 3:25Indeed, in our minds, the virtual certainty that the S&P
- 3:29will do far less well in the next decade or two than it has
- 3:33done since 1982. A recent article in Fortune
- 3:36expressed my views as to why this is inevitable, and I'm
- 3:40enclosing a copy with this report.
- 3:42Our goal is to run our present business as well, a task made
- 3:46easy because of the outstanding managers we have in place and to
- 3:50acquire additional businesses having economic characteristics
- 3:53and managers comparable to those we already own.
- 3:56We made important progress in this respect during 1999 by
- 4:00acquiring Jordan's Furniture and contracting to buy a major
- 4:03portion of Mid American Energy. We will talk more about these
- 4:07companies later in the report, but let me emphasize one point
- 4:10here. We bought both for cash, issuing
- 4:13no Berkshire shares. Deals of that kind aren't always
- 4:16possible, but that is the method of acquisition that Charlie and
- 4:19I vastly prefer. Guides to intrinsic value.
- 4:22I often talk in these pages about intrinsic value, a key,
- 4:26though far from precise, measurement we utilize in our
- 4:29acquisitions of businesses and common stocks.
- 4:32For an extensive discussion of this and other investment and
- 4:36accounting terms and concepts, please refer to our Owner's
- 4:39manual on pages 55 to 62. Intrinsic value is discussed on
- 4:44page 60. In our last four reports, we
- 4:47have furnished you a table that we regard as useful in
- 4:50estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value.
- 4:52In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace
- 4:56two key components of value. The first column lists our per
- 4:59share ownership of investments, including cash and equivalents
- 5:03but excluding assets held in our financial products operation.
- 5:06And the second column shows our per share earnings from
- 5:09Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase
- 5:12accounting adjustments discussed on page 61, but after all
- 5:16interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all
- 5:20dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the
- 5:23investments presented in the first column.
- 5:26In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were
- 5:29split into two parts with one entity holding our investments
- 5:33and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all
- 5:36corporate costs. In 1999, our per share
- 5:40investments changed very little, but our operating earnings,
- 5:43affected by negatives that overwhelmed some strong
- 5:46positives, fell apart. Most of our operating managers
- 5:50deserve a grade of A for delivering fine results and for
- 5:53having widened the difference between the intrinsic value of
- 5:56their businesses and the value at which these are carried on
- 5:59our balance sheet. But offsetting this, we had a
- 6:02huge and I believe aberrational underwriting loss at General RE.
- 6:07Additionally, Geico's underwriting profit fell as we
- 6:11had predicted it would. Geico's overall performance,
- 6:14though, was terrific, outstripping my ambitious goals.
- 6:18We do not expect our underwriting earnings to improve
- 6:21in any dramatic way this year. Though Geico's intrinsic value
- 6:24should grow by a highly satisfying amount, it's
- 6:27underwriting performance is almost certain to weaken.
- 6:31That's because auto insurers as a group will do worse in 2000
- 6:35and because we will materially increase our marketing
- 6:38expenditures at General REE. We are raising rates, and if
- 6:42there is no mega catastrophe in 2000, the company's underwriting
- 6:46loss should fall considerably. It takes some time, however, for
- 6:50the full effect of rate increases to kick in, and
- 6:53General REE is therefore likely to have another unsatisfactory
- 6:57underwriting year. You should be aware that one
- 7:00item regularly working to widen the amount by which intrinsic
- 7:03value exceeds book value is the annual charge against income we
- 7:07take for amortization of good, an amount now running about $500
- 7:12million. This charge reduces the amount
- 7:15of goodwill we show as an asset and likewise the amount that is
- 7:18included in our book value. This is an accounting matter
- 7:22having nothing to do with true economic goodwill, which
- 7:25increases in most years. But even if economic goodwill
- 7:28were to remain constant, the annual amortization charge would
- 7:32persistently widen the gap between intrinsic value and book
- 7:35value. Though we can't give you a
- 7:37precise figure for Berkshire's intrinsic value or even an
- 7:40approximation, Charlie and I can assure you that it far exceeds
- 7:44our $57.8 billion book value. Businesses such as SEAS and
- 7:49Buffalo News are now worth 15 to 20 times the value at which they
- 7:53are carried on our books. Our goal is to continually widen
- 7:56this spread at all subsidiaries. A managerial story you will
- 8:00never read elsewhere. Berkshire's collection of
- 8:03managers is unusual in several important ways.
- 8:06As one example, a very high percentage of these men and
- 8:09women are independently wealthy, having made fortunes in the
- 8:13businesses that they run. They work neither because they
- 8:16need the money nor because they are contractually obligated to.
- 8:19We have no contracts at Berkshire.
- 8:22Rather, they work long and hard because they love their
- 8:24businesses, and I use the word there advisedly, since these
- 8:28managers are truly in charge. There are no show and tell
- 8:32presentations in Omaha, no budgets to be approved by
- 8:35headquarters, no dictums issued about capital expenditures.
- 8:39We simply ask our managers to run their companies as if these
- 8:42are the sole asset of their families and will remain so for
- 8:46the next century. Charlie and I try to behave with
- 8:49our managers just as we attempt to behave with Berkshire
- 8:52shareholders, treating both groups as we would wish to be
- 8:55treated if our positions were reversed.
- 8:58Though working means nothing to me financially, I love doing it
- 9:02at Berkshire for some simple reasons.
- 9:03It gives me a sense of achievement, of freedom to act
- 9:06as I see fit and an opportunity to interact daily with people I
- 9:10like and trust. Why should our managers,
- 9:13accomplished artists at what they do, see things differently
- 9:17in their relations with Berkshire?
- 9:19Our managers often appear to be hewing to President Kennedy's
- 9:22charge. Ask not what your country can do
- 9:24for you. Ask what you can do for your
- 9:27country. Here's a remarkable story from
- 9:29last year. It's about RC Wiley, Utah's
- 9:33dominant home furnishing business, which Berkshire
- 9:36purchased from Bill Child and his family in 1995.
- 9:40Bill and most of his managers are Mormons and for this reason
- 9:43are C Wiley. Stores have never operated on
- 9:46Sunday. This is a difficult way to do
- 9:48business. Sunday is the favorite shopping
- 9:51day for many customers. Bill nonetheless stuck to his
- 9:55principles and while doing so built his business.
- 9:57From $250,000 of annual sales in 1954 when he took over to $342
- 10:04million in 1999, Bill felt that our C Wiley could operate
- 10:09successfully in markets outside of Utah and in 1997 suggested
- 10:14that we open a store in Boise. I was highly skeptical about
- 10:17taking a No Sunday policy into a new territory where we would be
- 10:21up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week.
- 10:24Nevertheless, this was Bill's business to Ron, so despite my
- 10:29reservations, I told him to follow both his business
- 10:32judgement and his religious convictions.
- 10:34Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition.
- 10:38He would personally buy the land and build the store for about $9
- 10:42million, as it turned out, and would sell it to us at his cost
- 10:46if it proved to be successful. On the other hand, if sales fell
- 10:49short of his expectations, we could exit the business without
- 10:53paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would
- 10:56leave him with a huge investment in an empty building.
- 10:59I told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if
- 11:02Berkshire was going to get the upside, it should also take the
- 11:05downside. Bill said nothing doing if there
- 11:08was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he wanted to
- 11:11take the blow personally. The store opened last August and
- 11:14immediately became a huge success.
- 11:17Bill thereupon turned the property over to us, including
- 11:20some extra land that had appreciated significantly, and
- 11:24we wrote him a check for his cost.
- 11:25And get this, Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the
- 11:29capital he had tied up over the two years.
- 11:32If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public
- 11:35corporation, I haven't heard about it.
- 11:37You can understand why the opportunity to partner with
- 11:39people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every
- 11:43morning. A footnote.
- 11:44After our soft opening in August, we had a grand opening
- 11:48of the Boise store about a month later.
- 11:50Naturally, I went there to cut the ribbon.
- 11:52Your chairman, I wish to emphasize, is good for
- 11:55something. In my talk, I told the crowd how
- 11:57sales had far exceeded expectations, making us, by a
- 12:01considerable margin, the largest home furnishing store in Idaho.
- 12:05Then, as the speech progressed, my memory miraculously began to
- 12:09improve. By the end of my talk, it all
- 12:12had come back to me. Opening a store in Boise had
- 12:15been my idea. The economics of property
- 12:17casualty insurance. Our main business, though we
- 12:20have others of great importance is insurance.
- 12:23To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that
- 12:26you understand how to evaluate an insurance company.
- 12:29The key determinants are one, the amount of float that the
- 12:32business generates, 2 its cost, and three, most critical of all,
- 12:37the long term outlook for both of these factors.
- 12:40To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own.
- 12:43In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are
- 12:47received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes
- 12:50extends over many years. During that time, the insurer
- 12:54invests the money. This pleasant activity typically
- 12:57carries with it a downside, the premiums that an insurer takes
- 13:00and usually do not cover the losses and expenses it
- 13:03eventually must pay. That leaves it running an
- 13:06underwriting loss, which is the cost of float.
- 13:09An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time
- 13:13is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to
- 13:16obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if
- 13:19its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
- 13:22A caution is appropriate here because lost costs must be
- 13:26estimated. Insurers have enormous latitude
- 13:29and figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very
- 13:32difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost
- 13:35of float. Errors of estimation, usually
- 13:38innocent but sometimes not, can be huge.
- 13:41The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly
- 13:45into earnings. An experienced observer can
- 13:47usually detect large scale errors in reserving, but the
- 13:51general public can typically do no more than accept what's
- 13:54presented. And at times I have been amazed
- 13:56by the numbers that big name auditors have implicitly
- 13:59blessed. In 1999, a number of insurers
- 14:02announced reserve adjustments that made a mockery of the
- 14:05earnings that investors had relied on earlier when making
- 14:08their buy and sell decisions. At Berkshire, we strive to be
- 14:12conservative and consistent in our reserving.
- 14:15Even so, we warn you that an unpleasant surprise is always
- 14:19possible. The table that follows shows at
- 14:21intervals the float generated by the various segments of
- 14:24Berkshires Insurance operations since we entered the business 33
- 14:28years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company,
- 14:31whose traditional lines are included in the segment.
- 14:34Another primary for the table, we have calculated our float
- 14:38which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium
- 14:41volume by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment
- 14:44reserves, funds held under reinsurance, assumed and
- 14:48unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents
- 14:51balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and
- 14:55deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance.
- 14:58Got that? Growth of float is important,
- 15:01but it's cost is what's vital. Over the years, we have usually
- 15:05recorded only a small underwriting loss, which means
- 15:08our cost of float was correspondingly low or actually
- 15:11had an underwriting profit, which means we were being paid
- 15:14for holding other people's money.
- 15:16Indeed, our cumulative result through 1998 was an underwriting
- 15:21profit. In 1999, however, we incurred a
- 15:24$1.4 billion underwriting loss that left us with float cost of
- 15:295.8%. One mildly mitigating factor.
- 15:33We enthusiastically welcomed $400 million of a loss because
- 15:37it stems from business that will deliver us exceptional float
- 15:41over the next decade. The balance of the loss,
- 15:44however, was decidedly unwelcome and our overall result must be
- 15:48judged extremely poor. Absent a mega catastrophe, we
- 15:52expect float cost to fall in 2000, but any decline will be
- 15:56tempered by our aggressive plans for GEICO, which we will discuss
- 15:59later. There are a number of people who
- 16:01deserve credit for manufacturing so much no cost float over the
- 16:06years. Foremost is Ajit Jain.
- 16:08It's simply impossible to overstate Ajit's value to
- 16:11Berkshire. He has from scratch built an
- 16:14outstanding reinsurance business, which during his
- 16:17tenure has earned an underwriting profit and now
- 16:19holds $6.3 billion of float. In Ajit, we have an underwriter
- 16:25equipped with the intelligence to properly rate most risks, the
- 16:28realism to forget about those he can't evaluate, the courage to
- 16:32write huge policies when the premium is appropriate, and the
- 16:36discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the premium
- 16:39is inadequate. It is rare to find a person
- 16:42possessing any one of these talents.
- 16:44For one person to have them all is remarkable.
- 16:47Since Ajit specializes in Super Cat reinsurance, a line in which
- 16:51losses are infrequent but extremely large when they occur,
- 16:55his business is sure to be far more volatile than most
- 16:58insurance operations to date. We have benefited from good luck
- 17:02on this volatile book. Even so, Ajit's achievements are
- 17:05truly extraordinary in a smaller but nevertheless important way.
- 17:10Our other primary insurance operation has also added to
- 17:13Berkshire's intrinsic value. This collection of insurers has
- 17:16delivered a $192 million underwriting profit over the
- 17:21past five years, while supplying us with the float shown in the
- 17:24table. In the insurance world, results
- 17:26like this are uncommon and for their feet, we thank Rod Eldred,
- 17:30Brad Kinsler, John Kaiser, Don Tall and Don Wurster.
- 17:34As I mentioned earlier, the general re operation had an
- 17:37exceptionally poor underwriting year in 1999.
- 17:41Though investment income left the company well in the black.
- 17:44Our business was extremely underpriced both domestically
- 17:47and internationally, a condition that is improving but not yet
- 17:51corrected. Over time, however, the company
- 17:54should develop a growing amount of low cost float at both
- 17:58General Rhee and it's Cologne subsidiary.
- 18:00Incentive compensation plans are now directly tied to the
- 18:03variables of float growth and cost of float, the same
- 18:07variables that determine value for owners.
- 18:09Even though a reinsurer may have a tightly focused and rational
- 18:13compensation system, it cannot count on every year coming up
- 18:17roses. Reinsurance is a highly volatile
- 18:20business, and neither General Rhee nor Ajit's operation is
- 18:23immune to bad pricing behavior in the industry.
- 18:26But General Rhee has the distribution, the underwriting
- 18:29skills, the culture, and, with Berkshire's backing, the
- 18:33financial clout to become the world's most profitable
- 18:36reinsurance company. Getting there will take time,
- 18:39energy and discipline, but we have no doubt that Ron Ferguson
- 18:42and his crew can make it happen. GEICO 1800 847-7536 or
- 18:49geico.com. GEICO made exceptional progress
- 18:52in 1999. The reasons are simple.
- 18:55We have a terrific business idea of being implemented by an
- 18:58extraordinary manager, Tony Nicely.
- 19:01When Berkshire purchased GEICO at the beginning of 1996, we
- 19:05handed the keys to Tony and asked him to run the operation
- 19:08exactly as if he owned 100% of it.
- 19:11He has done the rest. Take a look at his scorecard.
- 19:14In 1995, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652
- 19:20telephone counselors. Last year, the company spent
- 19:23$242 million and the counselor count grew to 2631.
- 19:29And we are just starting. The pace will step up materially
- 19:32in 2000. Indeed, we would happily commit
- 19:35$1 billion annually to marketing if we knew we could handle the
- 19:39business smoothly and if we expected the last dollar spent
- 19:42to produce new business at an attractive cost.
- 19:45Currently, 2 trends are affecting acquisition costs.
- 19:49The bad news is that it has become more expensive to develop
- 19:52inquiries. Media rates have risen, and we
- 19:55are also seeing diminishing returns.
- 19:58That is as both we and our competitors step up advertising.
- 20:02Inquiries per ad fall for all of us.
- 20:04These negatives are partly offset however by the fact that
- 20:08our closure ratio, the percentage of inquiries
- 20:11converted to sales has steadily improved.
- 20:14Overall, we believe that our cost of new business though
- 20:17definitely rising is well below that of the industry.
- 20:20Of even greater importance, our operating costs for renewal
- 20:24business are the lowest among broad based national auto
- 20:27insurers. Both of these major competitive
- 20:30advantages are sustainable. Others may copy our model, but
- 20:34they will be unable to replicate our economics.
- 20:37The table above makes it appear that Geico's retention of policy
- 20:40holders is falling, but for two reasons appearances are in this
- 20:44case deceiving. First, in the last few years our
- 20:47business mix has moved away from preferred policy holders for
- 20:51whom industry wide retention rates are high towards standard
- 20:54and non standard policy holders for whom retention rates are
- 20:58much lower. Despite the nomenclature, the
- 21:01three classes have similar profit prospects.
- 21:03Second, retention rates for relatively new policy holders
- 21:07are always lower than those for long time customers and because
- 21:10of our accelerated growth, our policy holder ranks now include
- 21:14an increased proportion of new customers.
- 21:17Adjusted for these two factors, our retention rate has changed
- 21:21hardly at all. We told you last year that
- 21:23underwriting margins for both GEICO and the industry would
- 21:26fall in 1999 and they did. We make a similar prediction for
- 21:312000. A few years ago, margins got too
- 21:34wide. Having enjoyed the effects of an
- 21:36unusual and unexpected decrease in the frequency and severity of
- 21:40accidents, the industry responded by reducing rates but
- 21:44now is having to contend with an increase in loss costs.
- 21:48We would not be surprised to see the margins of auto insurers
- 21:51deteriorate by around 3 percentage points in 2002.
- 21:55Negatives, besides worsening frequency and severity, will
- 21:59hurt the industry this year. First, rate increases go into
- 22:02effect only slowly, both because of regulatory delay and because
- 22:07insurance contracts must run their course before new rates
- 22:10can be put in. Second, reported earnings of
- 22:13many auto insurers have benefited in the last few years
- 22:16from reserve releases it made possible because the companies
- 22:19overestimated their lost costs in still earlier years.
- 22:23This reservoir of redundant reserves has now largely dried
- 22:27up, and future boosts to earnings from this source will
- 22:30be minor at best in compensating its associates.
- 22:33From Tony on down, GEICO continues to use two variables
- 22:37and only two in determining what bonuses and profit sharing
- 22:41contributions will be. One, it's percentage growth in
- 22:44policyholders and two, the earnings of its seasoned
- 22:47business meaning policies that have been with us for more than
- 22:50a year. We did outstandingly well on
- 22:53both fronts during 1999 and therefore made a profit sharing
- 22:57payment of 28.4% of salary, in total $113.3 million to the
- 23:03great majority of our associates.
- 23:05Tony and I love writing those checks.
- 23:08At Berkshire. We want to have compensation
- 23:10policies that are both easy to understand and In Sync with what
- 23:13we wish our associates to accomplish.
- 23:16Writing new business is expensive and as mentioned,
- 23:19getting more expensive. If we were to include those
- 23:22costs in our calculation of bonuses, as management's did
- 23:25before our arrival at GEICO, we would be penalizing our
- 23:29associates for garnering new policies, even though these are
- 23:32very much in Berkshire's interest.
- 23:34So in effect, we say to our associates that we will foot the
- 23:38bill for new business. Indeed, because percentage
- 23:41growth and policy holders is part of our compensation scheme,
- 23:45we reward our associates for producing this initially and
- 23:48profitable business, and then we reward them additionally for
- 23:51holding down costs on our seasoned business.
- 23:54Despite the extensive advertising we do, our best
- 23:58source of new business is word of mouth recommendations from
- 24:01existing policy holders who on the whole are pleased with our
- 24:04prices and service. An article published last year
- 24:07by Kiplinger's Personal Finance magazine gives a good picture of
- 24:11where we stand in customer satisfaction.
- 24:13The magazine survey of 20 state insurance departments showed
- 24:17that Geico's complaint ratio was well below the ratio for most of
- 24:21its major competitors. Our strong referral business
- 24:24means that we probably could maintain our policy count by
- 24:27spending as little as $50 million annually on advertising.
- 24:31That's a guess, of course, and we will never know whether it is
- 24:34accurate because Tony's foot is going to stay on the advertising
- 24:38pedal and my foot will be on his.
- 24:40Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that a major
- 24:43percentage of the $300 to $350 million we will spend in 2000 on
- 24:48advertising, as well as large additional costs we will incur
- 24:52for sales counselors, communications and facilities
- 24:55are optional outlays we choose to make so that we can both
- 24:58achieve significant growth and extend and solidify the promise
- 25:02of the GEICO brand in the minds of Americans.
- 25:05Personally, I think these expenditures are the best
- 25:08investment Berkshire can make through its advertising.
- 25:11GEICO is acquiring a direct relationship with a huge number
- 25:15of households that on average will send US $1100 year after
- 25:20year. That makes us among all
- 25:22companies selling whatever kind of product, one of the countries
- 25:26leading direct merchandisers. Also as we build our long term
- 25:30relationships with more and more families, cash is pouring and
- 25:33rather than going out. No Internet economics here.
- 25:36Last year as GEICO increased its customer base by 766256, it
- 25:42gained $590 million of cash from operating earnings and the
- 25:46increase in float. In the past three years, we have
- 25:49increased our market share in personal auto insurance from
- 25:522.7% to 4.1%. But we rightfully belong in many
- 25:57more households, maybe even yours.
- 26:00Give us a call and find out. About 40% of those people
- 26:03checking our rates find that they can save money by doing
- 26:06business with us. The proportion is not 100%
- 26:09because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with
- 26:12some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in
- 26:16certain geographic areas or work at certain occupations.
- 26:19Our closure rate indicates, however, that we more frequently
- 26:23offer the low price than does any other national carrier,
- 26:26selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states, we
- 26:30can offer a special discount, usually 8%, to our shareholders.
- 26:35Just be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so
- 26:39that our sales counselor can make the appropriate adjustment.
- 26:42It's with sadness that I report to you that Lorimer Davidson,
- 26:45Geico's former chairman, died last November, a few days after
- 26:49his 97th birthday. For GEICO, Davy was a business
- 26:53giant who moved the company up to the big leagues.
- 26:56For me, he was a friend, teacher and hero.
- 26:59I have told you of his lifelong kindnesses to me in past
- 27:02reports. Clearly, my life would have
- 27:05developed far differently had he not been a part of it.
- 27:08Tony Lou Simpson and I visited Davy in August and marveled at
- 27:12his mental alertness, particularly in all matters
- 27:15regarding GEICO. He was the company's number one
- 27:18supporter right up to the end and we will forever miss him.
- 27:22Aviation Services Our two aviation services companies,
- 27:25Flight Safety International FSI and Executive Jet Aviation EJ,
- 27:31are both runaway leaders in their field.
- 27:33EJA, which sells and manages the fractional ownership of Jet
- 27:37Aircraft through its Net Jets program, is larger than its next
- 27:40two competitors combined. FSI trains pilots as well as
- 27:44other transportation professionals and is five times
- 27:48or so the size of its nearest competitor.
- 27:50Another common characteristic of the company's is that they are
- 27:53still managed by their founding entrepreneurs.
- 27:56Al Ulchi started FSI in 1951 with $10,000, and Rich Santouli
- 28:02invented the fractional ownership industry in 1986.
- 28:06These men are both remarkable managers who have no financial
- 28:09need to work but thrive on helping their companies grow and
- 28:12excel. Though these two businesses have
- 28:15leadership positions that are similar, they differ in their
- 28:18economic characteristics. FSI must layout huge amounts of
- 28:22capital. A single flight simulator can
- 28:24cost as much as $15 million and we have 222 only one person at a
- 28:30time. Furthermore can be trained in a
- 28:32simulator, which means that the capital investment per dollar of
- 28:35revenue at FSI is exceptionally high.
- 28:38Operating margins must therefore also be high if we were to earn
- 28:42a reasonable return on capital. Last year, we made capital
- 28:45expenditures of $215 million at FSI and Flight Safety Boeing,
- 28:51it's 50% owned affiliate. At EJ in contrast, the customer
- 28:56owns the equipment, though we of course must invest in a core
- 29:01fleet of our own planes to ensure outstanding service.
- 29:04For example, the Sunday after Thanksgiving, EJ's busiest day
- 29:08of the year, strains our resources.
- 29:10Since fractions of 169 planes are owned by 1412 customers,
- 29:15many of whom are bent on flying home between 3:00 and 6:00 PM on
- 29:19that day and certain others, We need a supply of company owned
- 29:23aircraft to make sure all parties get where they want,
- 29:26when they want. Still, most of the planes we fly
- 29:29are owned by customers, which means that modest pre tax
- 29:32margins in this business can produce good returns on equity.
- 29:36Currently our customers own planes worth over $2 billion and
- 29:40in addition, we have $4.2 billion of planes on order.
- 29:44Indeed, the limiting factor in our business right now is the
- 29:47availability of planes. We now are taking delivery of
- 29:51about 8% of all business jets manufactured in the world and we
- 29:55wish we could get a bigger share than that.
- 29:57Though EJ was supply constrained in 1999, it's recurring
- 30:01revenues, monthly management fees plus hourly flight fees
- 30:05increased 46%. The fractional ownership
- 30:09industry is still in its infancy.
- 30:11EJA is now building critical mass in Europe and over time we
- 30:15will expand around the world. Doing that will be expensive,
- 30:18very expensive, but we will spend what it takes.
- 30:21Scale is vital to both us and our customers.
- 30:24The company with the most planes in the air worldwide will be
- 30:27able to offer its customers the best service.
- 30:30Buy a fraction, Get a fleet has real meaning at EJEJA enjoys
- 30:35another important advantage in that its two largest competitors
- 30:39are both subsidiaries of aircraft manufacturers and sell
- 30:43only the aircraft their parents make.
- 30:45Though these are fine planes, these competitors are severely
- 30:48limited in the cabin styles and mission capabilities they can
- 30:51offer. EJ, in contrast, offers a wide
- 30:55array of planes from 5 suppliers.
- 30:57Consequently, we can give the customer whatever he needs to
- 31:00buy rather than his getting what the competitors parent needs to
- 31:03sell. During the past year, 2 of
- 31:06Berkshire's outside directors have also signed on with EJA.
- 31:09Maybe we're paying them too much.
- 31:11You should be aware that they and I are charged exactly the
- 31:14same price for planes and service as is any other
- 31:17customer. EJA follows a most Favored
- 31:20Nations policy with no one getting a special deal.
- 31:24And now brace yourself. Last year, the EJA passed the
- 31:27ultimate test. Charlie signed up.
- 31:30No other endorsement could speak more eloquently to the value of
- 31:33the EJA service. Give us a call at 1-800-848-6436
- 31:40and ask for our white paper on fractional ownership
- 31:44acquisitions of 1999. At both GEICO and Executive Jet,
- 31:48our best source of new customers is the happy ones.
- 31:51We already have. Indeed, about 65% of our new
- 31:56owners of aircraft come as referrals from current owners
- 31:59who have fallen in love with the service.
- 32:01Our acquisitions usually develop in the same way.
- 32:04At other companies, executives may devote themselves to
- 32:07pursuing acquisition possibilities with investment
- 32:10bankers utilizing an auction process that has become
- 32:13standardized. In this exercise, the bankers
- 32:16prepare a book that makes me think of the Superman comics of
- 32:19my youth. In the Wall Street version, a
- 32:22formerly mild mannered company emerges from the investment
- 32:25bankers phone booth, able to leap over competitors in a
- 32:28single bound and with earnings moving faster than a speeding
- 32:32bullet. Titillated by the book's
- 32:34description of the Aquarius Powers acquisition.
- 32:37Hungry CE OS Lois Lanes all beneath their cool exteriors,
- 32:41promptly sworn. What's particularly entertaining
- 32:44in these books is the precision with which earnings are
- 32:47projected for many years ahead. If you ask the author banker,
- 32:50however, what his own firm will earn next month, he will go into
- 32:54a protective Crouch and tell you that business and markets are
- 32:57far too uncertain for him to venture a forecast.
- 33:01Here's one story I can't resist relating.
- 33:03In 1985, a major investment banking house undertook to sell
- 33:08Scott Fetzer, offering it widely but with no success.
- 33:12Upon reading of this strikeout, I wrote Ralph Shay, then and now
- 33:16Scott Fetzer CEO, expressing an interest in buying the business.
- 33:20I had never met Ralph, but within a week we had a deal.
- 33:23Unfortunately, Scott Fetzer's letter of engagement with the
- 33:26banking firm provided it a $2.5 million fee upon sale, even if
- 33:31it had nothing to do with finding the buyer.
- 33:34I guess the lead banker felt he should do something for his
- 33:36payment, so he graciously offered us a copy of the book on
- 33:39Scott Fetzer that his firm had prepared with his customary
- 33:43tact. Charlie responded, I'll pay $2.5
- 33:46million not to read it. Which brings us to the furniture
- 33:49business. Two years ago, I recounted how
- 33:52the acquisition of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983 and my
- 33:56subsequent association with the Blumkin family led to follow on
- 34:00transactions with RC Wiley 1995 and Star Furniture 1997.
- 34:06For me, these relationships have all been terrific.
- 34:09Not only did Berkshire acquire 3 outstanding retailers, these
- 34:13deals also allowed me to become friends with some of the finest
- 34:16people you will ever meet. Naturally, I have persistently
- 34:20asked the Blumpkins, Bill Child and Melvin Wolf whether there
- 34:23are any more out there like you. They're invariable answer was
- 34:26the Tattleman Brothers of New England and their remarkable
- 34:30furniture business Jordan's. I met Barry and Elliott
- 34:33Tattleman last year and we soon signed an agreement for
- 34:36Berkshire to acquire the company.
- 34:38Like our three previous furniture acquisitions, this
- 34:41business had long been in the family, in this case since 1927
- 34:46when Barry and Elliot's grandfather began operations in
- 34:49a Boston suburb. Under the brothers management,
- 34:52Jordan's has grown ever more dominant in its region, becoming
- 34:56the largest furniture retailer in New Hampshire as well as
- 34:59Massachusetts. The Tattlemans don't just sell
- 35:01furniture or manage stores, they also present customers with a
- 35:05dazzling entertainment experience called shop
- 35:08retainment. A family visiting a store can
- 35:10have a terrific time while concurrently viewing an
- 35:13extraordinary selection of merchandise.
- 35:16The business results are also extraordinary.
- 35:18Jordan's has the highest sales per square foot of any major
- 35:22furniture operation in the country.
- 35:24I urge you to visit one of their stores if you are in the Boston
- 35:26area, particularly the one at Natick, which is Jordan's
- 35:30newest. Bring money.
- 35:32Barry and Elliott are classy people, just like their
- 35:35counterparts at Berkshire's three other furniture
- 35:37operations. When they sold to us, they
- 35:39elected to give each of their employees at least 50 for every
- 35:43hour that he or she had worked for Jordan's.
- 35:46This payment added up to $9 million, which came from the
- 35:49Tattleman's own pockets, not from Berkshire's, and Barry and
- 35:53Elliott were thrilled to write the checks.
- 35:55Each of our furniture operations is #1 in its territory.
- 35:59We now sell more furniture than anyone else in Massachusetts,
- 36:03New Hampshire, Texas, Nebraska, Utah and Idaho.
- 36:07Last year, stars Melvin Wolf and his sister Shirley Tumum scored
- 36:11two major successes, a move into San Antonio and a significant
- 36:16enlargement of Stars store in Austin.
- 36:18There's no operation in the furniture retailing business
- 36:21remotely like the one assembled by Berkshire.
- 36:24It's fun for me and profitable for you.
- 36:26WC Fields once said it was a woman who drove me to drink, but
- 36:31unfortunately I never had the chance to thank her.
- 36:34I don't want to make that mistake.
- 36:36My thanks go to Louie Ron and Irv Blumkin for getting me
- 36:39started in the furniture business and for unerringly
- 36:42guiding me as we have assembled the group we now have now for
- 36:46our second acquisition deal. It came to us through my good
- 36:49friend Walter Scott, junior Chairman of Level 3
- 36:53Communications and a director of Berkshire.
- 36:55Walter has many other business connections as well, and one of
- 36:59them is with Mid American Energy, a utility company in
- 37:02which he has substantial holdings and on whose board he
- 37:05sits. At a conference in California
- 37:07that we both attended last September, Walter casually asked
- 37:10me whether Berkshire might be interested in making a large
- 37:13investment in Mid American, and from the start, the idea of
- 37:17being in partnership with Walter struck me as a good one.
- 37:20Upon returning to Omaha, I read some of Mid Americans public
- 37:23reports and had two short meetings with Walter and David
- 37:27Sokol, Mid Americans talented and entrepreneurial Ceoi then
- 37:31said that at an appropriate price, we would indeed like to
- 37:34make a deal. Acquisitions in the electric
- 37:37utility industry are complicated by a variety of regulations,
- 37:41including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- 37:45Therefore, we had to structure a transaction that would avoid
- 37:49Berkshire gaining voting control.
- 37:51Instead, we are purchasing an 11% fixed income security along
- 37:55with a combination of common stock and exchangeable preferred
- 37:58that will give Berkshire just under 10% of the voting power of
- 38:02Mid American, but about 76% of the equity interest.
- 38:06All told, our investment will be about $2 billion.
- 38:10Walter characteristically backed up his convictions with real
- 38:13money. He and his family will buy more
- 38:16Mid American stock for cash when the transaction closes, bringing
- 38:19their total investment to about $280 million.
- 38:24Walter will also be the controlling shareholder of the
- 38:26company, and I can't think of a better person to hold that post.
- 38:30Though there are many regulatory constraints in the utility
- 38:33industry, it's possible that we will make additional commitments
- 38:36in the field. If we do, the amounts involved
- 38:39could be large acquisition accounting.
- 38:41Once again, I would like to make some comments about accounting,
- 38:44in this case about its application to acquisitions.
- 38:47This is currently a very contentious topic and before the
- 38:51dust settles, Congress may even intervene.
- 38:54A truly terrible idea. When a company is acquired,
- 38:58Generally Accepted Accounting Principles GAAP currently
- 39:01condone 2 very different ways of recording the transaction,
- 39:05purchase and pooling. In a pooling, stock must be the
- 39:09currency in a purchase. Payment can be made in either
- 39:12cash or stock, whatever the currency.
- 39:15Management's usually detest purchase accounting because it
- 39:18almost always requires that a goodwill account be established
- 39:22and subsequently written off, a process that saddles earnings
- 39:26with a large annual charge that normally persists for decades.
- 39:29In contrast, pooling avoids a goodwill account, which is why
- 39:33management's love it. Now, the Financial Accounting
- 39:36Standards Board, FASB, has proposed an end to pooling, and
- 39:40many CE OS are girding for battle.
- 39:43It will be an important fight, so we'll venture some opinions.
- 39:46To begin with, we agree with the many managers who argue that
- 39:50goodwill amortization charges are usually spurious.
- 39:53You'll find my thinking about this in the appendix to our 1983
- 39:57Annual Report, which is available on our website.
- 40:00And in the owner's manual on pages 55 to 62.
- 40:04For accounting rules to mandate amortization that will, in the
- 40:08usual case, conflict with reality is deeply troublesome.
- 40:12Most accounting charges relate to what's going on, even if they
- 40:15don't precisely measure it. As an example, depreciation
- 40:19charges can't with precision calibrate the decline in value
- 40:22that physical assets suffer. But these charges do at least
- 40:25describe something that is truly occurring.
- 40:28Physical assets invariably deteriorate correspondingly.
- 40:32Obsolescence charges for inventories, bad debt charges
- 40:35for receivables, and accruals for warranties are among the
- 40:38charges that reflect true costs. The annual charges for these
- 40:42expenses can't be exactly measured, but the necessity for
- 40:46estimating them is obvious. In contrast, economic goodwill
- 40:50does not in many cases diminish. Indeed, in a great many
- 40:55instances, perhaps most, it actually grows in value over
- 40:58time. In character, economic goodwill
- 41:01is much like land. The value of both assets is sure
- 41:05to fluctuate, but the direction in which value is going to go is
- 41:08in no way ordained. At SEAS, for example, economic
- 41:12goodwill has grown in an irregular but very substantial
- 41:16manner for 78 years, and if we run the business right, growth
- 41:21of that kind will probably continue for at least another 78
- 41:24years. To escape from the fiction of
- 41:26goodwill charges, managers embrace the fiction of pooling.
- 41:30This accounting convention is grounded in the poetic notion
- 41:33that when two rivers merge, their streams become
- 41:36indistinguishable. Under this concept, a company
- 41:39that has been merged into a larger enterprise has not been
- 41:43purchased, even though it will often have received a large
- 41:46sellout premium. Consequently, no goodwill is
- 41:49created and those pesky subsequent charges to earnings
- 41:53are eliminated. Instead, the accounting for the
- 41:56ongoing entity is handled as if the businesses had forever been
- 41:59one unit. So much for poetry.
- 42:02The reality of merging is usually far different.
- 42:05There is indisputably an acquirer and an inquiry, and the
- 42:09latter has been purchased no matter how the deal has been
- 42:12structured. If you think otherwise, just ask
- 42:15employees severed from their jobs which company was the
- 42:17Conqueror and which was the conquered.
- 42:19You will find no confusion. So on this point, the FASB is
- 42:23correct. In most mergers a purchase has
- 42:26been made. Yes, there are some true mergers
- 42:29of equals, but they are few and far between.
- 42:32Charlie and I believe there's a reality based approach that
- 42:35should both satisfy the FASB, which correctly wishes to record
- 42:39a purchase and meet the objections of management's to
- 42:42nonsensical charges for diminution of goodwill.
- 42:45We would first have the acquiring company record its
- 42:47purchase price whether paid in stock or cash at fair value.
- 42:52In most cases, this procedure would create a large asset
- 42:56representing economic goodwill. We would then leave this asset
- 42:59on the books, not requiring its amortization later.
- 43:03If the economic goodwill became impaired, as it sometimes would,
- 43:07it would be written down, just as would any other asset judged
- 43:11to be impaired. If our proposed rule were to be
- 43:13adopted, it should be applied retroactively so that
- 43:17acquisition accounting would be consistent throughout America, a
- 43:20far cry from what exists today. 1 Prediction.
- 43:24If this plan were to take effect, managements would
- 43:26structure acquisitions more sensibly, deciding whether to
- 43:29use cash or stock based on the real consequences for their
- 43:33shareholders rather than on the unreal consequences for their
- 43:36reported earnings. In our purchase of Jordans, we
- 43:39followed a procedure that will maximize the cash produced for
- 43:42our shareholders but minimize the earnings we report to you.
- 43:45Berkshire purchased assets for cash, an approach that on our
- 43:49tax returns permits us to amortize the resulting goodwill
- 43:52over a 15 year period. Obviously, this tax deduction
- 43:56materially increases the amount of cash delivered by the
- 43:59business. In contrast, when stock rather
- 44:03than assets is purchased for cash, the resulting write offs
- 44:06of goodwill are not tax deductible.
- 44:09The economic difference between these two approaches is
- 44:11substantial. From the economic standpoint of
- 44:14the acquiring company, the worst deal of all is a stock for stock
- 44:18acquisition. Here, a huge price is often paid
- 44:21without there being any step up in the tax basis of either the
- 44:24stock of the acquiry or its assets.
- 44:27If the acquired entity is subsequently sold, its owner may
- 44:30owe a large capital gains tax at a 35% or greater rate, even
- 44:35though the sale may truly be producing a major economic loss.
- 44:39We have made some deals at Berkshire that used far from
- 44:42optimal tax structures. These deals occurred because the
- 44:45sellers insisted on a given structure and because overall we
- 44:49still felt the acquisition made sense.
- 44:52We have never done an inefficiently structured deal,
- 44:55however, in order to make our figures look better.
- 44:58Sources of Reported Earnings The table that follows shows the
- 45:02main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings in this
- 45:05presentation. Purchase accounting adjustments
- 45:07are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply,
- 45:11but are instead aggregated and shown separately.
- 45:14This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as
- 45:17they would have been reported have we not purchased them for
- 45:20the reasons discussed on page 61.
- 45:22This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to
- 45:25investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted
- 45:29accounting principles GAP, which require purchase premiums to be
- 45:33charged off business by business.
- 45:35The total earnings we show in the table are of course
- 45:38identical to the GAP total in our audited financial
- 45:41statements. Almost all of our manufacturing,
- 45:44retailing and service businesses had excellent results in 1999.
- 45:49The exception was Dexter Shoe and there the shortfall did not
- 45:52occur. Because of managerial problems
- 45:55and skills, energy and devotion to their work, the Dexter
- 45:58executives are every bit the equal of our other managers.
- 46:02But we manufacture shoes primarily in the US, and it has
- 46:05become extremely difficult for domestic producers to compete
- 46:08effectively. In 1999, approximately 93% of
- 46:13the 1.3 billion pairs of shoes purchased in this country came
- 46:17from abroad, where extremely low cost labor is the rule.
- 46:20Counting both Dexter and HH Brown, we are currently the
- 46:25leading domestic manufacturer of shoes and we are likely to
- 46:29continue to be. We have loyal, highly skilled
- 46:32workers in our US plants and we want to retain every job here
- 46:36that we can. Nevertheless, in order to remain
- 46:38viable, we are sourcing more of our output internationally.
- 46:42In doing that, we have incurred significant severance and
- 46:45relocation costs that are included in the earnings we show
- 46:49in the table a few years back. Helzberg's our 200 store jewelry
- 46:53operation needed to make operating adjustments to restore
- 46:57margins to appropriate levels. Under Jeff Comments leadership,
- 47:00the job was done and profits have dramatically rebounded in
- 47:04the shoe business where we have Harold Alfond, Peter Lunder,
- 47:08Frank Rooney and Jim Isler in charge.
- 47:10I believe we will see a similar improvement over the next few
- 47:13years. See's Candies deserves a special
- 47:16comment given that it achieved a record operating margin of 24%
- 47:21last year. Since we bought SEAS for $25
- 47:24million in 1972, it has earned $857 million pre tax and despite
- 47:31its growth, the business has required very little additional
- 47:34capital. Give the credit for this
- 47:36performance to Chuck Huggins. Charlie and I put him in charge
- 47:40the day of our purchase and his fanatical insistence on both
- 47:43product quality and friendly service has rewarded customers,
- 47:47employees and owners. Chuck gets better every year.
- 47:51When he took charge of CS at age 46, the company's pre tax
- 47:55profit, expressed in millions, was about 10% of his age.
- 47:59Today he's 74 and the ratio has increased to 100%.
- 48:04Having discovered this mathematical relationship, let's
- 48:07call it Huggins Law, Charlie and I now become giddy at the mere
- 48:10thought of Chuck's birthday. Additional information about our
- 48:14various businesses is given on pages 39 to 54 where you will
- 48:18also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis.
- 48:22In addition, on pages 63 to 69, we have rearranged Berkshire's
- 48:27financial data into four segments on a non GAAP basis, a
- 48:30presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think
- 48:34about the company look through earnings.
- 48:36Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic
- 48:39progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the
- 48:43table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive
- 48:46from investees, though these dividends typically represent
- 48:50only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our
- 48:53ownership. Not that we mind this division
- 48:56of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed
- 48:59earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion
- 49:03paid out. The reason for our thinking is
- 49:05simple. Our investees often have the
- 49:07opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return.
- 49:11So why should we want them paid out to depict something closer
- 49:14to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings.
- 49:17Though we employ the concept of look through earnings as we
- 49:22calculate these. They consist of one the
- 49:24operating earnings reported in the previous section plus to our
- 49:28share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that
- 49:32under GAAP accounting are not reflected in our profits less.
- 49:363IN allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if
- 49:39these retained earnings of investees had instead been
- 49:42distributed to us. When tabulating operating
- 49:45earnings here, we exclude purchase accounting adjustments
- 49:48as well as capital gains and other major non recurring items.
- 49:52The following table sets forth our 1999 look through earnings,
- 49:56though I warn you that the figures can be no more than
- 49:59approximate since they are based on a number of judgement calls.
- 50:03The dividends paid to us by these investees have been
- 50:05included in the operating earnings itemized on page 13,
- 50:09mostly under insurance Group. Net investment income represents
- 50:13tax basis cost which in aggregate is $691 million less
- 50:19than GAAP cost. We made few portfolio changes in
- 50:221999. As I mentioned earlier, several
- 50:25of the companies in which we have large investments had
- 50:28disappointing business results last year.
- 50:30Nevertheless, we believe these companies have important
- 50:33competitive advantages that will endure over time.
- 50:36This attribute which makes for good long term investment
- 50:39results is 1C and I occasionally believe we can identify.
- 50:44More often, however, we can't not at least with a high degree
- 50:48of conviction. This explains, by the way, why
- 50:51we don't own stocks of tech companies, even though we share
- 50:54the general view that our society will be transformed by
- 50:58their products and services. Our problem, which we can't
- 51:01solve by studying up, is that we have no insights into which
- 51:04participants in the tech field possess a truly durable
- 51:07competitive advantage. Our lack of tech insights, we
- 51:11should add, does not distress us.
- 51:13After all, there are a great many business areas in which
- 51:16Charlie and I have no special capital allocation expertise.
- 51:20For instance, we bring nothing to the table when it comes to
- 51:23evaluating patents, manufacturing processes, or
- 51:27geological prospects. So we simply don't get into
- 51:29judgements in those fields. If we have a strength, it is in
- 51:33recognizing when we are operating well within our circle
- 51:36of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter.
- 51:39Predicting the long term economics of companies that
- 51:42operate in fast changing industries is simply far beyond
- 51:46our perimeter. If others claim predictive skill
- 51:49in those industries and seem to have their claims validated by
- 51:52the behavior of the stock market, we neither envy nor
- 51:55emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what
- 51:58we understand. If we stray, we will have done
- 52:01so inadvertently, not because we got restless and substituted
- 52:05hope for rationality. Fortunately, it's almost certain
- 52:09there will be opportunities from time to time for Berkshire to do
- 52:12well within the circle we've staked out.
- 52:15Right now, the prices of the fine businesses we already own
- 52:18are just not that attractive. In other words, we feel much
- 52:22better about the businesses than their stocks.
- 52:24That's why we haven't added to our present holdings.
- 52:27Nevertheless, we haven't yet scaled back our portfolio in a
- 52:30major way. If the choice is between a
- 52:33questionable business at a comfortable price or a
- 52:35comfortable business at a questionable price, we much
- 52:38prefer the latter. What really gets our attention,
- 52:41however, is a comfortable business at a comfortable price.
- 52:45Our reservations about the prices of securities we own
- 52:48apply also to the general level of equity prices.
- 52:51We have never attempted to forecast what the stock market
- 52:54is going to do in the next month or the next year, and we are not
- 52:57trying to do that now. But as I point out in the
- 53:00enclosed article, equity investors currently seem wildly
- 53:04optimistic in their expectations about future returns.
- 53:08We see the growth in corporate profits as being largely tied to
- 53:11the business done in the country, GDP, and we see GDP
- 53:15growing at a real rate of about 3%.
- 53:18In addition, we have hypothesized 2% inflation.
- 53:22Charlie and I have no particular conviction about the accuracy of
- 53:252%, however, it's the market's view.
- 53:29Treasury inflation protected securities TIPS yield about two
- 53:32percentage points less than the standard Treasury bond.
- 53:35And if you believe inflation rates are going to be higher
- 53:37than that, you can profit by simply buying TIPS and shorting
- 53:41governments. If profits do indeed grow along
- 53:44with GDP at about a 5% rate, the valuation placed on American
- 53:49business is unlikely to climb by much more than that.
- 53:52Add in something for dividends and you emerge with returns from
- 53:55equities that are dramatically less than most investors have
- 53:59either experienced in the past or expect in the future.
- 54:02If investor expectations become more realistic, and they almost
- 54:06certainly will, the market adjustment is apartment to be
- 54:10severe, particularly in sectors in which speculation has been
- 54:13concentrated. Berkshire will someday have
- 54:16opportunities to deploy major amounts of cash in equity
- 54:19markets. We are confident of that.
- 54:21But as the song goes, who knows where or when?
- 54:25Meanwhile, if anyone starts explaining to you what is going
- 54:29on in the truly manic portions of this enchanted market, you
- 54:33might remember still another line of song.
- 54:35Fools give you reasons. Wise men never try share
- 54:39repurchases. Recently, a number of
- 54:42shareholders have suggested to us that Berkshire repurchase its
- 54:45shares. Usually the requests were
- 54:47rationally based, but a few leaned on spurious logic.
- 54:51There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable
- 54:54for a company to repurchase its shares.
- 54:57First, the company has available funds, cash plus sensible
- 55:01borrowing capacity beyond the near term needs of the business,
- 55:05and 2nd finds its stock selling in the market below its
- 55:08intrinsic value, conservatively calculated.
- 55:11To this we add a caveat. Shareholders should have been
- 55:15supplied all the information they need for estimating that
- 55:18value. Otherwise, insiders could take
- 55:20advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their
- 55:23interests at a fraction of true worth.
- 55:26We have on rare occasions seen that happen.
- 55:29Usually, of course, chicanery is employed to drive stock prices
- 55:33up, not down. The business needs that I speak
- 55:36of are of two kinds. First, expenditures that a
- 55:39company must make to maintain its competitive position, EG the
- 55:43remodeling of stores at Helzberg's.
- 55:45And 2nd, optional outlays aimed at business growth that
- 55:49management expects will produce more than a dollar of value for
- 55:52each dollar spent. RC Wiley's expansion into Idaho.
- 55:57When available funds exceed needs of those kinds, a company
- 56:01with a growth oriented shareholder population can buy
- 56:03new businesses or repurchase shares.
- 56:06If a company's stock is selling well below intrinsic value,
- 56:09repurchases usually make the most sense.
- 56:12In the mid 1970's, the wisdom of making these was virtually
- 56:16screaming at management's, but few responded.
- 56:19In most cases, those that did made their owners much wealthier
- 56:23than if alternative courses of action had been pursued.
- 56:26Indeed, during the 1970s and spasmodically for some years
- 56:30thereafter, we searched for companies that were large
- 56:33repurchasers of their shares. This often was a tip off that
- 56:36the company was both undervalued and run by a shareholder
- 56:39oriented management. That day has passed.
- 56:42Now repurchases are all the rage, but are all too often made
- 56:46for an unstated and in our view, ignoble reason to pump or
- 56:51support the stock price. The shareholder who chooses to
- 56:54sell today, of course, is benefited by any buyer, whatever
- 56:59his origin or motives, but the continuing shareholder is
- 57:02penalized by repurchases above intrinsic value.
- 57:05Buying dollar bills for 1.10 dollars is not good business for
- 57:09those who stick around. Charlie and I admit that we feel
- 57:13confident in estimating intrinsic value for only a
- 57:16portion of traded equities, and then only when we employ a range
- 57:20of values rather than some pseudo precise figure.
- 57:23Nevertheless, it appears to us that many companies now making
- 57:27repurchases are overpaying departing shareholders at the
- 57:30expense of those who stay. In defense of those companies, I
- 57:33would say that it is natural for CEOs to be optimistic about
- 57:37their own businesses. They also know a whole lot more
- 57:39about them than I do. However, I can't help but feel
- 57:42that too often today's repurchases are dictated by
- 57:45management's desire to show confidence or be in fashion,
- 57:49rather than by a desire to enhance per share value.
- 57:52Sometimes, too, companies say they are repurchasing shares to
- 57:56offset the shares issued when stock options granted at much
- 57:59lower prices are exercised. This buy high, sell low strategy
- 58:04is 1. Many unfortunate investors have
- 58:06employed, but never intentionally.
- 58:08Managements, however, seem to follow this perverse activity
- 58:12very cheerfully. Of course, both option grants
- 58:16and repurchases may make sense. But if that's the case, it's not
- 58:20because the two activities are logically related.
- 58:22Rationally, a company's decision to repurchase shares or to issue
- 58:26them should stand on its own feet.
- 58:28Just because stock has been issued to satisfy options or for
- 58:32any other reason does not mean that stocks should be
- 58:35repurchased at a price above intrinsic value.
- 58:38Correspondingly, a stock that sells well below intrinsic value
- 58:41should be repurchased, whether or not stock has previously been
- 58:45issued or maybe because of outstanding options.
- 58:48You should be aware that at certain times in the past I have
- 58:52erred in not making repurchases. My appraisal of Berkshire's
- 58:55value was then too conservative, or I was too enthused about some
- 58:59alternative use of fonts. We have therefore missed some
- 59:02opportunities, though Berkshire's trading volume at
- 59:05these points was too light for us to have done much buying,
- 59:08which means that the gain in our per share value would have been
- 59:11minimal. A repurchase of, say, 2% of a
- 59:14company's shares at a 25% discount from per share
- 59:17intrinsic value produces only a percent gain in that value at
- 59:21most, and even less if the funds could alternatively have been
- 59:24deployed in value building moves.
- 59:27Some of the letters we've received clearly imply that the
- 59:29rider is unconcerned about intrinsic value considerations,
- 59:33but instead wants us to trumpet an intention to repurchase so
- 59:36that the stock will rise or quit going down.
- 59:39If the rider wants to sell tomorrow, his thinking makes
- 59:42sense for him, but if he intends to hold, he should instead hope
- 59:46the stock falls and trades in enough volume for us to buy a
- 59:49lot of it. That's the only way a repurchase
- 59:52program can have any real benefit for a continuing
- 59:55shareholder. We will not repurchase shares
- 59:58unless we believe Berkshire stock is selling well below
- 1:00:01intrinsic value conservatively calculated.
- 1:00:04Nor will we attempt to talk the stock up or down.
- 1:00:06Neither publicly or privately have I ever told anyone to buy
- 1:00:10or sell Berkshire shares. Instead, we will give all
- 1:00:14shareholders and potential shareholders.
- 1:00:17The same valuation related information we would wish to
- 1:00:19have if our positions were reversed.
- 1:00:22Recently, when the A shares fell below $45,000, we considered
- 1:00:27making repurchases. We decided, however, to delay
- 1:00:31buying, if indeed we elect to do any until shareholders have had
- 1:00:35the chance to review this report.
- 1:00:37If we do find that repurchases make sense, we will only rarely
- 1:00:41place bids on the New York Stock Exchange NYSE.
- 1:00:44Instead, we will respond to offers made directly to us at or
- 1:00:48below the NYSE bid. If you wish to offer stock, have
- 1:00:51your broker call Mark Millard at 402-346-1400.
- 1:00:57When a trade occurs, the broker can either record it in the
- 1:01:00third market or on the NYSE. We will favor purchase of the B
- 1:01:04shares if they are selling at more than a 2% discount to the
- 1:01:07A. We will not engage in
- 1:01:09transactions involving fewer than 10 shares of A or 50 shares
- 1:01:13of B. Please be clear about one point.
- 1:01:16We will never make purchases with the intention of stemming a
- 1:01:19decline in Berkshire's price. Rather, we will make them if and
- 1:01:23when we believe that they represent an attractive use of
- 1:01:25the company's money. At best, repurchases are likely
- 1:01:29to have only a very minor effect on the future rate of gain in
- 1:01:32our stocks. Intrinsic value.
- 1:01:34Shareholder Designated Contributions About 97.3% of all
- 1:01:39eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1999 Shareholder
- 1:01:43Designated Contributions Program, with contributions
- 1:01:46totalling $17.2 million. A full description of the
- 1:01:51program appears on pages 70 to 71.
- 1:01:54Cumulatively, over the 19 years of the program, Berkshire has
- 1:01:58made contributions of $147 million pursuant to the
- 1:02:02instructions of our shareholders.
- 1:02:04The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries,
- 1:02:08which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevail before
- 1:02:11they were acquired, except that their former owners themselves
- 1:02:14take on the responsibility for their personal charities.
- 1:02:17In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $13.8
- 1:02:22million in 1999, including in kind donations of $2.5 million.
- 1:02:28To participate in future programs, you must own Class A
- 1:02:31shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner,
- 1:02:34not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository.
- 1:02:38Shares not so registered on August 31st, 2000 will be
- 1:02:42ineligible for the 2000 program. When you get the contributions
- 1:02:46form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put
- 1:02:49aside or forgotten. Designations received after the
- 1:02:53due date will not be honored. The Annual meeting this year's
- 1:02:56Woodstock Weekend for capitalists will follow a format
- 1:02:59slightly different from that of recent years.
- 1:03:02We need to make a change because the Ex Sarban Coliseum, which
- 1:03:05served us while the past three years, is gradually being closed
- 1:03:09down. Therefore, we are relocating to
- 1:03:11the Civic Auditorium, which is on Capitol Ave. between 18th and
- 1:03:1519th behind the DoubleTree Hotel, the only other facility
- 1:03:19in Omaha offering the space we require.
- 1:03:22The Civic, however, is located in downtown Omaha, and we would
- 1:03:26create a parking and traffic nightmare if we were to meet
- 1:03:29there on a weekday. We will therefore convene on
- 1:03:32Saturday, April 29th, with the doors opening at 7:00 AM, the
- 1:03:37movie beginning at 8:30, and the meeting itself commencing at
- 1:03:409:30. As in the past, we will run
- 1:03:43until 3:30 with a short break at noon for food, which will be
- 1:03:47available at the Civics concession stance.
- 1:03:49An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with
- 1:03:52this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will
- 1:03:55need for admission to the meeting and other events.
- 1:03:59As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again
- 1:04:02signed up American Express 800-799-6634 to give you special
- 1:04:08help. In our normal fashion, we will
- 1:04:10run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting.
- 1:04:13After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the
- 1:04:16hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Deportiums and the
- 1:04:20airport. Even so, you are likely to find
- 1:04:23a car useful. We have scheduled the meeting in
- 1:04:252002 and 2003 on the customary first Saturday in May.
- 1:04:30In 2001, however, the Civic is already booked on that Saturday,
- 1:04:35so we will meet on April 28th. The Civic should fit our needs
- 1:04:39well on any weekend since there will then be more than ample
- 1:04:42parking in nearby lots and garages as well as on streets.
- 1:04:46We will also be able to greatly enlarge the space we give
- 1:04:49exhibitors. So, overcoming my normal
- 1:04:52commercial reticence, I will see that you have a wide display of
- 1:04:55Berkshire products at the Civic that you can purchase as a
- 1:04:58benchmark. In 1999, shareholders bought
- 1:05:013059 lbs of See's Candy, $16,155 of World Book products, 1928
- 1:05:09pairs of Dexter shoes, 895 sets of Kickut knives, 1752 golf
- 1:05:15balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo, and 3446 items of
- 1:05:20Berkshire apparel. I know you can do better.
- 1:05:23Last year we also initiated the sale of at least 8 fractions of
- 1:05:27Executive Jet aircraft. We will again have an array of
- 1:05:30models at the Omaha Airport for your inspection on Saturday and
- 1:05:33Sunday. Ask an EJ representative at the
- 1:05:36Civic about viewing any of these planes.
- 1:05:39Dairy Queen will also be on hand at the Civic and again will
- 1:05:42donate all proceeds to the Children's Miracle Network.
- 1:05:45Last year we sold 4586 Dilly bars, fudge bars and Vanilla
- 1:05:51Orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a
- 1:05:54booth that will be staffed by a number of our top counselors
- 1:05:57from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with
- 1:06:00auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be
- 1:06:04able to offer you a special shareholders discount.
- 1:06:06Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out
- 1:06:09whether we can save you some money.
- 1:06:11Finally, Ajit Jain and his associates will be on hand to
- 1:06:15offer both no Commission annuities and a liability policy
- 1:06:19with jumbo limits of a size rarely available elsewhere.
- 1:06:22Talk to Ajit and learn how to protect yourself and your family
- 1:06:26against a $10 million judgement. NF Ms. newly remodeled complex
- 1:06:31located on a 75 acre site on 72nd St. between Dodge and
- 1:06:35Pacific is open from 10:00 AM to 9:00 PM on weekdays and 10:00 AM
- 1:06:41to 6:00 PM on Saturdays and Sundays.
- 1:06:44This operation offers an unrivaled breadth of
- 1:06:46merchandise, furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets
- 1:06:51and computers all at can't be beat prices.
- 1:06:54In 1999, NFM did more than $300 million of business at its 72nd
- 1:06:59St. location, which in a metropolitan area of 675,000 is
- 1:07:04an absolute miracle. During the Thursday, April 27th
- 1:07:08to Monday, May 1st period, any shareholder presenting his or
- 1:07:12her meeting credential will receive a discount that is
- 1:07:15customarily given only to employees.
- 1:07:18We have offered this break to shareholders the last couple of
- 1:07:21years and sales have been amazing.
- 1:07:23In last year's five day Berkshire weekend, NF Ms. volume
- 1:07:27was $7.98 million, an increase of 26% from 1998 and 51% from
- 1:07:341997. Borchium's, the largest jewelry
- 1:07:38store in the country except for Tiffany's Manhattan store, will
- 1:07:41have two shareholder only events.
- 1:07:44The first will be a champagne and dessert party from 6:00 PM
- 1:07:47to 10:00 PM on Friday, April 28th.
- 1:07:50The 2nd, the main gala, will be from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM on
- 1:07:54Sunday, April 30th. On that day, Charlie and I will
- 1:07:58be on hand to sign sales tickets.
- 1:08:00Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through
- 1:08:03Monday, so if you wish to avoid the largest crowds, which will
- 1:08:06form on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and
- 1:08:10identify yourself as a shareholder.
- 1:08:12On Saturday, we will be open until 7:00 PM.
- 1:08:15Borchium's operates on a gross margin that is fully 20
- 1:08:19percentage points below that of its major rivals, so be prepared
- 1:08:22to be blown away by both our prices and selection in the
- 1:08:26mall. Outside of Borchium's, we will
- 1:08:28again have Bob Hammond, the best bridge player the game has ever
- 1:08:31seen, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday.
- 1:08:35We will also have a few other experts playing at additional
- 1:08:38tables. In 1999, we had more demand than
- 1:08:41tables, but we will cure that problem this year.
- 1:08:44Patrick Wolf, twice US chess champion, will again be in the
- 1:08:48mall playing blindfolded against all comers.
- 1:08:51He tells me that he has never tried to play more than four
- 1:08:54games simultaneously while handicapped this way, but might
- 1:08:57try to bump that limit to five or six this year.
- 1:09:00If you're a chess fan, take Patrick on, but be sure to check
- 1:09:03his blindfold before your first move.
- 1:09:06Goritz, my Favorite steakhouse, will again be open exclusively
- 1:09:10for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 30th and will be
- 1:09:14serving from 4:00 PM until about midnight.
- 1:09:17Please remember that you can't come to Gorrett's on Sunday
- 1:09:19without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733
- 1:09:26on April 3rd, but not before. If Sunday is sold out, try Gords
- 1:09:31on one of the other evenings you will be in town.
- 1:09:33I make a quality check of Gords about once a week and can report
- 1:09:37that their rare T-bone with a double order of hash Browns is
- 1:09:40still unequalled throughout the country.
- 1:09:43The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at
- 1:09:467:00 PM on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden
- 1:09:49Spikes will play the Iowa Cubs. Come early because that's when
- 1:09:53the real action takes place. Those who attended last year saw
- 1:09:56your chairman pitch to Ernie Banks.
- 1:09:59This encounter proved to be the Titanic duel that the sports
- 1:10:02world had long-awaited. After the first few pitches,
- 1:10:05which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best?
- 1:10:09I fired a brush back at Ernie just to let him know who was in
- 1:10:11command. Ernie charged the mound and I
- 1:10:14charged the plate, but a clash was avoided because we became
- 1:10:17exhausted before reaching each other.
- 1:10:20Ernie was dissatisfied with his performance last year and has
- 1:10:23been studying the game films all winter.
- 1:10:25As you may know, Bernie had 512 home runs in his career as a
- 1:10:29Cub. Now that he has spotted telltale
- 1:10:31weaknesses in my delivery, he expects to get 513 on April
- 1:10:3629th. I, however, have learned new
- 1:10:39ways to disguise my Flutterball. Come and watch this matchup.
- 1:10:43I should add that I have extracted a promise from Ernie
- 1:10:46that he will not hit a comebacker at me since I would
- 1:10:49never be able to duck in time to avoid it.
- 1:10:51My reflexes are like Woody Allen's who said his were so
- 1:10:54slow that he was once hit by a car being pushed by two guys.
- 1:10:58Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining
- 1:11:01tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other
- 1:11:04information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha.
- 1:11:08Join us at the Capitalist Caper on Capitol Ave., March 1st,
- 1:11:122000. Warren E Buffett, Chairman of
- 1:11:14the Board.