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Whats Irans own view of the war_ Fareed examines · DEEP INSIGHT

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: President Trump said today Iran would be living in hell
• 0:04
  Speaker 1: if they do not open the straight of Formos, and
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  Speaker 1: this weekend, Iranian official said they would open the gates
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  Speaker 1: of hell if it attacks against Iran continued. So what
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  Speaker 1: do these threats mean and how is the current leadership
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  Speaker 1: of Iran thinking joined me to discuss is Alivas, the
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  Speaker 1: International Crisis Group's Iran project director, one of the smartest
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  Speaker 1: observers about Iran Ali, I want to ask you, what
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  Speaker 1: do you think Trump's rhetoric bombing you back to the
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  Speaker 1: stone ages Iranians are evil? What is it doing inside Iran?
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  Speaker 1: Because you know, there are plenty of people in Iran
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  Speaker 1: who are unhappy with the regime, but it does feel
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  Speaker 1: like they're facing a huge amount of bombing, which all
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  Speaker 1: of which must be having some kind of effect on
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  Speaker 1: their day to day lives.
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  Speaker 2: It's great to be with you, very look, it is
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  Speaker 2: definitely a doating a lot of regime opponents who were
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  Speaker 2: hoping that, as the president promise, he would come to
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  Speaker 2: their rescue and he would bring health, not more harm.
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  Speaker 2: It is also energizing the regime space. It's kind of
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  Speaker 2: validating the narrative that the Islamic Republic had out there
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  Speaker 2: for more than four decades, that the animosity of the
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  Speaker 2: United States is not just against the regime but against
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  Speaker 2: Iran as a state. So going after infrastructure, after historic sites,
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  Speaker 2: these are all things that are provoking a sense of nationalism.
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  Speaker 2: And in fact, the regime could not have hoped for
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  Speaker 2: any better propaganda during this war.
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  Speaker 3: In support of his own narrative.
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  Speaker 1: What do you make of the current leadership? You know,
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  Speaker 1: President Drum says there has been regime change, which obviously
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  Speaker 1: there hasn't this the same system in place, just a
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  Speaker 1: new set of leaders. But how do you characterize these
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  Speaker 1: guys compared to the old guys.
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  Speaker 3: So there are two things that have happened. The regiment
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  Speaker 3: is still the same, there are new faces.
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  Speaker 2: And these new faces are in the category of uber
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  Speaker 2: hawks in Iran. Just to give you an examples, the
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  Speaker 2: new head of the IRGC and the new National Security Advisor.
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  Speaker 2: These were people who were involved in the Iran Iraq War,
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  Speaker 2: in which Iran actually regained the territory that Iraq had
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  Speaker 2: occupied in the first two years of the war, and
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  Speaker 2: yet extended that conflict for another six bloody traumatizing gears
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  Speaker 2: in order to gain the upper hand. So this is
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  Speaker 2: the kind of people we're dealing with right now. And
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  Speaker 2: the other thing that has happened is that power has
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  Speaker 2: gravitated away from the office of the Supreme Leader towards.
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  Speaker 3: The Revolutionary Guards.
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  Speaker 2: Il Ali Khameney, who was killed in the opening act
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  Speaker 2: of this war, had the Revolutionary Guards really subservient to him.
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  Speaker 3: But his son, the new.
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  Speaker 2: Supreme Leader, is actually no longer supreme. He is subservient
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  Speaker 2: to the Lutionary Guards because he owes his position and
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  Speaker 2: the survival of his regime to them.
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  Speaker 1: Ali, you are by training a nuclear scientist, So tell
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  Speaker 1: me what clearly the Iranians must be thinking. You know,
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  Speaker 1: maybe we should have had a nuclear bomb, because then
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  Speaker 1: we wouldn't have been attacked in this way. You know,
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  Speaker 1: the kind of North Korea option. Could they get a
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  Speaker 1: nuclear bomb at this point, with all this bombing, with
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  Speaker 1: all the pressure and observation, can you do something underground
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  Speaker 1: that is viable or feasible?
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  Speaker 2: So very the intent is now higher than ever before
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  Speaker 2: because number one, as we discussed, the military is now
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  Speaker 2: in charge. And for the military, the ultimate deterrance in
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  Speaker 2: the form of nuclear weapons is always very attractive, especially
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  Speaker 2: when you're very close to it plus Iran's regional deterrence
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  Speaker 2: and it's conventional deterrence in the form of ballistic missiles
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  Speaker 2: did not or the US and Israel from attacking it
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  Speaker 2: twice in the course of less than a year. One
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  Speaker 2: of the political obstacles to a nuclear deal, which was
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  Speaker 2: Ietolia Coommedy, is also removed. He had a religious edict
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  Speaker 2: against nuclear weaponization which died with him, and he was
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  Speaker 2: afraid of a war on the pathway to get nuclear weapons.
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  Speaker 3: And that war has already happened.
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  Speaker 2: There is also more bottom up support, again going back
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  Speaker 2: to your initial question, because a lot of people who
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  Speaker 2: are very angry about the damage to civilian infrastructure and
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  Speaker 2: the civilian toll of this war want the country to
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  Speaker 2: have an ultimate deterrent. Now there is a shortcut, a
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  Speaker 2: pathway to nuclear weapons that is still open to Iran.
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  Speaker 3: It actually doesn't need to enrich more material.
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  Speaker 2: It still has a stockpile of sixty percent in rich uranium,
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  Speaker 2: so it has the material. It has the manpower in
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  Speaker 2: the form of hundreds of scientists, and it has the
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  Speaker 2: ma in the forms of hundreds of advanced centrifugures that
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  Speaker 2: are unaccounted for. Now with sixty percent. You can't generate
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  Speaker 2: a very high yield sophisticated device, but you can create
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  Speaker 2: a crude nuclear device, And in fact, depending on the design,
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  Speaker 2: they have enough for about four to six nuclear weapons,
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  Speaker 2: similar to the ones that the US used in Hiroshima,
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  Speaker 2: for instance.
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  Speaker 3: These are big, bulky, not very high yield.
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  Speaker 2: But all we need is a flash in the desert,
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  Speaker 2: and by that point the game is lost because we
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  Speaker 2: will enter into a phase of nuclear ambiguity, not knowing
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  Speaker 2: whether they only had one that they tested or they
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  Speaker 2: have more.
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  Speaker 1: That is a very sobering target. Thirty seconds left, Ali,
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  Speaker 1: just a quick question. The premise of American strategy seems
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  Speaker 1: to be that the Iranians will buckle under pain. Just
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  Speaker 1: be your reaction to that. Knowing this.
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  Speaker 2: Well, I think if anybody understood the culture of this
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  Speaker 2: regime of martyrdom and resistance, I don't think they would
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  Speaker 2: have considered capitulation an option. And let me say that
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  Speaker 2: that they don't need necessarily a weapon of mass destruction
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  Speaker 2: in order to take their adversaries hostage. They have already
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  Speaker 2: discovered a weapon of mass destruction in the form of
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  Speaker 2: their control over the straight of four months.
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  Speaker 1: So two weapons in a sense, the strait of hormones
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  Speaker 1: and potential Aliba is pleasure to have you on fascinating conversation.
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  Speaker 1: Why is Irn being so intransigent in the face of
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  Speaker 1: these extraordinary threats that Trump has made.
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  Speaker 4: I mean, first of all, Iran thinks that through the
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  Speaker 4: forty Days war they did make some strategic gains that
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  Speaker 4: they want to consolidate, and they also think that they
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  Speaker 4: can actually get a final deal with President Trump if
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  Speaker 4: they stand their ground. But the most important thing here
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  Speaker 4: is an issue of trust. I think in Islamabad, the
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  Speaker 4: opportunity was for the two sides to build trust that
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  Speaker 4: then would allow them to resolve things. But after the
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  Speaker 4: talks ended, I think trust has actually collapsed even further
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  Speaker 4: between Iran saying it will open the straits, the United
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  Speaker 4: States not lifting the blockade, and then President Trump issuing
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  Speaker 4: a series of tweets that Iranians say were false and
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  Speaker 4: portrays the image like Iran has already surrendered even before
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  Speaker 4: there's a final deal. So I think what we see
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  Speaker 4: as Iranian in transigence is also Iran's deep distrust that
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  Speaker 4: this is oily rules like what it happened in Geneva,
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  Speaker 4: the US is setting them up for something bigger to come.
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  Speaker 1: The Geneva point is important because my understanding is the
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  Speaker 1: Iranians thought they were negotiating in good faith in Geneva,
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  Speaker 1: and in the middle of it, Trump starts the war,
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  Speaker 1: and so there is specifically a lot of lack of
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  Speaker 1: trust with the two negotiators, with Coffin Kushner.
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  Speaker 3: Correct.
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  Speaker 4: Yes, those two in particular, especially in Geneva the last round,
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  Speaker 4: because Iran did put forward very new things that it
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  Speaker 4: hadn't done before. It went much farther than it had
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  Speaker 4: gone before, and what it got instead was bombing in orders.
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  Speaker 4: It's not like the US said, Okay, these are great concessions,
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  Speaker 4: I want you to concede even more and I'm going
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  Speaker 4: to be tougher until you concede. It just went straight
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  Speaker 4: to war. And it had done this once before. When
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  Speaker 4: the war happened in June, they were also in the
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  Speaker 4: middle of negotiations with with Coffin Usher with Coffin Kushner.
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  Speaker 4: So the Iranians are extremely suspicious that maybe this whole
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  Speaker 4: islam about exercise is theater. As the United States build
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  Speaker 4: its forces in the region, sort of learns the lessons
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  Speaker 4: of the first forty days and Trump may go back
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  Speaker 4: to war again. So and also this whole talk about
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  Speaker 4: Iran has made concessions is a way of actually creating
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  Speaker 4: confusion in Tehran and breaking ranks within Iran.
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  Speaker 1: Own you on that is that Trump is just talking
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  Speaker 1: down the stock market. He knows that every time he
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  Speaker 1: says things like we're close to a deal, they've surrendered.
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  Speaker 1: The stock market doesn't collapse, which is one of his goals.
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  Speaker 1: Is there new leadership in Iran? And how to think
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  Speaker 1: about that issue of these these new people, Are they divided?
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  Speaker 1: Are they you know? Are they more hard line?
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  Speaker 4: There is a I believe there is a cohesive leadership.
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  Speaker 4: You know, the top four or five people are all
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  Speaker 4: have known each other, have worked together, or from the
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  Speaker 4: same ILK in Iran. They are all much about kamenas
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  Speaker 4: people and he included. So it's not like you have
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  Speaker 4: you have a coalition at the top, you have the
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  Speaker 4: same ILK there. They're much more hawkish leaders in Iran.
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  Speaker 4: They are not restrained in waging aggressive war, but they've
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  Speaker 4: also shown that they can. They are willing to lean
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  Speaker 4: into negotiations and deploy What.
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  Speaker 1: Does a more hardline mean?
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  Speaker 4: Means that they are willing to take actions that perhaps
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  Speaker 4: the previous Dreme leader was not willing to take, for instance,
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  Speaker 4: attacking Iran's neighbors in the way they have done, be
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  Speaker 4: willing to escalate with the United States. And as one
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  Speaker 4: of the advisors to Mushtavakamedy said, it's not an eye
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  Speaker 4: for an eye, it's an eye ahead, a hand and neck.
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  Speaker 4: You know, we sort of if you provoke, will provoke
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  Speaker 4: even further. And so this is a very different approach
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  Speaker 4: than the previous Supreme leader who responded to an American
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  Speaker 4: attack on Iran's nuclear facilities with the symbolic sending of
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  Speaker 4: missiles into a krattack. But at the same time, I
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  Speaker 4: think they've been willing to go further than perhaps the
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  Speaker 4: previous Supreme Leader was willing to go in terms of
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  Speaker 4: negotiating with the US. But domestically, you know, the factions
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  Speaker 4: in Iran are still the same. The regime still has
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  Speaker 4: to manage its base, has to manage public opinion in Iran.
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  Speaker 4: It has asked Yerronians in particular, its own people, to
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  Speaker 4: sacrifice enormously for this war. So when President Trump says
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  Speaker 4: oh Iran has already given up everything even before there's
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  Speaker 4: a signature, it actually creates a crisis with them for
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  Speaker 4: them about how do they manage perceptions within Iran which
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  Speaker 4: is quite significant,