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21 - Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire by James Headlam-Morley · Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire

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  Speaker 1: Section twenty one of Bismarck and the Foundation of the
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  Speaker 1: German Empire by James Hedron. This Livery Box recording is
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  Speaker 1: in the public domain. Recording by Esskin Manid bai Jo, Portugal,
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  Speaker 1: Chapter thirteen, The Outbreak of War with France, eighteen sixty
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  Speaker 1: seven to eighteen seventy Part one. Ever since the conclusion
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  Speaker 1: of peace, the danger of a conflict between France and
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  Speaker 1: Germany had been opparent. It was not only the growing
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  Speaker 1: discontent and suspicion of the French nation and the French army,
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  Speaker 1: who truly felt that the supremacy of France had been
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  Speaker 1: shaken by the growth of this new power. It was
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  Speaker 1: not only that the deep rooted hatred of France which
• 0:54
  Speaker 1: prevailed in Germany had been stirred by Napoleon's action, and
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  Speaker 1: that the Germans had received confidence from the consciousness of
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  Speaker 1: their own strengths. Had there been nothing more than this,
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  Speaker 1: year after year might have gone by, and as has
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  Speaker 1: happened since and had happened before, a war always anticipated
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  Speaker 1: might have been always differed. We may be sure that
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  Speaker 1: Peasmarck would not have gone to war unless he believed
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  Speaker 1: it to be necessary and desirable, and he would not
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  Speaker 1: have thought this unless there was something to be gained.
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  Speaker 1: He has often shown before and since that he was
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  Speaker 1: quite as well able to use his powers in the
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  Speaker 1: maintenance of peace as in creating courses for war. There was, however,
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  Speaker 1: one reason which made war almost inevitable. The unity of
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  Speaker 1: Germany was only half completed. Those southern states still existed
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  Speaker 1: in a curious state of sense isolation. This could not
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  Speaker 1: long continue. The opposition must be regulated. War arises from
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  Speaker 1: the state of uncertainty, which is always present when a
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  Speaker 1: political community has not found the stable and permanent constitution.
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  Speaker 1: In Germany, men were looking forward to the time when
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  Speaker 1: the southern states should join the north. The work was progressing.
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  Speaker 1: The treaties of offensive and Defensive Alliance had been followed
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  Speaker 1: by the creation of new customs Union, and it was
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  Speaker 1: a further step when at Pismarck's proposal or Parliament consisting
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  Speaker 1: of members elected throughout the whole of Germany, was summoned
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  Speaker 1: at Berlin for the management of matters connected with the tariff.
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  Speaker 1: Further than this, however, he was not able to go.
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  Speaker 1: The new constitution was working well. They could risk welcoming
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  Speaker 1: the states of the South into it. But this could
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  Speaker 1: not be done without the war with France. Pismack had
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  Speaker 1: rejected the French proposal for an alliance. He knew and
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  Speaker 1: everyone else knew, that France would oppose by the sword
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  Speaker 1: any attempt to complete the unity of Germany, and which
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  Speaker 1: was more serious unless great question was used that she
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  Speaker 1: would be supported by Austria and perhaps by the Anti
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  Speaker 1: Prussian party in Bavaria. There were some who wished to
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  Speaker 1: press it forward at once. Pismack was very strongly pressed
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  Speaker 1: by the National liberals to hasten the union with the South.
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  Speaker 1: At the beginning of eighteen seventy, the Grand Duke of Baden,
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  Speaker 1: himself or son in law of the King of Prussia
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  Speaker 1: and always the chief supporter of the Prussian influence in
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  Speaker 1: the South, formally applied to be admitted into the Federation.
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  Speaker 1: The request had to be refused, but Pismarck had some
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  Speaker 1: difficulty in defending his position against his enthusiastic friends. He
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  Speaker 1: had to warn them not to hurry. They must not
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  Speaker 1: press the development too quickly. If they did so, they
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  Speaker 1: would stir the resentment of the anti Prussian Party. They
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  Speaker 1: would play into the hands of Napoleon and Austria. But
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  Speaker 1: if there was danger in haste, there was equal danger
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  Speaker 1: in delay, the prestige of Prussia would suffer. It is
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  Speaker 1: clear that there was one way in each the Union
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  Speaker 1: might be brought about, almost without resistance, and that was
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  Speaker 1: if France were to make an unprovoked attack upon Germany,
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  Speaker 1: an attack so completely without reason and excuse, that the
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  Speaker 1: strong national passion it provoked might, in the enthusias war,
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  Speaker 1: sweep away all minor differences and party feelings. There was
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  Speaker 1: another element, which we must not omit. These years witnessed
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  Speaker 1: the growth in determination and in power of the ultra
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  Speaker 1: mountained Party. We can find their influence in every country
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  Speaker 1: in Europe. Their chief aim was the preservation of the
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  Speaker 1: temporal power of the Pope and the destruction of the
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  Speaker 1: newly created Kingdom of Italy. They were also opposed to
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  Speaker 1: the unity of Germany on the Prussia. They were very
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  Speaker 1: active and powerful in South Germany, and at the elections
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  Speaker 1: in eighteen sixty nine had gained the majority. The real
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  Speaker 1: object must be to win over the Emperor of the French,
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  Speaker 1: to complete agreement with themselves, to appretiate him, to forsake
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  Speaker 1: his earlier policy, and to destroy what he had done
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  Speaker 1: so much to create. There the strong support in the
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  Speaker 1: person of the Empress, and they joined with the injured
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  Speaker 1: divinity of the French to press the Emperor towards war.
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  Speaker 1: In eighteen sixty seven, war had almost broken out on
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  Speaker 1: the question of Luxembourg. Napoleon had attempted to get at
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  Speaker 1: least this small extension of territory. Relying on the support
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  Speaker 1: of Prussia, he entered into negotiations with the King of Poland.
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  Speaker 1: The king agreed to surrender the Grand Duchy to France,
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  Speaker 1: making however, a condition that Napoleon should secure the ascent
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  Speaker 1: of Prussia to this arrangement. At the very last moment,
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  Speaker 1: when the treaty was almost assigned, Pismarck made it clear
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  Speaker 1: that the national feeling in Germany was so strong that
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  Speaker 1: if the transaction took place, he would have to declare
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  Speaker 1: war against France. At the same time he published the
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  Speaker 1: secret treaties with the Southern States. These events destroyed the
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  Speaker 1: last hope of maintaining the old friendly relations with Napoleon.
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  Speaker 1: I have been duped, said the Emperor, who at once
• 7:15
  Speaker 1: began reorganizing and rearming his forces. For some weeks there
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  Speaker 1: was great danger of war concerning the right of garrison
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  Speaker 1: in Luxembourg. This had hitherto belonged to Prussia. But of course,
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  Speaker 1: with the dissolution of the German Confederation, the right had
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  Speaker 1: elapsed the German nation, which was much excited, and thought
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  Speaker 1: little of the precise terms of treatise which to defend
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  Speaker 1: the right. Chismarck knew that in this matter the Prussian
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  Speaker 1: claim could not be supported. Moreover, even if he had
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  Speaker 1: wished to go war with France, he was not ready
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  Speaker 1: for some time most elapse before the army of the
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  Speaker 1: North German Confederation could be reorganized on the Prussian model.
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  Speaker 1: He therefore preserved the peace, and the matter was settled
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  Speaker 1: by a European Congress in the summer of eighteen sixty seven.
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  Speaker 1: He visited Paris with the King. Externally, the good relations
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  Speaker 1: between the two states were restored, but it was in
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  Speaker 1: reality only on armed peace. It is difficult to decide
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  Speaker 1: for Napoleon's wishes. He seems to have believed that war
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  Speaker 1: was inevitable, there is no proof that he desired it.
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  Speaker 1: He made preparations, the army was reorganized, the numbers increased,
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  Speaker 1: and the new weapon introduced. At the same time, he
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  Speaker 1: looked about four allies. Negotiations were carried on with Austria.
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  Speaker 1: In eighteen sixty eight, a meeting was arranged between the
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  Speaker 1: two emperors. Boist, who was now Chancellor of the Austrian Empire,
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  Speaker 1: was anxious to make an attempt to overthrow the power
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  Speaker 1: of Prussia in Germany. In eighteen seventy, negotiations were entered
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  Speaker 1: into for a military alliance. A special envoy, General Lobron,
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  Speaker 1: was sent to Vienna to discuss the military arrangement in
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  Speaker 1: case of war. No treaty was signed, but it was
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  Speaker 1: an almost understood thing that Sunua later an alliance between
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  Speaker 1: the two emperors should be formed against Prussia. It will
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  Speaker 1: be seen then that at the beginning of eighteen seventy
• 9:43
  Speaker 1: everything was tending towards war, and that under certain circumstances
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  Speaker 1: war was desirable, both for France and for Germany. Much
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  Speaker 1: seemed to depend on the occasion of the outbreak. If
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  Speaker 1: Prussia took the offensive, if she attempted by force to
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  Speaker 1: win the southern states, she should be faced by a
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  Speaker 1: coalition of France and Austria, supported only to probably by Bavaria.
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  Speaker 1: And this was a coalition which should find much sympathy
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  Speaker 1: among the discontented in North Germany. On the other hand,
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  Speaker 1: it was for the advantage of Prussia not to delay
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  Speaker 1: the conflict. The king was growing old. Bismarck could never
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  Speaker 1: be sure how long he would remain in office. Moreover,
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  Speaker 1: the whole forces of North Germany had now been completely
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  Speaker 1: reorganized and were ready for war. But with the year
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  Speaker 1: eighteen seventy one, it was to be foreseen that a
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  Speaker 1: fresh attempt would be made to reduce their numbers. It
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  Speaker 1: was desirable to avoid a fresh conflict on the military budget.
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  Speaker 1: Everything shows that eighteen seventy was the year in each
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  Speaker 1: it would be most convenient for Prussia to Prussia at
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  Speaker 1: this time had no active allies on whom she would depend.
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  Speaker 1: Pismarck indeed had secured the neutrality of Russia, but he
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  Speaker 1: did not know that the TZA would come actively to
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  Speaker 1: his help. We may feel sure that he would prefer
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  Speaker 1: not to have to call upon Russia for assistance, for,
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  Speaker 1: as you have seen in all the days, a war
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  Speaker 1: between Trance and Prussia in which Germany joint would be
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  Speaker 1: very harmful to Germany. It was in these circumstances that
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  Speaker 1: an opportunity showed itself of gaining another airline would be
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  Speaker 1: more subservient than Russia. One of the many revolutions which
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  Speaker 1: had harassed Spain during this century had broken out. Queen
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  Speaker 1: Isabella had lost the throne, and General prim found himself
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  Speaker 1: of life to look about for a new sovereign. He
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  Speaker 1: applied in vain to all the Catholic courts, nobody was
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  Speaker 1: anxious to accept an honor coupled with such danger as
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  Speaker 1: ruling over the Spanish people, among others. He applied to Leopold,
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  Speaker 1: hereditary Prince of Rowen Soleron, eldest son of that Prince
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  Speaker 1: of Juan Solon, who of few years before had been
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  Speaker 1: President of the Prussian Ministry. To choice seemed the good one.
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  Speaker 1: The Prince was an amiable, courageous man. He was a Catholic.
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  Speaker 1: He was more over connected with the Napoleonic family. His
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  Speaker 1: brother had treears before been appointed King of Romania with
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  Speaker 1: Napoleon's goodwill. The proposal was probably made in all good
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  Speaker 1: faith under ordinary circumstances. The Prince, had he been willing
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  Speaker 1: to accept, would have been a very proper candidate. It was, however,
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  Speaker 1: no from the first that Napoleon would not give his consent,
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  Speaker 1: and according to the Committee of Europe, he had the
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  Speaker 1: right to be conserted. Nor can you say that Napoleon
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  Speaker 1: was not justified in opposing the appointment. It has indeed
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  Speaker 1: been said that the prince was not a member of
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  Speaker 1: the Prussian royal house, and that his connection with Napoleon
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  Speaker 1: was really closer than that with the King of Prussia.
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  Speaker 1: This is true, but to lay stress on it is
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  Speaker 1: to ignore the very remarkable voluntary connection which united the
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  Speaker 1: two apprentices of the House of June Soleron. The prince's
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  Speaker 1: father had done what no sovereign prince in Germany has
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  Speaker 1: ever done before or since, all of loyalty to Prussia.
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  Speaker 1: He had surrendered his position as sovereign ruler and presented
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  Speaker 1: his dominions to the King of Prussia. He had, on
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  Speaker 1: this occasion been adopted it into the royal family. He
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  Speaker 1: had formally recognized the King as head of the house
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  Speaker 1: and subjected himself to his authority. More than this, he
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  Speaker 1: had even condescended to accept the position of the Prussian Minister.
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  Speaker 1: Was not Napoleon justified if he feeled that the son
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  Speaker 1: of a man who had shown so great an affection
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  Speaker 1: to Prussia would not be an agreeable naghbor on the
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  Speaker 1: throne of Spain. It was in the early spring of
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  Speaker 1: eighteen sixty nine, that the first proposers were made to
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  Speaker 1: the Prince. Our information as to this is very defective,
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  Speaker 1: but it seems that they were at once rejected. Benedetti's
• 14:46
  Speaker 1: suspicions were, however, roused. He heard that a Spanish diplomatist
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  Speaker 1: who had formerly been ambassaded at Berlin, had again visited
• 14:57
  Speaker 1: the city and added two interviews with Pismock. He feeled
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  Speaker 1: that perhaps he had submission with regard to the Juenzuln candidature,
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  Speaker 1: and in accordance with instructions from his government. Inquired first
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  Speaker 1: of Tiller, and after a visit to Paris, saw Pismack himself.
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  Speaker 1: The Count was quite ready to discuss the matter with
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  Speaker 1: great frankness. He explained all the reasons why if the
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  Speaker 1: throne were offered to the Prince, the King would doubtless
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: advise him not to accept it. Benedetti was still suspicious,
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: but for the time the metal dropped from what happened later,
• 15:40
  Speaker 1: though we have no proof, we must, i think share
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  Speaker 1: his suspicion that Pismuck was already considering the proposal and
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  Speaker 1: was prepared to lend it his support. In September of
• 15:56
  Speaker 1: the same year, the affair began to advance. Price and Salaza,
• 16:01
  Speaker 1: a Spanish gentleman to Germany with the semi official commission
• 16:06
  Speaker 1: to invite the Prince to become a candidate, and gave
• 16:11
  Speaker 1: him a letter to a German occaintance who would procure
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  Speaker 1: him an introduction to the Prince. This German accaintance was
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  Speaker 1: no other than help Roon Verto, Prussian ambassador at Vienna.
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  Speaker 1: If we remember the very strict discipline which Pismarck maintained
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: in the diplomatics office, we must feel convinced that Verto
• 16:35
  Speaker 1: was acting according to instructions. He brought the envoy to
• 16:40
  Speaker 1: the Prince of Juenzoloon. The very greatest caution was taken
• 16:44
  Speaker 1: to preserve secrecy. The Spaniard did not go directly to
• 16:49
  Speaker 1: the castle of Weinberg, but left the train at another station,
• 16:53
  Speaker 1: waited in the town till it was dark, and oly
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: approached the castle when hidden from observation by night, and
• 17:02
  Speaker 1: the dick missed. He first of all asked Prince Charles
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  Speaker 1: himself to accept the throne, and when he refused, offered
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  Speaker 1: it to Prince Leopold, who also, though he did not refuse,
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  Speaker 1: point blank, left no doubt that he was disinclined to
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  Speaker 1: the proposal. He could only accept, He said, if the
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  Speaker 1: Spanish government procured the assent of the Emperor Napoleon and
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  Speaker 1: the King of Prussia, notwithstanding the reluctance of the family
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  Speaker 1: to take the profoled dignity, helfon Erto and we must
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  Speaker 1: look on him as Pismarck's agent or Fortnight later traveled
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  Speaker 1: from Munich in order to press on the Prince of
• 17:48
  Speaker 1: Romania that he should use his influence not to allow
• 17:53
  Speaker 1: the House of Jen Sulleron to refuse the throne for
• 17:57
  Speaker 1: the time. However, the subject aims to have dropped. A
• 18:02
  Speaker 1: few months later, for the third time, the offer was repeated,
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  Speaker 1: and now Pismack uses the whole of his influence in
• 18:10
  Speaker 1: its favor. At the end of February, Salaza came on
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: an official mission to Berlin. He had three letters, one
• 18:18
  Speaker 1: to the King, one to Bismarck, one to the Prince.
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  Speaker 1: The King refused to receive him. Prince Leopold did not
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: waive in his refusal and was supported by his father.
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  Speaker 1: Their attitude was that they should not consider the matter
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: seriously unless higher reasons of state recuarited. With Prince Bismarck. However,
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: the envoy was more successful. He had several interviews with
• 18:46
  Speaker 1: the minister and then left the city in other dead
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: suspicions might not be aroused for the attention of the
• 18:53
  Speaker 1: French government directed to the negotiations. Pismack pleaded with great
• 18:59
  Speaker 1: warm for the acceptance of the offer. In a memoir
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: to the King, it dwelt on the great importance which
• 19:07
  Speaker 1: the summons of Juan soleran Prince to the Spinnish Drone
• 19:11
  Speaker 1: would have for Germany. It would be politically invaluable to
• 19:17
  Speaker 1: have a friendly land in the rear of France. It
• 19:20
  Speaker 1: would be of the greatest economic advantage for Germany and
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: Spain if this thoroughly monarchical country developed its resources under
• 19:30
  Speaker 1: King of German descent. In consequences of this conference was
• 19:34
  Speaker 1: held at Berlin, at which they were present besides the King,
• 19:39
  Speaker 1: the Crown, Prince, Prince carl Anton and Prince Leopold, Bismarck,
• 19:45
  Speaker 1: own Mortke, Schleinitz, Tilde and Delbrick. By summoning the advice
• 19:52
  Speaker 1: of these men, the metal was taken out of the
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: range of private and family matter. It is true that
• 20:00
  Speaker 1: it was not officially brought before the Prussian ministry, but
• 20:04
  Speaker 1: those consulted with the men by whom the policy of
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: the state was directed. The unanimous decision of the counselors
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: was for acceptance on the ground that it was the
• 20:17
  Speaker 1: fulfillment of patriotic duty to Prussia. The crown Prince saw
• 20:23
  Speaker 1: great difficulties in the way and warned his cousin if
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: he accepted, not to rely on Prussian help in the future,
• 20:32
  Speaker 1: even if for the attainment of the definite and the
• 20:35
  Speaker 1: Prussian government followed the project for the moment. The King
• 20:40
  Speaker 1: did not agree with his ministers. He had many serious
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: objections and refused to give any definite author to the
• 20:48
  Speaker 1: Prince that he should accept the offer. He left the
• 20:52
  Speaker 1: final decision to him. He eventually refused. Bismuck, however, was
• 20:59
  Speaker 1: not to be beat. He insisted that the juyan Zulans
• 21:03
  Speaker 1: should not let the metal drop, and, as he could
• 21:07
  Speaker 1: not appreciate the king to use his authority, acted directly
• 21:11
  Speaker 1: upon the family, with such success that Prince carl Anton
• 21:16
  Speaker 1: telegraphed to his daughter son Frederick, to ask if he
• 21:20
  Speaker 1: would not accept instead of his brother. Bismack had now
• 21:25
  Speaker 1: declared that the acceptance by one of the princes was
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: a political necessity, he said repeatedly and with the greatest emphasis.
• 21:36
  Speaker 1: At the same time, he dispatched the Prussian officer of
• 21:40
  Speaker 1: the General's staff and his private secretary Lota Pucho, to
• 21:45
  Speaker 1: Spain in order that they might study the situation. It
• 21:50
  Speaker 1: was important that, as far as possible, the official representative
• 21:55
  Speaker 1: of Prussia should have no share in the arrangement of
• 21:59
  Speaker 1: this matter. Prince Frederick came to Berlin, but like his brother,
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: he refused unless the King gave a command. At the
• 22:10
  Speaker 1: end of April, the negotiations seemed again to have broken down. Bismarck,
• 22:16
  Speaker 1: who was in ill health, left Berlin for Vasin, where
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: he remained for six weeks. We are, however, not surprised,
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: since we know that Bismarck's interest was so strongly engaged
• 22:31
  Speaker 1: that he was able, after all, to carry the metal through.
• 22:36
  Speaker 1: He seems to have appreciated Prince Carlhanton. He then wrote
• 22:40
  Speaker 1: to prim telling him not to despair. The carvacture was
• 22:44
  Speaker 1: an excellent thing which was not to be lost sight of.
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: He must, however, negotiate not with the Prussian government but
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: with the Prince himself. When he wrote this, he knew
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: that he had at last sit in breaking down the
• 23:01
  Speaker 1: relubtance of the prince, and that the King, though he
• 23:05
  Speaker 1: still was unwilling to undertake any responsibility, would not refuse
• 23:11
  Speaker 1: his consent if the prince voluntarily accepted. Prince Leopold was
• 23:17
  Speaker 1: influenced not only by his interest in the Spanish race,
• 23:21
  Speaker 1: but also by a letter from Bismack. In it, he
• 23:24
  Speaker 1: said that he ought to put aside all scruples and
• 23:27
  Speaker 1: accept in the interests of Prussia. The envoys had also
• 23:32
  Speaker 1: returned from Spain and brought back a favorable report. They
• 23:38
  Speaker 1: received an extraordinary hearty welcome. We may perhaps suspect with
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: the King that they had allowed their report to receive
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: two rosio color. No doubt, however, they were acting in
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: accordance with what they knew. What the wishes of the
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: men who had sent them out in the beginning of
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: June was made. Prince Leopold wrote the King that he
• 24:04
  Speaker 1: accepted the crown which had been offered to him, since
• 24:08
  Speaker 1: he thereby hoped to do a great service to his fatherland.
• 24:12
  Speaker 1: King William immediately answered that he approved of the decision. Pismack,
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: then at last was successful. A few days later, Don
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: Salazar again traveled to Germany. This time he brought a
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: formal offer, which was formally accepted. Though courtes were then
• 24:33
  Speaker 1: in session. It was arranged that they should remain at
• 24:37
  Speaker 1: Madrid till his return. The election would then be at
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: once completed, for a majority was assured. The secrecy had
• 24:46
  Speaker 1: been strictly maintained. There were rumors, indeed, but none knew
• 24:51
  Speaker 1: of all those sacred interviews. Men might suspect, but they
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: could not prove that it was an intrigue of Pismack.
• 25:01
  Speaker 1: If the election had once been made the solemn act
• 25:04
  Speaker 1: of the whole nation, Napoleon would have been confronted with
• 25:08
  Speaker 1: the fatal compleat. To have objected would have been most injurious.
• 25:14
  Speaker 1: He would have had to not with Prussia, which apparently
• 25:18
  Speaker 1: was not concerned, but with the Spanish nation. The feeling
• 25:22
  Speaker 1: of France would not allow him to occurs in the election,
• 25:27
  Speaker 1: but it would have deeply offended the dignity and pride
• 25:31
  Speaker 1: of Spain. Had he claimed that the king, who had
• 25:34
  Speaker 1: been formally accepted, should at his demand be rejected, he
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: could scarcely have done so without bringing about the war.
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: The war with Spain would have crippled French resources and
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: devoted the attention from Prussia. Even if a war did
• 25:53
  Speaker 1: not ensue, permanent ill feeling would be created. It is
• 25:58
  Speaker 1: not difficult to understand the motives by which Bismack had
• 26:02
  Speaker 1: been influenced. At the last moment the plan failed, A
• 26:07
  Speaker 1: sipehful telegram from Berlin was misinterpreted in Madrid, and in
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: consequence the Cultess, instead of remaining in session, was pro
• 26:18
  Speaker 1: till the autumn. All had depended on the election being
• 26:23
  Speaker 1: carried out before the secret was disclosed. A delay of
• 26:27
  Speaker 1: some weeks must take place, and some indiscreet word of
• 26:32
  Speaker 1: Salaza disclosed the truth. General prim had no cause left
• 26:37
  Speaker 1: him but to send to the French ambassador to give
• 26:40
  Speaker 1: him official information as to what had been done, and
• 26:44
  Speaker 1: tried to camp his uneasiness. What were Bismack's motives in
• 26:50
  Speaker 1: this affair? It is improbable that he intended to use
• 26:54
  Speaker 1: it as a means of bringing about a war with France.
• 26:58
  Speaker 1: He could not possibly have seen the very remarkablecies of
• 27:02
  Speaker 1: events which were to follow, and but for them, or
• 27:06
  Speaker 1: arising out of this would have been very unwise for
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: German public opinion and the sympathy of all the neutral
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: powers would have been opposed to Prussia, had it appeared
• 27:19
  Speaker 1: that the government was disturbing the peace of Europe simply
• 27:23
  Speaker 1: in order to put a Prussian prince on the throne
• 27:26
  Speaker 1: of Spain, contrary to the wishes of France. He could
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: not ignore German public opinion now as he had done
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: in old days. He did not want to conquer South Germany.
• 27:39
  Speaker 1: He wished to attract it. It seems much more probable
• 27:43
  Speaker 1: that he had no very clear conception of the results
• 27:47
  Speaker 1: which would to follow. He did not wish to lose
• 27:50
  Speaker 1: what might be the means of gaining an ally to
• 27:53
  Speaker 1: Germany and weakening France. It would be quite invaluable if
• 27:59
  Speaker 1: suppose there were to be war arising from this or
• 28:03
  Speaker 1: other courses. Spain could be appreciaded to join in the
• 28:07
  Speaker 1: attack on France, and at the part which Italy had
• 28:11
  Speaker 1: played in eighteen sixty six. What he probably hoped for
• 28:16
  Speaker 1: more than anything else was that France would declare war
• 28:20
  Speaker 1: against Spain. Then Napoleon would waste his strength in a
• 28:25
  Speaker 1: new Mexico. He would no longer be a danger to Germany,
• 28:30
  Speaker 1: and whether Germany joined in the war or not, should
• 28:33
  Speaker 1: gain a free hand by the preoccupation of France. If
• 28:38
  Speaker 1: none of these events happened, it would be an advantage
• 28:42
  Speaker 1: that some commercial gain might be secured for Germany. On
• 28:47
  Speaker 1: the whole, the affair is not one which shows his
• 28:50
  Speaker 1: strongest points as a diplomatist. It was too subtle and
• 28:55
  Speaker 1: too hazardous. The news aroused the sleeping jealousy or perre
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: among the French people. The suspicion and irritation of the
• 29:04
  Speaker 1: government was extreme, and this feeling was not ill founded.
• 29:10
  Speaker 1: They assumed that the whole matter was an intrigue of Bismarcks,
• 29:14
  Speaker 1: though owing to the caution with which the negotiations had
• 29:18
  Speaker 1: been conducted, they had no proofs. They might argue that
• 29:23
  Speaker 1: a Prussian prince could not accept such an offer without
• 29:27
  Speaker 1: the permission of his sovereign, and they had a great
• 29:31
  Speaker 1: cause of complaint that this permission had been given without
• 29:35
  Speaker 1: any communication with Napoleon, whom the matter so nearly concerned.
• 29:41
  Speaker 1: The arrangement itself was not alone the cause of alarm.
• 29:46
  Speaker 1: The secrecy with which it had been surrounded was interpreted
• 29:50
  Speaker 1: as a sign of malevolence. Of course, they must interfere
• 29:56
  Speaker 1: to prevent the election being completed. However, were they to
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: address themselves with a just instinct, they directed their remonstrance
• 30:07
  Speaker 1: not to Madrid, but to Berlin. They would thereby appear
• 30:11
  Speaker 1: not to be interfering with the independence of the Spaniards,
• 30:16
  Speaker 1: but to be acting in self defense against the insidious
• 30:19
  Speaker 1: advance of German power. They could not, however, approach Pismack.
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: He had retired to Vatsin to recruit his health. The
• 30:30
  Speaker 1: other ministers were also absent, The king was at ems.
• 30:36
  Speaker 1: It was convenient that at this Cuddain crisis they should
• 30:40
  Speaker 1: be away, for it was imperative that the Prussian government
• 30:44
  Speaker 1: should deny all complicity. Pismack must not let it appear
• 30:49
  Speaker 1: that he had any interest in or knowledge of the matter.
• 30:54
  Speaker 1: He therefore remained in the seclusion of Pomerania. And She'll
• 31:00
  Speaker 1: twenty one