Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The espionage group that taught routers to hide their own tracks
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Tuesday, the first of September.
- 0:06The espionage group that taught routers to hide their own tracks.
- 0:11A China-linked espionage group called Fire Ant has spent recent months turning the least glamorous parts of
- 0:18a network into listening posts.
- 0:20Cisco routers. T A C A C S+ authentication servers.
- 0:24Linux jump boxes. And it did it largely by getting those devices to lie about their own logs.
- 0:31Sygnia published its investigation this week.
- 0:34The detail worth sitting with isn't the espionage itself.
- 0:38It's how ordinary the compromised kit was.
- 0:40Next. Teaching a router to forget.
- 0:44Fire Ant first made its name in 2025, burrowing into VMware ESXi and vCenter.
- 0:51Sygnia's new findings show it has expanded into the infrastructure that sits around those servers.
- 0:57That's Cisco I O S X R routers, the T A C A C S+ servers that authenticate network administrators, and the Li
- 1:05nux hosts used to manage them.
- 1:07Once inside, Fire Ant didn't just plant a backdoor and hope nobody looked.
- 1:13It rewrote the layer that would tell an administrator something was wrong.
- 1:16It modified system libraries so log messages showed only routine health checks.
- 1:22It hid G R E tunnel configurations from the running config.
- 1:27And it disabled SELinux.
- 1:35An injector named acppid loaded a malicious library straight into the running authentication process, to capt
- 1:44ure passwords as they passed through.
- 1:45Those were written to a hidden file, lightly obfuscated with a single-byte X O R key.
- 1:52And a backdoor called BridgeAgent disguised itself as the Zabbix monitoring agent that network teams already
- 1:59trust to be running.
- 2:06This isn't a burglar avoiding the cameras.
- 2:08It's a burglar who gets into the control room, edits the tape, and leaves the "all quiet" light on.
- 2:14Sygnia found evidence Fire Ant used its footholds to probe toward higher-value environments, including infra
- 2:22structure it describes as critical.
- 2:24But confirmed compromise there was limited to scanning and connection attempts, rather than full access.
- 2:30And finally. The Secure by Design lesson.
- 2:33The design flaw here isn't a single C V E.
- 2:37It's an architectural habit.
- 2:39Treating network devices as plumbing rather than endpoints, and trusting the logs a device produces about its
- 2:46elf. If a router, switch or T A C A C S+ server can be told what to log, an attacker with administrative acces
- 2:55s can tell it to log nothing interesting.
- 2:57So what does Secure by Design mean for this class of kit?
- 3:01Telemetry that leaves the device immediately, to a store the device has no ability to write to or delete from
- 3:08. And separating the management plane, the network used to administer routers and switches, from the productio
- 3:15n traffic those devices carry.
- 3:17If you're a UK organisation running Cisco I O S X R estates, or T A C A C S+ for network admin authenticatio
- 3:27n, and that's a good slice of enterprise and public sector networks, treat this as a prompt.
- 3:32Check whether your monitoring would actually catch a device lying to you, rather than just a device going qui
- 3:38et.
- 3:44Thanks for listening.