Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 016 - Air Operations 1963
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- 0:01Speaker 1: Chapter fifteen of Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:05Speaker 1: five by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a
- 0:08Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:13Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:18Speaker 1: Chapter fifteen. Air Operations nineteen sixty three. Although some US
- 0:25Speaker 1: units were scheduled to leave Vietnam by the end of
- 0:27Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three, the JCS earlier that year had suggested
- 0:32Speaker 1: and Secretary Macnamara approved an additional C one twenty three
- 0:36Speaker 1: Provider Squadron for Denang. Arrival of the seven hundred seventy
- 0:40Speaker 1: seventh Troop Carrier Squadron in April nineteen sixty three was
- 0:44Speaker 1: sixteen C one twenty threes, augmented the airlift of the
- 0:48Speaker 1: twenty nine C one twenty threes at Tonsenut. Crew manning
- 0:52Speaker 1: permitted each provider to fly sixty hours per month. In addition,
- 0:56Speaker 1: eight UH one otters, sixteen O one as a bird
- 1:00Speaker 1: dog observation planes, ten UH one b Iroquois helicopters, and
- 1:05Speaker 1: a second CV two Caribou company reached Vietnam to support
- 1:09Speaker 1: the core tactical zones and Special Forces. General Harkins MACV
- 1:14Speaker 1: commander had agreed to place the CV twos under the
- 1:17Speaker 1: Coordinated Airlift System. However, Army headquarters in Hawaii urged Admiral
- 1:22Speaker 1: Felt to recognize the special features of the Caribou. The
- 1:26Speaker 1: Army had purchased the planes for short takeoff and landing,
- 1:29Speaker 1: which rendered them instantly responsive to ground commanders in combat zones.
- 1:34Speaker 1: While centralized control of airlift was more efficient for cargo deliveries,
- 1:38Speaker 1: swift reaction to a field commander's needs came first. In
- 1:42Speaker 1: this context. Harkins assigned the two Caribou companies to centralized
- 1:47Speaker 1: airlift control, but one of these had the further mission
- 1:50Speaker 1: of immediate support to the Senior Corps Advisors. The Southeast
- 1:54Speaker 1: Asia Airlift System managed the forty eight Air Force C
- 1:57Speaker 1: one twenty three's, thirty two Vietnam M forty sevens, and
- 2:01Speaker 1: thirty two Army CV twos. Though the SEA one twenty
- 2:05Speaker 1: threes normally made deliveries to four major depots and twenty
- 2:09Speaker 1: nine other distribution points, they actually operated at ninety five
- 2:13Speaker 1: different airfields and sixty five drop zones, carrying a lighter
- 2:16Speaker 1: load than the C one twenty three the CV two
- 2:19Speaker 1: could use shorter runways, but reversible propellers let the provider
- 2:23Speaker 1: land on wet surfaces in distances impossible for the Cariboo
- 2:27Speaker 1: not yet so equipped. The eighth Aerial Port Squadron expanded
- 2:32Speaker 1: in May by creating Detachments six and seven at Quinon
- 2:36Speaker 1: and Cantoll. Temporary duty personnel served one hundred twenty day
- 2:40Speaker 1: duty tours at the new sites. Much of the Southeast
- 2:44Speaker 1: Asia Airlift System's work dealt with tactical operations. About thirty
- 2:49Speaker 1: per cent of the troop carrier flights were paradropery supply,
- 2:52Speaker 1: paratrooper drops and assault air landings. Resolute efforts to support
- 2:57Speaker 1: remote stations drew grateful prey from the ground troops. They
- 3:01Speaker 1: deemed the system reliable and responsive. Uncertain surface travel, the
- 3:06Speaker 1: conservative bent of logistic planners and the use of scaled
- 3:10Speaker 1: US planning factors tended to inflate requirements. In October, the
- 3:15Speaker 1: airlift system's excess capacity prompted plans for reduction. In December,
- 3:21Speaker 1: macvie's strength was paired by one thousand. Released were personnel
- 3:25Speaker 1: of the Army's first aviation company, Cariboo. The thirty US
- 3:30Speaker 1: Air Force C forty seven pilots flying with the Vietnamese
- 3:33Speaker 1: Air Force, and half of the eighth Aerial Port Squadron's people.
- 3:38Speaker 1: The sixty first Aviation Company Cariboo with twenty five CV
- 3:42Speaker 1: twos stayed behind to support senior Corps advisors. Some of
- 3:47Speaker 1: these Cariboos became spares to ensure a certain number of
- 3:50Speaker 1: operational aircraft at every core tactical zone. The Air Force's
- 3:54Speaker 1: nineteenth Tactical Air Support Squadron was activated at Benhois in
- 3:59Speaker 1: July nineteen sixty three and assigned to packaff the new units.
- 4:04Speaker 1: Aircraft and crews trickled in four to oh ones and
- 4:07Speaker 1: twenty two crews were on board by July, and the
- 4:10Speaker 1: remaining eighteen planes arrived on the USS card in August.
- 4:14Speaker 1: Since Americans were forbidden to direct air strikes, eleven seasoned
- 4:18Speaker 1: Vietnamese observers were integrated into the squadron to do so.
- 4:22Speaker 1: Operational in September, the unit furnished more and more forward
- 4:26Speaker 1: air controllers and air liaison officers for the National Campaign Plan.
- 4:31Speaker 1: Its primary mission was to train Vietnamese liaison pilots in
- 4:34Speaker 1: forward air control, visual reconnaissance, combat support, and observer procedures.
- 4:40Speaker 1: The aim was to replace those pilots drained off to
- 4:43Speaker 1: fill fighter cockpits. The squadron was to remain in Vietnam
- 4:47Speaker 1: no more than a year, then turn its o ones
- 4:49Speaker 1: over to the Vietnamese. Preparations to open a training center
- 4:54Speaker 1: at Natrain were delayed because American pilots needed proficiency in
- 4:58Speaker 1: the U. S. Army L nineteen one aircraft. General le
- 5:02Speaker 1: May had ordered this plane sent in lieu of depleting
- 5:05Speaker 1: the few L twenty eights in US Air Force stocks.
- 5:08Speaker 1: As his director of Plans, Major General John W. Carpenter
- 5:12Speaker 1: the Third said, the chief clearly expressed his desires toward
- 5:16Speaker 1: getting on with the war against the Communists in Vietnam,
- 5:19Speaker 1: as opposed to worrying about the source of light aircraft.
- 5:23Speaker 1: After twenty five officers and sixty nine airmen underwent factory
- 5:26Speaker 1: training in July and August, they opened in the training
- 5:30Speaker 1: center in September. Trainees took one month of pre flight
- 5:33Speaker 1: instruction and three months of primary flight training that included
- 5:37Speaker 1: eighty hours of actual flying. Vietnamese liaison pilots and reasonable
- 5:41Speaker 1: numbers were ready for combat. In early nineteen sixty four.
- 5:45Speaker 1: Twelve Air Force officers and forty seven airmen reached Thomsone
- 5:49Speaker 1: in January nineteen sixty three to train Vietnamese helicopter pilots.
- 5:54Speaker 1: By June they graduated fifteen student pilots who were qualified
- 5:57Speaker 1: to fly H nineteen's went on throughout the year. Admiral
- 6:02Speaker 1: Felt hoped that the Vietnamese could have the four r
- 6:05Speaker 1: T thirty three jets authorized by the Military Assistance Program.
- 6:09Speaker 1: In February, however, Secretary of State Rusk announced that overriding
- 6:13Speaker 1: political considerations and international risks ruled out their delivery. Shortly thereafter,
- 6:19Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs approved a boost in US Air Force
- 6:22Speaker 1: reconnaissance aircraft, including four RB twenty six's and two more
- 6:27Speaker 1: R F one oh one s for farm Gate. The
- 6:29Speaker 1: RB twenty six's reached Tonsonut in March from Fort Worth, Texas.
- 6:34Speaker 1: Two of them were equipped for night photography and the
- 6:37Speaker 1: other two were experimental RB twenty six l's specially outfitted
- 6:41Speaker 1: with night photo and RECONOFAX four infrared sensing devices. In May,
- 6:46Speaker 1: Fifth Air Force sixty ninety first Reconnaissance Squadron flew two
- 6:51Speaker 1: RB fifty sevens to a temporary duty site at Tanzenut.
- 6:55Speaker 1: These jets featured advanced and improved day and Night. K
- 6:58Speaker 1: fifty two panoramic Us and Reconifact six infrared sensors airborne
- 7:04Speaker 1: high frequency direction finders had difficulty locating Vietcong radio transmitters.
- 7:10Speaker 1: More than two hundred enemy sets were active, but it
- 7:12Speaker 1: was impossible to fix their exact sites. General Antus and
- 7:16Speaker 1: other officials thought it might be better to listen to
- 7:19Speaker 1: the traffic instead of disrupting or destroying it. In any event,
- 7:23Speaker 1: knowing where the radios were operating was deemed essential. Infrared
- 7:28Speaker 1: devices were meant to detect thermal radiation emitted by campfires, vehicles, structures,
- 7:34Speaker 1: and traffic on trails and streams. In theory, the sensors
- 7:38Speaker 1: could pinpoint activities hidden from normal photography, but the Riconifacts
- 7:42Speaker 1: four infrared photo equipment on the RB twenty six l's
- 7:46Speaker 1: broke down, and the technical representative in Vietnam could not
- 7:49Speaker 1: make the system originally designed for B fifty eight's work.
- 7:53Speaker 1: Climatic conditions, chiefly dust and dampness, fouled the sensors. Heat
- 7:58Speaker 1: from the photo flare cartridge ject forward of the infrared
- 8:01Speaker 1: system saturated the infrared detector and ruined the film. As
- 8:06Speaker 1: for the RB fifty seven e's infrared sensors. Integral components
- 8:11Speaker 1: were missing. The plane's panoramic cameras provided very clear horizon
- 8:15Speaker 1: to horizon pictures, even at high speed and low altitude.
- 8:19Speaker 1: Having both horizons and the shot enhanced the perspective of
- 8:22Speaker 1: the photo interpreter, but he had to learn how to
- 8:25Speaker 1: compensate for distortion in the wide lateral coverage. When equipment worked,
- 8:31Speaker 1: the intelligence apparatus was often unable to exploit the information gathered.
- 8:36Speaker 1: The zonal concept of ground operations worked against a centralized
- 8:40Speaker 1: air reconnaissance network. Separating intelligence data by core tactical zone
- 8:45Speaker 1: was not easy because planes flew across core boundaries. Moreover,
- 8:50Speaker 1: there were no courier aircraft to deliver reconnaissance film rapidly
- 8:53Speaker 1: throughout Vietnam. Before the coming of two U three s
- 8:57Speaker 1: from the United States in May. The OV one Mohawks
- 9:01Speaker 1: attached to Vietnamese ground divisions reacted quickly to shifting situations. However,
- 9:07Speaker 1: the intelligence they collected was not fed into the national
- 9:10Speaker 1: intelligence reconnaissance set up. General Harkins still labeled the Mohawks
- 9:14Speaker 1: as complimentary rather than competitive, to US Air Force and
- 9:18Speaker 1: Vietnamese tactical air reconnaissance. He saw no need to coordinate
- 9:22Speaker 1: them with the standard activities, saying they were outside the
- 9:26Speaker 1: specialized capabilities of other photo aircraft. Air Force planes flew
- 9:31Speaker 1: nearly all the reconnaissance in nineteen sixty three, yet the
- 9:35Speaker 1: flights failed to glean a great deal of intelligence by
- 9:38Speaker 1: reason of weather, jungle and forested terrain. Finding and photographing
- 9:44Speaker 1: the small and fleeting enemy targets was a stiff proposition.
- 9:49Speaker 1: Air defense radar control centers were situated at Tansunut, De
- 9:52Speaker 1: Nang and play Coup. These and the radar at Uban,
- 9:56Speaker 1: Thailand gave high altitude surveillance. The interceptor fleet consisted of
- 10:02Speaker 1: Air Force F one O two and Navy EA one
- 10:05Speaker 1: F eight five Q. All weather fighters rotated to Saigon
- 10:10Speaker 1: mountain screening cluttered radar coverage below five thousand feet. The
- 10:14Speaker 1: F one O twos performed marginally in low level interceptions,
- 10:18Speaker 1: while the EA one f's lacked the speed to intercept
- 10:21Speaker 1: aircraft intruding in areas distant from Saigon. To stretch the
- 10:26Speaker 1: coverage and especially to scan much of south central Vietnam,
- 10:29Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force moved a TPS one ten D
- 10:33Speaker 1: training radar from Tonsonut to Banmetuo, in February nineteen sixty three.
- 10:39Speaker 1: From February tenth to fifteen, an unusual number of low level,
- 10:44Speaker 1: slow flying radar tracks appeared before midnight near Plaikoup and
- 10:47Speaker 1: De Nang, then disappeared before dawn. Air Force and Navy
- 10:51Speaker 1: interceptors investigated, using flares and other techniques. They found nothing,
- 10:56Speaker 1: the tracks vanishing from ground and air radars. As the
- 10:59Speaker 1: plane approached around Dnang. On February fourteenth, a Navy aircraft
- 11:04Speaker 1: intercepted a flight of ducks. Consequently, officials concluded that migrating
- 11:09Speaker 1: waterfowl had caused the unknown tracks. Convinced that no air
- 11:14Speaker 1: battles would be fought in Vietnam, General Harkins nevertheless sents
- 11:18Speaker 1: the need for flight following since November nineteen sixty one,
- 11:22Speaker 1: mule train transport squadrons had used their network of high
- 11:26Speaker 1: frequency radios farm gate crews reported their in flight positions
- 11:30Speaker 1: to the nearest radar control center every thirty minutes. On
- 11:34Speaker 1: January tenth, nineteen sixty three, an Army OV one was
- 11:38Speaker 1: lost during an unreported flight out of Quinon, and it
- 11:42Speaker 1: took over two hundred and fifty search sorties to find
- 11:45Speaker 1: the plane. In March, the Flight Service Center and Network
- 11:48Speaker 1: was born at Tansenut. The reduced likelihood of communist air
- 11:53Speaker 1: intrusions and the birth of the Flight Service Center and
- 11:56Speaker 1: Network threw into question the need for the F one
- 11:59Speaker 1: O two s and EA one fs at Tonsonut. Safety
- 12:03Speaker 1: considerations alone seemed to warrant their removal. For two hundred
- 12:06Speaker 1: thirty three military aircraft of all sorts used the airfield,
- 12:10Speaker 1: along with commercial planes. General Anthos wanted to clear the
- 12:14Speaker 1: ten thousand foot runway by moving out some of the helicopters,
- 12:17Speaker 1: but Packaffs suggested keeping the interceptors on call in the Philippines.
- 12:22Speaker 1: These planes withdrew in May. The supersonic F one O
- 12:25Speaker 1: two s could return to Tonsonut within twelve hours, the
- 12:29Speaker 1: EA one f's within forty eight. There was no call
- 12:32Speaker 1: for them in nineteen sixty three, however, triggered by President
- 12:35Speaker 1: Kennedy's approval on December thirty first, nineteen sixty two, to
- 12:40Speaker 1: augment farm Gate, the Air Force in nineteen sixty three
- 12:43Speaker 1: acted to regularize the status of its units in Vietnam.
- 12:48Speaker 1: Admiral Felt furnished the impetus when he spurned the principle
- 12:51Speaker 1: hitherto held that US Air Force personnel sent to the
- 12:54Speaker 1: country had to have prior training in counterinsurgency. Farm Gate,
- 12:59Speaker 1: he said, was flying conventional missions. Airmen could accordingly be
- 13:03Speaker 1: assigned on a routine, permanent change of station basis. This
- 13:07Speaker 1: would clear the way for doubling the number of aircrews
- 13:10Speaker 1: and maintenance men and could raise the sortie rate by
- 13:13Speaker 1: twenty five or thirty percent. Felt. In addition, wished to
- 13:17Speaker 1: boost the number of liaison aircraft and forward air controllers
- 13:21Speaker 1: by a full two squadrons to furnish visual reconnaissance beyond
- 13:25Speaker 1: anything already on hand. This, he said, would be the
- 13:28Speaker 1: key to a successful national campaign plan. General LEA May
- 13:32Speaker 1: in early February pressed for putting US markings on Farmgate aircraft.
- 13:37Speaker 1: He said that current classification restrictions on farm Gate are
- 13:40Speaker 1: considered unnecessary. Actual operation is well known through SVN, and
- 13:45Speaker 1: classification has become an administrative burden. The State Department queried
- 13:50Speaker 1: Admiral Nolting in a series of articles in the press
- 13:53Speaker 1: on US combat air activities, particularly those of American pilot
- 13:57Speaker 1: at aircraft. In his reply, Nolting pointed out the rather
- 14:01Speaker 1: gradual and inevitable uncovering of facts by US journalists that
- 14:06Speaker 1: Americans flew combat aircraft was common knowledge. This was expressly
- 14:11Speaker 1: true after the deaths of Captains John P. Bartley and
- 14:14Speaker 1: John F. Shaughnessy Junior in an RB twenty six down
- 14:17Speaker 1: by Vietcong fire on February third, and the loss of
- 14:20Speaker 1: Major James E. O'Neill in a crash three days later.
- 14:24Speaker 1: Secretary of State Rusk, however, continued to accent the American
- 14:28Speaker 1: role as strictly limited to advisory, logistic, and training functions.
- 14:33Speaker 1: General le May and marsh again asked for permission to
- 14:36Speaker 1: declassify farm Gate, but Ambassador Nolting said, we are winning
- 14:40Speaker 1: without such overt us action. By June nineteen sixty three,
- 14:45Speaker 1: macveee had sixteen thousand, six hundred fifty two people four
- 14:49Speaker 1: thy seven hundred ninety of them air Force. On the
- 14:52Speaker 1: twenty eighth, Secretary of Defense McNamara froze macvie's strength. To
- 14:57Speaker 1: clear up the confusing array of US Air Air Force units,
- 15:01Speaker 1: PACAF formed new ones without expanding manpower authorizations. On July eighth,
- 15:07Speaker 1: Farm Gate at Binhoits became the first Air Commando Squadron composite,
- 15:11Speaker 1: a regular PACAFF organization. Although PACAFF wanted the code name
- 15:16Speaker 1: farm Gate dropped. Air Force Headquarters disapproved because various logistic
- 15:21Speaker 1: facilities supporting Farmgate were thoroughly familiar with the name and
- 15:25Speaker 1: all it implied as first Air Commando Squadron. Farm Gate
- 15:30Speaker 1: contained two strike sections. The first consisted of ten B
- 15:34Speaker 1: twenty six's with twenty three crews pilot and navigator and
- 15:38Speaker 1: two RB twenty six's. The second had thirteen to twenty
- 15:43Speaker 1: eights with two crew members per plane. In addition, there
- 15:46Speaker 1: were two support sections, one of four psychological warfare U
- 15:50Speaker 1: tens and the other of six C forty sevens. The
- 15:54Speaker 1: remaining eight B twenty six's were in detachments at Pleikuoup
- 15:57Speaker 1: and Sakchrog. Likewise, on July eighth, the thirty third and
- 16:01Speaker 1: thirty fourth Tactical Groups came into being, based at Tonsonut
- 16:06Speaker 1: and Under. The thirty third tactical Group were the thirty
- 16:09Speaker 1: third Air Base Squadron, the thirty third consolidated Aircraft Maintenance
- 16:13Speaker 1: Squadron CAMRON and Detachment I, a reconnaissance element. The thirty
- 16:18Speaker 1: third group also had detachments at Canteau and Natrenge at Benhois.
- 16:23Speaker 1: The thirty fourth Tactical Group consisted of the nineteenth Tactical
- 16:27Speaker 1: Air Support Squadron, the thirty fourth Air Base Squadron and
- 16:31Speaker 1: the thirty fourth Cameron. Detachments of the thirty fourth Group
- 16:35Speaker 1: were at Plai Coup and Soaktroang. Directly under Second Air
- 16:39Speaker 1: Division was the twenty third Air Base Group activated at
- 16:43Speaker 1: de Nang with its twenty third camroon. A detachment of
- 16:46Speaker 1: the group at Quinan was previously the sixty two to
- 16:49Speaker 1: twenty second Air Base Squadron. General anthus wanted a single
- 16:56Speaker 1: control point for the packets of reconnaissance detachments, called a
- 17:00Speaker 1: male Black Watch Patricia Lynn and Sweet sus. He therefore
- 17:05Speaker 1: requested a Tactical Air Reconnaissance Squadron for his second Air Division,
- 17:10Speaker 1: but the Air Staff could not create the unit within
- 17:13Speaker 1: the authorized four structure. In consequence, the commander of Detachment
- 17:17Speaker 1: I thirty third Tactical Group exercised a loose central direction
- 17:22Speaker 1: over the reconnaissance operations. The mule train C one twenty
- 17:27Speaker 1: three units became troop carrier squadrons, the three hundred ninth
- 17:30Speaker 1: and three hundred tenth at Tonsonut and the three hundred
- 17:33Speaker 1: eleventh at Dinang. They were part of the three hundred
- 17:36Speaker 1: fifteenth Troop Carrier Group Assault, attached to second Air Division
- 17:41Speaker 1: but assigned to Packass three hundred fifteenth Air Division Combat Cargo,
- 17:45Speaker 1: headquartered in Japan. The upshot of this sweeping reorganization was
- 17:50Speaker 1: to free General Anthus from dealing directly with twelve or
- 17:53Speaker 1: more major subordinate units. Farmgate gained fresh aircraft in January
- 17:59Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three five T twenty eights, ten B twenty six's,
- 18:04Speaker 1: and two C forty sevens, and by February boasted forty
- 18:08Speaker 1: two planes and two hundred seventy five men. General Anthus
- 18:12Speaker 1: fashioned an air strike team of six B twenty six's
- 18:15Speaker 1: and one SEA forty seven at Plai Coup, which had
- 18:18Speaker 1: been revamped to take B twenty six's. He formed another
- 18:21Speaker 1: of five T twenty eights and one C forty seven
- 18:24Speaker 1: at Saktrong, where the unimproved thirty two hundred foot runway
- 18:28Speaker 1: admitted only T twenty eight operations until General Harkins in
- 18:32Speaker 1: midyear gave the Vietnamese border Control troops some aircraft of
- 18:36Speaker 1: their own, farm Gate flew combat support for them. These
- 18:40Speaker 1: forces embraced about five thousand Vietnamese Army rangers and civilian
- 18:45Speaker 1: Irregular Defense Group personnel, accompanied by US Special Forces advisors.
- 18:50Speaker 1: They manned one hundred three outposts along Vietnam's nine hundred
- 18:54Speaker 1: mile land border to cut down on Vietcong infiltration, varying
- 18:59Speaker 1: in from platoon to battalion. They further carried out covert
- 19:04Speaker 1: penetrations across the frontier. State Department pressure prompted the Joint
- 19:08Speaker 1: General Staff to forbid ground and air operations within ten
- 19:12Speaker 1: kilometers of the border without prior approval. Macvee termed the
- 19:16Speaker 1: restriction completely incongruous for this strip of de facto demilitarized
- 19:21Speaker 1: territory afforded the viet Cong safe haven. Over the last
- 19:27Speaker 1: days of March nineteen sixty three, US Special Forces mounted
- 19:31Speaker 1: an operation in the Seven Mountains of southwestern Vietnam. Farm
- 19:35Speaker 1: gate bombing before the assault killed about one hundred fifty
- 19:38Speaker 1: enemy and let the ground troops move into the hills.
- 19:41Speaker 1: Captain John Curcell, the Second Air Division forward air controller
- 19:45Speaker 1: assigned to the operation, went with the troops on foot
- 19:48Speaker 1: and directed air strikes with a PRC ten radio. Even
- 19:52Speaker 1: though the attack brought Vietnamese territory under government control, the
- 19:56Speaker 1: four Corps commander protested the intrusion into his zone. The
- 20:00Speaker 1: Joint General Staff then ruled that special Forces teams had
- 20:04Speaker 1: to request air support through Vietnamese channels. Ten days later,
- 20:09Speaker 1: the Joint General Staff removed earlier curbs on border operations.
- 20:13Speaker 1: Vietnamese ground forces could now operate to the border wherever
- 20:17Speaker 1: a geographical feature such as a river or road clearly
- 20:20Speaker 1: marked it. Elsewhere, they could go to within one thousand
- 20:24Speaker 1: meters of the border, except along the northern part, where
- 20:27Speaker 1: a strip of ten thousand meters applied. Vietnamese aircraft could
- 20:30Speaker 1: operate to the border where it was clearly visible elsewhere
- 20:34Speaker 1: to two thousand meters if a forward air controller was
- 20:37Speaker 1: at hand, and to five thousand meters without air control.
- 20:41Speaker 1: Core Headquarters rather than the Joint General Staff, had to
- 20:44Speaker 1: approve all actions along the frontier. The State Department ordered
- 20:49Speaker 1: Ambassador Noltung to press for suspension of the new procedures
- 20:53Speaker 1: since they could inflame Cambodia, North Vietnam, and China. Knowlton
- 20:58Speaker 1: was sympathetic to the new rules because of the considerable
- 21:01Speaker 1: supplies coming across the borders to the viet Cong. All
- 21:05Speaker 1: the same, he and General Harkins talked with Vietnamese officials
- 21:09Speaker 1: about how border violations seriously disturbed the common interests of
- 21:13Speaker 1: Vietnam and the United States. Admiral felt new border incidents
- 21:18Speaker 1: could be disruptive, but thought that trimming infiltration was worth
- 21:22Speaker 1: the risk. General O'Donnell proposed having US aircraft survey the
- 21:26Speaker 1: border to correct map errors. His proposal was shelved for
- 21:30Speaker 1: fear of breaching the nineteen sixty two Geneva Agreement on
- 21:33Speaker 1: Laotian Neutrality. At the Secretary of Defense conference in Hawaii
- 21:38Speaker 1: on May sixth, the participants agreed that the troops stationed
- 21:42Speaker 1: along the border must do their utmost to slow down
- 21:45Speaker 1: enemy movements, but they believed putting pressure on Hanoi to
- 21:49Speaker 1: be a better way to end infiltration. In April, the
- 21:53Speaker 1: Joint Chiefs had identified eight targets in North Vietnam that
- 21:56Speaker 1: were vulnerable to attack from American carrier and thailand land
- 22:00Speaker 1: based aircraft. Among them were the Dong Hoi and Vin airfields,
- 22:05Speaker 1: several highway bridges, pol storage, the Hiphong thermal power plant,
- 22:10Speaker 1: a rolling mill, and a chemical plant. Bombing would be
- 22:14Speaker 1: a warning to Ho Chi Minh, but risked bringing Chinese
- 22:17Speaker 1: air assistance to North Vietnam. Mister McNamara now recommended to
- 22:22Speaker 1: the conferees that sink pack embody air strikes against North
- 22:25Speaker 1: Vietnam for planning options. Perhaps the State Department fetters on
- 22:30Speaker 1: covert operations into North Vietnam could be loosened. Roger Hillsman
- 22:35Speaker 1: of the State Department, informed the group that he was
- 22:38Speaker 1: optimistic about the border control exercised by the Special Forces
- 22:42Speaker 1: and Montagnards. Strategic hamlets combined with Montagnard operations were making
- 22:47Speaker 1: dramatic gains. He predicted, You have circles. In the center
- 22:51Speaker 1: of each circle is a Special Forces team. These circles
- 22:55Speaker 1: are getting bigger. When they close up, I think you
- 22:58Speaker 1: will see a noticeable chokeing down of the use of
- 23:01Speaker 1: the infiltration groups. Admiral Felt said he also expected solid
- 23:06Speaker 1: progress from the air strikes against Vietcong war zones and bases.
- 23:10Speaker 1: He scored these power centers as the nuclei of the
- 23:14Speaker 1: VC governmental structure, giving protective sanctuaries for offensive enemy operations
- 23:19Speaker 1: and providing little arsenals and installations. Unfortunately, all out interdiction
- 23:25Speaker 1: clashed with the individual interests of the largely independent core commanders.
- 23:30Speaker 1: While U. S Air Force liaison officers called for interdiction,
- 23:33Speaker 1: air attacks not tied directly to ground operations began to decline.
- 23:38Speaker 1: Vietnamese probes into viet Cong Zone D during February and
- 23:42Speaker 1: March made good use of pre planned air interdiction strikes.
- 23:46Speaker 1: Rangers swept into the area later and burnt enemy headquarters
- 23:50Speaker 1: in camps along the Madah River. They discovered deep log
- 23:53Speaker 1: covered bunkers built by the Communists to protect against air attacks.
- 23:58Speaker 1: Inasmuch as fighters usually se circled before striking, there was
- 24:02Speaker 1: enough time for everybody to take cover. In March, the
- 24:06Speaker 1: Air Force and army advisers in that area got the
- 24:09Speaker 1: go ahead for a prolonged low priority interdiction bombing program.
- 24:14Speaker 1: Planes returning to base with unused ordinance could attack targets
- 24:18Speaker 1: under the direction of a Vietnamese forward air controller. Strikes
- 24:22Speaker 1: got under way on April first and went on almost
- 24:25Speaker 1: every day. It was difficult to assess results due to
- 24:28Speaker 1: the jungle cover. On April thirtieth, fighters surprised a gathering
- 24:33Speaker 1: of Viet Cong and attacked. Inspecting the area. The next day,
- 24:37Speaker 1: the Fuktan province chief estimated that over one hundred enemy
- 24:41Speaker 1: had been killed. Vietcong deserters confirmed that the strikes inflicted casualties,
- 24:47Speaker 1: damaged morale, and kept everyone on the move, but said
- 24:51Speaker 1: the attacks were no serious threat to their existence. The
- 24:54Speaker 1: Communists kept a firm grip on Zone D, continuing to
- 24:58Speaker 1: collect road taxes and to excit tribute from plantation owners.
- 25:02Speaker 1: Between April twenty fourth and May twenty fourth, the two
- 25:05Speaker 1: Corps commander spearheaded a drive into the Yosau War Zone
- 25:09Speaker 1: headquarters area of Vietcong Inner Zone five in the mountains
- 25:13Speaker 1: on the borders of Quang Nai, Kongtum and Quang Tin Provinces.
- 25:17Speaker 1: His five regiments of ground troops and two battalions of
- 25:20Speaker 1: Vietnamese Marines totaled about ten thousand men. Assisted by an
- 25:24Speaker 1: air support operations center, the three days of preliminary interdiction
- 25:29Speaker 1: generated thirty six A one h fourteen T twenty eight
- 25:33Speaker 1: and thirty four B twenty six sorties. Throughout the month
- 25:37Speaker 1: long operation, pilots flew one hundred fifteen A, one H
- 25:41Speaker 1: one hundred eight twenty eight and seventy four B twenty
- 25:45Speaker 1: six sorties. Besides killing five Viet Kong, these timely and
- 25:49Speaker 1: potent air strikes destroyed two hundred thirty eight structures and
- 25:53Speaker 1: damaged seventy seven. The badly scattered enemy would need several
- 25:58Speaker 1: months to return and reastabate. Bablished Vietcong Region five, which,
- 26:02Speaker 1: like the old Inner Zone five, guarded infiltration routes to
- 26:06Speaker 1: base areas. Air Force and Vietnamese pilots faithfully followed the
- 26:10Speaker 1: rule that air strikes had to be handled by a
- 26:13Speaker 1: Vietnamese forward air controller. Although the procedure precluded arm reconnaissance
- 26:18Speaker 1: aircraft from attacking targets of opportunity, it was a sound
- 26:21Speaker 1: precaution against indiscriminate bombing. Crews staging two and from forward
- 26:27Speaker 1: airfields were encouraged to fly low and seek out the
- 26:30Speaker 1: enemy before they could attack. However, they needed an airborne
- 26:34Speaker 1: forward air controller. Army ov Ie crews enjoyed less stringent
- 26:38Speaker 1: rules of engagement. They frequently flew as low as fifty feet,
- 26:42Speaker 1: enticing the viet Cong to open fire so they could
- 26:45Speaker 1: shoot back. Lieutenant Colonel David S. Melish, three Corps Air
- 26:49Speaker 1: Liaison Officer, secured authority in September to start an air
- 26:53Speaker 1: interdiction program. Vietnamese province chiefs certified certain areas free of
- 26:59Speaker 1: friendly people. The Air Operations Center scheduled air strikes under
- 27:03Speaker 1: forward air controllers into these regions. Provincial officials reviewed each
- 27:07Speaker 1: target belt weekly. This interdiction paid off in tain In
- 27:11Speaker 1: and Foketon provinces during October, though the viet Cong learned
- 27:15Speaker 1: to disperse and take cover as soon as the L
- 27:18Speaker 1: nineteen dropped smoke grenades to mark targets for the strike planes.
- 27:22Speaker 1: Melish persistently urged armed reconnaissance in holly Viet Cong sections.
- 27:28Speaker 1: Vietnamese pilots, he said, should sweep these areas and shoot
- 27:32Speaker 1: VC on site. At present, we are ineffective because our
- 27:36Speaker 1: politically inspired target marking is the best possible air raid
- 27:40Speaker 1: warning the VC could hope to have. Colonel Donald h. Ross,
- 27:44Speaker 1: second Air Division Director of Operations, reminded his associates that
- 27:48Speaker 1: the Vietnamese, not the Americans, were waging the war. Forward
- 27:53Speaker 1: air controllers were vital to protect friendly people. Carefully targeted
- 27:59Speaker 1: and controlled indiction strikes on Vietcong base camps, assembly areas,
- 28:03Speaker 1: and logistic installations were designed to help ground troops clear
- 28:08Speaker 1: and hold Vietnam, but the overriding air mission was support
- 28:12Speaker 1: preparation and cover for helliborne landings, night hamlet defense, and
- 28:18Speaker 1: escort for convoys and trains. Over the first half of
- 28:21Speaker 1: nineteen sixty three, Vietnamese L nineteen's usually escorted truck convoys
- 28:26Speaker 1: and trains, but strike aircraft covered those transporting high priority cargoes.
- 28:32Speaker 1: Vietnamese and US Air Force planes flew close to one
- 28:35Speaker 1: thousand sorties in these missions. The Vietcong ambush no surface
- 28:40Speaker 1: movement having air cover, yet were quick to pounce on
- 28:43Speaker 1: motor columns and trains running aerial escort developed from original
- 28:48Speaker 1: farm gate tactics, Night flare strike missions and defensive outposts
- 28:52Speaker 1: and hamlets under attack remained effective. One Vietnamese C forty
- 28:57Speaker 1: seven flair ship stayed on night ground alert at Plai Coup,
- 29:00Speaker 1: a second stood similar duty at Denang, and a third
- 29:03Speaker 1: flew airborne alert every night over three and four corps.
- 29:07Speaker 1: Yet the commander of the five hundred fourteenth Fighter Squadron
- 29:10Speaker 1: refused to accept orders for a one h night strike
- 29:13Speaker 1: crews alerted at Benhoi and Plea Coup. He argued that
- 29:17Speaker 1: his pilots were not ready to fly at night, but
- 29:19Speaker 1: yielded to American pressure and accepted about half of the
- 29:22Speaker 1: missions requested. Fighters working with a flair ship could commonly
- 29:26Speaker 1: dispense with a forward air controller during strikes in defense
- 29:29Speaker 1: of an installation. However, for close air support of friendly
- 29:33Speaker 1: troops under attack at night, a controller was required to
- 29:36Speaker 1: mark targets. Success of flare strike defensive missions depended upon
- 29:43Speaker 1: the speed with which those under attack could report to
- 29:46Speaker 1: an air support operations center. By May nineteen sixty three,
- 29:50Speaker 1: most villages had radios, and the time lapse between attack
- 29:54Speaker 1: and report averaged about forty eight minutes. The delay stemmed
- 29:59Speaker 1: chiefly from the sho short ranges of the provincial radio
- 30:01Speaker 1: transmitters that demanded retransmission of messages, often at district, sector
- 30:07Speaker 1: and division levels. Vietcong attacks on hamlets and outposts from
- 30:12Speaker 1: January through April were few, and an average of thirty
- 30:15Speaker 1: three C forty seven sorties was flown each month. The
- 30:19Speaker 1: enemy customarily broke off an attack when a flareplane came
- 30:22Speaker 1: on the scene. In the far northern IKRPS, the First
- 30:26Speaker 1: and Second Divisions controlled the coastal plane to the mountains.
- 30:30Speaker 1: The Vietcong owned the mountains aside from Special forces camps
- 30:33Speaker 1: along the ocean border and in the Oshawa Valley corridor
- 30:36Speaker 1: toward d Nang. In mid January nineteen sixty three, the U. S.
- 30:41Speaker 1: Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron HMM one sixty two became operational
- 30:46Speaker 1: at Danang, with staging areas at Huei and at a
- 30:49Speaker 1: point midway between Danang and Quang Nai. This unit's H
- 30:54Speaker 1: thirty fours supported the border outposts with resupply and troop
- 30:58Speaker 1: exchange missions that normally needed no strike aircraft support, but
- 31:02Speaker 1: air mobile troops assault operations took careful advance planning for
- 31:06Speaker 1: fighter escort, landing zone preparation, and air cover. In these operations,
- 31:12Speaker 1: the H thirty fours flew in three ship elements one
- 31:15Speaker 1: minute apart. En route to the landing zone. The helicopter
- 31:19Speaker 1: commanders ran the whole affair, calling for strike aircraft to
- 31:23Speaker 1: neutralize enemy fire. Even though the Marine Corps helicopter commanders
- 31:27Speaker 1: evaluated the Vietnamese A ONEH pilots as outstanding, they favored
- 31:32Speaker 1: US Air Force fighters because there was no communications language problem.
- 31:36Speaker 1: When a platoon of Army UH one helicopters at Denang
- 31:39Speaker 1: was attainable in April, these gunships protected landing zones, the
- 31:44Speaker 1: ICORPS commander had to approve all requests for air strikes.
- 31:48Speaker 1: Members of Second Air Division who visited the Air Operations
- 31:52Speaker 1: Center there had the impression that US Army advisors dominated
- 31:55Speaker 1: the scene. For example, the advisors funneled many air support
- 31:59Speaker 1: REPS quests to the two armed ov I Mohawks stationed
- 32:03Speaker 1: at d Nang. In the two Corps eight US Air
- 32:07Speaker 1: Force B twenty six's joined the four Vietnamese A one
- 32:11Speaker 1: h's at Pleaiku at once. Air support sorties rose, probably
- 32:15Speaker 1: because Vietnamese ground officers could see the aircraft on hand,
- 32:19Speaker 1: but communications with the division command posts at Quinon and
- 32:23Speaker 1: Quang Nai were regularly unreliable, and bad weather in the
- 32:27Speaker 1: mountains east and northeast of Pleiku repeatedly impeded flights to
- 32:31Speaker 1: the coastal provinces. To shake weather restrictions, Macvie shifted two
- 32:37Speaker 1: B twenty six's from Pleiku to d Nang. Since the
- 32:41Speaker 1: Vietnamese pilots were unable or unwilling to operate out of
- 32:45Speaker 1: Quinon and Quang Nai. Aircraft from Pleiku or Natreng supported
- 32:50Speaker 1: the ninth and twenty fifth Divisions. The division commanders complained
- 32:54Speaker 1: that they had to divulge their operational plans before they
- 32:57Speaker 1: wanted to. Also, for a short while, the one hundred
- 33:00Speaker 1: tenth Liaison Squadron commander declined to send L nineteen's to
- 33:04Speaker 1: Qwang Ni he resented the time a ground force officer
- 33:08Speaker 1: had usurped the job of a Vietnamese air observer adjusting artillery.
- 33:12Speaker 1: The T twenty eighths dispatched to Queenaon and Quang Tree
- 33:16Speaker 1: were regularly late for planned operations, despite two days advance notice.
- 33:21Speaker 1: This deprived at least one helliborne operation of air cover.
- 33:26Speaker 1: When we speak of immediate air strikes in this division,
- 33:28Speaker 1: wrote Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Meyer, Ninth Division air liaison officer,
- 33:33Speaker 1: the Arvin only laugh, and I can hardly blame them.
- 33:39Speaker 1: Vietnamese air crews executed well in the two Corps attack
- 33:43Speaker 1: on the Yosa Headquarters area during April twenty fourth May
- 33:46Speaker 1: twenty fourth, nineteen sixty three. Their performance was below par
- 33:50Speaker 1: in June, when the Ninth Division triggered an eight hundred
- 33:54Speaker 1: man helliborne attack around on k The L nineteen chosen
- 33:58Speaker 1: to work the landing zone with late. Only one of
- 34:01Speaker 1: the four pre strike A one h's properly delivered napalm,
- 34:06Speaker 1: and the H twenty one helicopters had to circle and
- 34:09Speaker 1: wait for the air preparations. Two days later, a Vietnamese
- 34:13Speaker 1: forward air controller brought pre Strike A one hs to
- 34:17Speaker 1: a landing zone ten minutes early. On five separate occasions
- 34:21Speaker 1: in the course of the action, L nineteen pilots and
- 34:24Speaker 1: observers were unable to accept strike aircraft at assigned rendezvous points.
- 34:29Speaker 1: Air Force L nineteens, with American pilots and Vietnamese observers
- 34:33Speaker 1: solved the problems. Poor performance by Vietnamese air crews imperiled
- 34:38Speaker 1: several ground operations in the two corps. Operations nonetheless made
- 34:43Speaker 1: marked gains around Saigon, disrupting a key viet Cong base
- 34:47Speaker 1: and defending strategic hamlets in Quang Nai Province against severe
- 34:51Speaker 1: Communist attacks. More and more local residents came forth with
- 34:56Speaker 1: information on Vietcong movements, and the Popular forces defending the
- 35:00Speaker 1: hamlets killed three hundred eighty three enemy while losing thirty
- 35:03Speaker 1: three of their own. In the three corps north of Saigon,
- 35:08Speaker 1: Vietnamese forces were busy. Rangers probed into Zone D, the
- 35:13Speaker 1: fifth Division engaged the enemy in Zone C of Teannan Province,
- 35:17Speaker 1: and the twenty third Division attacked Vietcong bans and protected
- 35:21Speaker 1: hamlets in the Banmetou area. Not one of these operations
- 35:25Speaker 1: received enough tactical air support. The L nineteens of the
- 35:29Speaker 1: one hundred twelve Liaison Squadron at Tansuonut worked both three
- 35:33Speaker 1: and four Corps and thus were often unavailable to one
- 35:36Speaker 1: or the other. Poor communications between three Corps headquarters and
- 35:41Speaker 1: Banmetuo led to authorizing the twenty third Division eight T
- 35:45Speaker 1: twenty eight sorties each day from Natrang. As the division
- 35:49Speaker 1: pushed deeper into Teannan Province and outran dependable landline communications.
- 35:55Speaker 1: Radio equipment troubles increasingly impeded air support. The use of U.
- 35:59Speaker 1: S Army armed helicopters for fire support came to be routine.
- 36:04Speaker 1: The four Corps employed the seventh and twenty first Divisions
- 36:08Speaker 1: in the generally flat and water sodden terrain of the
- 36:11Speaker 1: densely populated Mekong Delta, where transportation was mostly by canal
- 36:17Speaker 1: but some by road. The ground favored the guerrillas, who
- 36:20Speaker 1: massed at places and times of their choosing. Skimpy landline
- 36:25Speaker 1: communications made for heavy radio traffic at Suktrog. The five
- 36:30Speaker 1: US Air Force T twenty eights, together with a detachment
- 36:33Speaker 1: of L nineteens from the one hundred twenty second Liaison
- 36:36Speaker 1: Squadron at Canto, afforded air strikes and forward air control
- 36:41Speaker 1: like all other airfields in the Delta, Soktrong needed development.
- 36:46Speaker 1: Its unlighted, thirty three hundred foot runway was suited solely
- 36:49Speaker 1: to daytime T twenty eight operations. The glide slope was
- 36:54Speaker 1: too steep for a T twenty eight to touch down
- 36:56Speaker 1: safely in wet weather. Though a T twenty eight could
- 36:59Speaker 1: take off night or in bad weather to land after
- 37:02Speaker 1: a mission, it had to go to Saigon. Macvie proposed
- 37:06Speaker 1: constructing an airfield at Kanto to replace Suktrong. Even so,
- 37:11Speaker 1: building a six thousand foot runway would take nearly four
- 37:14Speaker 1: point five million dollars in Military Assistance Program funds and
- 37:19Speaker 1: about two years to complete, The project continued under study
- 37:23Speaker 1: in Hawaii. The seventh Division was distinctly less aggressive. Following
- 37:27Speaker 1: the Battle of ap Bach, the division commander, believing that
- 37:31Speaker 1: the Vietcong were monitoring his radio, directed unit commanders to
- 37:35Speaker 1: hand carry requests for air support to the division headquarters.
- 37:39Speaker 1: The twenty first Division engaged extensively in helleborne operations through
- 37:44Speaker 1: February and March. Plans were usually too ambitious for the
- 37:48Speaker 1: troops committed, and the enemy was never where he was
- 37:50Speaker 1: supposed to be. Postponements and no notice changes in plans
- 37:55Speaker 1: complicated the air scheduling of escort and strike planes. After
- 37:59Speaker 1: three visiting a Marria arkans were pinned down by enemy
- 38:01Speaker 1: fire for an hour while strike aircraft were circling overhead
- 38:05Speaker 1: and no forward air controller was to be had. Three
- 38:08Speaker 1: US Air Force pilots were assigned to the Vietnamese L
- 38:11Speaker 1: nineteen detachment at Canto. In April, a daring scenario called
- 38:17Speaker 1: for twenty first Division troops to go to the town
- 38:20Speaker 1: of Rakyah by motor convoy and to fainte away from
- 38:23Speaker 1: the objective the Vietcong regional headquarters in western Kenjiang Province
- 38:28Speaker 1: between seven Mountains and the Cambodian border. On the following day,
- 38:33Speaker 1: helicopters would land troops to storm the headquarters and to
- 38:36Speaker 1: cut off probable escort routes to the mountains. Aircraft were
- 38:40Speaker 1: to fly cover and support. The plan may have been
- 38:43Speaker 1: compromised for the Vietcong withdrew from their sites several days
- 38:46Speaker 1: before the assault. Then a classic demonstration of order, counter order,
- 38:51Speaker 1: and disorder took place. The division altered all helicopter radio
- 38:56Speaker 1: frequencies and some participants failed to receive note. Several strike
- 39:01Speaker 1: crews orbited target areas waiting for helicopters that never appeared.
- 39:05Speaker 1: The ground troops did not clash with the foe, but
- 39:08Speaker 1: his fire hit two UH one and seven twenty one helicopters.
- 39:13Speaker 1: Interdiction bombing in seven mountains by US and Vietnamese strike
- 39:16Speaker 1: pilots was said to have killed three hundred forty five
- 39:19Speaker 1: fleeing Vietcong. To prevent whimsical, uncoordinated changes in planned helicopter
- 39:26Speaker 1: operations directly affecting the escort, General anthus asked the MACV
- 39:31Speaker 1: Joint Frequency Coordinating Board to set up standard radio frequencies
- 39:35Speaker 1: for helliborne operations and to insist on their use. The
- 39:39Speaker 1: Second Air Division assigned one of its KWM two A
- 39:43Speaker 1: radios and an operator to the twenty first Division. This
- 39:46Speaker 1: gave the US Air Liaison officer a rapid communications link
- 39:50Speaker 1: to cope with sudden changes in air support needs. An
- 39:53Speaker 1: Air Ground Operation School orientation team from the United States
- 39:58Speaker 1: promoted understanding among twenty four ves Division personnel of the
- 40:01Speaker 1: procedures for air support at battalion and company levels pre strikes,
- 40:07Speaker 1: escort and air cover were required items in twenty first
- 40:11Speaker 1: Division planning. On the fourteenth and fifteenth of June in
- 40:16Speaker 1: Qinjyong Province. B twenty six pre strikes in T twenty
- 40:20Speaker 1: eight cover and escort helped the twenty first Division kill
- 40:23Speaker 1: thirty three enemy two by air and capture thirty In
- 40:27Speaker 1: Anchuin Province late in June, one hundred seven communists were killed,
- 40:32Speaker 1: fifty five by air, seventy two prisoners taken, and many
- 40:36Speaker 1: arms and munitions captured. Air support coordination, it was reported,
- 40:40Speaker 1: was absolutely outstanding. In contrast was the clear neglect of
- 40:45Speaker 1: air support by the seventh Division. Early in July, the
- 40:49Speaker 1: division commander aimed at Helleborn thrust at a Vietkong force
- 40:53Speaker 1: in Qinhua Province. Relying on the firepower of four UH
- 40:57Speaker 1: one gunships, these helicopters could not knock out the guns
- 41:01Speaker 1: dug in at the treeline adjacent to the landing zone.
- 41:04Speaker 1: Before the afternoon was over ground fire hit eleven helicopters
- 41:08Speaker 1: and wounded three U. S. Army crewmen called to the scene.
- 41:12Speaker 1: Two B twenty sixes, six T twenty eights and two
- 41:16Speaker 1: eighty sixes tangled with the communists. The Vietcong retreated at nightfall,
- 41:22Speaker 1: leaving behind the twenty four men killed by air strikes.
- 41:25Speaker 1: The loss to enemy ground fire of two B twenty
- 41:28Speaker 1: six is in February and a T twenty eight in
- 41:31Speaker 1: June spurred a boost in air strike firepower. With two
- 41:35Speaker 1: B twenty sixes in lieu of one and four T
- 41:38Speaker 1: twenty eights rather than two, the crews could cover each
- 41:41Speaker 1: other during low level passes. Unfortunately, bigger flights meant fewer missions.
- 41:47Speaker 1: General Anthos accented the importance of good defensive flying, mutual cover,
- 41:52Speaker 1: suppression of hostile fire by strafing evasive maneuvers and avoiding
- 41:56Speaker 1: needless exposure to ground fire. Stationing Vietnamese air units at small,
- 42:03Speaker 1: outlying airfields closer to the ground action was well nigh impossible.
- 42:08Speaker 1: Acute shortages existed in crew chiefs, electrical specialists, armorers, and
- 42:13Speaker 1: other skilled men. There was also a dearth of specialist tools,
- 42:18Speaker 1: test sets, as well as bomb handling trailers and other
- 42:21Speaker 1: ground handling equipment. In consequence, the Vietnamese aircraft at forward
- 42:26Speaker 1: fields were quickly out of commission. Yet Colonel Harvey E. Henderson,
- 42:31Speaker 1: Deputy Commander of second Air Division, could say, in my
- 42:34Speaker 1: six months here, I have been amazed at the rapidity
- 42:38Speaker 1: with which the VNAF have learned and improved their operations.
- 42:44Speaker 1: Belying the progress was the resurgence of Vietcong attacks. In July,
- 42:49Speaker 1: the Communists successfully struck hamlets south of Baumetol and ambushed
- 42:54Speaker 1: the roads leading into the area. They cowed the Montagnards,
- 42:58Speaker 1: who became less helpful intelligence sources. In a ten minute
- 43:02Speaker 1: attack just before midnight on July sixteenth, twenty to thirty
- 43:06Speaker 1: sixty millimeter mortar rounds slammed into troop housing at Kanto
- 43:10Speaker 1: Airfield and wounded seventeen Vietnamese and US Special Forces troops.
- 43:15Speaker 1: The guerrillas slipped away without casualties. Statistics revealed a rising
- 43:20Speaker 1: trend in Vietcong attacks and other incidents, but a drop
- 43:24Speaker 1: in the number of Communist casualties, weapon losses, and defections.
- 43:30Speaker 1: Even though General Harkins was pleased with the fifteen thousand
- 43:33Speaker 1: Vietnamese operations per month in July and August, the national
- 43:37Speaker 1: campaign plan needed a shot in the arm. Many offensive
- 43:41Speaker 1: forays failed to find the foe. There were too many
- 43:45Speaker 1: one day only operations, too few night ones. The Vietnamese
- 43:49Speaker 1: did not patrol deep within Vietcong areas, pursue enemy troops
- 43:53Speaker 1: that broke contact, and capitalize on air reconnaissance. Beginning In September,
- 43:58Speaker 1: the viet Cong swept over exposed hamlets in the area
- 44:02Speaker 1: south of Bonmetol. In the better developed hamlets of Quangnai Province,
- 44:07Speaker 1: enemy activity teams of three to five men achieved some gains.
- 44:11Speaker 1: Vietnamese intelligence identified a large scale, well planned Communist defensive
- 44:16Speaker 1: in the Mekong Delta. Visiting Vietnam during the last week
- 44:21Speaker 1: of September, Secretary macnamara and General Taylor deemed the military
- 44:26Speaker 1: situation good, but political conditions explosive. A week later, in Saigon,
- 44:32Speaker 1: General Harkins told members of the House Foreign Affairs Far
- 44:36Speaker 1: East Subcommittee that the military effort was going well despite
- 44:40Speaker 1: the shaky political scene. A significant JCS assessment supported this view.
- 44:46Speaker 1: The faster tempo of Vietcong attacks created new air support
- 44:49Speaker 1: needs as Vietnamese and US Air Force airpower diminished. Vietnamese
- 44:54Speaker 1: Air Force units appeared to be more interested in training
- 44:57Speaker 1: than in combat. The five sixteen eighth Fighter Squadron commander
- 45:01Speaker 1: trimmed the T twenty eights in his detachment at Dunag
- 45:04Speaker 1: from eight to four. He based his action on the
- 45:07Speaker 1: desire to release some T twenty eight pilots for upgrade
- 45:10Speaker 1: training to a one HS In September, the five hundred
- 45:14Speaker 1: fourteenth Fighter Squadron commander gave on the average, just nine
- 45:18Speaker 1: of his twenty six A one h's to the Air
- 45:20Speaker 1: Operations Center for daily strike missions, saying he had to
- 45:24Speaker 1: divert flying hours to a one H pilot upgrading For
- 45:27Speaker 1: reasons unclear to Americans. He regularly ignored requests for napalm strikes.
- 45:32Speaker 1: This happened principally in the three and four Corps during
- 45:35Speaker 1: the rainy season. Even though incendiaries worked better than explosives
- 45:39Speaker 1: in the water soaked terrain, crews deployed for a while
- 45:43Speaker 1: away from home bases seemed to be unmotivated, uneager, and
- 45:47Speaker 1: unreliable under the rules of engagement, farm Gate continued to
- 45:51Speaker 1: fly those combat missions that the Vietnamese could not. Though
- 45:55Speaker 1: given more people, farm Gate failed to increase its sore
- 45:58Speaker 1: tee rate. The unit that had been permitted to scale
- 46:01Speaker 1: down normal maintenance because of the field operating conditions. Moreover,
- 46:05Speaker 1: the planes were being overworked, and by autumn they were
- 46:08Speaker 1: becoming less safe to fly. The operational readiness rate reached
- 46:12Speaker 1: only fifty to sixty percent, due chiefly to spare part
- 46:16Speaker 1: shortages in flight mechanical failures and enemy action likewise took
- 46:21Speaker 1: their toll. A major cause of B twenty six fatigue
- 46:24Speaker 1: not yet identified in the field, was the eight seven
- 46:28Speaker 1: hundred fifty pound bombs hung on specially designed racks under
- 46:31Speaker 1: the aircraft's wings when the B twenty six was airborne.
- 46:35Speaker 1: This weight did not overstress the wings, but taxiing the
- 46:38Speaker 1: heavily armed plane for many months over rough runways and
- 46:42Speaker 1: ramps imposed excessive negative G force that brought the wings
- 46:46Speaker 1: to their fatigue limit. A B twenty six lost a
- 46:49Speaker 1: wing in flight during a combat mission on August sixteenth,
- 46:52Speaker 1: killing two Americans and a Vietnamese. September was no better.
- 46:57Speaker 1: Twenty three aircraft suffered battle damage. Another B twenty six
- 47:01Speaker 1: and a T twenty eight crashed because of mechanical failures.
- 47:05Speaker 1: On the twenty third, three via conguerrellas cut through the
- 47:08Speaker 1: perimeter fence at n Trang and with package explosives, blew
- 47:12Speaker 1: up two C forty sevens. General Anthos hoped to keep
- 47:17Speaker 1: the B twenty sixes going by having the crews fly
- 47:20Speaker 1: them cautiously and use soft approach and recovery tactics. In
- 47:24Speaker 1: any event, every B twenty six was set for rotation
- 47:27Speaker 1: through depot maintenance contracted with Air Asia in taiwan. Anthus urged,
- 47:33Speaker 1: replacing the battle weary B twenty six's with dual control
- 47:37Speaker 1: Navy A one E fighters or with on Mark B
- 47:40Speaker 1: twenty six k's being refurbished in the United States by
- 47:44Speaker 1: the on Mark Engineering Company. In August and September, the
- 47:48Speaker 1: First Air Commando Squadron was down to an average of
- 47:51Speaker 1: nine to twenty eight and nine to twelve B twenty sixes. Still,
- 47:56Speaker 1: farm Gate was supposed to up its sore tee rate
- 47:59Speaker 1: by twenty percent to support planned Vietnamese ground offensives. Although
- 48:05Speaker 1: Farmgate owned fewer planes after October nineteen sixty three, standard
- 48:10Speaker 1: US Air Force maintenance procedures by the thirty fourth Cameron
- 48:14Speaker 1: at Benhoit lifted the operationally ready rate to around seventy
- 48:18Speaker 1: eight percent. Past farm Gate practices required thirty to forty
- 48:23Speaker 1: five minutes to refuel, rearm and turn around a flight
- 48:27Speaker 1: of two T twenty eights. New safety checklists made two
- 48:31Speaker 1: hour turnarounds for T twenty eights and three hour ones
- 48:34Speaker 1: for B twenty six's. The norm too few aircraft and
- 48:39Speaker 1: a cutback and flying damp and morale in the overman
- 48:42Speaker 1: first Air Commando Squadron, Depressed crews waited for days to
- 48:46Speaker 1: fly a strike mission. A dearth of L nineteen's ones
- 48:51Speaker 1: and crews for forward air control also sharply curtailed combat operations.
- 48:56Speaker 1: Between May and August, four hundred and thirty one air
- 48:59Speaker 1: SOL requests had to be turned down. The arrival of
- 49:03Speaker 1: the Army seventy third Aviation Company and the activation of
- 49:07Speaker 1: the Air Force's nineteenth Tactical Air Support Squadron did not
- 49:10Speaker 1: cure the trouble. Instead of placing the twenty two oh
- 49:13Speaker 1: ones of the seventy third Aviation Company under the Tactical
- 49:16Speaker 1: Air Control System, Macvie assigned them to support Army advisors.
- 49:21Speaker 1: The Vietnamese promptly withdrew their L nineteens from the ground
- 49:25Speaker 1: divisions because they felt that their craft were no longer needed.
- 49:28Speaker 1: Army O ones flew the local visual reconnaissance and convoy
- 49:32Speaker 1: escort previously flown by the Vietnamese liaison planes. However, removal
- 49:37Speaker 1: of the L nineteen's deprived forward air controllers and air
- 49:40Speaker 1: liaison officers of transportation unless they could borrow O ones
- 49:44Speaker 1: from the Army Advisors. As for the nineteenth Tactical Air
- 49:47Speaker 1: Support squadron. It was fully operational by September fifteenth. The unit,
- 49:53Speaker 1: commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Wilfong, kept sixteen oh
- 49:57Speaker 1: ones at Benhois and six at Conto. By year's end,
- 50:01Speaker 1: they flew three thousand, eight hundred sixty two sorties, chiefly
- 50:05Speaker 1: four hundred eighty three forward air control, two hundred twenty
- 50:09Speaker 1: one visual reconnaissance, and one thousand, five hundred eighteen combats
- 50:13Speaker 1: support liaison. The prompt response and can do attitude of
- 50:17Speaker 1: the crews bred a huge demand for their services. The
- 50:21Speaker 1: Americans met with slight success in trying to augment, rather
- 50:24Speaker 1: than supplant, Vietnamese liaison operations. A few US Air Force
- 50:29Speaker 1: pilots who flew with Vietnamese forward air controllers realized that
- 50:33Speaker 1: these men had been doing a boring and fairly thankless
- 50:36Speaker 1: job for many years with no end in sight. Since
- 50:40Speaker 1: the average Vietnamese pilot saw the law of averages working
- 50:43Speaker 1: against him, he was reluctant to fly below two thousand feet.
- 50:47Speaker 1: If he directed an attack on friendly people, criminal prosecution
- 50:51Speaker 1: awaited him. Nonetheless, the prevailing American view pictured Vietnamese crews
- 50:56Speaker 1: as unaggressive and unreliable. By October this disapproval was being
- 51:01Speaker 1: expressed by the overwhelming sentiment that we must run things.
- 51:06Speaker 1: As sorties swelled to meet Vietcong attacks, pre mission briefings
- 51:11Speaker 1: were seldom practical. Responding to requests, Vietnamese forward air controllers
- 51:16Speaker 1: frequently flew many miles to an unfamiliar area. They radioed
- 51:20Speaker 1: the ground unit to find out the locations of friendly
- 51:23Speaker 1: and enemy troops, then marked targets for the strike crews.
- 51:27Speaker 1: Air Force officers repeatedly urged the Vietnamese to attach air
- 51:31Speaker 1: liaison officers and forward air controllers to divisions so they
- 51:34Speaker 1: could get to know the local conditions. The Vietnamese Air
- 51:38Speaker 1: Force said no, citing the scarcity of qualified officers, the
- 51:42Speaker 1: failure of the young ones to work well when removed
- 51:44Speaker 1: from close supervision, and the discord between air and ground officers.
- 51:51Speaker 1: The vulnerable Mekong Delta induced the viet Cong to escalate
- 51:54Speaker 1: the war from simple guerrilla tactics to sustained field operations.
- 52:00Speaker 1: Day battle erupted in the wee hours of September tenth,
- 52:03Speaker 1: as eighty one millimeter mortar rounds arked into Suktrong Airfield.
- 52:08Speaker 1: Inside of five minutes, four farm gate pilots scrambled two
- 52:11Speaker 1: T twenty eights, called for flair ship and more fighters,
- 52:15Speaker 1: and straight the mortar muzzle flashes. This swift air support,
- 52:19Speaker 1: along with Vietnamese mortar fire, drove off the Communists, foiling
- 52:23Speaker 1: their bid to neutralize and destroy the American fighters and
- 52:27Speaker 1: helicopters on the airstrip. The aggressive action of the pilots
- 52:31Speaker 1: was commendable all the same, they had broken the rules
- 52:34Speaker 1: of engagement by attacking without Vietnamese crewmen and without target
- 52:39Speaker 1: assistance from a forward air controller or flair ship. At
- 52:42Speaker 1: about the same time, Vietcong battalions pounded the district headquarters
- 52:47Speaker 1: town of Dandois and Kainook, near the tip of the
- 52:50Speaker 1: Kamau Peninsula. Swarming over Kainuk, they set up roadblocks and
- 52:55Speaker 1: laid mines in the soul surfaced road between Buklow and Kamau.
- 53:00Speaker 1: Right after daybreak, T twenty eights out of Souktrong escorted
- 53:03Speaker 1: helleborn Vietnamese marines to Domdui and carried out pre landing strikes.
- 53:09Speaker 1: Most landings went well, but that afternoon a T twenty
- 53:12Speaker 1: eight crashed from fire received during a third pass over
- 53:15Speaker 1: an enemy machine gun. A UH one gun ship rescued
- 53:18Speaker 1: the crew, and the T twenty eight was destroyed to
- 53:21Speaker 1: keep its machine gun out of Communist hands. While Marines
- 53:25Speaker 1: encircled Domdoi ten C forty sevens and seven one twenty
- 53:30Speaker 1: threes flew four hundred ninety eight paratroopers of the twenty
- 53:33Speaker 1: first Division to the scene. The battle cost the enemy
- 53:37Speaker 1: one hundred twenty two killed, thirty by air strikes and
- 53:40Speaker 1: huge doors of munitions. Around Kainuk, the paratroopers killed fifty communists,
- 53:46Speaker 1: captured eight, and seized weapons. The sore tee rate for
- 53:50Speaker 1: September tenth exceeded all past four Corps records for a
- 53:55Speaker 1: single day. Over September tenth through fourteenth, the sore Tee
- 53:59Speaker 1: total ran into seventy two air cover, ten escort, eighteen
- 54:03Speaker 1: pre landing, and twenty two forward air control. The government
- 54:07Speaker 1: troops won a victory, but the Vietcong reduced the towns
- 54:11Speaker 1: to rubble and left one hundred and fifty three civilians
- 54:14Speaker 1: killed or wounded. The most critical shortcoming was too few
- 54:20Speaker 1: strike aircraft to support the bitter war in the Delta.
- 54:24Speaker 1: Only one B twenty six could be spared to cover
- 54:27Speaker 1: helleborne operations in the second Division area. The five US
- 54:31Speaker 1: Air Force T twenty eights at Suktrong were invaluable for
- 54:35Speaker 1: quick reaction, but the primitive airstrip hampered them and their
- 54:39Speaker 1: guns were too light to silence ground fire. Heavier armed
- 54:43Speaker 1: A one hs or B twenty six at benhoit had
- 54:47Speaker 1: to make a thirty minute flight to Canto or a
- 54:49Speaker 1: one hour one to the deep Delta. Aware of this lag,
- 54:53Speaker 1: the Vietcong usually attacked in mid afternoon to make it
- 54:56Speaker 1: difficult for aircraft to get into the area, to swing
- 54:59Speaker 1: into this busines position, and to strike during the few
- 55:02Speaker 1: remaining hours of daylight. In January nineteen sixty four, sink
- 55:06Speaker 1: Pack approved the construction of a new airfield at Canto
- 55:10Speaker 1: to be ready a year later. Planning a helicopter assault
- 55:14Speaker 1: into three landing zones. In mid October, the twenty first
- 55:18Speaker 1: Division asked for strong tactical air support. Five US Air
- 55:22Speaker 1: Force T twenty eights, two A one h's and one
- 55:26Speaker 1: B twenty six were available for cover, escort and pre
- 55:29Speaker 1: landing strikes. On the morning of October nineteen, T twenty
- 55:33Speaker 1: eight supported the first helicopter lift of troops, which met
- 55:37Speaker 1: with light ground fire at the landing zone. The Vietcong
- 55:40Speaker 1: put stiffer fire on the second helilift and pinned down
- 55:43Speaker 1: the troops that landed. They also hit and damaged a
- 55:47Speaker 1: B twenty six and a T twenty eight, forcing the
- 55:49Speaker 1: planes to leave their covering stations. The third hellilift overshot
- 55:54Speaker 1: its landing zone and enemy fired down in H twenty one,
- 55:57Speaker 1: injuring two of the four Americans aboard. With troops in
- 56:01Speaker 1: the second and third helllifts nailed down, Vietnamese forward air
- 56:05Speaker 1: controllers diverted all of their air cover to close air
- 56:08Speaker 1: support strikes in response to the division commander's call for
- 56:14Speaker 1: more air support. The planes returned and renewed their strikes
- 56:17Speaker 1: that afternoon. Army advisors praised the aggressiveness of the support,
- 56:22Speaker 1: chiefly that of the B twenty six it pursued the
- 56:25Speaker 1: attack with other ordinance after its guns quit. Even though
- 56:29Speaker 1: under fire from six to eight automatic weapons, The viet
- 56:32Speaker 1: Cong held firm in their trenches and fired doggedly at
- 56:36Speaker 1: attacking aircraft when they withdrew at nightfall under cover of rain.
- 56:40Speaker 1: Pursuit by flair ship and fighters was out of the
- 56:43Speaker 1: question because locations of government forces were uncertain. During the battle,
- 56:48Speaker 1: Vietnamese flew six A one H and eight T twenty
- 56:51Speaker 1: eight soreties, while U. S Air Force crews flew sixteen
- 56:55Speaker 1: T twenty eight and two B twenty six soreties. Ground
- 56:58Speaker 1: fire struck two v Vietnamese T twenty eights, four US
- 57:02Speaker 1: Air Force T twenty eights, and two US Air Force
- 57:05Speaker 1: B twenty sixes. Friendly losses included forty one killed, eighty
- 57:10Speaker 1: four wounded, twenty three Americans and one each twenty one
- 57:14Speaker 1: shot down. Thirty two of the enemy were killed, and
- 57:17Speaker 1: in addition, fifty nine freshly dug graves were found. Early
- 57:22Speaker 1: on the morning of November seventh, some two hundred Viet
- 57:25Speaker 1: Kong attacked a pagoda and then holed up in a
- 57:27Speaker 1: mud walled fishing settlement about twenty miles from Sulktrong. In
- 57:32Speaker 1: late afternoon, regular ground forces and civil guard troops located
- 57:36Speaker 1: and surrounded them. Although no friendly people were in the village,
- 57:40Speaker 1: the government troops made no assault. Instead, they let four
- 57:44Speaker 1: T twenty eights from Sulktron conduct repeated strikes the next day.
- 57:49Speaker 1: Blood marks within the enclosure suggested that the aircraft had
- 57:52Speaker 1: killed about forty Vietcong. By the end of nineteen sixty three,
- 57:58Speaker 1: the government military offensive was collapsing. Despite occasional and isolated successes,
- 58:03Speaker 1: the viet Cong were seizing the initiative nearly everywhere. The
- 58:07Speaker 1: limited number of US Air Force and Vietnamese aircraft in
- 58:10Speaker 1: Vietnam had nevertheless scored some tactical gains in the face
- 58:15Speaker 1: of severe handicaps. End of Chapter fifteen,