Latest / The Sperrins: Mining, Power & Community in Northern Ireland / #🎙️96 | Public Inquiry Special | Dr Steven Emerman on the Golder Report & Curraghinalt |
Transcript
- 0:06Unknown: Welcome to the Save Our Sperrins campaign. Voices from the front line. I'm Marella fyffe, your host and a member of the Save Our Sperrins team. At
- 0:15the heart of this struggle are the voices of local people, farmers, families, and young campaigners, whose homes, work, and families are rooted in this
- 0:25place. Their voices are joined by supporters from across the world, standing in solidarity, from professors to artists, from those offering vast expertise to
- 0:38those whose presence alone is an act of support. All have stood with us. In this series, we share stories of resistance, resilience, and hopes from those
- 0:50determined to protect these mountains, their land, their rivers, the very air they breathe, and their community. Let's get started. One of the
- 1:06difficulties with this public inquiry is the sheer volume of technical information involved, and I think for most ordinary people, myself included, there
- 1:15comes a point where another 100 and something-page report full of engineering terminology is hardly bedtime reading, but occasionally you come across a
- 1:25document where it really is worth spending the time and looking beyond the conclusions, and the Golda report is one of those. It reads as a fairly
- 1:35reassuring assessment of Dalradian's waste management plan, yet tucked away throughout it are questions about the mine waste facility, the ground
- 1:45underneath it, water, earthquakes, closure, and quite a few things that Golder itself says will need work later on. I wanted to understand just how
- 1:59important some of those qualifications are, and whether they are really matters that can safely be left until later. So, for that, I've gone back to
- 2:10someone many of you will already know, Dr. Stephen Emerman. Hello, Stephen, and welcome back to the podcast for for what is now your third visit.
- 2:23Okay, I'm happy to be back.
- 2:26You've been remarkably good at helping us make sense of some really complicated material, and this time we're looking at the Golda report. So while it's
- 2:36familiar to us, I wonder could you explain what the golder report is. How come you have it? And yeah, I guess that's good a place to start as any other.
- 2:51Oh, okay, okay. So, so it's important to consider what the golder report is and and what it isn't. Okay, and I might not have all of the background, but
- 3:01the basic story is that in 2021 there was already a plan to move forward into the public inquiry, and at that time the Department for Infrastructure (DFI) they
- 3:16asked Golder, the consulting company Golder now WSP Golder, they asked them to determine whether the material available, that is the current design of
- 3:26the project, whether that was sufficient to move forward into the public inquiry, and that work was completed by Golder. It was released as released to DFI
- 3:41in August 2021, and shortly after that, the BBC obtained a copy. I can't say how, but they obtained a copy. They offered that to me, asked for my
- 3:55comments. So I've had a copy of that report for for the last five years.
- 4:01Okay, that's that's a that's a great background into it. So let's jump straight in. For anyone coming to this cold, Golda reviewed 113 aspects of
- 4:14the Coronado proposal, essentially 113 individual questions about different parts of the design and supporting evidence, and rated each one
- 4:23acceptable or further clarification or unacceptable. And the final tally sounds pretty reassuring: 108 acceptable, five requiring
- 4:34further clarification, and not a single one rated unacceptable. So, so Stephen, what did you find when you looked beneath these ratings, and what does
- 4:46acceptable actually mean in the context of this report?
- 4:50Okay, let's start off with acceptable mean. Okay, yeah, and and this is part of explaining what the gold report is and what it isn't. Okay, so they were.
- 5:00Just asking that narrow question of, is this is there enough information to move forward into the public inquiry? Okay, Golder was not doing an independent
- 5:12investigation. They were not doing a verification. They were not doing independent assessment of the material that had been developed largely by SRK
- 5:20Consulting. They were just saying, "Is there enough to move forward into this public inquiry? Okay, they weren't asking, "Is this ready for
- 5:28construction? Is this is this a final design? Are we ready to start building? Just do we have enough to move forward into this public inquiry? Okay, now I'll
- 5:41just explain this in a context that'll make more sense for your American audience. Okay, there's an expression that everybody in America of my generation says,
- 5:51and that is, it's good enough for government work.
- 5:54Okay,
- 5:56that somehow that's some World War II expression, but the whole post war generation, we all learned that from our our parents, mostly. Okay, okay. So
- 6:07it really means that someone has done the bare minimum, but it's good enough to be checked off by a government inspector, but it's not fit for any other purpose.
- 6:19Okay,
- 6:20that's called good enough for government work.
- 6:21Okay. Okay. Got
- 6:23it. Okay. And in in America, that's what Gorda would have been asked. They would have been asked, "Is this good enough for government work? Yeah. Yeah. You
- 6:31might want to offer the equivalent Irish expression if if there is. Yeah.
- 6:34There. I suppose the equivalent Irish expression would be, "She'll be grand. It'll be grand.
- 6:42I see. Okay. Well, I'll assume this explosive expression that sounds kind of different. Okay, but that's basically what they were asking: Is it good enough
- 6:51for government work? Okay. Good enough for this public inquiry. Okay. Not not the same thing as saying, well, is it good enough as as a final project?
- 7:00Got it. Yeah. Okay. So, Golder says the definition of consequence and probability of exposure aren't provided, making it difficult to understand how
- 7:19the risk ratings were reached. Yet, structural failure of the mine waste facility is given a medium consequence, a negligible probability, and low overall
- 7:32risk. And first, can you tell us a little about consequence and probability of exposure? Exposure, excuse me, and explain what's wrong with that approach,
- 7:43and how potential loss of life should normally be dealt with in a risk assessment. Assessment.
- 7:50Okay, I'm just going to back up a little bit to explain what acceptable means, or how it's used in the goal report. Okay, there's basically so so
- 8:01acceptable means it's ready for the public inquiry, okay? Further clarification, it sounds like you just need a few more sentences here, okay? And
- 8:10unacceptable means not ready for the public inquiry, okay?
- 8:15Right now,
- 8:15that sounds very good on the surface, and if you just read the executive summary, well, it sounds very good on the surface, as you were explaining.
- 8:23Yeah,
- 8:24but there's a general pattern that the gold report will express very serious concerns, point out a very serious shortcoming, then say it's
- 8:36acceptable, it's ready for the public inquiry, and then say you better take care of this before you actually build the project,
- 8:44right?
- 8:45Okay, and that actually gets right to the heart of our expression: good enough for government work. Okay, meaning you better not end there. Okay,
- 8:52yeah, check off at that point, but you better not end there.
- 8:56Okay,
- 8:57okay. Now, in terms of, we also know that that's the general pattern for for what's acceptable. Okay, there are still five areas that need
- 9:08clarification. Okay, it says further clarification, and some of those are actually very serious. Right, just a matter of we need a few more sentences.
- 9:22Now. I think what you had summed up. I would like to read the exact language out of the Golder report.
- 9:37Great.
- 9:38Okay.
- 9:39Okay.
- 9:39They're asking the following question. Okay, this is one of their aspects. They're saying, are the definitions of consequences and probability of
- 9:48exposure given in the risk assessment adequate?
- 9:52Right.
- 9:52Okay. Now, what we're talking about here is different ways in which the project could fail. Probability of. Exposure is kind of a weird expression. I don't
- 10:04know why they didn't just say probability of failure or probability of occurrence, which which would be most straightforward. Okay, and
- 10:11then
- 10:12this is exactly what they say. What Golder says: It is noted that no definition of the consequences and probability of exposure has been provided
- 10:25within Section Six of the WMP, meaning waste plan. For this reason, it is difficult to understand the overall ratings allocated for consequence and
- 10:36probability of exposure. Further, no information has been provided on the calculation of the overall risk and the matrix used to determine the risk
- 10:46level. Okay, that entire discussion in the Golder report. Okay, right. Yeah. Now let's now look at the waste management plan. Okay, that's by SRK
- 10:58Consulting. That's part of the information that Golder is asking: Is this ready for the public inquiry? Look at some examples. Okay, we have a number
- 11:08of aspects of failure. One of them is structural failure of the mine waste storage facility. Well, that's pretty serious. That's you know catastrophic
- 11:19failure of the of the dry stack facility, okay. So we talked about a lot in the last consequence, okay.
- 11:25Uh huh.
- 11:26That has a consequence level of medium,
- 11:29right?
- 11:30Probability of negligible,
- 11:32right, and
- 11:33overall risk of low. Okay. Let's go to the next failure. Dry densities are lower than design value. Okay, well, why would that matter? It would matter
- 11:48because if the dry densities are lower than design, the tailings are going to take up more space in the dry stack facility than was thought.
- 11:58Uh huh.
- 11:58So the facility might not might need to be larger than was planned.
- 12:03Okay,
- 12:04that also has a consequence level of medium, and a probability of medium, and an overall risk of moderate.
- 12:12Right.
- 12:13And what what does any of this mean? Is basically what Golder is saying. Okay. Yeah. They're just using fewer words than me. Okay, everything has a
- 12:24consequence level of medium. If if if the dry stack collapses and all of those tailings flow down the slope, and we have hundreds of fatalities, that
- 12:36that's that's a consequence level of medium. And but but on the other hand, maybe we'll need an even bigger dry stack facility, and that's also a
- 12:44consequence level of medium. Okay, what what what does this even mean? What what is medium consequences?
- 12:52Yeah.
- 12:52Okay, I I have no idea what this means. Okay. So basically, there is simply the risk assessment simply doesn't exist. There's no value in any of this. Okay. Now,
- 13:04what they should have used is there actually are, you know, standard in the industry consequence rating consequence categories. Okay. Global
- 13:13industry standard on tailings management.
- 13:16Right.
- 13:16Consequences of tailings storage facility failure. There's low, significant, high, very high, extreme, and those are all very well defined.
- 13:26Okay.
- 13:26Okay. None of those are medium. Okay.
- 13:30Yeah. Yeah. And
- 13:30the second issue is probability. What what does that mean? Probability negligible. Probability medium. What what is the probability negligible? Does
- 13:41that mean one in 10,000,001? in a
- 13:45million? Yeah. I see. I see where you're coming from. That
- 13:48could mean anything.
- 13:49Yeah. Yeah.
- 13:50This is actually a serious problem when you have people arguing about probability and they're using words like low, very low, and they mean
- 13:58completely different things by those Words,
- 14:01yeah,
- 14:02okay. I mean, nobody knows what anybody else is talking about, and I'll give you a serious example of this. One of the most significant accidents in
- 14:14accident history was the explosion of the Challenger. Okay,
- 14:19yeah,
- 14:20dramatised a whole generation of school children who on TV in the classroom.
- 14:25Indeed, yeah.
- 14:26Teacher going up into space. Teacher blown up. Okay.
- 14:30Yeah.
- 14:30Anyway, very important for that that generation. There was an excellent book written on this. Quite a quite good books, but one was actually written by a
- 14:40Tailings dam engineer.
- 14:41All right,
- 14:42Stephen Big. He's also famous for writing planning, design, and analysis of tailings dams.
- 14:48Right. He
- 14:49wrote a book called Degrees of Belief. Okay. Sounds like it's a religious book, but it's about engineering judgement.
- 14:55Right.
- 14:56Okay. So he says the following: NASA has. Developed a very sophisticated means for estimating probabilities of failure. Okay.
- 15:06Yeah. 1%
- 15:070.1% Very sophisticated.
- 15:10Yeah.
- 15:10And the order came down to stop doing that. Stop assigning numerical values. Why? Because we had a president making a commitment that we will, without
- 15:20doubt, put a man on the moon. So how can NASA talk about probability of failure 50%
- 15:27Yeah,
- 15:27which it was okay according to Neil Armstrong. The probability had been assessed at 50%
- 15:33Right.
- 15:33Okay. Now this came up in the investigation into the Challenger accident that there were no numerical values to probability. Everything was low.
- 15:46Yeah, and it turned out engineers and managers had completely different understandings of what those words meant.
- 15:54Of course, yeah. And
- 15:55this is a long story, but that that is an important part of the history of the accident.
- 16:00Right. This
- 16:02destruction of vocabulary. Okay, we're saying this is no good. Okay, this medium, moderate. Okay, there, there is no meaning
- 16:10here. Doesn't mean anything. Explanation
- 16:12as to as to why catastrophic failure and underestimation of density both have medium consequences. There's simply no value here. Okay, that's pretty
- 16:25weak. I would say to put that under the category further clarification.
- 16:31Okay, I
- 16:32would have called that unacceptable. Okay, I would say there is no risk assessment.
- 16:36Okay, okay,
- 16:37okay. That that was to just give one example of what is under that category of further clarification.
- 16:46Okay, so shifting topic slightly. Okay, one of the themes running through the report is that Golder identifies shortcomings, but says they can
- 16:59be dealt with at a detailed design stage,
- 17:03right.
- 17:04And as an engineer, where should the line be drawn between work that can be legitimately legitimately wait until detailed design and evidence that needs
- 17:14to be established before planning permission is granted, or before the public inquiry, if You like,
- 17:21okay. Well, we kind of have two issues here. One is that right now is the opportunity for the public to respond to the project, with many aspects of
- 17:36the project being in a conceptual stage, or a totally undefined stage, or a preliminary stage, but this is the end, as I understand,
- 17:46according to the current plan.
- 17:47Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 17:49There's not going to be a final design followed by another public inquiry. That's right. That's right. So any information to which the public has any
- 17:58opportunity to respond is is now now okay. So we got to be very cautious in general about anything that says, "Well, we'll do it later. For the public,
- 18:09there is no later.
- 18:11That's right. Okay,
- 18:12that that that's a part of it. Okay, another part is that I I mean, I'm now looking at it more from the point of view of the Planning Appeals Commission. Is
- 18:26we have problems that have not been solved yet?
- 18:31Yeah. Yeah. Okay.
- 18:33And and we might say, okay, we have the outline of the solution. We know the basic idea. We have a preliminary solution, and we'll do the
- 18:41details later. But for some aspects that have not been dealt with at all, we could ask: Well, is there a solution, or is there a solution within this current
- 18:53general scheme, or is this whole project going to have to be rethought of from the beginning?
- 19:01Oh gosh! Yeah. Okay,
- 19:03and I assume you want an example.
- 19:05Yep.
- 19:06Okay. Okay. So I'll give you one example, and then and then we can go on to more. Okay. So um, the the exact wording in the Golden Report is is very
- 19:16important. So I'm going to quote this, and then and then I'll paraphrase. Okay. With respect to the waste rock geochemistry risk identifier, Golder notes
- 19:27that the notes the comments and agrees that the procedures for managing waste streams to ensure potentially acid-forming rock is stored underground and not at
- 19:38surface are to be defined as part of the final mine design. However, this does not impact on the risk assessment identifier being considered at public
- 19:49inquiry, as the risk linkage is sufficiently developed for the planning stage. Okay, now what is
- 19:55that
- 19:55saying? Okay, so this is the plan. We're going to have waste rock. Some of this waste rock will be potentially acid generating, and other others
- 20:06will other waste rock will not be. Okay. Potentially acid generating, we say PAG. Okay, so PAG waste rock.
- 20:15Okay,
- 20:16that will be combined with paste and put underground.
- 20:20Yeah. Okay.
- 20:21The waste rock that is not acid generating, we say NAG. The NAG waste rock will be put into the mined waste facility. It's going to be used to construct the dam.
- 20:34Right.
- 20:35Okay. Yeah, that sounds like a good plan. Okay. You never want to construct a dam out of acid generating material? Okay,
- 20:44right.
- 20:47Golder is pointing out that there is no plan for how do you decide whether waste rock is acid generating or not. Okay. Uh huh. Can you do it visually? Can
- 20:59you do it based on rock type, are you going to have to do chemical testing? Are you going to have to do chemical testing on what? 1000 tonnes, 100
- 21:10tonnes. We're not going to do a gramme by gramme.
- 21:13Yeah.
- 21:14Okay. Do you have a means for doing this separation?
- 21:17Yeah.
- 21:18Okay. Well, what if you don't have a means for doing a separation. Well, you've got to rethink this whole plan.
- 21:26That's right.
- 21:27Okay. Yeah. You've got to do something else with this waste rock. If if if you have no way to determine whether it's acid generating or not. Okay. The
- 21:37whole the whole the whole plan assumes that there is some procedure for making this separation, and and I would assume that probably when you
- 21:45hear the plan, you will assume there must be a procedure.
- 21:48Yeah, yeah, you would
- 21:50order saying you there's no procedure for this. Okay, so so please take care. Yeah, good enough for government work. Okay, but take care of this
- 21:58before you actually build this.
- 22:00Yeah.
- 22:01Okay. Now, now, now, why is this an acceptable category? Because Golder is saying, "Well, this is just part of the risk assessment. Okay, it is one of
- 22:09the risks. Okay, one of the risks is called waste rock geochemistry. Okay, we might not know whether rock is acid forming or not. Okay, that's one
- 22:18of the risks, and they say the consequences are low. I don't understand how they could be low. Okay, they can't
- 22:27be.
- 22:27You have acid generating material in the dam. First of all, it leads to the degradation of the dam. Okay, and also it means that the dam itself is
- 22:37then a source of acid mine drainage.
- 22:41Yeah,
- 22:42yeah. Okay, so I, I, I mean, I would, I, I, I would have called this unacceptable. I'm saying this is not ready for public inquiry. Okay, something for
- 22:53which the solution we don't know where the solution exists, but the potential solutions we can think about some of them might involve a completely different
- 23:02design. No, no, we're not ready for public inquiry. Okay, at this stage, is my understanding that's a possible outcome. Okay, that is the current plan might
- 23:14be approved or whatever the Planning Appeals Commission is going to do. Okay, they'll say it's good enough, good enough for government work. Okay,
- 23:22whatever whatever they're going to say. Okay, but but at some later point, the plan might completely change. Okay, the mind company, their consultants
- 23:31might realise, no, this is totally unworkable.
- 23:34Yeah.
- 23:34Okay, and then then what? There's a new public inquiry.
- 23:38Yeah,
- 23:39I I would have said the available material is is not ready for public inquiry.
- 23:43Okay.
- 23:44So anyway, there's many other examples. I gave you one. No, that's that's
- 23:49quite clear.
- 23:50Leave it at that. Okay.
- 23:54Let's look at what the mine waste facility is actually going to sit on. Golders and notes that there were no reported tests on some of the underlying
- 24:04weathered and fractured schist, even though those properties are described as critical to the stability analysis. There are also questions whether enough of
- 24:14the available borehole and trial pits were used in construction in constructing the ground model. How significant is is this?
- 24:24Okay. Okay. Good. Well, the the simple answer is it's very significant. Okay.
- 24:30Yeah.
- 24:31So we we kind of have two things here. I mean, first the existence of measurements of the geotechnical parameters of the fractured schist, and also the
- 24:45number of measurements made of the soil above above the fractured schist. So I'm going to start with the geotechnical parameters of the fractured
- 24:53schist. If you don't mind, I think the exact language that Golder uses is very important. So I would like to quote that if if you okay
- 25:02yes to
- 25:03okay okay there are no reported tests conducted on the underlying bedrock described as weathered schist from three metres to 6.5 metres below
- 25:15ground level becoming fractured schist proven to 18 metres below ground level.dot.it. is unclear how geotechnical properties assigned to these layers have
- 25:26been assessed. It is noted that these values are critical to the stability analysis of the mine waste facility, since deep-seated failure planes are
- 25:37modelled penetrating through these layers. Additional information and analysis should be sought at detailed design stage. However, it is considered
- 25:47that the assumptions made regarding the geotechnical properties of the bedrock are adequate for the current stage of design development. Okay,
- 25:56that last phrase is repeated over and over like a mantra. Are adequate for the current stage of design development. Okay, the short version is good enough for
- 26:06government work.
- 26:07Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 26:09This this mine waste facility, it'll sit on a very steep slope. Okay, since the last podcast, I've stood on that slope. Okay, very okay,
- 26:18right.
- 26:19It also is a rock type called schist. Okay, schist forms in the thin layers. It's very common to have landsliding when these layers slide past each
- 26:29other. Okay, many many cases of of landslides in in schist bedrock.
- 26:35Yeah. Okay.
- 26:37So to understand the strength of that schist, the foliation of the schist, the direction of the layering, that's very very important. Well, Golder says
- 26:44critical. Okay, it's critical for the stability analysis, right? But SRK Consulting, consultants for Dow Radian, they are simply assuming a value.
- 26:56Okay,
- 26:56as you as you would. Okay,
- 26:58well, you shouldn't simply assume a value that's critical.
- 27:01Yeah.
- 27:02Okay. And and this is the pattern throughout this report. Okay. You have this is a very serious shortcoming. It's good enough for government work. Wow,
- 27:11you better take care of this before you actually build the the mine. Okay. I mean that three step pattern is repeated over and over again, always
- 27:20ending with this mantra adequate for the current stage of the design development. Okay, and we were back to the previous point: is well, are we sure this is
- 27:30even a solvable problem?
- 27:32Okay,
- 27:33like for example, what if the layering and the schist is parallel to the hill slope?
- 27:38Okay,
- 27:39then you have schist that's going to be very likely to slide down that slope when you put weight on top of it, and when you get it wet, especially both
- 27:48when you put wet weight on top of it,
- 27:50right?
- 27:51Be very prone to landsliding. Okay, and if we find that out later, we might think, "Wow, this wasn't even a good site for this facility. We better start
- 28:02all over again.
- 28:03Right? Yeah.
- 28:04Okay. So, so to be doing a public inquiry at the stage where the entire project might change is really premature.
- 28:15Yeah. I get it. Yeah.
- 28:18I mean, if I were writing this golden report, I would have said no. This is not ready for public inquiry. Okay, we have problems that are potentially unsolvable.
- 28:29Yeah, could potentially be solved only by major changes to the project design. And no, it's it's not ready for anything that could be called public inquiry.
- 28:38Doesn't matter how that inquiry is being carried out. It's not ready for that. Okay. So, so this lack of foundation knowledge, I would put this in
- 28:47the unacceptable category
- 28:49again. Okay. Okay.
- 28:52Give you as many examples of that as you like.
- 28:56Yeah. No. But I get the I get the drift of what you're saying.
- 29:00Okay.
- 29:01So and. Stephen Golder notes that SRK reported SPTN values of 28 to greater than 50 beneath the mine waste facility, but that two lower results, 17 and
- 29:1626, were omitted from that reported range. First, can you explain in ordinary language what an SPT N value tells us, and then why those two omitted
- 29:28lower results might matter?
- 29:31Okay. Okay. So SPT stands for standard penetration test.
- 29:36Yeah.
- 29:38It's a way of assessing the strength of not necessarily not not the strength of bedrock, but the strength of a weathered rock. Okay, yeah. So the basic
- 29:51idea is that a weight is lifted and dropped, and you see how many times do you lift and drop. Weight to advance at a certain distance.
- 30:03I get it. Okay. Yeah.
- 30:06It's it's not perfect. It has a lot of drawbacks. There's other means for doing this kind of testing, but there's kind of a rough and ready correlation
- 30:15between the end value. That's just the number of weight drops. Okay. Yeah. And and and the rock strength or other geotechnical parameters. Okay, many people
- 30:26caution against relying on that, but it's been used for a long time. Okay, now what what Golda was saying here, which they're saying in quite a few areas, is
- 30:36they're saying they're asking SRK Consulting. Okay, why didn't you use all of the measurements that you made?
- 30:44Uh huh.
- 30:45Okay. Well, they're not actually asking; they're just pointing that out. Yeah. And not all of the measurements were used. This also relates to boreholes and
- 30:54trial pits, the depth of the gravelly sand, the depth of the weathered schist, the depth of the fractured cyst. They're pointing out that not all of
- 31:04these measurements were used. Okay, used in what? At some point, they do a stability analysis. So they're combining all of their various
- 31:13measurements into values that they use for to assess the stability, but they're not using all the Measurements. Okay, this also came up at the public
- 31:25inquiry this past week.
- 31:27Yeah, did it. Yeah,
- 31:30this was a question that the third party asked on on on Wednesday. Okay, yeah. Why are SRK Consulting had been talking about using industry values for
- 31:44weathered schist, fresh schist, etc. Okay, asked, well, why is that? Why are you using industry values instead of making measurements? Yeah, and then SRK
- 31:57Consulting slash Dowrating came back Thursday, something like three hours of going document by document, pointing out we made this measurement, we made that
- 32:07measurement. Okay, and and then the question came up again. But then why didn't you use those measurements?
- 32:14Yeah.
- 32:15Okay. So Golder had pointed that out five years ago.
- 32:20Yeah.
- 32:21Quite a few measurements were never used.
- 32:24That's right.
- 32:25Okay.
- 32:26Yeah.
- 32:26Now this would be a reasonable question for anyone to ask. Okay. So I've had the Golda report for for quite a while. I've forgotten much of
- 32:40it. Okay.
- 32:41The third party I think has just become aware of the Golder report. Okay, but the company has had this for five years, and in what way have they addressed
- 32:50all of these shortcomings that were pointed out by Golder? Okay, Golder did say, "Yeah, good enough for public inquiry. A lot of things you better take
- 32:59care of. Okay, have any of those things been addressed in the last five years? Okay, that would be a worthwhile if the Planning Appeals Commission
- 33:08wanted to ask that question. I think I think that would be a worthwhile question. Okay, a
- 33:12good question. Okay,
- 33:13so why why are we still talking about measurements that have not been made, measurements that have been made but have not been used in the stability analysis?
- 33:21Yeah,
- 33:21why are we still having this discussion? Okay, which we had this last week in the public inquiry. Anyway, Golder pointed this out five years ago.
- 33:32Okay, okay, that's great. So next question, Golder says it's difficult to be certain that poorly compacted tailings in the deeper saturated parts of the
- 33:44stack would not be susceptible to liquefaction, and says cyclical liquefaction needs further consideration depending upon the maximum credible
- 33:55earthquake. What would liquefaction mean for this facility, and is that something which can be reasonably be left until the detailed design stage?
- 34:09Okay, we actually have two issues here. You actually summed it up pretty well, but but would you mind if I still read exactly what the gold report says? Go
- 34:24for it. Go for it. I'll do
- 34:26some dot dot dots here. Yeah, yeah.
- 34:28It is
- 34:29difficult to be certain that the materials, if poorly compacted in the deepest parts of the stack, where saturation has been shown to occur in the transient
- 34:40seepage analyses are not susceptible to liquefaction. Dot dot dot. Depending on the maximum credible earthquake (MCE) the potential for cyclic
- 34:51liquefaction also requires consideration.dot.is. considered prudent to assess this at detailed design stage. However, it is considered that sufficient
- 35:02assessment has been completed for the current stage of design development. Dot dot dot. Neither document refers to the use of the MCE in design for
- 35:11closure. Dot dot dot. The pseudo-static stability analyses for closure should consider the calculated mce.dot.it. should be checked at detailed design
- 35:22stage. Okay. So anyway, we see this pattern repeated again and again.
- 35:27Okay.
- 35:28So so the first question is, we don't yet know where there's potential for cyclic liquefaction, and it's the same thing as seismic liquefaction.
- 35:39Okay. Liquefaction in response to a back and forth kind of disturbance, like like an earthquake,
- 35:46right?
- 35:47And well, but that is something very important. Okay, we ought to know whether liquefaction is possible. Okay, you cannot simply say that liquefaction is
- 35:59impossible at filter tating storage facilities, because that has happened. That has happened at least twice at working facilities. The entire facility
- 36:08has undergone liquefaction. That has happened twice in Indonesia. I think now there's a very good video on YouTube of mine workers took videos of the filter
- 36:19tailing stack as it was liquefying, okay. We know that is possible. Okay. Yeah. Now, if that is possible, then the facility needs to be designed so
- 36:30that even if liquefaction occurs, the facility will not undergo catastrophic failure. Okay. That is the industry standard. Right. Okay. To assume
- 36:41that anything that can liquefy eventually will liquefy, so design this so that liquefaction will not lead to a catastrophe.
- 36:49Right.
- 36:50Okay. Yeah. It is the first step. We should be certain that we know whether liquefaction is or is not possible.
- 36:58Okay. And
- 37:00holders pointing out that has not been established,
- 37:03right?
- 37:04Okay, yeah. It was also pointed out in last week's inquiry that it has not been established. Again,
- 37:11yeah.
- 37:11Consultants for Dowradian pointed out that they had tested samples that had compact been compacted to only 82% of their maximum density and said those
- 37:22samples did not liquefy in a lab test. Well, that's fine, okay, but you can get much lower compaction than that. Okay, I know of filtered tailing stacks.
- 37:34Filtered tailing stacks have been evaluated by the same SRK Consulting, where the compaction was on the order of 40% of the maximum density,
- 37:46right?
- 37:47Okay, so that's what needs to be considered. Okay, I mean, basically, if you have a lack of proper compaction, is liquefaction possible?
- 37:56Yeah.
- 37:57Now that's part of what's being said in this Golden Report. The other is that they're saying you should be designing for the maximum credible earthquake.
- 38:07Yeah,
- 38:07that's the largest earthquake that is even theoretically possible at this location in this tectonic framework.
- 38:15Yeah.
- 38:16Okay. And that has never been done, or it's never been reported.
- 38:21Yeah. Okay.
- 38:21The design by SRK Consulting is for an earthquake with a return period of 2500 years.
- 38:29Okay.
- 38:30Yeah, that sounds like a long time. Okay, sounds not very likely. But we're talking about hundreds of lives at risk. Okay, and we don't want to lose
- 38:40hundreds of lives when a filter tanning stack liquefies.
- 38:45Yeah.
- 38:45Okay. So that's the industry standard. When lives are at risk, you should be designing for the maximum credible earthquake.
- 38:54Okay.
- 38:54Okay.
- 38:55Yeah.
- 38:55And Golder is saying, well, yeah, good enough for now, but take care of that later. Okay. That is not an industry standard. Okay. Global industry
- 39:06standard on trainings management. That should be part of the most preliminary stages of design. Yeah. Is considering the consequences and designing
- 39:15for those consequences. That's not something you take care of at the end.
- 39:21Yeah.
- 39:21And it's not even clear how you do it. If you have a tailings facility designed to withstand a two 500 year earthquake, how you then beef that up to withstand
- 39:33the maximum credible earthquake? Well, it's not just toggling a switch. Okay, it could take some serious rethinking.
- 39:44Yeah.
- 39:44Okay. This is what's kind of disturbing about evaluating the project at a public inquiry at this stage is we're evaluating something that might be totally
- 39:55different in the end. What's what's the point? What's the what's
- 39:59the point? Yeah, what
- 40:01is the point? Yeah, what's the point? Think about how much time and money is being spent evaluating something at a preliminary stage.
- 40:09Yeah, yeah, it's nonsense.
- 40:12Okay.
- 40:15Staying with earthquakes, Golder also says that the maximum credible earthquake should be considered in the closure stability analysis. Why does
- 40:26that matter for a mine waste facility that will remain there long after the mine itself has closed? You've sort of answered it, anyways. You know.
- 40:37Well, I I have to say that. Golder is out of date here, and and and that could be related to the fact that this document is five years old. Okay. Oh,
- 40:56really? Yeah. Go on.
- 40:57Is it the industry has moved forward a lot,
- 41:01okay.
- 41:03Yeah, I mean, so we had the Brummagem disaster in 2019.
- 41:08Yeah.
- 41:09Okay. Certainly, many disasters came before then, but many pieces came together that there started being many advances in guidance documents and
- 41:17regulations.
- 41:19Yeah.
- 41:20Okay, and so I think what's being said here is is out of date. So so let me explain that. Okay.
- 41:28Okay.
- 41:29Okay. So so we're designing a facility that will be closed. Okay. Yes. It's going to sit on that spot forever.
- 41:38Yeah. Okay.
- 41:38But it'll be closed. Hopefully, be safely closed, okay, and it would be designed to withstand the maximum credible earthquake.
- 41:47Okay. Okay.
- 41:48Well, it's not designed that way now. Okay, but Golder says it should be.
- 41:52Okay. Okay.
- 41:53So at closure, this should be able to withstand the maximum credible earthquake, and it should be able to withstand that before closure. Also, that's
- 42:02what Golda was saying. Okay, now it kind of assumes that there's some technology where you take your engineered structure and you put it in a state where it
- 42:16can withstand the maximum credible earthquake, and it remains in that state forever.
- 42:22Okay.
- 42:23Okay. That technology does not exist.
- 42:26Sure.
- 42:26The technology never existed. Yeah. Okay. It just took a bit to get through everyone's hard heads that that technology did not exist. Yeah. Okay. The
- 42:37industry dogma. Okay. When I say dogma, I mean it's in handbooks like the Tailings Management Handbook by Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration.
- 42:47Okay, once information gets in an official industry handbook, it's yeah, it's dogma. It's yeah, adoption, doctor. Yeah,
- 42:55yeah.
- 42:56So, so the very first chapter called "What What Are Tailings? Okay, points out that these facilities will need perpetual care, perpetual maintenance.
- 43:06Okay, that we have no technology, we have no experience, we have no idea how to build structures that will last forever. It is totally
- 43:15outside of our engineering experience. Okay, so plan on perpetual maintenance.
- 43:20Yeah.
- 43:21Okay. Okay. So to say, so to say, design something to withstand the MCC closure would be considered pretty lame at the present time.
- 43:32Yeah.
- 43:33Okay. So that was the industry dogma as of when February 2022, when that handbook came out, okay. So that's after the Golda report, okay. Yeah. What shocked
- 43:46many people, pleasantly or otherwise, shocked me kind of pleasantly, okay. When the U.S. government came out with the same position last year, last
- 43:56December, okay, through the U.S. Forest Service,
- 44:00okay.
- 44:01Cover story in December 2025 issue of Mining Engineering, catering storage facilities and some other mine facilities will require perpetual maintenance.
- 44:11That means you're going to need a trust fund, and they're talking about the size of that trust fund so you can maintain them indefinitely. Okay, this is
- 44:20standard in the industry now, okay.
- 44:25Can I just ask you something? Is am I right in saying is the U.S. forestry is is in charge of maintenance of abandoned mines, or did I dream that up
- 44:33somewhere?
- 44:35I'm going to tell you one other thing first, and then I'll answer that.
- 44:37Okay. Yeah.
- 44:39Okay. Okay. Is that I'm taking part in another public inquiry at this very same time, but I'm doing it remotely, and that's in New Zealand for the Bendigo
- 44:50Ophir Gold Project.
- 44:51Yeah,
- 44:52and we are all assuming that Tatting Storers facility will require perpetual maintenance. Yeah. And we've all settled on the size of the trust fund that
- 45:02will be needed. Okay, we're debating very minor details, but that's the assumption everybody is working on.
- 45:10Yeah.
- 45:11Okay. What I'm not sure exactly. Something like the district council. Okay.
- 45:17Yeah.
- 45:17What they're demanding to know is is the company if there's catastrophic failure, is the company going to pay every last cent for that? Okay, that's what
- 45:26they're demanding to know.
- 45:27Yeah,
- 45:27perpetual maintenance is simply part of the part of the decision, part of the assumption. Okay, right.
- 45:34Now, now, where does the U.S. Forest Service come into this? Okay, so a lot of mining projects. So, well, in the United States, we have vast
- 45:45areas of the U.S. are federal lands.
- 45:47Uh huh.
- 45:48Okay, and they're managed by some federal agency. Could be Bureau of Land Management. Could be U.S. Forest Service. Those would be the biggest ones. Okay.
- 46:02If a mine is being put onto U.S. Forest Service land, then it's U.S. Forest Service that writes the environmental impact statement and the record of
- 46:11decision and decides on the rules that that will govern govern this mine. Okay.
- 46:17Yeah.
- 46:19They don't have any particular responsibility over abandoned mines, okay, but they're they're doing the decision making for a new mine on land that that they
- 46:29manage. That
- 46:30okay, right? So that's where I got that. Okay, I understand. And this is sort of a an off the cuff question. Envisioning forever maintenance on the
- 46:46current alt project. Who who could possibly do that? You know, like how could a how could a a district council afford that? Or no, who who would be
- 47:00responsible for it?
- 47:03Well, I assume the district council doesn't have the funding and the engineering expertise to maintain that facility indefinitely. Okay.
- 47:15Yeah.
- 47:17What was put forward by the U.S. Forest Service is that there needs to be a realistic assessment as to how much money is required each year, and there
- 47:28needs to be a trust fund, you know, earning interest established upfront that that's going to pay forever for that maintenance. Okay,
- 47:38I'll be some hell of a trust fund.
- 47:40What's that? It
- 47:41would be a hell of a trust fund to last forever.
- 47:46Well, yeah, well, yeah, it's yeah, it's a it's a fairly good good sized trust fund. Okay,
- 47:51okay,
- 47:52it's assumed it's going to earn interest. Okay, yeah, you have to make a lot of assumptions about. Well, that's it. You make a lot of assumptions about
- 48:00interest rates, inflation rates, etc. Okay, that was the real point of that article by the U.S. Forest Service: is let's get serious about these trust
- 48:12funds. Yeah,
- 48:16that that's the assumption for that New Zealand project, Bendigo Ophir Gold project. Okay, is is a trust fund would would be set up, and it wouldn't
- 48:26be the current mining company, but some other company is going to be hired, and that's going to be their job. Is the maintenance of of this mine after closure?
- 48:37Yeah,
- 48:39but I mean, certainly that has not been the case for this kernel project. No, nobody has talked about a trust fund or how big should the trust fund be.
- 48:49Those will be excellent questions for the Planning Appeals Commission to ask. Okay, you know what do you think will be the annual cost of
- 48:58maintenance of this facility? Okay, and then we'll ask the economists. Okay, to estimate, to make an estimate, how big should the trust fund be?
- 49:09Yeah. Okay, let's move on. The original filter testing apparently achieved tailings moisture contents of between 20 to 22% following a change in the
- 49:25tailings grind, 15 to 17 percent was assumed achievable, but Golder notes that there was no test work supporting that assumption. How important is
- 49:36moisture content to the successful operation and stability of a filtered tailing stack, particularly when you add prolonged westerone rainfall
- 49:45into the equation.
- 49:47I have noticed that it does rain a lot here.
- 49:51Really? Okay.
- 49:53Okay.
- 49:54I'll tell you what. I'm going to read this because the exact numbers are very important.
- 50:00Okay,
- 50:01so this is from the Golden Report. Filter test work described in the mine waste facility design report indicates that the moisture contents for
- 50:11the Tavings filter cake was between 20 and 22% Okay.
- 50:18Yeah.
- 50:19I'm going to stop right here and explain a point, and then I'll go back to that quote. Okay, this was discussed at great length in the public inquiry
- 50:28last week. Okay, because tailings are filter tailings are too wet; they cannot be properly compacted.
- 50:36Yeah,
- 50:37and if you try to compact tailings that we say wet wet of optimum, yeah. Wet on the optimum water content, you get a very very weak material. I see
- 50:47what you want to avoid that, okay? So we were told that the target water content was 14% but the target be as dry as 9% water or as wet as 19% water, and they
- 51:02could still achieve adequate compaction. Okay, we heard that quite a few times.
- 51:06Yeah. Okay,
- 51:07and quite a few times, a third party asked, "Well, what, what, what, what if they're wetter than 19% What are you going to do then? And how often is that
- 51:15going to happen? And then, of course, people talked about rainfall, etc. Okay. Now continue with the quote. The tailings. So, so first of all,
- 51:25according in the according to what Golder was saying, is that water contents have been between 20 and 22% Well, that's higher than that 19%
- 51:36It is
- 51:37okay. Okay. Yeah. Okay. Now, now continue the quote. The tailings grind was subsequently modified, and assumed assumed achievable moisture contents of 15 to 17
- 51:49percent were reported. However, no test work to support these assumptions.dot.it. may be prudent to conduct filter test work on samples of the new
- 52:00tailings materials, to check these are achievable moisture contents, or considers that sufficient assessment has been completed to determine the
- 52:10efficacy of the proposed filter operation for the proposed tailing stream for the current stage of design development. As they say over and over again,
- 52:19good enough for the current stage of design development. Okay, so Golder is saying, as far as we know, you have never gotten these tailings drier than
- 52:2820% water. Okay,
- 52:31yeah.
- 52:32SRK says they've achieved moisture contents of 15 to 17%
- 52:37Yeah,
- 52:38which is still above their target.
- 52:40Yeah.
- 52:40Okay. The Golder has not seen any of this test work. They have not seen any of this evidence.
- 52:46No evidence. Yeah. Okay. And then again,
- 52:48saying, okay, good enough for the public inquiry. You better take care of this before you actually try to build this facility.
- 52:57Yeah. Okay.
- 52:58Yeah.
- 53:01If adequate moisture contents cannot be consistently achieved,
- 53:06yeah,
- 53:07we're in really big trouble. I mean, there's no way to build this facility. Okay,
- 53:14yeah,
- 53:14that's what we were learning the public inquiry. 19% water content-that's the greatest water content we can handle,
- 53:21yeah.
- 53:22Okay, but if water contents are consistently 20 to 220 2% we have no way to build this. If we try to build this, we can't adequately compact the tailings,
- 53:33and if we try to compact them, it's just going to be a very weak material.
- 53:38Yeah.
- 53:38Okay. Now, my question is going to just like I've been saying: Is this solvable? I I don't know. I I can't say whether it is or not. Okay, but but that's
- 53:51that's that's those are very high water contents achieved to date. Okay, can you actually achieve the water contents you need?
- 54:00Yeah.
- 54:01Well, I don't know that. Okay. And if you can't, you're going to have to seriously rethink this whole project. Okay. Like something like, okay, we can't
- 54:13achieve the water contents we need. We're going to have to put these tailings out in the sun. Well, when there's a sun with these takings out in the sun to
- 54:24dry, and hopefully they don't keep getting wetter. Okay, well, it's going to take some calculation. Okay, you know what's the typical rainfall, the
- 54:35wind speed, the relative humidity, how much land are you going to need? Is that a realistic addition of the project? This drawing of
- 54:43tailings, called field drawing, drawing in the sun. Okay, is that is that realistic? Well, that's a big change to the project.
- 54:51Yeah.
- 54:52And by the way, I want to note that this was a very confusing part of the public inquiry last week. The way. The project seemed to be changing from day
- 55:02to day. It was almost like we're developing this project all together instead of evaluating a final design or a completed design. As I recall from
- 55:15Wednesday, the representatives from SRK Consulting, Dow Radian. Okay, we're talking about doing this field drawing, okay. And third part was asking, well,
- 55:25where, where are you going to do this? Where are you going to do this field drawing? Hey, we stated that well, the operator is going to be checking the
- 55:33weather, and if it's when it's when it's raining, the operator is going to be keeping the tailings indoors. Like when when is that? When is there? I don't.
- 55:44I don't know. Seems like it. Well, it's raining really hard right now. Okay, it seems like it rains all the time here. Okay, much more than I'm used
- 55:52to. Okay, but by by Thursday, it seemed the plan was that no, no, there is not going to be any field set aside for air drying of tailings. The tailings that
- 56:01are too wet will be put in the middle of the stack. They'll just be lightly compacted, so they won't affect the stability. That seemed to be a big change
- 56:09from from Wednesday to Thursday. If you consistently cannot achieve adequate water contents, you have to really rethink a lot of things, okay. I might be
- 56:24really even rethinking. Can we even do filter tailings technology here, okay? Considering
- 56:30something about these tailings, and I'm not sure what something about these tailings means they cut off, come off the filter presses wetter than expected.
- 56:40Plus, you know, this is not Nevada, Arizona. You can't so easily just put cavings out in the sun to dry. Okay,
- 56:49yeah, it could be have to be
- 56:51completely rethought. Okay, I mean, this is certainly a question I would put to Dalradian. Is it when this was pointed out to you by Golder
- 57:02five years ago that you have not you you cannot achieve the water contents that are for adequate compaction? You claim you can achieve them, but you haven't
- 57:12shown us the test work.
- 57:13Yeah.
- 57:14Okay. And and what's what's been changed in the last five years? Okay. This is even kind of confusing language from SRK. We haven't seen the test work.
- 57:25Well, did you ask for it? I don't quite understand that. Okay, this we haven't seen the test work. Okay, I don't know. I don't understand that. Okay, but
- 57:37but it's kind of within the same pattern. Serious shortcoming. Good good enough for this public inquiry. You sure better solve this before you build the mine.
- 57:47Okay, that's the consistent pattern. Okay, but but but there are some cases where Golder is is actually saying right out, we're not sure if you can do
- 57:59this at all.
- 58:01Yeah.
- 58:01Okay. Yeah. It relates to to what we're talking about: wet tailings and rainfall. So, would you mind if I I mention that?
- 58:09Please go. Yeah.
- 58:10Okay. Sorry. Let me take a quick look here. This is this is this is fairly alarming. So I'm reading this exact quote. The clarification on only placing in
- 58:28selected areas during prolonged rainfall is a good addition. Okay, and they mean only putting the wet tailings in the middle of the filter tailing stack when
- 58:40it's raining, okay. Clarification on only placing in selected areas during prolonged rainfall is a good addition. These work should not be carried
- 58:50out in excess rainfall. Okay, fine. Then they say where the project timeline allows. So what's Golder saying here? They're saying don't put wet
- 59:07tailings in the middle of the stack when there's heavy rainfall, but the project timeline, your own deadlines might not permit that. Okay,
- 59:21this ain't this whole strategy we're talking about might be unworkable.
- 59:25Yeah.
- 59:26Okay, in terms of how you're going to organise scheduling, production, producing tailings, drawing tailings, compacting tailings, you might not have
- 59:36that option. Okay, meaning what you might be. You might have to construct a stack that's not stable. I don't. I don't. I don't quite know what they're
- 59:49saying. That they're basically saying they're basically saying the whole project might be unworkable.
- 59:54Yeah, yeah, and that's that is it's really scary because you know. What are they going to do? You know, if it goes ahead and they're using this plan, and are
- 1:00:05are they going to build knowingly build an unstable stack?
- 1:00:10Well, I I I I'd love to say no one would ever do such a thing, but that has been the practice in Indonesia.
- 1:00:19Right. Okay,
- 1:00:22and and I I mean I mean we talked last time about well the number of filter tailing stacks have failed. That's
- 1:00:28right. That's right.
- 1:00:29Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia. Okay, well it's because something was done wrong. Okay, people were not building those stacks to adequate standards, adequate
- 1:00:40quality control, etc.
- 1:00:43Yeah. Okay.
- 1:00:44So we cannot assume that everybody will always follow whatever precautions they have to to ensure that the stack is stable.
- 1:00:52Yeah.
- 1:00:52Okay. But that last thing I read from the Golden Report, I thought that was quite alarming, and and and to still say acceptable, good enough for the
- 1:01:00public inquiry.
- 1:01:01Yeah.
- 1:01:02Well, it's not the language I would have used.
- 1:01:08Still on water, groundwater. It's a recurring issue. Golder discusses differences between modelled and observed groundwater levels, and the
- 1:01:18possibility that open drill holes could be influencing added flows. What does that tell us about our understanding of how groundwater actually moves
- 1:01:26through this site, and when should observations that don't fit a model begin to reduce our confidence in its predictions?
- 1:01:35Okay. Well, let's look at exactly what Golder says. Okay. Yeah.
- 1:01:40So, so the word used here is added, a d i t. Okay, I'm assuming that you pronounce it the same way.
- 1:01:49Yeah.
- 1:01:50So that's like a it's some kind of horizontal drain. Okay.
- 1:01:55Yeah. Okay.
- 1:01:56Horizontal drain through which water is is leaving the project site.
- 1:01:59Yeah. Okay.
- 1:02:01So this is what they say. In general, model groundwater levels near to the added are lower than observed in shallower units and higher than observed
- 1:02:11in deeper pits.dot.it. is reported that open drill holes could be having an influence on the added flow rates. It is important to ensure that all
- 1:02:21drill holes are adequately sealed following drilling to remove such pathways. Okay.
- 1:02:28So
- 1:02:28what they're saying here is that we don't understand what they said. We have a discrepancy between the groundwater flow levels and the added flow rates.
- 1:02:41Okay. The observations are not matching our model. Okay, and they're saying one way to explain this is that the drill holes are not sealed. Okay, so
- 1:02:52the water is actually flowing down the drill holes, and well, make sure you're sealing the drill holes. Okay, yeah, that's a serious issue if drill holes
- 1:03:04have not been adequately sealed. Okay.
- 1:03:08Yeah. You learn
- 1:03:09an awful lot about a mining company by the way they carry out exploration. Okay. And if they can't carry out exploration without environmental
- 1:03:18contamination or accidents, there's no way they're going to carry out the mining project safely. I was part of a case that went all the way to the
- 1:03:29constitutional court in Ecuador, where the judge said in Spanish, pretty much what I just said. Okay. Yeah. He said the environmental contamination by
- 1:03:39drilling was so serious that he revoked the judge revoked the mining permit,
- 1:03:45right?
- 1:03:46Okay, yeah. So it's kind of it's kind of food for thought. Okay,
- 1:03:52I do know there are drill holes that are not capped. We are aware of them, you know, or in the campaign. Go on and ask.
- 1:04:01Well, it's it's a very serious issue, and it's one of the most common causes of environmental contamination during exploration drilling. Okay, right. So if you
- 1:04:13have an open pathway, okay. So first of all, you could have artesian water, yeah. Okay, especially if you have springs, you know you have artesian
- 1:04:22water. Yeah, yeah,
- 1:04:23yeah. So
- 1:04:23groundwater can be coming up that drill hole, and it can be spilling onto the surface ground groundwater. Well, who knows what quality? Okay, whatever
- 1:04:32quality the groundwater has. Yeah, that can be getting into surface water.
- 1:04:37Yeah.
- 1:04:37Okay. That that was what's happening in Ecuador is the wells were not properly sealed. Artesian water was coming up, and it was putting basically
- 1:04:48acid mine drainage, arsenic, manganese, zinc, other heavy metals into downstream waterways.
- 1:04:55Oh, lovely. Okay, right. Okay,
- 1:04:58and the other, but you could have water. You could have. Flow the other way, okay?
- 1:05:02Oh yeah. So where the surface water flows into the groundwater,
- 1:05:05surface water. You could have drilling fluids. You could have drilling cuttings. Okay. Yeah. All of that can be going into the groundwater system. Okay.
- 1:05:15Yeah. Got it. Right. Okay.
- 1:05:19I. I. I mean that. a fairly straightforward thing to do to seal drill holes.
- 1:05:28Relatively simple, you would imagine.
- 1:05:30That's a known technology. Okay, I mean, you hire professionals to do the drilling. Okay, presumably they know the proper procedures. They know how to
- 1:05:39seal the drill hole. Yeah, I know how to inspect it later and make sure it's been sealed properly.
- 1:05:44Yeah.
- 1:05:45Okay. That that failure to carry out exploration in a responsible manner has caused other mining companies to lose their mining permits or not to get their
- 1:05:59mining permits.
- 1:06:01Okay.
- 1:06:02I mentioned this case in Ecuador because it was so high profile. It went all the way to the constitutional court because the government kept appealing,
- 1:06:10appealing the revocation of the mining permit. But there's been other cases like that. I mean, part of what made that possible in Ecuador is the community was
- 1:06:23very good at documenting all instances of contamination, and all of this was presented in court. So, if this is a concern of the community, I would
- 1:06:36encourage you as well as you as well as you can to to document this kind of thing.
- 1:06:41Okay, I think it. Yeah, I think it has been documented. I think I'm fully hoping about that. This is
- 1:06:45outright state in the goal to report. Okay, is they're not visiting drill holes. Okay,
- 1:06:52yeah. Well,
- 1:06:52they're not doing field work at all. They're just evaluating documents. Okay,
- 1:06:56yeah.
- 1:06:56They're just saying, well, there's no way to reconcile the the model with the added flow rates, unless those drill holes are pathways.
- 1:07:05Yeah. Okay. I get you. Okay. So we're coming to the closure plan, plan and the conceptual rehabilitation, and that and and it doesn't include a premature
- 1:07:23closing scenario, and Golder says that the financial guarantee should take in take one into account. Golder also didn't review the calculations
- 1:07:33or assumptions behind the closure cost estimate. I suppose before I ask you about that. Could you explain what might cause a premature closure, and
- 1:07:48then after that, what premature closure actually is behind? And we've kind of talked about this already. What would need to be included in a credible financial
- 1:08:00guarantee to ensure that public doesn't ultimately inherit the liability.
- 1:08:07Okay, okay. So this whole concept of premature closure, well, it happens all the time. It's actually not all that unusual approach. So the plan is
- 1:08:20to operate this mine, sometimes they say 20 years, sometimes 25 years. Okay, 20 to 25 years. Okay, well, the company could decide to pursue other
- 1:08:31investments. They could not be getting the gold grade they thought they were going to get.
- 1:08:39Yeah,
- 1:08:40there might be environmental contamination and too many complaints from environmental agencies.
- 1:08:49Okay,
- 1:08:51I'd say probably, or there could be technical difficulties in operating or managing the mine or processing the ore. They're producing a gold concentrate,
- 1:09:02which they're going to ship to who knows where for cyanide treatment, cyanide processing with cyanide. Yeah, there might not be anybody who wants that
- 1:09:11gold concentrate, okay? Or it might be too expensive to do the shipment. There could be all kinds of reasons why a mine closes prematurely. Okay. Okay.
- 1:09:23I get. I understand now. Yeah.
- 1:09:25But just to add in one more thing is that there's something that has actually become a huge problem in Canada, especially, is mines don't close for good.
- 1:09:35Okay. What they do is they'll go into what they call care and maintenance.
- 1:09:40Yeah.
- 1:09:41Meaning we're not operating this mine, but we're not going to carry out permanent closure either.
- 1:09:48So
- 1:09:49you have a long stage of really it's it's not operating, but it's not closed either.
- 1:09:56Okay, so they don't operate that, or they don't then trigger that. Closure
- 1:10:01process, right? They'll just say, I mean, and the
- 1:10:05financial and the financial costs associated with the closure process.
- 1:10:09I mean, this has gone on for some minds, like 30 years, 40 years. They've been in care and maintenance. Okay, part part of the argument is that nothing in
- 1:10:23Canadian regulations actually defines care and maintenance, but companies can still claim, "Oh, we're in care and maintenance.
- 1:10:32Yeah,
- 1:10:32I'm just kind of letting you know that. Okay,
- 1:10:34no, no, I don't. I didn't touch. Okay,
- 1:10:36well, those are all the reasons why a mine might go into premature closure. Okay, so the night decides we are done with this project.
- 1:10:46Yeah.
- 1:10:46Okay, we are going to close this project, but but especially considering international cases, especially for gold mines, it's more likely that it'll be
- 1:10:56temporary, and it could be temporary For decades,
- 1:11:02yeah.
- 1:11:02Okay, so no, we're not operating, but we're not closing either.
- 1:11:06Yeah.
- 1:11:07Okay, that that that's another scenario that actually was never discussed in that Golder report. Okay.
- 1:11:15Yeah.
- 1:11:16So that, but but Golder does say that there's no plan for premature closure. There's no finances set aside for a premature closure. Okay.
- 1:11:27Yeah. So
- 1:11:28I think your your question was, what's the difference between premature closure and that planned permanent closure?
- 1:11:36Yeah.
- 1:11:36Okay. So anyway, the plan and the money set aside for the plan. That's after 2025 years. We have we have basically a completed mine.
- 1:11:45Yeah, we got
- 1:11:46the dry stack facility. It's completed. It's been undergoing progressive rehabilitation for decades. We have all the mine water infrastructure in place.
- 1:11:56We have all the underground workings completely open, ready to receive that pace backfill.
- 1:12:02Yeah,
- 1:12:03it's assuming the mine is in a certain state at the end of 20 to 25 years.
- 1:12:08Yeah.
- 1:12:08Okay. Now suppose that we undergo closure after four years. Okay. Well, the mine could be in a very different state. Okay. Drive stack
- 1:12:20facility just starting to be constructed. Not all the water management infrastructure in place. Not all the underground workings opened up or completed.
- 1:12:33And so it becomes quite a different matter as to how much money is really required to do a closure after four
- 1:12:42years. Yeah. Okay. I
- 1:12:44want to point out one other thing: is that the money for closure under the plan for permanent closure
- 1:12:54after
- 1:12:54only 25 years, some of that money is being put up front. Okay. I think it's been estimated like 12 and a half million pounds. Okay.
- 1:13:04Yeah.
- 1:13:04But other money is going to be earned by the mining company over that 20 to 25 years.
- 1:13:11Yeah. And that's
- 1:13:12what they plan to do the closure with. Yeah. Yeah. Now I've gotten. I actually was pulling this up as I was talking. Okay, so so I'm reading out of a
- 1:13:27Dalharian argument. The conceptual closure plan supplied in the planning application was for 12.4 million pounds over the five year decommission of the
- 1:13:39mine. The five. guarantee will be used to restore and reclaim the land on which the mine is initially operating. As the mine expands, increased funds will be
- 1:13:52provided to ensure the full closure of the mine into the future. Okay.
- 1:13:58Yeah. Yeah. So, so, so this
- 1:13:59is the problem with closing prematurely: is you haven't earned. You can't
- 1:14:06generate the capital to do it.
- 1:14:08You haven't earned money over 20 or 25 years.
- 1:14:11Yeah, yeah.
- 1:14:11Okay. So, how much does it really cost to close in year four? Well, no one has calculated that, and and you have the money to close in year
- 1:14:22four. Well, it's not quite certain.
- 1:14:25Yeah.
- 1:14:26Okay. Um. At any rate, in in many jurisdictions, that complete sum of money for closure is supposed to be put up front.
- 1:14:37Okay.
- 1:14:38Okay. You're not supposed to plan to pay for closure through the money that you'll earn through operating the mine. Okay, so certainly that's going
- 1:14:49to create problems with permanent closure. Okay, but I think everyone, like especially the Planning Appeals Commission, I hope they ask about this
- 1:14:59tomorrow. Okay. Yeah. What What happens if you just have a temporary shutdown that lasts for 30 years? Yeah. Care and maintenance. Okay. Can you be in
- 1:15:11a perpetual state of not operating but not carrying out closure either?
- 1:15:16Yeah.
- 1:15:17Okay. So something to think about.
- 1:15:22An awful lot to think about.
- 1:15:24Okay. So, so by the way, this was what this this lack of a a plan for premature closure. Golder put that in the category of further clarification. Okay.
- 1:15:37Further clarification means add a couple more sentences of explanation. I would have called that unacceptable.
- 1:15:45Yeah, I
- 1:15:45would have said the public inquiry is going to ask about this, and you have nothing to say. So, so you're not ready. You're not ready for this public
- 1:15:52inquiry. Okay. And at this stage, at this stage, I would say, well, this was pointed out to you five years ago. So, in the in the intervening five
- 1:16:00years, have you developed a plan for premature closure?
- 1:16:04Yeah. Okay. So, looking beyond closure, Golder acknowledges that long-term active or passive treatment of mine water may be required. What does long term
- 1:16:21mean in engineering terms here, and what happens if treatment, monitoring, or maintenance eventually stops? Just we're chatting about mine water here.
- 1:16:30Okay. Well, I would say under any circumstance, when someone says long term, they're meaning on the order of centuries,
- 1:16:43yeah,
- 1:16:45something like that. There's quite a few closed minds where they require water treatment in perpetuity. Okay.
- 1:16:58Okay.
- 1:16:59So in some sense, well, someone has to be carrying out that water treatment in perpetuity. Okay.
- 1:17:05Yeah.
- 1:17:06Someone has to be carrying out maintenance. There needs to be some kind of some kind of trust fund or its equivalent set up to pay for that.
- 1:17:16Does that mean you would have things like pumps going in perpetuity? You know, pumping water out of some areas of the facility, the mine waste
- 1:17:28facility, or indeed the mine itself.
- 1:17:31Well, people make a distinction between active and passive treatment. Okay, passive treatment is you're just kind of discharging the mine water into
- 1:17:44a wetland and letting the wetland do the cleaning. That still requires monitoring. If it's not working, it's
- 1:17:55is that just done through through drainage? Is that that's how that's done? Is it if if it was you know well
- 1:18:01it's just it's just passive drainage. It's not actually pumping, but but passive. Okay,
- 1:18:05okay, right.
- 1:18:06Okay, it's not something that can just be abandoned. Okay.
- 1:18:12Well, your drains and things all clog up, don't
- 1:18:16they? There's nothing. There's no engineering structure that can be abandoned. Okay. Yeah, that whole concept does not exist in engineering. That that
- 1:18:24you build something once and for all and it's good forever. There, there's no such thing. Okay.
- 1:18:31Yeah.
- 1:18:32Now, certainly, if we have active water treatment, like we have reverse osmosis or something, well, certainly that requires monitoring and
- 1:18:39inspection and maintenance and review, okay. I mean, that just doesn't exist. The idea that you put the mine into a certain state and and you just walk away
- 1:18:53and and you're
- 1:18:54done. Yeah.
- 1:18:55Okay. And that that's kind of an overall concern I have about this whole project. Okay, is people will say that well, there's a fund set aside. Okay,
- 1:19:07it's 12 point 5 million pounds, which actually not that much. Okay, this fund, this fund that's set aside, and this cover the cost if the mining company
- 1:19:15abandons the project. Okay, well, there's there's no if here. Okay, that's the intention is to abandon the project.
- 1:19:23Yeah, yeah, yeah. We knew that. Yeah.
- 1:19:25Okay. Yeah. Someone says we will maintain that dry stack facility for five years, and then we're out of there. That that's called abandonment. Okay. That is
- 1:19:35outside of any industry standard. Okay. So so we we should not say if if it's abandoned and just recognise that that that's not a bug;
- 1:19:43that's a feature. Okay, that's built into the design.
- 1:19:47Yeah. Okay. Sobering stuff. Final question: Taking the Golda report as a whole, ground conditions. Stability, liquefaction, earthquakes,
- 1:20:04tailings moisture, groundwater, water quality closure, and financial provision. If you were advising the Planning Appeals Commission, which matters would
- 1:20:18you say need to be resolved before a decision is made, and would you be comfortable with leaving any of them until after planning permission at a
- 1:20:29detailed design stage? And you explained to me what you felt about the word "comfortable" last week. So, if you want to phrase that differently, I quite
- 1:20:40understand.
- 1:20:43Okay, okay. Well, I understand what you're asking, but I, I, I feel like we're repeating a few things from last podcast, but I'll still build on that.
- 1:20:53Yeah,
- 1:20:55you started asking you what what would be my expectations from the Planning Appeals Commission at this stage, okay. No,
- 1:21:04I started asking which matters would you say need to be resolved before a decision is is made, and if you'd be comfortable leaving any or all
- 1:21:16of them until after planning permission at detailed design stage.
- 1:21:21Okay. Okay. No. Okay. So, so, so, just to start from kind of step zero. Okay. Yeah. Is that in terms of the adequacy of this project, we should not even be
- 1:21:34having this discussion.
- 1:21:36Yeah.
- 1:21:37We should not even be having this public inquiry. We are not even at stage zero, okay. I I would have asked the following questions. I I would have said,
- 1:21:47are there people living downslope from this mine waste facility? And I know the answer. The answer is yes. Okay. Do you have the consent of the impacted
- 1:21:55communities? I know the answer. The answer is no. Okay. Have you carried out a dam break analysis. Have you carried out analysis of the consequences of
- 1:22:05failure? I know the answer. The answer is no. Okay. Yeah. Have you have you developed the the credible failure modes for this facility? I know the answer. The
- 1:22:17answer is no. Okay. So I say, well, then then we're done. There's there's nothing to talk about here, okay? Yeah. And and that simply could have started
- 1:22:26with step zero. Are there people living down slope from this facility? Yeah. The answer is yes. Okay. End of inquiry.
- 1:22:31End of inquiry.
- 1:22:32Okay. That that that's all I would need to know.
- 1:22:34Yeah. Okay. And really, you don't really need to explain any more than that. Okay.
- 1:22:39Okay. So so putting that aside, we have really major parts of the project left undefined. Okay, and I think the important thing is things for which there
- 1:22:55might not be any solution, or there might be a solution involves a total rethinking of the project.
- 1:23:02Yeah, to
- 1:23:03sum that up, it would be the lack of any procedure for separating acid generating and non acid generating waste rock. Well, that's huge. Okay,
- 1:23:14yeah, that is huge. Yeah, the the the
- 1:23:16inability to come anywhere close to the target water content with current trainings and filter press technology. The lack of any knowledge about the strength
- 1:23:31of the foundation, okay, especially the tendency of shifts to undergo landsliding.
- 1:23:37Yeah,
- 1:23:39all of that could potentially lead to a complete change in the project. I I do want to take a quick look and just make sure I have told the the important
- 1:23:53things. Well, it's certainly the lack of any meaningful risk assessment, and just throwing around this word medium, okay, the lack of any plan for
- 1:24:05premature closure and no discussion about well, what if you just stop operating the mine but or don't actually undergo closure, the lack of
- 1:24:16consideration of the maximum credible earthquake, and and I would put the maximum, the probable maximum precipitation into there also, which actually
- 1:24:25Golder does not talk about. They don't talk about what's the maximum precipitation event for which this whole facility can can withstand. Yeah, let's just.
- 1:24:41I'm just taking a quick look at one other thing. I mean, certainly they're concerned that maybe you're going to be forced to stack tailings that are too
- 1:24:59wet. During heavy rainfall, pretty chilling. It's
- 1:25:03pretty obvious,
- 1:25:05which which you know might mean a complete rethinking. Okay.
- 1:25:09Yeah.
- 1:25:12I mean, I I would say just for numerous reasons, we're not in any way ready for a public inquiry. Okay.
- 1:25:22Yeah.
- 1:25:25I mean, I mean, first of all, we don't have the preconditions for a project, which is consent of the impacted community. Okay, that's certainly a precondition.
- 1:25:33Yeah. So many things at this preliminary stage, which are not just looking for details, but are looking for solutions. Okay, that is pretty uncomfortable.
- 1:25:48Okay,
- 1:25:49yeah.
- 1:25:51Now I will come back to your question safe and comfortable, even though I did answer in the last podcast. You did,
- 1:25:59yeah, yeah, you did.
- 1:26:00Okay, is that it? All comes down to a comparison of benefits and risks. Okay, and mining is never going to be risk free. Okay, engineering is never going to be
- 1:26:14risk free. Okay, we just have a situation here where there's a foreign company receiving the benefits, and you have a down slope community bearing the
- 1:26:26risks. Okay, yeah. And if I were in that community, I would say nothing is going to make me comfortable. Okay, there's absolutely no reason why I and
- 1:26:36my descendants should have to live with this risk. There is nothing in this for me, okay. So I think that the idea of being safe and comfortable is not
- 1:26:48coming up, okay. That's why I prefer the last last podcast to talk about what are what are industry standards,
- 1:26:56yeah. What are best
- 1:26:57practices,
- 1:26:58yeah.
- 1:26:58Okay, that's the best you're going to be able to do that's not the same thing as as making people who are bearing the risk comfortable.
- 1:27:06Yeah. Okay.
- 1:27:07But but I would say also in this case with such a a wide range of aspects of the project being so poorly undefined, with the pro with the prospect for never
- 1:27:20being defined or not being solved or not being solved with the current framework, I would say no. Nothing about this makes me feel safe or comfortable.
- 1:27:31And I think, on that note, we will leave it for today, Steve. And thanks again for taking the time to work through all of this with us. You have the happy
- 1:27:40knack for taking some fairly impenetrable technical material and explaining what it actually means, and more importantly, where the questions still
- 1:27:50remain. I suspect after today there will be quite a few more questions that need answering. Thank you very much, Steve.
- 1:27:57Okay, thank you.
- 1:28:01I think what Stephen has done for us today is to put some meaning behind all of that work being left until detailed design stage. Ultimately, the people
- 1:28:12who will live with the consequences of these decisions won't be the consultants writing the reports, or the shareholders, or those of us
- 1:28:22sitting in the inquiry room, they will be the mothers and fathers and childrens of generations who haven't even been born yet. So I leave the
- 1:28:31last few words to Doctor Emmerman. It all comes down to a comparison of benefits and risks. Mining and engineering are never risk-free. Here we
- 1:28:43have a foreign company receiving the benefits, and a downslope company bearing the risks. If I was in that community, I would say nothing is going to make me
- 1:28:55comfortable. There is no reason why me and my descendants should bear this risk. There is nothing in this for me, and I think that's as probably a good a
- 1:29:06place as to leave it for tonight. You've been listening to the Save Our Sperrins podcast, Voices from the Frontline. Thank you for joining
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