Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Key 2025 California Real Estate Decisions
Transcript
- 0:03Welcome to Key 2025 California Real Estate Decisions.
- 0:08I'm Elizabeth Dryden, co -chair of the Beverly
- 0:10Hills Bar real estate section. Before we dive
- 0:13onto our presentation, I wanted to let you know
- 0:16that our next real estate section meeting will
- 0:18be on September 4th at 3 p .m. via Zoom and it's
- 0:22open to all. On October 23rd, Stephen Roucher
- 0:26of Rubin Roucher & Blum and Dan Fine of Alchemy
- 0:30Insurance Services will be speaking on habitability
- 0:34issues for landlords. And on January 21st, Jennifer
- 0:38Felton of RELAW Law will be speaking on legal
- 0:43ethics when advising on documenting and resolving
- 0:46real estate matters. Now. I am delighted to introduce
- 0:50our speakers. We have Olivia Doppler, who is
- 0:52a co -founder of LDY Law PC, where she represents
- 0:56owners and landlords in residential and commercial
- 0:58landlord disputes throughout the San Francisco
- 1:02Bay Area, bringing over a decade of experience
- 1:04with Ellis Act evictions, owner move -ins, buyout
- 1:08negotiations, and rent board proceedings. She
- 1:11earned her BA in political science with the highest
- 1:14honors from UC Davis and her JD from Golden Gate
- 1:18University School of Law, where she served as
- 1:20an associate editor of the Law Review. A frequent
- 1:23speaker on landlord tenant issues, Olivia represents
- 1:27to organizations such as CEB, PPMA of San Francisco,
- 1:32and SPOSFI. Analu is also an equity partner at
- 1:39LDY Law PC with 15 years of experience representing
- 1:42owners, developers, landlords, tenants, and other
- 1:45clients in complex real estate and landlord -tenant
- 1:49litigation across California. A recognized leader
- 1:52in the legal community, she serves on the executive
- 1:55committee of the California Lawyers Association's
- 1:58Real Property Law Section, speaks frequently
- 2:00on real estate law and diversity equity inclusion
- 2:04issues, and has published articles with California's
- 2:07Lawyers Association and the Daily Journal. Our
- 2:10accolades include the 2020 Outstanding Barrister
- 2:12Award from the Bar Association of San Francisco
- 2:15and a spot in Super Lawyers Rising Star List
- 2:19every year from 2017 to 2025. As we go through
- 2:26our presentation, we have a Q &A panel for you
- 2:30guys to be able to put in your questions. Our
- 2:33panelists have a lot to get through, so we are
- 2:35going to hold the questions to the end. Any questions
- 2:38that we don't get to, though, please feel free
- 2:40to reach out directly to Ana and Olivia. All
- 2:46right, over to you guys. Thank you so much, Elizabeth,
- 2:54and great to be here. Great to come back and
- 2:59present on the key 2025 decisions. Olivia and
- 3:02I were here a couple of years ago, and so we're
- 3:06glad to be giving an update for this year. So
- 3:09jumping right into our presentation, we have
- 3:14selected in our view the key real estate cases
- 3:17that were published in the year 2025. And the
- 3:22various areas we've targeted include commercial
- 3:25and residential tenancies, partitions, easements,
- 3:29quiet title, attorney misconduct, discovery sanctions,
- 3:33and some others. All right. And we've selected
- 3:38a total of 12 cases to cover in depth today.
- 3:42We've got the list here. I'll quickly run through
- 3:45those. And then we've got a few honorable mentions
- 3:47that we'll mention at the end of our presentation
- 3:50as well. But these are the ones that we'll be
- 3:52covering in more depth today. First, we have
- 3:55a case that it relates to a notice to pay rent
- 3:59that overstates the amount of rent due and the
- 4:01fact that that will not support a valid unlawful
- 4:04detainer case. Next, we'll be covering a case
- 4:08that is a civil procedure based case, and it
- 4:12found that facts that got denied in an original
- 4:14answer can actually stand to controvert the same
- 4:18facts in an amended complaint and prevent entry
- 4:24of default. Our third case is a landlord tenant
- 4:28case involving a notice to pay rent or quit.
- 4:32And it basically dealt with some issues where
- 4:34the notice was ultimately deemed defective because
- 4:38of a failure to identify when the notice period
- 4:41commenced and some other details. And this is
- 4:44a really key one for practitioners in landlord
- 4:46tenant and in an eviction law. So we'll go over
- 4:50how that's changed some key practices in that
- 4:52area. Our 4th case involves a cap on attorney's
- 4:59fees and costs in residential leases and the
- 5:03court found that that was enforceable. Our fifth
- 5:06case is an anti -slap case and this particular
- 5:10case involved an unlawful detainer action and
- 5:13found that the particular unlawful detainer action
- 5:17at issue was not protected activity to evict
- 5:20tenants from other units that were not subject
- 5:23to that action. Our sixth case is also another
- 5:27anti -slap case. Our seventh case is an HOA case.
- 5:33This one involved HOA negligence and liability
- 5:36for failure to repair. Our eighth case is a partition
- 5:41case and that one involves lack of standing to
- 5:44bring a partition action when ownership of the
- 5:47property is unresolved due to a probate proceeding.
- 5:51Ninth will cover a case that involves the interplay
- 5:55between malicious prosecution and an advice of
- 5:59counsel defense. 10, we will cover an elder abuse
- 6:04case. And although this one may not necessarily
- 6:06strictly be fully a real property law case, it
- 6:10does involve real property issues. And elder
- 6:13abuse claims do frequently come up in cases involving
- 6:18real property. So we thought this was an interesting
- 6:20one to cover. And of course, it deals also with
- 6:24attorney misconduct issues. So that's something
- 6:26that all of us would want to be aware of. um
- 6:3111th we will be covering a case involving terminating
- 6:35sanctions for discovery misconduct and then last
- 6:38but not least we'll be covering an easement case
- 6:41and this is a case involving secondary easement
- 6:43rights and um how only improvements that are
- 6:47necessary for convenient use um will how that
- 6:53gets into play Great. Thank you, Olivia, for
- 6:57the rundown. And let's dive right in. We're going
- 7:00to spend a few minutes per case. And we grouped
- 7:02them, again, based on subject matter area generally.
- 7:05So the first few are landlord, tenant, and eviction
- 7:09cases. And some are very key. One case was a
- 7:13game changer. So we'll get into that. The first
- 7:16case, Hefezegh v. Guavira, involved a non -payment
- 7:21of rent notice that in simple language, overstated
- 7:26how much rent was being sought from the tenants.
- 7:30And the court found that notice that overstates
- 7:35rent, not going to fly. Your unlawful detainer
- 7:39is bad and landlord, you're going to have to
- 7:40start all over again. So here in the year 2023,
- 7:44this landlord filed an unlawful detainer based
- 7:47on nonpayment or rent. And you would think that
- 7:50would be straightforward, but not here. The eviction
- 7:54notice that was attached to the unlawful detainer
- 7:57sought rent in the amount of $1 ,554 .44. But
- 8:03that was overstated by $4. And the court found
- 8:10in that case that you can't do that. And here's
- 8:13why. The tenants filed a motion for summary judgment.
- 8:17finding and stating that the notice was fatally
- 8:20defective because of that approximately four
- 8:23dollar per month and monthly fees that are permitted
- 8:27by the Los Angeles systematic code enforcement
- 8:31program SCEP could be passed through as rent
- 8:35or so the landlord thought and The tenants argued
- 8:40that no that's a fee that is not base rent and
- 8:43you cannot seek that for purposes of evictable
- 8:46debt. So the trial court in LA County entered
- 8:50judgment in the tenants favor and the court of
- 8:53appeal affirmed. The court found that those L
- 8:57.A. County fees are not considered rent under
- 9:01the definition of the L .A. Municipal Code and
- 9:04the court went into an extensive analysis over
- 9:08the definition in the various code sections and
- 9:11found that those fees cannot be demanded in a
- 9:14notice to pay rent or quit. particularly this
- 9:17SCEP fee was not included on the list of charges
- 9:22that could be passed through as rent. And so
- 9:25it was not properly included as rent in this
- 9:28non -payment of rent notice. Other couple of
- 9:31issues with the landlord's notice, the amount
- 9:34in the notice did not match the amount stated
- 9:36in the complaint. And so the tenants claimed
- 9:40that that made the complaint ambiguous. And it
- 9:43just highlights how important it is that if you
- 9:46are the landlord, whether you are in pro -per
- 9:49or you are represented by counsel, that you make
- 9:52sure your notice is perfect and that it also
- 9:55matches what you're seeking in the complaint.
- 9:58Otherwise, your entire case is going to get tossed
- 10:00out. And those of us that practice in LA County
- 10:04or San Francisco County or Oakland or Berkeley,
- 10:07areas where there are strict residential rents
- 10:10and eviction control ordinance know this all
- 10:12too well. And so in this particular case, the
- 10:17Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision
- 10:21that no, you cannot seek fees or other improper
- 10:25amounts in an eviction notice. And so landlord,
- 10:28you're going to have to start all over again.
- 10:32All right. This is the case that we were alluding
- 10:37to that was a complete game changer for the entire
- 10:41landlord industry statewide. This case changed
- 10:44how Olivia and I handle our eviction notices
- 10:48and our practice. It has changed how other landlord
- 10:52attorneys in the industry change how they. set
- 10:55up their eviction notices. So this was a big
- 10:57one, and this is why we chose it as one of the
- 11:00key cases to highlight. So in this particular
- 11:03case, the landlord served a notice to pay rent
- 11:08or quit, another non -payment case here. But
- 11:11in the notice, the landlord did not say when
- 11:14the three -day notice period started, nor when
- 11:18the three -day notice period ended. And there
- 11:21were other issues with the notice, such as the
- 11:24address where rent could be paid was not listed.
- 11:28And the notice didn't make clear that the tenant
- 11:30would be evicted if the rent was not paid on
- 11:33time. And many landlords said, well, wait a minute.
- 11:36It says notice to pay rent or quit. Doesn't that
- 11:39imply that if you don't pay on time, you got
- 11:41to quit and get out of the property? But the
- 11:43court did not agree with many landlords' analysis
- 11:48in that area. This is why this case is a big
- 11:52game changer. In this particular case, just to
- 11:55quickly go over the procedural history, it was
- 11:58transferred from the appellate division of LA
- 12:00Superior Court, so another Los Angeles case.
- 12:03And the procedural issues are really what brought
- 12:06us to the Court of Appeal, but it was the implications
- 12:08of how notices should be drafted that is the
- 12:11important takeaway from this case. And here in
- 12:14this case, the issue is whether a tenant can
- 12:16appeal a judgment for possession in an unlawful
- 12:20detainer if the landlord has outstanding damages
- 12:23claims that have not been adjudicated. And so
- 12:26the answer was no. If the landlord's complaint
- 12:30seeks damages, then possession only judgments
- 12:33are not appealable because it does not resolve
- 12:35all rights of the parties. And so in this case,
- 12:38the tenant filed a petition for writ of mandate
- 12:40under Code of Civil Procedure 1086. So just kind
- 12:44of quickly flying through the procedural history
- 12:46to get to the real meat of the case. And here,
- 12:49the court found that the three -day notice to
- 12:52pay rent was defective for three main reasons.
- 12:56First, again, the title of the notice was three
- 12:58-day notice to pay or quit. But the court found
- 13:01that that notice was not clear enough that the
- 13:04landlord would then take possession back of the
- 13:06unit if then the tenant did not pay rent prior
- 13:09to the expiration of the notice period. So, wow,
- 13:13that's a huge change because most of us know
- 13:17that when we call these notices, three -day notice
- 13:19to pay rent or quit, that's generally what we've
- 13:21been calling them for decades. And the court
- 13:24did not find that that was clear enough in this
- 13:26particular case. Number two, the notice did not
- 13:31state when the notice period started or ended.
- 13:34So the court had beef because it wasn't clear
- 13:37enough in the court's view to the tenant that
- 13:40when day one is and when is day three. And the
- 13:44notice did not inform the tenant that the three
- 13:47days don't include weekends or holidays. And
- 13:49so that is true. The three -day notice period
- 13:52does not include weekends or judicial holidays.
- 13:56And so, for example, if you serve a three -day
- 13:58notice to pay rent or quit on a Friday, then
- 14:02Saturday and Sunday are not included in that
- 14:04three -day period. So that was an important distinction
- 14:07that the court found was not clear enough. And
- 14:09then lastly, the other issue was the notice did
- 14:13not provide a clear address where the rent could
- 14:15be paid. So the appeal from this judgment was
- 14:19dismissed and the court directed the trial court
- 14:23to vacate the possession only judgment and enter
- 14:26a new judgment in favor of the tenant. So Olivia
- 14:29and I will just take a minute or two to share
- 14:32with you how this changed our practice and what
- 14:34we are doing for our notices because it was such
- 14:36a key case. Now, instead of calling our eviction
- 14:41notices three -day notice to pay rent or quit,
- 14:43we are calling them notice to pay rent or quit.
- 14:47We are also stating on the face of the notice
- 14:50the exact date the notice expires. So we are
- 14:54saying on or before September 16th, the tenant
- 14:57must pay rent and here's how. We are not saying
- 15:00within three days, of the date of this notice
- 15:02anymore. And that was a really big change because
- 15:04of this case. We are also, and I'll have Olivia
- 15:07jump in in a second, we are also changing other
- 15:11types of notices like rent increase notices and
- 15:14also CC827 notices, that's notices to change
- 15:18terms of tenancy. We're also being more clear
- 15:22on those kinds of notices as a result of this
- 15:24case, Olivia. Yeah, so I think the key takeaway
- 15:27from this case is that the court was basically
- 15:30saying the notice has to be understandable by
- 15:33a normal person, you know, a normal person may
- 15:35not Just from a title know what to do in response
- 15:39to a notice like this So the notice really has
- 15:41to explain to the tenant what they have to do
- 15:43You know, they have to pay or they have to move
- 15:45out by a particular time and it needs to Inform
- 15:49the tenant how to figure out what that time is
- 15:51because that was the whole issue here is that
- 15:53and I think one of the the problems that the
- 15:57landlord had in this case is that their notice
- 15:59was dated on a particular date, but it was actually
- 16:02served on a different date. And so the tenant
- 16:04was saying, well, I'm confused by that. I don't
- 16:06know when I actually have to comply by. So as
- 16:09Anna was noted, and I've seen practitioners do
- 16:13this in a couple of different ways, but the notice
- 16:14needs to make clear how the tenant can figure
- 16:17out when the notice period ends. I've seen some
- 16:21attorneys doing this by explaining to the tenant,
- 16:24this is the day the notice got served and this
- 16:26is how you count the time period and this is
- 16:29how many days you have. Though we've kind of
- 16:32taken a slightly different approach, which is
- 16:35to just state the date that the notice period
- 16:37ends. However you do it, it needs to be clear
- 16:41to the tenant what they need to do and when they
- 16:43need to do it by. All right, so we'll jump into
- 16:50our next case here. This is also a landlord -tenant
- 16:55case, but it's one that really is focused more
- 17:00on civil procedure issues more than landlord
- 17:03-tenant issues. It is relevant though to kind
- 17:07of all of our practice areas and something to
- 17:09be aware of because it relates to answers to
- 17:12amended complaints. So this case involved basically
- 17:19a court found that a defendant's answer to plaintiff's
- 17:23initial complaint was sufficient to controvert
- 17:26facts that got reasserted in amended complaint.
- 17:29And as a result, default judgment could not stand
- 17:32in that situation. So real quick procedural history,
- 17:38rather. The plaintiff in this case had filed
- 17:40an unlawful detainer complaint for possession
- 17:43of a property in Malibu. The defendant answered
- 17:46the original complaint. And there was some, you
- 17:50know, some additional procedure that happened
- 17:52in the case, but ultimately the plaintiff ended
- 17:55up filing a first amended complaint. And for
- 17:58some reason, the defendant did not answer that
- 18:01first amended complaint. So as a result, the
- 18:03court ended up entering a default and then a
- 18:07default judgment against the defendant. The defendant
- 18:10moved to set aside that default, but the court
- 18:12denied the motion, so defendant appealed. And
- 18:15that's what we're dealing with on appeal here.
- 18:19There were two issues that the court dealt with
- 18:21on appeal. The first was, was the appeal timely?
- 18:24And the second was, did the trial court erroneously
- 18:27deny the motion to set aside the default judgment?
- 18:30As to the first issue, the court found that the
- 18:33appeal was timely. The court looked at the rule
- 18:37that generally a notice of appeal has to be filed
- 18:40on or before the earliest of two dates. The first
- 18:44is either 60 days after notice of entry of judgment
- 18:47is served or otherwise it's 180 days after the
- 18:53entry of judgment. And here judgment includes
- 18:56an appealable order and an order denying a statutory
- 19:00motion to set aside a judgment is appealable.
- 19:03In this particular case, no notice of entry.
- 19:07of order ever got served. The plaintiff's attorney
- 19:10apparently didn't serve one and the court didn't
- 19:13serve one. So that then triggered the second
- 19:16rule there, which was that defendant had 180
- 19:18days after the entry of order to appeal. Fairly
- 19:22straightforward. The defendant filed 104 days
- 19:25after the entry, so it was timely. I think our
- 19:28takeaway here is make sure you're using a notice
- 19:31of entry of order. Get that time, that clock
- 19:34started. As to the second issue in the case,
- 19:41the appellate court found that the trial court
- 19:44erroneously denied the motion to set aside the
- 19:47default. And here the defendant had brought his
- 19:51motion under 473D. That is the section that permits
- 19:55a court to set aside a void judgment. And what
- 20:00the court ultimately ruled is that a defendant
- 20:03who answers an initial complaint but does not
- 20:07file an answer to the first amended complaint
- 20:11may nevertheless use the original answer to controvert
- 20:15facts that get reasserted in that second complaint.
- 20:19Although the defendant is admitting new factual
- 20:22allegations, anything new that got brought in
- 20:24on the amended complaint, a default judgment
- 20:27actually could not be taken against him based
- 20:30on allegations that he had denied in his original
- 20:33answer, essentially. So the court did acknowledge
- 20:37the general rule that when a plaintiff amends
- 20:39his complaint, he's abandoning his original issues.
- 20:43But the issue here is that judgment can't be
- 20:46taken against him for things that he had already
- 20:51denied, essentially. The court really relied
- 20:57on the fact that there's this general principle
- 21:00of caution in entering default judgments and
- 21:02that the law favors resolving disputes on the
- 21:05merits. And the court also noted that this will
- 21:08require that courts take the time to analyze
- 21:10a defendant's prior answer. They'll actually
- 21:12need to go through and figure out were certain
- 21:15key allegations denied or not. And if so, then
- 21:19a default judgment can't stand. Here, the first
- 21:23amended complaint It did set forth new causes
- 21:26of action, but they used all the same facts again.
- 21:31And defendant here had denied at least two key
- 21:34facts when he filed his original answer. And
- 21:37that was relating to ownership of the property
- 21:39and then the daily value of the property. And
- 21:42both of those facts are key to entering a judgment,
- 21:47basically, in an unlawful detainer case. And
- 21:49so since those two key elements had been denied,
- 21:53default was not appropriate here. So the court
- 21:55ultimately did set aside this default judgment.
- 21:58So obviously good lawyering is to make sure you
- 22:01do answer when go ahead and answer again when
- 22:04you are served with an amended complaint. But
- 22:07if something happens and you don't or if you're
- 22:10trying to take a default against another side
- 22:12who hasn't answered, you are going to need to
- 22:14look at whether or not key facts had already
- 22:17been denied with the prior answer. All right.
- 22:23And then our next case is Gogol v. Ding. And
- 22:27this case is the one that I was mentioning about
- 22:30enforceability of attorney fees and cost provisions
- 22:33and rental agreements. And in this particular
- 22:36case, the court found that a $1 ,000 cap on attorney's
- 22:40fees and costs in a residential lease is enforceable.
- 22:44So this matter also involved a residential landlord
- 22:48tenant dispute. And in this particular case,
- 22:50the parties had signed a written rental agreement
- 22:53for a house rental that rental agreement, which
- 22:56is. Pretty common, it had a provision stating
- 22:59that the prevailing party and litigation arising
- 23:02out of the lease would be entitled to recover
- 23:05their attorney's fees and costs from the losing
- 23:09party. However, again, somewhat common provision,
- 23:12there was a cap on that recovery. And in this
- 23:15particular lease, it capped the total attorney's
- 23:17fees and cost recovery at $1 ,000. In this particular
- 23:22case, the tenant plaintiffs had prevailed in
- 23:26their lawsuit against their landlord. And despite
- 23:29this 1K cap in the lease, they moved for and
- 23:32the trial court ultimately awarded them about
- 23:36$14 ,000 in costs. And the trial court here relied
- 23:40on a public policy argument. The trial court
- 23:44noted that One of the claims at issue that was
- 23:47brought was a retaliatory eviction claim. And
- 23:51that sort of claim and the statute that underlies
- 23:54that claim, the whole goal of it is to protect
- 23:57tenants from abusive conduct by their landlords.
- 24:00And so as a public policy, the trial court found
- 24:03that enforcing that 1K cap would run afoul of
- 24:06the public policy arguments, basically kind of
- 24:08disincentivizing bringing these types of claims.
- 24:14The landlord appealed and the issue on appeal
- 24:17was whether the parties to a contract may effectively
- 24:21waive, either in whole or in part, their right
- 24:25to recover litigation costs that they would otherwise
- 24:27be able to recover under CCP 1032B. And the court
- 24:32ultimately found that, yes, parties can waive
- 24:35that right. So here, the parties were not precluded
- 24:41by a statute from capping their recovery at $1
- 24:45,000. Next slide, please. So in analyzing this
- 24:57issue, the court looked at the interplay between
- 25:00two different statutes, actually, and that is
- 25:02CCP 1032B and Civil Code 3513. And 1032B, the
- 25:10court found that it just creates a default rule.
- 25:13The parties contemplates that the parties may
- 25:18agree to deal with their litigation costs in
- 25:20other ways though. It notes that 1032 indicates
- 25:25that except as otherwise expressly provided by
- 25:28statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a
- 25:31matter of right to recover. their costs in an
- 25:34action or proceeding. The tenants argue that
- 25:37this then created an unwaverable right to recover
- 25:40cost. But the court notes that that same statute
- 25:44then goes on to clarify that nothing in this
- 25:46section shall prohibit parties from stipulating
- 25:48to alternative procedures for awarding cost.
- 25:52And the court also looked at the fact that a
- 25:54common practice and a case recognizes this right
- 25:58is that parties often agree and settlements that
- 26:04they are not going to follow this rule. Basically
- 26:07that each side will bear their own attorney's
- 26:09fees and costs. That said, the court did note
- 26:13that the case that recognized that right did
- 26:15not consider the 3513 argument. And so the court
- 26:19looked at that as well. And that particular statute
- 26:22says that Anyone may waive the advantage of a
- 26:25law that's intended solely for their benefit,
- 26:28but a law established for a public reason can't
- 26:32be contravened by a private agreement. Again,
- 26:34kind of that public policy argument. That said,
- 26:38the court notes that the cost statute 1032 It
- 26:44serves a private financial interest of prevailing
- 26:46parties. It's not a public policy statute. This
- 26:50is something that it's a statute basically of
- 26:52general application in all civil cases. And so.
- 26:56It didn't matter that the particular statute
- 26:59that the tenants were trying to recover on was
- 27:01a public policy type statute. So at the end of
- 27:05the day, the court found that the trial court
- 27:09erred in declining to enforce that cap. So this
- 27:12is another important takeaway here for practitioners
- 27:14in this area is these. Provisions in lease agreements,
- 27:19they are effective. That means that when you're
- 27:23planning for litigation on behalf of clients,
- 27:25you need to be looking and seeing if these provisions
- 27:27are included. And you may want to help your clients
- 27:30plan for that and potentially change provisions
- 27:33of rental agreements to the extent you're allowed
- 27:35to by law in the terms of the agreement to potentially
- 27:40add these caps or remove these caps, whatever
- 27:43may be in your client's interest. Yeah, and just
- 27:48to add on to that, sometimes in our practice,
- 27:51if we are not thrilled by a particular attorney
- 27:55fee clause, we will serve a Civil Code Section
- 27:59827 notice to change the terms and either remove
- 28:02that attorney fee clause or clarify it. Or sometimes
- 28:06we'll add an attorney fee clause when the lease
- 28:09doesn't otherwise have them in certain jurisdictions.
- 28:13your rights to do so vary. But in general, we
- 28:16always analyze the attorney fee clause in these
- 28:19kinds of agreements prior to initiating any litigation.
- 28:25All right. And then our next case is Noon v.
- 28:27Fuentes. And this is an anti -slop case. This
- 28:31particular case, the underlying basis of the
- 28:33case was an unlawful detainer case where basically
- 28:37a landlord fraudulently used one unlawful detainer
- 28:41case for one unit to effectively evict tenants
- 28:44from other units and then tried to use the anti
- 28:46-slap statute to claim that that activity was
- 28:49protected. And the court disagreed. They found
- 28:51that this was not protected speech or petitioning
- 28:54activity. So in this particular case, there was
- 28:58a property at issue. It was actually a large
- 29:01single family home in Los Angeles that the owner
- 29:04apparently ended up subdividing into seven different
- 29:07units, probably different rooms that got rented.
- 29:10It wasn't quite clear, but there were seven different
- 29:12units. The landlord had then rented out each
- 29:15of these units to different tenants at different
- 29:18times with separate oral lease agreements. The
- 29:22tenants paid their rent separately each month
- 29:24and each of their doors had unit numbers hanging
- 29:27on them. So it really was seven different tenancies
- 29:30in this property. The owner had then gone, you
- 29:35know, after some time had gone to the tenants
- 29:37and told them that he was selling the property
- 29:39and he wanted them to move out and vacate in
- 29:4160 days. By the way, this is a property that
- 29:44is subject to the Los Angeles rent ordinance.
- 29:48And so just cause, for example, requirements
- 29:51applied. He ultimately ended up. offering these
- 29:57tenants cash for keys, but basically no one accepted,
- 30:00no one moved out because he didn't actually have
- 30:02just cause to remove them. The owner then apparently
- 30:06went on to begin a campaign of harassment against
- 30:08the tenants and threats to force them to vacate.
- 30:12And when that didn't work, he cooked up this
- 30:14new plan, which is basically what led to this
- 30:15case. And so What the owner ended up doing is
- 30:20he filed a non -payment of rent eviction against
- 30:22the Unit 7 tenant. She was the only one who was
- 30:25behind on her rent. But, curiously, he files
- 30:31the unlawful detainer complaint and lists the
- 30:34entire property address on it, not just Unit
- 30:36Number 7. And the complaint only named the Unit
- 30:407 tenant on it. Around the same time, he went
- 30:44over to the property and he removed all those
- 30:46unit numbers from the doors. And he filed the
- 30:50complaint and then apparently had it served to
- 30:52someone at unit number seven, but none of the
- 30:55rest of those tenants and the other six units
- 30:57ever heard about this thing, basically until
- 30:59a sheriff showed up at their door and pulled
- 31:02them out of the property. And they were informed
- 31:06that there was a default judgment on the property
- 31:09for unlawful detainer and that they were being
- 31:12removed from the property. Despite their protest,
- 31:16the sheriff ultimately carried out the eviction.
- 31:18Apparently the landlord was actually there telling
- 31:20the sheriffs that the tenants were either confused
- 31:23or just trying to trick the sheriff when apparently
- 31:25it was actually the other way around. But the
- 31:29tenants ended up homeless and a lot of them never
- 31:31even got an opportunity, it sounds like, even
- 31:32to go back and get most of their possessions.
- 31:35They went and checked in with the court and they
- 31:38were told, strangely, that there's no evictions
- 31:40against them. So they went ahead then and filed
- 31:45a wrongful eviction cases against the owner and
- 31:50as a result the owner filed this anti -slap.
- 31:53motion and the trial court actually decided with
- 31:57the owner originally finding that the claims
- 31:59at issue ultimately arose from this unlawful
- 32:01detainer case and was protected activity and
- 32:04the trial court also found that the tenants were
- 32:07that it basically didn't think that the tenants
- 32:09would be able to prevail on their claims because
- 32:13of issues like the litigation privilege the tenants
- 32:16on the other hand argued that that's not really
- 32:19correct that they're kind of that the court was
- 32:21missing the point of the case, which is that
- 32:24their eviction actually resulted as a result
- 32:27of fraudulent efforts here. There was no notice
- 32:30and there was no appropriate unlawful detainer
- 32:34process against them. So the issue on appeal
- 32:37was ultimately, is the landlord who evicted these
- 32:40tenants from six of his units without notice
- 32:43to them, protected by the anti -slop statute.
- 32:46just because he filed an unlawful detainer action
- 32:49against a seventh tenant. And the court ultimately
- 32:52found, no, this is not protected conduct. In
- 32:59making that decision, the court basically went
- 33:02through an analysis using the anti -slap statute.
- 33:05And it was looking at a particular part of the
- 33:09anti -slap statute, which is basically that a
- 33:13cause of action that's in furtherance of a person's
- 33:16right of petition or free speech in connection
- 33:19with a public issue is subject to an anti -slap
- 33:23motion unless the court finds that the plaintiff
- 33:26has a probability of prevailing on the claim.
- 33:30And then the court also noted that an act in
- 33:34furtherance of the right of petition or free
- 33:36speech includes written statements before a judicial
- 33:40proceeding and other conditions and furtherance
- 33:43of the exercise of the right of petition. So
- 33:47the court notes that when we're looking at anti
- 33:49-slap issues, we need to have a two -prong analysis.
- 33:52The first is that the defendant has the burden
- 33:55to show that the challenged claims arise from
- 33:58protected activity. And then the second is that
- 34:01it then shifts the burden to the plaintiff to
- 34:03demonstrate that their claims have at least minimal
- 34:05merit. The defendant here failed the first prong.
- 34:10The Court of Appeal did kind of see through everything
- 34:13and noted that this action, it's not based on
- 34:18protected conduct, it's based on a fraudulent
- 34:21termination of tenancy. The whole point was that
- 34:24the tenants were seeking redress because the
- 34:27owner had terminated their tenancy without resorting
- 34:30to the judicial process. Again, they never got
- 34:33served, they never got filed, nothing was even
- 34:35filed against them. And so if anything, this
- 34:37is the opposite of petitioning activity. And
- 34:41the court here really did seem to hone in on
- 34:43the fact that the landlord had deceptively used
- 34:46this unlawful detainer action, basically was
- 34:48just tricking everybody, including the sheriff
- 34:50deputies who ultimately carried out the eviction
- 34:53and had modified this property to make it look
- 34:56like it was just a single unit. So the whole
- 34:58thing really was just based on fraud. And luckily
- 35:01the court of appeal did not uphold that. Okay,
- 35:11switching gears to a commercial shopping center
- 35:14in Pasadena. This case is Goomerang v. Braemer
- 35:19on Raymond LLC. Court of Appeal case that started
- 35:2410 years ago in 2016 when the parties entered
- 35:30into a commercial shopping lease in Pasadena
- 35:34for an ice cream parlor and the commercial ice
- 35:38cream parlor spent about eight months renovating
- 35:41the space and to open their ice cream shop. And
- 35:46then unfortunately later that year about eight
- 35:48months later a fire destroyed this property And
- 35:52the fire department investigated and reports
- 35:56showed that the fire was an accident, but most
- 35:59likely caused by an electrical failure in a wall
- 36:03of the structure. And so the ice cream shop owner
- 36:07ends up suing the property owner for a breach
- 36:10of contract for negligence. And what was really
- 36:15interesting about this case is the particular
- 36:18contract had an indemnity provision stating that
- 36:23the property owner would need to be indemnified
- 36:26by the ice cream shop. in the event of any claims,
- 36:31but here the ice cream shop was the one bringing
- 36:33the claim against the property owner. And so
- 36:36the property owner, through some clever lawyering,
- 36:39did demand a defense and an indemnity based on
- 36:42the contract, and the property owner filed a
- 36:47cross -complaint against the ice cream shop based
- 36:50on comparative faults and indemnity among other
- 36:54claims. The property owner and the ice cream
- 37:00shop did have insurance. So the insurance carrier
- 37:02agreed to defend the property owner. So the ice
- 37:06cream shop moved to strike the cross complaint
- 37:09based on anti slap saying that, hey, we filed
- 37:12this lawsuit against you and that is protected
- 37:15activity. And the trial court granted the anti
- 37:23-slap motion in part and denied it in part. So
- 37:26the tenant filed, the ice cream shop filed an
- 37:29attorney's fees motion saying that they were
- 37:31the prevailing party in part. And the court denied
- 37:35that motion, finding that no, you only prevailed
- 37:38on part of your cause of action. The case is
- 37:43key because it shows that the cross -defendant
- 37:47here, the ice cream owner, can move to strike
- 37:50cross -claims arising from certain speech or
- 37:54petitioning activities. And the cross -claims
- 37:57here were based on allegations of this contract's
- 38:00indemnity provision requiring that the ice cream
- 38:04shop was supposed to indemnify and defend the
- 38:09owner against claims arising out of the shop's
- 38:12use and occupancy of this property, and a claim
- 38:15for contractual indemnity is akin to a claim
- 38:18for breach of contract. So the claims do not
- 38:22arise from any protected activity. So here the
- 38:26property owners cross claims against the ice
- 38:28cream shop for contractual indemnity, breach
- 38:31of contract, and deck relief. did not arise from
- 38:34protected activity for anti -slap purposes. And
- 38:38as Olivia had mentioned, the court went into
- 38:42an analysis on the anti -slap statute under CCP
- 38:47425 .16. So the court properly denied the anti
- 38:52-slap motion because none of these challenged
- 38:54cross -claims arose from any protected activity.
- 38:58So a similar outcome on the other anti -SLAC
- 39:01case. Switching gears now to HOA cases. This
- 39:07case is a key homeowners association case that
- 39:12was out of Santa Clara County. The condo owners
- 39:17owned one unit within a building of over 100
- 39:21units and these condo owners sued their homeowners
- 39:25association, alleging breach of the CCNRs and
- 39:31failure to timely investigate what was a big
- 39:34water intrusion and flood that resulted in mold
- 39:39and termite damage in the condo unit. And what
- 39:44happened was in 2018, the condo unit flooded
- 39:48and the flood came from the crawl space. And
- 39:51in this particular building, the crawl space
- 39:53was common area and the HOA was responsible for
- 39:57fixing the issue under the CCNRs. So this case
- 40:02had a 67 -day bench trial, which is an extraordinarily
- 40:05long trial. I can only imagine that there is
- 40:08much factual material to go over, which maybe
- 40:12is why the court had this long bench trial. And
- 40:16initially found in favor of the property owners
- 40:19on all of their claims, the court issued an injunction
- 40:23requiring the HOA to make the repairs and also
- 40:27compensate the owner for the owner's expenses,
- 40:32lost rent, and other damages. And the Court of
- 40:36Appeal affirmed the judgment for the owners.
- 40:40The owners hired a plumber, and that plumber
- 40:44was their expert who opined that the water issue
- 40:48was from an underground well. And the case does
- 40:52go into a pretty extensive factual back and forth
- 40:56between the condo owners, experts, and the HOA's
- 41:00experts. The HOA was advised to address the issues,
- 41:09dry out the crawlspace, and take other remediation
- 41:12measures. And apparently, the HOA ignored their
- 41:16advice and their obligations. So later in time,
- 41:22the crawlspace flooded again, and then a big
- 41:24sinkhole formed under this crawlspace. And throughout
- 41:28this whole time, the HOA did little to correct
- 41:31the issue. The condo owners suffered extensive
- 41:35damage from this problem. The court also talked
- 41:40about, in this case, how the HOA did really very
- 41:44little to investigate, to address the issue.
- 41:50agreed with the owners that this HOA engaged
- 41:54in a pattern of deceptive business practices,
- 41:57among other claims finding that there was ample
- 42:00evidence that the HOA failed to conduct a reasonable
- 42:03investigation. They didn't make repairs in a
- 42:06timely manner. And the court found that the HOA
- 42:10breached the CCNRs. And the CCNRs here had an
- 42:15exculpation clause. And this clause did not apply
- 42:18because the court found that the HOA acted with
- 42:22gross negligence, which is a pretty extreme finding.
- 42:27So here, again, the Court of Appeal upheld the
- 42:29injunction, found that the HOA breached its CCNRs.
- 42:33So takeaway from this case is the HOA was bad
- 42:37in this particular issue and court found gross
- 42:42negligence. Okay, our next case is Amundsen v.
- 42:49Cotello. This is a partition case and it involves
- 42:53the issue of whether the party had standing to
- 42:56bring a partition action. By way of a quick background,
- 43:01there was a decedent by the last name of Knowles
- 43:05and another owner, Ruth Cotello, they co -owned
- 43:09a property together. They had originally purchased
- 43:11it in 2005. And when they purchased it, they
- 43:15took ownership as joint tenants with a right
- 43:18of survivorship and the court notes that this
- 43:21gave them each an equal undivided share in the
- 43:24entire property. And then they're basically whoever
- 43:28passed away 1st, their share would then automatically
- 43:31pass to the survivor. In September of 2020, the
- 43:37decedent recorded a quitclaim deed, and it's
- 43:40valid that essentially severed the joint tenancy
- 43:43and instead created a tenancy in common with
- 43:47no right of survivorship. And so that would effectively
- 43:50mean that the decedent and Catello would continue
- 43:54to own their one -half shares each, but Upon
- 43:58one of the owners passing their share would then
- 44:01be devised by will or passed on to their heirs
- 44:04through inheritance laws basically. Rather than
- 44:08to the other owner, so that essentially completely
- 44:11changed the whole original relationship and how
- 44:14the property would pass upon death. A few weeks
- 44:18after this quitclaim deed got recorded, the decedent
- 44:21passed away and notably passed away unmarried
- 44:24and without children, which is important because
- 44:26that then, of course, affects inheritance rights.
- 44:31Procedurally, there were two separate actions,
- 44:34and one of them is the subject of this case and
- 44:37one is a separate case. First, there was a probate
- 44:41court action, and in that particular case, the
- 44:44decedent's siblings had initiated the probate
- 44:47proceedings to distribute the assets of her estate,
- 44:50including this particular property. Cotello had
- 44:54filed a competing petition, and one of the issues
- 44:59here is that the trial on that probate proceeding
- 45:02had not yet taken place as of the time the decision
- 45:06in this case was coming out. the probate proceedings
- 45:10were still ongoing. This case is a quiet title
- 45:15on partition action, as we've noted. And this
- 45:19particular case was filed afterwards and basically
- 45:22Catello had sued the siblings to cancel that
- 45:262020 quick claim deed and to quiet title to the
- 45:29property. The siblings had then responded and
- 45:32counterclaimed for partition of the property
- 45:36by sale. And so the whole issue in this case
- 45:39is really dealing with, did the siblings file
- 45:41their partition action prematurely before the
- 45:45conclusion of the probate proceedings that would
- 45:47determine their ownership in the property? And
- 45:50the court ultimately found, yes, they did file
- 45:53prematurely. And that's because uncertainty of
- 45:57ownership of the property means that these siblings
- 46:00did lack standing to bring their partition claim.
- 46:04The court notes that a party seeking Partition
- 46:07has to have clear title and so the whole problem
- 46:12here is that the property of a decedent, although
- 46:16it passes to the decedent's heirs at law. their
- 46:20right to it is still subject to administration
- 46:23of the estate and to its distribution in accordance
- 46:27with the law or the will and until that distribution
- 46:30takes place they don't actually have an interest
- 46:33in the property just yet that would allow them
- 46:35to maintain an action for partition. So basically
- 46:41the parties need to wait until that probate court
- 46:44proceeding is finalized. I'll move through this
- 46:49one rather quickly so we can get to our other
- 46:51cases on easements and other topics, but this
- 46:55is a case involving the intersection of malicious
- 46:59prosecution and advice of counsel. And in this
- 47:03particular case, we found it interesting because
- 47:06the case really found how the court looks at
- 47:10those two areas and how they can work together.
- 47:15So quickly going through the facts, here in this
- 47:19matter, this was a San Francisco case. And there
- 47:24were tenants who sued their landlord. Alleging
- 47:28various causes of action related to their tendency
- 47:30and these two parties had a lot of back and forth
- 47:35litigation starting from the year twenty fourteen
- 47:38and this was a twenty twenty five case so long
- 47:41standing history between the parties. After the
- 47:45tenants had sued the landlord, landlords hire
- 47:48a lawyer to defend and that attorney says to
- 47:53the landlord, hey, you can also file an unlawful
- 47:56detainer for non -payment of rent because the
- 47:59tenants hadn't paid you and you have grounds
- 48:02to do that. And in this particular case, the...
- 48:09landlord, the facts were a little murky because
- 48:11it sounds like the tenants were making rent payments,
- 48:13but it was by certified mail. And so the landlord
- 48:16just didn't go pick up their certified mail.
- 48:18And that was a big factor because the court found
- 48:21that there was probably bad faith there. You
- 48:23can't claim no rent being paid, but you didn't
- 48:26actually go get it in the mail. And in this particular
- 48:30case, the court found that there probably wasn't
- 48:36probable cause to bring that. So the landlord
- 48:38said, well, hey, I relied on my attorney. I'm
- 48:41going to claim advice of counsel defense. And
- 48:46the court looked at, OK, was that advice of counsel
- 48:51defense proper in the context of a malicious
- 48:54prosecution claim, and whether that attorney's
- 48:57advice was competent. But there was nothing in
- 49:00the court's record that went into why the attorney
- 49:04wouldn't be competent to advise this client after
- 49:08the client shared the relevant facts. And the
- 49:13court also made sure that the landlord understood
- 49:17the advice given by the attorney and found that
- 49:21the landlord relied in good faith on her attorney's
- 49:24advice. And so this malicious prosecution claim
- 49:27should have been dismissed based on the advice
- 49:29of counsel defense. And here, the court really
- 49:32harped on when there is a truthful disclosure
- 49:35of all relevant facts to the attorney. And then
- 49:38the attorney provides their advice and is competent
- 49:42to do so. And the court didn't really get into
- 49:44the competency issue, but found that there was
- 49:46no reason that the attorney couldn't provide
- 49:48that advice. party, the client, acted in good
- 49:52faith reliance, so that is a complete bar to
- 49:55a malicious prosecution defense claim. So the
- 49:59trial court was instructed to dismiss this claim
- 50:01because of the advice of counsel defense. Okay,
- 50:06so our next case is Heron versus George S. This
- 50:11is kind of a long one, so I'll go through the
- 50:13facts as quickly as possible. This is the one
- 50:16that is the elder abuse case. And so again, although
- 50:22maybe not strictly a real property law case,
- 50:24in a lot of real property law cases, elder abuse
- 50:27claims may sometimes be a component of these
- 50:30cases and do sometimes get looped in with them.
- 50:33The other thing too is, as I was noting before,
- 50:35is that this case involves attorney misconduct
- 50:38relating to entering into a retainer agreement
- 50:43basically with a client that has capacity issues.
- 50:47And so the facts at issue in this case are pretty
- 50:50egregious, but it is still important to note
- 50:53that attorneys do need to take that into consideration
- 50:55when entering into agreements with potential
- 50:59clients. So in this particular case, As noted,
- 51:04this is an elder abuse case relating to attorney
- 51:09misconduct, and this particular attorney secured
- 51:13an agreement from an elderly blind man with dementia
- 51:16to enter into an agreement to pay a $100 ,000
- 51:19retainer. There's a few different parties involved
- 51:24here. So George S is the plaintiff and respondent
- 51:27in this case, who was an elderly man in his 80s.
- 51:31In June of 2022, he had been diagnosed with moderate
- 51:36dementia and also declared incapacitated by two
- 51:39of his doctors. His daughter, Susanna, is the
- 51:42trustee and attorney in fact for him. So basically
- 51:46trustee of his trust, and then there was a power
- 51:48of attorney assigning her rights, including rights
- 51:50to bring litigation on his behalf. Heron is the
- 51:55lawyer at issue who secured the agreement from
- 51:58George to pay $100 ,000 retainer. And then George
- 52:01also had another daughter, Gabriella. And what
- 52:05happened basically is that in May of 2024, when
- 52:09Susanna, the trustee daughter was out of town,
- 52:12Gabriella let this attorney Heron into George's
- 52:15home to meet with him. And at that meeting, Heron,
- 52:19the attorney got George to sign a fee agreement
- 52:22to pay a $100 ,000 retainer. And then that same
- 52:26day, the attorney Heron turned around and sent
- 52:28a demand letter to Susanna, the trustee of George's
- 52:32trust, demanding that the trust pay that $100
- 52:35,000 retainer. So as a result of this, Susanna,
- 52:40the trustee daughter, filed a petition on behalf
- 52:43of George for a protective order against the
- 52:46attorney Heron to prevent Heron from basically
- 52:49financial elder abuse and from disturbing his
- 52:51peace. petition was brought under the Elder Abuse
- 52:54Act. Heron ended up contesting, alleging that
- 52:58Gabriella said basically what the attorney said
- 53:03is that Gabriella had sought out an attorney
- 53:06that said that George wanted to meet with someone
- 53:09and that George had allegedly disagreed with
- 53:12his diagnosis of incapacity and that he was being
- 53:15isolated from his friends and family and caregivers
- 53:18and basically wanted to file a petition to determine
- 53:20his competency. The court ended up hearing, holding
- 53:25an evidentiary hearing, and it involved testimony
- 53:28from several different witnesses, including George's
- 53:31doctor, who stated that George did indeed lack
- 53:34capacity to make either financial or medical
- 53:36decisions, and that he wouldn't have even been
- 53:39able to seek out an attorney because of his current
- 53:43state. And basically the doctor said that anybody
- 53:47with a meeting with him for five minutes would
- 53:51know that something was wrong. Other witnesses
- 53:54testified pretty similarly, basically, that he
- 53:57would get confused even on really basic concepts
- 53:59like where he lives, if he had grandchildren,
- 54:02a girlfriend, if his parents were alive, even
- 54:05just kind of what time of day it was. And I think
- 54:10one of the key issues that the court relied on
- 54:13here is that it came out during this hearing
- 54:16that Heron had been provided copies of the letters
- 54:20from George's doctor, declaring him incapacitated,
- 54:23and she was aware that Susanna was his co -trustee,
- 54:27not Gabriella. Despite that being the case, Heron
- 54:31testified that It was her opinion that George
- 54:34did have capacity and that he did have capacity
- 54:37to retain her and that he understood the consequences
- 54:40and legal concepts that they had discussed after
- 54:44having a 55 -minute meeting together. At the
- 54:48end of this hearing, the court did not buy it,
- 54:50and the trial court issued a restraining order
- 54:52against Herron, the attorney, preventing her
- 54:55from abusing and contacting George. So there
- 55:00were two issues that basically Heron appealed,
- 55:03and there were two issues on appeal. The first
- 55:06thing is Heron tried to argue that the court
- 55:08needed to first adjudicate Georgia's competence
- 55:11before issuing a restraining order under the
- 55:13Elder Abuse Act. And then the second was whether
- 55:16there was substantial evidence to support a finding
- 55:19that she had committed financial abuse of an
- 55:21elder. As to the first issue, the court ultimately
- 55:26determined that no, The court did not need to
- 55:29determine Georgia's capacity before adjudicating
- 55:32the restraining order and finding that elder
- 55:34abuse occurred. The court looked at the fact
- 55:37that the Elder Abuse Act explicitly provides
- 55:40that a petition may be brought on behalf of an
- 55:43abused elder by a variety of different parties,
- 55:46a conservator, a trustee, an attorney in fact,
- 55:49power of attorney, or a guardian ad litem. Susanna
- 55:52clearly had standing as a result. The other thing
- 55:56is that the court noted that the legislature
- 55:59intended a broad definition of standing under
- 56:02this law. Again, with all these parties being
- 56:04able to bring this claim. And it finally noted
- 56:10that capacity is not generally a defense to elder
- 56:13abuse. Basically, one can have either physical
- 56:17or mental capacity and yet still be subjected
- 56:21to undue influence. It may be harder to unduly
- 56:24influence them, but it can still happen. And
- 56:27so capacity is just not a relevant issue on these
- 56:30claims. Then, as to the second issue, the court
- 56:36also found that substantial evidence supported
- 56:38a finding that Heron did engage in financial
- 56:41elder abuse by exerting undue influence on George
- 56:44to obtain a property right from him. So the court
- 56:50notes that an abused elder does include someone
- 56:54who is financially abused and that that can occur
- 56:57in situations where a property right is obtained
- 57:00from the elder by undue influence. And the court
- 57:03notes that an agreement to pay a $100 ,000 retainer
- 57:07is indeed a property right. The court also looked
- 57:11at whether undue influence is present and that
- 57:14there are four factors under the elder abuse
- 57:16law that have to be met. Basically, Heron overwhelmingly
- 57:20met all the factors to establish elder abuse.
- 57:25The first was the victim's vulnerability. George
- 57:28was 86 years old. He was in severe and progressive
- 57:31dementia, legally blind. He couldn't even read
- 57:34the contract that this attorney had him sign.
- 57:38And so definitely vulnerable. The influencer's
- 57:43apparent authority. She was a legal professional
- 57:46and apparently threatened to sue someone else
- 57:49with elder abuse, George's caregiver, while she
- 57:51was there at the property. So she asserted authority
- 57:54in front of him. Her basically the influencers
- 57:59actions or tactics. So here this attorney showed
- 58:03up. She already had the retainer agreement with
- 58:05her. She met with George alone even though he
- 58:09was in this state was when Susanna his his trustee
- 58:13and power of attorney was out of town knowing
- 58:15that two medical professionals had found that
- 58:17he lacked capacity and she didn't even read the
- 58:20entire agreement to him. He was blind. He could
- 58:22not read it and she didn't even read the whole
- 58:24thing to him before having him sign it. And then
- 58:27finally, equity of the result. Basically, this
- 58:30was a complete divergence from George's intent
- 58:32that was expressed in his trust and his power
- 58:36of attorney. So the court ultimately dismissed
- 58:39the argument by Herron. And actually, there are
- 58:42apparently some briefs that were filed by other
- 58:45parties as well, arguing from the attorney perspective,
- 58:49I think, here, that this can potentially lead
- 58:52to an unjust outcome for attorneys because it
- 58:57perhaps suggests that just meeting with a client
- 58:59alone is elder abuse. But the court dismissed
- 59:03that argument and said, no, this is a case by
- 59:06case thing. And courts are sophisticated enough
- 59:09to be able to scrutinize the issues. And here
- 59:13again, this was really egregious behavior. the
- 59:18court was ultimately able to find that there
- 59:20was undue influence. Okay, I'm going to spend
- 59:26less than a minute on this case so that we have
- 59:29one final minute for our last case, given that
- 59:31we're just about out of time. So I will quickly
- 59:33go through this one. And again, the facts and
- 59:36cases are in your materials. So this is a discovery
- 59:40misconduct case against a proper defendant. This
- 59:45owner sued a consultant for fraud, elder abuse,
- 59:50undue influence, and served a bunch of discovery.
- 59:53The owner had to file nine motions to compel
- 59:57discovery responses. Those litigators out there
- 1:00:00know that's crazy, nine motions to compel. The
- 1:00:03court gave the pro -per defendant multiple extensions
- 1:00:07of time to respond before awarding sanctions
- 1:00:10and basically just gave this defendant who was
- 1:00:14in pro -prer so many chances, and then ultimately
- 1:00:18pro -prer defendant did not respond, did not
- 1:00:21give the discovery, so the court awarded terminating
- 1:00:24sanctions and a judgment for 1 .1 million dollars.
- 1:00:28That's huge. The court basically said, you know,
- 1:00:33we gave you so many chances. There were nine
- 1:00:35motions to compel. You didn't give the over to
- 1:00:37the discovery. We're going to issue terminating
- 1:00:39sanctions in this judgment. And the Court of
- 1:00:42Appeal upheld that award and basically said,
- 1:00:46trial court, you were very patient and you took
- 1:00:48a very measured approach and there was substantial
- 1:00:50evidence to support this judgment. All right.
- 1:00:54And then our last case is an easement case. We
- 1:00:56don't have much time left here, so I'm going
- 1:00:58to breeze through this one, but luckily it's
- 1:01:00pretty straightforward as far as the facts go.
- 1:01:02And we do have a full... We have the notes here
- 1:01:05if you want to follow along or read afterwards.
- 1:01:08This case involves secondary easement rights.
- 1:01:13So the plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining
- 1:01:15properties in the same subdivision. The plaintiff's
- 1:01:18property had a gravel road on it and the defendant...
- 1:01:21property had an easement to use that road for
- 1:01:24a driveway. The parties were involved in a first
- 1:01:28lawsuit about the road easement. Basically, the
- 1:01:31same plaintiff had sued this same neighboring
- 1:01:33property owner, alleging that the defendant easement
- 1:01:36holder had hired a construction company, entered
- 1:01:39the property, was kind of cutting down landscape,
- 1:01:42doing construction, excavation, all sorts of
- 1:01:45things that they weren't supposed to be doing.
- 1:01:48There was a partial settlement, and then the
- 1:01:50trial court entered a judgment. Next is this
- 1:01:54case. And basically, while that first case was
- 1:01:56pending, the plaintiff property owner filed this
- 1:01:59second case against the defendant for declaratory
- 1:02:02relief and an injunction seeking to prevent the
- 1:02:05defendant from paving that gravel roadway. The
- 1:02:09defendant filed a motion for judgment on the
- 1:02:11pleadings. The trial court denied that. And then
- 1:02:14there was a court trial and the plaintiff won.
- 1:02:17And it said that defendant was enjoined from
- 1:02:19paving the driveway and defendant appealed. So
- 1:02:23there's two issues basically on appeal. The first
- 1:02:25is, did plaintiff's complaint improperly split
- 1:02:30actions? And then the second is, did defendant's
- 1:02:33easement rights include the right to pave as
- 1:02:36a matter of law? First, the court found no, plaintiff
- 1:02:40did not improperly split actions. The defendant
- 1:02:44here was trying to argue a primary right theory,
- 1:02:47arguing that the scope of the road easement and
- 1:02:49the secondary easement rights are the primary
- 1:02:52right litigated in both cases and therefore tried
- 1:02:56to argue the second case was barred. arguing
- 1:02:58that it arose out of the same facts and primary
- 1:03:00rights as the first case. The Court of Appeal
- 1:03:03disagreed. It said, the facts are ultimately
- 1:03:06not the same here. The first case was about cutting
- 1:03:08down trees and building a wall and excavation,
- 1:03:12whereas the second case is about paving the road.
- 1:03:15And those are distinct episodes basically kind
- 1:03:18of. violations of the easement rights and if
- 1:03:22they were to find that this was a splitting of
- 1:03:24actions, it would effectively bar the plaintiff
- 1:03:26from ever bringing any future lawsuit involving
- 1:03:29this easement and that just doesn't make sense.
- 1:03:32So the trial court did not err in denying the
- 1:03:36motion on that basis. The second holding was
- 1:03:40that no, the secondary easement right did not
- 1:03:43give defendant a right to pave. The court goes
- 1:03:46into an explanation of what a secondary easement
- 1:03:49right is, and it is a right to do things necessary
- 1:03:52for the full enjoyment of the easement itself.
- 1:03:55This can include things like the right to make
- 1:03:58repairs or replacements on the property that's
- 1:04:00servient to the easement, but it's limited by
- 1:04:02the rule of reasonableness. Here the court made
- 1:04:07the rule basically that whether one improvement
- 1:04:10is more convenient than another is not the right
- 1:04:13analysis. What matters is whether the proposed
- 1:04:17improvement is necessary for the convenient use
- 1:04:20of the of the easement. At trial, the court found
- 1:04:24that Basically, the evidence established that
- 1:04:29paving the driveway is not reasonably necessary
- 1:04:32to make it available for safe and convenient
- 1:04:34vehicular use. That was the correct standard
- 1:04:38and so there was no automatic right to pave here.
- 1:04:45All right, and then just before we wrap up, there
- 1:04:48were a few other cases on there. Obviously due
- 1:04:52to time, we don't have time to cover all them,
- 1:04:54but go ahead and check those out and see if any
- 1:04:57of those are relevant to your practice area as
- 1:04:59well. Elizabeth, I think you're muted. Very good.
- 1:05:07Thank you. Thank you so much on Olivia. You did
- 1:05:10such a good job that we don't have any open Questions
- 1:05:13and our and our question Box. I actually though
- 1:05:17do have a quick question for you guys as kind
- 1:05:19of maybe a little bit more anecdotal going back
- 1:05:22to that case, the Eshagian versus Cepeda case,
- 1:05:27because I thought that was really interesting
- 1:05:28and I really appreciated y 'all telling us how
- 1:05:30that's changed your practice. And I was wondering
- 1:05:34if with those changes, if you've noticed any
- 1:05:37changes in how the tenant responded to the response
- 1:05:40to those notices. Yeah, I've definitely, at least
- 1:05:45up here, so I don't know how things are going
- 1:05:46down in Southern California, but up here in Northern
- 1:05:48California, we're definitely seeing tenants filing
- 1:05:52motions. This is actually a motion that's frequently
- 1:05:55brought in. Kind of like San Francisco Superior
- 1:05:59and Alameda Superior, where if the landlord is
- 1:06:02not really clearly stating in the notice, either
- 1:06:04this is the day the notice got served, this is
- 1:06:06how you calculate the period, or when it expires,
- 1:06:10tenant attorneys are filing demurs on those and
- 1:06:12getting those cases kicked out. So the court's
- 1:06:15up here applying it. I agree. I have friends
- 1:06:19and colleagues in San Diego and Los Angeles County
- 1:06:21who are seeing a slew of motions as well based
- 1:06:24on Eshiagin. So for those who either dabble in
- 1:06:27the area or who just haven't regularly updated
- 1:06:30their notices, you have to because tenants have
- 1:06:33definitely changed their practice in responding
- 1:06:36to these kinds of cases. I was gonna say, I think
- 1:06:41Ana mentioned too, we've kind of applied it across
- 1:06:43the board. This particular case was a non payment
- 1:06:45of rent case, but we figure let's just be safe.
- 1:06:47Let's do it with all our notices. Some notices
- 1:06:50include a proof of service with them, but even
- 1:06:52still, it's like, let's not chance it. I think
- 1:06:55that makes a lot of sense to me and appreciate
- 1:06:57those practice notes for for everyone in the
- 1:07:00audience out there. Alright, well, thank you
- 1:07:02all so much. We really appreciate it. It was
- 1:07:04wonderful presentation and we'll see everybody
- 1:07:08and our audience next time. Thank you for having
- 1:07:11us.