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Could the Nuclear Arms Race Have Been Stopped in 1946? - The Baruch Plan and the Failure of Atomic Control | Sleepy Facts About History · Sleepy Facts About History

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Welcome to Sleepy Facts About History. In the
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immediate aftermath of the atomic bombings of
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American scientists and
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policymakers recognized that an unchecked nuclear
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arms race would lead to catastrophe. This episode
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explores the ambitious but ultimately doomed
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attempt to place the world's most destructive
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technology under international control. It examines
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the Akerson -Lillienthal Report. which proposed
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a radical system of global ownership over dangerous
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nuclear activities and the subsequent Baruch
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Plan, presented to the United Nations in 1946.
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The narrative details the structural deadlock
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that emerged between the United States and the
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Soviet Union. Washington insisted on a system
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of international control and verification before
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dismantling its atomic monopoly. while Moscow
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demanded immediate disarmament before accepting
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any international oversight. The episode unpacks
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the security dilemma at the heart of these negotiations,
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explaining how mutual distrust, asymmetrical
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power, and disputes over the UN Security Council
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veto made agreement impossible and set the stage
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for the Cold War arms race. I kept returning
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to one central question while researching this
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episode. How do you convince rival nations to
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surrender a devastating new weapon before they
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trust each other enough to do so? The attempt
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to solve this problem in 1946 was genuine, and
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its failure was not simply a matter of bad faith
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but a profound structural trap. Understanding
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why this early window for nuclear control closed
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helps explain the logic of mutual vulnerability
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that still shapes our world today. In the summer
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of 1945, American scientists who had built the
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atomic bomb warned that unless it were placed
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under international control, national rivalry
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would produce an arms race of catastrophic proportions.
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Within four years, their warning had come true.
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It came true not because no one tried to prevent
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it, but because the attempt to do so collided
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with a problem that has yet to be solved. That
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problem is how to make nations surrender the
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most destructive power ever created, before they
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can trust the rivals they must surrender it to.
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In the summer of 1945, the United States did
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something no nation had ever done before. It
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used a weapon that could flatten an entire city
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in a single instant. Hiroshima was destroyed
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on August 6th. Nagasaki followed on August 9th,
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in Hiroshima. The heat was so intense that it
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burned shadows of people into the walls and steps
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where they had been sitting. Survivors who seemed
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unharmed began dying weeks later from radiation
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sickness that destroyed them from within. The
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war ended, but a new kind of fear took its place.
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Scientists who had built this weapon understood
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its implications better than anyone else. They
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had worked in secret, in laboratories across
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the American West and Midwest, and they emerged
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from that secrecy with a warning. Before the
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bomb was even used, a group of scientists led
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by James Franck had argued that a surprise attack
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would make international control harder to achieve.
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Their report, written in June 1945, warned that
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secrecy and national rivalry would lead to a
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catastrophic arms race. The bomb could not be
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uninvented. If rival nations competed to build
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more of them, The result would be a catastrophe
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beyond anything the world had yet seen. The question
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was whether anyone would listen, and whether
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the one nation that currently possessed this
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power would be willing to give it up. This is
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the story of what happened when the United States
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tried to answer that question, and why the answer
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failed. By early 1946, the world had begun to
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settle into a new order. The United Nations had
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been founded in San Francisco the previous year.
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It was an attempt to create an institution that
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could prevent the kind of global conflict that
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had just killed perhaps 70 million people. In
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January 1946, the UN established the Atomic Energy
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Commission. This was a body specifically charged
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with addressing the problem that the bomb had
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created. The United States held a temporary monopoly
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on atomic weapons. The Soviet Union, America's
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wartime ally, did not. But the Soviet Union was
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already working to change that. Through a combination
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of domestic research and espionage that had penetrated
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the American atomic program. The wartime alliance
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was fraying over disputes in Eastern Europe,
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Germany and Iran. But the full division of the
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Cold War was not yet fixed. There was still a
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window. however narrow, in which the two emerging
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superpowers might have chosen a different path.
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The first serious attempt to design that path
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came from within the American government itself.
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In late 1945, Secretary of State James Burns
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appointed a committee chaired by Dean Acheson,
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then Under Secretary of State, and David Lilienthal,
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Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The
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committee included scientists who had worked
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on the bomb. Their task was to devise a practical
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scheme for international control of atomic energy.
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The report they produced in March 1946 remains
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one of the most remarkable documents in the history
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of nuclear diplomacy. The Asherson -Lillianville
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report proposed something genuinely radical.
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It did not suggest merely that nations agree
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to monitor each other's atomic programs. It proposed
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the creation of an International Atomic Development
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Authority. that would own or control all dangerous
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nuclear activities. This meant uranium mining
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in places like the Belgian Congo and the American
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Southwest, where ore was pulled from the earth
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and refined. It meant enrichment facilities,
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vast industrial plants that separated the rare
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fissionable isotope of uranium from the common
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one. This was a process requiring enormous mechanical
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precision. It meant reactors. machines that could
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transmute uranium into plutonium, an element
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that did not exist in nature before human beings
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created it. These activities would be removed
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from national control entirely and placed under
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international ownership. Nations could retain
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authority over safe activities, medical research,
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the production of isotopes for hospitals, and
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basic scientific investigation. But the material
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and the infrastructure that could lead to weapons
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would belong to the world collectively. The report's
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authors believed that only ownership, not mere
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inspection, could prevent an arms race. Inspection
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alone, they argued, would always be vulnerable
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to evasion. A nation could hide facilities, delay
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access, or simply refuse to cooperate. If the
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international authority actually controlled the
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mines and the enrichment plants, the incentive
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to cheat would be removed because the capacity
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to cheat would no longer exist at the national
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level. This was a genuinely internationalist
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vision, shaped by the scientists' conviction
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that national rivalry over this technology would
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lead to disaster. But it was also drafted under
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conditions of American monopoly. The report assumed
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a stage transition. The United States would retain
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its atomic weapons while the international authority
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was being established, while facilities were
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being transferred, while the system was becoming
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operational. Only at the end of this process
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would the American arsenal be handed over. This
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sequencing was not incidental. It reflected a
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practical reality. You could not internationalize
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what did not yet exist as an international system.
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But it also meant that the Soviet Union would
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be asked to accept a period, perhaps an extended
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period, in which the United States alone possessed
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atomic weapons. The report was never presented
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to the United Nations in its original form. President
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Truman appointed Bernard Baruch, a wealthy financier
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and Democratic Party elder. to represent the
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United States at the Atomic Energy Commission.
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Baruch was 75 years old, a figure from an earlier
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era of American politics, and he approached the
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assignment with a sense of personal mission.
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He modified the Ackerson -Lillienthal framework
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in ways that reflected his own understanding
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of what American security required. On June 14,
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1946, Baruch presented the plan to the UN Atomic
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Energy Commission. He began with a line that
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captured the stakes as contemporaries understood
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them. We are here to make a choice between the
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quick and the dead. The plan he outlined retained
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the core of the Acheson Lilienthal vision, the
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international authority with ownership of dangerous
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activities. But Baruch added three crucial elements
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that were not in the original report. First,
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immediate sanctions against violators. Any nation
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that attempted to evade the international system
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would face automatic punishment, not merely a
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referral to the Security Council for debate.
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Second, a staged transition that preserved the
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American monopoly during the early phases. The
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United States would not destroy its weapons or
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cease production until the international authority
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was fully operational and had demonstrated its
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effectiveness. Third, and most controversially,
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Baruch demanded that the Security Council veto
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not apply to enforcement actions against atomic
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violators. The five permanent members of the
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Security Council, including the Soviet Union,
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each held a veto over substantive decisions.
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Baruch insisted that this veto could not be used
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to block punishment of a nation caught cheating
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on the atomic control system. These modifications
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were not merely technical. They transformed the
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political meaning of the plan. The Acheson -Lillienthal
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report had been a design for international control,
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written by people who believed that international
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control was possible. Burroughs' version was
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that design filtered through the lens of American
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security concerns and his own negotiating instincts.
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He was not wrong to worry about enforcement.
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A control system without teeth would indeed be
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vulnerable to evasion. But the veto limitation,
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in particular, struck at the core of Soviet security
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interests. The veto was the Soviet Union's guarantee
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that the United Nations could not be used against
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it. To surrender that protection in the atomic
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domain, while the United States retained its
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monopoly, was to accept a permanent strategic
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disadvantage. The Soviet response came five days
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later. Andrei Gomiko The Soviet representative
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presented a counter -proposal that was structurally
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incompatible with the American plan. The Soviet
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Union demanded the immediate prohibition of atomic
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weapons, their destruction within three months
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and only then the establishment of international
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control. The sequencing was reversed. Disarmament
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first, control afterward. Gromyko's proposal
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also insisted that the Security Council veto
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remain intact for all decisions, including enforcement,
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and it rejected the idea of international ownership
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of nuclear facilities, proposing instead international
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inspection of nationally controlled programs.
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The two positions faced each other across a chasm
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that could not be bridged. The United States
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demanded control before disarmament. The Soviet
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Union demanded disarmament before control. Each
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side had rational security reasons for its position.
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The United States feared that if it destroyed
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its weapons first, it would have no guarantee
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that the Soviet Union would not secretly retain
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or rebuild its own capability. International
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control without enforcement would be a facade,
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and enforcement without the veto limitation would
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be subject to Soviet obstruction. The Soviet
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Union feared that if it accepted international
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control while the United States retained its
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weapons, the control system would be used to
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perpetuate American dominance. Inspections would
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reveal the extent and location of Soviet atomic
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research, exposing its vulnerabilities while
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American secrets remained protected by the monopoly.
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The veto limitation would allow the United States
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and its allies to punish the Soviet Union for
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alleged violations while the Soviet Union could
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not protect itself. This was the security dilemma
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in its purest form. It was like two armed individuals
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in a dark room, each fearing the other will shoot
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first. But the room was not symmetrical. One
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of them was already holding the gun. Each side's
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defensive measures appeared offensive to the
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other. The American monopoly, which Washington
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saw as a temporary advantage to be traded for
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a permanent system, Moscow saw as a permanent
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threat to be eliminated before any cooperation
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could begin. The Soviet demand for immediate
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disarmament, which Moscow saw as a necessary
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equalization of power, Washington saw as a trick
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to strip America of its security while Soviet
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capabilities remained hidden. and potentially
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preserved. The mutual distrust of inspections
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was particularly telling. The Baruch Plan required
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extensive on -site access to mines, processing
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plants, and research facilities. For the Soviet
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Union, a closed society still recovering from
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catastrophic wartime losses, such access represented
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an intolerable penetration of national secrecy.
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The United States had its own secrets to protect.
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But its monopoly meant that inspections would
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fall disproportionately on Soviet territory.
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The Soviet Union had lost approximately 27 million
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people in the war, more than any other nation.
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Entire cities had been reduced to rubble. The
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industrial base that remained was a fraction
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of what it had been. Soviet leaders looked at
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the American monopoly and saw a nation that had
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emerged from the war with its territory intact.
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Its economy expanded. and its cities untouched.
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They were acutely sensitive to any arrangement
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that might leave them permanently inferior to
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a rival power that had suffered none of these
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things. The negotiations dragged on through 1946
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and into 1947. The Atomic Energy Commission met
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repeatedly, debated the two proposals, and attempted
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to find common ground. The United States held
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to Baruch's conditions. The Soviet Union held
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to Gromyko's. Other nations, including Britain
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and France, attempted to mediate or propose compromises,
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but the structural incompatibility remained.
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The United States would not accept disarmament
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before control. The Soviet Union would not accept
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control before disarmament. Neither side would
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accept a plan that left the other with a veto
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over enforcement. or that exposed its own secrets
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without reciprocal exposure, or that preserved
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the American monopoly during any transition period.
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The window was closing, though no one knew exactly
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how quickly. American intelligence estimates
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in 1946 suggested that the Soviet Union might
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develop its own atomic bomb within several years,
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perhaps as long as a decade. These estimates
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were wrong. Soviet espionage had been more successful
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than American officials realized, and Soviet
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domestic research was further advanced than Western
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analysts understood. But in 1946 and 1947, the
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American monopoly appeared more durable than
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it was, and this perception shaped the negotiations.
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American officials believed they had time to
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negotiate from strength. Soviet officials believed
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they had to resist any arrangement that would
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lock in that strength permanently. The Atomic
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Energy Commission's work effectively ended in
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1948 when it reported its failure to the Security
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Council. The Commission had been unable to agree
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on a plan for international control. The United
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States and the Soviet Union had voted against
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each other's proposals. The institutional mechanism
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created to address the atomic problem had produced
18:40
deadlock. In August 1949, the Soviet Union tested
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its first atomic bomb. The American monopoly
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was over. The window for international control,
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if it had ever been genuinely open, was now closed.
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The arms race that the scientists had warned
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against was underway. Within months, Both nations
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would be engaged in crash programs to develop
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more powerful weapons, larger arsenals and faster
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delivery systems. The logic of competition, once
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established, proved impossible to reverse. The
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failure of the Baruch Plan has been interpreted
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in many ways, and the evidence supports a nuanced
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understanding. It was not, as some American accounts
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have suggested, A noble offer irrationally rejected
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by a paranoid Soviet leadership, the plan preserved
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the American monopoly during a transition of
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undefined length. It demanded that the Soviet
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Union surrender its Security Council veto in
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the atomic domain. It required inspections that
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would have penetrated Soviet secrecy while American
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secrets remained protected. These were not neutral
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conditions. They reflected American power. and
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American security concerns, and a Soviet leader
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with any sense of national interest would have
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found them difficult to accept. Nor was it, as
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some Soviet and later critical accounts have
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suggested, a purely cynical American plot to
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preserve atomic dominance while cloaking it in
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internationalist rhetoric. The Akis and Lilienthal
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report was a serious attempt to design genuine
20:29
international ownership of dangerous nuclear
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activities. Many of the scientists who had built
20:35
the bomb genuinely believed that national rivalry
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over this technology would lead to catastrophe,
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and they were prepared to advocate for its internationalization
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at considerable personal and political risk.
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Baruch himself, whatever his modifications, was
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operating within a framework that had been created
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by people who believed in international control.
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The plan had genuine internationalist content.
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even if that content was filtered through American
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security interests. The Soviet proposal similarly
21:09
was not purely propaganda, though it had propaganda
21:12
value. The demand for immediate disarmament reflected
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a rational security logic for a state facing
21:20
a nuclear monopoly. Any Soviet leader would have
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sought to eliminate that monopoly before accepting
21:26
a control system that might perpetuate it. But
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the Soviet demand also had the effect, whether
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intended or not, of making agreement impossible.
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Since the United States would not surrender its
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weapons without guarantees that the Soviet Union
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was not prepared to give, the failure was structural,
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not personal. It arose from the condition of
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strategic asymmetry, the temporary American monopoly,
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and the mutual distrust that this asymmetry produced.
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Neither side could trust the other enough to
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surrender control first. Neither side could accept
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a plan that left the other with a lasting advantage.
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The sequencing problem, control before disarmament
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versus disarmament before control, was not a
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technical disagreement that cleverer negotiators
22:18
might have solved. It was the expression of a
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deeper dilemma. No state will give up the most
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dangerous technology ever created before trusting
22:29
its rival. and no state can trust its rival without
22:32
some mechanism of verification and control. Whether
22:37
a different outcome was possible remains one
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of the contested questions of nuclear history.
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Some historians have argued that if Baruch had
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not added the veto limitation, if the plan had
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hewed more closely to the Akerson -Lillienthal
22:52
vision, the Soviet Union might have engaged more
22:55
seriously. Others have argued that the Soviet
22:59
Union would have rejected any plan that preserved
23:01
the American monopoly during a transition, regardless
23:05
of its specific provisions. The evidence is ambiguous.
23:10
The Soviet Union did engage with the Atomic Energy
23:14
Commission, did propose alternatives, and did
23:17
participate in the negotiations. But it also
23:21
pursued its own atomic program with determination.
23:25
and Stalin's commitment to achieving Soviet nuclear
23:28
capability was likely non -negotiable. The exact
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balance between genuine negotiating interest
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and determined rejectionism in Soviet policy
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is difficult to establish from the available
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sources, and scholars continue to debate it.
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What can be said with confidence is that the
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failure established the central logic of the
23:48
nuclear age. Security would rest not on shared
23:53
authority, but on mutual vulnerability. The arms
23:57
race that followed was not inevitable in every
23:59
detail, but its broad outline was set by the
24:02
inability of the two emerging superpowers to
24:05
solve the problem of trust. Each subsequent arms
24:09
control agreement, from the Limited Test Ban
24:11
Treaty of 1963 to the Non -Proliferation Treaty
24:15
of 1968 to the various strategic arms limitations,
24:19
would operate within the constraints that the
24:22
Baruch plan's failure had revealed. They would
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regulate competition rather than eliminate it.
24:30
They would accept national arsenals rather than
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transcend them. They would verify rather than
24:36
own. The scientists who had warned of catastrophe
24:40
were not wrong in their fears. The arms race
24:44
did produce arsenals capable of destroying civilization
24:47
many times over. The world learned to live with
24:51
a danger that the Baruch plan had attempted to
24:54
remove. What remains worth understanding is that
24:58
the attempt was genuine, that its failure was
25:00
comprehensible, and that the dilemma it confronted
25:03
has not been solved in a decade since. The question
25:08
posed in 1946 was whether the most dangerous
25:11
technology ever created could be governed by
25:14
shared authority rather than sovereign competition.
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The answer that was given, provisional and incomplete,
25:21
was that no state would surrender control before
25:24
trusting its rival. and no state could trust
25:27
its rival without control. That answer has shaped
25:31
the world we still inhabit.