Latest / The Plato Library / Theaetetus Section II
Transcript
- 0:01Speaker 1: Part two of Thetetus by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
- 0:07Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by
- 0:12Speaker 1: Jeffrey Edwards. Socrates, take a look round, then, and see
- 0:19Speaker 1: that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now. By the uninitiated,
- 0:23Speaker 1: I mean the people who believe in nothing but what
- 0:26Speaker 1: they can grasp in their hands, and will not allow
- 0:29Speaker 1: that action, or generation, or anything invisible can have real
- 0:34Speaker 1: existence Thetetus. Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and
- 0:40Speaker 1: impenetrable mortals. Socrates, Yes, my boy, utter barbarians. Far more
- 0:47Speaker 1: ingenious are the brethren, whose mysteries I am about to
- 0:50Speaker 1: reveal to you. Their first principle is that all is motion,
- 0:55Speaker 1: and upon this all the affections of which we were
- 0:59Speaker 1: just now speaking, King are supposed to depend. There is
- 1:02Speaker 1: nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and
- 1:07Speaker 1: the other passive, both in endless number, and out of
- 1:11Speaker 1: the union and friction of them, there is generated a progeny,
- 1:15Speaker 1: endless in number, having two forms, sense and the object
- 1:19Speaker 1: of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to
- 1:23Speaker 1: the birth at the same moment. The senses are variously
- 1:26Speaker 1: named hearing, seeing, smelling. There is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear,
- 1:36Speaker 1: and many more which have names, as well as innumerable
- 1:39Speaker 1: others which are without them. Each has its kindred object.
- 1:44Speaker 1: Each variety of color has a corresponding variety of sight,
- 1:47Speaker 1: and so with sound and hearing, and with the rest
- 1:51Speaker 1: of the senses and the objects akin to them. Do
- 1:54Speaker 1: you see thetatus the bearings of this tale on the
- 1:58Speaker 1: preceding argument theetatus, Indeed I do not, Socrates, then attend,
- 2:06Speaker 1: and I will try to finish the story. The purport
- 2:09Speaker 1: is that all these things are in motion, as I
- 2:12Speaker 1: was saying, and that this motion is of two kinds,
- 2:15Speaker 1: a slower and a quicker. And the slower elements have
- 2:19Speaker 1: their motions in the same place and with reference to
- 2:22Speaker 1: things near them, and so they begift. But what is
- 2:26Speaker 1: begotten is swifter, for it is carried to and fro
- 2:30Speaker 1: and moves from place to place. Apply this to sents.
- 2:34Speaker 1: When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and
- 2:37Speaker 1: give birth to whiteness, and the sensation co natural with it,
- 2:42Speaker 1: which could not have been given by either of them
- 2:44Speaker 1: going elsewhere, then while the sight is flowing from the eye,
- 2:48Speaker 1: whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the color.
- 2:53Speaker 1: And so the eye is fulfilled with sight and really sees,
- 2:57Speaker 1: and becomes not sight but a seeing God. And the object,
- 3:02Speaker 1: which combined to form the color, is fulfilled with whiteness,
- 3:05Speaker 1: and becomes not whiteness but a white thing, whether wood
- 3:09Speaker 1: or stone, or whatever the object may be which happens
- 3:13Speaker 1: to be colored white. And this is true of all
- 3:16Speaker 1: sensible objects, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly
- 3:21Speaker 1: to be regarded, as I was saying before, not as
- 3:24Speaker 1: having any absolute existence, but as being all of them
- 3:28Speaker 1: of whatever kind, generated by motion in their intercourse with
- 3:32Speaker 1: one another. For of the agent and patient as existing
- 3:36Speaker 1: in separation, no trustworthy conception as they see can be formed.
- 3:41Speaker 1: For the agent has no existence until united with the patient,
- 3:45Speaker 1: and the patient has no existence until united with the agent.
- 3:49Speaker 1: And that which by uniting with something becomes an agent,
- 3:53Speaker 1: by meeting with some other thing is converted into a patient.
- 3:57Speaker 1: And from all these considerations, as I said at first,
- 4:01Speaker 1: there arises a general reflection that there is no one
- 4:04Speaker 1: self existent thing, but everything is becoming, and in relation
- 4:09Speaker 1: and being must be altogether abolished. Although from habit and
- 4:13Speaker 1: ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain
- 4:17Speaker 1: the use of the term. But great philosophers tell us
- 4:21Speaker 1: that we are not to allow either the word something
- 4:24Speaker 1: or belonging to something, or to me, or this or
- 4:31Speaker 1: that or any other detaining name to be used in
- 4:35Speaker 1: the language of nature. All things are being created and destroyed,
- 4:39Speaker 1: coming into being, and passing into new forms. Nor can
- 4:44Speaker 1: any name fix or detain them. He who attempts to
- 4:47Speaker 1: fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the
- 4:51Speaker 1: way of speaking, not only of particulars, but of aggregates,
- 4:55Speaker 1: such aggregates as are expressed in the word man or
- 5:00Speaker 1: or stone, or any name of an animal or of
- 5:03Speaker 1: a class. Oh, Thetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey?
- 5:09Speaker 1: And do you not like the taste of them in
- 5:11Speaker 1: the mouth? Say thetus. I do not know what to say, Socrates.
- 5:16Speaker 1: For indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving
- 5:19Speaker 1: your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out. Socrates,
- 5:25Speaker 1: you forget, my friend, that I neither know nor profess
- 5:28Speaker 1: to know, anything of these matters. You are the person
- 5:31Speaker 1: who is in labor. I am the barren midwife, and
- 5:35Speaker 1: this is why I soothe you and offer you one
- 5:38Speaker 1: good thing after another that you may taste them, and
- 5:41Speaker 1: I hope that I may at last help to bring
- 5:44Speaker 1: your own opinion into the light of day. When this
- 5:47Speaker 1: has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you
- 5:50Speaker 1: have brought forth is only a windig or a real
- 5:53Speaker 1: and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your spirits and answer
- 5:58Speaker 1: like a man what you think thettus? Ask me, Socrates,
- 6:04Speaker 1: then once more, is it your opinion that nothing is
- 6:07Speaker 1: but what becomes the good and the noble, as well
- 6:11Speaker 1: as all the other things which we were just now
- 6:13Speaker 1: mentioning Thetetus. When I hear you discoursing in this style,
- 6:18Speaker 1: I think that there is a great deal what you say,
- 6:21Speaker 1: and I am very ready to assent. Socrates. Let us
- 6:26Speaker 1: not leave the argument unfinished, then, for there still remains
- 6:29Speaker 1: to be considered an objection which may be raised about
- 6:32Speaker 1: dreams and diseases, in particular about madness and the various
- 6:37Speaker 1: illusions of hearing and sight, or of other senses. For
- 6:41Speaker 1: you know that in all these cases the essay perkeepi
- 6:46Speaker 1: theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since in dreams and
- 6:50Speaker 1: illusions we certainly have false perceptions, and far from saying
- 6:55Speaker 1: that everything is which appears. We should rather say that
- 6:58Speaker 1: nothing is which appears thetaetus? Very true, Socrates, Socrates, But then,
- 7:07Speaker 1: my boy, how can anyone contend that knowledge is perception,
- 7:11Speaker 1: or that to every man what appears is sataetus. I
- 7:16Speaker 1: am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer,
- 7:19Speaker 1: because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse.
- 7:23Speaker 1: But I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or
- 7:26Speaker 1: dreamers think truly when they imagine, some of them that
- 7:30Speaker 1: they are gods, and others that they can fly and
- 7:33Speaker 1: are flying in their sleep. Socrates, do you see another
- 7:37Speaker 1: question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about
- 7:41Speaker 1: dreaming and waking thetatus? What question, Socrates? A question which
- 7:48Speaker 1: I think that you must often have heard persons ask,
- 7:52Speaker 1: how can you determine whether at this moment we are
- 7:54Speaker 1: sleeping and all our thoughts are a dream, or whether
- 7:58Speaker 1: we are awake and talking to one another in the
- 8:01Speaker 1: waking state thetatus? Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how
- 8:07Speaker 1: to prove the one any more than the other, for
- 8:09Speaker 1: in both cases the facts precisely correspond, and there is
- 8:13Speaker 1: no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we
- 8:17Speaker 1: have been talking to one another in a dream, and
- 8:20Speaker 1: when in a dream we seem to be narrating dreams.
- 8:23Speaker 1: The resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing, Socrates.
- 8:28Speaker 1: You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of
- 8:30Speaker 1: sense is easily raised, since there may even be a
- 8:33Speaker 1: doubt whether we are awake or in a dream, And
- 8:37Speaker 1: as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking
- 8:41Speaker 1: in either sphere of existence, the soul contends that the
- 8:44Speaker 1: thoughts which are present to our minds at the time
- 8:47Speaker 1: are true, and during one half of our lives we
- 8:50Speaker 1: affirm the truth of the one, and during the other
- 8:53Speaker 1: half of the other, and are equally confident of both.
- 8:57Speaker 1: Thetatus most true, o Socrates. And may not the same
- 9:03Speaker 1: be said of madness and other disorders? The difference is
- 9:06Speaker 1: only that the times are not equal thettus certainly, Socrates,
- 9:13Speaker 1: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration
- 9:16Speaker 1: of time? Thetatus? That would be in many ways ridiculous, Socrates.
- 9:24Speaker 1: But can you certainly determine by any other means which
- 9:27Speaker 1: of these opinions is true? Thetitus? I do not think
- 9:31Speaker 1: that I can, Socrates. Listen then, to a statement of
- 9:35Speaker 1: the other side of the argument, which is made by
- 9:37Speaker 1: the champions of appearance, They would say, as I imagine,
- 9:42Speaker 1: can that which is wholly other than something have the
- 9:44Speaker 1: same quality as that from which it differs? And observe
- 9:48Speaker 1: thetatus that the word other means not partially but wholly
- 9:53Speaker 1: other thetatus, certainly, putting the question as you do, that
- 9:58Speaker 1: which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in any
- 10:02Speaker 1: other way, be the same Socrates, and must therefore be
- 10:07Speaker 1: admitted to be unlike thetitus true, Socrates. If then anything
- 10:14Speaker 1: happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when
- 10:18Speaker 1: it becomes like, we call it the same, when unlike
- 10:21Speaker 1: other thettus certainly, Socrates. Were we not saying that there
- 10:28Speaker 1: are agents many and infinite, and patience many and infinite thettus, yes, Socrates.
- 10:36Speaker 1: And also that different combinations will produce results which are
- 10:40Speaker 1: not the same but different thetitis certainly, Socrates. Let us
- 10:46Speaker 1: take you and me or anything as an example. There
- 10:50Speaker 1: is Socrates in health, in Socrates sick are they like
- 10:54Speaker 1: or unlike? Thetitis? You mean to compare Socrates in health
- 10:59Speaker 1: as a whole and Socrates in sickness as a whole
- 11:03Speaker 1: Socrates exactly. That is my meaning. Thetitus, I answer, they
- 11:09Speaker 1: are unlike Socrates, and if unlike they are other Thetitis
- 11:15Speaker 1: certainly Socrates. And would you not say the same of
- 11:20Speaker 1: Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states
- 11:23Speaker 1: which we were mentioning. Thetitus I should Socrates. All agents
- 11:29Speaker 1: have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is
- 11:33Speaker 1: well or ill. Thettus, of course, Socrates, and I, who
- 11:40Speaker 1: am the patient, and that which is the agent, will
- 11:43Speaker 1: produce something different in each of the two cases. Thettus certainly, Socrates.
- 11:50Speaker 1: The wine which I drink when I am in health
- 11:53Speaker 1: appears sweet and pleasant to me. Thetetus true, Socrates, for
- 12:00Speaker 1: this has been already acknowledged. The patient and agent meet
- 12:03Speaker 1: together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which
- 12:07Speaker 1: are in simultaneous motion. And the perception which comes from
- 12:12Speaker 1: the patient makes the tongue precipient, and the quality of
- 12:15Speaker 1: sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine,
- 12:19Speaker 1: makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet
- 12:22Speaker 1: to the healthy tongue. Thetetus certainly, that has been already acknowledged, Socrates.
- 12:30Speaker 1: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon
- 12:33Speaker 1: another and a different person, Theatatus, yes, Socrates. The combination
- 12:40Speaker 1: of the draft of wine and the Socrates who is sick,
- 12:44Speaker 1: produces quite another result, which is the sensation of bitterness
- 12:48Speaker 1: in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness
- 12:52Speaker 1: in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but
- 12:56Speaker 1: something bitter. As I myself become not percept but precipient,
- 13:02Speaker 1: Thetitus true, Socrates. There is no other object of which
- 13:08Speaker 1: I shall ever have the same perception, for another object
- 13:11Speaker 1: would give another perception and would make the precipient other indifferent.
- 13:16Speaker 1: Nor can that object which affects me meeting another subject
- 13:19Speaker 1: produce the same or become similar, for that too will
- 13:23Speaker 1: produce another result from another subject and become different Thetatus true, Socrates.
- 13:32Speaker 1: Neither can I by myself have this sensation, nor the
- 13:35Speaker 1: object by itself this quality. Thetetus certainly not Socrates. When
- 13:43Speaker 1: I perceive, I must become percipient of something. There can
- 13:47Speaker 1: be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing. The object,
- 13:52Speaker 1: whether it becomes sweet, bitter, or of any other quality,
- 13:56Speaker 1: must have relation to a percipient. Nothing can be I'm sweet,
- 14:00Speaker 1: which is sweet to no one thetitus certainly not, Socrates.
- 14:07Speaker 1: Then the inference is that we the agent and patient,
- 14:11Speaker 1: are or become in relation to one another. There is
- 14:14Speaker 1: a law which binds us one to the other, but
- 14:17Speaker 1: not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself.
- 14:21Speaker 1: And therefore we can only be bound to one another.
- 14:24Speaker 1: So that whether a person says that a thing is
- 14:27Speaker 1: or becomes, he must see that it is or becomes too,
- 14:31Speaker 1: or of or in relation to something else. But he
- 14:35Speaker 1: must not see or allow anyone else to see that
- 14:38Speaker 1: anything is or becomes. Absolutely such is our conclusion, thettus
- 14:46Speaker 1: very true, Socrates. Socrates. Then if that which acts upon
- 14:51Speaker 1: me as relation to me and to no other, I
- 14:54Speaker 1: and no other am the percipient of it, thetitis of course, Socrates,
- 15:01Speaker 1: then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from
- 15:05Speaker 1: my own being. And as Protagoras says to myself, I
- 15:09Speaker 1: am judge of what is and what is not to
- 15:12Speaker 1: me thetetus, I suppose so, Socrates. How then, if I
- 15:18Speaker 1: never err, and if my mind never trips in the
- 15:21Speaker 1: conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing
- 15:25Speaker 1: that which I perceive? Thetetus you cannot, Socrates. Then you
- 15:31Speaker 1: are quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception,
- 15:35Speaker 1: and the meaning turns out to be the same. Whether
- 15:37Speaker 1: with Homer and Heraclitus and all that company you say
- 15:41Speaker 1: that all is motion and flux, or with the great
- 15:45Speaker 1: sage Protagoras that man is the measure of all things,
- 15:48Speaker 1: or with Thetatus that, given these premises, perception is knowledge.
- 15:54Speaker 1: Am I not right, Thetatus? And is not this your
- 15:57Speaker 1: new born child, of which I have delivered you? What
- 16:00Speaker 1: say you, Thetatus? I cannot but agree, Socrates. Socrates, then
- 16:08Speaker 1: this is the child, however he may turn out, which
- 16:11Speaker 1: you and I have with difficulty brought into the world.
- 16:14Speaker 1: And now that he is born, we must run round
- 16:17Speaker 1: the hearth with him and see whether he is worth
- 16:21Speaker 1: rearing or is only a wind gig and a sham.
- 16:24Speaker 1: Is he to be reared in any case and not exposed?
- 16:28Speaker 1: Or will you bear to see him rejected and not
- 16:30Speaker 1: get into a passion? If I take away your first
- 16:33Speaker 1: born Theodoras, Thetitus will not be angry, for he is
- 16:38Speaker 1: very good natured. But tell me, Socrates, in Heaven's name,
- 16:42Speaker 1: is this, after all not the truth? Socrates? You Theodoras,
- 16:47Speaker 1: are a lover of theories, and now you innocently fancy
- 16:51Speaker 1: that I am a bag full of them and can
- 16:54Speaker 1: easily pull one out which will overthrow its predecessor. But
- 16:58Speaker 1: you do not see that, in reality, none of these
- 17:00Speaker 1: theories come from me. They all come from him who
- 17:03Speaker 1: talks with me. I only know just enough to extract
- 17:07Speaker 1: them from the wisdom of another, and to receive them
- 17:10Speaker 1: in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say
- 17:13Speaker 1: nothing myself, but shall endeavor to elicit something from our
- 17:16Speaker 1: young friend Theodoras. Do as you say, Socrates. You are
- 17:21Speaker 1: quite right, Socrates. Shall I tell you, Theodoras, what amazes
- 17:26Speaker 1: me in your acquaintance, Protagoras, Theodoras, what is it? Socrates?
- 17:33Speaker 1: I am charmed with his doctrine that what appears is
- 17:36Speaker 1: to each one. But I wonder that he did not
- 17:39Speaker 1: begin his book on truth with a declaration that a pig,
- 17:44Speaker 1: or a dog faced baboon, or some other yet stranger
- 17:47Speaker 1: monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things.
- 17:52Speaker 1: Then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our
- 17:54Speaker 1: opinion of him by informing us at the outset that
- 17:58Speaker 1: while we were reverencing him like a god for his wisdom,
- 18:02Speaker 1: he was no better than a Tadpole not to speak
- 18:05Speaker 1: of his fellow men. Would not this have produced an
- 18:08Speaker 1: overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no
- 18:13Speaker 1: man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has
- 18:17Speaker 1: any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true
- 18:20Speaker 1: or false. But each, as we have several times repeated,
- 18:24Speaker 1: is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he
- 18:27Speaker 1: judges is true and right. Why, my friend, should Protagoras
- 18:31Speaker 1: be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction and
- 18:34Speaker 1: deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have
- 18:39Speaker 1: to go to him? If each one is the measure
- 18:41Speaker 1: of his own wisdom, must he not be talking? And
- 18:45Speaker 1: Captain dum In all this, I say nothing of the
- 18:49Speaker 1: ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole
- 18:53Speaker 1: art of dialectic is placed. For the attempt to supervise
- 18:57Speaker 1: or refute the notions or opinions of others would be
- 19:00Speaker 1: a tedious and enormous piece of folly. If to each
- 19:04Speaker 1: man his own right, and this must be the case,
- 19:07Speaker 1: if Partagoras is truth, is the real truth, and the
- 19:11Speaker 1: philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out
- 19:15Speaker 1: of the shrine of his book, Theodorus, he was a
- 19:19Speaker 1: friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore
- 19:23Speaker 1: I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can
- 19:26Speaker 1: I oppose you when I agree with you. Please then
- 19:29Speaker 1: to take thetatus again, He seemed to answer very nicely, Socrates,
- 19:35Speaker 1: if you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus,
- 19:39Speaker 1: would you have a right to look on at the
- 19:41Speaker 1: naked wrestler's, some of them making a poor figure, if
- 19:45Speaker 1: you did not strip and give them an opportunity of
- 19:47Speaker 1: judging of your own person? Theodorus? Why not, Socrates, if
- 19:53Speaker 1: they would allow me, as I think you will, in
- 19:56Speaker 1: consideration of my age and stiffness, let some more supper,
- 20:00Speaker 1: try a fall with you, and do not drag me
- 20:03Speaker 1: into the gymnasium. Socrates. Your will is my will, Theodorus,
- 20:08Speaker 1: as the proverbial philosophers see, and therefore I will return
- 20:12Speaker 1: to the sage Thetitus tell me Thetetus, in reference to
- 20:17Speaker 1: what I was saying, Are you not lost in wonder
- 20:19Speaker 1: like myself? When you find that all of a sudden
- 20:22Speaker 1: you are raised to the level of the wisest of men?
- 20:25Speaker 1: Or indeed of the gods, for you would assume the
- 20:29Speaker 1: measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well
- 20:32Speaker 1: as men. Thetitus, certainly I should, and I confess to
- 20:38Speaker 1: you that I am lost in wonder. At first hearing,
- 20:41Speaker 1: I was quite satisfied with the doctrine that whatever appears
- 20:44Speaker 1: is to each one. But now the face of things
- 20:47Speaker 1: has changed, Socrates, Why, my dear boy, you are young,
- 20:53Speaker 1: and therefore your ear is quickly caught and your mind
- 20:56Speaker 1: influenced by popular arguments Protagoras, Or if some one speaking
- 21:01Speaker 1: on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply, good people,
- 21:05Speaker 1: young and old, you meet and harangued, and bring in
- 21:08Speaker 1: the gods whose existence or non existence I banish from
- 21:12Speaker 1: writing in speech. Or you talk about the reason of
- 21:14Speaker 1: man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which
- 21:18Speaker 1: is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one
- 21:21Speaker 1: word of proof or demonstration. Do you offer all is
- 21:24Speaker 1: probability with you? And yet surely you n Theodorus had
- 21:29Speaker 1: better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability
- 21:32Speaker 1: and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He
- 21:37Speaker 1: or any other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods
- 21:41Speaker 1: in geometry would not be worse an aece Thetetus. But
- 21:46Speaker 1: neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such arguments. Socrates,
- 21:53Speaker 1: then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must
- 21:56Speaker 1: look at the matter in some other way. Thettus, Yes,
- 22:00Speaker 1: in quite another way, Socrates. And the way will be
- 22:04Speaker 1: to ask whether perception is or is not the same
- 22:07Speaker 1: as knowledge. For this was the real point of our argument,
- 22:11Speaker 1: And with a view to this we raised, did we
- 22:14Speaker 1: not those many strange questions Thetetus? Certainly, Socrates, shall we
- 22:21Speaker 1: see that we know everything which we see and hear?
- 22:24Speaker 1: For example, shall we see that, not having learned, we
- 22:28Speaker 1: do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak
- 22:31Speaker 1: to us? Or shall we see that we not only hear,
- 22:35Speaker 1: but know what they are saying. Or again, if we
- 22:39Speaker 1: see letters which we do not understand, shall we see
- 22:42Speaker 1: that we do not see them? Or shall we aver
- 22:46Speaker 1: that seeing them we must know them? Thetetus. We shall say, Socrates,
- 22:52Speaker 1: that we know what we actually see and hear of them.
- 22:55Speaker 1: That is to say, we see and know the figure
- 22:58Speaker 1: and color of the letters, and we hear and know
- 23:01Speaker 1: the elevation or depression of the sound of them. But
- 23:05Speaker 1: we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know
- 23:08Speaker 1: that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them. Socrates capital thetatus,
- 23:15Speaker 1: and about this there shall be no dispute, because I
- 23:18Speaker 1: want you to grow. But there is another difficulty coming
- 23:22Speaker 1: which you will also have to repulse. Thetatus. What is it? Socrates?
- 23:29Speaker 1: Some one will say, can a man who has ever
- 23:31Speaker 1: known anything and still has and preserves a memory of
- 23:35Speaker 1: that which he knows, not know that which he remembers
- 23:38Speaker 1: at the time when he remembers? I have I fear
- 23:42Speaker 1: a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is
- 23:45Speaker 1: only whether a man who has learned and remembers can
- 23:49Speaker 1: fail to know thetatus? Impossible, Socrates. The supposition is monstrous, Socrates.
- 23:57Speaker 1: Am I talking nonsense? Then? Think is not seeing, perceiving,
- 24:02Speaker 1: and is not cite perception? Thetitus true, Socrates? And if
- 24:08Speaker 1: our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he
- 24:12Speaker 1: has seen thettus, yes, Socrates, And you would admit that
- 24:19Speaker 1: there is such a thing as memory. Thettus, yes, Socrates,
- 24:25Speaker 1: And is memory of something or of nothing? Thettus of
- 24:29Speaker 1: something surely, Socrates? Of things learned and perceived. That is
- 24:35Speaker 1: thettus certainly, Socrates. Often a man remembers that which he
- 24:41Speaker 1: has seen, Thetitus true, Socrates. And if he closed his eyes,
- 24:48Speaker 1: would he forget Thetitus? Who Socrates? Would dare to say so, Socrates,
- 24:56Speaker 1: But we must say so if the previous argument is
- 24:59Speaker 1: to be made, thettus, what do you mean? I am
- 25:04Speaker 1: not quite sure that I understand you, though I have
- 25:06Speaker 1: a strong suspicion that you are right, Socrates. As thus,
- 25:11Speaker 1: he who sees knows, as we see, that which he sees.
- 25:15Speaker 1: For perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be
- 25:18Speaker 1: the same. Thettus certainly, Socrates. But he who saw and
- 25:24Speaker 1: has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers when he
- 25:27Speaker 1: closes his eyes that which he no longer sees, Thetatus true, Socrates.
- 25:35Speaker 1: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not seeing is not knowing,
- 25:40Speaker 1: Thetatus very true, Socrates. Then the inference is that a
- 25:45Speaker 1: man may have attained the knowledge of something which he
- 25:48Speaker 1: may remember, and yet not know because he does not see.
- 25:53Speaker 1: And this has been affirmed by us to be a
- 25:55Speaker 1: monstrous supposition, Thetatus most true, Socrates. Thus, then, the assertion
- 26:03Speaker 1: that knowledge and perception are one involves a manifest impossibility. Thetatus. Yes, Socrates,
- 26:12Speaker 1: then they must be distinguished. Thetatus. I suppose that they
- 26:16Speaker 1: must Socrates. Once more, we shall have to begin and
- 26:21Speaker 1: ask what is knowledge? And yet Thetatus, what are we
- 26:25Speaker 1: going to do? Thetatus about what Socrates? Like a good
- 26:31Speaker 1: for nothing conck. Without having won the victory, we walk
- 26:34Speaker 1: away from the argument and crow Thetatus, how do you mean, Socrates?
- 26:41Speaker 1: After the manner of disputers, we were satisfied with mere
- 26:44Speaker 1: verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this way
- 26:48Speaker 1: we could gain an advantage. Although professing not to be
- 26:51Speaker 1: mere aristics but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously
- 26:56Speaker 1: fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons. Thetetus.
- 27:01Speaker 1: I do not as yet understand you, Socrates. Then I
- 27:06Speaker 1: will try to explain myself. Just now, we asked the
- 27:09Speaker 1: question whether a man who had learned and remembered could
- 27:13Speaker 1: fail to know, And we showed that a person who
- 27:16Speaker 1: had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut
- 27:19Speaker 1: and could not see, and then he would at the
- 27:22Speaker 1: same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility,
- 27:27Speaker 1: and so the Protagorian feeble came to nought, and yours also,
- 27:31Speaker 1: who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception. Thetetus
- 27:36Speaker 1: true Socrates. And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that
- 27:42Speaker 1: the result would have been different. If Protagoras, who was
- 27:45Speaker 1: the father of the first of the two brats, had
- 27:47Speaker 1: been alive, he would have had a great deal to
- 27:50Speaker 1: say on their behalf. But he is dead, and we
- 27:53Speaker 1: insult over his orphan child. And even the guardians whom
- 27:57Speaker 1: he left, and of whom are and Theodorus is one,
- 28:01Speaker 1: are unwilling to give any help. And therefore I suppose
- 28:05Speaker 1: that I must take up his cause myself and see
- 28:08Speaker 1: justice done. Theodoras not is Socrates, but rather Callias, the
- 28:14Speaker 1: son of Hipponicos, is guardian of his orphans. I was
- 28:17Speaker 1: too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless,
- 28:23Speaker 1: I shall be grateful to you if you assist him, Socrates,
- 28:27Speaker 1: very good Theodoris. You shall see how I will come
- 28:30Speaker 1: to the rescue. If a person does not attend to
- 28:33Speaker 1: the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument,
- 28:37Speaker 1: he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these.
- 28:41Speaker 1: Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus
- 28:45Speaker 1: theodoras to both of us, and let the younger answer.
- 28:49Speaker 1: He will incur less disgrace if he is discomfited, Socrates.
- 28:54Speaker 1: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this?
- 28:58Speaker 1: Can a man know and all so not know that
- 29:01Speaker 1: which he knows? Theodorus? How shall we answer thetatus? Thetatus
- 29:08Speaker 1: he cannot, I should say, Socrates, he can if you
- 29:13Speaker 1: maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are imprisoned in
- 29:17Speaker 1: a well, as the saying is, and the self assured
- 29:20Speaker 1: adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand and
- 29:23Speaker 1: asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye
- 29:26Speaker 1: which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable
- 29:29Speaker 1: man thettus? I should answer, not with that eye, but
- 29:35Speaker 1: with the other, Socrates. Then you see and do not
- 29:39Speaker 1: see the same thing at the same time. Thettus yes
- 29:44Speaker 1: in a certain sense. Socrates, none of that, he will reply.
- 29:49Speaker 1: I do not ask or bid you answer in what
- 29:52Speaker 1: sense you know, but only whether you know that which
- 29:56Speaker 1: you do not know. You have been proved to see
- 29:59Speaker 1: that which you do do not see, and you have
- 30:02Speaker 1: already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not seeing
- 30:06Speaker 1: is not knowing. I leave you to draw the inference thetatus. Yes,
- 30:12Speaker 1: the inference is the contradictory of my assertion, Socrates. Yes,
- 30:17Speaker 1: my marvel. And there might have been yet worse things
- 30:20Speaker 1: in store for you if an opponent had gone on
- 30:23Speaker 1: to ask whether you can have a sharp and also
- 30:26Speaker 1: a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near but
- 30:29Speaker 1: not at a distance, or know the same thing with
- 30:33Speaker 1: more or less intensity, and so on without end. Such
- 30:37Speaker 1: questions might have been put to you by a light
- 30:40Speaker 1: armed mercenary who argued for pay. He would have lain
- 30:43Speaker 1: in wait for you, And when you took up the
- 30:46Speaker 1: position that since is knowledge, he would have made an
- 30:49Speaker 1: assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses. He would
- 30:53Speaker 1: have shown you no mercy. And while you were lost
- 30:55Speaker 1: in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he would have
- 30:59Speaker 1: got you into his net, out of which you would
- 31:02Speaker 1: not have escaped until you had come to an understanding
- 31:05Speaker 1: about the sum to be paid for your release. Well,
- 31:09Speaker 1: you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall
- 31:13Speaker 1: I answer for him thetitis by all means, Socrates, he
- 31:19Speaker 1: will repeat all those things which we have been urging
- 31:22Speaker 1: on his behalf, and then he will close with us
- 31:26Speaker 1: in disdain and say the worthy. Socrates asked a little
- 31:30Speaker 1: boy whether the same man could remember and not know
- 31:33Speaker 1: the same thing, and the boy said no, because he
- 31:37Speaker 1: was frightened and could not see what was coming. And
- 31:40Speaker 1: then Socrates made fun of poor me. The truth is,
- 31:44Speaker 1: oh slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any
- 31:48Speaker 1: assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping.
- 31:52Speaker 1: If he has answered as I should have answered, then
- 31:55Speaker 1: I am refuted. But if he answers something else, then
- 31:59Speaker 1: he is refuted, and not I. For do you really
- 32:02Speaker 1: suppose that any one would admit the memory which a
- 32:05Speaker 1: man has of an impression which has passed away to
- 32:08Speaker 1: be the same with that which he experienced at the time,
- 32:12Speaker 1: assuredly not? Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the
- 32:16Speaker 1: same man may know and not know the same thing,
- 32:20Speaker 1: Or if he is afraid of making this admission, would
- 32:22Speaker 1: he ever grant that one who has become unlike is
- 32:25Speaker 1: the same as before he became unlike? Or would he
- 32:29Speaker 1: admit that a man is one at all, and not
- 32:32Speaker 1: rather many and infinite as the changes which take place
- 32:35Speaker 1: in him. I speak by the card in order to
- 32:38Speaker 1: avoid entanglements of words. But oh, my good sir, he
- 32:43Speaker 1: will say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit,
- 32:46Speaker 1: and either show if you can, that our sensations are
- 32:49Speaker 1: not relative and individual, or if you admit them to
- 32:53Speaker 1: be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence
- 32:56Speaker 1: that the appearance becomes, or if you will have the
- 32:59Speaker 1: word is to the individual only. As to your talk
- 33:04Speaker 1: about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig,
- 33:08Speaker 1: and you teach your hearers to make sport of my
- 33:10Speaker 1: writings in the same ignorant manner. But this is not
- 33:14Speaker 1: to your credit. For I declare that the truth is
- 33:17Speaker 1: as I have written, and that each of us is
- 33:20Speaker 1: a measure of existence and of non existence. Yet one
- 33:25Speaker 1: man maybe a thousand times better than another in proportion
- 33:29Speaker 1: as different things are and appear to him. And I
- 33:32Speaker 1: am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man
- 33:36Speaker 1: have no existence. But I say that the wise man
- 33:39Speaker 1: is he who makes the evils which appear and are
- 33:42Speaker 1: to a man into goods which are and appear to him.
- 33:46Speaker 1: And I would beg you not to press my words
- 33:49Speaker 1: in the letter, but to take the meaning of them
- 33:52Speaker 1: as I will explain them. Remember what has been already
- 33:56Speaker 1: said that to the sick man his food appears to
- 33:58Speaker 1: be and is bitter, and to the man in health
- 34:02Speaker 1: the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one
- 34:05Speaker 1: of these men can be or ought to be made
- 34:08Speaker 1: wiser than the other. Nor can you assert that the
- 34:11Speaker 1: sick man, because he has one impression, is foolish, and
- 34:15Speaker 1: the healthy man, because he has another, is wise. But
- 34:18Speaker 1: the one state requires to be changed into the other,
- 34:22Speaker 1: the worse into the better. As in education, a change
- 34:25Speaker 1: of state has to be affected, and the sophist accomplishes
- 34:29Speaker 1: by words the change which the physician works by the
- 34:32Speaker 1: aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another
- 34:36Speaker 1: think truly who previously thought falsely. For no one can
- 34:40Speaker 1: think what is not or think anything different from that
- 34:43Speaker 1: which he feels. And this is always true. But as
- 34:47Speaker 1: the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of a kindred nature,
- 34:51Speaker 1: so I conceive that a good mind causes men to
- 34:54Speaker 1: have good thoughts. And these which the inexperienced call true,
- 34:58Speaker 1: I maintain to be only better and not truer than others. And, oh,
- 35:04Speaker 1: my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men tadpoles.
- 35:08Speaker 1: Far from it, I say that they are the physicians
- 35:11Speaker 1: of the human body and the husbandmen of plants. For
- 35:15Speaker 1: the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations
- 35:19Speaker 1: of plants and infuse into them good and healthy sensations,
- 35:24Speaker 1: ay and true ones. And the wise and good rhetoricians
- 35:28Speaker 1: make the good instead of the evil, to seem just
- 35:30Speaker 1: to states. For whatever appears to a state to be
- 35:33Speaker 1: just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such,
- 35:37Speaker 1: is just and fair to it. But the teacher of
- 35:39Speaker 1: wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil,
- 35:43Speaker 1: both in appearance and in reality, and in like manner.
- 35:47Speaker 1: The sophist, who is able to train his pupils in
- 35:50Speaker 1: this spirit, is a wise man, and deserves to be
- 35:53Speaker 1: well paid by them. And so one man is wiser
- 35:56Speaker 1: than another, and no one thinks falsely. And you, whether
- 36:01Speaker 1: you will or not, must endure to be a measure
- 36:04Speaker 1: on these foundations. The argument stands firm, which you, socrates
- 36:08Speaker 1: me if you please overthrow by an opposite argument, or
- 36:12Speaker 1: if you like, you may put questions to me a
- 36:15Speaker 1: method to which no intelligent person will object. Quite the reverse.
- 36:20Speaker 1: But I must beg you to put fair questions, for
- 36:23Speaker 1: there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a
- 36:26Speaker 1: zeal for virtue and then always behaving unfairly in argument.
- 36:31Speaker 1: The unfairness of which I complain is that you do
- 36:33Speaker 1: not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic. The disputer may
- 36:38Speaker 1: trip up his opponent as often as he likes and
- 36:41Speaker 1: make fun, but the dialectician will be in earnest and
- 36:45Speaker 1: only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors
- 36:49Speaker 1: into which he has fallen, through his own fault or
- 36:52Speaker 1: that of the company which he has previously kempt. If
- 36:55Speaker 1: you do so, your adversary will lay the blame of
- 36:58Speaker 1: his own confusion and perplexity on himself and not on you.
- 37:03Speaker 1: He will follow and love you, and will het himself
- 37:06Speaker 1: and escape from himself into philosophy in order that he
- 37:09Speaker 1: may become different from what he was. But the other
- 37:12Speaker 1: mode of arguing, which is practiced by the many, will
- 37:16Speaker 1: have just the opposite effect upon him, and as he
- 37:19Speaker 1: grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will come to
- 37:22Speaker 1: hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before,
- 37:27Speaker 1: not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper,
- 37:31Speaker 1: but to find out in a friendly and congenial spirit.
- 37:35Speaker 1: What we really mean when we see that all things
- 37:37Speaker 1: are in motion, and that to every individual and state
- 37:41Speaker 1: what appears is in this manner you will consider whether
- 37:45Speaker 1: knowledge and sensation are the same or different. But you
- 37:49Speaker 1: will not argue, as you were just now doing, from
- 37:52Speaker 1: the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar
- 37:55Speaker 1: pervert in all sorts of ways, causing infinite perplexity to
- 37:59Speaker 1: one another. Such Theodorus is the very slight help which
- 38:02Speaker 1: I am able to offer to your old friend. Had
- 38:05Speaker 1: he been living, he would have helped himself in a
- 38:08Speaker 1: far more glorious style, Theodoras you are jesting, Socrates. Indeed,
- 38:14Speaker 1: your defense of him has been most valorous. Socrates, thank you, friend,
- 38:19Speaker 1: and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious,
- 38:23Speaker 1: as the text man is the measure of all things,
- 38:26Speaker 1: was a solemn one. And he reproached us with making
- 38:30Speaker 1: a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the
- 38:33Speaker 1: boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument. He
- 38:37Speaker 1: also declared that we made a joke of him, Theodorus.
- 38:41Speaker 1: How could I fail to observe all that Socrates? Socrates well,
- 38:46Speaker 1: and shall we do as he says, Theodoras by all means, Socrates,
- 38:53Speaker 1: But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and
- 38:56Speaker 1: I must take up the argument and in all seriousness,
- 39:00Speaker 1: and ask an answer one another. For you see that
- 39:03Speaker 1: the rest of us are nothing but boys. In no
- 39:05Speaker 1: other way can we escape the imputation that, in our
- 39:08Speaker 1: fresh analysis of his thesis we are making fun with boys.
- 39:13Speaker 1: Theodoras well, But is not thetatus better able to follow
- 39:17Speaker 1: a philosophical inquiry than a great many men who have
- 39:21Speaker 1: long beards? Socrates, Yes, Theodoras, but not better than you.
- 39:26Speaker 1: And therefore please not to imagine that I am to
- 39:29Speaker 1: defend by every means in my power, your departed friend,
- 39:33Speaker 1: and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At
- 39:36Speaker 1: any rate, my good man, do not cheer off until
- 39:39Speaker 1: we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams,
- 39:42Speaker 1: or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for
- 39:46Speaker 1: themselves in astronomy and geometry and the other branches of
- 39:50Speaker 1: knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them. Theodoras
- 39:55Speaker 1: he was sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid
- 39:58Speaker 1: being drawn into an argument. And when I said just
- 40:01Speaker 1: now that you would excuse me and not like the
- 40:04Speaker 1: Lacedaemonians compel me to strip and fight, I was talking nonsense.
- 40:09Speaker 1: I should rather compare you to Skiron, who threw travelers
- 40:12Speaker 1: from the rocks. For the Lacedaemonian rule is strip or depart.
- 40:17Speaker 1: But you seem to go about your work more after
- 40:19Speaker 1: the fashion of Antaeus. You will not allow anyone who
- 40:23Speaker 1: approaches you to depart until you have stripped him, and
- 40:26Speaker 1: he has been compelled to try a fall with you.
- 40:29Speaker 1: In argument, Socrates, there, Theodorus, you have hit off precisely
- 40:34Speaker 1: the nature of my complaint. But am even more pugnacious
- 40:38Speaker 1: than the giants of old. For I have met with
- 40:41Speaker 1: no end of heroes, many a Heracles, many a theseus
- 40:45Speaker 1: mighty in words, has broken my head. Nevertheless, I am
- 40:48Speaker 1: always at this rough exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then,
- 40:54Speaker 1: to try a fall with me, whereby you will do
- 40:57Speaker 1: yourself good as well as me. Theous I consent leave
- 41:02Speaker 1: me whither you will, for I know that you are
- 41:04Speaker 1: like Destiny. No man can escape from any argument which
- 41:08Speaker 1: you may weave for him. But I am not disposed
- 41:11Speaker 1: to go further than you suggest Socrates. Once will be enough,
- 41:16Speaker 1: and now take particular care that we do not again
- 41:19Speaker 1: unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly. Theodorus,
- 41:24Speaker 1: I will do my best to avoid that error. And
- 41:29Speaker 1: of part two of Thetaetus recording in Memory of Mitchell
- 41:34Speaker 1: Edwards