Latest / Foundations of Geometry / Introduction to Metaphysics-Henri Bergson
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- 0:00Speaker 1: An Introduction to Metaphysics by Henri Bergson Translated by T.E.
- 0:06Speaker 1: Holm Read by Mark Colley Translator's Preface This celebrated essay
- 0:14Speaker 1: was first published in the Revue de Metaphysique et de
- 0:17Speaker 1: Morale in January 1903. It appeared then after Time and
- 0:23Speaker 1: Free Will and Matter and Memory and before Creative Evolution.
- 0:29Speaker 1: and while containing ideas set forth in the first two
- 0:32Speaker 1: of these works, it announces some of those which were
- 0:35Speaker 1: afterwards developed in the last. Though this book can in
- 0:40Speaker 1: no sense be regarded as an epitome of the others,
- 0:43Speaker 1: it yet forms the best introduction to them. M. Edward Leroy,
- 0:49Speaker 1: in his lately published book on M. Bergson's philosophy, speaks
- 0:53Speaker 1: of this marvelously suggestive study, which constitutes the best preface
- 0:59Speaker 1: to the books themselves. It has, however, more importance than
- 1:03Speaker 1: a simple introduction would have, for in it M. Bergson explains,
- 1:08Speaker 1: at greater length and in greater detail than in the
- 1:11Speaker 1: other books, exactly what he means to convey by the
- 1:14Speaker 1: word intuition. The intuitive method is treated independently, and not,
- 1:20Speaker 1: as elsewhere in his writings, incidentally, in its applications to
- 1:24Speaker 1: particular problems. For this reason, every writer who has attempted
- 1:28Speaker 1: to give a complete exposition of M. Bergson's philosophy has
- 1:32Speaker 1: been obliged to quote this essay at length, and it
- 1:36Speaker 1: is indispensable, therefore, to the full understanding of its author's position.
- 1:41Speaker 1: Translations into German, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, Swedish, and Russian have
- 1:47Speaker 1: lately appeared, but the French original is at present out
- 1:51Speaker 1: of print. This translation has had the great advantage of
- 1:56Speaker 1: being revised in proof by the author. I have to
- 2:00Speaker 1: thank him for many alternative renderings, and also for a
- 2:03Speaker 1: few slight alterations in the text, which he thought would
- 2:07Speaker 1: make his meaning clearer. T.E. Holm, St. John's College, Cambridge.
- 2:12Speaker 2: An Introduction to Metaphysics by Henri Bergson Translated by T.E.
- 2:18Speaker 2: Holm Part 1 A comparison of the definitions of metaphysics
- 2:23Speaker 2: and the various conceptions of the Absolute leads to the
- 2:27Speaker 2: discovery that philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergences, agree
- 2:32Speaker 2: in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing.
- 2:36Speaker 2: The first implies that we move round the object, the
- 2:39Speaker 2: second that we enter into it. The first depends on
- 2:43Speaker 2: the point of view at which we are placed and
- 2:45Speaker 2: on the symbols by which we express ourselves. the second
- 2:49Speaker 2: neither depends on a point of view nor relies on
- 2:52Speaker 2: any symbol the first kind of knowledge may be said
- 2:55Speaker 2: to stop at the relative the second in those cases
- 2:59Speaker 2: where it is possible to attain the absolute consider for
- 3:05Speaker 2: example the movement of an object in space My perception
- 3:09Speaker 2: of the motion will vary with the point of view,
- 3:12Speaker 2: moving or stationary, from which I observe it. My expression
- 3:16Speaker 2: of it will vary with the systems of axes, or
- 3:19Speaker 2: the points of reference, to which I relate it, that is,
- 3:23Speaker 2: with the symbols by which I translate it. For this
- 3:26Speaker 2: double reason, I call such motion relative. In the one case,
- 3:31Speaker 2: as in the other, I am placed outside the object itself.
- 3:35Speaker 2: But when I speak of an absolute movement, I am
- 3:38Speaker 2: attributing to the moving object an interior and, so to speak,
- 3:42Speaker 2: states of mind. I also imply that I am in
- 3:46Speaker 2: sympathy with those states and that I insert myself in
- 3:49Speaker 2: them by an effort of imagination. Then, according as the
- 3:53Speaker 2: object is moving or stationary, according as it adopts one
- 3:57Speaker 2: movement or another, what I experience will vary. and what
- 4:02Speaker 2: I experience will depend neither on the point of view
- 4:05Speaker 2: I may take up in regard to the object, since
- 4:07Speaker 2: I am inside the object itself, nor on the symbols
- 4:11Speaker 2: by which I may translate the motion, since I have
- 4:14Speaker 2: rejected all translations in order to possess the original. In short,
- 4:19Speaker 2: I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remaining
- 4:23Speaker 2: where I am, but from where it is from within,
- 4:26Speaker 2: as it is in itself. I shall possess an absolute. Consider, again,
- 4:32Speaker 2: a character whose adventures are related to me in a novel.
- 4:36Speaker 2: The author may multiply the traits of his hero's character,
- 4:40Speaker 2: may make him speak and act as much as he pleases,
- 4:43Speaker 2: but all this can never be equivalent to the simple
- 4:46Speaker 2: and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were
- 4:50Speaker 2: able for an instant to identify myself with the person
- 4:53Speaker 2: of the hero himself. out of that indivisible feeling as
- 4:58Speaker 2: from a spring all the words gestures and actions of
- 5:01Speaker 2: the man would appear to me to flow naturally they
- 5:05Speaker 2: would no longer be accidents which added to the idea
- 5:08Speaker 2: i had already formed of the character continually enriched that
- 5:12Speaker 2: idea without ever completing it the character would be given
- 5:16Speaker 2: to me all at once in its entirety and the
- 5:20Speaker 2: thousand instances which manifest it instead of adding themselves to
- 5:24Speaker 2: the idea and so enriching it would seem to me
- 5:27Speaker 2: on the contrary to detach themselves from it without however
- 5:32Speaker 2: exhausting it or impoverishing its essence All the things I
- 5:36Speaker 2: am told about the man provide me with so many
- 5:38Speaker 2: points of view from which I can observe him. All
- 5:42Speaker 2: the traits which describe him and which can make him
- 5:45Speaker 2: known to me only by so many comparisons with persons
- 5:48Speaker 2: or things I know already are signs by which he
- 5:51Speaker 2: is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and points of view, therefore,
- 5:56Speaker 2: place me outside him. They give me only what he
- 6:00Speaker 2: has in common with others and not what belongs to
- 6:03Speaker 2: him and to him alone. But that which is properly himself,
- 6:07Speaker 2: that which constitutes his essence, cannot be perceived from without,
- 6:12Speaker 2: being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being
- 6:16Speaker 2: incommensurable with anything else. Description, history, and analysis leave me
- 6:23Speaker 2: here in the relative. Coincidence with the person himself would
- 6:27Speaker 2: alone give me the absolute. it is in this sense
- 6:31Speaker 2: and in this sense only that absolute is synonymous with
- 6:34Speaker 2: perfection were all the photographs of a town taken from
- 6:38Speaker 2: all possible points of view to go on indefinitely completing
- 6:42Speaker 2: one another they would never be equivalent to the solid
- 6:45Speaker 2: town in which we walk about were all the translations
- 6:49Speaker 2: of a poem into all possible languages to add together
- 6:53Speaker 2: their various shades of meaning and correcting each other by
- 6:56Speaker 2: a kind of mutual retouching to give a more and
- 6:59Speaker 2: more faithful image of the poem they translate they would
- 7:03Speaker 2: yet never succeed in rendering the inner meaning of the
- 7:06Speaker 2: original A representation taken from a certain point of view,
- 7:11Speaker 2: a translation made with certain symbols, will always remain imperfect
- 7:15Speaker 2: in comparison with the object of which a view has
- 7:18Speaker 2: been taken or which the symbols seek to express. But
- 7:22Speaker 2: the absolute which is the object and not its representation,
- 7:26Speaker 2: the original and not its translation, is perfect by being
- 7:30Speaker 2: perfectly what it is. It is doubtless for this reason
- 7:34Speaker 2: that the absolute has often been identified with the infinite.
- 7:39Speaker 2: Suppose that I wished to communicate to someone who did
- 7:42Speaker 2: not know Greek the extraordinarily simple impression that a passage
- 7:46Speaker 2: in Homer makes upon me. I should first give a
- 7:49Speaker 2: translation of the lines, I should then comment on my translation,
- 7:54Speaker 2: and then develop the commentary. In this way, by piling
- 7:57Speaker 2: up explanation on explanation, I might approach nearer and nearer
- 8:02Speaker 2: to what I wanted to express, but I should never
- 8:05Speaker 2: quite reach it. when you raise your arm you accomplish
- 8:09Speaker 2: a movement of which you have from within a simple
- 8:12Speaker 2: perception but for me watching it from the outside your
- 8:16Speaker 2: arm passes through one point then through another and between
- 8:20Speaker 2: these two there will be still other points so that
- 8:23Speaker 2: if i began to count the operation would go on
- 8:26Speaker 2: for ever viewed from the inside then an absolute is
- 8:30Speaker 2: a simple thing but looked at from the outside that
- 8:34Speaker 2: is to say relatively to other things it becomes in
- 8:38Speaker 2: relation to these signs which express it the gold coin
- 8:41Speaker 2: for which we never seem able to finish giving small
- 8:44Speaker 2: change now that which lends itself at the same time
- 8:49Speaker 2: both to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration
- 8:54Speaker 2: is by the very definition of the word an infinite
- 8:58Speaker 2: it follows from this that an absolute could only be
- 9:01Speaker 2: given in an intuition whilst everything else falls within the
- 9:05Speaker 2: province of analysis By intuition is meant the kind of
- 9:10Speaker 2: intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object
- 9:15Speaker 2: in order to coincide with what is unique in it
- 9:17Speaker 2: and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation
- 9:23Speaker 2: which reduces the object to elements already known, that is,
- 9:28Speaker 2: to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyze, therefore,
- 9:33Speaker 2: is to express a thing as a function of something
- 9:36Speaker 2: other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a
- 9:41Speaker 2: development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of
- 9:46Speaker 2: view from which we note as many resemblances as possible
- 9:49Speaker 2: between the new object which we are studying and others
- 9:53Speaker 2: which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied
- 9:57Speaker 2: desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled
- 10:00Speaker 2: to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its
- 10:04Speaker 2: points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representation,
- 10:09Speaker 2: and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect the
- 10:13Speaker 2: always imperfect translation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. but intuition,
- 10:19Speaker 2: if intuition is possible, is a simple act. Now it
- 10:24Speaker 2: is easy to see that the ordinary function of positive
- 10:27Speaker 2: science is analysis. Positive science works then, above all, with symbols.
- 10:33Speaker 2: Even the most concrete of the natural sciences, those concerned
- 10:37Speaker 2: with life, confine themselves to the visible form of living beings,
- 10:42Speaker 2: their organs and anatomical elements. They make comparisons between these forms.
- 10:48Speaker 2: They reduce the more complex to the more simple. In short,
- 10:52Speaker 2: they study the workings of life in what is, so
- 10:55Speaker 2: to speak, only its visual symbol. If there exists any
- 10:59Speaker 2: means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively,
- 11:04Speaker 2: of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it
- 11:07Speaker 2: from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead
- 11:11Speaker 2: of making the analysis, in short, of seizing it without
- 11:15Speaker 2: any expression, translation, or symbolic representation, metaphysics is that means. Metaphysics, then,
- 11:23Speaker 2: is the science which claims to dispense with symbols. An
- 11:28Speaker 2: Introduction to Metaphysics by Henri Bergson Translated by T. E.
- 11:33Speaker 2: Holm Part 2 There is one reality at least, which
- 11:38Speaker 2: we all seize from within, by intuition and not by
- 11:41Speaker 2: simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing
- 11:45Speaker 2: through time, our self which endures. We may sympathize intellectually
- 11:51Speaker 2: with nothing else, but we certainly sympathize with our own selves.
- 11:56Speaker 2: When I direct my attention inward to contemplate my own self,
- 12:00Speaker 2: supposed for the moment to be inactive, I perceive at
- 12:04Speaker 2: first as a crust solidified on the surface all the
- 12:07Speaker 2: perceptions which come to it from the material world. These
- 12:11Speaker 2: perceptions are clear, distinct, juxtaposed or juxtaposable one with another.
- 12:16Speaker 2: They tend to group themselves into objects. Next, I notice
- 12:21Speaker 2: the memories which more or less adhere to these perceptions
- 12:25Speaker 2: and which serve to interpret them. These memories have been detached,
- 12:29Speaker 2: as it were, from the depth of my personality, drawn
- 12:33Speaker 2: to the surface by the perceptions which resemble them. They
- 12:37Speaker 2: rest on the surface of my mind without being absolutely myself. Lastly,
- 12:42Speaker 2: I feel the stir of tendencies and motor habits, a
- 12:46Speaker 2: crowd of virtual actions more or less firmly bound to
- 12:49Speaker 2: these perceptions and memories. All these clearly defined elements appear
- 12:54Speaker 2: more distinct from me the more distinct they are from
- 12:58Speaker 2: each other. Radiating as they do from within outwards, they form, collectively,
- 13:04Speaker 2: the surface of a sphere which tends to grow larger
- 13:07Speaker 2: and lose itself in the exterior world. but if I
- 13:10Speaker 2: draw myself in from the periphery towards the center, if
- 13:14Speaker 2: I search in the depth of my being that which
- 13:16Speaker 2: is most uniformly, most constantly, and most enduringly myself, I
- 13:22Speaker 2: find an altogether different thing. There is, beneath these sharply
- 13:26Speaker 2: cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which
- 13:30Speaker 2: is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen.
- 13:34Speaker 2: there is a succession of states each of which announces
- 13:37Speaker 2: that which follows and contains that which precedes it they
- 13:42Speaker 2: can properly speaking only be said to form multiple states
- 13:46Speaker 2: when i have already passed them and turned back to
- 13:48Speaker 2: observe their track Whilst I was experiencing them, they were
- 13:53Speaker 2: so solidly organized, so profoundly animated with a common life,
- 13:57Speaker 2: that I could not have said where any one of
- 14:00Speaker 2: them finished or where another commenced. In reality, no one
- 14:04Speaker 2: of them begins or ends, but all extend into each other.
- 14:09Speaker 2: This inner life may be compared to the unrolling of
- 14:12Speaker 2: a coil, for there is no living being who does
- 14:15Speaker 2: not feel himself coming gradually to the end of his roll,
- 14:19Speaker 2: and to live is to grow old. But it may
- 14:22Speaker 2: just as well be compared to a continual rolling up,
- 14:25Speaker 2: like that of a thread on a ball, for our
- 14:28Speaker 2: past follows us, it swells incessantly with the present that
- 14:32Speaker 2: it picks up on its way, and consciousness means memory.
- 14:37Speaker 2: but actually it is neither an unrolling nor a rolling
- 14:40Speaker 2: up for these two similes evoke the idea of lines
- 14:44Speaker 2: and surfaces whose parts are homogeneous and superimposable on one
- 14:48Speaker 2: another Now, there are no two identical moments in the
- 14:52Speaker 2: life of the same conscious being. Take the simplest sensation,
- 14:56Speaker 2: suppose it constant, absorb in it the entire personality. The
- 15:01Speaker 2: consciousness which will accompany this sensation cannot remain identical with
- 15:06Speaker 2: itself for two consecutive moments, because the second moment always contains,
- 15:11Speaker 2: over and above the first, the memory that the first
- 15:14Speaker 2: has bequeathed to it. A consciousness which could experience two
- 15:19Speaker 2: identical moments would be a consciousness without memory. It would
- 15:23Speaker 2: die and be born again continually. In what other way
- 15:27Speaker 2: could one represent unconsciousness? It would be better, then, to
- 15:32Speaker 2: use as a comparison the myriad-tinted spectrum with its insensible
- 15:37Speaker 2: gradations leading from one shade to another. a current of
- 15:41Speaker 2: feeling which passed along the spectrum assuming in turn the
- 15:45Speaker 2: tint of each of its shades would experience a series
- 15:48Speaker 2: of gradual changes each of which would announce the one
- 15:51Speaker 2: to follow and would sum up those which preceded it
- 15:55Speaker 2: yet even here the successive shades of the spectrum always
- 15:59Speaker 2: remain external one to another they are juxtaposed they occupy
- 16:03Speaker 2: space but pure duration on the contrary excludes all idea
- 16:09Speaker 2: of juxtaposition reciprocal externality and extension let us then rather
- 16:15Speaker 2: imagine an infinitely small elastic body contracted if it were
- 16:20Speaker 2: possible to a mathematical point Let this be drawn out
- 16:24Speaker 2: gradually in such a manner that from the point comes
- 16:27Speaker 2: a constantly lengthening line. let us fix our attention not
- 16:31Speaker 2: on the line as a line but on the action
- 16:34Speaker 2: by which it is traced let us bear in mind
- 16:37Speaker 2: that this action in spite of its duration is indivisible
- 16:41Speaker 2: if accomplished without stopping that if a stopping-point is inserted
- 16:45Speaker 2: we have two actions instead of one that each of
- 16:48Speaker 2: these separate actions is then the indivisible operation of which
- 16:52Speaker 2: we speak and that it is not the moving action
- 16:55Speaker 2: itself which is divisible but rather the stationary line it
- 16:59Speaker 2: leaves behind it as its track in space finally let
- 17:04Speaker 2: us free ourselves from the space which underlies the movement
- 17:07Speaker 2: in order to consider only the movement itself the act
- 17:11Speaker 2: of tension or extension in short pure mobility we shall
- 17:16Speaker 2: have this time a more faithful image of the development
- 17:19Speaker 2: of our self in duration However, even this image is incomplete, and, indeed,
- 17:26Speaker 2: every comparison will be insufficient, because the unrolling of our
- 17:30Speaker 2: duration resembles in some of its aspects the unity of
- 17:34Speaker 2: an advancing movement and in others the multiplicity of expanding states. And, clearly,
- 17:40Speaker 2: no metaphor can express one of these two aspects without
- 17:44Speaker 2: sacrificing the other. If I use the comparison of the
- 17:47Speaker 2: spectrum with its thousand shades, I have before me a
- 17:51Speaker 2: thing already made, whilst duration is continually in the making.
- 17:56Speaker 2: If I think of an elastic which is being stretched,
- 17:59Speaker 2: or of a spring which is extended or relaxed, I
- 18:03Speaker 2: forget the richness of color characteristic of duration that is lived,
- 18:07Speaker 2: to see only the simple movement by which consciousness passes
- 18:11Speaker 2: from one shade to another. The inner life is all
- 18:14Speaker 2: this at once, variety of qualities, continuity of progress and
- 18:19Speaker 2: unity of direction. It cannot be represented by images. But
- 18:25Speaker 2: it is even less possible to represent it by concepts,
- 18:28Speaker 2: that is by abstract, general or simple ideas. It is
- 18:33Speaker 2: true that no image can reproduce exactly the original feeling
- 18:36Speaker 2: I have of the flow of my own conscious life.
- 18:40Speaker 2: but it is not even necessary that I should attempt
- 18:42Speaker 2: to render it. If a man is incapable of getting
- 18:46Speaker 2: for himself the intuition of the constitutive duration of his
- 18:49Speaker 2: own being, nothing will ever give it to him concepts
- 18:53Speaker 2: no more than images. Here the single aim of the
- 18:56Speaker 2: philosopher should be to promote a certain effort, which in
- 19:00Speaker 2: most men is usually fettered by habits of mind more
- 19:03Speaker 2: useful to life. now the image has at least this
- 19:06Speaker 2: advantage that it keeps us in the concrete no image
- 19:10Speaker 2: can replace the intuition of duration but many diverse images
- 19:15Speaker 2: borrowed from many different orders of things may by the
- 19:18Speaker 2: convergence of their action direct consciousness to the precise point
- 19:23Speaker 2: where there is a certain intuition to be seized By
- 19:27Speaker 2: choosing images as dissimilar as possible, we shall prevent any
- 19:31Speaker 2: one of them from usurping the place of the intuition
- 19:34Speaker 2: it is intended to call up, since it would then
- 19:36Speaker 2: be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that,
- 19:41Speaker 2: in spite of their differences of aspect, they all require
- 19:44Speaker 2: from the mind the same kind of attention, and in
- 19:47Speaker 2: some sort the same degree of tension, we shall gradually
- 19:51Speaker 2: accustom consciousness to a particular and clearly defined disposition, that
- 19:56Speaker 2: precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to
- 19:59Speaker 2: itself as it really is, without any veil. but then
- 20:04Speaker 2: consciousness must at least consent to make the effort, for
- 20:07Speaker 2: it will have been shown nothing, it will simply have
- 20:10Speaker 2: been placed in the attitude it must take up in
- 20:13Speaker 2: order to make the desired effort, and so come by
- 20:16Speaker 2: itself to the intuition. Concepts on the contrary, especially if
- 20:21Speaker 2: they are simple, have the disadvantage of being in reality
- 20:25Speaker 2: symbols substituted for the object they symbolize, and demand no
- 20:29Speaker 2: effort on our part. examined closely each of them it
- 20:34Speaker 2: would be seen retains only that part of the object
- 20:37Speaker 2: which is common to it and to others and expresses
- 20:40Speaker 2: still more than the image does a comparison between the
- 20:44Speaker 2: object and others which resemble it but as the comparison
- 20:47Speaker 2: has made manifest a resemblance as the resemblance is a
- 20:51Speaker 2: property of the object and as a property has every
- 20:54Speaker 2: appearance of being a part of the object which possesses
- 20:57Speaker 2: it We easily persuade ourselves that by setting concept beside concept,
- 21:03Speaker 2: we are reconstructing the whole of the object with its parts,
- 21:06Speaker 2: thus obtaining, so to speak, its intellectual equivalent. In this way,
- 21:11Speaker 2: we believe that we can form a faithful representation of
- 21:14Speaker 2: duration by setting in line the concepts of unity, multiplicity, continuity,
- 21:20Speaker 2: finite or infinite divisibility, etc., there precisely is the illusion
- 21:26Speaker 2: there also is the danger just in so far as
- 21:30Speaker 2: abstract ideas can render service to analysis that is to
- 21:34Speaker 2: the scientific study of the object in its relations to
- 21:37Speaker 2: other objects so far are they incapable of replacing intuition
- 21:42Speaker 2: that is the metaphysical investigation of what is essential and
- 21:46Speaker 2: unique in the object For on the one hand, these concepts,
- 21:50Speaker 2: laid side by side, never actually give us more than
- 21:54Speaker 2: an artificial reconstruction of the object, of which they can
- 21:57Speaker 2: only symbolize certain general and, in a way, impersonal aspects.
- 22:02Speaker 2: It is therefore useless to believe that with them we
- 22:06Speaker 2: can seize a reality of which they present to us
- 22:08Speaker 2: the shadow alone. And, on the other hand, besides the illusion,
- 22:13Speaker 2: there is also a very serious danger. for the concept
- 22:17Speaker 2: generalizes at the same time as it abstracts. The concept
- 22:22Speaker 2: can only symbolize a particular property by making it common
- 22:25Speaker 2: to an infinity of things. It therefore always more or
- 22:29Speaker 2: less deforms the property by the extension it gives to it.
- 22:33Speaker 2: Replaced in the metaphysical object to which it belongs, a
- 22:37Speaker 2: property coincides with the object, or at least molds itself
- 22:41Speaker 2: on it, and adopts the same outline. extracted from the
- 22:45Speaker 2: metaphysical object and presented in a concept it grows indefinitely
- 22:49Speaker 2: larger and goes beyond the object itself since henceforth it
- 22:54Speaker 2: has to contain it along with a number of other
- 22:57Speaker 2: objects thus the different concepts that we form of the
- 23:00Speaker 2: properties of a thing inscribe round it so many circles
- 23:04Speaker 2: each much too large and none of them fitting it
- 23:06Speaker 2: exactly and yet in the thing itself the properties coincided
- 23:11Speaker 2: with the thing and coincided consequently with one another so
- 23:16Speaker 2: that if we are bent on reconstructing the object with
- 23:19Speaker 2: concepts some artifice must be sought whereby this coincidence of
- 23:23Speaker 2: the object and its properties can be brought about for
- 23:27Speaker 2: example we may choose one of the concepts and try
- 23:30Speaker 2: starting from it to get round to the others but
- 23:33Speaker 2: we shall then soon discover that according as we start
- 23:36Speaker 2: from one concept or another the meeting and combination of
- 23:40Speaker 2: the concepts will take place in an altogether different way
- 23:44Speaker 2: according as we start for example from unity or from
- 23:48Speaker 2: multiplicity we shall have to conceive differently the multiple unity
- 23:52Speaker 2: of duration everything will depend on the weight we attribute
- 23:56Speaker 2: to this or that concept and this weight will always
- 23:59Speaker 2: be arbitrary since the concept extracted from the object has
- 24:04Speaker 2: no weight being only the shadow of a body in
- 24:07Speaker 2: this way as many different systems will spring up as
- 24:11Speaker 2: there are external points of view from which the reality
- 24:14Speaker 2: can be examined or larger circles in which it can
- 24:17Speaker 2: be enclosed simple concepts have then not only the inconvenience
- 24:22Speaker 2: of dividing the concrete unity of the object into so
- 24:25Speaker 2: many symbolical expressions they also divide philosophy into distinct schools
- 24:31Speaker 2: each of which takes its seat chooses its counters and
- 24:34Speaker 2: carries on with the others a game that will never
- 24:37Speaker 2: end Either metaphysics is only this play of ideas, or else,
- 24:42Speaker 2: if it is a serious occupation of the mind, if
- 24:45Speaker 2: it is a science and not simply an exercise, it
- 24:48Speaker 2: must transcend concepts in order to reach intuition. Certainly, concepts
- 24:53Speaker 2: are necessary to it, for all the other sciences work
- 24:57Speaker 2: as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot dispense with
- 25:01Speaker 2: the other sciences. but it is only truly itself when
- 25:04Speaker 2: it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it
- 25:07Speaker 2: frees itself from rigid and ready-made concepts in order to
- 25:11Speaker 2: create a kind very different from those which we habitually use.
- 25:16Speaker 2: I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always ready
- 25:20Speaker 2: to mold themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition. We
- 25:24Speaker 2: shall return later to this important point. Let it suffice
- 25:28Speaker 2: us for the moment to have shown that our duration
- 25:31Speaker 2: can be presented to us directly in an intuition, that
- 25:35Speaker 2: it can be suggested to us indirectly by images, but
- 25:38Speaker 2: that it can never, if we can find the word
- 25:40Speaker 2: concept to its proper meaning, be enclosed in a conceptual representation.
- 25:47Speaker 2: let us try for an instant to consider our duration
- 25:50Speaker 2: as a multiplicity it will then be necessary to add
- 25:53Speaker 2: that the terms of this multiplicity instead of being distinct
- 25:57Speaker 2: as they are in any other multiplicity encroach on one
- 26:01Speaker 2: another and that while we can no doubt by an
- 26:04Speaker 2: effort of imagination solidify duration once it has elapsed divide
- 26:09Speaker 2: it into juxtaposed portions and count all these portions yet
- 26:13Speaker 2: this operation is accomplished on the frozen memory of the
- 26:16Speaker 2: duration on the stationary trace which the mobility of duration
- 26:20Speaker 2: leaves behind it and not on the duration itself we
- 26:25Speaker 2: must admit therefore that if there is a multiplicity here
- 26:28Speaker 2: it bears no resemblance to any other multiplicity we know
- 26:32Speaker 2: shall we say then that duration has unity Doubtless a
- 26:36Speaker 2: continuity of elements which prolong themselves into one another participates
- 26:41Speaker 2: in unity as much as in multiplicity, but this moving, changing, colored,
- 26:46Speaker 2: living unity has hardly anything in common with the abstract, motionless,
- 26:51Speaker 2: and empty unity which the concept of pure unity circumscribes.
- 26:56Speaker 2: Shall we conclude from this that duration must be defined
- 26:59Speaker 2: as unity and multiplicity at the same time? But singularly enough,
- 27:04Speaker 2: however much I manipulate the two concepts, portion them out,
- 27:08Speaker 2: combine them differently, practice on them the most subtle operations
- 27:12Speaker 2: of mental chemistry, I never obtain anything which resembles the
- 27:16Speaker 2: simple intuition that I have of duration, while, on the contrary,
- 27:22Speaker 2: when I replace myself in duration by an effort of intuition,
- 27:26Speaker 2: I immediately perceive how it is unity, multiplicity, and many
- 27:30Speaker 2: other things besides. These different concepts, then, are only so
- 27:35Speaker 2: many standpoints from which we could consider duration. Neither separated
- 27:40Speaker 2: nor reunited have they made us penetrate into it. We
- 27:44Speaker 2: do penetrate into it, however, and that can only be
- 27:48Speaker 2: by an effort of intuition. In this sense, an inner,
- 27:52Speaker 2: absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the
- 27:54Speaker 2: self is possible. but if metaphysics here demands and can
- 27:58Speaker 2: obtain an intuition science has none the less need of
- 28:02Speaker 2: an analysis now it is a confusion between the function
- 28:06Speaker 2: of analysis and that of intuition which gives birth to
- 28:09Speaker 2: the discussions between the schools and the conflicts between systems Psychology,
- 28:15Speaker 2: in fact, proceeds like all the other sciences by analysis.
- 28:20Speaker 2: It resolves the self which has been given to it
- 28:22Speaker 2: at first in a simple intuition into sensations, feelings, ideas, etc.,
- 28:28Speaker 2: which it studies separately. It substitutes then for the self
- 28:33Speaker 2: a series of elements which form the facts of psychology.
- 28:37Speaker 2: but are these elements really parts that is the whole
- 28:40Speaker 2: question and it is because it has been evaded that
- 28:44Speaker 2: the problem of human personality has so often been stated
- 28:47Speaker 2: in insoluble terms It is incontestable that every psychical state,
- 28:53Speaker 2: simply because it belongs to a person, reflects the whole
- 28:57Speaker 2: of a personality. Every feeling, however simple it may be,
- 29:01Speaker 2: contains virtually within it the whole past and present of
- 29:05Speaker 2: the being experiencing it, and, consequently, can only be separated
- 29:10Speaker 2: and constituted into a state by an effort of abstraction
- 29:14Speaker 2: or of analysis. but it is no less incontestable that
- 29:18Speaker 2: without this effort of abstraction or analysis, there would be
- 29:22Speaker 2: no possible development of the science of psychology. What then
- 29:26Speaker 2: exactly is the operation by which a psychologist detaches a
- 29:30Speaker 2: mental state in order to erect it into a more
- 29:34Speaker 2: or less independent entity? He begins by neglecting that special
- 29:38Speaker 2: coloring of the personality which cannot be expressed in known
- 29:42Speaker 2: and common terms then he endeavors to isolate in the
- 29:46Speaker 2: person already thus simplified some aspect which lends itself to
- 29:50Speaker 2: an interesting inquiry if he is considering inclination for example
- 29:55Speaker 2: he will neglect the inexpressible shade which colors it and
- 29:59Speaker 2: which makes the inclination mine and not yours he will
- 30:03Speaker 2: fix his attention on the movement by which our personality
- 30:06Speaker 2: leans towards a certain object he will isolate this attitude
- 30:11Speaker 2: and it is this special aspect of the personality this
- 30:14Speaker 2: snapshot of the mobility of the inner life this diagram
- 30:18Speaker 2: of concrete inclination that he will erect into an independent
- 30:22Speaker 2: fact there is in this something very like what an
- 30:26Speaker 2: artist passing through paris does when he makes for example
- 30:30Speaker 2: a sketch of a tower of notre dame The tower
- 30:33Speaker 2: is inseparably united to the building, which is in itself
- 30:37Speaker 2: no less inseparably united to the ground, to its surroundings,
- 30:41Speaker 2: to the whole of Paris, and so on. It is
- 30:44Speaker 2: first necessary to detach it from all these. Only one
- 30:48Speaker 2: aspect of the whole is noted, that formed by the
- 30:51Speaker 2: Tower of Notre Dame. Moreover, the special form of this
- 30:55Speaker 2: tower is due to the grouping of the stones of
- 30:58Speaker 2: which it is composed. but the artist does not concern
- 31:01Speaker 2: himself with these stones, he notes only the silhouette of
- 31:05Speaker 2: the tower. For the real and internal organization of the thing,
- 31:10Speaker 2: he substitutes then an external and schematic representation, so that,
- 31:15Speaker 2: on the whole, his sketch corresponds to an observation of
- 31:19Speaker 2: the object from a certain point of view and to
- 31:22Speaker 2: the choice of a certain means of representation. but exactly
- 31:26Speaker 2: the same thing holds true of the operation by which
- 31:29Speaker 2: the psychologist extracts a single mental state from the whole personality.
- 31:34Speaker 2: This isolated psychical state is hardly anything but a sketch,
- 31:38Speaker 2: the commencement of an artificial reconstruction. It is the whole
- 31:43Speaker 2: considered under a certain elementary aspect in which we are
- 31:46Speaker 2: specially interested, and which we have carefully noted. It is
- 31:51Speaker 2: not a part, but an element. It has not been
- 31:54Speaker 2: obtained by a natural dismemberment, but by analysis. Now beneath
- 31:59Speaker 2: all the sketches he has made at Paris, the visitor
- 32:02Speaker 2: will probably, by way of memento, write the word Paris.
- 32:07Speaker 2: And as he has really seen Paris, he will be able,
- 32:10Speaker 2: with the help of the original intuition he had of
- 32:13Speaker 2: the whole, to place his sketches therein and so join
- 32:17Speaker 2: them up together. But there is no way of performing
- 32:20Speaker 2: the inverse operation. It is impossible, even with an infinite
- 32:24Speaker 2: number of accurate sketches, and even with the word Paris,
- 32:27Speaker 2: which indicates that they must be combined together, to get
- 32:31Speaker 2: back to an intuition that one has never had, and
- 32:34Speaker 2: to give oneself an impression of what Paris is like
- 32:38Speaker 2: if one has never seen it. This is because we
- 32:41Speaker 2: are not dealing here with real parts, but with mere
- 32:44Speaker 2: notes of the total impression. To take a still more
- 32:48Speaker 2: striking example, where the notation is more completely symbolic, suppose
- 32:53Speaker 2: that I am shown, mixed together at random, the letters
- 32:56Speaker 2: which make up a poem I am ignorant of. If
- 32:59Speaker 2: the letters were parts of the poem, I could attempt
- 33:03Speaker 2: to reconstitute the poem with them by trying the different
- 33:06Speaker 2: possible arrangements, as a child does with the pieces of
- 33:09Speaker 2: a Chinese puzzle. but I should never for a moment
- 33:13Speaker 2: think of attempting such a thing in this case, because
- 33:16Speaker 2: the letters are not component parts, but only partial expressions,
- 33:21Speaker 2: which is quite a different thing. That is why, if
- 33:24Speaker 2: I know the poem, I had once put each of
- 33:27Speaker 2: the letters in its proper place and joined them up
- 33:29Speaker 2: without difficulty by a continuous connection, whilst the inverse operation
- 33:34Speaker 2: is impossible. even when i believe i am actually attempting
- 33:38Speaker 2: this inverse operation even when i put the letters end
- 33:42Speaker 2: to end i begin by thinking of some plausible meaning
- 33:46Speaker 2: i thereby give myself an intuition and from this intuition
- 33:51Speaker 2: i attempt to redescend to the elementary symbols which would
- 33:54Speaker 2: reconstitute its expression the very idea of reconstituting a thing
- 34:00Speaker 2: by operations practiced on symbolic elements alone implies such an
- 34:04Speaker 2: absurdity that it would never occur to any one if
- 34:07Speaker 2: they recollected that they were not dealing with fragments of
- 34:10Speaker 2: the thing but only as it were with fragments of
- 34:14Speaker 2: its symbol Such is, however, the undertaking of philosophers who
- 34:19Speaker 2: try to reconstruct personality with psychical states, whether they confine
- 34:24Speaker 2: themselves to these states alone or whether they add a
- 34:27Speaker 2: kind of thread for the purpose of joining the states together.
- 34:31Speaker 2: Both empiricists and rationalists are victims of the same fallacy.
- 34:36Speaker 2: Both of them mistake partial notations for real parts, thus
- 34:40Speaker 2: confusing the point of view of analysis and of intuition,
- 34:44Speaker 2: of science and of metaphysics. The empiricists say quite rightly
- 34:49Speaker 2: that psychological analysis discovers nothing more in personality than psychical states.
- 34:55Speaker 2: Such is, in fact, the function and the very definition
- 34:59Speaker 2: of analysis. the psychologist has nothing else to do but
- 35:03Speaker 2: analyze personality that is to note certain states at the
- 35:08Speaker 2: most he may put the label ego on these states
- 35:11Speaker 2: in saying they are states of the ego just as
- 35:14Speaker 2: the artist writes the word paris on each of his
- 35:16Speaker 2: sketches On the level at which the psychologist places himself,
- 35:21Speaker 2: and on which he must place himself, the ego is
- 35:24Speaker 2: only a sign by which the primitive and moreover very
- 35:28Speaker 2: confused intuition which has furnished the psychologist with his subject
- 35:32Speaker 2: matter is recalled. It is only a word, and the
- 35:36Speaker 2: great error here lies in believing that while remaining on
- 35:40Speaker 2: the same level we can find behind the word a thing.
- 35:44Speaker 2: Such has been the error of these philosophers who have
- 35:47Speaker 2: not been able to resign themselves to being only psychologists
- 35:50Speaker 2: in psychology, Tain and Stuart Mill, for example. Psychologists, in
- 35:56Speaker 2: the method they apply, they have remained metaphysicians in the
- 36:00Speaker 2: object they set before themselves. They desire an intuition, and
- 36:04Speaker 2: by a strange inconsistency they seek this intuition in analysis,
- 36:09Speaker 2: which is the very negation of it. They look for
- 36:12Speaker 2: the ego, and they claim to find it in psychical states,
- 36:16Speaker 2: though this diversity of states has itself only been obtained,
- 36:20Speaker 2: and could only be obtained, by transporting oneself outside the
- 36:24Speaker 2: ego altogether, so as to make a series of sketches, notes,
- 36:28Speaker 2: and more or less symbolic and schematic diagrams. thus however
- 36:32Speaker 2: much they place the states side by side multiplying points
- 36:36Speaker 2: of contact and exploring the intervals the ego always escapes
- 36:41Speaker 2: them so that they finish by seeing in it nothing
- 36:44Speaker 2: but a vain phantom we might as well deny that
- 36:47Speaker 2: the iliad had a meaning on the ground that we
- 36:50Speaker 2: had looked in vain for that meaning in the intervals
- 36:53Speaker 2: between the letters of which it is composed philosophical empiricism
- 36:58Speaker 2: is born here then of a confusion between the point
- 37:01Speaker 2: of view of intuition and that of analysis seeking for
- 37:06Speaker 2: the original in the translation where naturally it cannot be
- 37:10Speaker 2: it denies the existence of the original on the ground
- 37:13Speaker 2: that it is not found in the translation it leads
- 37:16Speaker 2: of necessity to negations, but on examining the matter closely,
- 37:21Speaker 2: we perceive that these negations simply mean that analysis is
- 37:25Speaker 2: not intuition, which is self-evident. From the original, and, one
- 37:30Speaker 2: must add, very indistinct intuition which gives positive science its material,
- 37:35Speaker 2: science passes immediately to analysis, which multiplies to infinity its
- 37:40Speaker 2: observations of this material from outside points of view. it
- 37:45Speaker 2: soon comes to believe that by putting together all these
- 37:48Speaker 2: diagrams it can reconstitute the object itself. No wonder, then,
- 37:53Speaker 2: that it sees this object fly before it, like a
- 37:56Speaker 2: child that would like to make a solid plaything out
- 37:59Speaker 2: of the shadows outlined along the wall. But rationalism is
- 38:03Speaker 2: the dupe of the same illusion. It starts out from
- 38:07Speaker 2: the same confusion as empiricism and remains equally powerless to
- 38:11Speaker 2: reach the inner self. Like empiricism, it considers psychical states
- 38:16Speaker 2: as so many fragments detached from an ego that binds
- 38:19Speaker 2: them together. Like empiricism, it tries to join these fragments
- 38:24Speaker 2: together in order to recreate the unity of the self.
- 38:28Speaker 2: Like empiricism, finally, it sees this unity of the self
- 38:32Speaker 2: in the continually renewed effort it makes to clasp it,
- 38:35Speaker 2: steal away indefinitely like a phantom. but whilst empiricism weary
- 38:40Speaker 2: of the struggle ends by declaring that there is nothing
- 38:43Speaker 2: else but the multiplicity of psychical states rationalism persists in
- 38:48Speaker 2: affirming the unity of the person It is true that,
- 38:52Speaker 2: seeking this unity on the level of the psychical states themselves,
- 38:57Speaker 2: and obliged besides to put down to the account of
- 38:59Speaker 2: these states all the qualities and determinations that it finds
- 39:03Speaker 2: by analysis, since analysis by its very definition leads always
- 39:08Speaker 2: to states, nothing is left to it for the unity
- 39:11Speaker 2: of personality but something purely negative, the absence of all determination.
- 39:17Speaker 2: the psychical states having necessarily in this analysis taken and
- 39:21Speaker 2: kept for themselves everything that can serve as matter the
- 39:25Speaker 2: unity of the ego can never be more than a
- 39:27Speaker 2: form without content it will be absolutely indeterminate and absolutely
- 39:33Speaker 2: void to these detached psychical states to these shadows of
- 39:38Speaker 2: the ego the sum of which was for the empiricists
- 39:41Speaker 2: the equivalent of the self rationalism in order to reconstitute
- 39:45Speaker 2: personality adds something still more unreal the void in which
- 39:50Speaker 2: these shadows move a place for shadows one might say
- 39:55Speaker 2: How could this form, which is in truth formless, serve
- 39:58Speaker 2: to characterize a living, active, concrete personality, or to distinguish
- 40:03Speaker 2: Peter from Paul? Is it astonishing that the philosophers who
- 40:07Speaker 2: have isolated this form of personality should then find it
- 40:11Speaker 2: insufficient to characterize a definite person, and that they should
- 40:15Speaker 2: be gradually led to make their empty ego a kind
- 40:18Speaker 2: of bottomless receptacle which belongs no more to Peter than
- 40:21Speaker 2: to Paul, and in which there is room, according to
- 40:24Speaker 2: our preference, for entire humanity, for God, or for existence
- 40:28Speaker 2: in general? i see in this matter only one difference
- 40:32Speaker 2: between empiricism and rationalism the former seeking the unity of
- 40:37Speaker 2: the ego in the gaps as it were between the
- 40:40Speaker 2: psychical states is led to fill the gaps with other
- 40:43Speaker 2: states and so on indefinitely so that the ego compressed
- 40:47Speaker 2: in a constantly narrowing interval tends towards zero, as analysis
- 40:52Speaker 2: is pushed farther and farther, whilst rationalism, making the ego
- 40:57Speaker 2: the place where mental states are lodged, is confronted with
- 41:00Speaker 2: an empty space which we have no reason to limit
- 41:03Speaker 2: here rather than there, which goes beyond each of the
- 41:07Speaker 2: successive boundaries that we try to assign to it, which
- 41:10Speaker 2: constantly grows larger, and which tends to lose itself no
- 41:14Speaker 2: longer in zero, but in the infinite. The distance, then,
- 41:18Speaker 2: between a so-called empiricism like that of Tain and the
- 41:22Speaker 2: most transcendental speculations of certain German pantheists is very much
- 41:27Speaker 2: less than is generally supposed. The method is analogous in
- 41:31Speaker 2: both cases. It consists in reasoning about the elements of
- 41:35Speaker 2: a translation as if they were parts of the original.
- 41:39Speaker 2: But a true empiricism is that which proposes to get
- 41:42Speaker 2: as near to the original itself as possible, to search
- 41:46Speaker 2: deeply into its life, and so, by a kind of
- 41:49Speaker 2: intellectual ascultation, to feel the throbbings of its soul, and
- 41:54Speaker 2: this true empiricism is the true metaphysics. It is true
- 41:58Speaker 2: that the task is an extremely difficult one, for none
- 42:01Speaker 2: of the ready-made conceptions which thought employs in its daily
- 42:05Speaker 2: operations can be of any use. Nothing is more easy
- 42:09Speaker 2: than to say that the ego is multiplicity or that
- 42:12Speaker 2: it is unity or that it is the synthesis of both.
- 42:16Speaker 2: Unity and multiplicity are here representations that we have no
- 42:21Speaker 2: need to cut out on the model of the object.
- 42:24Speaker 2: They are found ready-made and have only to be chosen
- 42:27Speaker 2: from a heap. They are stock-sized clothes which do just
- 42:31Speaker 2: as well for Peter as for Paul, for they set
- 42:34Speaker 2: off the form of neither. but an empiricism worthy of
- 42:37Speaker 2: the name, an empiricism which works only to measure, is
- 42:41Speaker 2: obliged for each new object that it studies to make
- 42:45Speaker 2: an absolutely fresh effort. It cuts out for the object
- 42:49Speaker 2: a concept which is appropriate to that object alone, a
- 42:52Speaker 2: concept which can as yet hardly be called a concept,
- 42:56Speaker 2: since it applies to this one thing. It does not
- 42:59Speaker 2: proceed by combining current ideas like unity and multiplicity, but
- 43:04Speaker 2: it leads us, on the contrary, to a simple, unique representation, which,
- 43:09Speaker 2: however once formed, enables us to understand easily how it
- 43:13Speaker 2: is that we can place it in the frames unity, multiplicity, etc.,
- 43:18Speaker 2: all much larger than itself. In short, philosophy thus defined
- 43:23Speaker 2: does not consist in the choice of certain concepts and
- 43:26Speaker 2: in taking sides with a school, but in the search
- 43:29Speaker 2: for a unique intuition from which we can descend with
- 43:32Speaker 2: equal ease to different concepts, because we are placed above
- 43:36Speaker 2: the divisions of the schools. That personality has unity cannot
- 43:41Speaker 2: be denied, but such an affirmation teaches one nothing about
- 43:46Speaker 2: the extraordinary nature of the particular unity presented by personality.
- 43:51Speaker 2: That our self is multiple I also agree, but then
- 43:55Speaker 2: it must be understood that it is a multiplicity which
- 43:58Speaker 2: has nothing in common with any other multiplicity. What is
- 44:02Speaker 2: really important for philosophy is to know exactly what unity,
- 44:06Speaker 2: what multiplicity, and what reality superior both to abstract unity
- 44:11Speaker 2: and multiplicity, the multiple unity of the self actually is.
- 44:16Speaker 2: Now philosophy will know this only when it recovers possession
- 44:20Speaker 2: of the simple intuition of the self by the self. Then,
- 44:24Speaker 2: according to the direction it chooses for its descent from
- 44:27Speaker 2: this summit, it will arrive at unity or multiplicity, or
- 44:31Speaker 2: at any one of the concepts by which we try
- 44:34Speaker 2: to define the moving life of the self. But no
- 44:37Speaker 2: mingling of these concepts would give anything which at all
- 44:40Speaker 2: resembles the self that endures. If we are shown a
- 44:44Speaker 2: solid cone, we see without any difficulty how it narrows
- 44:48Speaker 2: towards the summit and tends to be lost in a
- 44:51Speaker 2: mathematical point, and also how it enlarges in the direction
- 44:55Speaker 2: of the base into an indefinitely increasing circle. But neither
- 45:00Speaker 2: the point nor the circle, nor the juxtaposition of the
- 45:03Speaker 2: two on a plane, would give us the least idea
- 45:06Speaker 2: of a cone. The same thing holds true of the
- 45:10Speaker 2: unity and multiplicity of mental life and of the zero
- 45:13Speaker 2: and the infinite towards which empiricism and rationalism conduct personality.
- 45:19Speaker 2: An Introduction to Metaphysics by Henri Bergson Translated by T. E.
- 45:25Speaker 2: Halm Part 3 concepts as we shall show elsewhere generally
- 45:31Speaker 2: go together in groups and represent two contraries there is
- 45:35Speaker 2: hardly any concrete reality which cannot be observed from two
- 45:38Speaker 2: opposing standpoints which cannot consequently be subsumed under two antagonistic
- 45:44Speaker 2: concepts hence a thesis and an antithesis which we endeavour
- 45:49Speaker 2: in vain to reconcile logically for the very simple reason
- 45:53Speaker 2: that it is impossible with concepts and observations taken from
- 45:56Speaker 2: outside points of view to make a thing but from
- 46:00Speaker 2: the object, seized by intuition, we pass easily in many
- 46:04Speaker 2: cases to the two contrary concepts, and as in that
- 46:08Speaker 2: way thesis and antithesis can be seen to spring from reality,
- 46:13Speaker 2: we grasp at the same time how it is that
- 46:15Speaker 2: the two are opposed and how they are reconciled. It
- 46:19Speaker 2: is true that to accomplish this, it is necessary to
- 46:23Speaker 2: proceed by a reversal of the usual work of the intellect,
- 46:27Speaker 2: Thinking usually consists in passing from concepts to things and
- 46:31Speaker 2: not from things to concepts. To know a reality, in
- 46:35Speaker 2: the usual sense of the word know, is to take
- 46:38Speaker 2: ready-made concepts, to portion them out and to mix them
- 46:42Speaker 2: together until a practical equivalent of the reality is obtained.
- 46:46Speaker 2: But it must be remembered that the normal work of
- 46:49Speaker 2: the intellect is far from being disinterested. We do not
- 46:53Speaker 2: aim generally at knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but
- 46:56Speaker 2: in order to take sides to draw profit, in short,
- 47:00Speaker 2: to satisfy an interest. We inquire up to what point
- 47:03Speaker 2: the object we seek to know is this or that,
- 47:07Speaker 2: to what known class it belongs, and what kind of action, bearing,
- 47:11Speaker 2: or attitude it should suggest to us. These different possible
- 47:15Speaker 2: actions and attitudes are so many conceptual directions of our
- 47:19Speaker 2: thought determined once for all. It remains only to follow
- 47:23Speaker 2: them in that precisely consists the application of concepts to things.
- 47:29Speaker 2: To try to fit a concept on an object is
- 47:32Speaker 2: simply to ask what we can do with the object
- 47:35Speaker 2: and what it can do for us. To label an
- 47:38Speaker 2: object with a certain concept is to mark in precise
- 47:41Speaker 2: terms the kind of action or attitude the object should
- 47:44Speaker 2: suggest to us. All knowledge, properly so called, is then
- 47:49Speaker 2: oriented on a certain direction or taken from a certain
- 47:53Speaker 2: point of view. It is true that our interest is
- 47:56Speaker 2: often complex. This is why it happens that our knowledge
- 47:59Speaker 2: of the same object may face several successive directions and
- 48:03Speaker 2: may be taken from various points of view. It is
- 48:07Speaker 2: this which constitutes, in the usual meaning of the terms,
- 48:11Speaker 2: a broad and comprehensive knowledge of the object. The object
- 48:15Speaker 2: is then brought not under one single concept, but under
- 48:18Speaker 2: several in which it is supposed to participate. How does
- 48:22Speaker 2: it participate in all these concepts at the same time?
- 48:25Speaker 2: This is a question which does not concern our practical action,
- 48:29Speaker 2: and about which we need not trouble. It is, therefore,
- 48:33Speaker 2: natural and legitimate in daily life to proceed by the
- 48:37Speaker 2: juxtaposition and portioning out of concepts. No philosophical difficulty will
- 48:42Speaker 2: arise from this procedure, since by a tacit agreement we
- 48:46Speaker 2: shall abstain from philosophizing. but to carry this modus operandi
- 48:51Speaker 2: into philosophy to pass here also from concepts to the
- 48:55Speaker 2: thing to use in order to obtain a disinterested knowledge
- 48:58Speaker 2: of an object that this time we desire to grasp
- 49:02Speaker 2: as it is in itself a manner of knowing inspired
- 49:05Speaker 2: by a determinate interest consisting by definition in an externally
- 49:09Speaker 2: taken view of the object is to go against the
- 49:13Speaker 2: end that we have chosen to condemn philosophy to an
- 49:16Speaker 2: eternal skirmishing between the schools and to install contradiction in
- 49:21Speaker 2: the very heart of the object and of the method.
- 49:24Speaker 2: Either there is no philosophy possible and all knowledge of
- 49:28Speaker 2: things is a practical knowledge aimed at the profit to
- 49:31Speaker 2: be drawn from them, or else philosophy consists in placing
- 49:34Speaker 2: oneself within the object itself by an effort of intuition.
- 49:39Speaker 2: But in order to understand the nature of this intuition,
- 49:42Speaker 2: in order to fix with precision where intuition ends and
- 49:45Speaker 2: where analysis begins, it is necessary to return to what
- 49:49Speaker 2: was said earlier about the flux of duration. It will
- 49:53Speaker 2: be noticed that an essential characteristic of the concepts and
- 49:57Speaker 2: diagrams to which analysis leads is that, while being considered,
- 50:02Speaker 2: they remain stationary. I isolate from the totality of interior
- 50:06Speaker 2: life that psychical entity which I call a simple sensation.
- 50:11Speaker 2: So long as I study it, I suppose that it
- 50:14Speaker 2: remains constant. If I noticed any change in it, I
- 50:18Speaker 2: should say that it was not a single sensation, but
- 50:21Speaker 2: several successive sensations, and I should then transfer to each
- 50:25Speaker 2: of these successive sensations the immutability that I first attributed
- 50:30Speaker 2: to the total sensation. in any case i can by
- 50:34Speaker 2: pushing the analysis far enough always manage to arrive at
- 50:37Speaker 2: elements which i agree to consider immutable there and there
- 50:42Speaker 2: only shall i find the solid basis of operations which
- 50:45Speaker 2: science needs for its own proper development but then i
- 50:50Speaker 2: cannot escape the objection that there is no state of
- 50:53Speaker 2: mind however simple which does not change every moment since
- 50:57Speaker 2: there is no consciousness without memory and no continuation of
- 51:01Speaker 2: a state without the addition to the present feeling of
- 51:04Speaker 2: the memory of past moments it is this which constitutes
- 51:08Speaker 2: duration Inner duration is a continuous life of a memory
- 51:12Speaker 2: which prolongs the past into the present, the present either
- 51:16Speaker 2: containing within it, in a distinct form, the ceaselessly growing
- 51:20Speaker 2: image of the past, or more probably, showing by its
- 51:23Speaker 2: continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load
- 51:27Speaker 2: we drag behind us as we grow older. Without this
- 51:31Speaker 2: survival of the past into the present, there would be
- 51:34Speaker 2: no duration, but only instantaneity. probably if i am thus
- 51:39Speaker 2: accused of taking the mental state out of duration by
- 51:42Speaker 2: the mere fact that i analyze it i shall reply
- 51:46Speaker 2: is not each of these elementary psychical states to which
- 51:49Speaker 2: my analysis leads itself a state which occupies time my
- 51:54Speaker 2: analysis i shall say does indeed resolve the inner life
- 51:58Speaker 2: into states each of which is homogeneous with itself only
- 52:03Speaker 2: since the homogeneity extends over a definite number of minutes
- 52:07Speaker 2: or of seconds the elementary psychical state does not cease
- 52:11Speaker 2: to endure although it does not change But, in saying that,
- 52:16Speaker 2: I fail to see that the definite number of minutes
- 52:19Speaker 2: and of seconds which I am attributing here to the
- 52:21Speaker 2: elementary psychical state has simply the value of a sign
- 52:26Speaker 2: intended to remind me that the psychical state, supposed homogeneous,
- 52:31Speaker 2: is in reality a state which changes and endures. The state,
- 52:35Speaker 2: taken in itself, is a perpetual becoming. i have extracted
- 52:39Speaker 2: from this becoming a certain average of quality which i
- 52:42Speaker 2: have supposed invariable i have in this way constituted a
- 52:46Speaker 2: stable and consequently schematic state i have on the other
- 52:51Speaker 2: hand extracted from it becoming in general i e a
- 52:56Speaker 2: becoming which is not the becoming of any particular thing
- 52:59Speaker 2: and this is what i have called the time the
- 53:02Speaker 2: state occupies were i to look at it closely i
- 53:05Speaker 2: should see that this abstract time is as immobile for
- 53:09Speaker 2: me as the state which i localize in it that
- 53:12Speaker 2: it could flow only by a continual change of quality
- 53:15Speaker 2: and that if it is without quality merely the theatre
- 53:18Speaker 2: of the change it thus becomes an immobile medium I
- 53:22Speaker 2: should see that the construction of this homogeneous time is
- 53:26Speaker 2: simply designed to facilitate the comparison between the different concrete durations,
- 53:31Speaker 2: to permit us to count simultaneities, and to measure one
- 53:35Speaker 2: flux of duration in relation to another. And lastly, I
- 53:39Speaker 2: should understand that, in attaching the sign of a definite
- 53:43Speaker 2: number of minutes and of seconds to the representation of
- 53:46Speaker 2: an elementary psychical state, I am merely reminding myself and
- 53:50Speaker 2: others that the state has been detached from an ego
- 53:53Speaker 2: which endures, and merely marking out the place where it
- 53:56Speaker 2: must again be set in movement in order to bring
- 53:59Speaker 2: it back from the abstract schematic thing it has become
- 54:03Speaker 2: to the concrete state it was at first. But I
- 54:06Speaker 2: ignore all that because it has nothing to do with analysis.
- 54:11Speaker 2: This means that analysis operates always on the immobile, whilst
- 54:16Speaker 2: intuition places itself in mobility, or, what comes to the
- 54:19Speaker 2: same thing, in duration. There lies the very distinct line
- 54:24Speaker 2: of demarcation between intuition and analysis. The real, the experienced,
- 54:29Speaker 2: and the concrete are recognized by the fact that they
- 54:32Speaker 2: are variability itself, the element by the fact that it
- 54:36Speaker 2: is invariable. and the element is invariable by definition, being
- 54:41Speaker 2: a diagram, a simplified reconstruction, often a mere symbol, in
- 54:46Speaker 2: any case a motionless view of the moving reality. But
- 54:50Speaker 2: the error consists in believing that we can reconstruct the
- 54:53Speaker 2: real with these diagrams. As we have already said, and
- 54:57Speaker 2: may as well repeat here, from intuition one can pass
- 55:00Speaker 2: to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition. Out of
- 55:05Speaker 2: variability we can make as many variations, qualities, and modifications
- 55:10Speaker 2: as we please, since these are so many static views
- 55:14Speaker 2: taken by analysis of the mobility given to intuition. But
- 55:18Speaker 2: these modifications put end to end will produce nothing which
- 55:22Speaker 2: resembles variability, since they are not parts of it, but elements,
- 55:27Speaker 2: which is quite a different thing. Consider, for example, the
- 55:31Speaker 2: variability which is nearest to homogeneity, that of movement in space.
- 55:36Speaker 2: Along the whole of this movement, we can imagine possible stoppages.
- 55:41Speaker 2: These are what we call the positions of the moving body,
- 55:44Speaker 2: or the points by which it passes. But with these positions,
- 55:48Speaker 2: even with an infinite number of them, we shall never
- 55:51Speaker 2: make movement. They are not parts of the movement, they
- 55:54Speaker 2: are so many snapshots of it. They are, one might say,
- 55:58Speaker 2: only supposed stopping places. The moving body is never really
- 56:03Speaker 2: in any of the points. The most we can say
- 56:06Speaker 2: is that it passes through them. But passage, which is movement,
- 56:10Speaker 2: has nothing in common with stoppage, which is immobility. A
- 56:14Speaker 2: movement cannot be superimposed on an immobility, or it would
- 56:18Speaker 2: then coincide with it, which would be a contradiction. The
- 56:22Speaker 2: points are not in the movement as parts, nor even
- 56:25Speaker 2: beneath it as positions occupied by the moving body. They
- 56:29Speaker 2: are simply projected by us under the movement as so
- 56:33Speaker 2: many places where a moving body, which by hypothesis does
- 56:36Speaker 2: not stop, would be if it were to stop. They
- 56:40Speaker 2: are not, therefore, properly speaking, positions, but suppositions, aspects, or
- 56:46Speaker 2: points of view of the mind. But how could we
- 56:49Speaker 2: construct a thing with points of view? Nevertheless, this is
- 56:53Speaker 2: what we try to do whenever we reason about movement,
- 56:56Speaker 2: and also about time, for which movement serves as a
- 56:59Speaker 2: means of representation. as a result of an illusion deeply
- 57:04Speaker 2: rooted in our mind and because we cannot prevent ourselves
- 57:07Speaker 2: from considering analysis as the equivalent of intuition we begin
- 57:12Speaker 2: by distinguishing along the whole extent of the movement a
- 57:15Speaker 2: certain number of possible stoppages or points which we make
- 57:19Speaker 2: whether they like it or no parts of the movement
- 57:23Speaker 2: Faced with our impotence to reconstruct the movement with these points,
- 57:27Speaker 2: we insert other points, believing that we can in this
- 57:30Speaker 2: way get nearer to the essential mobility in the movement. Then,
- 57:34Speaker 2: as the mobility still escapes us, we substitute for a
- 57:38Speaker 2: fixed and finite number of points an indefinitely increasing number,
- 57:43Speaker 2: thus vainly trying to counterfeit, by the movement of a
- 57:46Speaker 2: thought that goes on indefinitely adding points to points, the
- 57:49Speaker 2: real and undivided motion of the moving body. finally we
- 57:53Speaker 2: say that movement is composed of points but that it
- 57:57Speaker 2: comprises in addition the obscure and mysterious passage from one
- 58:01Speaker 2: position to the next as if the obscurity was not
- 58:04Speaker 2: due entirely to the fact that we have supposed immobility
- 58:08Speaker 2: to be clearer than mobility and rest anterior to movement
- 58:12Speaker 2: as if the mystery did not follow entirely from our
- 58:15Speaker 2: attempting to pass from stoppages to movement by way of
- 58:18Speaker 2: addition which is impossible when it is so easy to
- 58:22Speaker 2: pass by simple diminution from movement to the slackening of
- 58:26Speaker 2: movement and so to immobility it is movement that we
- 58:30Speaker 2: must accustom ourselves to look upon as simplest and clearest
- 58:34Speaker 2: immobility being only the extreme limit of the slowing down
- 58:38Speaker 2: of movement a limit reached only perhaps in thought and
- 58:42Speaker 2: never realized in nature What we have done is to
- 58:45Speaker 2: seek for the meaning of the poem in the form
- 58:47Speaker 2: of the letters of which it is composed. We have
- 58:50Speaker 2: believed that by considering an increasing number of letters, we
- 58:54Speaker 2: would grasp at last the ever-escaping meaning, and in desperation,
- 58:59Speaker 2: seeing that it was useless to seek for a part
- 59:01Speaker 2: of the sense in each of the letters, we have
- 59:04Speaker 2: supposed that it was between each letter and the next
- 59:07Speaker 2: that this long-sought fragment of the mysterious sense was lodged.
- 59:11Speaker 2: But the letters, it must be pointed out once again,
- 59:14Speaker 2: are not parts of the thing, but elements of the symbol. Again,
- 59:19Speaker 2: the positions of the moving body are not parts of
- 59:22Speaker 2: the movement, they are points of the space which is
- 59:24Speaker 2: supposed to underlie the movement. This empty and immobile space
- 59:29Speaker 2: which is merely conceived, never perceived, has the value of
- 59:33Speaker 2: a symbol only. How could you ever manufacture reality by
- 59:38Speaker 2: manipulating symbols? But the symbol in this case responds to
- 59:42Speaker 2: the most inveterate habits of our thought. We place ourselves
- 59:46Speaker 2: as a rule in immobility in which we find a
- 59:49Speaker 2: point of support for practical purposes and with this immobility
- 59:53Speaker 2: we try to reconstruct motion. We only obtain in this
- 59:57Speaker 2: way a clumsy imitation, a counterfeit of real movement. But
- 1:00:02Speaker 2: this imitation is much more useful in life than the
- 1:00:05Speaker 2: intuition of the thing itself would be. Now our mind
- 1:00:08Speaker 2: has an irresistible tendency to consider that idea clearest, which
- 1:00:13Speaker 2: is most often useful to it. That is why immobility
- 1:00:16Speaker 2: seems to it clearer than mobility and rest anterior to movement.
- 1:00:22Speaker 2: the difficulties to which the problem of movement has given
- 1:00:25Speaker 2: rise from the earliest antiquity have originated in this way
- 1:00:30Speaker 2: they result always from the fact that we insist on
- 1:00:33Speaker 2: passing from space to movement from the trajectory to the
- 1:00:36Speaker 2: flight from immobile positions to mobility and on passing from
- 1:00:41Speaker 2: one to the other by way of addition but it
- 1:00:44Speaker 2: is movement which is anterior to immobility, and the relation
- 1:00:48Speaker 2: between positions and a displacement is not that of parts
- 1:00:52Speaker 2: to a whole, but that of the diversity of possible
- 1:00:55Speaker 2: points of view to the real indivisibility of the object.
- 1:01:00Speaker 2: Many other problems are born out of the same illusion.
- 1:01:03Speaker 2: What stationary points are to the movement of a moving body,
- 1:01:07Speaker 2: concepts of different qualities are to the qualitative change of
- 1:01:10Speaker 2: an object. The various concepts into which a change can
- 1:01:14Speaker 2: be analyzed are therefore so many stable views of the
- 1:01:17Speaker 2: instability of the real. And to think of an object,
- 1:01:21Speaker 2: in the usual meaning of the word thing, is to
- 1:01:24Speaker 2: take one or more of these immobile views of its mobility.
- 1:01:28Speaker 2: It consists, in short, in asking from time to time
- 1:01:31Speaker 2: where the object is, in order that we may know
- 1:01:34Speaker 2: what to do with it. Nothing could be more legitimate, moreover,
- 1:01:39Speaker 2: than this method of procedure, so long as we are
- 1:01:41Speaker 2: concerned only with a practical knowledge of reality. Knowledge, insofar
- 1:01:46Speaker 2: as it is directed to practical matters, has only to
- 1:01:49Speaker 2: enumerate the principal possible attitudes of the thing towards us,
- 1:01:53Speaker 2: as well as our best possible attitude towards it. Therein
- 1:01:57Speaker 2: lies the ordinary function of ready-made concepts, those stations with
- 1:02:02Speaker 2: which we mark out the path of becoming. but to
- 1:02:05Speaker 2: seek to penetrate with them into the inmost nature of
- 1:02:08Speaker 2: things is to apply to the mobility of the real
- 1:02:11Speaker 2: a method created in order to give stationary points of
- 1:02:14Speaker 2: observation on it it is to forget that if metaphysic
- 1:02:18Speaker 2: is possible it can only be a laborious and even
- 1:02:21Speaker 2: painful effort to remount the natural slope of the work
- 1:02:25Speaker 2: of thought in order to place one's self directly by
- 1:02:28Speaker 2: a kind of intellectual expansion within the thing studied in
- 1:02:33Speaker 2: short a passage from reality to concepts and no longer
- 1:02:36Speaker 2: from concepts to reality is it astonishing that like children
- 1:02:41Speaker 2: trying to catch smoke by closing their hands philosophers so
- 1:02:45Speaker 2: often see the object they would grasp fly before them
- 1:02:48Speaker 2: it is in this way that many of the quarrels
- 1:02:51Speaker 2: between the schools are perpetuated each of them reproaching the
- 1:02:54Speaker 2: others with having allowed the real to slip away But
- 1:02:58Speaker 2: if metaphysics is to proceed by intuition, if intuition has
- 1:03:02Speaker 2: the mobility of duration as its object, and if duration
- 1:03:06Speaker 2: is of a psychical nature, shall we not be confining
- 1:03:09Speaker 2: the philosopher to the exclusive contemplation of himself? Will not
- 1:03:14Speaker 2: philosophy come to consist in watching oneself merely live, as
- 1:03:18Speaker 2: a sleepy shepherd watches the water flow? to talk in
- 1:03:22Speaker 2: this way would be to return to the error which
- 1:03:24Speaker 2: since the beginning of this study we have not ceased
- 1:03:27Speaker 2: to point out it would be to misconceive the singular
- 1:03:31Speaker 2: nature of duration and at the same time the essentially
- 1:03:35Speaker 2: active i might almost say violent character of metaphysical intuition
- 1:03:40Speaker 2: It would be failing to see that the method we
- 1:03:42Speaker 2: speak of alone permits us to go beyond idealism as
- 1:03:46Speaker 2: well as realism, to affirm the existence of objects inferior
- 1:03:50Speaker 2: and superior, though in a certain sense interior, to us,
- 1:03:54Speaker 2: to make them coexist together without difficulty, and to dissipate
- 1:03:58Speaker 2: gradually the obscurities that analysis accumulates round these great problems.
- 1:04:04Speaker 2: Without entering here upon the study of these different points...
- 1:04:07Speaker 2: let us confine ourselves to showing how the intuition we
- 1:04:11Speaker 2: speak of is not a single act but an indefinite
- 1:04:14Speaker 2: series of acts all doubtless of the same kind but
- 1:04:17Speaker 2: each of a very particular species and how this diversity
- 1:04:21Speaker 2: of acts corresponds to all degrees of being if i
- 1:04:25Speaker 2: seek to analyze duration that is to resolve it into
- 1:04:29Speaker 2: ready-made concepts i am compelled by the very nature of
- 1:04:33Speaker 2: the concepts and of analysis to take two opposing views
- 1:04:37Speaker 2: of duration in general with which i can then attempt
- 1:04:40Speaker 2: to reconstruct it This combination, which will have, moreover, something
- 1:04:45Speaker 2: miraculous about it, since one does not understand how two
- 1:04:48Speaker 2: contraries would ever meet each other, can present neither a
- 1:04:52Speaker 2: diversity of degrees nor a variety of forms. Like all miracles,
- 1:04:57Speaker 2: it is or it is not. I shall have to say,
- 1:05:01Speaker 2: for example, that there is on the one hand a
- 1:05:04Speaker 2: multiplicity of successive states of consciousness and on the other
- 1:05:08Speaker 2: a unity which binds them together. duration will be the
- 1:05:12Speaker 2: synthesis of this unity and this multiplicity a mysterious operation
- 1:05:16Speaker 2: which takes place in darkness and in regard to which
- 1:05:20Speaker 2: i repeat one does not see how it would admit
- 1:05:23Speaker 2: of shades or of degrees in this hypothesis there is
- 1:05:27Speaker 2: and can only be one single duration that in which
- 1:05:31Speaker 2: our own consciousness habitually works to express it more clearly
- 1:05:35Speaker 2: if we consider duration under the simple aspect of a
- 1:05:39Speaker 2: movement accomplishing itself in space and we seek to reduce
- 1:05:42Speaker 2: to concepts movement considered as representative of time we shall
- 1:05:47Speaker 2: have on the one hand as great a number of
- 1:05:49Speaker 2: points on the trajectory as we may desire and on
- 1:05:53Speaker 2: the other hand an abstract unity which holds them together
- 1:05:56Speaker 2: as a thread holds together the pearls of a necklace
- 1:06:00Speaker 2: between this abstract multiplicity and this abstract unity the combination
- 1:06:05Speaker 2: when once it has been posited as possible is something
- 1:06:08Speaker 2: unique which will no more admit of shades than does
- 1:06:11Speaker 2: the addition of given numbers in arithmetic but if instead
- 1:06:15Speaker 2: of professing to analyze duration i e at bottom to
- 1:06:19Speaker 2: make a synthesis of it with concepts we at once
- 1:06:22Speaker 2: place ourselves in it by an effort of intuition we
- 1:06:26Speaker 2: have the feeling of a certain very determinate tension in
- 1:06:29Speaker 2: which the determination itself appears as a choice between an
- 1:06:33Speaker 2: infinity of possible durations Henceforward we can picture to ourselves
- 1:06:38Speaker 2: as many durations as we wish, all very different from
- 1:06:41Speaker 2: each other, although each of them, on being reduced to concepts,
- 1:06:46Speaker 2: that is, observed externally from two opposing points of view,
- 1:06:50Speaker 2: always comes in the end to the same indefinable combination
- 1:06:53Speaker 2: of the many and the one. Let us express the
- 1:06:57Speaker 2: same idea with more precision. If I consider duration as
- 1:07:01Speaker 2: a multiplicity of moments bound to each other by a
- 1:07:04Speaker 2: unity which goes through them like a thread, then, however
- 1:07:08Speaker 2: short the chosen duration may be, these moments are unlimited
- 1:07:12Speaker 2: in number. I can suppose them as close together as
- 1:07:15Speaker 2: I please. There will always be between these mathematical points
- 1:07:19Speaker 2: other mathematical points, and so on to infinity. Looked at
- 1:07:23Speaker 2: from the point of view of multiplicity then, duration disintegrates
- 1:07:27Speaker 2: into a powder of moments, none of which endures, each
- 1:07:31Speaker 2: being an instantaneity. If, on the other hand, I consider
- 1:07:35Speaker 2: the unity which binds the moments together, this cannot endure either,
- 1:07:40Speaker 2: since by hypothesis everything that is changing and everything that
- 1:07:43Speaker 2: is really durable in the duration has been put to
- 1:07:47Speaker 2: the account of the multiplicity of moments. as i probe
- 1:07:50Speaker 2: more deeply into its essence this unity will appear to
- 1:07:54Speaker 2: me as some immobile substratum of that which is moving
- 1:07:58Speaker 2: as some intemporal essence of time it is this that
- 1:08:01Speaker 2: i shall call eternity an eternity of death since it
- 1:08:05Speaker 2: is nothing else than the movement emptied of the mobility
- 1:08:08Speaker 2: which made its life closely examined the opinions of the
- 1:08:12Speaker 2: opposing schools on the subject of duration would be seen
- 1:08:15Speaker 2: to differ solely in this that they attribute a capital
- 1:08:19Speaker 2: importance to one or the other of these two concepts
- 1:08:22Speaker 2: some adhere to the point of view of the multiple
- 1:08:25Speaker 2: they set up as concrete reality the distinct moments of
- 1:08:29Speaker 2: a time which they have reduced to powder the unity
- 1:08:32Speaker 2: which enables us to call the grains of powder they
- 1:08:35Speaker 2: hold to be much more artificial Others, on the contrary,
- 1:08:39Speaker 2: set up the unity of duration as concrete reality. They
- 1:08:43Speaker 2: place themselves in the eternal, but as their eternity remains,
- 1:08:48Speaker 2: notwithstanding abstract, since it is empty, being the eternity of
- 1:08:52Speaker 2: a concept which, by hypothesis, excludes from itself the opposing concept,
- 1:08:58Speaker 2: one does not see how this eternity would permit of
- 1:09:00Speaker 2: an indefinite number of moments co-existing in it In the
- 1:09:04Speaker 2: first hypothesis we have a world resting on nothing which
- 1:09:08Speaker 2: must end and begin again of its own accord at
- 1:09:10Speaker 2: each instant. In the second we have an infinity of
- 1:09:14Speaker 2: abstract eternity about which also it is just as difficult
- 1:09:18Speaker 2: to understand why it does not remain enveloped in itself
- 1:09:22Speaker 2: and how it allows things to coexist with it. But
- 1:09:25Speaker 2: in both cases and whichever of the two metaphysics it
- 1:09:28Speaker 2: be that one is switched into Time appears, from the
- 1:09:32Speaker 2: psychological point of view, as a mixture of two abstractions
- 1:09:36Speaker 2: which admit of neither degrees nor shades. in one system
- 1:09:40Speaker 2: as in the other there is only one unique duration
- 1:09:44Speaker 2: which carries everything with it a bottomless bankless river which
- 1:09:48Speaker 2: flows without assignable force in a direction which could not
- 1:09:51Speaker 2: be defined even then we can call it only a
- 1:09:55Speaker 2: river and the river only flows because reality obtains from
- 1:09:59Speaker 2: the two doctrines this concession profiting by a moment of
- 1:10:03Speaker 2: perplexity in their logic as soon as they recover from
- 1:10:06Speaker 2: this perplexity they freeze this flux either into an immense
- 1:10:10Speaker 2: solid sheet or into an infinity of crystallized needles always
- 1:10:15Speaker 2: into a thing which necessarily partakes of the immobility of
- 1:10:19Speaker 2: a point of view it is quite otherwise if we
- 1:10:22Speaker 2: place ourselves from the first by an effort of intuition
- 1:10:26Speaker 2: in the concrete flow of duration certainly we shall then
- 1:10:30Speaker 2: find no logical reason for positing multiple and diverse durations
- 1:10:35Speaker 2: strictly there might well be no other duration than our
- 1:10:38Speaker 2: own as for example there might be no other colour
- 1:10:42Speaker 2: in the world but orange but just as a consciousness
- 1:10:45Speaker 2: based on color which sympathized internally with orange instead of
- 1:10:49Speaker 2: perceiving it externally would feel itself held between red and
- 1:10:53Speaker 2: yellow would even perhaps suspect beyond this last color a
- 1:10:57Speaker 2: complete spectrum into which the continuity from red to yellow
- 1:11:01Speaker 2: might expand naturally so the intuition of our duration far
- 1:11:05Speaker 2: from leaving us suspended in the void as pure analysis
- 1:11:08Speaker 2: would do brings us into contact with a whole continuity
- 1:11:12Speaker 2: of durations which we must try to follow whether downwards
- 1:11:16Speaker 2: or upwards in both cases we can extend ourselves indefinitely
- 1:11:20Speaker 2: by an increasingly violent effort in both cases we transcend
- 1:11:24Speaker 2: ourselves in the first we advance towards a more and
- 1:11:28Speaker 2: more attenuated duration the pulsations of which being rapider than
- 1:11:32Speaker 2: ours and dividing our simple sensation dilute its quality into
- 1:11:36Speaker 2: quantity at the limit would be pure homogeneity that pure
- 1:11:41Speaker 2: repetition by which we define materiality advancing in the other
- 1:11:46Speaker 2: direction we approach a duration which strains contracts and intensifies
- 1:11:51Speaker 2: itself more and more at the limit would be eternity
- 1:11:56Speaker 2: no longer conceptual eternity, which is an eternity of death,
- 1:11:59Speaker 2: but an eternity of life, a living and therefore still
- 1:12:03Speaker 2: moving eternity, in which our own particular duration would be
- 1:12:07Speaker 2: included as the vibrations are in light, an eternity which
- 1:12:11Speaker 2: would be the concentration of all duration, as materiality is
- 1:12:15Speaker 2: its dispersion. Between these two limits intuition moves, and this
- 1:12:20Speaker 2: movement is the very essence of metaphysics. An Introduction to
- 1:12:26Speaker 2: Metaphysics by Henri Bergson, translated by T. E. Holm, Part
- 1:12:31Speaker 2: 4 There can be no question of following here the
- 1:12:35Speaker 2: various stages of this movement, but having presented a general
- 1:12:39Speaker 2: view of the method and made a first application of it,
- 1:12:43Speaker 2: it may not be amiss to formulate, as precisely as
- 1:12:46Speaker 2: we can, the principles on which it rests. Most of
- 1:12:50Speaker 2: the following propositions have already received in this essay some
- 1:12:54Speaker 2: degree of proof. We hope to demonstrate them more completely
- 1:12:58Speaker 2: when we come to deal with other problems. 1. There
- 1:13:02Speaker 2: is a reality that is external and yet given immediately
- 1:13:06Speaker 2: to the mind. Common sense is right on this point
- 1:13:09Speaker 2: as against the idealism and realism of the philosophers. 2.
- 1:13:15Speaker 2: This reality is mobility, not things made, but things in
- 1:13:20Speaker 2: the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states exist.
- 1:13:26Speaker 2: Rest is never more than apparent or rather relative. The
- 1:13:30Speaker 2: consciousness we have of our own self in its continual
- 1:13:33Speaker 2: flux introduces us to the interior of a reality on
- 1:13:38Speaker 2: the model of which we must represent other realities. all
- 1:13:42Speaker 2: reality therefore is tendency if we agree to mean by
- 1:13:46Speaker 2: tendency an incipient change of direction three our mind which
- 1:13:52Speaker 2: seeks for solid points of support has for its main
- 1:13:55Speaker 2: function in the ordinary course of life that of representing
- 1:13:59Speaker 2: states and things it takes at long intervals almost instantaneous
- 1:14:04Speaker 2: views of the undivided mobility of the real it thus
- 1:14:08Speaker 2: obtains sensations and ideas in this way it substitutes for
- 1:14:14Speaker 2: the continuous the discontinuous for motion stability for tendency in
- 1:14:19Speaker 2: process of change fixed points marking a direction of change
- 1:14:23Speaker 2: and tendency this substitution is necessary to common sense to
- 1:14:28Speaker 2: language to practical life and even in a certain degree
- 1:14:32Speaker 2: which we shall endeavor to determine to positive science Our intellect,
- 1:14:38Speaker 2: when it follows its natural bend, proceeds on the one
- 1:14:41Speaker 2: hand by solid perceptions and on the other by stable conceptions.
- 1:14:46Speaker 2: It starts from the immobile and only conceives and expresses
- 1:14:50Speaker 2: movement as a function of immobility. It takes up its
- 1:14:54Speaker 2: position in ready-made concepts and endeavors to catch in them,
- 1:14:58Speaker 2: as in a net, something of the reality which passes.
- 1:15:03Speaker 2: This is certainly not done in order to obtain an
- 1:15:05Speaker 2: internal and metaphysical knowledge of the real, but simply in
- 1:15:09Speaker 2: order to utilize the real, each concept, as also each sensation,
- 1:15:14Speaker 2: being a practical question which our activity puts to reality,
- 1:15:19Speaker 2: and to which reality replies, as must be done in
- 1:15:22Speaker 2: business by a yes or a no. But, in doing that,
- 1:15:27Speaker 2: it lets that which is its very essence escape from
- 1:15:30Speaker 2: the real. 4. The inherent difficulties of metaphysic, the antinomies
- 1:15:36Speaker 2: which it gives rise to, and the contradictions into which
- 1:15:39Speaker 2: it falls, the division into antagonistic schools, and the irreducible
- 1:15:44Speaker 2: opposition between systems, are largely the result of our applying,
- 1:15:48Speaker 2: to the disinterested knowledge of the real, processes which we
- 1:15:52Speaker 2: generally employ for practical ends. They arise from the fact
- 1:15:56Speaker 2: that we place ourselves in the immobile in order to
- 1:16:00Speaker 2: lie in wait for the moving thing as it passes,
- 1:16:03Speaker 2: instead of replacing ourselves in the moving thing itself in
- 1:16:07Speaker 2: order to traverse with it the immobile positions. They arise
- 1:16:11Speaker 2: from our professing to reconstruct reality, which is tendency and
- 1:16:15Speaker 2: consequently mobility, with percepts and concepts whose function it is
- 1:16:20Speaker 2: to make it stationary. with stoppages however numerous they may
- 1:16:24Speaker 2: be we shall never make mobility whereas if mobility is
- 1:16:29Speaker 2: given we can by means of diminution obtain from it
- 1:16:33Speaker 2: by thought as many stoppages as we desire in other
- 1:16:37Speaker 2: words it is clear that fixed concepts may be extracted
- 1:16:40Speaker 2: by our thought from mobile reality but there are no
- 1:16:44Speaker 2: means of reconstructing the mobility of the real with fixed
- 1:16:47Speaker 2: concepts dogmatism however in so far as it has been
- 1:16:52Speaker 2: a builder of systems has always attempted this reconstruction five
- 1:16:58Speaker 2: in this it was bound to fail it is on
- 1:17:01Speaker 2: this impotence and on this impotence only that the sceptical
- 1:17:05Speaker 2: idealist critical doctrines really dwell in fact all doctrines that
- 1:17:10Speaker 2: deny to our intelligence the power of attaining the absolute
- 1:17:15Speaker 2: But because we fail to reconstruct the living reality with
- 1:17:18Speaker 2: stiff and ready-made concepts, it does not follow that we
- 1:17:22Speaker 2: cannot grasp it in some other way. The demonstrations which
- 1:17:26Speaker 2: have been given of the relativity of our knowledge are
- 1:17:29Speaker 2: therefore tainted with an original vice. They imply, like the
- 1:17:33Speaker 2: dogmatism they attack, that all knowledge must necessarily start from
- 1:17:37Speaker 2: concepts with fixed outlines in order to clasp with them
- 1:17:41Speaker 2: the reality which flows. 6. but the truth is that
- 1:17:46Speaker 2: our intelligence can follow the opposite method it can place
- 1:17:50Speaker 2: itself within the mobile reality and adopt its ceaselessly changing
- 1:17:54Speaker 2: direction in short can grasp it by means of that
- 1:17:58Speaker 2: intellectual sympathy which we call intuition this is extremely difficult
- 1:18:05Speaker 2: the mind has to do violence to itself has to
- 1:18:08Speaker 2: reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually
- 1:18:11Speaker 2: thinks has perpetually to revise or rather to recast all
- 1:18:16Speaker 2: its categories but in this way it will attain to
- 1:18:20Speaker 2: fluid concepts capable of following reality in all its sinuosities
- 1:18:25Speaker 2: and of adopting the very movement of the inward life
- 1:18:28Speaker 2: of things only thus will a progressive philosophy be built
- 1:18:32Speaker 2: up freed from the disputes which arise between the various
- 1:18:35Speaker 2: schools and able to solve its problems naturally because it
- 1:18:39Speaker 2: will be released from the artificial expression in terms of
- 1:18:43Speaker 2: which such problems are posited to philosophize therefore is to
- 1:18:48Speaker 2: invert the habitual direction of the work of thought seven
- 1:18:53Speaker 2: this inversion has never been practiced in a methodical manner
- 1:18:57Speaker 2: but a profoundly considered history of human thought would show
- 1:19:01Speaker 2: that we owe to it all that is greatest in
- 1:19:03Speaker 2: the sciences as well as all that is permanent in
- 1:19:06Speaker 2: metaphysics The most powerful of the methods of investigation at
- 1:19:11Speaker 2: the disposal of the human mind, the infinitesimal calculus, originated
- 1:19:16Speaker 2: from this very inversion. Modern mathematics is precisely an effort
- 1:19:21Speaker 2: to substitute the being made for the ready-made, to follow
- 1:19:25Speaker 2: the generation of magnitudes, to grasp motion no longer from
- 1:19:29Speaker 2: without and in its displayed result, but from within and
- 1:19:33Speaker 2: in its tendency to change. in short to adopt the
- 1:19:37Speaker 2: mobile continuity of the outlines of things it is true
- 1:19:41Speaker 2: that it is confined to the outline being only the
- 1:19:44Speaker 2: science of magnitudes it is true also that it has
- 1:19:48Speaker 2: only been able to achieve its marvellous applications by the
- 1:19:52Speaker 2: invention of certain symbols and that if the intuition of
- 1:19:55Speaker 2: which we have just spoken lies at the origin of
- 1:19:58Speaker 2: invention it is the symbol alone which is concerned in
- 1:20:01Speaker 2: the application But metaphysics, which aims at no application, can
- 1:20:07Speaker 2: and usually must abstain from converting intuition into symbols. Liberated
- 1:20:13Speaker 2: from the obligation of working for practically useful results, it
- 1:20:17Speaker 2: will indefinitely enlarge the domain of its investigations. What it
- 1:20:21Speaker 2: may lose in comparison with science in utility and exactitude,
- 1:20:26Speaker 2: it will regain in range and extension. Though mathematics is
- 1:20:30Speaker 2: only the science of magnitudes, though mathematical processes are applicable
- 1:20:35Speaker 2: only to quantities, it must not be forgotten that quantity
- 1:20:39Speaker 2: is always quality in a nascent state. It is, we
- 1:20:42Speaker 2: might say, the limiting case of quality. It is natural, then,
- 1:20:47Speaker 2: that metaphysics should adopt the generative idea of our mathematics
- 1:20:51Speaker 2: in order to extend it to all qualities, that is,
- 1:20:54Speaker 2: to reality in general. It will not by doing this
- 1:20:58Speaker 2: in any way be moving towards universal mathematics, that chimera
- 1:21:02Speaker 2: of modern philosophy. On the contrary, the farther it goes,
- 1:21:07Speaker 2: the more untranslatable into symbols will be the objects it encounters.
- 1:21:12Speaker 2: But it will at least have begun by getting into
- 1:21:14Speaker 2: contact with the continuity and mobility of the real, just
- 1:21:18Speaker 2: where this contact can be most marvelously utilized. it will
- 1:21:22Speaker 2: have contemplated itself in a mirror which reflects an image
- 1:21:26Speaker 2: of itself, much shrunken no doubt, but for that reason
- 1:21:30Speaker 2: very luminous. it will have seen with greater clearness what
- 1:21:34Speaker 2: the mathematical processes borrow from concrete reality and it will
- 1:21:38Speaker 2: continue in the direction of concrete reality and not in
- 1:21:42Speaker 2: that of mathematical processes. Having then discounted beforehand what is
- 1:21:47Speaker 2: too modest and at the same time too ambitious in
- 1:21:51Speaker 2: the following formula, we may say that the object of
- 1:21:54Speaker 2: metaphysics is to perform qualitative differentiations and integrations. 8. The
- 1:22:02Speaker 2: reason why this object has been lost sight of and
- 1:22:05Speaker 2: why science itself has been mistaken in the origin of
- 1:22:08Speaker 2: the processes it employs is that intuition, once attained, must
- 1:22:13Speaker 2: find a mode of expression and of application which conforms
- 1:22:17Speaker 2: to the habits of our thought and one which furnishes
- 1:22:20Speaker 2: us in the shape of well-defined concepts with the solid
- 1:22:23Speaker 2: points of support which we so greatly need. In that
- 1:22:27Speaker 2: lies the condition of what we call exactitude and precision,
- 1:22:31Speaker 2: and also the condition of the unlimited extension of a
- 1:22:34Speaker 2: general method to particular cases. Now this extension and this
- 1:22:39Speaker 2: work of logical improvement can be continued for centuries, whilst
- 1:22:44Speaker 2: the act which creates the method lasts but for a moment.
- 1:22:48Speaker 2: That is why we so often take the logical equipment
- 1:22:51Speaker 2: of science for science itself, forgetting the metaphysical intuition from
- 1:22:55Speaker 2: which all the rest has sprung. From the overlooking of
- 1:22:59Speaker 2: this intuition proceeds all that has been said by philosophers
- 1:23:03Speaker 2: and by men of science themselves about the relativity of
- 1:23:07Speaker 2: scientific knowledge. What is relative is the symbolic knowledge by
- 1:23:11Speaker 2: pre-existing concepts which proceeds from the fixed to the moving,
- 1:23:16Speaker 2: and not the intuitive knowledge which installs itself in that
- 1:23:19Speaker 2: which is moving and adopts the very life of things.
- 1:23:23Speaker 2: This intuition attains the absolute. Science and metaphysics, therefore, come
- 1:23:29Speaker 2: together in intuition. A truly intuitive philosophy would realize the
- 1:23:34Speaker 2: much-desired union of science and metaphysics. While it would make
- 1:23:38Speaker 2: of metaphysics a positive science, that is, a progressive and
- 1:23:42Speaker 2: indefinitely perfectible one, it would at the same time lead
- 1:23:46Speaker 2: the positive sciences, properly so called, to become conscious of
- 1:23:51Speaker 2: their true scope, often far greater than they imagine. it
- 1:23:55Speaker 2: would put more science into metaphysics and more metaphysics into
- 1:23:59Speaker 2: science it would result in restoring the continuity between the
- 1:24:03Speaker 2: intuitions which the various sciences have obtained here and there
- 1:24:07Speaker 2: in the course of their history and which they have
- 1:24:10Speaker 2: obtained only by strokes of genius 9. That there are
- 1:24:15Speaker 2: not two different ways of knowing things fundamentally, that the
- 1:24:18Speaker 2: various sciences have their root in metaphysics, is what the
- 1:24:22Speaker 2: ancient philosophers generally thought. Their error did not lie there.
- 1:24:27Speaker 2: It consisted in their being always dominated by the belief,
- 1:24:31Speaker 2: so natural to the human mind, that a variation can
- 1:24:34Speaker 2: only be the expression and development of what is invariable,
- 1:24:38Speaker 2: Whence it followed that action was an enfeebled contemplation, duration
- 1:24:43Speaker 2: a deceptive and shifting image of immobile eternity, the soul
- 1:24:48Speaker 2: a fall from the idea. The whole of the philosophy
- 1:24:52Speaker 2: which begins with Plato and culminates in Plotinus is the
- 1:24:55Speaker 2: development of a principle which may be formulated thus. There
- 1:25:00Speaker 2: is more in the immutable than in the moving, and
- 1:25:03Speaker 2: we pass from the stable to the unstable by a
- 1:25:05Speaker 2: mere diminution. Now it is the contrary which is true.
- 1:25:10Speaker 2: Modern science dates from the day when mobility was set
- 1:25:14Speaker 2: up as an independent reality. It dates from the day
- 1:25:17Speaker 2: when Galileo, setting a ball rolling down an inclined plane,
- 1:25:22Speaker 2: firmly resolved to study this movement from top to bottom
- 1:25:25Speaker 2: for itself, in itself, instead of seeking its principle in
- 1:25:29Speaker 2: the concepts of high and low, two immobilities by which
- 1:25:32Speaker 2: Aristotle believed he could adequately explain the mobility. and this
- 1:25:37Speaker 2: is not an isolated fact in the history of science
- 1:25:41Speaker 2: several of the great discoveries of those at least which
- 1:25:44Speaker 2: have transformed the positive sciences or which have created new
- 1:25:47Speaker 2: ones have been so many soundings in the depths of
- 1:25:50Speaker 2: pure duration the more living the reality touched the deeper
- 1:25:55Speaker 2: was the sounding but the lead line sunk into the
- 1:25:59Speaker 2: sea bottom brings up a fluid mass which the sun's
- 1:26:02Speaker 2: heat quickly dries into solid and discontinuous grains of sand
- 1:26:06Speaker 2: and the intuition of duration when it is exposed to
- 1:26:09Speaker 2: the rays of the understanding in like manner quickly turns
- 1:26:13Speaker 2: into fixed distinct and immobile concepts In the living mobility
- 1:26:18Speaker 2: of things, the understanding is bent on marking real or
- 1:26:22Speaker 2: virtual stations, it notes departures and arrivals, for this is
- 1:26:26Speaker 2: all that concerns the thought of man insofar as it
- 1:26:29Speaker 2: is simply human. It is more than human to grasp
- 1:26:33Speaker 2: what is happening in the interval, but philosophy can only
- 1:26:37Speaker 2: be an effort to transcend the human condition. Men of
- 1:26:41Speaker 2: science have fixed their attention mainly on the concepts with
- 1:26:44Speaker 2: which they have marked out the pathway of intuition. The
- 1:26:48Speaker 2: more they laid stress on these residual products, which have
- 1:26:51Speaker 2: turned into symbols, the more they attributed a symbolic character
- 1:26:55Speaker 2: to every kind of science. And the more they believed
- 1:26:58Speaker 2: in the symbolic character of science, the more did they
- 1:27:01Speaker 2: indeed make science symbolical. Gradually they have blotted out all difference,
- 1:27:07Speaker 2: in positive science, between the natural and the artificial, between
- 1:27:11Speaker 2: the data of immediate intuition and the enormous work of
- 1:27:15Speaker 2: analysis which the understanding pursues around intuition. Thus they have
- 1:27:20Speaker 2: prepared the way for a doctrine which affirms the relativity
- 1:27:23Speaker 2: of all our knowledge. But metaphysics has also labored to
- 1:27:28Speaker 2: the same end. How could the masters of modern philosophy,
- 1:27:32Speaker 2: who have been renovators of science as well as of metaphysics,
- 1:27:35Speaker 2: have had no sense of the moving continuity of reality?
- 1:27:39Speaker 2: How could they have abstained from placing themselves in what
- 1:27:43Speaker 2: we call concrete duration? They have done so to a
- 1:27:47Speaker 2: greater extent than they were aware, above all, much more
- 1:27:51Speaker 2: than they said. If we endeavor to link together, by
- 1:27:54Speaker 2: a continuous connection, the intuitions about which systems have become organized,
- 1:28:00Speaker 2: we find, together with other convergent and divergent lines, one
- 1:28:04Speaker 2: very determinate direction of thought and of feeling. What is
- 1:28:08Speaker 2: this latent thought? How shall we express the feeling? To
- 1:28:12Speaker 2: borrow once more the language of the Platonists, we will say,
- 1:28:17Speaker 2: depriving the words of their psychological sense and giving the
- 1:28:20Speaker 2: name of idea to a certain settling down into easy intelligibility,
- 1:28:25Speaker 2: and that of soul to a certain longing after the
- 1:28:28Speaker 2: restlessness of life, that an invisible current causes modern philosophy
- 1:28:33Speaker 2: to place the soul above the idea. It thus tends,
- 1:28:37Speaker 2: like modern science, and even more so, than modern science
- 1:28:41Speaker 2: to advance in an opposite direction to ancient thought But
- 1:28:45Speaker 2: this metaphysics, like this science, has enfolded its deeper life
- 1:28:50Speaker 2: in a rich tissue of symbols, forgetting something that, while
- 1:28:54Speaker 2: science needs symbols for its analytical development, the main object
- 1:28:58Speaker 2: of metaphysics is to do away with symbols. Here again,
- 1:29:02Speaker 2: the understanding has pursued its work of fixing, dividing, and reconstructing.
- 1:29:07Speaker 2: It has pursued this, it is true, under a rather
- 1:29:10Speaker 2: different form. Without insisting on a point which we propose
- 1:29:14Speaker 2: to develop elsewhere, it is enough here to say that
- 1:29:17Speaker 2: the understanding, whose function it is to operate on stable elements,
- 1:29:22Speaker 2: may look for stability either in relations or in things.
- 1:29:26Speaker 2: Insofar as it works on concepts of relations, it culminates
- 1:29:30Speaker 2: in scientific symbolism. Insofar as it works on concepts of things,
- 1:29:36Speaker 2: it culminates in metaphysical symbolism, but in both cases the
- 1:29:40Speaker 2: arrangement comes from the understanding, hence it would feign believe
- 1:29:44Speaker 2: itself independent. Rather than recognize at once what it owes
- 1:29:49Speaker 2: to an intuition of the depths of reality, it prefers
- 1:29:52Speaker 2: exposing itself to the danger that its whole work may
- 1:29:55Speaker 2: be looked upon as nothing but an artificial arrangement of symbols.
- 1:30:00Speaker 2: so that if we were to hold on to the
- 1:30:02Speaker 2: letter of what metaphysicians and scientists say, and also to
- 1:30:06Speaker 2: the material aspect of what they do, we might believe
- 1:30:10Speaker 2: that the metaphysicians have dug a deep tunnel beneath reality,
- 1:30:14Speaker 2: that the scientists have thrown an elegant bridge over it,
- 1:30:17Speaker 2: but that the moving stream of things passes between these
- 1:30:20Speaker 2: two artificial constructions without touching them. One of the principal
- 1:30:25Speaker 2: artifices of the Kantian criticism consisted in taking the metaphysician
- 1:30:30Speaker 2: and the scientist literally, forcing both metaphysics and science to
- 1:30:34Speaker 2: the extreme limit of symbolism to which they could go,
- 1:30:38Speaker 2: and to which, moreover, they make their way of their
- 1:30:41Speaker 2: own accord as soon as the understanding claims an independence
- 1:30:45Speaker 2: full of perils. Having once overlooked the ties that bind
- 1:30:49Speaker 2: science and metaphysics to intellectual intuition, Kant has no difficulty
- 1:30:54Speaker 2: in showing that our science is wholly relative and our
- 1:30:57Speaker 2: metaphysics entirely artificial. Since he has exaggerated the independence of
- 1:31:03Speaker 2: the understanding in both cases, since he has relieved both
- 1:31:07Speaker 2: metaphysics and science of the intellectual intuition which served them
- 1:31:11Speaker 2: as inward ballast, science with its relations presents to him
- 1:31:15Speaker 2: no more than a film of form, and metaphysics with
- 1:31:19Speaker 2: its things no more than a film of matter. Is
- 1:31:23Speaker 2: it surprising that the first, then, reveals to him only
- 1:31:26Speaker 2: frames packed within frames, and the second only phantoms chasing phantoms?
- 1:31:31Speaker 2: He has struck such telling blows at our science and
- 1:31:34Speaker 2: our metaphysic that they have not even yet quite recovered
- 1:31:38Speaker 2: from their bewilderment. Our mind would readily resign itself to
- 1:31:42Speaker 2: seeing in science a knowledge that is wholly relative, and
- 1:31:46Speaker 2: in metaphysics a speculation that is entirely empty. it seems
- 1:31:50Speaker 2: to us even at this present date that the kantian
- 1:31:53Speaker 2: criticism applies to all metaphysics and to all science in
- 1:31:58Speaker 2: reality it applies more especially to the philosophy of the
- 1:32:02Speaker 2: ancients as also to the form itself borrowed from the
- 1:32:05Speaker 2: ancients in which the moderns have most often left their
- 1:32:09Speaker 2: thought It is valid against a metaphysic which claims to
- 1:32:13Speaker 2: give us a single and completed system of things against
- 1:32:17Speaker 2: a science professing to be a single system of relations.
- 1:32:21Speaker 2: In short, against a science and a metaphysic presenting themselves
- 1:32:25Speaker 2: with the architectural simplicity of the Platonic theory of ideas
- 1:32:29Speaker 2: or of a Greek temple. if metaphysics claims to be
- 1:32:33Speaker 2: made up of concepts which were ours before its advent
- 1:32:37Speaker 2: if it consists in an ingenious arrangement of pre-existing ideas
- 1:32:41Speaker 2: which we utilize as building material for an edifice if
- 1:32:45Speaker 2: in short it is anything else but the constant expansion
- 1:32:48Speaker 2: of our mind the ever-renewed effort to transcend our actual
- 1:32:52Speaker 2: ideas and perhaps also our elementary logic it is but
- 1:32:56Speaker 2: too evident that like all the works of pure understanding
- 1:33:00Speaker 2: it becomes artificial and if science is wholly and entirely
- 1:33:04Speaker 2: a work of analysis or of conceptual representation If experience
- 1:33:10Speaker 2: is only to serve therein as a verification for clear ideas, if,
- 1:33:14Speaker 2: instead of starting from multiple and diverse intuition, which insert
- 1:33:19Speaker 2: themselves in the particular movement of each reality, but do
- 1:33:22Speaker 2: not always dovetail into each other, it professes to be
- 1:33:26Speaker 2: a vast mathematic, a single and closed-in system of relations,
- 1:33:31Speaker 2: imprisoning the whole of reality in a network prepared in advance.
- 1:33:35Speaker 2: It becomes a knowledge purely relative to human understanding. if
- 1:33:39Speaker 2: we look carefully into the critique of pure reason we
- 1:33:43Speaker 2: see that science for kant did indeed mean this kind
- 1:33:46Speaker 2: of universal mathematic and metaphysics this practically unaltered platonism in
- 1:33:53Speaker 2: truth the dream of a universal mathematic is itself but
- 1:33:56Speaker 2: a survival of platonism Universal Mathematic is what the world
- 1:34:01Speaker 2: of ideas becomes when we suppose that the idea consists
- 1:34:05Speaker 2: in a relation or in a law and no longer
- 1:34:08Speaker 2: in a thing. Kant took this dream of a few
- 1:34:11Speaker 2: modern philosophers for a reality. More than this, he believed
- 1:34:16Speaker 2: that all scientific knowledge was only a detached fragment of,
- 1:34:20Speaker 2: or rather a stepping stone to, Universal Mathematics. Hence the
- 1:34:24Speaker 2: main task of the critique was to lay the foundation
- 1:34:27Speaker 2: of this Mathematic. that is, to determine what the intellect
- 1:34:31Speaker 2: must be, and what the object, in order that an
- 1:34:35Speaker 2: uninterrupted mathematic may bind them together. And of necessity, if
- 1:34:40Speaker 2: all possible experience can be made to enter thus into
- 1:34:43Speaker 2: the rigid and already formed framework of our understanding, it is,
- 1:34:47Speaker 2: unless we assume a pre-established harmony, because our understanding itself
- 1:34:52Speaker 2: organizes nature and finds itself again therein as in a mirror.
- 1:34:57Speaker 2: hence the possibility of science which owes all its efficacy
- 1:35:01Speaker 2: to its relativity and the impossibility of metaphysics since the
- 1:35:06Speaker 2: latter finds nothing more to do than to parody with
- 1:35:08Speaker 2: phantoms of things the work of conceptual arrangement which science
- 1:35:12Speaker 2: practises seriously on relations Briefly, the whole critique of pure
- 1:35:18Speaker 2: reason ends in establishing that Platonism, illegitimate if ideas are things,
- 1:35:23Speaker 2: becomes legitimate if ideas are relations, and that the ready-made idea,
- 1:35:29Speaker 2: once brought down in this way from heaven to earth, is,
- 1:35:32Speaker 2: in fact, as Plato held, the common basis alike of
- 1:35:35Speaker 2: thought and of nature. But the whole of the critique
- 1:35:38Speaker 2: of pure reason also rests on this postulate that our
- 1:35:42Speaker 2: intellect is incapable of anything but platonizing, that is, of
- 1:35:47Speaker 2: pouring all possible experience into pre-existing molds. On this the
- 1:35:52Speaker 2: whole question depends. If scientific knowledge is indeed what Kant supposed,
- 1:35:57Speaker 2: then there is one simple science pre-formed and even pre-formulated
- 1:36:01Speaker 2: in nature, as Aristotle believed. Great discoveries, then, serve only
- 1:36:06Speaker 2: to illuminate, point by point, the already drawn line of
- 1:36:10Speaker 2: this logic imminent in things, just as on the night
- 1:36:13Speaker 2: of a fate we light up one by one the
- 1:36:16Speaker 2: rows of gas jets which already outline the shape of
- 1:36:19Speaker 2: some building. And if metaphysical knowledge is really what Kant supposed,
- 1:36:24Speaker 2: it is reduced to a choice between two attitudes of
- 1:36:27Speaker 2: the mind before all the great problems both equally possible.
- 1:36:31Speaker 2: Its manifestations are so many arbitrary and always ephemeral choices
- 1:36:36Speaker 2: between two solutions, virtually formulated from all eternity. It lives
- 1:36:42Speaker 2: and dies by antinomies. But the truth is that modern
- 1:36:46Speaker 2: science does not present this unilinear simplicity, nor does modern
- 1:36:50Speaker 2: metaphysics present these irreducible oppositions. modern science is neither one
- 1:36:57Speaker 2: nor simple it rests i freely admit on ideas which
- 1:37:01Speaker 2: in the end we find clear but these ideas have
- 1:37:04Speaker 2: gradually become clear through the use made of them they
- 1:37:08Speaker 2: owe most of their clearness to the light which the
- 1:37:11Speaker 2: facts and the applications to which they led have by
- 1:37:14Speaker 2: reflection shed on them the clearness of a concept being
- 1:37:18Speaker 2: scarcely anything more at bottom than the certainty at last
- 1:37:21Speaker 2: obtained of manipulating the concept profitably at its origin more
- 1:37:27Speaker 2: than one of these concepts must have appeared obscure not
- 1:37:31Speaker 2: easily reconcilable with the concepts already admitted into science and
- 1:37:36Speaker 2: indeed very near the border-line of absurdity This means that
- 1:37:40Speaker 2: science does not proceed by an orderly dovetailing together of
- 1:37:44Speaker 2: concepts predestined to fit each other exactly. True and fruitful
- 1:37:48Speaker 2: ideas are so many close contacts with currents of reality
- 1:37:53Speaker 2: which do not necessarily converge on the same point. However,
- 1:37:57Speaker 2: the concepts in which they lodge themselves manage somehow, by
- 1:38:01Speaker 2: rubbing off each other's corners, to settle down well enough together.
- 1:38:06Speaker 2: On the other hand, modern metaphysics is not made up
- 1:38:09Speaker 2: of solutions so radical that they can culminate in irreducible oppositions.
- 1:38:15Speaker 2: It would be so, no doubt, if there were no
- 1:38:18Speaker 2: means of accepting at the same time and on the
- 1:38:21Speaker 2: same level the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomies.
- 1:38:26Speaker 2: But philosophy consists precisely in this, that by an effort
- 1:38:29Speaker 2: to of intuition one places oneself within that concrete reality
- 1:38:34Speaker 2: of which the critique takes from without the two opposed
- 1:38:37Speaker 2: views thesis and antithesis I could never imagine how black
- 1:38:42Speaker 2: and white interpenetrate if I had never seen gray. But
- 1:38:46Speaker 2: once I have seen gray, I easily understand how it
- 1:38:49Speaker 2: can be considered from two points of view, that of
- 1:38:53Speaker 2: white and that of black. Doctrines which have a certain
- 1:38:56Speaker 2: basis of intuition escape the Kantian criticism exactly insofar as
- 1:39:01Speaker 2: they are intuitive. And these doctrines are the whole of metaphysics,
- 1:39:06Speaker 2: provided we ignore the metaphysics which is fixed and dead
- 1:39:09Speaker 2: in theses and consider only that which is living in philosophers.
- 1:39:15Speaker 2: The divergencies between the schools, that is, broadly speaking, between
- 1:39:20Speaker 2: the groups of disciples formed round a few great masters,
- 1:39:23Speaker 2: are certainly striking, but would we find them as marked
- 1:39:27Speaker 2: between the masters themselves? Something here dominates the diversity of systems, something,
- 1:39:33Speaker 2: we repeat, which is simple and definite like a sounding,
- 1:39:37Speaker 2: about which one feels that it has touched at greater
- 1:39:40Speaker 2: or less depth the bottom of the same ocean, though
- 1:39:43Speaker 2: each time it brings up to the surface very different materials.
- 1:39:47Speaker 2: It is on these materials that the disciples usually work.
- 1:39:51Speaker 2: In this lies the function of analysis. and the master,
- 1:39:55Speaker 2: insofar as he formulates, develops, and translates into abstract ideas
- 1:40:00Speaker 2: what he brings, is already in a way his own disciple.
- 1:40:04Speaker 2: But the simple act which started the analysis, and which
- 1:40:08Speaker 2: conceals itself behind the analysis, proceeds from a faculty quite
- 1:40:12Speaker 2: different from the analytical. This is, by its very definition, intuition.
- 1:40:19Speaker 2: In conclusion, we may remark that there is nothing mysterious
- 1:40:23Speaker 2: in this faculty, every one of us has had occasion
- 1:40:26Speaker 2: to exercise it to a certain extent any one of
- 1:40:30Speaker 2: us for instance who has attempted literary composition knows that
- 1:40:35Speaker 2: when the subject has been studied at length the materials
- 1:40:38Speaker 2: all collected and the notes all made something more is
- 1:40:41Speaker 2: needed in order to set about the work of composition
- 1:40:44Speaker 2: itself and that is an often very painful effort to
- 1:40:48Speaker 2: place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject and
- 1:40:51Speaker 2: to seek as deeply as possible an impulse after which
- 1:40:55Speaker 2: we need only to let ourselves go. This impulse, once received,
- 1:41:00Speaker 2: starts the mind on a path where it rediscovers all
- 1:41:03Speaker 2: the information it had collected and a thousand other details besides.
- 1:41:08Speaker 2: It develops and analyzes itself into terms which could be
- 1:41:11Speaker 2: enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we discover.
- 1:41:17Speaker 2: We shall never say all that could be said, and
- 1:41:20Speaker 2: yet if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse that
- 1:41:23Speaker 2: we feel behind us and try to seize it, it
- 1:41:26Speaker 2: is gone, for it was not a thing, but the
- 1:41:29Speaker 2: direction of a movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is
- 1:41:33Speaker 2: infinitely simple. Metaphysical intuition seems to be something of the
- 1:41:39Speaker 2: same kind. What corresponds here to the documents and notes
- 1:41:43Speaker 2: of literary composition is the sum of observations and experience
- 1:41:47Speaker 2: gathered together by positive science. For we do not obtain
- 1:41:51Speaker 2: an intuition from reality, that is, an intellectual sympathy with
- 1:41:56Speaker 2: the most intimate part of it, unless we have won
- 1:41:58Speaker 2: its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations.
- 1:42:04Speaker 2: And it is not merely a question of assimilating the
- 1:42:06Speaker 2: most conspicuous facts— so immense a mass of facts must
- 1:42:11Speaker 2: be accumulated and fused together that in this fusion all
- 1:42:15Speaker 2: the preconceived and premature ideas which observers may unwittingly have
- 1:42:19Speaker 2: put into their observations will be certain to neutralize each
- 1:42:23Speaker 2: other in this way only can the bare materiality of
- 1:42:27Speaker 2: the known facts be exposed to view even in the
- 1:42:31Speaker 2: simple and privileged case which we have used as an
- 1:42:33Speaker 2: example even for the direct contact of the self with
- 1:42:37Speaker 2: the self the final effort of distinct intuition would be
- 1:42:41Speaker 2: impossible to any one who had not combined and compared
- 1:42:45Speaker 2: with each other a very large number of psychological analyses
- 1:42:49Speaker 2: The masters of modern philosophy were men who had assimilated
- 1:42:53Speaker 2: all the scientific knowledge of their time, and the partial
- 1:42:56Speaker 2: eclipse of metaphysics for the last half century has evidently
- 1:43:00Speaker 2: no other cause than the extraordinary difficulty which the philosopher
- 1:43:04Speaker 2: finds today in getting into touch with positive science, which
- 1:43:09Speaker 2: has become far too specialized. but metaphysical intuition although it
- 1:43:14Speaker 2: can be obtained only through material knowledge is quite other
- 1:43:18Speaker 2: than the mere summary or synthesis of that knowledge it
- 1:43:22Speaker 2: is distinct from these we repeat as the motor impulse
- 1:43:25Speaker 2: is distinct from the path traversed by the moving body
- 1:43:29Speaker 2: as the tension of the spring is distinct from the
- 1:43:31Speaker 2: visible movements of the pendulum In this sense, metaphysics has
- 1:43:36Speaker 2: nothing in common with a generalization of facts, and nevertheless
- 1:43:40Speaker 2: it might be defined as an integral experience.