Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / CIA Coup in Iran 1953 — Operation Ajax Explained | Part 1/5 | Epic Fury Series
Transcript
- 0:16It is the summer of 1953. Iran has a democracy.
- 0:22It is young, imperfect and fragile, but it is real.
- 0:26The man leading it is a 71 year old lawyer and nationalist named
- 0:30Mohamed Mosaddek, who has done something no Iranian leader had
- 0:33dared to do before him. He is told the British Empire to
- 0:37get out. He has looked at the oil beneath
- 0:39Iranian soil, oil that had been pumping wealth into British
- 0:43coffers for decades, while ordinary Iranians live in
- 0:46poverty. And he has said this belongs to
- 0:48us. Within months, the Central
- 0:51Intelligence Agency would help destroy him.
- 0:53What happened in Iran in August of 1953 is not a foot No, it is
- 0:59the root. It is the event that, more than
- 1:01any other single moment in the 20th century, shaped the
- 1:05relationship between Iran and the United States, a
- 1:07relationship that has now, in the spring of 2026, produced one
- 1:12of the most significant military conflicts in a generation.
- 1:15To understand Operation Epic Fury, you have to understand
- 1:19Operation Ajax. To understand Operation Ajax,
- 1:23you have to go back to the beginning.
- 1:25This is the CIA and Iran bonus series episode 1 The coup that
- 1:30started everything. Iran in the late 19th and early
- 1:3420th century was a country being carved up by foreign powers.
- 1:38Britain wanted its southern regions for the route to India
- 1:41and later for oil. Russia wanted its northern
- 1:44regions as a buffer zone, a potential gateway to warm water.
- 1:48The Iranian people, ruled by the Kajar dynasty and then the
- 1:52Pallavi dynasty, had very little say in any of it.
- 1:56They were subjects of a competition between empires that
- 1:59barely acknowledged their existence as a nation with
- 2:01legitimate interests of its own. The Constitutional Revolution of
- 2:0519 O 5 to 1911 had given Iranians A genuine taste of
- 2:09representative government. It established A parliament, the
- 2:12Majlis, and a constitution that was progressive for its time and
- 2:16place. But the constitutional gains
- 2:19were constantly under pressure. The parliament was suspended,
- 2:23restored and suspended again. Foreign powers intervened
- 2:27whenever their strategic interests required it.
- 2:30In 19 O 7, Britain and Russia signed the Anglo Russian
- 2:33Convention, a secret agreement that divided Iran into spheres
- 2:36of influence without any input from the Iranian government
- 2:39whatsoever. The north went to Russia.
- 2:42The South, including the oil rich regions, went to Britain.
- 2:46A so-called neutral zone sat between them.
- 2:49Iran was not consulted. Iran was not informed.
- 2:53Iran was simply petitioned on a map drawn up in Saint
- 2:56Petersburg. The message to Iranians was
- 2:59explicit, even if unspoken. Your sovereignty is conditional
- 3:03on whether it suits us. That message was received
- 3:06clearly, and it was never forgotten.
- 3:09The oil discovery changed the stakes entirely.
- 3:13In 19 O, 1A British businessman named William Knox Darcy secured
- 3:17a concession from the Iranian government giving him the right
- 3:20to explore for and extract oil across most of the country.
- 3:23For the next 60 years, the terms were extraordinarily lopsided.
- 3:28Darcy and his investors would take the overwhelming majority
- 3:31of profits. Iran would receive a small
- 3:34royalty payment and very little else.
- 3:37Seven years later, in 19 O 8 oil was struck at Masjid Solomon in
- 3:42southwest Iran. It was one of the largest oil
- 3:44discoveries in the history of the industry to that point.
- 3:48The Anglo Persian Oil Company was formed to exploit it.
- 3:52That company would later change its name.
- 3:54You know what today is? BP For the next 4 decades, the
- 3:58Anglo Iranian Oil Company, as it was renamed in 1935, extracted
- 4:03enormous quantities of Iranian oil and returned a fraction of
- 4:06the proceeds to Iran. The disparity was staggering and
- 4:10meticulously documented in Iranian parliamentary debates
- 4:13and an independent audits of the time.
- 4:15In some years, the British government collected more in
- 4:18taxes from the company than Iran received in total royalty
- 4:22payments at the Abaddon refinery, the largest oil
- 4:25refinery in the world at that time, processing Iranian oil on
- 4:29Iranian land. The conditions for Iranian
- 4:32workers were by any honest description.
- 4:34Colonial workers were barred from senior management
- 4:37positions, regardless of their qualifications.
- 4:40They were housed separately from their British counterparts.
- 4:43They earned a fraction of British wages for identical or
- 4:46harder work. They ate in separate canteens.
- 4:50They use separate facilities. They were treated on their own
- 4:54soil as a lower order of human being in an industry built
- 4:58entirely on their country's resources.
- 5:00The resentment this generated inside Iran was deep,
- 5:03structural, widely shared and entirely legitimate.
- 5:07It was not manufactured by politicians for electoral gain.
- 5:11It was lived experience for hundreds of thousands of Iranian
- 5:14workers and their families. Into this atmosphere stepped
- 5:17Muhammad Mosaddegh. Mosadic was not a firebrand in
- 5:21the conventional sense. He did not project the menace of
- 5:24revolution or incite crowds through inflammatory rhetoric.
- 5:28He was an aristocrat by birth, connected through family to the
- 5:32Kajar court that had preceded the polyvies.
- 5:35He was a lawyer by training, having studied in France and
- 5:38later completed a doctorate in Switzerland.
- 5:41He was a man of considerable personal wealth who had
- 5:43nonetheless spent his entire political career advocating for
- 5:47constitutional government, judicial independence and
- 5:50national sovereignty over Iranian affairs.
- 5:53He was known for weeping openly in the match list when he felt
- 5:56the dignity of Iran was being compromised.
- 5:59He sometimes received journalists from his bed dressed
- 6:02in pyjamas, which the foreign press found faintly absurd and
- 6:05ordinary Iranians found utterly endearing.
- 6:08He was, in other words, exactly the kind of politician that
- 6:11colonial administrators consistently underestimate.
- 6:15His connection to the Iranian public crossed class lines in a
- 6:18way that is genuinely rare in political history.
- 6:21He spoke to educated nationalists and to impoverished
- 6:25workers. He spoke to the religious
- 6:27establishment and to secular liberals.
- 6:30His argument was not ideological in a partisan or revolutionary
- 6:34sense. It was fundamentally moral.
- 6:37The oil beneath Iranian soil belongs to the Iranian people.
- 6:41The profits it generates should serve Iranian development and
- 6:45Iranian welfare. The arrangement that currently
- 6:47exists is a form of legalized theft, and it must end.
- 6:51He had been making that argument in Parliament for years before
- 6:54he became Prime Minister. When the Majlis voted in March
- 6:571951 to nationalize the Anglo Iranian Oil Company and then
- 7:01elected Mosaic as Prime Minister the following month on a
- 7:04powerful wave of nationalist sentiment, the mandate was
- 7:07clear, and the moment was his He moved swiftly to implement the
- 7:11policy that had brought him to power.
- 7:14Iranian workers raised the national flag over the Abaddon
- 7:17refinery. British technicians were told
- 7:19their services were no longer required.
- 7:22The Iranian National Oil Company was established to take over the
- 7:25running of the industry. The oil at last belonged to
- 7:29Iran. On the 1st of May 1951, the
- 7:33nationalization became law. The reaction from London was
- 7:36immediate and severe. The British government, which
- 7:40held a majority stake in the Anglo Iranian Oil Company,
- 7:43treated nationalization not as a legitimate sovereign act but as
- 7:46expropriation, a theft that could not be allowed to stand as
- 7:49precedent. Winston Churchill, who returned
- 7:52to the position of Prime Minister in October 1951,
- 7:55described Mosaddegh with open contempt and employed language
- 7:59that carried the assumptions of imperial superiority without
- 8:02apology. The British imposed A
- 8:04comprehensive economic blockade on Iran, withdrew their
- 8:07technical staff from Abaddon, taking with them the expertise
- 8:10needed to operate the refinery at full capacity, and pursued
- 8:14legal action at the International Court of Justice.
- 8:17Most critically, they pressured allied nations and independent
- 8:20oil companies around the world to refuse to purchase Iranian
- 8:24oil. Iran had the oil but could not
- 8:26sell it to anyone. The economy contracted.
- 8:30Unemployment rose. The government struggled to meet
- 8:33basic obligations. The British were deliberately
- 8:36engineering a national crisis, bidding that economic suffering
- 8:40would erode public support for Mosaic and force him to
- 8:43capitulate. The British government also went
- 8:45directly to Washington with a request.
- 8:48Help us remove this man. The Truman administration was
- 8:51initially resistant, and the reasons for that resistance are
- 8:54worth understanding. President Truman and his
- 8:57Secretary of State, Dean Atchison, were not naive about
- 9:00geopolitics, but they had a more careful read of Iranian politics
- 9:04than their British counterparts. Atchison understood that Mosaic
- 9:08was not a communist and had no meaningful ideological alignment
- 9:12with Moscow. He understood that Iranian
- 9:15nationalism was a legitimate political force rooted in real
- 9:18historical grievance, not a Soviet front operation with a
- 9:21democratic mask. He reportedly told British
- 9:24officials repeatedly that their handling of Iran was dangerously
- 9:27counterproductive, that treating an elected nationalist leader as
- 9:31an enemy would achieve precisely the outcome they feared driving
- 9:34Iran toward the Soviet Union, and that a reasonable oil
- 9:37settlement respecting the principle of nationalization was
- 9:40the only sustainable resolution. American mediators were sent to
- 9:44broker a compromise. All those efforts fail primarily
- 9:48because the British refused any settlement that validated the
- 9:51idea. Iran had the right to
- 9:53nationalize in the 1st place. Truman left office in January
- 9:571953. Dwight Eisenhower was
- 10:00inaugurated as the 34th president of the United States.
- 10:04His Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles.
- 10:07His CIA director was Allen Dulles, John Foster's brother.
- 10:11Both men were committed Cold warriors, shaped by a worldview
- 10:14that was far less inclined to make distinctions between
- 10:17genuine nationalism and communist subversion when
- 10:20strategic interests were in play.
- 10:22The British made their case again.
- 10:24Iran was descending into instability.
- 10:26The Tudor party was growing in influence.
- 10:28The Soviet Union was watching and waiting, and without
- 10:31decisive action, Iran could be lost to the West entirely.
- 10:35This time, the argument found the audience it needed.
- 10:38Allen Dulles authorized the operation.
- 10:41It's American code name was Operation Ajax.
- 10:44The British component was called Operation Boot.
- 10:47The man selected to run the operation on the ground in
- 10:50Tehran was Kermit Roosevelt Junior.
- 10:52He was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, 37 years
- 10:56old, a Harvard graduate and a veteran of the wartime Office of
- 10:59Strategic Services, the predecessor organization to the
- 11:02CIA. He spoke Persian.
- 11:05He had detailed knowledge of Iran's political landscape and
- 11:08its key personalities. He arrived in Tehran in July
- 11:121953 carrying CIA funds estimated at several $1,000,000,
- 11:16a very substantial sum for a covert operation of that era and
- 11:20a mandate to accomplish through deception, bribery and
- 11:23manufactured chaos what the blockade had not been able to
- 11:26achieve by economic pressure alone.
- 11:28What he built over the following weeks was a layered political
- 11:31warfare operation designed to manufacture the appearance of a
- 11:34country turning against its own democratically elected
- 11:37government. CIA money reached members of the
- 11:40Iranian parliament, bribe deputies withdrew their support
- 11:43from Mosadic, publicly spoke against him to Matchless, and
- 11:47worked to fracture the nationalist coalition that had
- 11:49brought him to power. CIA funds were channeled to
- 11:52newspaper editors and journalists to plant stories
- 11:55casting Mosadic as a Communist sympathizer, a Soviet tool, and
- 11:59a danger to Iranian Islam. The messaging was carefully
- 12:02calibrated for different audiences.
- 12:05Secular nationalists were told he was leading the country into
- 12:08economic ruin. Religious conservatives were
- 12:11told he was enabling godless communism to take root in an
- 12:14Islamic Society. The business community was told
- 12:17that his economic mismanagement was destroying Iran's commercial
- 12:21future. St. level operations were run
- 12:24through criminal networks and pay gang leaders, including
- 12:27figures from Tehran's rougher working class neighborhoods who
- 12:30had the connections and the muscle to fill the streets with
- 12:32bodies on demand. These men were deployed to
- 12:35attack opposition newspapers, to stage violent demonstrations
- 12:38against the government, and to create the impression of
- 12:41widespread popular unrest directed at MOSADDIC.
- 12:44CIA operatives also arranged for provocateurs to pose as MOSADDIC
- 12:48supporters and commit acts of violence and vandalism that
- 12:51could then be attributed to the prime minister's camp steadily
- 12:54degrading his public image. Religious networks were
- 12:57cultivated and activated. Ayatollah Kashini, a powerful
- 13:02cleric who had once been a close ally of Mosaic before a serious
- 13:05falling out over political power was approached and his influence
- 13:09leverage to frame the anti government campaign in Islamic
- 13:12terms. Sermons and mosques across
- 13:14Tehran carry the message that Mosaic was weakening Iran
- 13:17against communist atheism. This was a sophisticated piece
- 13:21of political engineering. It transformed A dispute rooted
- 13:24in colonial oil extraction into a crisis of national faith and
- 13:28identity. The Shah himself remained the
- 13:30most uncertain and essential piece.
- 13:33Muhammad Reza Palavi was a cautious, often anxious man who
- 13:37had spent 12 years as a constitutional monarch with
- 13:40genuinely limited power. He wanted to rule as his father
- 13:44had ruled, with real authority, not subject to a parliament he
- 13:47could not control. He resented Mosadic deeply, but
- 13:51he feared failure more than he desired power, and a previous
- 13:55attempt by his supporters to remove Mosadic in 1952 had ended
- 13:59in humiliation. He demanded firm guarantees
- 14:02before he would put his name on the royal decrees needed to
- 14:05formally dismiss the Prime Minister.
- 14:07Roosevelt met with the Shah repeatedly and incomplete
- 14:10secrecy, working through back channels and trusted
- 14:13intermediaries to assure him that Washington was fully
- 14:16committed. To demonstrate the depth of that
- 14:18commitment, A prearranged signal was embedded in an American
- 14:21radio broadcast, a specific phrase that the Shah would
- 14:24recognize as confirmation that Eisenhower himself stood behind
- 14:28the operation. The Shah received the signal.
- 14:31He signed the royal decrees dismissing Mosaic and appointing
- 14:34General Fazlala Zahidi, a man the CIA had selected and been
- 14:38funding for months, as Iran's new Prime Minister.
- 14:41Then the first attempt fell apart entirely.
- 14:45On the night of August 15th, the officer assigned to deliver the
- 14:48Shah's dismissal order to Mosadiga's residence was
- 14:51intercepted and turned back by loyal troops were the operation
- 14:55had leaked, almost certainly through Tutor Party intelligence
- 14:59sources embedded in the military.
- 15:01Mosadiga arrested the officer, broadcast a statement to the
- 15:04Iranian public that a royalist coup attempt had been defeated,
- 15:08and declare that his government remained firmly in place.
- 15:11The Shah, receiving word that the attempt had failed, panicked
- 15:15and fled. He left Iran that night with his
- 15:17wife, flying first to Baghdad and then continuing to Rome.
- 15:21From Rome, he gave interviews to the international press that
- 15:24read like the words of a man who had already accepted his
- 15:27political fate. He seemed to genuinely believe
- 15:30it was over. Roosevelt remained in Tehran.
- 15:34He did not withdraw. He did not signal Washington
- 15:37that the operation was finished. He began rebuilding from the
- 15:41beginning. Over 4 days, he poured more CIA
- 15:44money into the street networks. He re established contact with
- 15:48military officers who had not been exposed or compromised.
- 15:52The propaganda operation was intensified across every
- 15:56available channel. Additional religious leaders
- 15:59were brought into the effort. Arrangements were made to flood
- 16:02Tehran with a coordinated combination of paid
- 16:04demonstrators, genuine royalists, military units moving
- 16:08in pre agreed sequence and provocateurs whose specific role
- 16:11was to generate maximum chaos in the streets and ensure it was
- 16:15attributed to the Mosaic government.
- 16:17On August 19th, 1953, the second attempt was launched.
- 16:22What followed was a day of serious and sustained violence.
- 16:26Mobs moved through Tehran from multiple directions
- 16:29simultaneously. Tanks from royalist military
- 16:32units rolled through streets where people were still fighting
- 16:35one another. The radio station was seized
- 16:38early in the day and broadcast immediately began announcing
- 16:41that the Shah had dismissed Mosaic, that General Zahidi was
- 16:44the legitimate Prime Minister, and that loyal citizens should
- 16:47support the restoration of royal authority.
- 16:50Fighting between pro mosaic and anti mosaic forces left
- 16:53somewhere between 200 and 300 people dead by the most credible
- 16:57contemporary estimates. It was not a clean or antiseptic
- 17:01intelligence success. It was a violent political
- 17:04seizure dressed up as a popular uprising.
- 17:07By the evening of August 19th, the government of Muhammad
- 17:10Mosaddic had ceased to exist. Mosaddic surrendered rather than
- 17:14allow the bloodshed to continue. He was arrested, charged with
- 17:18treason and tried before a military court.
- 17:22He was sentenced to three years in prison.
- 17:25After his release, he was confined to his country estate
- 17:28under permanent house arrest. He was forbidden from speaking
- 17:31to the press, forbidden from meeting with former political
- 17:34allies, forbidden from returning to public life in any capacity.
- 17:39He spent the remaining 15 years of his life in that confinement.
- 17:43He died in March 1967 at the age of 84.
- 17:47He maintained to the end of his life that the nationalization of
- 17:50Iranian oil had been lawful, that his government had been
- 17:52legitimate, and that what had been done to him and to Iran was
- 17:56a crime. He was right on all three
- 17:58counts. The Shahra turned from Rome to
- 18:01an organized welcome. American official celebrated.
- 18:05Allen Dulles declared Operation Ajax the CIA's greatest
- 18:09achievement to that point. Kermit Roosevelt was
- 18:11congratulated by Eisenhower personally.
- 18:14He would later write his memoir about the operation, a self
- 18:17congratulatory account published in 1979, the very year that
- 18:21everything the coup had been designed to preserve was swept
- 18:24away by the Islamic Revolution. The consequences of August 1953
- 18:29played out over the following decades in ways that surprised
- 18:32almost everyone who had been involved in designing the
- 18:35operation. The Shah ruled with increasing
- 18:38authoritarianism. The CIA helped him build and
- 18:41train Savik his feared internal security apparatus.
- 18:44That story is the subject of episode 2 of this series.
- 18:48Political opposition was systematically crushed.
- 18:51The liberal and nationalist movements that had supported
- 18:54Mosaddic were broken. The Tudor party was destroyed.
- 18:58The press was controlled. The parliament became a
- 19:01formality. What the post coup system could
- 19:03not fully suppress was the religious establishment.
- 19:07The Shia clerical network rooted in the seminary cities of Kham
- 19:10and Mashhad and woven through the fabric of Iranian life at
- 19:13the level of the local mosque in the local neighborhood was too
- 19:16dispersed, too socially embedded, and too difficult to
- 19:19monitor for any security apparatus to neutralize
- 19:22completely. Within that network, a cleric
- 19:25named Rahalla Khomeini was watching and drawing
- 19:27conclusions. Khomeini took from 1953 a set of
- 19:31arguments that would define his political theology for the next
- 19:3425 years. Iran's government have been
- 19:37captured by foreign powers. The Shah was their instrument.
- 19:41Western style democracy was not a vehicle for Iranian dignity,
- 19:45but a mechanism by which Western interests disguise themselves as
- 19:49domestic politics. The only authentic form of
- 19:51governance for a Muslim people was rooted in Islamic law and
- 19:55led by scholars who owed nothing to any foreign patron.
- 19:58When he came to power in 1979, he did not need to persuade
- 20:02Iranians that America was untrustworthy.
- 20:05August 1953 had already made that case.
- 20:09When students stormed the US Embassy compound in Tehran in
- 20:13November 1979. They found CIA files inside
- 20:17cables, operational documents, lists of Iranian agents who had
- 20:22worked for American intelligence, evidence of the
- 20:25depth of American penetration of Iranian political and security
- 20:28life going back decades. Those documents were published,
- 20:32studied and circulated across Iran.
- 20:35The embassy that Khomeini named the den of spies was, in a
- 20:38precise historical sense, accurately described in the
- 20:42first days of Operation Epic Fury in February 2026.
- 20:46Iranian state television ran extended retrospective coverage
- 20:49of 1953. The argument was consistent and
- 20:53deliberate. What America is doing now is
- 20:55what it did then. This is not a new confrontation.
- 20:59It is the continuation of a pattern that has never been
- 21:02honestly reckoned with, rooted in a wound that has never
- 21:05genuinely closed. That argument simplifies a
- 21:08conflict with multiple causes and many actors over many
- 21:11decades. But the historical grievance at
- 21:14its core is documented, factual and real.
- 21:17Muhammad Mosaddegh, the man the CIA helped remove in the summer
- 21:21of 1953, is remembered in Iran today as a national hero.
- 21:25His image appears in public spaces.
- 21:28His name is invoked across the political spectrum as a symbol
- 21:31of what Iranian dignity looks like when it refuses to submit.
- 21:35The man British and American intelligence regarded as an
- 21:38inconvenient obstacle has proved across the long arc of history
- 21:42far more enduring than the regime that was installed to
- 21:45replace him. The coup that took four days to
- 21:47execute in August 1953 is still reverberating in 2026.
- 21:53The bombs falling on Iranian cities, the missiles over the
- 21:56Strait of Hormuz, the deep and unresolved antagonism between
- 21:59Washington and Tehran, All of it has roots in those streets in
- 22:03those four days of bribery and propaganda and organized
- 22:06violence, and in the decision taken in Washington and London
- 22:09that a fragile Iranian democracy was less valuable than the oil
- 22:13flowing beneath its ground. That is Episode 1.
- 22:16Next time, the CIA goes deeper, building the secret police force
- 22:21that will hold the Shah's regime together for 1/4 century, and in
- 22:24doing so, making the revolution that follows truly inevitable.