Latest / The Fourcast / Trump Iran war: will US Marines attack critical Iranian oil hub?

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Trump Iran war: will US Marines attack critical Iranian oil hub? · The Fourcast

0:00
This will end only when Trump says it ends, and I think it
0:03
will leave Netanyahu with no real achievement.
0:06
There are these 2500 U.S. Marines on the way to Hague
0:09
Island in the Persian Gulf. How would that change this?
0:12
Conflict. One bad decision has been
0:15
doubled down on every stage so far, right?
0:16
Doing the operation was a mistake.
0:18
Escalating the operation was a mistake.
0:20
Potentially going doing the cargo operation is a mistake.
0:22
I don't understand how we can just continue to make the same
0:24
decision over and over and think the outcome will be different.
0:30
Welcome to this latest edition of The Forecast, coming to you
0:34
from the bunker of my hotel. In fact, the corridor to the
0:38
hotel kitchen. This is the safest place in the
0:40
hotel. And we've spent so much time
0:43
here in the last few days because the number of sirens and
0:46
alarms over Jerusalem has increased exponentially, that
0:49
instead of interrupting the pod, as we had to do yesterday, we've
0:51
decided to do it all from here for you today.
0:55
And of course, there's no shortage of news.
0:57
There are reports today that Donald Trump has dispatched or
1:00
the 2000 U.S. Marines perhaps to try and
1:03
capture Hag Island, that is the all important Iranian oil
1:07
terminal in the Persian Gulf. Is he doing that?
1:10
Is that his plan? How will that change the war?
1:13
Then of course, last night the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin
1:16
Netanyahu said that Iran can no longer enrich uranium.
1:20
Is that true? How do they know?
1:22
Where is the uranium by the way and what difference will that
1:26
make to the war? So to to get a sense of the
1:29
state of this conflict almost three weeks in, we're joined now
1:33
by Nate Swanson as an American State Department veteran on the
1:37
subject of Iran. He worked for the Biden
1:39
administration. He also worked for the Trump
1:41
administration until he was fired last year.
1:45
And we'll find out from him why, because he's the kind of guy you
1:47
really want on your team, especially at the moment.
1:50
And then we have Ronan Bergman, who is an Israeli investigative
1:53
journalist based in Tel Aviv. Welcome to you both.
1:55
Let me start with you, Nate. I mean, there's a lot of stuff
1:58
going on. I guess, you know, the latest
2:00
development is that there are these 2500 U.S.
2:03
Marines on the way to Hague Island in the Persian Gulf.
2:08
We're not quite sure what Trump intends to do with them, but
2:10
there's a suggestion that he intends to take it.
2:14
Is is that the way you read it? And how would that change this
2:17
conflict? That is how I read it.
2:20
And I think the perception that the Trump administration using
2:25
here is that they can exert this kind of a maximum pressure and
2:29
then it's going to cause Iranian capitulation.
2:32
And it's kind of the same thinking that's LED us to where
2:34
we are right now, which is that I think from the Trump
2:37
administration perspective, and I don't think the this is shared
2:41
by the Israelis, but from Trump's perspective, they still
2:43
think force leads to capitulation.
2:47
And as long as we continue to put more force on, at some
2:49
point, Iran will capitulate. And it just hasn't happened yet.
2:52
I've seen the exact opposite. And I, and I don't know for sure
2:55
what will happen with the cargo operation, but I would my guess
2:59
would be we have more of the same, you know, Iran will
3:01
retaliate in kind and. Then what?
3:05
I mean, we kind of say or have said rather flippantly, that war
3:08
is a way of teaching Americans, including their president,
3:11
geography. But it turns out that Trump has
3:14
been obsessed or interested in Hague Island since 1988, when he
3:18
made a statement about taking Hague Island if he was in
3:21
charge. So this is a bit of a theme for
3:23
him. Yeah, apparently.
3:25
I mean, I guess I can't really explain why he feels that way,
3:29
but he has. He's talked about it a lot.
3:31
And and this has been a key theme.
3:33
And, you know, as we start kind of in Venezuela, you know, he
3:36
sees kind of the spoils of victory to include oil.
3:41
How that works here, I don't know.
3:43
And how Iran responds, whether they sell sabotage or they go
3:47
after Gulf energy, I don't really know.
3:50
But I think both are viable possibilities.
3:52
So yeah, I, I don't, I don't know why the president is
3:54
obsessed with this, but clearly is.
3:56
I mean, I would just say though, I mean this is not a new option
4:00
and this is kind of always hypothetically been a military
4:03
option for the USI just never considered in this context or
4:07
that seriously. Ronan Bergman in Tel Aviv.
4:10
I mean, last night the Prime Minister here, Benjamin
4:12
Netanyahu, gave a a press conference in Hebrew and in
4:16
English, as he often does. And one of the things he stated
4:19
was that Iran could no longer enrich uranium.
4:23
Now, what exactly did he mean by that?
4:27
Where is the uranium? There's famous 440 kilograms as
4:31
far as we know. And do you think he was telling
4:33
the truth? So I think that he meant exactly
4:35
what literally was understood and I would be fleshing out the
4:42
differences in what he said in Hebrew and in English because it
4:44
was not the same, though on the same panel just two minutes
4:48
after where in Israel said we will fight as long as necessary,
4:53
basically giving the impression as if we are looking at the war.
4:56
That will take quite long time to exhaust.
5:01
In English, he said this is going to take far shorter.
5:07
It's going to end much sooner than everybody thinks, which is
5:12
not exactly the same. Now, in Hebrew, he didn't say
5:15
anything about no, no enrichment, while in English he
5:18
said, and he said no, no capability to produce new
5:21
missiles. I just want us to recall that at
5:24
the end of the war in June, after President Trump gave his
5:29
famous, famous speech about obliterated Prime Minister
5:34
Netanyahu said we removed the existential threat of the
5:39
nuclear existential threat and the missile existential threat
5:43
for generations to come. And guess what, generations to
5:47
come means maximum 8 months. So he was lying then as he was
5:54
lying last night. He knows that this is not true.
5:59
Of course the the industrial level of 22 or at least 20,000
6:06
centrifuges that were operating in those two sites, Natanz and
6:11
Fodu, this is gone. This was bombed, this was
6:14
damaged. But the Iranians still not all
6:17
the centrifuges were damaged. They put some of them in safe
6:19
and more important since 2021, they kicked out the IAEA
6:25
inspectors from the two factories, Tessa and Teba, where
6:29
they produce new centrifuges. So this is unregistered.
6:32
They have hundreds, possibly thousands, but they don't need
6:35
more than few hundreds and something around the size of a
6:40
baseball court to put together. They have the machinery, they
6:45
have the knowledge if maybe they can even do that secretly and
6:49
have a very rapid and I was told relatively simple process to
6:54
enrich the 60% to 90%. So this is not true.
6:59
They can enrich the the uranium and this the uranium the 430
7:06
sufficient quantity for something like 11 bombs if it
7:09
reached to 90%. This is the most I would say
7:13
critical component that if removed it will seriously not as
7:20
a proposing statement, but this will seriously decapitate the
7:24
Iranian nuclear project for very long time because they need to
7:27
start from the beginning. But if not, they are close to
7:32
the OR they have the ability to assemble a first device nuclear
7:38
device and test that. And that depends on the
7:41
political decision and that depends on the ability to hide
7:44
it, But it does not depend on their knowledge and capability.
7:48
So just to sum up what you've said, you despite all the, you
7:51
know, depletion of their military assets, you know, the,
7:54
the 16,000 air strikes from the Israelis and the Americans,
7:58
you're saying that they still might have this ability to
8:01
enrich uranium to 90% where it could in theory be used to be
8:05
strapped, you know, to the front of a missile.
8:07
Should they still have that technology available somewhere?
8:10
I said that just one, one correction.
8:12
I said the device, I didn't say a warhead, A warhead technology
8:16
to be digitized, a device shoulders of a ballistic missile
8:20
that that will take another year or a year and a half, the expert
8:23
says. But the just imagine, you know,
8:28
horrible imagination there. If Iran runs the test in a, an
8:33
underground nuclear tests, this will change, I think change the
8:37
course of history in the Middle East, even if they don't have a
8:40
war enough that they have a test and the repercussions are going
8:44
to be severe. And I think and, and, and I
8:47
think it's, it's not enough to bury the material.
8:50
It's not enough to bomb the material.
8:52
It's not bombable like it's it's very hard to to kill from from a
8:56
distant, but the whole world is waiting for a commando raid on
9:02
the site where they they hide it.
9:04
And I assume that the Iranians also read the press and are also
9:08
waiting for for these commandos to come.
9:10
Nate, I mean, it's fascinating what Ronan said there about
9:14
Benjamin Netanyahu's message in Hebrew and English being
9:17
somewhat different. And it sounds like the English
9:19
version of his message last night was really meant to kind
9:22
of reassure the American public this thing will be over quite
9:25
soon, but also reassured Donald Trump.
9:28
Is there any sign that Trump and Netanyahu, who are, you know, in
9:33
lock step on this since the beginning, are beginning to fall
9:36
out? Have they been in lock step
9:38
since the beginning? I don't know.
9:39
I mean, I think from the US perspective, well, and the
9:43
Israeli perspective are quite different on this.
9:45
I mean, I think the from Trump's perspective, this was going to
9:49
be June 2025 all over again. It was going to be quick.
9:53
It was going to be decisive and it was going to be, you know, a
9:57
major victory. And he has this long history of
9:59
defying critics. And I I think, you know, you go
10:02
all the way back to moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to
10:05
Jerusalem. You know, I was in the State
10:07
Department this time there was this perception like this was
10:09
the end of the world. Nothing happened.
10:11
And then, you know, same thing, you know, midnight hammer strike
10:14
last year. You know, this was going to lead
10:16
to immediate break out of Iranian nuclear weapons.
10:18
Nothing happened. Maduro operation, nothing
10:20
happened. So I think from Trump's
10:21
perspective, and and this is just by, you know, tangential
10:25
communications with folks still in the admin was that there was
10:28
this, they were like, Trump's going to do this.
10:30
It's been successful in the past.
10:32
Why is it going to be successful?
10:33
Why want to be successful this time?
10:35
I mean, so I think that's from the American perspective.
10:38
And then now we're kind of flailing to figure out what the
10:40
objective is. But then and then Ronan should
10:42
correct me, but our my perception that from an American
10:45
perspective is that the from the Israeli perception is that this
10:49
is, you know, really, you know, the post October 7th mind frame
10:54
that you're no longer going to accept these threats.
10:57
You know, the rhetoric that came out of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran,
11:00
it was no longer acceptable. And so these are two very
11:03
different objectives. And so they might have had, you
11:05
know, a military objectives that overlap for a day, a week, two
11:09
weeks, but the angle's very different.
11:11
So, you know, and I, I think tactically where we've seen
11:14
where, you know, when Israel has hit Iranian energy
11:18
infrastructure, I mean, this has made Trump extremely
11:20
uncomfortable because this has a.
11:21
Huge global. Impact on the global economy.
11:24
So I, I do think ultimately the objectives are not the same, but
11:28
I mean very much welcome, Ronan, you know, disagreeing with me on
11:31
this. Well, I think that in order for
11:33
me to disagree, I would need to know what were the the
11:35
objectives of both sides from the beginning.
11:39
And I'm not sure that I'm not sure that the, that anyone
11:41
really knows because the, the Israelis basically waits for or
11:50
rush the, the process of hitting more targets because they
11:53
understand that the fate of the war is dictated from somewhere
11:57
else, not in Israel. It's not even the Prime Minister
11:59
with their complicated relations.
12:01
It's about Trump. They, I think, relieve the, the,
12:06
the intelligence and the military chiefs relieve
12:09
themselves from the, the need to think about the day after
12:13
because it says it's not up to us anyway.
12:15
It's about Trump. And we heard we the the New York
12:19
Times team, we also heard some of the explanations coming from
12:21
American officials about some different objectives.
12:25
But I would, I would then ask what were the American
12:29
objectives? I think that the Israeli
12:32
objectives were to use the historical opportunity of having
12:36
such a massive military buildup in the Gulf.
12:38
The America and the ability of, you know, complicated mixture of
12:44
of, of, of circumstances and, and, and, and people trying to
12:49
convince Trump, including Netanyahu, but also because of
12:51
the process using the opportunity and hit Iran as hard
12:55
as possible with some, you know, sharing of targets and the the
13:01
burden between them and, and the US.
13:03
And this is basically how Israel sees this.
13:06
What would what was what were the Americans trying to to to
13:09
think if like the if Khamenei is killed then they will have a
13:12
Maduro style government. Who said that?
13:16
Who promised it? But I mean, just, you know, it's
13:19
so interesting because from my impression talking to Israeli,
13:23
you know, government officials, I spoke to President Herzog
13:25
yesterday, speaking to Israelis, there seems to be, as you say,
13:29
Ronin, the kind of broad understanding of what why
13:32
they're doing this. And we know that it's been an
13:34
obsession with Netanyahu forever.
13:36
But but Donald Trump has changed his tune almost as often as he
13:41
he's changed his kind of Happy Meals in the last few weeks.
13:45
And I wonder whether that's just him being inarticulate and a bit
13:48
woolly or whether there is genuine confusion there.
13:51
Nate. And given that question, how
13:55
serious do you think he now is about putting boots on the
13:58
ground, which is something he always said he wouldn't do?
14:02
Yeah. I mean, that's a great question.
14:04
I I genuinely don't think he knows what his objective is
14:08
beyond American glory on the front end, right?
14:11
And we've seen it switch so many times.
14:13
The first day it was regime change, but by the second day,
14:17
you know, it was military degradation, then complete
14:20
surrender. He wanted to pick Comedy's
14:22
replacement. You know, it's changed every
14:24
day. But now I think the objective
14:26
has shifted to Iran capitulating into opening the straight, which
14:31
was, you know, open 3 weeks ago. And so I don't know how how you
14:36
go from here. But here's the So like, on one
14:38
hand, I've kind of thought and incorrectly, that at some point
14:42
Trump would just pull the plug on this and say, like, OK, you
14:45
know, this is too much of A threat to my own domestic
14:47
politics, too much of A threat to the global economy.
14:50
Like I have to, we're done, you know, and he could say, look, I
14:54
killed Harmony, I degraded the military, all successes.
14:58
But he seems to instead be going the opposite way, doubling down,
15:01
which I think is still based on this idea that that Iran will
15:07
capitulate and he'll get like a Delci Rodriguez equivalent.
15:09
And so I don't even know who that is at this point.
15:11
I mean, they're, they're almost all dead.
15:12
I'm running out of Iranians that I feel like I I kind of
15:15
understand at this point. So, you know, I don't think, you
15:18
know, Jalili is going to be sitting down and talking to
15:20
Trump anytime soon if that's who they think the successor is.
15:22
So, so I don't know. So they're so I do think it's
15:26
quite likely we do card. But but then what?
15:28
I mean, I really I don't know because I don't see Iran
15:30
capitulating. And and they should just at this
15:32
point remind the audience that you were fired by the Trump
15:36
administration because you knew too much about Iran, not because
15:40
you knew too little, because you were one of the experts who were
15:43
warning about the very kinds of things that we're now seeing
15:46
unfold. And one of Trump's biggest, you
15:49
know, influencers and friends, Laura Luma, who's in a far right
15:53
ideologue, basically had you fired.
15:55
Is that correct? Yeah, I mean, there's some new
15:58
ones there. Look, I mean, I'll just, yeah,
16:01
so I got lumored. I mean, so I'll say in the
16:03
administration's defense, right? I mean, I had senior political
16:06
officials reach out to me and asked me to help be a part of
16:09
the negotiations team last last spring.
16:12
And so I mean, I think, you know, that was a genuine good
16:14
faith effort. You know, and then I just became
16:17
A and then and those same people treat me very well the entire
16:20
time I was there. And, you know, like these are
16:21
little Trump officials. Good.
16:23
But, you know, Loomer just has a lot of personality and it just
16:25
wasn't worth it at some level for the government, the, you
16:28
know, to keep me. So, you know, that's just the
16:31
atmosphere we created. But I I don't that's the
16:34
responsibility of Donald Trump. That's the responsibility of
16:36
Marc Rubio. But it is not all Trump
16:39
officials. And I don't think it had
16:40
anything to do with my knowledge.
16:41
It just was, you know, I was like, I was in the the Biden NSC
16:46
and that, you know, just was something to go after.
16:49
So anyway, that doesn't really matter that much.
16:52
And I'm not convinced that I would be listening to either
16:55
way. So, you know, whatever.
16:57
Ronan, I mean, in in trying to decipher what the motivations
17:01
for this war really were, which I think is essential because
17:04
that might give you some hint about what level of pain the
17:08
Trump administration, but also the Netanyahu administration is
17:12
prepared to put up with. What was your reading of the
17:16
events, you know, that led up to the 28th of February?
17:19
Was it Netanyahu leading Trump by the nose?
17:23
You know, was it that Trump always wanted to do this and
17:26
actually bounce Netanyahu into it?
17:27
Because I was told that actually he wants to go in June and not
17:30
as early as the end of February. What's your understanding for
17:34
the timing and the rationale behind the beginning of this
17:37
war? The bottom line is that for the
17:39
third time in eight months, Netanyahu was able or got Trump
17:46
in the exact point where he wanted Trump to be first,
17:51
surprising everybody Trump Trump gave his blessing to an Israeli
17:56
attack on the night between the 12th and the 13th of June 2nd
18:01
last year. Second, to the great surprise of
18:05
everybody, Trump joined in Sandy, the B1.
18:09
And 3rd is Trump fulfilling Netanyahu's, I think, biggest
18:14
political and diplomatic and international dream of having a
18:20
joint full cooperation, full partnership strike over Iran.
18:24
Netanyahu told me in 2019 when the we did the a cover story for
18:31
the New York Times Magazine about the confrontation between
18:35
Obama and Netanyahu about striking Iran.
18:38
He said, and the Obama administration was suspecting
18:41
Netanyahu that he's trying to drag the US into war.
18:45
He said, of course I was not trying to drag them, but if I
18:48
can get the US participate in attacking Iran, of course I
18:53
would. I would rather do it with
18:55
American participation. And what happened here, I think
18:59
is a mixture of smart Netanyahu and some other advisers
19:04
whispering to Trump's ear that he is the one, unlike other
19:11
American presidents, especially, I think that was told this
19:14
trigger, unlike Obama. He is the one with the courage.
19:19
He's the one with the kahunas. He will do what they were afraid
19:23
to do. This is one thing and the other
19:28
so. So Netanyahu comes to see Trump
19:30
in Mar a Lago at the end of the year, the end of 25, and he
19:35
present to him a plan 2 plans, either strike together or
19:40
Israeli unilateral strike with the US helping in the defense
19:44
between April and June. Trump doesn't close the door.
19:50
He said maybe, but you come again and we discuss it again.
19:52
So basically Netanyahu just gives the order to get to get
19:55
ready and then the protest starts and the protest basically
20:00
changes everything With Trump, I believe this is just my
20:03
assessment sort of like a little bit of trapping himself into
20:07
that being very much smugged after Maduro and thinking that
20:12
he can be an omnipotent. And I think that a lot of
20:15
people, not just Trump, a lot of people start especially in
20:17
Israel after he concluded the war and bring brought back the
20:20
hostages Israel. If he runs in Israel tomorrow,
20:24
he would beat any any candidate. Even in Jerusalem, even where
20:29
you are now, even in the, in the shelter where you are.
20:32
So, so I think, I think that he started to believe, people
20:36
started to believe and one thing led to another.
20:40
He started speaking about the, the aid is on its way, help is
20:43
on its way. But then on the 15th of January,
20:45
he completely flips the targets and started to speak about
20:48
nuclear. How is this helping?
20:50
If you have a, a deal with the the regime about nuclear or
20:54
missile, then of course what you're going to give the regime
20:57
in return is immunity to the regime if they give you what you
21:01
want on, on this. So this is the opposite of
21:03
helping the, the protesters and you have these these things
21:06
happening again and again. But I think that the bottom line
21:08
is that there would not be an American strike, American war
21:12
with Iran if it wasn't for the protest.
21:15
And it wouldn't be a war with Iran if it wasn't for Netanyahu.
21:20
The exact measurement, the the, the, the ballots.
21:23
I I'm not sure I can do that. Right.
21:25
So last June, I was here as well for the for the 12 day war,
21:29
mercifully short at the time. And, and what I was led to
21:32
believe by Israeli officials afterwards is that actually for
21:35
Israel, Trump ended that war too soon.
21:38
They wanted to carry on and do more.
21:41
And so there was an agreement afterwards that at some stage
21:44
they would have to revisit this and and try again.
21:47
And that's what we're seeing right now.
21:49
Because the tenure and Trump created such a gap between
21:53
reality and what they say. Reality was that everybody
21:57
expected this to be long lasting generations and suddenly they
22:01
they, they, they come. It was on a circle to the same
22:04
position. So what's the nightmare scenario
22:06
for Israel here? Is it that Trump suddenly gets
22:09
fed up with gas prices going too high?
22:11
He's worried about the midterm elections, and he's bored?
22:14
He wants to move on to Cuba or play golf God knows what.
22:18
And he says, I declare victory the the big guys dead, all these
22:22
other guys are dead, all their missiles are dead.
22:24
I'm going to go home now. And then it that leaves Israel
22:27
to kind of deal with this on it's own.
22:29
Is that a nightmare scenario or is that something that Netanyahu
22:32
is almost expecting to happen? So I think that the the
22:36
military, the expert, the intelligence officials, they
22:38
understand basically they ran out of serious targets.
22:41
They can continue bombing around for for months, for years, but
22:45
the level we are talking about now, like third tier targets,
22:50
not very important. It exhausted itself.
22:53
And I think that there are many military officials who are just
22:55
waiting for Trump to push the button and stop.
22:59
On the Netanyahu front, it's different.
23:01
And I think this in in a way correlates with with Trump, both
23:04
leaders, I believe, and at least Netanyahu cannot say this time
23:07
we remove the the threat. And you already see Netanyahu's
23:12
speeches that because he understands that he cannot say I
23:16
removed the existential threat. He's now writing again,
23:20
reengineering the targets of the war.
23:22
So he's no longer speaking about the nuclear and less in English
23:26
for the for the the foreign reporters last night, but he's
23:30
no longer speaking in Hebrew about the nuclear threat, the
23:33
existential threat, something that he built a career on.
23:36
Suddenly, he says, it's enough for us to be regional
23:39
superpower, to confront all threats for generations to come.
23:43
This is a sign that Netanyahu sees the end of the war very
23:47
soon. So, So what from what you're
23:48
saying, you think this might actually, from Israel's point of
23:51
view be over quite soon? And what about regime change?
23:55
What about, you know, the rump regime that's left in its bunker
23:58
that is shown an extraordinary resilience that that, you know,
24:01
certainly that that Nate might have predicted, but no one in
24:04
the Trump administration was predicted.
24:06
It will end only when Trump says it.
24:08
It ends, Netanyahu will obey as he did last time, even being
24:14
furious, even having to turn back the the planes.
24:17
This will end only when Trump says it ends.
24:20
And I think it will leave Netanyahu with no real
24:23
achievement. And I I just.
24:26
So we could be back there again in a year's time.
24:30
Well, a year's time would be after the elections, if maybe
24:32
it's not the Prime Minister. Can I ask a question, Ronan,
24:34
though this to me, this is the fundamental thing.
24:36
So like this is a really unpopular war in the US, right?
24:40
And I am guessing don't know for sure that that the president
24:46
will not be open to another round of this again.
24:49
He wants to say we have permanently degraded Iran's
24:52
military. Iran is going to reconstitute
24:56
their missile and UAV program. So like, where does that leave
24:58
Israel? Because, you know, Israel will
25:01
want to strike again in six months, but there's a pretty
25:05
decent chance that Trump won't, especially on the trajectory
25:09
we're going. So what?
25:09
What is that? What happens then?
25:11
Then they will, you know, if it's Netanyahu, another
25:14
politician will find all the excuses why suddenly the
25:16
existential immediate threat became not very existential and
25:20
not very immediate. And they, because, you know, you
25:22
always make, make concessions and, and make and make
25:25
comparison. But I think that the Israeli
25:29
public is not aware of the fact that, for example, the military
25:34
is counting launchers, military missile launchers.
25:37
They say we there were 450 at the beginning and now we
25:40
destroyed 300, three, 150. But the, it, it could be true.
25:44
I think that it's a little bit exaggerated, but it could be
25:46
true. Let's say it's true.
25:48
What they don't explain is that it's very hard to produce a
25:51
ballistic missile. It's not very hard to produce a
25:54
a launcher. It's just a truck with a little
25:56
bit of work. It would take the Iranians no
25:58
time and this bottleneck would be open and then they can they
26:02
can fire the rest of whatever 3000 that they still.
26:05
So I, I think that there's a, there's a propaganda machine
26:08
that is being laundering all the time and creating achievements.
26:12
And every time again and again, the Israeli public are
26:15
disappointed. They taught to believe that
26:18
force can solve everything. Then they realise it's not at
26:22
the end of the day you cannot win, sorry.
26:25
At the end of the day you cannot win this.
26:27
There's no ultimate victory unless you have an agreement.
26:32
OK. Ronan, that's a really
26:33
interesting note for you to end on because I know you've got to
26:36
rush off, but I want to carry on with Nathan.
26:38
I want to pick up is American, as is American leadership or
26:41
perhaps even Israeli leadership, just not as smart as the smart
26:46
bombs that they, you know, fire against Iranian targets.
26:49
Because the smart thing at the end of the day has to be a
26:52
political solution. And they're obsessed with
26:54
military solutions. I, I, I look, I clearly they're
27:00
very smart people. And the president is, is smart.
27:03
I mean, he, he is. I just think they just aren't
27:06
paying attention to Iran. Like they're not thinking that
27:10
Iran has a vote in this calculation at all.
27:12
I mean, there is just, we clearly have military
27:16
superiority and we clearly have military dominance, but that
27:20
doesn't that doesn't translate into capitulation.
27:23
And so that part just seems to be missing from the equation.
27:26
And I just think it's driven by this extreme confidence that
27:30
that a bombing campaign can lead to regime change or, you know,
27:34
picking the supreme leader or whatever.
27:36
And that just fundamentally is just kind of ignoring some very
27:39
basic facts about Iran. And so, you know, I don't know
27:44
if it's not, I don't know, I don't know what that I mean,
27:47
it's not a lack of intelligence. It's just, it's just an
27:50
overconfidence in your own ability, I think.
27:52
But maybe a lack of, you know, maybe a lack of judgement or
27:55
wisdom. I mean, it's about 3 weeks into
27:58
this war, almost three weeks being rather resilient Iranian
28:03
rump regime has, you know, is holding the world economy in a
28:09
choke through the Straits of Hormuz and has also confronted
28:13
the Trump administration with the choice.
28:16
You can either choose to save the world economy, so you call
28:19
it a ceasefire, you do a deal and even that's beset with
28:23
doubt, or you protect Israel. And that is a choice I don't
28:28
think that Donald Trump ever wants to face, but he's facing
28:31
it. Totally.
28:32
I mean, I, I completely agree. I mean, and then yeah.
28:35
And then Iran, I mean, obviously can't compete like
28:38
conventionally with us, but asymmetrically they're forcing
28:41
this choice. And and I, you know, I don't
28:44
have, I'm not in the military, you know, I'm not in the
28:46
government anymore. So I don't have great insights
28:49
into what exactly Iranian capabilities are, but they right
28:55
now when they seem to want to do something and they announce
28:57
they're going to do something, they seem to do it successfully.
29:00
And so my my assumption here is that Iran can keep inflicting
29:04
pain on the US and pain on the global economy for a while.
29:07
It seems to want this what level, this war of attrition.
29:10
So, yeah, the longer this goes on, I feel like the more it
29:13
plays into Iran's hands where he will either, as they, as you
29:16
said, have to double down and to say, you know, the only way I'm
29:20
going to achieve my objective is boots on the ground.
29:22
And maybe not. And maybe Karg's not even
29:23
enough, maybe you to take out more or he's going to have to
29:26
basically adhere to what I perceive the Iranian demand to
29:29
be, which is to restrain BB, right.
29:33
I mean, I think that's Iran doesn't want to be Lebanon.
29:36
They don't want to be hit every, you know, couple weeks, couple
29:40
months, as you know, Iran as Israel, the United States sees
29:44
fit. And so that they're better off
29:46
fighting a longer war now if that means restraining Israel in
29:50
the future. And so that that's, you know, an
29:51
awful place for both Israel and the United States to be.
29:54
But, you know, when Iran is willing to sacrifice as many
29:58
lives and people as they have, then they can fight this war.
30:02
So it's a very, I think I'm strategic at the end of the day
30:05
for both the US and Israel. And yet again, it strikes me
30:09
that America, an American administration, has
30:14
underestimated the complexities of the society that they've, you
30:18
know, gone to war against and have not done their homework.
30:22
I mean, in Iraq, we had, you know, Paul Bremer not really
30:25
understanding the difference between Sunnis and Shias.
30:29
Or maybe Bush didn't understand it.
30:31
And they made some terrible, terrible mistakes, you know,
30:35
stripping all the, you know, Saddam Hussein's military of, of
30:38
their, of their, of their salaries, of their status, of
30:42
their dignity. And ISIS was born.
30:46
And, and this is a bit of a shortcut, but that's roughly
30:48
what happened and they're making mistakes again now, aren't they?
30:52
So. Absolutely.
30:54
I mean, yeah, I mean, we have no idea.
30:56
So we know, OK. So best case scenario, I mean,
31:00
the, I think the upper end of the estimates is, you know, a
31:02
million, maybe 1,000,000, 1/2 people came out onto the streets
31:04
in January, right? That's very significant.
31:06
These are people who want to see the regime falling.
31:09
That's a lot. But at the same time we've seen
31:11
a security forces that I mean depending on estimates is you
31:14
know 11.1 million, 1.2 million which is and we've seen 0
31:18
defections. So you have these two very large
31:21
chunks of people and you have 90 million people in the middle
31:24
that we don't know anything about where they are.
31:26
I mean, our assumption is that many of them are anti regime,
31:31
but we don't really know. And so I, I think I wrote this,
31:34
but I'll just say this quick story.
31:35
I mean, you know what, we had this interaction with the
31:38
Iranian official one time and I think 22, we were 2023 where we
31:41
said, you know, you have huge legitimacy problems.
31:43
And this Iranian official acknowledges it.
31:45
And he's like, you're right. He's like we do.
31:47
And he's like, but you know, we have an equal number of people
31:50
who are, you know, committed to the regime and will die for the
31:53
regime. And so he said, but he's like,
31:54
but look, the vast majority just want a better life.
31:57
And so we kind of started referring to this is like the
31:58
2020 sixty ratio. We made-up the numbers, not him,
32:01
and that they could be off. But the idea was that, you know,
32:04
that you have like this real split.
32:07
And I think, you know, it might not have worked, but from my
32:10
perspective, the hope was this, 60% of Iranians who want a
32:13
better life would eventually join forces with the people who
32:16
are opposed to the regime. And that might force a future
32:18
leader to to, to chart a different course for Iran's
32:23
future and base. And that a lot of that comes
32:26
down to how they approach Israel, right?
32:27
As long as you are, you know, projecting hostility and
32:33
existential threats to Israel, you're never going to have the
32:35
economic relief you want. You're never going to have the
32:37
security you want. So a lot of it just comes down
32:39
to that pure thing. And so, you know, there was the
32:41
hope that Anahama was set in his course.
32:44
He was, he made his choice. He doubled down on ideology.
32:47
But the the hope was that whoever came next would have to
32:49
actually really ask himself the hard question.
32:51
Like, OK, like I've, you know, we've had 47 years of failure as
32:55
an Islamic Republic. Like we need to actually look at
32:58
our foreign policy. We need to actually look at our
32:59
domestic policy and see what we want to be.
33:01
And the problem is we kind of made the decision for them with
33:04
this existential threat. We're saying, no, you have to
33:06
double down on your on your current policy.
33:09
You have to survive. Only force works.
33:11
And so, you know, maybe that's not a permanent decision, but
33:14
but a minimum, it delays any positive change for I think
33:16
years at this point and that's unfortunate.
33:19
So really what you're saying is that the administration, you
33:22
know, and Israel have done things in the last three weeks
33:26
that have had, they've been completely counterproductive.
33:28
We've gone from one Khamenei to another Khamenei.
33:31
We've got a rump regime that is, you know, surprisingly
33:35
resilient. They're hanging on.
33:37
And if they survive this, perhaps because of the chokehold
33:41
that they hold they have on the world economy, the one thing
33:44
they're going to try and do is develop a nuclear weapon because
33:46
that's the only thing that might keep them as safe as, you know,
33:49
Kim Jong Un is being kept at the moment because there is nuclear
33:53
weapon. So this is, you know, they've
33:54
done exactly the things that they set out not to do, or
33:58
rather the result of what they've done is exactly the
34:01
opposite to what they wanted. Yeah, I hope you're wrong, but I
34:04
think there's a very decent chance that's right.
34:06
Right. I mean, if you're if you're an
34:08
Iranian security official and you're like, what should we have
34:11
done differently? I think, you know, a lot of them
34:13
are going to argue for pursuing a nuclear weapon and they're
34:16
going to say, hey, look, you know this, the US has this
34:19
perception that when we let any kind of people rise up or have
34:22
any domestic composition that this is a chance for regime
34:24
change. You know, so like, we're not
34:26
going to let any, you know, personal freedoms.
34:29
And so I mean this could happen. But you could also get the
34:32
opposite, right? I mean, if, if the regime falls,
34:36
you know, and the, you know, and the country ends up being a
34:38
benign neighbor in the, in this rather dangerous neighborhood,
34:42
then Trump would have Trump's gamble would have paid off.
34:45
And, you know, you can finally put whatever prize he wants.
34:48
And that is still a possibility. Yeah, I mean, I, I think you're
34:51
right. I mean, look, if the bottom line
34:53
goal should be in Iran that has a completely different foreign
34:56
policy and treats people differently, that is the goal.
35:00
I think the the problem with the war is we're not necessarily
35:03
moving towards that. We're moving away.
35:05
If the regime falls and you know, a pro Western, pro Israeli
35:09
Democrat comes in, great. You know, this is like best case
35:13
scenario. I'm just my worry is just we're
35:15
not headed that direction. And then in some ways we've
35:17
delayed that. When's this going to be over?
35:19
If we still weeks or months from now?
35:21
When's it going to be over? Well, if we believe that the
35:24
report you referenced on the front end, right, it's another
35:26
four weeks of Karg before we even do Karg, then you have the
35:30
Karg operation, then presumably you have Iranian retaliation of
35:34
that. And then and then to me that at
35:36
that point like you either go, you have to go all in at that
35:40
point or you have to back out. So I think, you know, in
35:42
whatever six weeks or so, we'll have to see this question
35:45
revisited if this report is accurate.
35:48
And then I would guess the president would not actually go
35:51
for a full ground force invasion of Iran.
35:53
But I can't say that confidently at this point.
35:55
So I don't know. But my guest guest is, you know,
35:58
we'll have, you know, another four or five, six weeks.
36:01
And then he'll have to, like, actually look at this question
36:03
again and say, OK, Iran has capitulated still, what now?
36:06
Nate, if Donald Trump, who loves to ring people directly out of
36:09
the blue, rang you up tonight and said, I'm sorry, Nate, you
36:12
shouldn't have been fired, you shouldn't have got loomed, you
36:14
can come back on the team tomorrow morning, would you?
36:21
At this point, no, I don't think I would go back in.
36:26
Sure, you could stand this whole thing in inventible way.
36:30
You could have your, you could be part, you know, a stakeholder
36:33
as opposed to a ringside observer.
36:35
No, look, I mean, there is nothing I enjoy more than
36:38
actually trying to help make Iran policy.
36:40
I really do enjoy it and it's been an honor to work on Iran
36:43
policy in the US government for 18 years.
36:45
But I, I don't, I don't think I would have that role in the
36:49
Trump administration. And now after this war, I don't
36:52
think meaningful diplomacy is going to happen in the next
36:56
three years. So I I think I'd rather take my
36:58
chances in a hopefully a future administration.
37:01
So do you think actually, you know, when this fateful moment
37:05
comes in six weeks or two months from now, the president should
37:08
decide to go all in, you know, send the troops, you know, do a
37:13
full scale invasion? I don't.
37:15
You don't. I I don't no, no, I don't.
37:18
I think it's one bad decision has LED has been doubled down on
37:24
every stage so far, right. Doing the operation was a
37:26
mistake. Escalating the operation was a
37:29
mistake. Potentially going doing the
37:32
cargo operation was a mistake. I don't understand how we can
37:35
just continue to make the same decision over and over and think
37:37
the outcome will be different. And so unfortunately he's left
37:41
himself with only bad choices. But to me that would probably be
37:46
the worst outcome. Or or trying to foment this
37:49
civil war. I mean, both those are awful
37:51
outcomes. But so no, I don't think you
37:52
should do that. Nate Swanson, Ronenberg, thank
37:54
you very much to both of you from the bunker here in
37:58
Jerusalem, and we'll speak to you again soon.