Latest / Dissidentpodden / The Unthinkable - svenska
Transcript
- 0:22SPEAKER_00: In May 1945, while the ashes of war were still warm
- 0:28SPEAKER_00: the British Chiefs of Staff were tasked with drawing up plans for a new war
- 0:34SPEAKER_00: on the orders of Prime Minister Winston Churchill
- 0:38SPEAKER_00: Not against Japan, which was still fighting.
- 0:42SPEAKER_00: But against the Soviet Union—the ally that had just lost
- 0:46SPEAKER_00: more than twenty million people in the struggle against Nazi Germany.
- 0:52SPEAKER_00: The plan bore a name that seemed almost self-aware
- 0:56SPEAKER_00: Operation Unthinkable.
- 1:01SPEAKER_00: What was unthinkable was not the existence of the operation itself
- 1:06SPEAKER_00: but one of its premises: that German prisoners of war
- 1:12SPEAKER_00: would be rearmed and placed under British command.
- 1:16SPEAKER_00: The war against fascism had not even officially ended.
- 1:23SPEAKER_00: There is a kind of vertigo in that detail.
- 1:26SPEAKER_00: A feeling that the floor shifts beneath the history we imagine ourselves standing upon.
- 1:32SPEAKER_00: And that vertigo is what this film is about
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: not Operation Unthinkable itself, but what happens
- 1:42SPEAKER_00: when such a history becomes known.
- 1:47SPEAKER_00: Operation Unthinkable remained classified in British archives for more than fifty years.
- 1:54SPEAKER_00: When it was finally released in 1998, the Russian side had long been aware of its existence
- 1:59SPEAKER_00: through the spy Guy Burgess during the Cold War
- 2:06SPEAKER_00: and saw in it confirmation of something it had asserted for decades
- 2:11SPEAKER_00: that beneath the West’s professed values of freedom and democracy lies
- 2:17SPEAKER_00: an older and more enduring impulse
- 2:22SPEAKER_00: a desire to permanently eliminate Russia as a factor of power in Europe.
- 2:29SPEAKER_00: The document exists.
- 2:31SPEAKER_00: It is authentic.
- 2:34SPEAKER_00: It is historical.
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: It should be precisely the sort of source material that historians
- 2:41SPEAKER_00: journalists, and analysts welcome—something that opens up questions, complicates assumptions and
- 2:48SPEAKER_00: perhaps helps us trace patterns and continuities in foreign-policy thinking
- 2:52SPEAKER_00: over extended time horizons.
- 2:59SPEAKER_00: Could the document offer keys to understanding our present more clearly?
- 3:04SPEAKER_00: Could it deepen our understanding of why we are where we are?
- 3:10SPEAKER_00: Is the document available for that sort of inquiry?
- 3:18SPEAKER_00: I look for it in the public discourse,
- 3:21SPEAKER_00: the one that shapes our perception of the conflict.
- 3:24SPEAKER_00: Almost entirely in vain.
- 3:26SPEAKER_00: Operation Unthinkable is a document that the Russian side has previously highlighted
- 3:32SPEAKER_00: In the Western public sphere it appears that the people in charge, who has made use of the facts
- 3:38SPEAKER_00: contained in a document determines its availability more than the content itself.
- 3:47SPEAKER_00: Have we reached a point where a document’s analytical value is determined
- 3:53SPEAKER_00: not by what it says, but by who nods in recognition at it?
- 4:00SPEAKER_00: Where association with a particular audience can make a fact difficult to handle
- 4:05SPEAKER_00: almost unusable—as effectively as a lie would do?
- 4:12SPEAKER_00: This is something different from censorship.
- 4:16SPEAKER_00: It is something Orwell understood when he coined the concept of crimethink
- 4:21SPEAKER_00: it is not the thought that is forbidden, but the thought that automatically
- 4:27SPEAKER_00: places you in the wrong category simply by being thought.
- 4:32SPEAKER_00: No censor is needed.
- 4:35SPEAKER_00: No explicit rule.
- 4:37SPEAKER_00: It is enough that certain thoughts carry an address to which no one wishes to send a letter.
- 4:45SPEAKER_00: And this may be more dangerous than a lie.
- 4:49SPEAKER_00: A lie can be challenged but this mechanism is invisible
- 4:52SPEAKER_00: It operates in the space between the spoken and the unspoken
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: in the reflexive reaction that determines what is acceptable to think
- 5:05SPEAKER_00: before a thought has even been fully formed.
- 5:13SPEAKER_00: A known lie is easier to navigate than an unconscious framework.
- 5:22SPEAKER_00: The British military document from May 1945 does not speak of limiting Russia.
- 5:28SPEAKER_00: It speaks of eliminating it.
- 5:31SPEAKER_00: Literally.
- 5:33SPEAKER_00: Throughout the document, the term used is Russia, not the Soviet Union.
- 5:42SPEAKER_00: Russia was the imperial name for a geographical and historical entity
- 5:48SPEAKER_00: not an ideological system.
- 5:52SPEAKER_00: It was not communism one wanted to eliminate.
- 5:55SPEAKER_00: It was Russia—as a geographic center of gravity
- 6:00SPEAKER_00: as a power factor in the Eurasian space.
- 6:05SPEAKER_00: The document is an X-ray image, revealing a skeleton
- 6:09SPEAKER_00: older than the Cold War, older than 1945
- 6:15SPEAKER_00: older than communism itself.
- 6:18SPEAKER_00: The British Empire fought Russia in the Crimean War of 1853.
- 6:25SPEAKER_00: It intervened on the White side during the Russian Civil War in 1918.
- 6:32SPEAKER_00: It pursued its struggle for dominance in Central Asia throughout the nineteenth century.
- 6:40SPEAKER_00: The question of how much power Russia should be allowed to wield
- 6:45SPEAKER_00: in Europe is one of the oldest questions in European geopolitics.
- 6:49SPEAKER_00: And Operation Unthinkable is its most naked, stripped-down formulation.
- 6:56SPEAKER_00: The question has never ceased to be asked.
- 6:59SPEAKER_00: It has simply changed clothes, adopting the language available to each era.
- 7:06SPEAKER_00: Is that why the document is so difficult to use?
- 7:10SPEAKER_00: Because, if taken seriously, it forces a question that the dominant narrative
- 7:16SPEAKER_00: would prefer remain unspoken: Whether what we call the West’s defence of democracy is merely
- 7:22SPEAKER_00: the latest chapter in a game that began long before democracy existed as a justification
- 7:31SPEAKER_00: what was once called the Great Game.
- 7:36SPEAKER_00: Russian propaganda is well known and already accounted for.
- 7:40SPEAKER_00: Few expect the Kremlin to provide
- 7:45SPEAKER_00: a genuinely free space for thought.
- 7:47SPEAKER_00: That is not where the problem lies.
- 7:51SPEAKER_00: The problem is what happens when a fact happens to confirm something
- 7:56SPEAKER_00: the Kremlin also claims.
- 7:59SPEAKER_00: Not necessarily because Russia is right.
- 8:02SPEAKER_00: But because the point of contact alone is enough.
- 8:07SPEAKER_00: At that moment, something automatic is triggered in the Western discourse
- 8:11SPEAKER_00: not censorship but a reflexive distancing that is harder
- 8:17SPEAKER_00: to see and therefore harder to challenge.
- 8:23SPEAKER_00: The system can no longer distinguish between what is being said and who is saying it.
- 8:31SPEAKER_00: Truth becomes contaminated by its bearer.
- 8:36SPEAKER_00: The Western narrative of the war in Ukraine presents itself as the free space
- 8:41SPEAKER_00: the critical, open, morally grounded space.
- 8:48SPEAKER_00: And that is precisely why its blind spots are dangerous.
- 8:53SPEAKER_00: Today, as Europe moves toward conflict with Russia at a pace
- 8:57SPEAKER_00: few wish to acknowledge, we find ourselves trapped in a peculiar cognitive dilemma.
- 9:04SPEAKER_00: Those who attempt to understand the war in Ukraine through deeper structures
- 9:10SPEAKER_00: geography,
- 9:11SPEAKER_00: empires,
- 9:11SPEAKER_00: the logic of buffer zones, the long continuity of British great-power strategy since
- 9:18SPEAKER_00: the nineteenth century—risk immediately being perceived as apologists for the Kremlin.
- 9:27SPEAKER_00: Those who remain within the moral framework democracy versus autocracy,
- 9:32SPEAKER_00: the rules-based international order, sovereignty, avoid that trap but lose something else:
- 9:41SPEAKER_00: The ability to see how we arrived here, and where we are going.
- 9:48SPEAKER_00: To dismiss structural analysis as political naïveté or worse, as inadvertent collaboration
- 9:55SPEAKER_00: is not censorship but something subtler and more destructive.
- 10:03SPEAKER_00: Something that causes us to avoid certain thoughts, narrows our perspective, and has by now
- 10:09SPEAKER_00: become so internalized and invisible that we no longer experience it as a limitation at all
- 10:15SPEAKER_00: but as the only reasonable way to think.
- 10:23SPEAKER_00: This is the quiet capitulation of the intellectual sphere.
- 10:28SPEAKER_00: And beneath this epistemological problem lies an older and simpler one.
- 10:35SPEAKER_00: One that is not about how we think or the blindness of thought
- 10:41SPEAKER_00: but about what we are no longer capable of seeing.
- 10:46SPEAKER_00: There is a map that does not change.
- 10:50SPEAKER_00: Regardless of which ideological system rules in Moscow—Tsarism, communism, Putinism
- 10:56SPEAKER_00: Russia’s geographic position remains the same.
- 11:03SPEAKER_00: A vast landmass without natural defensive boundaries in the west.
- 11:09SPEAKER_00: No mountain ranges.
- 11:11SPEAKER_00: No seas.
- 11:13SPEAKER_00: Charles XII marched through Lithuania and Belarus in 1708.
- 11:20SPEAKER_00: Napoleon’s army came through Belarus in 1812.
- 11:24SPEAKER_00: The German Wehrmacht attacked along the entire western front in 1941
- 11:30SPEAKER_00: from Finland in the north to Ukraine in the south.
- 11:35SPEAKER_00: From that perspective, the logic of buffer zones is not a Russian invention.
- 11:40SPEAKER_00: It is a geographic necessity written into the terrain itself.
- 11:47SPEAKER_00: Operation Unthinkable is about geography and power.
- 11:52SPEAKER_00: Poland was the stated reason, but the task given to the Chiefs of Staff concerned
- 11:57SPEAKER_00: whether Russia itself should be permitted to exist as a power.
- 12:06SPEAKER_00: The same strategic calculation would likely have arisen even in relation to a democratic Russia.
- 12:14SPEAKER_00: It is not what Russia is that drives this logic.
- 12:18SPEAKER_00: It is where Russia is.
- 12:23SPEAKER_00: When the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that a direct attack on
- 12:26SPEAKER_00: the Soviet Union was impossible, the objective did not change.
- 12:31SPEAKER_00: Only the timescale did.
- 12:34SPEAKER_00: If Russia could not be crushed immediately, how could it be weakened over the long term?
- 12:39SPEAKER_00: The same logic.
- 12:41SPEAKER_00: The same direction.
- 12:42SPEAKER_00: But slower.
- 12:44SPEAKER_00: Encircle
- 12:45SPEAKER_00: Isolate
- 12:47SPEAKER_00: Exhaust
- 12:48SPEAKER_00: Until it collapses from within.
- 12:53SPEAKER_00: The British document was drafted in May 1945.
- 12:56SPEAKER_00: Eight months later,
- 12:59SPEAKER_00: the American diplomat George Kennan formulated what would become
- 13:03SPEAKER_00: the foundation of the West’s postwar Russia policy.
- 13:08SPEAKER_00: Whether this was a direct influence or parallel thinking within the same
- 13:14SPEAKER_00: Anglo-American strategic culture is difficult to determine.
- 13:19SPEAKER_00: What is clear is that the British analysis came first
- 13:24SPEAKER_00: and that the conclusion was essentially the same.
- 13:28SPEAKER_00: Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of 1946 and the anonymous “X Article” in Foreign Affairs in 1947
- 13:35SPEAKER_00: laid the groundwork for what he called containment:
- 13:42SPEAKER_00: a long-term, patient, but relentless limitation of Russian power.
- 13:49SPEAKER_00: Not an attack.
- 13:51SPEAKER_00: A slow suffocation.
- 13:55SPEAKER_00: Already within the Truman administration, a rival voice emerged.
- 14:01SPEAKER_00: John Foster Dulles argued that containment was insufficient
- 14:06SPEAKER_00: it was not enough to keep Russia in place.
- 14:09SPEAKER_00: America’s objective should be rollback: actively pushing back Russian power,
- 14:15SPEAKER_00: liberating Eastern Europe, weakening the empire until it no longer existed as a threat.
- 14:23SPEAKER_00: The tension between containment and rollback runs like an undercurrent
- 14:29SPEAKER_00: through the entire Cold War and into the present day.
- 14:33SPEAKER_00: A tension never resolved—only transformed.
- 14:40SPEAKER_00: When NATO began expanding after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kennan warned in 1997
- 14:46SPEAKER_00: that this represented the most fateful mistake in American foreign policy of
- 14:52SPEAKER_00: the entire postwar era.
- 14:55SPEAKER_00: His argument was simple: Expansion would create exactly what it claimed to prevent
- 15:00SPEAKER_00: Russian aggression in response to a policy Moscow would inevitably perceive as a threat.
- 15:10SPEAKER_00: Poland in 1999.
- 15:12SPEAKER_00: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2004.
- 15:16SPEAKER_00: Albania and Croatia in 2009.
- 15:20SPEAKER_00: Montenegro in 2017.
- 15:23SPEAKER_00: North Macedonia in 2020.
- 15:26SPEAKER_00: The logic of containment, implemented step by step.
- 15:35SPEAKER_00: Where are we now?
- 15:37SPEAKER_00: When Sweden and Finland have abandoned neutrality
- 15:41SPEAKER_00: and joined NATO
- 15:45SPEAKER_00: How close are we to something beyond which there is nothing left?
- 15:50SPEAKER_00: How close can one come to the edge of the abyss without seeing it
- 15:55SPEAKER_00: or even acknowledging that it exists, because it is not supposed to exist?
- 16:01SPEAKER_00: Because we are right.
- 16:03SPEAKER_00: We possess the moral certainty that renders the abyss invisible.
- 16:12SPEAKER_00: In January 2022—one month before Russia invaded Ukraine
- 16:17SPEAKER_00: Gregory Hayes, CEO of Raytheon, one of the world's largest weapons manufacturers,
- 16:25SPEAKER_00: addressed the company's investors:
- 16:29SPEAKER_00: “We fully expect that we are going to see benefits from this,”
- 16:35SPEAKER_00: he said regarding the rising tensions in Eastern Europe.
- 16:39SPEAKER_00: It was a business forecast.
- 16:42SPEAKER_00: It proved correct.
- 16:45SPEAKER_00: Since February 2022, Rheinmetall's share price has risen by approximately 1,700 percent.
- 16:53SPEAKER_00: BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leonardo, Renk, SAAB
- 17:00SPEAKER_00: major actors within the military-industrial complex
- 17:04SPEAKER_00: have all dramatically outperformed stock market indices during the same period.
- 17:10SPEAKER_00: In August 2025, reports emerged about possible peace negotiations in Ukraine.
- 17:18SPEAKER_00: No agreement was reached.
- 17:20SPEAKER_00: Yet the share prices of Rheinmetall, Leonardo, and Renk fell between five
- 17:25SPEAKER_00: and eight percent in a single day.
- 17:29SPEAKER_00: This is market logic, and it tells us something that politics rarely states openly:
- 17:36SPEAKER_00: that there are actors whose economic interests are structurally
- 17:41SPEAKER_00: dependent on conflicts not being resolved, but sustained.
- 17:48SPEAKER_00: Peace is not assessed to be profitable by these entities.
- 17:52SPEAKER_00: That is an observation that ought to be a self-evident part of any
- 17:56SPEAKER_00: discussion about how this war might end and why it has not ended.
- 18:04SPEAKER_00: Economic interests are the easiest to see.
- 18:07SPEAKER_00: More difficult to see—but no less real are the geopolitical grounds for a prolonged war.
- 18:14SPEAKER_00: Is the American interest in Europe really about defending democracy?
- 18:19SPEAKER_00: Or is it about preventing what has always constituted Washington's underlying nightmare:
- 18:25SPEAKER_00: a Europe that seeks its own path— toward a relaxed and peaceful
- 18:29SPEAKER_00: cooperation with Russia that would render the United States peripheral?
- 18:36SPEAKER_00: Such a Europe would require no American security guarantees.
- 18:42SPEAKER_00: And without those guarantees, influence diminishes.
- 18:49SPEAKER_00: This is one of the most fundamental principles of geopolitics.
- 18:56SPEAKER_00: The actor that controls the security guarantees controls the politics
- 19:01SPEAKER_00: as long as the threat persists,
- 19:04SPEAKER_00: and as long as the narrative surrounding it remains unquestioned.
- 19:09SPEAKER_00: Wars with clear moral coordinates— democracy versus autocracy,
- 19:16SPEAKER_00: freedom versus oppression—generate engagement, support, and political capital.
- 19:24SPEAKER_00: Complexity generates none of these things.
- 19:27SPEAKER_00: No ill intent is required for an information system to consistently produce simplifications.
- 19:35SPEAKER_00: It is enough that simplifications work better.
- 19:39SPEAKER_00: Three interacting forces—economic, geopolitical, and media-driven
- 19:46SPEAKER_00: point in the same direction.
- 19:48SPEAKER_00: And that direction is not toward peace.
- 19:55SPEAKER_00: On February 20, 2014, a large number of demonstrators and police officers
- 19:59SPEAKER_00: were shot on Kyiv's Maidan Square.
- 20:03SPEAKER_00: They were killed by snipers.
- 20:06SPEAKER_00: The killings became the triggering event that brought down President Yanukovych,
- 20:11SPEAKER_00: legitimized the new Ukrainian leadership in the eyes of the West,
- 20:16SPEAKER_00: and laid the foundation for the conflict that,
- 20:17SPEAKER_00: ten years later, would grow into the war in which
- 20:22SPEAKER_00: Europe and its NATO member states old and new alike—now find themselves.
- 20:28SPEAKER_00: The western narrative was immediate and unequivocal:
- 20:33SPEAKER_00: Yanukovych had ordered the massacre of his own citizens.
- 20:39SPEAKER_00: That narrative was confronted in 2023 by an inconvenient document—from Kyiv.
- 20:49SPEAKER_00: The ruling of Kyiv's Sviatoshyn District Court,a Ukrainian judicial decision—concluded that
- 20:57SPEAKER_00: a significant number of the killed and wounded demonstrators
- 21:03SPEAKER_00: were not shot from positions controlled by government forces.
- 21:11SPEAKER_00: This was not random gunfire amid chaos.
- 21:14SPEAKER_00: It involved targeted sniper fire.
- 21:21SPEAKER_00: The court determined that Hotel Ukraina was controlled by the activists,
- 21:25SPEAKER_00: that activists inside the hotel were armed,
- 21:27SPEAKER_00: and that fatal shots were fired from there.
- 21:36SPEAKER_00: The court also found no evidence that Russian agents had played any role in the massacre.
- 21:42SPEAKER_00: Ivan Katchanovski, Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa,
- 21:48SPEAKER_00: has since 2014 documented in a series of peer-reviewed academic studies—published,
- 21:53SPEAKER_00: among others, by Palgrave—what he describes as
- 21:58SPEAKER_00: a false-flag operation carried out by elements of the Maidan opposition.
- 22:05SPEAKER_00: His conclusions are far-reaching and controversial.
- 22:09SPEAKER_00: But they are not unsupported.
- 22:12SPEAKER_00: And they are, on crucial points, corroborated by the Ukrainian court.
- 22:19SPEAKER_00: Katchanovski's research exists.
- 22:22SPEAKER_00: It is accessible.
- 22:24SPEAKER_00: It ought to form part of the body of evidence used to understand the larger picture.
- 22:29SPEAKER_00: Yet, in the current climate, it is not enough for research to be rigorous
- 22:35SPEAKER_00: and for a court to confirm its central findings.
- 22:38SPEAKER_00: If it risks complicating an already established interpretation—if it asks questions for which
- 22:45SPEAKER_00: that interpretation has no room—it simply never becomes part of the broader narrative.
- 22:57SPEAKER_00: In March 2022—just weeks after the Russian invasion began
- 23:02SPEAKER_00: direct peace negotiations were held in Istanbul between Ukrainian and Russian delegations.
- 23:09SPEAKER_00: Both sides confirmed that talks were underway.
- 23:14SPEAKER_00: Turkish President Erdoğan, who hosted and mediated the negotiations,
- 23:20SPEAKER_00: described the progress as promising.
- 23:23SPEAKER_00: By the end of March, the delegations had produced a joint document
- 23:28SPEAKER_00: the Istanbul Communiqué, a framework for a possible treaty.
- 23:35SPEAKER_00: It was not a finalized agreement.
- 23:38SPEAKER_00: Major issues remained unresolved.
- 23:42SPEAKER_00: The two sides remained far apart on key points, including the size of Ukraine's future military.
- 23:51SPEAKER_00: Critics have since pointed out that the proposed security guarantees contained
- 23:57SPEAKER_00: serious structural weaknesses.
- 24:00SPEAKER_00: Others have argued that Russia never intended to honor any agreement.
- 24:08SPEAKER_00: Political scientists Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko, who studied multiple draft documents
- 24:15SPEAKER_00: and interviewed participants from both sides, concluded in a 2024 article in Foreign Affairs
- 24:22SPEAKER_00: that the evidence pointed to a mutual willingness on the part of both Zelensky and Putin
- 24:28SPEAKER_00: to consider far-reaching concessions—and that an agreement was close to completion.
- 24:39SPEAKER_00: Their conclusion was an independent academic assessment based
- 24:43SPEAKER_00: on access to the actual negotiating documents.
- 24:47SPEAKER_00: The movement was forward.
- 24:49SPEAKER_00: Then it stopped.
- 24:52SPEAKER_00: On April 9, 2022—while the peace process was still underway
- 24:59SPEAKER_00: Boris Johnson arrived unexpectedly in Kyiv.
- 25:04SPEAKER_00: Davyd Arakhamia, leader of Zelensky's parliamentary faction and chief negotiator
- 25:09SPEAKER_00: for the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated in an interview in November 2023
- 25:13SPEAKER_00: that Johnson came to Kyiv and said Ukraine should not sign anything with Russia at all.
- 25:26SPEAKER_00: “Let's just fight,”Arakhamia quoted the British Prime Minister as saying.
- 25:34SPEAKER_00: Three days after Johnson's visit,
- 25:37SPEAKER_00: Putin publicly declared that the peace talks had reached a dead end.
- 25:44SPEAKER_00: What is certain is this: The talks ended.
- 25:48SPEAKER_00: The negotiations collapsed.
- 25:51SPEAKER_00: What caused their collapse remains disputed.
- 25:55SPEAKER_00: The British Prime Minister arrived in Kyiv during ongoing peace negotiations.
- 26:02SPEAKER_00: What he said there has been documented by Ukraine's own chief negotiator.
- 26:07SPEAKER_00: Yet the timing of the visit, its relationship to the ongoing talks, and whose interests
- 26:13SPEAKER_00: it ultimately served—all passed without the level of scrutiny they ought to have provoked.
- 26:22SPEAKER_00: It is an observation about an absence.
- 26:28SPEAKER_00: The fact exists.
- 26:30SPEAKER_00: The timeline exists.
- 26:33SPEAKER_00: Arakhamia's statement is documented.
- 26:37SPEAKER_00: But what it collectively means—which forces were at work,
- 26:43SPEAKER_00: which interests prevailed—these are questions for which there appears to be little room.
- 26:51SPEAKER_00: Perhaps there is a simple answer.
- 26:53SPEAKER_00: Perhaps the answer is that Bucha changed everything,
- 26:57SPEAKER_00: that no one could reasonably negotiate with Putin afterward,
- 27:01SPEAKER_00: that Johnson merely voiced what everyone already believed.
- 27:05SPEAKER_00: Perhaps.
- 27:08SPEAKER_00: But perhaps is not an answer.
- 27:12SPEAKER_00: It is the absence of an answer.
- 27:15SPEAKER_00: And in a situation where the war has since cost hundreds of thousands of lives
- 27:21SPEAKER_00: —and where Europe now stands closer to a major war than at any point since 1945
- 27:25SPEAKER_00: the absence of that answer is not neutral.
- 27:33SPEAKER_00: It is a choice.
- 27:37SPEAKER_00: Since February 2022, Western governments have progressively
- 27:43SPEAKER_00: escalated their military support for Ukraine.
- 27:47SPEAKER_00: Each step has been presented as a necessary response to Russian aggression.
- 27:53SPEAKER_00: Long-range missiles.
- 27:55SPEAKER_00: Permission to strike targets on Russian territory.
- 27:59SPEAKER_00: Real-time intelligence cooperation.
- 28:03SPEAKER_00: Weapons systems whose range would, only a few years ago, have been considered a red line.
- 28:10SPEAKER_00: And at every stage, the question of whether these actions might themselves
- 28:15SPEAKER_00: be viewed as escalating provocations has found little room in public discourse.
- 28:22SPEAKER_00: None of these decisions have been preceded by
- 28:26SPEAKER_00: an open public debate about escalation risks.
- 28:31SPEAKER_00: The issue is not whether these decisions are right or wrong.
- 28:36SPEAKER_00: The issue is that they are being made in a space where certain questions are no longer asked.
- 28:43SPEAKER_00: To ask, What will the consequences of this be?
- 28:47SPEAKER_00: has become equivalent to asking, Should we really support Ukraine?
- 28:53SPEAKER_00: Which, in turn, has become equivalent to acting as the Kremlin's voice in the West.
- 29:00SPEAKER_00: The chain of equivalence is so rapid, so automatic, that it is hardly noticed anymore.
- 29:07SPEAKER_00: Yet it governs everything.
- 29:11SPEAKER_00: The First World War cost twenty million lives.
- 29:15SPEAKER_00: The Second World War cost between seventy and eighty-six million
- 29:20SPEAKER_00: a figure so vast that it loses all real meaning
- 29:24SPEAKER_00: unless one pauses to consider it.
- 29:27SPEAKER_00: Eighty-six million.
- 29:30SPEAKER_00: Mostly civilians.
- 29:32SPEAKER_00: Mostly killed by starvation, disease, bombing, and massacre
- 29:38SPEAKER_00: not by heroism on the battlefield.
- 29:42SPEAKER_00: Europe knows what a major war means.
- 29:46SPEAKER_00: Europe knew what a major war means.
- 29:50SPEAKER_00: Somewhere along the way, that knowledge ceased to be alive.
- 29:55SPEAKER_00: It became history in the sense we usually mean by the word
- 30:01SPEAKER_00: something that happened, something completed, something belonging
- 30:08SPEAKER_00: to a different kind of people in a different age.
- 30:10SPEAKER_00: Disconnected from the present.
- 30:14SPEAKER_00: We are no longer those people.
- 30:16SPEAKER_00: We are wiser.
- 30:18SPEAKER_00: We have institutions.
- 30:20SPEAKER_00: We have international law.
- 30:23SPEAKER_00: We have the information society.
- 30:26SPEAKER_00: We also have nuclear weapons.
- 30:32SPEAKER_00: A quiet revolution has occurred in the political language.
- 30:37SPEAKER_00: Calling for caution in the face of nuclear-war risks has become ideologically suspect.
- 30:45SPEAKER_00: The person who says, We need to understand where the escalation ladder leads,
- 30:50SPEAKER_00: is not accused of being factually wrong.
- 30:54SPEAKER_00: They are accused of yielding to blackmail.
- 30:58SPEAKER_00: Of rewarding nuclear threats.
- 31:02SPEAKER_00: Of being naïve in the face of a dictator's bluff.
- 31:07SPEAKER_00: Perhaps it is a bluff.
- 31:09SPEAKER_00: Perhaps.
- 31:13SPEAKER_00: But we have constructed a public discourse in which it is impossible
- 31:17SPEAKER_00: to raise that question seriously without immediately losing ones moral credibility.
- 31:25SPEAKER_00: We have turned caution into cowardice.
- 31:29SPEAKER_00: We have turned warnings into propaganda.
- 31:33SPEAKER_00: And we have done so in a situation where the consequences of being wrong
- 31:38SPEAKER_00: are not the loss of a debate or a political defeat.
- 31:44SPEAKER_00: They are the end of civilization.
- 31:49SPEAKER_00: That is not a metaphor.
- 31:51SPEAKER_00: That is what nuclear war means.
- 31:54SPEAKER_00: Once, we knew that.
- 31:58SPEAKER_00: Questions of nuclear deterrence, escalation dynamics, and thresholds that must not be crossed
- 32:03SPEAKER_00: were carried during the Cold War by a generation
- 32:09SPEAKER_00: of politicians and military leaders who had seen what conventional weapons did
- 32:13SPEAKER_00: to European cities
- 32:13SPEAKER_00: and understood that nuclear weapons were something categorically different.
- 32:23SPEAKER_00: That generation is gone.
- 32:26SPEAKER_00: And with it disappeared something for which we do not yet have a name
- 32:30SPEAKER_00: perhaps simply the direct, physical knowledge of what war actually is.
- 32:38SPEAKER_00: We replaced it with moral certainty.
- 32:42SPEAKER_00: And moral certainty creates, as Orwell showed in Notes on Nationalism (1945),
- 32:49SPEAKER_00: an asymmetry in perception:
- 32:52SPEAKER_00: we see the actions of our opponents with sharp clarity
- 32:57SPEAKER_00: and our own with benevolent blindness.
- 33:01SPEAKER_00: We see why we are right.
- 33:03SPEAKER_00: We do not see where we are heading.
- 33:07SPEAKER_00: This is not naïveté or deliberate malice.
- 33:12SPEAKER_00: It is something more dangerous.
- 33:14SPEAKER_00: It is goodwill in free fall.
- 33:18SPEAKER_00: Are we truly thinking freely?
- 33:21SPEAKER_00: Or are we thinking within a simplified narrative constructed for us
- 33:27SPEAKER_00: about who is evil and who is good, who is right and who is wrong,
- 33:32SPEAKER_00: what is history and what is propaganda?
- 33:39SPEAKER_00: Reality is almost always more complex than that.
- 33:44SPEAKER_00: This moment of genuine danger demands that we consider more perspectives,
- 33:50SPEAKER_00: more interests, and more stories than those immediately offered to us.
- 33:54SPEAKER_00: Quite simply because simplification and one-sidedness in a situation like this
- 33:58SPEAKER_00: constitute a direct threat to human life.
- 34:04SPEAKER_00: In a 2014 article for The Washington Post,
- 34:06SPEAKER_00: Henry Kissinger wrote: “The West must understand that,
- 34:11SPEAKER_00: to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country.”
- 34:17SPEAKER_00: He warned that treating Ukraine as a battlefield in an East-West confrontation would
- 34:21SPEAKER_00: destroy the possibility of cooperation between Russia and the West for decades to come.
- 34:31SPEAKER_00: That was considered an acceptable analysis at the time.
- 34:35SPEAKER_00: And 2014 is not very long ago.
- 34:39SPEAKER_00: Today, such an analysis would likely be considered unpublishable,
- 34:44SPEAKER_00: and its author would risk being labeled a Kremlin apologist.
- 34:50SPEAKER_00: Kissinger—a Putinist?
- 34:53SPEAKER_00: What happened to that way of thinking in such a short time?
- 34:58SPEAKER_00: What happened to analysis from multiple perspectives?
- 35:02SPEAKER_00: Where did it go?
- 35:05SPEAKER_00: Why is it so difficult to hold two thoughts in one's mind simultaneously?
- 35:10SPEAKER_00: That Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a violation of international law— and that Russia
- 35:16SPEAKER_00: has legitimate security interests which the West has systematically ignored.
- 35:22SPEAKER_00: That one can condemn the war and still ask how it came into being.
- 35:27SPEAKER_00: That moral clarity and historical understanding are not opposites
- 35:32SPEAKER_00: but prerequisites for finding a way forward.
- 35:40SPEAKER_00: There is no good ending to this text.
- 35:44SPEAKER_00: It would be dishonest to offer one.
- 35:48SPEAKER_00: There is no political solution to point toward, no diplomatic initiative in which
- 35:54SPEAKER_00: to place our trust, no institution currently capable
- 36:00SPEAKER_00: of bearing the full weight of what is at stake.
- 36:05SPEAKER_00: There is only the line between what we choose to see and what we choose not to see.
- 36:12SPEAKER_00: And that line does not run between East and West.
- 36:16SPEAKER_00: Nor between democracy and autocracy.
- 36:20SPEAKER_00: It runs directly through ourselves.
- 36:25SPEAKER_00: Operation Unthinkable.
- 36:28SPEAKER_00: The name carries its own commentary— the unthinkable was nevertheless thought.
- 36:34SPEAKER_00: In secret, in cold calculation, or perhaps in desperation.
- 36:39SPEAKER_00: In that chaotic week when one war had just ended
- 36:44SPEAKER_00: and another was already taking shape beneath the surface.
- 36:49SPEAKER_00: The human element is familiar: In moments of extreme uncertainty, we fall back upon
- 36:56SPEAKER_00: the one thing we know how to do, plan, control,
- 37:01SPEAKER_00: the next move on the board.
- 37:04SPEAKER_00: Unable to stop.
- 37:06SPEAKER_00: Unable to raise our gaze.
- 37:11SPEAKER_00: We find ourselves in a similar moment now.
- 37:14SPEAKER_00: And we are doing the same thing.
- 37:18SPEAKER_00: The logic behind Western policy toward Russia is older than
- 37:22SPEAKER_00: any of the individuals who uphold it today.
- 37:26SPEAKER_00: The British military establishment planned war against Moscow while Stalin
- 37:30SPEAKER_00: was still an ally, while Russian soldiers were still dying
- 37:37SPEAKER_00: in a common struggle against fascism.
- 37:41SPEAKER_00: Communism came and went.
- 37:44SPEAKER_00: The Cold War came and went.
- 37:47SPEAKER_00: The Soviet Union dissolved.
- 37:49SPEAKER_00: Putin is mortal.
- 37:52SPEAKER_00: Everything changes, yet the logic remains.
- 37:56SPEAKER_00: It changed its clothes.
- 37:57SPEAKER_00: It changed its language.
- 37:59SPEAKER_00: It found new justifications, new institutions, new generations of sincere believers.
- 38:09SPEAKER_00: The structure remains the same as it was in May 1945, when an unthinkable plan was formulated
- 38:16SPEAKER_00: amid the ruins of bombed-out Europe.
- 38:22SPEAKER_00: What separates us from 1945 is not that we are wiser,
- 38:27SPEAKER_00: braver, or more moral.
- 38:30SPEAKER_00: What separates us is the weapons.
- 38:34SPEAKER_00: And what unites us with 1945—with 1914, with every historical moment when Europe
- 38:40SPEAKER_00: drifted toward war without fully understanding how it happened
- 38:45SPEAKER_00: is this capacity to fill the intellectual space with so much noise, so many justifications,
- 38:51SPEAKER_00: so many necessary next steps, that the simple question never gets asked.
- 39:02SPEAKER_00: The simple question is not who is right.
- 39:06SPEAKER_00: The simple question is: What happens next?
- 39:11SPEAKER_00: Not as rhetoric.
- 39:13SPEAKER_00: Not as a debating point.
- 39:16SPEAKER_00: But as a genuine attempt to imagine the consequences of the decisions we make
- 39:23SPEAKER_00: with the same seriousness, the same lack of sentimentality,
- 39:28SPEAKER_00: the same willingness to confront uncomfortable realities that we demand from one another
- 39:32SPEAKER_00: when discussing the catastrophes and tragedies of the past.
- 39:39SPEAKER_00: We believe we are very good at understanding wars in retrospect.
- 39:44SPEAKER_00: We build monuments.
- 39:46SPEAKER_00: We count the dead.
- 39:49SPEAKER_00: We say never again, and in that moment we mean it sincerely.
- 39:56SPEAKER_00: The unthinkable is not that it could happen again.
- 40:00SPEAKER_00: The unthinkable is that we know it— and have nevertheless made it unthinkable.