Latest / Deep Dive / Why Australia Stopped Building Social Housing
Transcript
- 0:00Imagine holding the title to this massive apartment building.
- 0:04You haven't laid a single new brick, you know You haven't
- 0:07updated the plumbing, you definitely haven't added a fresh
- 0:10coat of paint, and you obviously haven't built a new bedroom.
- 0:13But just by changing the corporate logo on your
- 0:15letterhead, you suddenly unlock literally millions of dollars in
- 0:21federal cash. Yeah, it's, I mean, it sounds
- 0:23like a highly sophisticated white collar accounting trick,
- 0:26but today we're actually going to look at how that exact
- 0:29mechanism is basically the foundational operating logic of
- 0:32an entire multibillion dollar public system, right?
- 0:36It's wild and welcome to you, the learner.
- 0:38We know you're here because, well, you don't just want those
- 0:41surface level headlines. You really want to understand
- 0:43the actual physical mechanics of the world.
- 0:45You want to see the blueprints behind the drywall, so to speak.
- 0:48Exactly. And so today we are taking a
- 0:50deep dive into the invisible machinery of Australia's housing
- 0:53crisis, and we're specifically focusing on the most critically
- 0:56stressed sector of it all, which is social housing.
- 0:59Which is just a massive topic. So to do that, we have this
- 1:01really compelling stack of source material.
- 1:03Today we're going to be synthesizing two major texts.
- 1:07The 1st is a rigorous peer reviewed academic paper and it's
- 1:10titled Reified Scarcity and the Problem Space of Need Unpacking
- 1:15Australian Social Housing Policy.
- 1:17Which I know, Despite that incredibly dense academic title,
- 1:21it's actually this fascinating psychological autopsy of how
- 1:24policy makers think. Yeah, it really gets into the
- 1:26heads of the people pulling the levers.
- 1:28And then our second source kind of grounds all that psychology
- 1:31in hard financial data. It's a comprehensive final
- 1:34report from AHERI, which is the Australian Housing and Urban
- 1:38Research Institute. Right.
- 1:39And that report is called Australia's Multi Provider
- 1:42Social Housing System Contest or growth.
- 1:45And that document is essentially the Ledger.
- 1:47I mean, it tracks the dollars, the debt structures and the
- 1:49actual flow of all these subsidies.
- 1:51So our mission for this deep dive is to figure out why a
- 1:55system that is fundamentally designed to provide basic human
- 1:58shelter is actually actively shrinking.
- 2:02We're going to examine how the rules of the game have been, you
- 2:05know, quietly rewritten to favor private markets.
- 2:09And finally, look at global models that offer actual
- 2:12mechanical blueprints for how to fix it.
- 2:14Right. OK, let's unpack this.
- 2:15Let's start with the psychological aspect, because
- 2:18according to that first academic paper, the way the government
- 2:21currently defines the housing problem effectively guarantees
- 2:24they can't actually solve. It that's exactly right, because
- 2:26before we can even look at the money, we really have to look at
- 2:29the mindset. The defining feature of the
- 2:31Australian social housing system today is this structural
- 2:34phenomenon, and it's known as residualization.
- 2:37Residualization, which is a term that I don't know.
- 2:40It just sounds like you're scraping the bottom of a barrel.
- 2:42Yeah. And mechanistically, that is
- 2:44exactly what has happened. You know, residualization
- 2:47basically refers to the intentional stripping back of a
- 2:50welfare system until it only caters to the absolute extremes
- 2:54of society, right? If we look at the data in the
- 2:58HRI report, there was actually a time when social housing in
- 3:01Australia was a legitimate mainstream option for the
- 3:04working class. I mean, back in 1997, social
- 3:07housing made-up 5.2% of all housing stock in the country.
- 3:11OK, 5.2% And then in 2023 the data shows that number has
- 3:16fallen to 3.9%. Exactly.
- 3:19And that drop is profound. We aren't just talking about a
- 3:23failure to keep up with population growth here.
- 3:25We are talking about a deliberate contraction of the
- 3:27system. So they were actively shrinking
- 3:29it. Yes, governments actively sold
- 3:31off prime public housing assets, and they did this largely to
- 3:35balance state budgets while simultaneously cutting the
- 3:38capital grants that are required to build new stock.
- 3:41OK, so the state intentionally sells off the houses, right?
- 3:44And they start building new ones.
- 3:45But the academic paper points out that the policymaker is
- 3:48running the system. They don't actually talk about
- 3:50it as a deliberate choice, do they?
- 3:51No, they don't. And this is where it gets
- 3:53psychologically really fascinating.
- 3:55The researchers actually went out and interviewed housing
- 3:58policy actors. So these are the directors and
- 4:01the bureaucrats actually running the system across NSW,
- 4:05Queensland and Tasmania and. What does he say?
- 4:08Well, listen to how a Queensland policy maker described their
- 4:11day-to-day reality. They said, Quote, we know people
- 4:16are eligible for social housing, we really want to house them,
- 4:19but we just haven't got anything right now.
- 4:21Yes, and a policy maker from Tasmania said quote.
- 4:24We don't have an infinite resource to be able to apply to
- 4:26community need. I mean, there is just a heavy
- 4:29tone of total resignation there. They'd sound like, I don't know,
- 4:33aid workers responding to an earthquake, not government
- 4:37officials who literally control billions of dollars in land
- 4:39zoning. Which brings us to the core
- 4:41sociological theory in that first paper, which is reified
- 4:44scarcity. Reified Scarce.
- 4:46Yeah, the researchers borrow this concept of reification from
- 4:50the sociologists Berger and Luckman.
- 4:52And to reify something basically means to take a human made
- 4:56synthetic concept or structure and treat it as if it were a non
- 5:00human natural law. Oh, I see.
- 5:02So it's treating a policy induced shortage of housing like
- 5:05it's a weather pattern, like it's this drought that you just
- 5:08have to, you know, batten down the hatches and manage rather
- 5:12than a problem caused by someone literally turning off the tap.
- 5:15The scarcity becomes an objective truth in their minds.
- 5:18It's reified. They view the lack of housing as
- 5:21a law of physics. I think a good way to visualize
- 5:24this for you, the learner, is to imagine playing a game of
- 5:27musical chairs. Let's say over the course of 20
- 5:30years, the referees deliberately walked into the room and
- 5:32unscrewed and removed half the chairs, right?
- 5:35But now when the music stops and people are scrambling and
- 5:37falling on the floor, those exact same referees just shrug
- 5:41and say, well, look at the immutable laws of nature.
- 5:44There simply aren't enough chairs for everyone.
- 5:46That captures the dynamic perfectly.
- 5:48That is exactly what's happening.
- 5:50And the reason this reified scarcity is so dangerous is
- 5:53because it completely shifts the burden of governance.
- 5:57Well, if scarcity is an unchangeable law of nature, then
- 6:01the government is basically off the hook for actually building
- 6:04more houses. The whole political imperative
- 6:07to construct new dwellings just vanishes.
- 6:10If the scarcity is inevitable, the only job left for the
- 6:13bureaucracy is to fiercely, ruthlessly manage the wait list
- 6:18for the few chairs that remain. Right, because if you accept the
- 6:21premise that we can't build more houses, the immediate next
- 6:24question you have to answer, well, who gets the few houses we
- 6:26have left? And that takes us into what the
- 6:28paper calls the problem space of neediness.
- 6:31Yes, when supply shrinks, targeting intensifies.
- 6:35You have to start rationing and up until the 1990's the
- 6:37allocation system in Australia was largely based on a wait turn
- 6:40principle. Meaning you've just waited in a
- 6:42chronological queue, like taking a ticket at the deli.
- 6:44Essentially, yes. You proved you met the low
- 6:47income threshold, you got your name on the register, and
- 6:49housing offers were made primarily in date order.
- 6:52But under residualization, that logical queue is entirely
- 6:55dismantled. It gets replaced by this
- 6:57intensely targeted triage system that prioritizes the most urgent
- 7:02complex needs. OK, let me play devil's advocate
- 7:05here for a second though. If I have a severely limited
- 7:08resource, say I'm an emergency room doctor and I only have one
- 7:12operating table, I don't operate on the person who arrived first
- 7:15with the sprained ankle, right? I operated on person who just
- 7:18arrived with a gunshot wound. Triage makes sense.
- 7:22Why is prioritizing the most vulnerable a bad thing in
- 7:25housing? It's a great question and I mean
- 7:27it's the exact logic the government uses to defend it.
- 7:30To see how this manifests, the paper looks of the NSW
- 7:33government's future directions policy.
- 7:35OK, what does that policy do? This policy explicitly takes the
- 7:39massive wait list and splits people into two distinct groups.
- 7:42The 1st is the safety net group. That's safety net group.
- 7:45OK, yeah, These are the frail, the elderly, people with
- 7:47profound disabilities or severe chronic mental illness.
- 7:50The state acknowledges these individuals will never survive
- 7:53in the private rental market. They fundamentally need
- 7:55permanent shelter. That makes total sense.
- 7:58And the second group. The second group is called the
- 8:00Opportunity Group. So these are people who might be
- 8:03homeless right now or fleeing domestic violence, but who the
- 8:07state deems capable of eventual independence, meaning with a
- 8:12short term intervention they can be pushed back out into the
- 8:15private housing market. Wait, I see the trap here.
- 8:17If you're like a working class family who just got evicted
- 8:21because your landlord jacked up the rent, you are technically
- 8:25capable of working so you get labeled the opportunity group.
- 8:29Exactly. And then you get pushed to the
- 8:30back of the line or pushed entirely out of the system.
- 8:33So to get a permanent house, you essentially have to prove that
- 8:36you are fundamentally permanently broken.
- 8:38Exactly. The researchers point out that
- 8:40in a system of reified scarcity, trauma actually becomes your
- 8:44currency, having what the bureaucracy calls complex needs.
- 8:48Which means you have intersecting vulnerabilities
- 8:50like being homeless, plus having a severe health issue, plus
- 8:53battling substance use. All of that actually increases
- 8:57your value within this specific rationing system.
- 8:59It's like a perverse neediness Olympics.
- 9:02You're forcing people to perform and document their deepest
- 9:05trauma just to get a key to a basic apartment.
- 9:08What's fascinating here is how this marks a profound shift in
- 9:11the underlying philosophy of state welfare.
- 9:14In what way? Well, in the late 90s and early
- 9:172000's, the dominant neoliberal political narrative actively
- 9:22derided social housing tenants. They were framed as an
- 9:26underclass who were making a moral choice to be lazy and
- 9:30dependent on the state. Right.
- 9:31Yeah, the whole narrative of dole bledgers or welfare Queens.
- 9:34Precisely. But now, by pivoting the entire
- 9:36system to focus on complex needs, the state essentially
- 9:40forgives that dependency. It removes the moral judgement
- 9:43of laziness, but only for the most severely, undeniably
- 9:46marginalized individuals. Wow.
- 9:48The state basically says, we see, you are too damaged to
- 9:50work, therefore you deserve a house.
- 9:52But. The cruelty of that is it
- 9:54abandons everyone else. Like if you were just poor, you
- 9:57were completely out of luck. Yes, and on the ground this
- 10:00creates immense tension. The paper details the constant
- 10:03clashes between frontline housing workers and tenant
- 10:06advocates over how this rationing actually plays out in
- 10:09reality. I would imagine advocates want
- 10:11everything to be strictly by the book.
- 10:14No, they do. Advocates want an impartial,
- 10:17transparent algorithm. If the rules say XY and Z gets
- 10:21you a house, they want that applied fairly to everyone.
- 10:23So there is 0 bias. Makes sense.
- 10:25But frontline workers? The people who are actually
- 10:28sitting across a desk from a desperate, terrified human
- 10:31being? They despise the rigid
- 10:33algorithm. They rely heavily on
- 10:35discretionary rule breaking. They want the power to request
- 10:39special allocations to bump a highly traumatized client to the
- 10:42top of the list, regardless of what the spreadsheet says.
- 10:44Which, to you, the learner, is probably a deeply recognizable
- 10:48dynamic. Think about any time you've had
- 10:50to navigate a massive rationing bureaucracy.
- 10:53Maybe you're fighting a health insurance claim, or trying to
- 10:55get a visa, or applying for disability benefits.
- 10:58These systems are designed to gatekeeper resources, and they
- 11:01inherently force you to jump through deeply dehumanizing
- 11:04hoops to prove you are worthy. It really is the institutional
- 11:08rationing of compassion. And the ultimate tragedy which
- 11:11the academic paper makes so clear is that this intense focus
- 11:16on who is needy enough, it consumes all the political
- 11:20oxygen, right? While frontline workers and
- 11:22advocates are fighting bitterly over how to accurately measure a
- 11:25client's trauma, nobody is asking the much larger, simpler
- 11:29question, which is why aren't we just pouring concrete and
- 11:32building enough homes for everyone?
- 11:34Which pivots is perfectly to the second source, the HURI report,
- 11:37because if the government decided it was just too
- 11:39expensive to build traditional public housing for all these
- 11:42people, they still had to do something.
- 11:44And what they did was shift the responsibility by creating a
- 11:47multi provider system. Yes, the multi provider system
- 11:50or NPS. For decades, social housing in
- 11:52Australia was a strict state monopoly.
- 11:54The government funded it, built it, owned it and managed it.
- 11:57That was public housing. But over the last 20 years,
- 12:00there has been a massive transition to incorporate
- 12:02Community Housing organizations, or CHO's, and these are
- 12:05independent not-for-profit entities.
- 12:08OK. But I mean multi provider sounds
- 12:09good. It sounds like diversifying the
- 12:12portfolio. You know, it sounds like you're
- 12:14bringing in specialized nonprofits who might be better
- 12:17at managing localized communities than some giant
- 12:20faceless state bureaucracy. And if you look at the top line
- 12:23data, the Community Housing sector has grown massively.
- 12:26So what is the actual issue? The issue is how that growth was
- 12:31actually achieved. The vast majority of the
- 12:34expansion in the Community Housing sector over the last 20
- 12:36years did not come from these nonprofits actually building new
- 12:40homes. We really.
- 12:41No, it came from the state government simply transferring
- 12:44the titles of existing public housing stock over to the CHOS.
- 12:48OK, stop. Right there, they didn't build a
- 12:50new house. They just took a house the
- 12:52public already owned and handed the deed to a nonprofit.
- 12:55Why? What on earth does that actually
- 12:57accomplish? It accomplishes a very specific,
- 13:00very calculated bureaucratic maneuver known as the CRA
- 13:03loophole. And let me break down the exact
- 13:06mechanics of this because it is literally the engine driving the
- 13:09entire multi provider shift. Please do, because I really need
- 13:12to understand how moving a piece of paper generates housing.
- 13:16So CRA stands for Commonwealth Rent Assistance.
- 13:20It is a federal subsidy designed to help low income people pay
- 13:23their rent. Crucially though, by federal
- 13:26law, if you live in state owned public housing, you are strictly
- 13:31prohibited from receiving Commonwealth Rent Assistance.
- 13:34Right, because you are already living in a heavily subsidized
- 13:37state asset. The government isn't going to
- 13:39give you a federal cash voucher to pay a state subsidized rent.
- 13:43I mean that would just be double dipping.
- 13:45Precisely. But if the state government
- 13:47takes that exact same public housing building and legally
- 13:50transfers the title to a Community Housing provider, the
- 13:53tenant inside that building is no longer a public tenant.
- 13:57Suddenly, by the exact letter of the law, they qualify for
- 14:00Commonwealth rent assistance. So wait, it's the exact same
- 14:03physical building, It's the exact same low income tenant
- 14:06living inside it, but simply by changing the logo on the
- 14:10landlord's letterhead from state housing to Community Housing
- 14:13nonprofit, they suddenly unlock a stream of federal cash.
- 14:16Yes. The Community Housing
- 14:18organization is then able to capture that federal CRA money.
- 14:23They collect it, claim it as a guaranteed long term revenue
- 14:26stream on their balance sheets, and then they use that revenue
- 14:29to go to private financial institutions to leverage private
- 14:32debt. OK, I have to push back here.
- 14:35Even if it is kind of a sneaky accounting trick, isn't that
- 14:37ultimately a good thing? If a nonprofit captures new
- 14:40federal money, they can use that money to provide better wrap
- 14:44around services for traumatized tenants, or better yet, use that
- 14:48private debt they leveraged to finally build new houses.
- 14:51Well, that is the theoretical justification the government
- 14:53uses, but the AHRI report investigates the actual outcomes
- 14:57of this exact mechanism, and what they found is that this
- 15:00policy specifically incentivizes title transfers over actual
- 15:03construction. So they just keep swapping
- 15:05titles. Yes, some CHOS do build a few
- 15:09new dwellings at the margins, sure, but fundamentally the
- 15:12sheer volume of titles transferred completely dwarfs
- 15:15the new construction. It creates a massive illusion of
- 15:18growth and competition, but the actual physical supply of homes,
- 15:23the total number of bricks and mortar in the country does not
- 15:27meaningfully increase. So the chairs in our musical
- 15:30chairs game haven't multiplied at all.
- 15:33They've just been painted a different color.
- 15:35And now there's a private bank collecting interest on the paint
- 15:38job. Exactly, and it creates deeply
- 15:40arbitrary inequities on the ground.
- 15:42You could literally have two identical low income families
- 15:45living next door to each other. One is generating a federal
- 15:48subsidy for their Community Housing landlord and the other
- 15:51isn't purely based on who happens to hold the deed to the
- 15:54property. Which forces us to ask a really
- 15:56uncomfortable question. If all this bureaucratic
- 15:59maneuvering with the CRA loophole, it's just moving old
- 16:01houses around, where is the actual Federal Housing budget
- 16:05going? I mean, the government isn't
- 16:06spending its money building new public housing.
- 16:08Who is getting the cash? To answer that, we have to look
- 16:11directly at the AHUR reports breakdown of the 2021 to 2022
- 16:16Commonwealth housing expenditure.
- 16:18And the data here is just staggering.
- 16:20When you look at the total pool of federal money spent on
- 16:23housing subsidies, over 80% of it flays directly into the
- 16:27private rental market. Over 80%.
- 16:29OK, I want to slow down and actually unpack the mechanics of
- 16:31that, because that completely upends the narrative we usually
- 16:34hear. How exactly is the government
- 16:37subsidizing the private market? It primarily happens through the
- 16:41tax code, so let's look at the specific figures from the 2122
- 16:44period. The federal government spent
- 16:46$2.42 billion on negative gearing, they spent $1.9 billion
- 16:52on capital gains tax concessions, and they spent
- 16:54$4.73 billion on Commonwealth Rent Assistance, the vast
- 16:58majority of which goes directly to tenants who are renting from
- 17:01private landlords. Here's where it gets really
- 17:03interesting. Let's break down those first two
- 17:05because they are crucial for a listener who might not be an
- 17:07accountant. How does negative gearing
- 17:09actually work mechanistically? Negative gearing is a tax
- 17:13mechanism that basically allows an individual who owns an
- 17:16investment property to offset the losses from that property
- 17:20against their primary personal income.
- 17:22OK. So like a salary?
- 17:24Right. So if the rent you collect on
- 17:26your investment property doesn't actually cover the cost of the
- 17:29mortgage and the maintenance, you are taking a loss on that
- 17:32property. The government allows you to
- 17:34deduct that loss from your regular salary, meaning you pay
- 17:38significant less personal income tax overall.
- 17:40So the government is essentially subsidizing you to take a
- 17:43financial loss on a property because the assumption is the
- 17:46property will eventually go up in value.
- 17:47Exactly. Which brings us to the second
- 17:50mechanism, which is capital gains tax concessions.
- 17:54Capital gains tax is the tax you pay on the profit when you
- 17:56finally sell an asset in Australia.
- 17:59If you hold an investment property for more than 12
- 18:01months, the government cuts that tax burden in half.
- 18:04Wow, in half. Yeah, it is a massive concession
- 18:08that explicitly encourages people to use housing as a
- 18:10speculative wealth building vehicle rather than, you know,
- 18:14just a place to live. So when you combine a mechanism
- 18:17that offsets your operational losses with a mechanism that
- 18:20halves the tax on your eventual massive profit, you have
- 18:24engineered a giant state sponsored demand engine for
- 18:29private property investment. And you said the total cost of
- 18:32these subsidies plus the CRA is what?
- 18:35When you add them all up, it is nearly $9 billion of federal
- 18:39money subsidizing the private housing market and private
- 18:41landlords in a single year. $9 billion.
- 18:44And what is the comparative figure for actual social
- 18:47housing? The contrast is immense.
- 18:50The National Housing and Homelessness Agreement, which is
- 18:52the main funding vehicle for social housing, provided public
- 18:55housing with just $1.25 billion and the Community Housing sector
- 18:59received about 825 million. So you have roughly $2 billion
- 19:03going to the public and community sectors and almost $9
- 19:06billion going to the private sector.
- 19:08It's like having a farm with two fields.
- 19:10You are actively routing 80% of your water supply to the private
- 19:14field. And then you are looking at the
- 19:15public field, seeing all the crops with her and saying, wow,
- 19:19look at this natural, inevitable scarcity.
- 19:21It's a tragedy of nature. The water metaphor is incredibly
- 19:24apartment, and I think it's important to pause here and
- 19:27reinforce that our goal today is strict political impartiality.
- 19:32We are not making a moral judgement about whether
- 19:34individuals should or shouldn't use negative gearing to secure
- 19:38their retirement, right? Absolutely.
- 19:40We are simply observing the structural mathematical reality
- 19:44presented in the a ECRI data, which is that the Australian
- 19:48housing system is fundamentally designed to stimulate demand and
- 19:51subsidized investment in the private sector rather than
- 19:54directly fund supply in the public sector.
- 19:57But the mathematical reality is that you cannot starve the
- 19:59public sector of capital and then be surprised.
- 20:02When public houses don't miraculously materialize and
- 20:06this lack of capital leads us into the next major mechanism,
- 20:08the A he Sure, I report highlights because despite
- 20:11everything, governments still occasionally face immense
- 20:14political pressure to build some new social homes.
- 20:17But since they've diverted all their capital to subsidize the
- 20:19private market, they have to figure out these incredibly
- 20:22convoluted ways to finance construction without actually
- 20:25using upfront cash. Which brings us to what we can
- 20:27basically call the financialization trap.
- 20:30Right. The report breaks down housing
- 20:33growth into four basic inputs. Can you walk us through those?
- 20:36Certainly any housing development relies on 4 inputs.
- 20:40First is capital, so this is upfront cash grants or Freeland.
- 20:44Second is subsidies which are ongoing operating grants just to
- 20:48keep the lights on. 3rd is rent, the revenue collected from the
- 20:51tenant. And 4th is financing which is
- 20:54debt. So capital subsidies, rent debt.
- 20:56OK, so let's apply those 4 inputs to the current Australian
- 20:59social housing model. Well, we know from our earlier
- 21:02discussion that the rent they collect is extremely low, and
- 21:04that's because the system has been residualized to only house
- 21:08the most deeply impoverished complex needs tenants.
- 21:11Rents are strictly capped to a percentage of their very low
- 21:14incomes. And we also just established
- 21:16that upfront government capital grants have largely dried up.
- 21:19So if the rent input is trainee and the capital input is
- 21:22basically gone, the only lever left to pull to build anything
- 21:25is debt. Exactly.
- 21:27Social housing providers are forced to rely heavily on
- 21:30expensive private debt, and the primary vehicle the government
- 21:34uses to facilitate this without putting up their own capital is
- 21:37a highly complex instrument called a Public Private
- 21:40Partnership or a PPP. I hear that acronym thrown
- 21:43around constantly for things like toll roads and NASA
- 21:45hospitals. How does a PPP actually work
- 21:49mechanistically for housing? Well, in a traditional model,
- 21:52the government would just hire a construction company, pay them
- 21:55to build a 100 unit apartment block, and then the government
- 21:58would own that block forever. Under APPP model, the government
- 22:02brings in a private consortium, and this consortium is usually a
- 22:05complex web of private financiers, property developers
- 22:08and corporate lawyers. Sounds expensive.
- 22:10Very The private consortium takes on the debt and builds the
- 22:13housing. In return, the government signs
- 22:16a contract promising to pay that private consortium an annual
- 22:19availability payment for the next 25 to 30 years to
- 22:23essentially lease the housing back for public use.
- 22:26Wait, so instead of just buying the asset the government puts
- 22:28the housing on a 30 year high interest credit card?
- 22:31That is essentially the exact financial reality.
- 22:34But surely the private sector is more efficient.
- 22:36Doesn't the government save money in the long run by
- 22:39offloading the construction risk?
- 22:40The AURI report heavily scrutinizes that exact
- 22:44assumption. They highlight several massive
- 22:46flaws with the PPT model for housing.
- 22:49First, they are incredibly inflexible.
- 22:51If a community's needs change over 30 years, you cannot easily
- 22:55alter a rigid multi decade financial contract.
- 22:59Second, the transaction costs are astronomical.
- 23:02You're basically paying the profit margins of private
- 23:04financiers, developers and an army of lawyers required to
- 23:07draft these bespoke contracts. But what happens at the end,
- 23:11like what happens at year 30 when the final availability
- 23:14payment is made? If we connect this to the bigger
- 23:16picture, that is the most devastating flaw.
- 23:19At the end of the 25 or 30 year lease, the public owns
- 23:22absolutely nothing. The availability payment stop,
- 23:25the private consortium retains the physical asset and the
- 23:28public sector has zero equity to show for three decades of
- 23:31taxpayer payments. The cycle of scarcity just
- 23:34starts all over again from scratch.
- 23:35It's deeply frustrating to look at the mechanics of this.
- 23:38It feels like an entire architecture designed to extract
- 23:41yield for middle men rather than actually house vulnerable
- 23:45people. So if we have successfully
- 23:47diagnosed the disease here, and it's clearly a severe case of
- 23:51financialized residualized scarcity, let's look at the
- 23:55cures. Because our sources don't just
- 23:57critique the system, right? They offer actual tested global
- 24:00blueprints. How do other nations handle this
- 24:03without relying on 30 year credit card schemes?
- 24:06This is where the source material gets truly inspiring
- 24:08because it proves this isn't an unsolvable law of physics.
- 24:12Let's look at Europe first. The AURI report specifically
- 24:15examines the systems in Austria, Denmark, France, and Finland.
- 24:19They largely avoid these convoluted PPP structures by
- 24:21utilizing 2 key mechanisms and those are the cost rental model
- 24:25combined with revolving funds. OK.
- 24:27Let's break those down first. What exactly is a cost rental
- 24:29model? How does it differ from what we
- 24:31do? In a standard private market,
- 24:34rent is speculative, right? A landlord charges whatever the
- 24:38market will bear to maximize their profit yield.
- 24:41But in a cost rental model, the rent a tenant pays is
- 24:45mathematically calculated to cover the actual precise cost of
- 24:49providing and maintaining that specific building.
- 24:53It covers paying down the initial construction loan, the
- 24:55ongoing maintenance, and the management fees.
- 24:58It is not pegged to an inflated market rate.
- 25:01It is purely pegged to the physical, the reality of the
- 25:04building's cost. OK, that makes sense.
- 25:06It keeps rents affordable while ensuring the building doesn't go
- 25:08bankrupt. But I have a question about the
- 25:10math here. Say a building cost $10 million
- 25:12to build. The cost rent is set to slowly
- 25:15pay down that mortgage. But what happens 20 or 30 years
- 25:19later when that mortgage is finally paid off in the private
- 25:21market? The landlords costs plummet but
- 25:24they keep charging the same rent and that money becomes pure
- 25:27profit. And this is the absolute genius
- 25:29of the European system. This is the revolving fund
- 25:31architecture. Once a building's debt is paid
- 25:33off, the tenant actually continues to pay their
- 25:36affordable rent, but by strict statutory regulation that
- 25:40surplus rent cannot be extracted as profit.
- 25:42It must go directly into a legally protected sector wide
- 25:46revolving fund and that capital can only be used to finance the
- 25:50construction of the next block of social housing.
- 25:52Wow, so the system literally sustains its own growth.
- 25:56The rent paid by a tenant in a building constructed in say,
- 25:591985 is currently providing the debt free capital to pour the
- 26:04concrete for a new building in 2026.
- 26:06Exactly. The capital is trapped in a
- 26:08public utility loop. It builds massive compounding
- 26:12public equity over decades. They never start from scratch
- 26:15and they combine this financial engine with highly aggressive
- 26:18land policy. What does that look like in
- 26:20practice? Well, many European nations and
- 26:22particularly cities like Vienna, they utilize strict inclusionary
- 26:25zoning. They manage mandate that 25 to
- 26:2730% of all new urban developments must be social or
- 26:30cost rental housing. They don't just sit around
- 26:33hoping the private market will eventually trickle down some
- 26:35affordable units. They literally force social
- 26:38housing into the urban fabric from day one.
- 26:40That is a fundamentally different approach.
- 26:43It treats housing as a systemic requirement, not an
- 26:45afterthought. But it's not just Europe that
- 26:48the report looks at right? There are models much closer to
- 26:51home. Yes, the AURR report highlights
- 26:53incredibly successful alternative frameworks emerging
- 26:56in Aodoro, New Zealand and specifically indigenous Mari LED
- 27:01housing provision. How does their approach differ
- 27:04from the financialized model we've been discussing?
- 27:06Well, through what is known as the Akori framework, Maury
- 27:10organizations are utilizing treaty rights and land rights to
- 27:14build Community Housing. That completely re evaluates the
- 27:16metric of success. The Australian system, as we've
- 27:19seen, views housing through purely financialized metrics,
- 27:22right. So leveraging debt, maximizing
- 27:24CRA subsidies, managing wait lists.
- 27:26Right, all spreadsheets. But the Mari LED model shifts
- 27:28the paradigm entirely. They prioritize cultural
- 27:31belonging, multi generational living structures, and a long
- 27:34term community strength over purely financial yield.
- 27:38It's treating housing as a mechanism for healing and
- 27:40community building rather than just a tradable asset class.
- 27:45So looking at these brilliant global models, I have to ask the
- 27:49obvious question, why can't we just copy paste the Danish
- 27:52revolving fund or the Austrian cost rental model into Australia
- 27:56tomorrow? Because Australia currently
- 27:58lacks the core regulatory architecture required to make it
- 28:01work. Right now, there is literally no
- 28:04legislative requirement for Australian Community Housing
- 28:06providers to lock their surpluses into a revolving funds
- 28:09for new growth. Without that legal framework,
- 28:12the compounding equity loop can never actually start.
- 28:15But deeper than the legal barrier is the cultural barrier.
- 28:18The mindset we talked about at the very beginning.
- 28:19Precisely. We treat social housing as a
- 28:22residual emergency welfare safety net for the desperate.
- 28:25Europe treats social housing as essential societal
- 28:28infrastructure. They view it exactly like a
- 28:30highway, a power grid, or a public school system.
- 28:33It is designed to be accessible to a broad swath of the working
- 28:36public, not just the most traumatized few.
- 28:39And if we refuse to adopt that mindset, if we just keep pushing
- 28:43this highly targeted multi provider system that relies on
- 28:46accounting tricks and private debt, what is the end game like?
- 28:50Where does this actually lead us?
- 28:51The AERI report actually gives us a crystal ball for this.
- 28:55We don't have to guess what happens when you heavily
- 28:57financialize a social service through a multi provider system
- 29:01because Australia has already pushed two other major sectors
- 29:04down this exact same path over the last 20 years and that is
- 29:08childcare and aged care. Oh wow, those are two sectors
- 29:11that have been subject to massive royal commissions and
- 29:13explosive news investigations for systemic failures.
- 29:16Exactly. Both childcare and aged care
- 29:19were transformed into multi provider systems.
- 29:22The government intentionally stepped back from direct public
- 29:24provision. Instead, they relied heavily on
- 29:27a mix of private, nonprofit and for profit providers, and they
- 29:30subsidized the users with government vouchers.
- 29:33Which is mechanistically identical to what they are doing
- 29:35with the CRA housing loophole. They are giving the user a
- 29:38federal voucher and telling them to go find a provider in a
- 29:41fragmented market. Yes, and the results in the care
- 29:43economy are rigorously documented in the report.
- 29:47Massive profit extraction by private companies, incredibly
- 29:51poor quality outcomes for the consumers, and ballooning
- 29:54uncontrollable expenses for the public purse.
- 29:57And the report makes a vital structural point about why this
- 30:00happens. Vulnerable users in these
- 30:03systems inherently lack market power.
- 30:05Because the whole premise of a free market is that a consumer
- 30:08can just walk away if the product is bad.
- 30:10Precisely, if you are buying a television and the television is
- 30:13terrible, you return it and buy a different brand.
- 30:15That is market discipline. But if you are an 85 year old in
- 30:19an aged care bed or a traumatized low income family
- 30:22facing homelessness, you cannot easily vote with your wallet.
- 30:26You are desperate for survival. You will accept whatever is
- 30:28given to you. You have no leverage.
- 30:31This raises an important question which leads to a total
- 30:33disconnect between the billions of dollars the government spends
- 30:37and the actual physical well-being of the user.
- 30:39The providers just capture the subsidies without having to
- 30:42improve the service. But the report doesn't say all
- 30:45multi provider systems are doomed, does it?
- 30:47Because I think they offer a counter example of one that
- 30:49actually functions well. They do the school education
- 30:52system. Australia has a massive multi
- 30:55provider system for education. There are state public schools,
- 30:58Catholic systemic schools and independent private schools.
- 31:02But the critical difference is regulation.
- 31:05How so? The education sector faces
- 31:07highly strict overarching regulation that is totally
- 31:10agnostic to the provider type. There are universally required
- 31:14qualifications for teachers across all sectors, the
- 31:17curriculum is standardized, and, crucially, funding is tightly
- 31:21monitored with a relentless focus on student outcomes rather
- 31:24than just the financial viability of the school itself.
- 31:26So if we treat housing the way we treat aged care, we're
- 31:29basically setting up a system where vulnerable tenants are
- 31:32trapped in substandard conditions, terrify to complain,
- 31:35while private providers extract government subsidies to service
- 31:38their debt. So how do we regulate housing
- 31:40more like schools? Well, the AR report explicitly
- 31:43recommends that we need to regulate for outcomes, not just
- 31:46financial inputs. They argue we need state based
- 31:49tenant advocacy services with actual legal teeth.
- 31:53We need to force all housing providers, whether state or
- 31:55nonprofit, to publicly report their eviction rates, their
- 31:59repair times and their tribunal actions.
- 32:01Bring it all out into light. Exactly.
- 32:03You have to implement transparent, enforceable
- 32:06standards that put the power back into the hands of the
- 32:08tenant. Without that overarching
- 32:10regulation, a multi provider system will only ever serve the
- 32:14financiers, not the residents. So what does this all mean?
- 32:17Let's zoom out and synthesize this massive journey we've just
- 32:20taken through the invisible mechanics, the housing crisis.
- 32:23We started by looking at the psychology of the system.
- 32:26We saw how a deliberate, decades long starvation of government
- 32:30capital was repackaged and sold to the public as reified
- 32:32scarcity. A natural drought we just have
- 32:35to endure, right? And we saw how that scarcity
- 32:37forces a brutal triage system where only people with extreme,
- 32:41complex needs get priority, essentially turning basic
- 32:44survival into a dehumanizing bureaucratic obstacle course.
- 32:47And then we followed the actual money.
- 32:49We exposed how accounting tricks like the CRA loophole mask a
- 32:54fundamental lack of new construction and how the vast
- 32:57majority of taxpayer housing dollars, nearly $9 billion, are
- 33:01funneled to subsidized private landlords while the public
- 33:04sector is left to wither. And we looked at the
- 33:06financialization trap of 30 year PPP credit cards that extract
- 33:10massive transaction costs while building absolutely zero public
- 33:13equity. But importantly, we also saw the
- 33:16blueprints for hope. We saw how European revolving
- 33:19funds, cost recovery models and indigenous frameworks in New
- 33:22Zealand offer a proven, sustainable way out of the
- 33:25scarcity mindset to you, the learner.
- 33:27What this deep dive ultimately reveals is that housing policy
- 33:30is not just dry, abstract economics.
- 33:33It is the literal physical architecture of our society
- 33:36where a tax dollars are routed, whether a subsidizing the
- 33:38speculative wealth of private landlords or building
- 33:40compounding. Collective public equity
- 33:42dictates who gets to live with stability and dignity and who is
- 33:45left out in the cold. And I want to leave you with one
- 33:48final structural thought to consider.
- 33:51We've talked extensively today about the shift in mindset
- 33:54required to fix this, moving from a residualized model to a
- 33:57universal infrastructure model. But consider the massive
- 34:01economic implications of that shift.
- 34:03If we truly transitioned our mindset and we successfully
- 34:06built a social housing system that was self-sustaining, high
- 34:10quality, and available to a broad swath of the working
- 34:13public, like a highway or a public school, how would that
- 34:17fundamentally threaten the concept of real estate as a
- 34:19speculative investment? The entire private housing
- 34:22market currently relies on the desperation of renters who have
- 34:25no alternative. Is it possible that the real
- 34:28unspoken fear among policy makers isn't that a massive
- 34:31public housing system will fail, but that it might succeed too
- 34:34well? That is a profoundly disruptive
- 34:36question to chew on. If the bridge is collapsing by
- 34:40design, you always have to look at who is profiting off the
- 34:43ferry. Thank you, the learner, for
- 34:44taking this deep dive into the blueprints with us today.
- 34:47Keep questioning the mechanics of the world around you, and
- 34:49we'll see you next time.