Latest / Escape The Clock: How to Become Financially Free and Have the Option Not to Work / Defending the Vault: Protecting Your Wealth in the Age of AI Scams with Robert Siciliano of Protect Now
Transcript
- 0:00Today on Escape the Clock, we're aiming to answer
- 0:02the following question. As the threats to our
- 0:04financial security get smarter and faster, how
- 0:07do we keep the wealth that we're working so hard
- 0:09to build? Consider this. 2024, investment fraud
- 0:13became the most financially damaging category
- 0:15of cybercrime, accounting for over $6 .5 billion
- 0:19in reported losses. That comes from the FBI Internet
- 0:23Crime Report. And that's not just the cost of
- 0:25bad luck. That's the cost of an industry of bad
- 0:28actors who are just getting more sophisticated.
- 0:31They're getting faster and better, and it's getting
- 0:34harder to defend against them. And they're no
- 0:36longer just guessing at our passwords. They're
- 0:39using three -second clips of our voices and deepfakes
- 0:42of our faces to trick us to give access to our
- 0:44bank accounts, our businesses, and our families
- 0:48into handing over the keys to our vaults. To
- 0:51answer this question, I'll be joined by someone
- 0:53who has spent decades studying exactly this problem.
- 0:56You'll be hearing my conversation with Robert
- 0:58Cisleano. He's a private investigator, a best
- 1:01-selling author, and the CEO of ProtectNow. Robert
- 1:04is the architect of the Strategic Human Firewall.
- 1:07It's a behavioral protocol that he's designed
- 1:09to defend our wealth against the kind of digital
- 1:12attacks that honestly most of us never seem coming
- 1:14until it's too late. So today, we're going to
- 1:18get into the specific behaviors and protocols
- 1:20that will help us protect that wealth. From basic
- 1:23mistakes that 90 % of people are still making,
- 1:26to the new AI -driven scams that get past even
- 1:29the most paranoid among us, including myself.
- 1:31I learned a lot from this conversation, and if
- 1:34you stay tuned to the end of it, I'll admit to
- 1:36a mistake I recently made since my conversation
- 1:39with Robert, falling for one of these pretty
- 1:42sophisticated scams myself. And I'll share all
- 1:45about that at the end if you're willing to hang
- 1:47out. So stay tuned for my conversation with Robert
- 1:50Siciliano. Learn how to harden your defenses,
- 1:53build your strategic human firewall, and protect
- 1:55the wealth that you're working so hard to live
- 1:57off of. Welcome back to Escape the Clock. the
- 2:20show where we highlight strategies and approaches
- 2:21for achieving financial freedom and having the
- 2:23option not to work. I'm your host, Daniel C.
- 2:26Rogers. There are some well -understood strategies
- 2:28for the offense of financial independence. Increase
- 2:31your savings rates, optimize tax strategy, beat
- 2:34inflation, compound your way to your goal, et
- 2:37cetera. Accumulation can be enjoyable, especially
- 2:39when you know the strategies and you see them
- 2:41working. But as you are successful with the accumulation,
- 2:45you become a more attractive target to those
- 2:47that are looking to take instead of earn. There's
- 2:50a defense side to the equation that, when ignored,
- 2:53comes at great risk. According to a 2024 FBI
- 2:56Internet Crime Report, identity theft complaints
- 2:59rose by nearly 10%, with a record number of cases
- 3:02involving the hijacking of existing accounts.
- 3:05But the most alarming shift isn't in the volume
- 3:07of attacks. It's in the sophistication. The tools
- 3:10being used against us are evolving faster than
- 3:12our traditional security habits can keep up.
- 3:15The days of don't click on a clearly suspicious
- 3:17link have passed, and this place is an era of
- 3:20biological hacking and deep fakes. Even the most
- 3:23careful can fall prey to these new traps. We're
- 3:26hardwired by millions of years of evolution to
- 3:28trust our eyes and our ears. So when we hear
- 3:30a family member's voice on the phone or see a
- 3:33business partner's face on a Zoom call, our biological
- 3:36instinct is to trust. And the hackers understand
- 3:38that. It's become scarily easy to use a three
- 3:41second audio clip to clone voices and deep fake
- 3:44technology to create digital mashups that can
- 3:46even trick the most skeptical high earner into
- 3:49authorizing a catastrophic wire transfer. The
- 3:53truth is, if you think you're too smart to be
- 3:54scammed, then you're operating with a human blind
- 3:56spot. It can be a multimillion dollar wealth
- 3:58leak, and that's a risk that needs to be mitigated
- 4:01in the plan. Our guest today is here to help
- 4:04explain how dangerous things have become and
- 4:06how you can harden up your defenses against the
- 4:08digital onslaught to our portfolios. Robert Cisleano
- 4:11is a private investigator, a bestselling author,
- 4:14and the CEO of Protect Now. He's appeared on
- 4:17CNN, Fox News, and the Today Show as one of the
- 4:20nation's most trusted voices on cybercrime and
- 4:22personal protection. He's the architect of the
- 4:24Strategic Human Firewall, a methodology that
- 4:27moves beyond software to focus on governance.
- 4:30trusting your natural instincts, and to your
- 4:33strongest defense. Robert, welcome to Escape
- 4:36the Clock. Thank you, Daniel. Very happy to be
- 4:38here. Awesome. You spent decades in the trenches
- 4:41here with cybersecurity, and I know you've seen
- 4:43a lot of this transition I was talking about
- 4:46from simple phishing emails to some of the AI
- 4:48-driven stuff that's happening. When did you
- 4:51become clear that the greatest threat to our
- 4:54financial security isn't some technical glitch
- 4:56in our bank account, but the human side of things?
- 5:00Actually, I became Claire on this 20 years ago.
- 5:06It's it's it's this has been a long time coming.
- 5:09But the reality of it is we are no more secure
- 5:13today as consumers than we were 20, even 30 years
- 5:19ago. And the reason is we talked about that human
- 5:21blind spot, you know, consumers, just everyday
- 5:24people. We don't want to think or believe that
- 5:26these things can happen to us, like most of us
- 5:28to a certain degree. And it's kind of sad to
- 5:30say. we function in a level of denial that it
- 5:33can't happen to me. And that's our default. And
- 5:36when I get in front of a live audience and I
- 5:37do that quite often. I ask basic questions like,
- 5:40you know, how many of you can honestly say that
- 5:42you're using a different passcode across all
- 5:44your critical accounts, you know, different passcode
- 5:46across each account. If I get 10 % of the room
- 5:49to raise their hand, go, yeah, I'm using a different
- 5:51passcode across each account. That's a lot, which
- 5:53means that like 90 % are using the same passcode
- 5:57everywhere. And most people don't know this,
- 5:59but there's been like 15 billion passcodes on
- 6:03the dark web in the past, you know, 10, 15 years,
- 6:0615 billion, which means. Most of our passcodes
- 6:09are in fact on the dark web. So if one account
- 6:12has been compromised, that means all your accounts
- 6:16are compromised due to the fact that your passwords
- 6:18are out there and we're engaging in very poor
- 6:21password hygiene. So that's been going on forever.
- 6:25And we just don't engage in basic one -on -one
- 6:27security as we should. And the bad actors. they
- 6:31recognize that and they're organized and they're
- 6:34making a ton of money because we're just not
- 6:37engaged in the one -on -one stuff yeah that makes
- 6:40a lot of sense there was um uh fraud and cryptocurrency
- 6:45and brokerage accounts had a reported loss of
- 6:48over 5 .8 billion dollars in 2024 like it just
- 6:52crazy high amount of fraud there so let's start
- 6:56with some basics for a moment uh for someone
- 6:59who Let's say they are accumulating well, they
- 7:03might be becoming a bigger target every day and
- 7:05they're starting to worry about this, or they're
- 7:07just curious what they should be looking for
- 7:09in their plan with some basic failure points
- 7:12that people might start to look for. Well, for
- 7:17one, we mentioned password management. That's
- 7:20just the first thing. Utilizing a password manager
- 7:24itself. which is a tool you download for free.
- 7:27And then it might be free going forward or a
- 7:30small monthly or annual fee for anywhere from
- 7:3420 to 60, 80 bucks. I spend, I think, $17 a year
- 7:38on mine, my password manager that I've had now
- 7:41for, what, 22 years. And then once your passwords
- 7:45are in order, never using the same passcode twice,
- 7:47long, strong, uppercase, lowercase, that the
- 7:49password manager itself generates. And then from
- 7:52there, it's two -factor authentication. two -factor
- 7:55authentication for all your critical accounts,
- 7:57especially email. You know, if you just do a
- 8:01quick search for two -factor AOL, two -factor
- 8:04PayPal, two -factor eBay, two -factor Amazon,
- 8:07you'll see the exact instructions on how to set
- 8:10up two -factor authentication for all your critical
- 8:12accounts. And before you know it... Like really,
- 8:15you are in the top 10 % of those in America that
- 8:17are secure. Because when I say that like 90 %
- 8:20of us are not using two -factor and using the
- 8:23same passcodes everywhere, yeah. So the top 10
- 8:26% of secure consumers are the ones that are doing
- 8:28the basic things. Yeah, I imagine the idea here
- 8:32is make yourself more and more difficult. target
- 8:35because i imagine a lot of these hackers are
- 8:38automating things across a high volume of potential
- 8:41victims so they're trying to like maybe start
- 8:43with who has the obvious easy predictable passwords
- 8:47and you know who use it everywhere and i know
- 8:50two -factor auth is huge that makes a lot of
- 8:52sense pretty much everyone could do that now
- 8:54right everyone has another device they can use
- 8:56to authenticate uh themselves in a better way.
- 9:00What about things like hardware keys, physical
- 9:03security tokens, face ID? I imagine there's lots
- 9:06of layers you could put in place. How important
- 9:08is it? How far should people be going here? Hardware
- 9:11keys eliminate vulnerability. is what they do.
- 9:15Predators use what we call high -precision impersonation
- 9:19to trick you, your human blind spot, into handing
- 9:22over a password or a texted code through what
- 9:25they call man -in -the -middle attacks. But a
- 9:27physical token acts as a literal vault door key.
- 9:32It requires a physical possession and a physical
- 9:35tap to authorize access. So there's some manual
- 9:39labor involved that's really easy, actually.
- 9:42If a scammer... perfectly execute what we call
- 9:45manufactured urgency and steals your login credentials
- 9:49they fish you or they get it off the dark web
- 9:51whatever the case is uh they're permanently locked
- 9:54out because they don't have a physical key in
- 9:57their hand your key it enforces unhackable physical
- 10:01verification at the hardware level i i always
- 10:04recommend physical keys in that regard Are there
- 10:08certain platforms or accounts or services that
- 10:10people should be aware of are less secure than
- 10:12others? Or is that kind of moot if you're doing
- 10:15some of these other things? It's moot. At this
- 10:18point, most companies that engage in some type
- 10:21of commerce, they provide multi -factor authentication,
- 10:25the ability to use an external physical token.
- 10:28And so they all know that they need to be as
- 10:32secure as necessary for the consumers. The consumers
- 10:35are generally the path of least resistance. It's
- 10:37those in the chair in front of the computer that
- 10:40are the vulnerability. Gotcha. Can you talk a
- 10:43minute about SIM swapping? I'm curious, for people
- 10:47who are using their mobile apps to manage their
- 10:49bank accounts, is that effective in your mind
- 10:52or is there a risk with that? SIM swapping is
- 10:55a problem, especially for, you know, high net
- 10:57worth individuals. And SIM swapping essentially
- 11:01is when your phone is targeted, your SIM is actually
- 11:07targeted, and that often begins with compromising
- 11:11the victim's email. So their email might already
- 11:14be compromised. Your username being your email
- 11:16address, your passcode being whatever it might
- 11:18be, might already be exposed on the internet
- 11:21and or that high net worth net worth individual
- 11:24gets phished and then from there once they're
- 11:27inside their email the next thing is to reset
- 11:30the passcode for or even access their mobile
- 11:33phone account online and then from there once
- 11:35they're inside the mobile phone account then
- 11:38they can easily have the sim ported to a different
- 11:43device So either in eSIM or an actual physical
- 11:48card ported to a different device. And then the
- 11:51criminal has access to the two -factor authentication.
- 11:54That's a huge problem. So number one, making
- 11:59sure that your email is properly protected, different
- 12:02passcode than any other account, that your mobile
- 12:06phone account itself has two -factor authentication.
- 12:10And then even considering a different username.
- 12:14for, say, your crypto account and or your bank
- 12:17account than you use for regular email. So your
- 12:21most valued financial accounts, you want to consider
- 12:25as standing separately in regards to the username
- 12:28and, of course, the passcode than, say, your
- 12:32Facebook account or your Amazon account, for
- 12:35that matter. Your most moneyed accounts should
- 12:38be separate and stand alone from anything else.
- 12:41Got it. Got it. Wow. You know, consumers reported
- 12:44losing more than $2 .9 billion to imposter scams
- 12:50in 2024 due to things like voice cloning. So,
- 12:53you know, these attacks are getting more sophisticated.
- 12:55I know you said like, you know, there's some
- 12:57basic things and that was really helpful. Like
- 12:59people should be doing some basic things here
- 13:00for sure to protect themselves. But, you know,
- 13:03we are moving into an era of these like perfect
- 13:05lies where AI can clone a family member's voice
- 13:08or a business partner's face. So how do we think
- 13:10about building defenses against fraud that sounds
- 13:13and looks exactly like the people that we trust?
- 13:15Yeah, predators only need three seconds of audio
- 13:19to clone your loved one's voice from a social
- 13:22media clip to achieve that high precision impersonation
- 13:25we talked about. They feed it into AI generators
- 13:30and create a perfect digital clone. It's perfect.
- 13:34You and I can't tell the difference. You know,
- 13:36our brain does not. understand uh a digital clone
- 13:41it's just perfect uh they call you unexpectedly
- 13:45weaponizing that manufactured urgency like your
- 13:48loved one is in distress uh claiming a car accident
- 13:51or an arrest or a kidnapping for that matter
- 13:53uh and hearing that loved one's voice over the
- 13:57phone instantly triggers our emotions. And your
- 14:00emotions, of course, bypass any logic. And it
- 14:04defaults to, okay, what do I got to do to get
- 14:06my loved one out of this situation? Manipulating
- 14:09you into sending funds even before you have any
- 14:11idea what just happened to you. Right now, having
- 14:15a conversation with your loved ones that this
- 14:16is a real thing, this is happening, people are
- 14:18being victimized by it. The likelihood of your
- 14:21loved ones, say, ending up in this like tragic
- 14:23car accident or being kidnapped is, you know,
- 14:27relatively rare compared to somebody at this
- 14:31point calling you, posing as your daughter or
- 14:34having your daughter screaming in the background
- 14:36is becoming more common. So having some type
- 14:38of a family code word, some type of a phrase,
- 14:42you know, where did we vacation on your birthday?
- 14:45What's your favorite food? What's your mother's
- 14:48middle name? Like basic stuff, even though like
- 14:50mother's maiden name is common, like having some
- 14:52type of a phrase that or keyword that that person
- 14:55has to answer, they're probably just going to
- 14:57hang up. Yeah, that's really smart. So how do
- 15:00people start to train their human firewall here?
- 15:03Because there's some biological senses that are
- 15:06telling us that we need to react to this urgency,
- 15:08right? Like I get it. Like if my daughter had
- 15:10a call and panicked, I'm just going to go into
- 15:13firefighting fix it mode. But the code word makes
- 15:16sense. But are there other red flags we should
- 15:18be looking for? And is there other things we
- 15:21need to do to calm and stop ourselves in the
- 15:24moment so we don't just react and make a mistake?
- 15:26Yeah. So to train your strategic human firewall,
- 15:30basically when you are experiencing this urgency,
- 15:34this manufactured urgency, you got to pause.
- 15:37You got to recognize risk. You must replace biological
- 15:41panic with engineered muscle memory. That means
- 15:44like really thinking it through. So when scammers
- 15:47use that urgency, your brain just floods with
- 15:50adrenaline and it triggers that. that emotional
- 15:53response, your biological instinct to act as
- 15:56fast as possible to help that loved one. And
- 15:59you defeat this by understanding and learning
- 16:02what we call the AAA protocol, right? It's analyze
- 16:05what's happening to me right now. What's going
- 16:08on? What really is this? Authenticate, like,
- 16:11you know, is what is happening, you know, real
- 16:15or fake? And then... act and that means like
- 16:18you know getting in touch with whoever until
- 16:21it becomes reflex you know train yourself train
- 16:24your family that that urgency itself is the primary
- 16:27indicator that this is a threat that's probably
- 16:30fake the moment that you feel rushed that anxiety
- 16:34must automatically trigger like a hard pause
- 16:36to execute that mandatory out of band verification
- 16:40call that person that's the acting part call
- 16:43that person email that person like text that
- 16:46person whoever it might be, a loved one, grandchild,
- 16:49daughter, sibling, whatever the case is, don't
- 16:52just get all emotional and react and start wiring
- 16:55money. Right. Yeah. And I know this goes broader
- 16:58than that too, because many of us are building
- 17:01personal brands or we're investing in our social
- 17:04media presence and scams initiated on social
- 17:07media platforms hit a record $1 .9 billion in
- 17:11losses again in 2024. So I know there is this
- 17:16kind of risk with visibility and trade -off with
- 17:20security for a lot of us. So how do we minimize
- 17:23the risk there while still remaining active on
- 17:28all these platforms? Yeah. So, you know, high
- 17:32earners, let's say, you know, they unwittingly
- 17:36arm scammers by oversharing. everything you know
- 17:40linkedin instagram facebook you know um i put
- 17:45nothing of of that online personally i just don't
- 17:49like i never have and i never will you know um
- 17:51there's no need to do that you know predators
- 17:54they scrape um off of all of your various platforms,
- 18:00whatever your memberships are, any philanthropic
- 18:04affiliations, any family tags, relationships
- 18:08you might have. In real time, they'll grab all
- 18:11your travel updates, where you are, where you
- 18:14aren't, you know, a conference you might be speaking
- 18:16at and so forth. And all of this fuels that high
- 18:20precision impersonation. When hackers know, like,
- 18:24for example, you know, an executive is on a flight
- 18:26and unreachable, then they'll target their assistant,
- 18:30say, with that manufactured urgency or have them
- 18:34buy a gift card for them or for their clients
- 18:36or whatever, requesting a rapid wire transfer,
- 18:40whatever the case might be. Because the context
- 18:43aligns perfectly with reality, it exploits that,
- 18:46you know, executives out of town, going after
- 18:53that assistant, it triggers their blind spot,
- 18:56let's say, bypassing logic to be helpful, right?
- 18:59And really it's up to us to pay attention to
- 19:03how can what I am sharing and putting out there
- 19:06be used against me or my family or my business.
- 19:10I know personally, I never would share anything
- 19:12publicly. I never know photos of my kids. I never
- 19:15wanted to put any private information out there.
- 19:17I was always freezing on my credit boards. I
- 19:19was a little paranoid maybe. But at this point,
- 19:23you know, I'm trying to put myself out there
- 19:25in a different way with a brand and to help do
- 19:27free financial education here. And I've never
- 19:30felt more exposed as I've been doing that, but
- 19:33I've been trying to be smart about it and protect.
- 19:35So, you know, people who are trying to do the
- 19:38best practices here, How do you separate your
- 19:41public persona from some private brand or financial
- 19:45infrastructure? Are there common things you should
- 19:47be doing or is it really just going to be a risk
- 19:50you have to take? Well, there are certainly risks
- 19:53there, but I don't necessarily think we should
- 19:54just throw our hands up in the air and give up
- 19:56and do nothing. I do quite a bit, actually, to
- 19:59continually monitor my exposure. Although, you
- 20:04know, I'm out there. There's, you know, hundreds
- 20:06of hours of video and audio and, you know, I'm
- 20:10out there. But I do what's necessary to kind
- 20:14of scrub my personal life off the net relatively
- 20:16frequently. Start by searching your name, your
- 20:19phone number. your address right do it like in
- 20:22an incognito browser and see what shows up right
- 20:25um predators use this open source intelligence
- 20:29to craft these various you know forms of high
- 20:32precision impersonation uh search all the various
- 20:36data broker sites in the real estate property
- 20:39type sites out there and see what shows up you
- 20:42know review your social media from a public perspective
- 20:45and so by identifying all the different data
- 20:48points that are out there about you you could
- 20:50begin to scrub it before it's weaponized against
- 20:53you so What I probably do quarterly is I'll search
- 20:57my name and my address and my phone number and
- 20:58see what shows up with me and my actual cellular
- 21:01phone number. And then the same thing with my
- 21:03wife. And because they share a name with my dad,
- 21:05I do his too. And then the various data brokers,
- 21:08they... provide you the ability to actually remove
- 21:11your information from public view and from their
- 21:14sites where it says like, do not sell or another
- 21:17tool that they might offer. You can actually
- 21:19remove it. And what I generally do is I'll reach
- 21:22out, I'll say, remove it. And then I'll take
- 21:25that same link where my information shows up.
- 21:27I'll copy paste it. email it to myself and I'll
- 21:31check it two weeks later, like snooze it, check
- 21:33it two weeks later, that email, see if they actually
- 21:35removed it. And if they did great. And then what
- 21:37I'll do is snooze that same link again for like
- 21:40six months to see if it went back again, you
- 21:43know? And yeah, that way, like if they, if it
- 21:46repropagated, I have it removed again. So I do
- 21:49that at least, you know, quarterly to every six
- 21:53months and then annually. And I am. doing a pretty
- 21:57good job of it. Like right now I might have one
- 22:00to two places occasionally that pop up with my
- 22:03mobile phone number and my physical address.
- 22:05Keeping in mind, like I'm not sharing anything
- 22:08with my daughters or my wife in regards to like,
- 22:11I'm not connected to them on social media, you
- 22:13know, my dad, none of that stuff. Like as much
- 22:16of it, we can keep off the web, the better. Wow.
- 22:20Yeah. That's really great. Great advice. For
- 22:23me, I've been more focused on preventative types
- 22:25of things. So for instance, I'm, looking to buy
- 22:27my my wife a car for her birthday right now it's
- 22:30a big it's a big milestone birthday and i was
- 22:33looking at uh getting the car from some dealership
- 22:36website and going through and they're asking
- 22:37me all this personal privacy information just
- 22:40to you know get the car ordered and at the end
- 22:44there's all these forced opt -ins and i started
- 22:47i just copy and pasted and threw it through ai
- 22:48i'm like what is this really saying it's going
- 22:50to do And it's like, they're going to take that
- 22:53information. They're going to keep that information.
- 22:56They're going to sell that information. I said,
- 22:59Nope, I'm not going to go. I guess I'll just,
- 23:01I'll just drive to a dealership and deal with
- 23:03this because I didn't want to do that. I didn't,
- 23:05I didn't know how I would scrub that kind of
- 23:08thing. If I could scrub that kind of thing after
- 23:10we go out there, it didn't seem worth the cost.
- 23:12So yeah. Awesome advice. Love that. I would love
- 23:15to ask you about the psychology pieces here though,
- 23:19because You can hear all this great advice, but
- 23:22acting on it's different because I think a lot
- 23:24of people might hear this go, yeah, that makes
- 23:25sense. But there is a gap between how people
- 23:29feel about this and actually implementing some
- 23:32of the defense systems that you're recommending
- 23:34here. Can you go a little bit into the why this
- 23:38won't happen to me myth and how that's actually
- 23:40self -sabotaging people and what to do about
- 23:42it? Yeah. So, you know, you said something that
- 23:46I think I just want to. point out real quick
- 23:48that like when you were looking for that car
- 23:50you had done a quick search and asked like you
- 23:54know how might this information be used against
- 23:55me you know we call that a thinking person you're
- 23:59thinking this thing through like you're well
- 24:00thought out in that regard like what are the
- 24:02repercussions of this and and i don't know that
- 24:04most people do that i don't know that most people
- 24:06like take the time we just kind of like bang
- 24:08through life we're busy we're overwhelmed but
- 24:10like you thought about that and you recognize
- 24:12that there might be potential repercussions there
- 24:14and and if we do that on a regular basis and
- 24:17using various tools that are at our disposal
- 24:18then we're essentially like you know outsmarting
- 24:22the sales and the marketing, those that are out
- 24:25there taking advantage of us. In that same realm,
- 24:29we're also outsmarting the bad guys, those with
- 24:31actual bad intentions, right? Like thinking these
- 24:34things through. The fact of the matter is these
- 24:36things do happen to us, right? And that it won't
- 24:40happen to me myth is the ultimate expression
- 24:43of what I call the human blind spot, like that
- 24:45want and need to trust others, right? It is frankly
- 24:48an arrogant belief that your wealth or your...
- 24:52status makes you immune to scammers whether you
- 24:55have a lot of money or a little bit of money
- 24:56for that matter you know this cognitive dissonance
- 24:59um you know causes you know certain people to
- 25:02dismiss basic security like multi -factor authentication
- 25:06or you know managing passwords and such right
- 25:10and and we wouldn't even think to engage in that
- 25:13triple a protocol that i talked about you know
- 25:15analyze authenticate act right because it's inconvenient
- 25:18right and and consequently You know, we become
- 25:21easier targets because we do nothing to protect
- 25:24ourselves. Why would they target me is so unbelievably
- 25:28childish, bordering on arrogant, okay? Cyber
- 25:32predators rely on this exact overconfidence or
- 25:36denial. right? They bypass technical firewalls
- 25:40using that manufactured urgency that I've mentioned
- 25:43multiple times, impersonating a loved one or
- 25:46a government agency or law enforcement, whatever,
- 25:48and they exploit us. So if you're thinking things
- 25:52through, if you're recognizing risk, if you know
- 25:54that these things can and do happen, but you
- 25:57don't worry about it, you don't worry about these
- 26:00things, we equate in our culture, we equate fear
- 26:07and worry and paranoia with security. As if engaging
- 26:14in security practices means that you worry and
- 26:17you're fearful. When I get in front of a live
- 26:20audience, I ask the question, how many of you
- 26:22have a home security system? And I ask this for
- 26:24a reason and I'll explain real quick. How many
- 26:27of you have a home security system? If I get
- 26:2910 to 15 % of the room to raise their hand, that's
- 26:32a lot. right keeping in mind that like every
- 26:35year between a million and a million and a half
- 26:38or even two million homes are burglarized right
- 26:40so in the next like 10 years that's like between
- 26:4210 and 20 million homes burglarized in the next
- 26:45decade but but when i asked the question okay
- 26:47so why don't you have a home security system
- 26:50the most common answer is i don't have a home
- 26:54security system because i don't want to live
- 26:56like that This is what they say. What does that
- 27:01actually mean? Well, I don't want to live in
- 27:03fear. I don't want to have to worry. I don't
- 27:06want to be paranoid. As if having a home security
- 27:09system is a constant reminder that people break
- 27:13into houses. So I don't want to have to think
- 27:15about that. Therefore, I'm not going to do anything
- 27:17about it. So I don't have to live in fear. Like,
- 27:20think about the ridiculousness of that. I don't
- 27:25want to be one of those people that have been
- 27:26seen as having to have one of these things. There's
- 27:30like a status thing there, I imagine, as well.
- 27:32It's just childish is what it boils down to.
- 27:36It's somebody who is thinking as a child. I don't
- 27:39want to have to worry, live in fear. I want to
- 27:41put the covers over my head and do nothing. Like,
- 27:44that's just silly. But that's how many of us
- 27:47are. And I'm not pointing fingers or anything.
- 27:49I'm just, this is what I see. over and over and
- 27:52over again. And which is why there are billions
- 27:55and billions and billions of dollars lost every
- 27:58single year. And people wonder, how did that
- 28:00happen to me? Why did they target me? Well, it's
- 28:03because we did nothing to protect ourselves to
- 28:05begin with. Yeah, you know, I imagine as, you
- 28:10know, people are hearing this, they may hear
- 28:11their logic here, they might go, okay, I need
- 28:13to wake up from this. But it does get harder,
- 28:16I think. as people get older, to break habits
- 28:19they have. And like you said, people get really
- 28:21busy. Are there things, though, that we can start
- 28:24to teach our children before this becomes a more
- 28:27difficult problem? I know kids are more technology
- 28:31savvy than ever before. I see that with my kids.
- 28:34But at the same time, they put themselves out
- 28:36there way more than I'm comfortable with. And
- 28:39I wish they would protect themselves a little
- 28:41better. So how do we actually start to get a
- 28:44handle on this with our own kids? Well, as a
- 28:47dad, I'm a girl dad, and I've been talking to
- 28:50my girls about personal protection since they
- 28:53were young, young. If they're going to be going
- 28:55over a friend's house and spending the night,
- 28:59at the age of five and six years old, I'm talking
- 29:02about good touches and bad touches. I'm talking
- 29:06serious personal security at a young, young age.
- 29:10Why? Because it's something that they need to
- 29:12know. Because there are people out there that...
- 29:15have no problem with touching a child, right?
- 29:18So when you start to have conversations with
- 29:21loved ones about personal protection first, violence
- 29:24and theft prevention, right? Personal protection
- 29:27at a young age, at any age for that matter, you
- 29:32make security personal. And then from there,
- 29:35what's more personal than protecting your identity?
- 29:38right your social security number managing your
- 29:40passwords again two -factor authentication like
- 29:43all this stuff is personal to us on the hierarchy
- 29:46of human needs at the base of that triangle is
- 29:48like physiological needs you know getting a good
- 29:50night's rest consuming foods and fluids. Right
- 29:53above that is safety, security, stability, structure,
- 29:56and protection. And these are conversations that
- 29:58we don't generally have with our loved ones at
- 30:00all, because we don't want to think these things
- 30:02can happen to us. And so my daughter's going
- 30:04off to college. She's already learned self -defense.
- 30:07She's already learned how to physically debilitate
- 30:09and physically hurt somebody really bad if necessary.
- 30:13And so we've had multiple conversations about
- 30:15the fact that going off to college and ending
- 30:18up in a fraternity, you know, at a party, that
- 30:20there's a one - of four chance that because one
- 30:23out of four young women are sexually assaulted
- 30:24at school that these are uncomfortable conversations
- 30:27that we don't have with our loved ones that we
- 30:31should and once you have these conversations
- 30:33then Consuming information about managing risk
- 30:38financially, updating your hardware, updating
- 30:42your software, protecting your identity, recognizing
- 30:45what to do when the phone rings, when you get
- 30:46a text message, when an email comes in. All of
- 30:49this stuff becomes more and more natural when
- 30:52you begin to make all security personal. The
- 30:57average American, there was an Empower study
- 31:01this year. I said, the average American now manages
- 31:04168 passwords and that's a 70 % increase since
- 31:082021. And, you know, I think, you know, like
- 31:11you said, not everyone's doing this, but there
- 31:13are people are doing this are finding because
- 31:15there's so many places that ask for a password.
- 31:18Now you end up creating tons and tons and tons
- 31:21and tons of them. And this can be in particular
- 31:24a bottleneck for families when they're thinking
- 31:26about things like an estate transfer, for instance,
- 31:29and there's a fear. that happens of locking out
- 31:32our families of their legacy because digital
- 31:37security was actually too tight and that didn't
- 31:39get passed on properly. So people don't have
- 31:41access to the wealth that we worked so hard to
- 31:43build. Is there a risk of being too successful
- 31:45with the security here and actually creating
- 31:47it, making it backfire? Yeah. So that's a great
- 31:51question. Our planning for our digital estate
- 31:56should be right alongside planning for our demise.
- 32:00I mean, that's just, Look it, my wife, my girls,
- 32:04they have full -blown access to my afterlife,
- 32:08my digital life, right? They have access to the
- 32:12password manager. And I've told them point blank,
- 32:15you know, when I perish, because it's going to
- 32:16happen anytime now. Look it, I'm only 57. But
- 32:20when I say it's going to happen anytime now,
- 32:22that's legit. It could happen anytime now. That's
- 32:26true when you're younger. Yeah. I mean, it can
- 32:28happen anytime now. You could walk outside, you
- 32:31know, not paying attention, going to crosswalk
- 32:34and looking at your phone and the driver's not
- 32:36paying attention either. And both of you, you
- 32:38know, are at fault. You know what I'm saying?
- 32:41And so stuff happens, heart attack, whatever.
- 32:44Okay. And so by having full blown access to my
- 32:48password manager, I also said to them, if and
- 32:52when it happens, you also got to pay for my mobile
- 32:54phone. plan for the next couple of years because
- 32:57that's attached to two -factor authentication
- 32:58so not only are you going to need the username
- 33:01and the passcode to get in via the password manager
- 33:03you're going to need my phone as that second
- 33:05factor so Digital assets like your investments
- 33:10and cryptocurrency and the private keys and all
- 33:14that stuff, it matters. Traditional assets, you
- 33:17know, have a legal paper trail. Your wealth in
- 33:21general might require that second factor, private
- 33:25keys. If you die becoming incapacitated without
- 33:28securely transferring the, you know, exact alphanumerical
- 33:32string, whatever it might be, your wealth can
- 33:35die with you. You know, your family can't say,
- 33:38simply call blockchain and say, hey, how do I
- 33:41get in? So having that discussion now and having
- 33:46some form of strategy, like a multi -sig protocol,
- 33:52whatever that might be, and you could determine
- 33:53what that is by doing your own searches and determining
- 33:56a strategy that one daughter has this, another
- 34:00daughter has that, your wife has this, some type
- 34:04of a protocol where it takes... know, more than
- 34:08one key to get access to it all makes a lot of
- 34:11sense. And that's something that those who have
- 34:15built wealth should be thinking of right now.
- 34:18Do you think that high earners should be bringing
- 34:21on a digital executor on top of a traditional
- 34:25one? Is that something that you would recommend?
- 34:28So that's certainly an option. And that might
- 34:30be your attorney. It might be a third party altogether.
- 34:34And as as we get a little bit deeper into the
- 34:37weeds and, you know. like you did earlier, doing
- 34:40a quick search on how does entering my information
- 34:43cause negative repercussions and what might they
- 34:46do with it. As you investigate these various
- 34:49tools that are available to you, where they should
- 34:52be stored and who has access to them and what
- 34:55that multi -sig protocol looks like, whatever
- 34:59third parties are out there that you can also
- 35:02engage in will become apparent to you. Got it.
- 35:06Well, Robert, this has been fantastic. Honestly,
- 35:09a very amazing and insightful conversation. I
- 35:12have a couple of takeaways I'm going to do actually
- 35:14after this, and that doesn't always happen. So
- 35:16thank you for that. How can listeners connect
- 35:19with you and get help on this? Well, if you can
- 35:22spell Siciliano, you can just Google me. Otherwise,
- 35:25yeah, right. S -I -C -I -L -I -A -N -O. I'm all
- 35:29over the webs. Connect with me on LinkedIn. Otherwise,
- 35:31my website, protectnowllc .com. Again, protectnowllc
- 35:35.com. Fantastic. That'll be in the show notes
- 35:38as well. Thanks again, Robert, for coming on
- 35:41Escape the Clock and helping us with this. My
- 35:43pleasure. I've always been careful with my data,
- 35:57but look, I'm not even immune here. The conversation
- 36:01that you just heard with Robert, I recorded that
- 36:04back on March 5th of 2026. It's been about two
- 36:08months since that conversation. And since then,
- 36:10after 45 years of living, I finally become a
- 36:13victim to a successful phishing scam. Okay, so
- 36:16here's what happened. My daughter wanted to sell
- 36:19some dolls and toys. So I did some research and
- 36:22I found this platform that I've never used before
- 36:24called Macari. And I decided, okay, I'll join
- 36:28that and I'll list some stuff there. Well, soon
- 36:30after I started getting these emails saying that
- 36:33two of the items had sold. And that seemed pretty
- 36:36normal. I've been selling things on eBay for
- 36:38decades and I looked at these emails and everything
- 36:41looked legit. The branding looked right. The
- 36:45type of information they were displaying was
- 36:46correct. The times were right. I would hover
- 36:51the links and everything was pointing to the
- 36:53Macari websites, things like that. It all looked
- 36:55completely fine. It looked like the kind of thing
- 37:01you'd expect because it was asking me to confirm
- 37:03how I want to receive payment for a thing that
- 37:06I sold. And I knew I'd have to give them that
- 37:08information eventually. So this actually made
- 37:10sense in this part of the workflow. So I was
- 37:13ready to give that account information out. And
- 37:16so I went and I clicked on the link and it took
- 37:19me to the site I had been on all day, the Macari
- 37:22site. And it started prompting me for the bank
- 37:26account that I wanted to use to receive the payment.
- 37:28I entered that information. And then something
- 37:31a little weird happened next. It asked me for
- 37:34my driver's license. Now, that's not completely
- 37:37inappropriate because sometimes you have to give
- 37:40identification for tax purposes and things like
- 37:42that. So I said, OK, that's probably fine. I
- 37:46probably wouldn't need to give that anyway. So
- 37:48I uploaded my driver's license information. Well,
- 37:52as this is happening, I noticed that the buyer.
- 37:56is sending emails. I'm getting notifications
- 37:58of new emails from one of the buyers. And they're
- 38:02pressuring me to go faster, asking me where I
- 38:05am and if I'm done yet. And I'm like, well, okay,
- 38:09this is strange. In all the many, many years
- 38:12I've been selling things, I've never had a buyer
- 38:14pressuring me to hurry up with confirming the
- 38:19purchase that I received a payment. Normally,
- 38:23they're more interested in knowing that it's
- 38:24shipped. So I go and I see these multiple emails
- 38:27and even one of them saying that, hey, if you're
- 38:31getting stuck, you can click on the support link
- 38:33and someone will connect to help connect to your
- 38:35machine and guide you through the process. And
- 38:38that was it for me. As soon as I heard someone
- 38:40saying I should give access to my machine to
- 38:43someone that triggered my full paranoia. So I
- 38:46opened up the Macari site in a different web
- 38:49browser and what I saw completely froze me. The
- 38:53items that had said was sold no longer said that.
- 38:56I was seeing the same site, but with the actual
- 38:59information. So I knew I had been phished. I
- 39:03had just went through a deep fake of the Macari
- 39:05website. So I immediately called my bank and
- 39:08had them cancel my card. But of course, as I'm
- 39:11looking at my bank and having it canceled, I
- 39:13can see that thousands of dollars had already
- 39:15been emptied out. And I just felt like so stupid
- 39:18for this. I'm a complete idiot. So, of course,
- 39:21I fall for the thing that I had never fallen
- 39:24for before after talking with Robert and learning
- 39:29more about how important it is as ever to protect
- 39:31yourself. And look, I even knew that AI was making
- 39:36it easier than ever for scammers to impersonate
- 39:38people and entire apps. Yet here I was going,
- 39:42OK, I'm just doing the same old easy things I've
- 39:45been doing to protect myself, being kind of naive
- 39:47to. how good this stuff is getting now on the
- 39:51good side, you know, I have the other things
- 39:53I do to protect myself or working. I always keep
- 39:55my credit reports frozen. So whatever information
- 39:58they got, including my driver's license can't
- 40:01be used to create new accounts in my name. So
- 40:03that's good. And I, you know, I reported it to
- 40:07the police and I reported it to other official
- 40:09places. You know, the, the, all the appropriate
- 40:13things you can do. And my bank is able to, you
- 40:16know, see that that's fraudulent. information
- 40:19and get me that money reimbursed. And most importantly,
- 40:23I knew that whatever bank account I should use,
- 40:25shouldn't be my big access to a lot of my financial
- 40:29information. It was a smaller account with less
- 40:32money into it, but still that's a few thousand
- 40:34dollars. It's not nothing. So after recording
- 40:37this entire podcast episode on this exact topic,
- 40:40I still got hit. That's just how sophisticated
- 40:43these attacks have come. They're not catching
- 40:46the careless anymore. They're really catching
- 40:49everyone, even the careful. And Robert was clear
- 40:52that most people are failing at the one -on -one
- 40:54level basics. So I feel like if that's you or
- 40:58someone you know, you really got to take action
- 41:01now. Because if they're able to do things like
- 41:05this, even non -technical hackers can use AI
- 41:09to create something this effective. It's important.
- 41:13to do at least some of the basic stuff, like
- 41:15different passwords for each of your, at least
- 41:17your critical accounts. Don't ever reuse a password.
- 41:20Make it a little bit harder in that way. But
- 41:24most importantly, the two -factor auth. It doesn't
- 41:26take that much time to set up two -factor authentication,
- 41:29especially on your email. And once you do that,
- 41:32you're really making it significantly harder
- 41:35for people. Not impossible, but harder. And that
- 41:38won't make you that go -to target. Things like
- 41:41the hardware keys, now that is really effective.
- 41:45Of course, if you have something like a significant
- 41:48amount of wealth in crypto or something, it's
- 41:51actually become kind of a norm to use a hardware
- 41:53key for that. But you can consider using that
- 41:56for other important data that you want to protect
- 41:58as well. So ultimately, separating your credentials
- 42:01for your bank, your brokerage, and your crypto,
- 42:04so that if you do have a breach, it's not going
- 42:06to cascade. through your entire financial life
- 42:08becoming some kind of crazy catastrophe for me
- 42:11it was a stressful event i had to make some phone
- 42:14calls including talking to the police not fun
- 42:17but not a catastrophe robert also talked about
- 42:22this new attack surface one that we really got
- 42:25to be careful about which is voice and image
- 42:29a predator now only needs a few seconds of audio
- 42:32to clone your voice And with so many of us putting
- 42:37videos and things online, it's easier than ever
- 42:40to find this information. And AI can really analyze
- 42:44the tone, the speech manners, the way that the
- 42:54person enunciates, all kinds of things. to really
- 43:00try to replicate it in a really effective way.
- 43:02It's getting better and better at this. So to
- 43:05the point that you might get a phone call from
- 43:08a family member in a panic asking you to wire
- 43:10money, but it's not actually a family member
- 43:13at all. And that's pretty scary. But Robert did
- 43:17recommend a pretty simple, but I can imagine
- 43:20quite effective tactic, which is introduce a
- 43:23code word or some phrase that you can prompt
- 43:27to them to create a barrier. That was actually
- 43:29one of the big action I took from my conversation
- 43:32with Robert ever since I recorded this interview.
- 43:34And I went and spoke to my children and I came
- 43:38up with fun and easy things, kind of funny things
- 43:41that each of them individually would know, but
- 43:42only each of them so that I could do that in
- 43:45the case that that were to happen to me. And
- 43:48look, if in the case that. Your AI is being used
- 43:53to scrape your social media and to deep fake
- 43:56things like this. If you have someone on the
- 43:59other end that isn't the person you think it
- 44:00is and you prompt them and they don't know what
- 44:03to say, it's very likely they're just going to
- 44:05hang up. So it can definitely be worth it because
- 44:09as Robert was saying, you have to teach people
- 44:13how to protect themselves and we have to teach
- 44:15our children how to protect themselves as well
- 44:17because it's only going to get tougher. And so
- 44:20he came up with this, what he calls a triple
- 44:22A protocol that analyze, authenticate and act.
- 44:26I think that's pretty useful, especially the
- 44:29first part, which is pausing when something feels
- 44:32urgent. If I had paused and taken a moment to
- 44:36just go back and double check the website and
- 44:41the browser session I had been in without clicking
- 44:44the link I had clicked. That would have made
- 44:47all the difference for me, the Macari fishing
- 44:48incident that I went through. Also, recognizing
- 44:52that the urgency itself is a manipulation, that's
- 44:55definitely part of it. And you can authenticate
- 44:58through whatever channel is appropriate to see
- 45:01that you are being manipulated. Because then
- 45:04when you decide you do need to act, you're actually
- 45:06moving with your logical brain rather than your
- 45:10emotional one. And you're much more likely to
- 45:13make decisions that you won't regret. Another
- 45:16important thing you mentioned was the training
- 45:18aspect, because we need to train ourselves to
- 45:20do this until it becomes reflex. Because in the
- 45:22moment, it's likely we'll just revert to our
- 45:24natural tendencies and that'll get us in trouble.
- 45:27Robert mentioned with his daughters, at least,
- 45:30that he started this when they were young, as
- 45:31early as like five years old, I think he said.
- 45:34That's great because if we start talking to our
- 45:37children or our loved ones and make it common,
- 45:40we're reinforcing the behaviors in ourselves
- 45:42as we're teaching it. We're also making it a
- 45:44norm for them to think about these things. And
- 45:48with like a child, for instance, if we're talking
- 45:50about how to protect our identity and personal
- 45:52protection when they're young, when they get
- 45:54older and become more digitally connected, it'll
- 45:57just be a natural conversation to extend that
- 45:59to their online identity and presence. I think
- 46:02that was really good advice. And again, I could
- 46:05have done all of this for myself. That's on me.
- 46:08I screwed up. But each one of these things is
- 46:11a learning experience as well. And so I've had
- 46:15a lot of time to think about this kind of thing
- 46:18since talking to Robert. And I have a few, it's
- 46:21not a blueprint, but it's a few thoughts, takeaways
- 46:23that I think are worth considering. The first
- 46:27is that one of the cheapest and still most effective
- 46:31measures you can take is to be anonymous. Just
- 46:35don't put your information out there. Now that's
- 46:37becoming more and more impossible. Literally
- 46:39every. Where you go, they're going to ask you
- 46:41for information now. And information is very
- 46:44valuable. It can be sold. It can be used. It
- 46:48can be trained. So it's very hard to not do this.
- 46:51And even Robert himself admitted that even though
- 46:54he said he puts nothing out there, he has to
- 46:56go and scrub the information out. He has reminders
- 46:59to go and recheck that it actually got removed
- 47:01and that it didn't get repropagated. It can be
- 47:04very tough. But if you can keep that amount of
- 47:07data to a minimum. then at least you're a harder
- 47:10target to hit. But let's be honest, being anonymous
- 47:14online isn't really possible. And even if you
- 47:17could, it's probably not enough. You still need
- 47:19some of these other protocols. 90 % of people
- 47:22who reuse passwords are not getting hacked because
- 47:27they posted their travel plans on Instagram.
- 47:29They're getting hacked because they're not using
- 47:31their two -factor auth. If someone guesses your
- 47:35password and you don't have that extra check,
- 47:38protecting them into your account, then you're
- 47:42going to be in trouble. They not only have access,
- 47:44but it's likely that it's going to propagate
- 47:47throughout your entire system. So it's all about
- 47:52barriers, different passwords, two -factor authentication,
- 47:57passcodes, make it complicated. Just think about
- 48:02if you were the bad guy, what would discourage
- 48:05you and try to do that to them? Let's be honest,
- 48:09though, like your security is only going to be
- 48:11as strong as the weakest member of those who
- 48:13have access to your data. You could be perfect.
- 48:16You could be using a passwords manager and doing
- 48:19flawless passwords and everything. You could
- 48:21even have a hardware key locked in a safe somewhere.
- 48:24But if your spouse or parent or assistant, like
- 48:28Robert said, in the case where the executive
- 48:30was posting, they were going to be traveling
- 48:33on an airplane. And the bad actors went for the
- 48:37assistant because that was the soft target. It
- 48:40could be a child. It could be anyone, whoever
- 48:41it is. That is your vulnerability because you
- 48:45still can be exposed to the people who have access
- 48:48to the thing we're trying to protect. Family
- 48:52level cybersecurity is a household responsibility.
- 48:55It's not just a you thing. We can take the lead
- 48:58in our lives and try to protect our loved ones,
- 49:01but we need to bring everyone in. and educate
- 49:04each other and try to help each other out here.
- 49:07Because these protections, they have to extend
- 49:09to everyone. They have a key to all those things
- 49:12in our lives. And it's not just about hackers
- 49:15anymore either. Like the number of bad actors
- 49:19here are greater than ever. There is a $290 billion
- 49:22global industry that is legally built on collecting,
- 49:26packaging, and selling your personal data without
- 49:29your consent. This is all from market research.
- 49:34You'll find this on the show notes if you want
- 49:36to learn more about this. But that's $290 billion
- 49:39being made for taking and selling your data without
- 49:42you saying it's okay. I don't know if you're
- 49:46all right with that, but I certainly am not,
- 49:48knowing these people are profiting from things
- 49:51I never intended to use it for. The U .S. Senate
- 49:55Joint Economic Committee even published information
- 49:58that said that four of the major Data broker
- 50:01breaches in recent years have cost the American
- 50:04consumers over $20 billion in identity theft
- 50:07losses. Imagine that. All that money being spent,
- 50:12taxpayer money, due to identity theft. $20 billion
- 50:19that could be spent on defense, could be spent
- 50:22on education, that could be spent on healthcare.
- 50:26That's a lot of lost money. And, you know, these
- 50:29criminals are not operating in the dark. Sometimes
- 50:32these are companies that you've heard of, or
- 50:34maybe you haven't heard of them. And they're
- 50:36profiting from data that maybe you didn't know
- 50:39was being collected. And because these practices
- 50:42have become so institutionalized, it has started
- 50:46to kind of feel like a norm. So I shared my experience
- 50:49about the car dealership that was trying to get
- 50:52all my private information from me. They had
- 50:55some hidden, very, very legalese that said what
- 50:58they would do with it. That made me pause. But
- 51:01so many times we miss that thing. There might
- 51:04be a free app. Well, what makes it free? They
- 51:07ask you for a lot of information. I was going
- 51:10to download an editing software, a video editor
- 51:12the other day, and they want my address and my
- 51:15phone number, email, all required fields. Now,
- 51:18sure, you can fake all that stuff, but who has
- 51:20the time to create fake emails every other minute?
- 51:23They know that's where they're going to get their
- 51:26value. So we have to be aware that every one
- 51:30of these interactions is a leak. And the same
- 51:33data brokers selling to advertisers are the ones
- 51:36whose breaches arm the scammers. And those are
- 51:39the ones who eventually come for our wealth.
- 51:42Which brings me to the final and maybe the most
- 51:44important point. Wealth is not what we earn.
- 51:47It's what we're able to keep. We can spend a
- 51:50decade building those portfolios. mastering the
- 51:53offense of saving and investing in compounding,
- 51:56all the stuff I talk about on the show. But in
- 51:58a single week moment on Tuesday afternoon between
- 52:01answering emails, without really thinking about
- 52:04it, we click on the wrong link and on something
- 52:09that looks like a real platform, or we trust
- 52:11someone who wasn't who they said they were, and
- 52:14we pay the cost of losing potentially years or
- 52:18more of all that hard -earned work. So the defense
- 52:22matters as much as the offense. And the time
- 52:25to build it is before you need it. I'd love to
- 52:29hear from you. Have you ever been targeted by
- 52:31something sophisticated? What was the moment
- 52:34you realized the rules have changed? Email me
- 52:36at contact at escapetheclock .com or leave a
- 52:39comment wherever you listen. I'm Daniel C. Rogers.
- 52:42Thanks for listening. And best of luck hardening
- 52:45your defenses and escaping the clock. I'll catch
- 52:47you next week. That's a wrap on this episode
- 52:53of Escape the Clock. Everything you've heard
- 52:55today is for educational purposes only, designed
- 52:58to help you think, plan, and build a stronger
- 53:00financial program. Take what resonates, bring
- 53:02it into your Escape the Clock plan, and review
- 53:05it with a qualified professional before making
- 53:06any major moves. The book, the free planner,
- 53:09and the one -on -one time with me are all waiting
- 53:11for you at escape the clock .com. If this episode
- 53:14was valuable, please leave a rating, share it
- 53:16with someone who needs to hear it. I'll catch
- 53:17you next week. Thank you.