Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / 【13F】Bill Ackman‘s $14 Billion Eight Stock Bet
Transcript
- 0:00Imagine sitting on nearly $14 billion of capital.
- 0:04That is a lot of money. Right.
- 0:06And instead of just, you know, buying the market like a normal
- 0:08person, you bet it all on just eight ideas which.
- 0:11Is wild. It is because, I mean, your
- 0:14financial advisor practically begs you to buy a 500 stock
- 0:17index fund to stay safe, right? But one of Wall Street's most
- 0:20famous snipers is doing the exact opposite.
- 0:23He's concentrating billions into just a handful of companies and
- 0:28basically rejecting everything we're taught about risk.
- 0:30Yeah, throwing it right out the window.
- 0:32Exactly. So today we're standing at the
- 0:33base of that $13.71 billion mountain of capital to figure
- 0:38out exactly how Bill Ackman is deploying it.
- 0:40This deep dive is a a comprehensive audit of Pershing
- 0:45Square Capital Management's Q 12026 portfolio.
- 0:49We're unpacking this highly concentrated strategy, examining
- 0:52this massive structural rotation into tech and, you know,
- 0:56exploring some of that deep value Buffett style analysis on
- 0:59his core holdings. It's a fascinating portfolio to
- 1:02tear apart. It really is now before we jump
- 1:05into the numbers, a quick note for you to access more Advanced
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- 1:49Awesome. OK, so let's unpack this because
- 1:51looking at pushing squares approach, it's just it's wild
- 1:55compared to standard Wall Street operating procedure.
- 1:58Oh. Completely.
- 1:59They completely reject modern portfolio theory, like Ackman
- 2:02views over diversification as a structural drag on performance.
- 2:06Right. He calls it diversification
- 2:07sometimes, yeah. And for you listening, if you've
- 2:10been told your whole life to spread your bets, putting
- 2:12billions into just 8 to 12 companies sounds absolutely
- 2:17terrifying. I mean, it really is a sniper
- 2:20versus a shotgun approach. You better be incredibly
- 2:23accurate if you only have a few bullets.
- 2:25You have to be, because it fundamentally forces you to
- 2:27redefine what what risk actually means.
- 2:31Well, in modern portfolio theory, which you know is what
- 2:34almost every retirement account is built on, the industry
- 2:37standard basically equates risk with price volatility.
- 2:41Right, the finance pros call this beta.
- 2:42Exactly beta. So if a stocks price bounces up
- 2:46and down a lot on a daily basis, the traditional view says OK,
- 2:50that asset is risky, but Pershing square mathematically
- 2:53and philosophically just throws that out the window.
- 2:55They. Don't care about the daily
- 2:56balances. Not at all.
- 2:57They completely divorce risk for standard deviation.
- 3:00In their framework. Risk is strictly defined by a
- 3:03very simple unforgiving equation.
- 3:06Risk equals the probability of permanent capital loss.
- 3:09Permanent capital loss, so meaning the business actually
- 3:14fails, right? Like the underlying economic
- 3:16engine fundamentally breaks or they literally go bankrupt,
- 3:19right? It doesn't mean the stock price
- 3:21took a 10% dip on a random Tuesday because of a bad jobs
- 3:24report. No, and that distinction is
- 3:26everything. A stock price dropping because
- 3:28of market sentiment is well, it's an opportunity, not a risk.
- 3:32Tru risk is a structurally flawed business model.
- 3:36Got it So to manage that specific probability of
- 3:39permanent loss, their investment mandate requires target
- 3:42companies to satisfy these exceptionally rigid structural
- 3:45criteria before a single dollar is deployed.
- 3:48They're. Not just throwing darts.
- 3:50Definitely not. They demand a large cap, durable
- 3:52growth enterprises with simple, easily understood business
- 3:56models. And these companies must prove
- 3:58they have highly predictable cash flows, low sensitivity to
- 4:01macroeconomic sharks, high barriers to entry and almost 0
- 4:06exposure to cyclical commodity prices.
- 4:08And they don't just take a CEO's word for it either 'cause I was,
- 4:11I was looking into their filtering process and their
- 4:13primary research method is intense.
- 4:16Oh, it's forensic. Yeah, they will go back and
- 4:18track at least five years of a company's quarterly earnings
- 4:22called transcripts before pulling the trigger.
- 4:24Which is an ultimate credibility test that, let's be honest, very
- 4:28few retail investors take the time to do.
- 4:30Oh, almost none. Who's reading five years of
- 4:32transcripts? Right.
- 4:34But they use those historical transcripts to basically trace
- 4:37corporate commitments against actual operational outcomes.
- 4:41So like, did they do what they said they would do?
- 4:43Exactly. If a management team promised a
- 4:46specific strategic pivot or, you know, a share buyback program or
- 4:50some major cost cutting measure back in 2021, Pershing Square is
- 4:55pulling the receipts in 2026 to see if the company actually
- 4:58executed. They're searching for narrative
- 5:00alignment. Yeah, it's a classic Warren
- 5:03Buffett philosophy applied with just forensic precision.
- 5:06You know, buy high quality businesses when they're
- 5:09temporarily misunderstood, ensure management is ruthlessly
- 5:12honest, and then just hold them to let intrinsic value compound.
- 5:15But wait, if you only hold a few stocks and you operate this
- 5:18finite pool of capital, adding a new position requires massive
- 5:22conviction. Huge conviction.
- 5:24Because a $2 billion buy doesn't just appear out of thin air, he
- 5:28had to butcher something else in the portfolio to fund that
- 5:31right. Which brings us to the great Q
- 5:3412026 capital rotation. The quarter ending March 31 was
- 5:39marked by this massive thematic pivot toward dominant technology
- 5:43platforms. The big hyperscalers, yeah.
- 5:45The big move was buying over 5.6 million shares of Microsoft.
- 5:51They valued that position at $2.09 billion, which instantly
- 5:57made it over 15% of the entire portfolio.
- 5:59Passive allocation. And they also bumped up their
- 6:01Amazon state by over 19%. So where exactly did that
- 6:05mountain of cash come from? Well, it came from utilizing.
- 6:08We can basically think of as an internal ATM strategy.
- 6:11An ATM strategy. Yeah, to finance this
- 6:14multibillion dollar technology allocation, Pershing Square
- 6:17executed some really aggressive liquidation.
- 6:20They completely exited a 5.6% position in Hilton Worldwide
- 6:24Holdings. OK, hotels are gone.
- 6:26Gone. But the real ATM was Alphabet,
- 6:28Google's parent company. They slashed their massive stake
- 6:32in Alphabet by roughly 95%. Wait, wait.
- 6:36Reducing a position in one of the most powerful tech companies
- 6:39on Earth by 95% sounds like a screening red flag.
- 6:43It does sound like one, yeah. Were they suddenly panicking
- 6:46about Google's future? Like maybe the threat of AI
- 6:49disrupting traditional. You know it.
- 6:52It's tempting to think that, but the underlying logic is much
- 6:55more mechanical than panic. This wasn't really a bearish bet
- 6:58on Google's fundamentals, Really.
- 7:00No, I mean, Alphabet is still widely recognized as having this
- 7:04virtually impenetrable economic Moat in its search division, but
- 7:08context matters here. Alphabet had experienced a
- 7:11basically a parabolic price run up throughout 2024 and 2025.
- 7:15Oh, so you just got too expensive?
- 7:16It was performing Florida State and as a result it was fully
- 7:19valued by the market market. And because Ackman operates that
- 7:22finite capital base we talked about, a fully valued Alphabet
- 7:25became a highly liquid source of cash.
- 7:28I see they monetize a great company that was priced
- 7:31perfectly to fund a contrarian bet on a great company that was
- 7:34priced poorly. Calling a $2 billion bet on
- 7:37Microsoft Contrarian sounds like a complete oxymoron to me.
- 7:41Like, I mean, it's Microsoft. I know it sounds crazy, but look
- 7:44at the exact timing of the trade, OK?
- 7:46They initiated this massive position in February 2026, right
- 7:51after Microsoft stock took a beating following its fiscal
- 7:54second quarter earnings. Oh right, the big tech sell off.
- 7:57Yeah. The broader market was in a
- 7:59state of panic over Microsoft's elevated capital expenditures
- 8:02for artificial intelligence. Everyone was freaking out about
- 8:05the servers. Exactly.
- 8:06Wall Street saw billions being poured into these AI data
- 8:10centers and perceived it as this massive margin threat.
- 8:13But Ackman looked at the exact same data and saw a temporary
- 8:17mispricing. He saw a discount.
- 8:19He saw one of the greatest software businesses in human
- 8:22history trading at roughly 21 times forward earnings, which
- 8:25was, you know, significantly below its historical average.
- 8:28He pounced on the market, short term anxiety and.
- 8:31When you look at why these tech hyperscalers like Microsoft,
- 8:34Amazon, Meta are dominating this portfolio, it all comes down to
- 8:38the friction of switching. Switching costs are everything.
- 8:41Yeah, Kee, thinking of this Roach motel dynamic with
- 8:45Microsoft's Azure and Amazon's AW for you listening, trying to
- 8:50grasp the power of these cloud infrastructure models, it's
- 8:54like, it's like trying to replace the foundation of your
- 8:56house while you're still living in.
- 8:58It that is a terrifying thought. Right.
- 9:00The operational risk, the retraining costs, the sheer
- 9:03terror of an enterprise migrating its entire database
- 9:06and security framework away from AWS or Office 365 over to a
- 9:11competitor is just too high. Once you check in, you do not
- 9:15check out. And that foundation replacement
- 9:17analogy perfectly illustrates their pricing power.
- 9:20Because they can just keep bumping the rent.
- 9:21Because that migration is a logistical nightmare, Amazon and
- 9:25Microsoft can consistently raise prices without losing the
- 9:27enterprise customer. The switching cost is the
- 9:30absolute core of their wide economic moats, and the hard
- 9:34numbers from the sources just prove it.
- 9:36We're looking at. Well, look at Microsoft's
- 9:38profitability metrics. They are operating with a 47%
- 9:42operating margin and a 34% return on equity. 34% Let's
- 9:47translate that 34% return on equity for the listener.
- 9:50That means for every single dollar of shareholder money
- 9:54Microsoft retains, they are generating 30-4 cents of pure
- 9:58profit in a single year. It's absurd.
- 10:01It kind of defies the laws of economic physics for a company
- 10:04valued in the trillions. It really does.
- 10:07And then you add to that a fortress balance sheet with a
- 10:10debt to equity ratio of just 0.22.
- 10:13Practically 0 debt. They are essentially printing
- 10:15money. That is why they're massive $190
- 10:20billion capital expenditure budget for AI and cloud build
- 10:23outs didn't scare Pershing Square at all.
- 10:26A value investor sees that not as reckless spending, but is
- 10:29tightly linked, necessary capital expenditure to just
- 10:32secure future growth. And Meta's numbers are somehow
- 10:34even crazier meta. Is a beast.
- 10:36Meta is sitting on an incredible 82% gross margin.
- 10:40Their return on equity and return on invested capital match
- 10:43perfectly at 33% and they are operating with negative net
- 10:47debt. Which is an amazing position to
- 10:49be in. Meaning if they had to pay off
- 10:51every single liability tomorrow, they literally have more cash on
- 10:55hand than total debt. And all of this is happening
- 10:58while Mark Zuckerberg is funding these massive, speculative,
- 11:02multibillion dollar bets in AI and reality labs.
- 11:06Because their financial fortress is built entirely on direct
- 11:09network effects, over 3 billion people use their family of apps.
- 11:13Half the planet. Yeah, that massive user base
- 11:16anchors the social network which irresistible resistibly draws
- 11:19the advertisers, which creates A virtually non disruptible
- 11:22channel of free cash flow. It funds the speculative future
- 11:26without risking the core business.
- 11:28OK, so we have these tech giants providing massive invisible
- 11:31digital moats and printing insane amounts of free cash
- 11:34flow. If tech is so bulletproof, why
- 11:36own anything else? That's the $1,000,000.
- 11:39But here is where the portfolio structure gets really
- 11:41interesting to me. It's deliberately balanced
- 11:43against something entirely different.
- 11:45It acts as a structural barbell. The.
- 11:46Barbell strategy, yes. On one side, you have digital
- 11:50intangible hyperscalers. On the other side, you have hard
- 11:54physical tangible assets acting as an inflation hedge.
- 11:58We're talking about Brookfield Corporation, Howard Hughes
- 12:00Holdings and Restaurant Brands International, known as QSR.
- 12:04And that barbell dynamic is incredibly deliberate.
- 12:07You have the high organic growth and high cash generation of
- 12:11technology perfectly counterweighted by the non
- 12:14correlated hard asset valuation floors of real estate, physical
- 12:18infrastructure and global franchises.
- 12:20I get the theory right. I have to push back hard here.
- 12:23OK, go for. It.
- 12:24Because I'm looking at the risk metrics on these physical
- 12:26assets, and they seem to completely contradict the
- 12:29philosophy we just established. Well, we just talked about
- 12:32Microsoft's Fortress balance sheet with practically 0 debt.
- 12:36But look at Brookfield. It has an Altman Z score of
- 12:390.39. OK, let's unpack that.
- 12:41For you listening, AZ Score is a financial metric that measures
- 12:44the probability of a company going bankrupt within two years.
- 12:48Anything below a 1.8 is generally considered the
- 12:50distress zone. A 0.39 usually screams imminent
- 12:54collapse, and QSR, the parent company of Burger King and Tim
- 12:59Horton's, has a debt to equity ratio of 4.84.
- 13:03High leverage. Super high?
- 13:06Are we missing a huge red flag here?
- 13:09How on earth does a company with a 0.39 bankruptcy score fit the
- 13:140 probability of permanent capital loss rule?
- 13:17It's a great question, and it seems like a glaring
- 13:20contradiction until you unpack the mechanics of structural
- 13:23leverage. Basically, how debt is designed
- 13:26is often more important than how much debt exists.
- 13:28OK, give me an example. Let's take Brookfield.
- 13:31The parent holding company's balance sheet aggregates all the
- 13:33debt across its ecosystem, which makes the Z score look
- 13:36terrifying. But that debt is primarily non
- 13:39recourse asset level project finance.
- 13:41What does that actually mean in plain English?
- 13:42It means it is tied directly to massive physical assets like a
- 13:47specific utility scale, renewable power grid or a toll
- 13:51road. Those grids operate on 15 to 20
- 13:54year power purchase agreements, which are essentially inflation
- 13:56linked contracts guaranteeing cash flow.
- 13:59So it's quarantine debt? Yes.
- 14:00Like if a specific hydro plant project fails, the bank can only
- 14:04seize the hydro plant. The debt is contained to that
- 14:07specific asset. The bank cannot go after
- 14:10Brookfield's corporate parent company.
- 14:11Quarantine is the perfect way to describe it.
- 14:14The risk is completely isolated and we see a similar deliberate
- 14:18debt strategy with QSR. With the fast food, yeah.
- 14:22They carry high debt because they are executing a transition
- 14:26to a 99% franchise asset light model by 2027.
- 14:31So they don't want to own the restaurants anymore.
- 14:33Exactly. They're getting rid of the
- 14:35operational overhead, the labor headaches, and the food cost
- 14:38volatility of actually running company owned stores.
- 14:41Instead, their debt is serviced by highly predictable high
- 14:44margin royalties and advertising fees taken directly off the top
- 14:48of franchise sales. Which is way safer.
- 14:50Right, the sheer predictability of that royalty stream makes a
- 14:53higher debt load entirely manageable.
- 14:55OK, so if Brookfield's debt is quarantined to its physical
- 14:58power plants, what happens when you apply that same localized
- 15:01logic to raw land? Because Ackman's other massive
- 15:05physical bet operates on dirt, not electricity.
- 15:08Let's look at Howard. He's Holdings.
- 15:10This company operates master Planned communities, or MPCS.
- 15:14The business model is a fascinating flywheel Land, then
- 15:18commercial, then cash. They buy massive empty tracks of
- 15:23raw land just outside major cities.
- 15:25They sell residential plots to home builders, and then they use
- 15:28the cash from those land sales to build the commercial
- 15:30properties, the grocery stores, the offices, the retail centers
- 15:34within that exact same community.
- 15:35And that flywheel creates a localized geographic monopoly.
- 15:39Think about the barriers to entry here.
- 15:41They're huge. Competing developers simply
- 15:43cannot assemble thousands of contiguous acres of land
- 15:46adjacent to a booming metropolis like Houston or Las Vegas.
- 15:50They are entirely boxed out. Howard Hughes acts almost like a
- 15:54private municipal government. They tightly control the supply
- 15:56of commercial zoning to ensure their own retail centers never
- 16:00face oversupply, which ruthlessly protects long term
- 16:03property values and rental rates.
- 16:05And Ackman apparently loves this localized monopoly so much he
- 16:08plans to hold it forever. Forever is a long time, but
- 16:11yeah. Well, the stock trades around
- 16:13$64, but the sum of the parts intrinsic value, meaning if you
- 16:17actually chopped up the company and sold off all that raw land
- 16:20and commercial real estate piece by piece, is estimated at $118
- 16:25per share. It's a massive discount.
- 16:27It's a classic deep value play, trading massively below its net
- 16:32asset value. They even spun off the more
- 16:34speculative entertainment assets into a new public company,
- 16:38Seaport Entertainment Group, where Pershing Square
- 16:41immediately stepped in to grab a 39.43% stake.
- 16:45Just to control it. Exactly, just to control it's
- 16:48highly unique New York and Vegas waterfront real estate.
- 16:51It's basically an under the radar compounding machine built
- 16:54entirely on irreplaceable land, which actually provides A
- 16:58fascinating transition into the final puzzle pieces of the Q1
- 17:03portfolio. The activism stuff.
- 17:04Right, the speculative activism, because this is where the
- 17:07strategy shifts from passively holding mature compounding
- 17:10machines to actively forcing turnarounds in distressed
- 17:13situations. Right the turn around place Uber
- 17:15and Hertz. Let's touch on Uber's history
- 17:18first, because for a long time, Uber was the ultimate poster
- 17:22child for setting venture capital on fire.
- 17:24They burned billions. They subsidized every ride just
- 17:27to grow, but that narrative has totally flipped.
- 17:30They've stopped the crazy unprofitable acquisitions
- 17:34focused on their core mobility and delivery networks and
- 17:37transition into an absolute cash cow total.
- 17:39Transformation. By 2025, they hit a 12.1% return
- 17:44on invested capital and generated $9.8 billion in free
- 17:48cash flow over a 12 month period.
- 17:51They're literally just using that cash to buy back their own
- 17:53shares now. Ober figured it out.
- 17:55But Hertz, man, Hertz is the wild card.
- 17:58It is the most speculative and aggressive play in the entire
- 18:01portfolio by a wide margin. I am genuinely baffled by this
- 18:04allocation. Pershing Square bought a massive
- 18:0719.8% activist stake in Hertz and an average of $3.73 per
- 18:12share. A.
- 18:13Huge swing. Hertz has a terrible economic
- 18:15mode. It operates in a brutal cyclical
- 18:18industry where travelers just go on a travel website and pick
- 18:21whatever rental car is $3 cheaper.
- 18:24And going back to our bankruptcy metric, it has a distressed
- 18:26Level Z score of 0.18. It's basically flatlining.
- 18:30Why buy this? For you listening, this feels
- 18:33exactly like buying a condemned falling down house.
- 18:36I get it. But to run with your condemned
- 18:38house analogy, a savvy developer will absolutely buy a condemned
- 18:42house if they realize it sits on top of a gold mine of prime real
- 18:45estate. Oh.
- 18:46Interesting. Hertz's economic Moat isn't its
- 18:48brand name or its customer loyalty.
- 18:50Its Moat is its physical footprint.
- 18:53They possess an irreplaceable logistical network of 11,200
- 18:57physical airport and city locations globally alongside a
- 19:01$12.7 billion vehicle fleet. You simply cannot replicate that
- 19:05physical infrastructure from scratch today.
- 19:08OK, I see the value of the land so to, but what is the actual
- 19:11blueprint to fix the condemned house?
- 19:13Well, the activist thesis rests on 4 very specific pillars.
- 19:17First, the car rental industry has quietly consolidated into an
- 19:20oligopoly. So less competition.
- 19:22Right. A few major players control the
- 19:24market, which means they no longer have to engage in a race
- 19:27to the bottom on pricing. Fewer competitors lead to
- 19:30rational pricing and higher operating margins Makes sense.
- 19:33Second, Hertz is aggressively dumping its depreciating Tesla
- 19:37electric vehicle fleet. Wait, why did the EVs hurt them
- 19:40so badly? Weren't they supposed to be the
- 19:41future? You'd think so, but the unit
- 19:44economics of rental cars rely on predictable depreciation and
- 19:48fast turn around times. The Tesla suffered massive,
- 19:51unpredictable depreciation cliffs when the manufacturer cut
- 19:54retail prices. Oh, they crushed the fleet
- 19:56value. Completely, and they had
- 19:58exorbitant collision repair costs that kept cars out of the
- 20:01rental fleet for weeks. Dumping them removes a massive
- 20:05operational headwind. OK, what's pillar 3?
- 20:07The third pillar is installing a new hardened turn around
- 20:11management team to execute the basics of fleet management.
- 20:15And 4th and this is the massive speculative catalyst, Ackman has
- 20:19proposed A strategic partnership directly with Uber.
- 20:22Oh wow, so he is actively trying to tie his two mobility holdings
- 20:26together. Exactly.
- 20:28The proposal is for Hertz's vast physical infrastructure to serve
- 20:32as the logistical backbone for Uber's future autonomous vehicle
- 20:36fleet. Oh man, think of the synergy
- 20:38there. It's wild.
- 20:40Uber has the routing software, the algorithmic pricing and the
- 20:43massive consumer network. Hertz has the physical
- 20:46maintenance bays, the airport lots and the institutional fleet
- 20:49management expertise. So if they pair up.
- 20:51If they pair up, it massively increases the daily vehicle
- 20:55utilization rate for Hertz and completely rewires the unit
- 20:58economics of the traditional rental business.
- 21:00Wow. So what does this all mean when
- 21:02we step back and look at the entire $13.71 billion picture?
- 21:07Because you have a ortfolio of justice, A few heavily
- 21:10concentrated ositions ranging from ristine tech monopolies to
- 21:14highly distressed rental car turnarounds.
- 21:17Yet somehow it is built to withstand almost any
- 21:19macroeconomic shock. It truly is a master class in
- 21:21structural resilience. If you look closely, this Q
- 21:2412026 portfolio doesn't rely on successfully predicting GDP
- 21:28growth or inflation. No, it is entirely all weather.
- 21:32If the global economy tightens, inflation stays high, and
- 21:35capital becomes scarce, the digital monopolies of Microsoft
- 21:38and Meta just keep printing billions in free cash flow and
- 21:41taking market share from weaker competitors.
- 21:44Right. But if the economy slows down
- 21:46and central banks forced to drop interest rates, the heavily
- 21:49leveraged physical asset side of the barbell, Brookfield, Howard
- 21:53Hughes and even Hertz, will see their massive interest expenses
- 21:57plummet, causing the equity value of their underlying hard
- 22:00assets to explode. It's GDP agnostic and interest
- 22:04rate agnostic that is the genius of separating risk from stock
- 22:08price volatility and focusing entirely on business
- 22:11fundamentals. You know, going through all
- 22:13these sources leaves me with one final thought to ponder.
- 22:15What's that? We just spent a lot of time
- 22:17looking at how Ackman balances the physical monopolies of a
- 22:21real estate giant like Howard Hughes against the digital
- 22:24monopolies of a hyper scaler like Amazon Web Services.
- 22:27Barbell, right? But as our entire global economy
- 22:30moves to the cloud, at what point do we stop viewing these
- 22:34massive tech platforms? It's just, you know, software
- 22:37companies and start valuing them as the literal foundational
- 22:41utilities of the 21st century like.
- 22:43Water or electricity? Just like we view power grids,
- 22:46water systems and prime real estate.
- 22:48Because if Amazon and Microsoft are the new utility companies,
- 22:51it really changes how you look at the price of that
- 22:53foundational real estate, doesn't it?