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There Are 5,000+ Pedophiles Working In The U.S. Government · The conspiracy

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Speaker 1: Keeping Them Honest, and I potentially one hundreds of military
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Speaker 1: employees and contractors who may have bought online but haven't
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Speaker 1: been prosecuted or even in some cases investigated. That's right,
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Speaker 1: you heard me, as many seventeen hundred names according to
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Speaker 1: a US senator on a list of fifty two hundred
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Speaker 1: from an internet sting operation overlooked the first time around
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Speaker 1: four years ago.
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Speaker 2: On January sixth, twenty eleven, Anderson Cooper went live on
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Speaker 2: his CNN show Keeping Them Honest with US Senator Chuck
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Speaker 2: Grassley publicly exposing an overlooked internet sting operation from two
0:30
Speaker 2: thousand and six, five years prior that was being reopened,
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Speaker 2: which previously had discovered approximately five thousand, two hundred government
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Speaker 2: employees and contractors working for the United States government who
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Speaker 2: had purchased.
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Speaker 3: Or as we're going to call it. For the remainder of.
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Speaker 2: This episode, most of these individuals were from the Department
0:51
Speaker 2: of Defense and had army or fleet addresses and ZIP codes.
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Speaker 3: Out of those.
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Speaker 2: Five thousand, two hundred names, only three thousand, five hundred
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Speaker 2: of them were cross checked or investigated further. The remaining
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Speaker 2: names were never touched. Out of those three thousand, five
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Speaker 2: hundred names who were cross checked. Only two hundred and
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Speaker 2: sixty four employees or contractors of the Secretary of Defense
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Speaker 2: and National Security Agency were identified, and only approximately fifty
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Speaker 2: two of those names were investigated at all. So keep
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Speaker 2: that in mind. Over five thousand, two hundred predators were
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Speaker 2: found to be working for the United States government, and
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Speaker 2: out of those five thousand, two hundred predators, only fifty
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Speaker 2: two of them were investigated at all. The operation, known
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Speaker 2: as Operation Flicker, ended eight months later with only a
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Speaker 2: handful of prosecutions. But what happened to the other thousands
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Speaker 2: of government employees or contractors who were identified as having
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Speaker 2: purchased using their own private accounts well. According to a
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Speaker 2: Pentagon spokesman, Operation Flicker originally ended less than a year
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Speaker 2: after it started due to a quote lack of resources.
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Speaker 1: Only now are they supposedly getting a second look, and
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Speaker 1: only to pressure from investigative reporters and the US Center
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Speaker 1: Republican Charles Grasslay Pentagon story began in two thousand and
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Speaker 1: six and Immigration and Customers Enforcement DING operation called Project Flicker,
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Speaker 1: produced payment records of about fifty two hundred people, many
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Speaker 1: of whom provided army or fleet ZIP codes or military
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Speaker 1: email addresses. Subsequently, the Pentagon's investigative branch, DCIS began going
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Speaker 1: through the ICE list to identify who actually was a
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Speaker 1: DoD employee or a contractor. The investigation, however, only ran
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Speaker 1: for eight months and only crosscheck some thirty five hundred
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Speaker 1: names for Pentagon.
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Speaker 4: Ties, according to a senator.
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Speaker 1: According to DCIS documents revealed in a Freedom of Information
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Speaker 1: Act request, out of that thirty five hundred, investigators uncovered
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Speaker 1: two hundred and sixty four employees or contractors, including staffers
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Speaker 1: for the Secretary of Defense and contractors at the NSA.
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Speaker 1: Nine people had top security clearances, but only about twenty
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Speaker 1: percent of those two hundred and sixty four people were
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Speaker 1: completely investigated. Fewer still were prosecuted, and after about eight
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Speaker 1: months the entire probe was halted. It left about seventeen
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Speaker 1: hundred names totally unchecked, seventeen hundred alleged customers, an unknown
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Speaker 1: number of whom may still work in some capacity for
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Speaker 1: the Defense Department. Late last summer, after investigations by The
3:08
Speaker 1: Boston Globe and Yahoo News reveal the figures, a Pentagon
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Speaker 1: spokesman promised to reopen the investigation, conceding that DCIS had
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Speaker 1: stopped due to lack of resources. DCIS says it is
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Speaker 1: now revisiting all fifty two hundred names, telling Cenator Grassley's
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Speaker 1: staff they've now identified three hundred and two employees or staffers.
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Speaker 1: The Pentagon's ig telling us, and I quote any suggestion
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Speaker 1: that the DoD Office of Inspector General or its Criminal
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Speaker 1: Investigative Arm, the DCIS is not taking the operation flicker
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Speaker 1: and that issued pre you seriously is in error. Senator
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Speaker 1: Grassley says he is still not getting the cooperation he
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Speaker 1: needs from this Pentagon. I spoke to him earlier. Center Grassley,
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Speaker 1: you were told that fifty two hundred Defense Department employees
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Speaker 1: had allegedly purchased and yet you're saying only thirty five
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Speaker 1: hundred of those names were cross checked by Defense investigator
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Speaker 1: to see if they were really DoD personnel. That's mind boggling.
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Speaker 3: Why weren't all of them crosscheck?
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Speaker 4: Well, we don't have an answer to that question, but
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Speaker 4: it's quite obvious that the other seventeen hundred should it
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Speaker 4: be crosscheck. And that's one of the answers to my
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Speaker 4: questions that I want answered. And the implication of our
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Speaker 4: question is they ought to be crosscheck. We ought to
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Speaker 4: find out because we're talking about not just general here,
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Speaker 4: we're talking about and taking that down is a crime.
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Speaker 4: And also there's an added factor here considering the fact
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Speaker 4: that there's a lot of national security information that the
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Speaker 4: world shouldn't know that a lot of times foreign operatives
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Speaker 4: will use this sort of criminal activity to blackmail to
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Speaker 4: get information. So there's a lot of things here that
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Speaker 4: are involved. Because it's a Defense department issue as opposed
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Speaker 4: to any other department of government.
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Speaker 1: I mean, if your numbers are correct, seventeen hundred people
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Speaker 1: out there who allegedly purchase we don't know if they
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Speaker 1: were ever crosscheck or investigated, right, that's true.
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Speaker 4: And there's been some other names in the hundreds where
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Speaker 4: the names have actually been given out that we don't
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Speaker 4: know what's going to be done about them. Now there's
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Speaker 4: some reason to believe that it's a criminal act. The
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Speaker 4: case it's been so far since has happened that they
5:08
Speaker 4: could be stale. Maybe you can't have criminal prosecution, but
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Speaker 4: we would be looking at administrative action to be taken
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Speaker 4: against these people. And I want to know who they
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Speaker 4: are and what administrative actions being taken.
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Speaker 1: Yeah, because I mean, what's even worth startling is that
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Speaker 1: of the three hundred and two people confirmed as DoD
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Speaker 1: personnel or contractors, only seventy of them were actually investigated.
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Speaker 1: I mean, how is it possible that all of them
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Speaker 1: weren't investigated.
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Speaker 4: Well, here's I think the thing that overrides everything you
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Speaker 4: just ask, and that is we ask criminal investigators in
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Speaker 4: the Division of Defense that does that the extent to
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Speaker 4: what supervisors of these people knew that this was going
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Speaker 4: And the criminal investigators couldn't even answer that question for
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Speaker 4: us when we had a briefing from that.
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Speaker 1: So wait a minute, So you're saying, we don't even
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Speaker 1: know if the supervisors of these people were told that
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Speaker 1: their you know, employees may have downloaded.
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Speaker 4: That's the question that my staff asked of the criminal investigators,
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Speaker 4: and they could not answer the question whether or not
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Speaker 4: supervisors had been informed of this. And if supervisors don't
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Speaker 4: know about it, you know, it's a bad environment that
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Speaker 4: things like this can happen in the first place, and
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Speaker 4: worse that it's a criminal act when things are downloaded.
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Speaker 1: Until you started raising this issue, I mean, this investigation
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Speaker 1: was closed by the Defense Department. They only investigated for
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Speaker 1: about eight months. Do you think the Pentagon just didn't
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Speaker 1: take this seriously.
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Speaker 4: Well, it's quite obvious that they didn't take it seriously,
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Speaker 4: because it wasn't only that I was asking the questions.
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Speaker 4: It wasn't until it started getting questions from people like
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Speaker 4: you who are journalists that this got their attention and
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Speaker 4: we got any consideration and reopening of this in the
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Speaker 4: first place.
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Speaker 1: Well, one of your staffers told us that getting information
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Speaker 1: from the Defense Department on this has been like pulling teeth.
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Speaker 3: Is that how you describe it.
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Speaker 4: Oh, I've been involved in oversight of the Defense Department
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Speaker 4: for almost all the years I've been in the United
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Speaker 4: States Senate, and it's very difficult to get from a
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Speaker 4: lot of bureaucracies, but it's quite more difficult in the
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Speaker 4: Defense Department.
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Speaker 2: This is an operation that nobody here in America has
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Speaker 2: ever really heard of, and that's because nothing ever came
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Speaker 2: of it. You had over five thousand, two hundred identified
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Speaker 2: predators working for the United States government that all escaped justice.
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Speaker 2: That's what we're looking at.
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Speaker 3: Today on the show.
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Speaker 2: And be prepared because this is going to be an
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Speaker 2: extremely disturbing, extremely deep dive as always with this show.
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Speaker 2: If you want to research this case, yourself. I use
7:26
Speaker 2: the resources that we use to construct this script in
7:29
Speaker 2: a document in the description of the show. All parties
7:32
Speaker 2: are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.
7:35
Speaker 2: And I do not intend on doing anything to myself
7:37
Speaker 2: going anywhere or you know, you know what I'm trying
7:40
Speaker 2: to say here anytime in the near future. Without further ado,
7:43
Speaker 2: Welcome to the Conspiracy Files. So you guys know that
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Speaker 2: I absolutely hate predators. They are some of the worst
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Speaker 2: things that have ever been created on Earth. I don't
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Speaker 2: even know how to phrase that properly, but I have
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Speaker 2: a hatred of these people, especially when they're enabled by
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Speaker 2: governments worldwide to continue with their crimes. I mean, you
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Speaker 2: see it in England all the time, you see it
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Speaker 2: in Canada all the time. You even see it here
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Speaker 2: in America. These people are caught doing the most egregious things,
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Speaker 2: some of the most horrific crimes against children that you
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Speaker 2: can possibly imagine. These people are caught with thousands of
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Speaker 2: videos or images, they're convicted of targeting minors for years
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Speaker 2: on end, and then they're given like two years in
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Speaker 2: prison and they're loose back into society. Many times, these
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Speaker 2: same people who you know serve a minuscule sentence and
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Speaker 2: then are released back into society. They end up reoffending,
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Speaker 2: and they end up hurting more kids. And that's just
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Speaker 2: absolutely unacceptable to me because I don't know, I just
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Speaker 2: feel like people don't talk about these sorts of things enough.
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Speaker 2: There isn't enough awareness raised around these issues. And that's
8:53
Speaker 2: a huge part of why I started this channel in
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Speaker 2: the first place, was to expose the massive amounts of
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Speaker 2: predators that in today's society. You know, I hate government corruption.
9:03
Speaker 2: I've had my own experiences with it. I know that
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Speaker 2: it's very very real. I know that money can buy
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Speaker 2: anything in this world. But it really makes no sense
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Speaker 2: to me why the US government has for such a
9:13
Speaker 2: long time allowed crimes like the ones we're going to
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Speaker 2: talk about today to happen without any repercussions. This is
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Speaker 2: an absolutely crazy story that every American needs to know,
9:23
Speaker 2: especially because it deals with our own government, our own country,
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Speaker 2: and the fact that they let these people just go
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Speaker 2: with a slap on the wrist. Now, I am a
9:32
Speaker 2: little more radical in my thinking where I think that
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Speaker 2: if you're caught with you should be imprisoned the same
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Speaker 2: amount of time that a person who commits a crime
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Speaker 2: against a child physically should be imprisoned for I don't
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Speaker 2: think there's any you know, differentiation between the two. If
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Speaker 2: you're purchasing or downloading that sort of a thing, you're
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Speaker 2: revictimizing the child every single time that either you download
9:55
Speaker 2: those images or you know, you share those images. So
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Speaker 2: I think that they should be treated the same. And
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Speaker 2: I think these sentences people who hurt children, they should
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Speaker 2: be given life sentences. These should be treated like murders
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Speaker 2: because for so many of these people, there's no rehabilitation.
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Speaker 2: They will get out and they will continue to offend
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Speaker 2: in the same ways that they have in the past.
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Speaker 2: So people all the time say, why do you cover
10:15
Speaker 2: stories like this? Why do you talk about this so much?
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Speaker 2: And blah blah blah. People online saying creepy, that's really
10:21
Speaker 2: a weird comment that I've gotten. Oh he's creepy for
10:24
Speaker 2: talking about this stuff. Well, no one's talking about this stuff,
10:27
Speaker 2: and we need to talk about this stuff. It needs
10:30
Speaker 2: to be more normalized that larger creators share stories like this,
10:34
Speaker 2: because otherwise you're letting them win. We're letting those people
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Speaker 2: win if we just sit back and say, ah, it's
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Speaker 2: too disturbing, it's too gross, it's too creepy.
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Speaker 3: He's creepy for talking about that. That's horrible.
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Speaker 2: And there's also people that I've seen in my comment
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Speaker 2: section saying that I'm trying to make money off of
10:50
Speaker 2: victims and I'm abusing and exploiting these stories and children's names.
10:55
Speaker 2: I'm trying to raise awareness. Now, the monetization thing on
10:58
Speaker 2: the videos is a whole differ diferent thing. Not only
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Speaker 2: do I get frequently demonetized, but I have videos completely
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Speaker 2: removed by YouTube. So there has to be a level
11:06
Speaker 2: of censorship if you're watching on this platform, because that's
11:09
Speaker 2: just the rules. You have to play by the rules.
11:11
Speaker 2: I have a whole team of people that work for me.
11:13
Speaker 2: I have editors, I have script writers and researchers. So
11:16
Speaker 2: it's not just me writing these scripts and putting these
11:18
Speaker 2: things out. There's a whole team and a production that's
11:21
Speaker 2: helping to bring these stories to light.
11:23
Speaker 3: People that I.
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Speaker 2: Consider are joining me on this journey, people that have
11:27
Speaker 2: chosen to write about these things and help research them
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Speaker 2: for heroic reasons. So there's so much that goes on
11:33
Speaker 2: behind the scenes of the show. But I really I
11:36
Speaker 2: just feel like this is what whether it's God or
11:38
Speaker 2: a higher power, somebody has called me to try to
11:41
Speaker 2: use my platforms to expose these things because I've put
11:44
Speaker 2: so much work into growing all my social media's and
11:48
Speaker 2: I've devoted my life to this career. And I know
11:51
Speaker 2: that this is a controversial spin and a way to turn,
11:54
Speaker 2: but I just feel no one talks about this enough.
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Speaker 3: On TikTok.
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Speaker 2: I've been talking about these things for years now, literally years.
12:00
Speaker 2: I've been posting at least four or five videos a
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Speaker 2: week exposing child predators. So this is nothing new, but
12:06
Speaker 2: this is one of the stories that actually radicalized me
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Speaker 2: to want to start talking about this stuff more.
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Speaker 4: So.
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Speaker 3: Yeah, this one's a doozy.
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Speaker 2: Let's just uh, just be prepared without further ado, let's
12:15
Speaker 2: get right into it. So remember Operation Flicker. It was
12:18
Speaker 2: in two thousand and six they identified those five two
12:22
Speaker 2: hundred names. Only around fifty or so people were actually investigated,
12:26
Speaker 2: way less than fifty were ever convicted of any crimes,
12:29
Speaker 2: and then it just went away. Then you get to
12:30
Speaker 2: that news report with Anderson Cooper talking about this. It's
12:33
Speaker 2: really one of the only things that you can find
12:35
Speaker 2: online discussing Operation Flicker. But a second look at that
12:39
Speaker 2: very list in twenty eleven increased the cross check number
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Speaker 2: from two hundred and sixty four to three hundred and two.
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Speaker 2: Out of those names, only seventy people were investigated, with
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Speaker 2: no answers as to why the remaining two hundred and
12:52
Speaker 2: thirty two people were not. During Keeping Them Honest, that
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Speaker 2: segment that Anderson Cooper aired talking about Operation Flicker, Cooper
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Speaker 2: stated that the case was only reopened after so many
13:02
Speaker 2: years because of Senator Chuck Grassley's interest in the lack
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Speaker 2: of investigation and pressure from investigative journalists like himself Anderson Cooper. Still, though,
13:11
Speaker 2: Chuck Grassley stated that getting answers from criminal investigators in
13:14
Speaker 2: the Division of Defense during briefs was like quote pulling
13:17
Speaker 2: teeth and they never answered any crucial questions that were asked.
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Speaker 2: And then after that one live segment on CNN, the
13:23
Speaker 2: story was completely dropped and we never heard anything about
13:27
Speaker 2: Operation Flicker again in mainstream media. What happened to Operation
13:31
Speaker 2: Flicker and why was something as serious as thousands of
13:34
Speaker 2: United States government employees and contractors purchasing using their official
13:40
Speaker 2: government credentials swept under the rug. Who was covering for
13:44
Speaker 2: these predators and why. The Department of Defense stated that
13:47
Speaker 2: they didn't have enough evidence to prosecute most of the
13:50
Speaker 2: people identified, but the investigation documents that were released in
13:53
Speaker 2: November two thousand and nine show anything but a.
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Speaker 3: Lack of evidence.
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Speaker 2: So we have to talk about what Operation flick or
14:00
Speaker 2: was to really dive into the story. Operation Flicker was
14:03
Speaker 2: a series of different investigations that included small lists of
14:06
Speaker 2: suspects each were counted in their documents. According to the
14:09
Speaker 2: released investigation documents, only ten men were convicted or given
14:14
Speaker 2: any type of punishment out of the two hundred and
14:16
Speaker 2: sixty four government employees or contractors who were cross checked
14:20
Speaker 2: and fully identified as having purchased immaterials in the past.
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Speaker 2: This low number is incredibly concerning, especially given that they
14:29
Speaker 2: started out with five thousand plus names that were a
14:32
Speaker 2: match of the criteria that they were looking for, which
14:34
Speaker 2: included working in some fashion for the United States government
14:38
Speaker 2: and somehow being involved at any point along the way
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Speaker 2: in either viewing, downloading, or distributing immaterials on the web. Now,
14:47
Speaker 2: investigators may believe they did their due diligence in investigating
14:50
Speaker 2: these cases, but even the cases that ended in some
14:53
Speaker 2: sort of punishment had their issues too. On May twenty ninth,
14:56
Speaker 2: two thousand and seven, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service also
15:00
Speaker 2: known as DCIS out of Arlington, Virginia, initiated Operation Flicker
15:05
Speaker 2: based on information provided to them by the Assistant US
15:08
Speaker 2: Attorney at the time, Gerald Smogola. Smogla stated that the
15:11
Speaker 2: US Immigration and Custom Enforcements also known as ICE, had
15:15
Speaker 2: conducted a national investigation that identified over five thousand individuals
15:20
Speaker 2: who had subscribed to established websites. So these are people
15:24
Speaker 2: who they discovered had actually given their personal credentials, their
15:28
Speaker 2: credit card information over to dark web websites that had
15:32
Speaker 2: videos and photographs of children from baby age to toddlers
15:37
Speaker 2: and teenagers being graphically and repeatedly, sometimes violently on film. Now,
15:44
Speaker 2: after looking into those names that list of five thousand individuals,
15:47
Speaker 2: Smogla grew suspicious. He wanted DCIS to specifically identify anyone
15:52
Speaker 2: identified in that list if they were Department of Defense personnel. Now,
15:56
Speaker 2: DCIS pulled information from the Department of Defenses in Employee
16:00
Speaker 2: Interactive Data System and the Joint Personnel Adjudication Systems to
16:04
Speaker 2: identify those affiliated with the DoD One Man in particular,
16:08
Speaker 2: whose name was redacted was a direct match. For reference's sake,
16:11
Speaker 2: we'll call him John Doe. According to their records, John
16:14
Speaker 2: Doe was an employee of Oracle Corporation, a multinational computer
16:18
Speaker 2: software company who had a contract with the National Security
16:21
Speaker 2: Agency of the DoD. He also worked a position that
16:24
Speaker 2: held a top secret clearance. Smoglas said that John Doe
16:28
Speaker 2: was also identified in a previous ICE operation that collected
16:32
Speaker 2: information on subscribers who once again subscribed to websites that
16:36
Speaker 2: distributed materials. So this guy, this was his second time
16:40
Speaker 2: being identified as a predator. Now, out of the four
16:43
Speaker 2: hundred names who appeared from Virginia in this previous operation,
16:46
Speaker 2: John Doe himself was the largest buyer, having purchased subscriptions
16:51
Speaker 2: to twenty one different services or websites that distributed During
16:56
Speaker 2: Operation Flicker, they discovered four more subscriptions that John Doe
17:00
Speaker 2: had himself, meaning that he subscribed to twenty five different
17:03
Speaker 2: services or websites that were peddling this disgusting material depicting
17:08
Speaker 2: the graphic of children. On June twentieth, two thousand and seven,
17:12
Speaker 2: both of John Doe's computers were released to investigators for
17:16
Speaker 2: forensic analysis. They suspended John Doe's employee access and placed
17:20
Speaker 2: him on administrative leave with pay. Weirdly enough, of course,
17:23
Speaker 2: if you let the predator go, kind of make sure
17:25
Speaker 2: he's getting paid right well. The next day, on June
17:28
Speaker 2: twenty first, two thousand and seven, agents executed a search
17:31
Speaker 2: warrant on John's residence and interviewed him. He admitted two
17:34
Speaker 2: agents that he had been interested in over the last
17:38
Speaker 2: three years, and that he had spent approximately sixty dollars
17:41
Speaker 2: every month on different websites across the web to purchase it.
17:44
Speaker 2: He also admitted that he frequently purchased cornography related to
17:49
Speaker 2: adults and animals, and that his wife had no knowledge
17:54
Speaker 2: that he was doing any of this behind her back.
17:56
Speaker 2: Another search warrant discovered more illegal materials, and John DOEH
18:00
Speaker 2: was officially then indicted in the US District Court Eastern
18:03
Speaker 2: District of Virginia on March twenty seventh, two thousand and eight,
18:06
Speaker 2: on two counts of attempted receipt of and possession of
18:11
Speaker 2: John Doe then fled the United States. Yes you heard
18:14
Speaker 2: that right. He escaped, but was eventually arrested in Libya
18:17
Speaker 2: on September tenth, two thousand and eight, before being extradited
18:20
Speaker 2: back to the States. No other information was included about
18:23
Speaker 2: John Doe, including any sentencing information. Did he get the
18:27
Speaker 2: prison time he deserved? Maybe, but it wasn't included in
18:30
Speaker 2: the investigative reports for some reason. So that's where the
18:33
Speaker 2: story ends. So they found that this guy subscribed to
18:35
Speaker 2: twenty five different than distribution websites or services. This guy
18:40
Speaker 2: was a serial predator who got sick deep pleasure in
18:44
Speaker 2: victimizing children.
18:45
Speaker 3: Who knows.
18:45
Speaker 2: I mean, that's got to be an ungodly amount of
18:49
Speaker 2: that this guy downloaded and stored on his devices. There
18:51
Speaker 2: was no information about that either. He probably had terabytes,
18:55
Speaker 2: hundreds thousands of photos and videos depicting this sick But
18:58
Speaker 2: then the reports that were relieved, they don't have any
19:00
Speaker 2: information about him being sentenced, no information about him being tried.
19:04
Speaker 2: It makes you wonder did he ever actually face any
19:07
Speaker 2: repercussions or was he given a slap on the wrist.
19:10
Speaker 2: Why would they hide his name if he was actually
19:12
Speaker 2: convicted of any of these crimes. Why would they protect
19:14
Speaker 2: him in that way? Why would they redact his information
19:16
Speaker 2: from the reports? If he was really guilty and he
19:19
Speaker 2: was convicted of the crimes. I mean, one would assume
19:21
Speaker 2: a guy, a super predator like that would have to
19:24
Speaker 2: get on the registry, right, the so registry. But there's
19:27
Speaker 2: no information. Weird, but we have to move on to
19:29
Speaker 2: another offender. On August first, two thousand and seven, a
19:32
Speaker 2: search warrant revealed ninety three documents, eight thousand, four hundred
19:36
Speaker 2: pictures and two hundred movies, all photos and movies depicting
19:42
Speaker 2: on the computer of a man named Leland Fitzpatrick. On
19:45
Speaker 2: September twenty fourth, two thousand and eight, Fitzpatrick was arrested,
19:48
Speaker 2: and on November twelfth, two thousand and eight, Fitzpatrick was
19:51
Speaker 2: indicted on charges of the receipt of and the possession of.
19:55
Speaker 2: Once again, Leland Fitzpatrick was an employee of the United
19:59
Speaker 2: States government. He had been identified by Operation Flicker, and
20:02
Speaker 2: on February ninth, two thousand and nine, Fitzpatrick pled guilty
20:05
Speaker 2: to the receipt of, but the count of possession of
20:09
Speaker 2: was dismissed without any explanation in the release documents. Maybe
20:13
Speaker 2: he was given a plea deal, but that's hard to
20:16
Speaker 2: even imagine. This guy had over eight thousand, four hundred
20:20
Speaker 2: photos and over two hundred videos. Think of the amount
20:24
Speaker 2: of children that had to be victimized to create that stuff,
20:28
Speaker 2: hundreds thousands of children, and he's not even charged or
20:31
Speaker 2: found guilty of the possession of it, even though they
20:34
Speaker 2: found it in his possession and they stayed it in
20:36
Speaker 2: the documents. Ultimately, on May first, two thousand and nine,
20:39
Speaker 2: Leland Fitzpatrick was sentenced to sixty months in prison, sixty
20:43
Speaker 2: month supervised release, and ordered to pay a one hundred
20:46
Speaker 2: dollars fee. Hardly any information was given about Leland Fitzpatrick
20:50
Speaker 2: except for his name. It's unknown exactly who he worked for,
20:54
Speaker 2: but according to some online records, he currently resides in
20:57
Speaker 2: Fairfax Station, Virginia, right outside of Washington, DC. And that's
21:00
Speaker 2: what I'm talking about here. Here's a guy who has
21:03
Speaker 2: thousands of photos and videos. This is a guy that
21:05
Speaker 2: clearly had a sick obsession with this stuff and he
21:08
Speaker 2: stockpiled it. Here's a guy who is responsible partly for
21:12
Speaker 2: the victimization of thousands of children, and he's given sixty
21:16
Speaker 2: months in prison. That's five years in prison for all
21:19
Speaker 2: those kids that he enabled these people to continue victimizing.
21:23
Speaker 2: If that doesn't make you sick to your stomach, I
21:25
Speaker 2: don't know what would. But we have to move on.
21:27
Speaker 2: Another man identified was Christopher Oswald. Christopher Oswald was a
21:31
Speaker 2: telephone maintenance worker at Naval Air Station in Point Magoo, California.
21:36
Speaker 2: He was arrested on August six, two thousand and eight,
21:39
Speaker 2: after a California State search warrant executed by the Ventura
21:42
Speaker 2: County Sheriff's Office High Tech Task Force, ICE, Camarillo and
21:46
Speaker 2: DCIS revealed that Christopher was in possession of thousands of images.
21:52
Speaker 2: So once again they got a tip that this guy
21:54
Speaker 2: was subscribing to these websites, They executed search warrants and
21:57
Speaker 2: they found that he had thousands of images his possession.
22:00
Speaker 2: He was eventually convicted on two counts of possession of
22:04
Speaker 2: It's like a joke and sentenced to drum roll please,
22:09
Speaker 2: sixteen months in prison and registration with the National Registry.
22:13
Speaker 3: Once again, a guy.
22:14
Speaker 2: That's responsible for the victimization of could be dozens, could
22:17
Speaker 2: be hundreds, could be thousands of children, sixteen months in prison. However,
22:22
Speaker 2: during that same investigation that discovered Christopher Oswald, twelve other
22:26
Speaker 2: individuals who had ties to the Department of Defense were
22:29
Speaker 2: also suspected of having downloaded or disseminated materials on the Internet.
22:34
Speaker 2: And now this is where it gets crazy. So authorities
22:37
Speaker 2: actually discovered twelve other people related to Christopher Oswald, whether
22:41
Speaker 2: they were friends or co workers, that all had ties
22:44
Speaker 2: to the Department of Defense, and they found that all
22:47
Speaker 2: those people had either traded to Christopher, they had visited
22:51
Speaker 2: the same websites to download some of the same materials
22:54
Speaker 2: as Christopher. They all had been involved in some way
22:57
Speaker 2: or another in the downloading and trade of materials. But
23:01
Speaker 2: three of those cases were dismissed for a lack of evidence,
23:04
Speaker 2: even though according to the documents, they found enough evidence
23:07
Speaker 2: to suspect these people, and for the remaining nine individuals,
23:11
Speaker 2: whom they actually believed they had enough evidence to prosecute,
23:14
Speaker 2: it was determined that the probable cause for their search
23:17
Speaker 2: warrants was stale and that current evidence was not available.
23:20
Speaker 2: It was also determined, according to the investigation documents, that
23:23
Speaker 2: the referral originally indicated that these suspects used their military
23:28
Speaker 2: email accounts to register for or illegally purchase materials. The
23:33
Speaker 2: use of a dot mil account or a military email account,
23:36
Speaker 2: along with any military service connection, was considered a sufficient
23:40
Speaker 2: probable cause to initiate an investigation. Interestingly, enough though investigators
23:45
Speaker 2: later on recanted this statement and claimed that the remaining
23:48
Speaker 2: suspects actually didn't possess any dot mil accounts. And yeah,
23:52
Speaker 2: those nine guys who they had enough evidence to lock
23:55
Speaker 2: up for the possession and downloading of they were all
23:58
Speaker 2: cut loose. So I did the military later claim that
24:02
Speaker 2: no military emails were used when this was the actual
24:05
Speaker 2: basis for opening the entire investigation in the first place.
24:08
Speaker 2: It's an odd discrepancy on their part. If it was
24:11
Speaker 2: a discrepancy in the first place, this is their reason
24:13
Speaker 2: as to why they weren't further investigated, But is it
24:16
Speaker 2: the real reason? I mean, it's bizarre. The entire investigation
24:19
Speaker 2: into these twelve individuals was because they found that these guys,
24:23
Speaker 2: who all worked for the Department of Defense, they had
24:25
Speaker 2: military emails. They found that these twelve emails were linked to,
24:29
Speaker 2: you know, either subscribing to a website that has available
24:33
Speaker 2: for purchas or download or the people who had the
24:35
Speaker 2: emails actually downloaded these materials. So they identified twelve emails
24:40
Speaker 2: belonging to twelve Department of Defense employees. They stated that
24:43
Speaker 2: in the warrants. They stated that in the documents, they
24:45
Speaker 2: wrote it down and certified everything, and then later on
24:47
Speaker 2: they backtracked and said, oh, these people didn't even have accounts.
24:51
Speaker 3: But why, that's my question.
24:52
Speaker 2: But once again, we just have to move on because
24:54
Speaker 2: there are no real answers here. Ronald Shanky was the
24:57
Speaker 2: first sergeant for the Minneapolis Recruiting comp Company, Minneapolis Recruiting Battalion,
25:02
Speaker 2: and the US Army Recruiting Command for about one year
25:05
Speaker 2: prior to his retirement in two thousand and four. He
25:07
Speaker 2: was then hired as a civilian contractor for an affiliate
25:11
Speaker 2: of the Department of Defense. On May seventeenth, two thousand
25:14
Speaker 2: and five, Ronald was interviewed and asked for an attorney,
25:17
Speaker 2: shortly after becoming emotional. A search warrant was executed on
25:20
Speaker 2: that same day on Ronald's home, and two of his
25:22
Speaker 2: computers were seized by authorities, one being his work computer
25:26
Speaker 2: provided by the US Army Recruiting Command. The next year,
25:29
Speaker 2: on October fourth, two thousand and six, a grand jury
25:32
Speaker 2: indicted Ronald Shanky in Madison, Wisconsin on two counts of
25:35
Speaker 2: possessing and distributing involving minors. He was sentenced to one
25:41
Speaker 2: hundred and eight months in prison, followed by a supervised
25:44
Speaker 2: release for life registration as in a one hundred dollars
25:47
Speaker 2: criminal assessment payment. So once again you might think, you know,
25:51
Speaker 2: five six years is a long time, but compared to
25:53
Speaker 2: how many children have to be victimized to get that
25:56
Speaker 2: material onto that person's computer, it's not even close to
25:58
Speaker 2: enough for me. And it's another slap on the wrist
26:00
Speaker 2: for a DoD employee. And keep in mind, these are
26:03
Speaker 2: only like the few, the ten, however, many small amount
26:07
Speaker 2: of men that were actually convicted for these crimes. There
26:09
Speaker 2: were five two hundred plus people that were identified under
26:12
Speaker 2: the same circumstances that were you know, investigated or identified
26:17
Speaker 2: as a whole. Then you have Daniel Sweeney. Daniel Sweeney
26:20
Speaker 2: was active duty in the US Navy E six and
26:22
Speaker 2: worked at the Navy Yard in Washington, d C. At
26:25
Speaker 2: the time of his investigation in June two thousand and seven,
26:28
Speaker 2: after a search warrant discovered, he admitted to accessing that
26:32
Speaker 2: material while he was stationed on the USS Mason. According
26:36
Speaker 2: to Daniel, fellow sailors saw him looking at this graphic
26:40
Speaker 2: on the ship and they warned him to stop. Later on,
26:42
Speaker 2: though he was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia
26:46
Speaker 2: on two counts once again, two counts of attempted receipt
26:49
Speaker 2: of and the possession of it. Was sentenced to forty
26:53
Speaker 2: one months in prison, two hundred and forty months of
26:55
Speaker 2: supervised release, and one hundred dollars penalty. So here you
26:58
Speaker 2: have a sailor that's actually want these images and videos
27:01
Speaker 2: on a ship and he's watching it out in the open,
27:04
Speaker 2: and his fellow sailors are actually seeing him watch the stuff,
27:07
Speaker 2: and they're talking to him, and they eventually report him
27:09
Speaker 2: and he gets forty one months in prison. Think about that, guys,
27:12
Speaker 2: that's less than four years. But we got to move on.
27:15
Speaker 2: Cameron Campbell's occupation was not included in the investigation documents,
27:19
Speaker 2: but after he was caught receiving materials, he was sentenced
27:23
Speaker 2: in Alexandria, Virginia to sixty months in prison, so five years,
27:27
Speaker 2: sixty months of supervised release, and once again a one
27:30
Speaker 2: hundred dollars penalty assessment. Another guy caught was Paul Jones.
27:33
Speaker 2: Paul Jones's occupation was also redacted in the investigation documents,
27:38
Speaker 2: so it's unknown what his relation to the government exactly was.
27:42
Speaker 2: We just know that he worked for the government. After
27:44
Speaker 2: ICE obtained information confirming Paul Jones's subscriptions to known websites,
27:50
Speaker 2: agents from DCIS and ICE executed a search warrant on
27:53
Speaker 2: Paul Jones's residence on July twenty fifth, two thousand and seven,
27:57
Speaker 2: and obviously when they searched his stuff, they found tons
28:00
Speaker 2: of materials. He was then arrested and eventually sentenced to
28:04
Speaker 2: sixty months in prison, five years once again, one hundred
28:07
Speaker 2: and twenty months of supervised release, and required to pay
28:10
Speaker 2: a two thousand dollars restitution payment and one hundred dollars
28:13
Speaker 2: special assessment fee. So it's interesting. Something you'll notice here too,
28:16
Speaker 2: is that tons of these documents are redacted. So they
28:19
Speaker 2: redacted this guy's occupation, they redacted the last guy's occupation,
28:23
Speaker 2: They redact this and that, they redact the names, they
28:25
Speaker 2: redact this, and they redact you know, where they're from,
28:28
Speaker 2: and the charges and the exact details. Why all they're redacting.
28:31
Speaker 2: Why the protecting of these predators. Who gives a if
28:34
Speaker 2: they worked for the US government at some point, expose them.
28:37
Speaker 2: These people are scum of the earth. These people are
28:39
Speaker 2: worse than the scum on the bottom of my shoe.
28:42
Speaker 2: And the US government is providing them with a safety
28:44
Speaker 2: net for some reason and not telling us what their
28:47
Speaker 2: job was. Hm. In April of two thousand and six,
28:50
Speaker 2: ICE's Cybercrime Center Slash Child Exploitation Section began investigating a
28:55
Speaker 2: criminal organization that was operating a commercial website known as
29:00
Speaker 2: home Collection. The investigation revealed that the same organization was
29:04
Speaker 2: operating other distribution websites, totaling a number of eighteen websites.
29:10
Speaker 2: So they looked into this one website that was operating
29:13
Speaker 2: on the Dark Web selling these videos and images of children, teenagers, toddlers,
29:18
Speaker 2: even babies at times being on video and in photos.
29:22
Speaker 2: And when they looked at this one website, they found
29:24
Speaker 2: seventeen other websites that were run kind of by the
29:27
Speaker 2: same criminal syndicate that were all pushing out the same
29:30
Speaker 2: disgusting materials. And that investigation would eventually turn into Project Flicker,
29:35
Speaker 2: which came to be known colloquially as Operation Flicker. What
29:38
Speaker 2: we're talking about today, we got to talk about another guy.
29:41
Speaker 2: Christopher Stokes was a US government employee at the National
29:44
Speaker 2: Defense University in Norfolk, Virginia. He was caught making purchases
29:48
Speaker 2: from websites and later charged with possession of material containing
29:53
Speaker 2: and criminal forfeiture, which allows the government to seize your
29:56
Speaker 2: property after proper sentencing. He was sentenced to six months
30:00
Speaker 2: in prison, a lifetime of supervised release, and a payment
30:03
Speaker 2: of twelve thousand, five hundred dollars in fines. So at
30:07
Speaker 2: the very beginning, these were all you know, Operation Flickers
30:10
Speaker 2: started in two thousand and six, it really got going.
30:13
Speaker 2: And if you noticed, most of these convictions and these
30:16
Speaker 2: investigations really occurred in two thousand and six, two thousand
30:19
Speaker 2: and seven, two thousand and eight around that time period.
30:22
Speaker 2: And all these investigations at the start of Operation Flicker
30:25
Speaker 2: that ended in convictions initially made it look like the
30:27
Speaker 2: operation was going to produce some pretty productive results.
30:31
Speaker 3: But then you have to remember.
30:32
Speaker 2: That's that's all the people that were convicted of anything
30:34
Speaker 2: related to Operation Flicker, the people that I just listed
30:37
Speaker 2: and went through. But remember, in total, they identified five thousand,
30:40
Speaker 2: two hundred plus people working for the US government that
30:43
Speaker 2: were involved in these activities. So what prevented them from
30:46
Speaker 2: continuing this investigation and following up on the other thousands
30:50
Speaker 2: of suspects? Were they just finding out too much about
30:53
Speaker 2: too many government employees. If they put in the same
30:56
Speaker 2: amount of effort that they did on those first few
30:58
Speaker 2: cases to all the other suspects cases. What would have
31:01
Speaker 2: come of it with thousands of government employees and contractors
31:04
Speaker 2: have been terminated and prosecuted. For the entire world to
31:07
Speaker 2: see something as big as that would have absolutely shed
31:09
Speaker 2: a disturbing light on the American government, military, and the
31:13
Speaker 2: country as a whole. It could have wrecked the government
31:15
Speaker 2: on many different levels. And I doubt that they wanted
31:18
Speaker 2: that to happen. It definitely, you know, makes sense as
31:21
Speaker 2: to why they wouldn't want the world to see this. Oh,
31:23
Speaker 2: we got five thousand predator employees. Yeah, we're just the
31:27
Speaker 2: greatest country on earth.
31:28
Speaker 3: Look at us.
31:28
Speaker 2: We have all these thousands of predators working for us.
31:31
Speaker 2: It's not the best look. But are they really willing
31:34
Speaker 2: to allow these people to go free just to save face?
31:37
Speaker 2: Or maybe is it something darker? Were these people involved
31:39
Speaker 2: in other activities that they didn't want coming to light?
31:42
Speaker 2: Were their national security risks involved? Were some of these
31:45
Speaker 2: people agents or deeply embedded in things? So those are
31:48
Speaker 2: questions you have to ask because this doesn't make sense,
31:51
Speaker 2: And this section will really we're going to talk about
31:54
Speaker 2: some of the people that should have been prosecuted that
31:56
Speaker 2: just weren't so. On March fourteenth, two thousand and seven,
31:59
Speaker 2: the zens Contract Management Agency also known as DCMA, out
32:03
Speaker 2: of Hartford, Connecticut, remotely accessed a government workers computer after
32:07
Speaker 2: they had suspicions that he had been accessing Internet gambling
32:11
Speaker 2: websites at work. But what they discovered when they looked
32:14
Speaker 2: at this rogue employee's computer was far worse. His name
32:17
Speaker 2: was redacted throughout this release document, so we'll just call
32:20
Speaker 2: him John Doe number two. JD number two's government owned
32:23
Speaker 2: work computer when his boss has actually checked it out,
32:26
Speaker 2: contained images of what they thought was After taking a
32:30
Speaker 2: deeper look at it, forensic examiners had identified approximately forty
32:34
Speaker 2: thumbnail images on his computer, meaning that they've been viewed
32:37
Speaker 2: but not downloaded now. John Doe number two was interviewed
32:40
Speaker 2: on June twenty first, two thousand and seven, and admitted
32:43
Speaker 2: to playing games and accessing websites while he was at work,
32:46
Speaker 2: but he denied ever downloading any of it on his
32:49
Speaker 2: work computer. He also denied ever intending to view or
32:52
Speaker 2: possess materials. Despite this, though, he confessed to downloading approximately
32:57
Speaker 2: five hundred images on a memory ste stick from his
33:00
Speaker 2: home computer, and when asked if any of those images contained,
33:04
Speaker 2: he replied that some of the images might raise some
33:07
Speaker 2: eyebrows and might be quote questionable. The next day he
33:10
Speaker 2: handed over his memory stick to investigators, but none of
33:13
Speaker 2: the individuals in the images could be positively identified as children.
33:17
Speaker 2: A number of the images he had downloaded, though, depicted
33:19
Speaker 2: miners engaged in posing, and according to the reports, evaluations
33:25
Speaker 2: of the images indicated that the individuals were not preteen
33:28
Speaker 2: in age, but pubescent and developed females, some of who
33:32
Speaker 2: might be teenagers. As if that makes it any better, still,
33:35
Speaker 2: they were miners. I want to stress that they tried
33:38
Speaker 2: to say, oh, they might have been a little bit
33:39
Speaker 2: older looking. It's kind of gross that they put that
33:41
Speaker 2: kind of wording in the documents, But they were all
33:44
Speaker 2: still miners that they discovered on his memory stick images
33:47
Speaker 2: of miners doing so. On October eleventh, two thousand and seven,
33:52
Speaker 2: the US Attorney's Office randomly came forward and declined to
33:55
Speaker 2: prosecute John Doe number two for the possession of based
33:59
Speaker 2: upon an inability to determine the age or identity of
34:02
Speaker 2: the individuals depicted in the files. John Doe number two
34:06
Speaker 2: statement that he did not intend to possess. His cooperation
34:09
Speaker 2: in the investigation and the large number of other images
34:12
Speaker 2: that were not material worked in his favor. Overall, John
34:16
Speaker 2: Doe number two did indeed have actual images on his
34:20
Speaker 2: computer and flash drive, but most of the images weren't
34:23
Speaker 2: of underage teenagers, so he was innocent in their eyes. Also,
34:27
Speaker 2: he cooperated with their investigation and didn't mean to download
34:31
Speaker 2: images of young teenagers, which I guess his grounds for
34:34
Speaker 2: not arresting someone. John Doe number two ended up with
34:37
Speaker 2: only a thirty day suspension by DCMA for misuse of
34:40
Speaker 2: government time and resources, but nothing related to the viewing
34:44
Speaker 2: and downloading of which is a hardcore federal crime. They
34:48
Speaker 2: also attempted to recoup twenty thousand dollars from him to
34:51
Speaker 2: represent the dollar value of the time he spent on
34:53
Speaker 2: his work computer gaming during the work day, but that
34:56
Speaker 2: never happened. Basically, he got away scott free and was
34:59
Speaker 2: able to contain when you working for the government, as
35:01
Speaker 2: if nothing ever happened. You heard that right in the
35:04
Speaker 2: files it talks about this. They found those images depicting
35:07
Speaker 2: miners doing as they describe it. I don't know what
35:10
Speaker 2: the differentiation there is for them naked, and they found
35:15
Speaker 2: those images, They identified these images, and they also found
35:18
Speaker 2: that this guy was around on the job and he
35:20
Speaker 2: was wasting time and money, and he literally got suspended
35:24
Speaker 2: for thirty days and then was allowed to return to
35:26
Speaker 2: his job as if nothing had ever happened. It's really bizarre.
35:30
Speaker 2: Then you have Robert macciny Now. Shanky's investigation, who we
35:34
Speaker 2: discussed earlier led investigators to other perpetrators who were friends
35:38
Speaker 2: of his, including Steven H. McConaughey, Ronald Elmquist, and Robert macchiney.
35:43
Speaker 2: Hardly any information was given about Robert mcchiney other than
35:46
Speaker 2: the fact that he was included in the same investigation
35:49
Speaker 2: as Shanky, and he was indicted on December twentieth, two
35:52
Speaker 2: thousand and six, on charges, including charges of distributing those materials.
35:57
Speaker 2: The next year, he was sentenced to five years probation
36:00
Speaker 2: in Massachusetts state court. No prison time for distributing, only
36:04
Speaker 2: a few years of probation. It's hard to tell why
36:07
Speaker 2: they included little to no information about this investigation in
36:10
Speaker 2: the documents, but court records from the Massachusetts Superior Court
36:13
Speaker 2: give a little insight into mccinie's case. Chief Daniel Howder
36:17
Speaker 2: of the New Waterford, Ohio Police Department was conducting an
36:20
Speaker 2: undercover investigation into the trading of on the internet. Chief
36:24
Speaker 2: Howder posed as a fourteen year old girl under the
36:27
Speaker 2: screen name Tina Greeneyes fourteen and chatted with a man
36:30
Speaker 2: who was later identified as Robert macchiney. Believing the investigator
36:34
Speaker 2: was a young teenage girl. Robert then said some pretty
36:37
Speaker 2: disgusting things in their chats. Chief Howder later created a
36:40
Speaker 2: new screen name and participated in a chat room called
36:43
Speaker 2: Father's Chatting, and almost immediately he received another instant message
36:48
Speaker 2: from Robert mcciny wanting to see if Chief Howder had
36:50
Speaker 2: anything to trade him. Robert mcchini then emailed the chief
36:54
Speaker 2: a photograph of a prepubescent girl in a pose. Afterwards,
36:58
Speaker 2: Chief Howder issued a curtain warrant for records of his
37:01
Speaker 2: AOL account, which included approximately fifty images that had been
37:05
Speaker 2: sent and received. He was an explicit, hardcore serial child
37:10
Speaker 2: predator who made a hobby out of trading images and
37:13
Speaker 2: talking to miners on the Internet about things, yet he
37:17
Speaker 2: only received probation. This is all in the documents. This
37:20
Speaker 2: guy was found with fifty. He was caught in an
37:24
Speaker 2: undercover sting. He sent us to a chief who was
37:27
Speaker 2: under cover. He talked graphically to someone who he believed
37:31
Speaker 2: was fourteen, and he got probation. Now, where's the logic
37:34
Speaker 2: in that? But we have to move on. John Doe
37:36
Speaker 2: number three, another guy investigated in this whole thing, was
37:38
Speaker 2: identified as working as an employee at a local mall
37:42
Speaker 2: in McLean, Virginia. So it's unclear what his government job
37:45
Speaker 2: was at the time he was investigated, or if he
37:47
Speaker 2: was just a retired government worker. Still, he was included
37:51
Speaker 2: on the list of Department of Defense personnel that were
37:53
Speaker 2: involved in some way with Investigators had discovered that he
37:57
Speaker 2: made purchases on a website called desired Angles. Apparently, he
38:02
Speaker 2: said he had never downloaded any of the stuff, but
38:05
Speaker 2: stated his computer might contain images of random underage girls
38:09
Speaker 2: wearing some clothing. Still an incredibly odd thing to have
38:13
Speaker 2: on your computer, something that you know, in my opinion,
38:15
Speaker 2: should be criminal. But on April thirtieth, two thousand and eight,
38:17
Speaker 2: images from John Doe number three's computer were downloaded onto
38:21
Speaker 2: a CD and given to the United States Postal Inspection
38:24
Speaker 2: Service and the National Center for Missing and exploited children
38:27
Speaker 2: in Alexandria, Virginia to examine if the CD had any
38:31
Speaker 2: known child victims on it. As it turns out, files
38:34
Speaker 2: did contain images of previously identified child victims. Unfortunately, Assistant
38:39
Speaker 2: US Attorney Smogla declined to prosecute John Doe number three
38:43
Speaker 2: because the images identified on his computer were from a
38:46
Speaker 2: free space that's a quote, and did not constitute as possession. Additionally,
38:51
Speaker 2: they claimed that websites that he paid for and frequently
38:54
Speaker 2: clearly had images of teenage and young girls, but did
38:56
Speaker 2: not plainly advertise the website as a marketplace for as
39:00
Speaker 2: if that makes it acceptable. No further action was taken
39:03
Speaker 2: and John Doe number three's case was closed, giving him
39:06
Speaker 2: the freedom to live the rest of his life as
39:08
Speaker 2: an uncaught child predator.
39:09
Speaker 3: So that's right.
39:10
Speaker 2: Once again, they find some of the materials they link
39:13
Speaker 2: this guy to known child victims.
39:15
Speaker 3: They just let him go.
39:15
Speaker 2: Not even probation for this guy. He's out there right
39:18
Speaker 2: now here in America. He could be watching this video.
39:20
Speaker 2: He could be your neighbor.
39:21
Speaker 3: But we need to go.
39:22
Speaker 2: Back to twenty and eleven. What we talked about towards
39:25
Speaker 2: the beginning with Anderson cooper airing the report about Operation Flicker,
39:29
Speaker 2: Chuck Grassley becoming interested. In twenty and eleven, US Senator
39:33
Speaker 2: Chuck Grassley became personally interested in Operation Flicker and in
39:37
Speaker 2: the large gaps that he noticed in the investigations. It's
39:40
Speaker 2: also noted in the documents that a lot of the
39:42
Speaker 2: original investigations were stopped because ICE refused to cooperate and
39:47
Speaker 2: hand over evidence when they were asked to, which Chuck
39:49
Speaker 2: Grassley was rightly so very suspicious of. So under pressure
39:53
Speaker 2: from Grassley, the Pentagon agreed to reopen Operation Flicker and
39:57
Speaker 2: pursue the employees who were already identified, along with the
40:00
Speaker 2: approximate one thousand, seven hundred leads who had not been
40:04
Speaker 2: originally cross checked. But still no further arrests were made
40:08
Speaker 2: and no evidence of any new investigations was ever found.
40:11
Speaker 2: So that beg is the question. Did the Pentagon claim
40:15
Speaker 2: to have reopened Operation Flicker.
40:17
Speaker 3: And they just didn't do it? Well, that's exactly what
40:19
Speaker 3: it looks like.
40:20
Speaker 2: I mean, they say that they're reopening these cases, they're
40:22
Speaker 2: going to cross examined, they're gonna take a deeper, harder
40:25
Speaker 2: look at these predators who were in the United States
40:27
Speaker 2: government who got away with their crimes. But then nothing
40:29
Speaker 2: comes of it. No documents have ever been released showing
40:32
Speaker 2: that any new investigations were attempted. Freedom of Information Acts
40:36
Speaker 2: have revealed nothing, things that don't exist. There were no
40:39
Speaker 2: more prosecutions, no more indictments, literally nothing. It's just like saying,
40:43
Speaker 2: you know, oh, look all these people are really angry
40:45
Speaker 2: at the US government for not looking into these cases.
40:48
Speaker 2: Oh we're gonna look into these cases. Don't worry about us.
40:51
Speaker 2: Just kidding, we got them. They're just like they just
40:54
Speaker 2: didn't do it. Because you see, in twenty fifteen, four
40:58
Speaker 2: years after they said they were reopening this whole thing,
41:00
Speaker 2: several Freedom of Information Act requests were made to access
41:04
Speaker 2: additional documentation from the reopening in twenty eleven, but of course,
41:08
Speaker 2: the Department of Defense declined, claiming that they could not
41:12
Speaker 2: provide the request to documents because they involved quote open investigations.
41:16
Speaker 2: They claimed Operation Flicker was an open investigation although there
41:20
Speaker 2: had been zero activity with it for the last four years.
41:23
Speaker 2: It just doesn't add up. What exactly were they concealing
41:27
Speaker 2: And that's something that they'll do, honestly to keep files sealed. Oftentimes,
41:31
Speaker 2: with these freedom of Information Act requests, they'll say, oh,
41:35
Speaker 2: this is still an open investigation. If they're trying to
41:37
Speaker 2: cover something up, they'll find a loophole to make the
41:40
Speaker 2: investigation into whatever it is, whether it's a murder or
41:43
Speaker 2: a predator ring. They'll say, oh, it's still an open case,
41:46
Speaker 2: so we can't give this to you. It's just a
41:48
Speaker 2: way of saying like, we're not going to give this
41:49
Speaker 2: to you, and here's this tiny little technicality that lets
41:52
Speaker 2: us not give it to you. Gordon s Hedl, the
41:55
Speaker 2: Department of Defense's Inspector General, said in a statement to
41:58
Speaker 2: The Boston Globe in January twenty eleven, but his office
42:01
Speaker 2: was working aggressively to correct the mishandling of cases identified
42:05
Speaker 2: in Operation Flicker. In his first public statement regarding the matter,
42:09
Speaker 2: he said, quote, I can assure those with questions that
42:11
Speaker 2: my office is conducting an aggressive pursuit of anyone implicated
42:15
Speaker 2: an Operation Flicker, and that it is a key investigative
42:18
Speaker 2: priority end quote. But interestingly enough, less than a year later,
42:22
Speaker 2: he stepped down from his post in December twenty and eleven.
42:25
Speaker 2: You see, to this very day, twenty twenty five, it's
42:29
Speaker 2: unknown what exactly came of the reopening of Operation Flicker
42:33
Speaker 2: by Chuck Grassley or if it was successful in any way,
42:36
Speaker 2: And after Chuck Grassley went on CNN with Anderson Cooper,
42:40
Speaker 2: like in that clip that I showed you at the
42:41
Speaker 2: very beginning, nothing was really ever disclosed to the public again,
42:45
Speaker 2: and certainly it was never talked about in the media.
42:48
Speaker 3: So what the hell happened?
42:49
Speaker 2: Well, in twenty nineteen, some pretty disturbing information about the
42:53
Speaker 2: Department of Defense was dropped. Legislation was introduced by Representatives
42:57
Speaker 2: Abigail Spanberger and Mark Meadows to the use of DoD
43:01
Speaker 2: computer networks by users for obtaining and sharing images of children.
43:06
Speaker 2: It was called the End National Defense Network Abuse or
43:10
Speaker 2: End Network Abuse. Their proposal was inspired by the information
43:13
Speaker 2: discovered during Operation Flicker and was eventually passed by Congress.
43:17
Speaker 2: The End Network Abuse Act requires the Pentagon to enter
43:21
Speaker 2: into agreements with law enforcement, child protection services, social services,
43:25
Speaker 2: and trauma informed healthcare providers in order to cut down
43:29
Speaker 2: or stop the spread of these images and videos on
43:31
Speaker 2: Department of Defense networks. The bill was also supposed to
43:34
Speaker 2: upgrade the training and technical expertise of the military organizations
43:38
Speaker 2: involved in investigating these types of crimes. The National Criminal
43:42
Speaker 2: Justice Training Center, one of the groups that worked towards
43:44
Speaker 2: passing the bill, reported in twenty eighteen that the DoD's
43:48
Speaker 2: network was ranked nineteen out of twenty eight hundred and
43:51
Speaker 2: ninety one nationwide networks in the amount of peer to
43:55
Speaker 2: peer sharing. Yes, you heard that correctly, out of two thousand,
44:00
Speaker 2: eight hundred and ninety one networks existing in America. The
44:04
Speaker 2: US Department of Defense ranked nineteenth for the largest amount
44:09
Speaker 2: of sharing between members and users. There's only eighteen more
44:14
Speaker 2: groups of people in America that share more with each other.
44:17
Speaker 2: The Department of Defense is number nineteen. These are government
44:20
Speaker 2: employees working to keep America safe, people that you trust
44:24
Speaker 2: with your safety and your information, and they're one of
44:26
Speaker 2: the largest groups of predators in the country. Representative span
44:30
Speaker 2: Burger at the time that that act was passed stated,
44:32
Speaker 2: quote the notion that the Department of Defence's network and
44:35
Speaker 2: Pentagon issued computers may be used to view, create, or
44:40
Speaker 2: circulate such horrifying images as a shameful disgrace and one
44:43
Speaker 2: we must fight head on end quote. Representative Meadows added
44:47
Speaker 2: that the quote peer to peer trading of is an
44:50
Speaker 2: unacceptable practice and federal agencies cannot allow their networks to
44:54
Speaker 2: become a platform for it.
44:55
Speaker 3: End quote.
44:56
Speaker 2: Their statements are true, but where was this considerate motivation
44:59
Speaker 2: from anyone at all? Over a decade ago during Operation Flicker?
45:03
Speaker 2: Why wasn't anyone as passionate about stopping the government from
45:06
Speaker 2: sharing as these two when Operation Flicker was happening at
45:10
Speaker 2: that time, Remember, they had over five thousand predators that
45:13
Speaker 2: they had taken the time and effort to identify as
45:16
Speaker 2: either belonging to or having downloaded these materials from these
45:20
Speaker 2: flagged websites online. According to the National Center of the
45:24
Speaker 2: Department of Defense, is unequipped to deal with the level
45:27
Speaker 2: of coming from within their own ranks. They didn't even
45:30
Speaker 2: have the manpower to catch and prosecute those individuals, and
45:33
Speaker 2: it just clearly hasn't been an investigative priority for the military. Additionally,
45:37
Speaker 2: most of the military investigators are not properly trained or
45:40
Speaker 2: given the tools to catch offenders like these. Despite this problem,
45:44
Speaker 2: military investigators even admitted that combating was not one of
45:48
Speaker 2: the Defense Criminal Investigation Services priorities. As a result, military
45:53
Speaker 2: investigators have continuously lacked the skills to follow up investigative leads,
45:57
Speaker 2: including at least seventeen hundred of the soub identified in
46:01
Speaker 2: the two thousand and six ICE report that started off
46:04
Speaker 2: Operation Flicker. Why wasn't it a priority?
46:06
Speaker 3: Though?
46:07
Speaker 2: Those are all the questions, while some people think it
46:09
Speaker 2: was because of money. As we know, money runs the world,
46:12
Speaker 2: even if it's at the expense of child victims. Of
46:15
Speaker 2: there's a chance that Operation Flicker was not taken as
46:17
Speaker 2: seriously as it should have been because they didn't want
46:20
Speaker 2: to spend the necessary amounts of money that it would
46:22
Speaker 2: take for proper investigations into all of these predators. You see,
46:25
Speaker 2: Conducting thorough investigations that include forensic data can be incredibly costly,
46:30
Speaker 2: and maybe the US government just didn't care enough to
46:32
Speaker 2: use their funds for these sorts of investigations. Alternatively, it's
46:36
Speaker 2: never out of the realm of possibilities that investigators and
46:39
Speaker 2: other folks within the DoD were paid off to keep
46:42
Speaker 2: quiet and move on from these investigations. We know thousands
46:45
Speaker 2: of these government workers were not investigated at all when
46:48
Speaker 2: dealing with Operation Flicker. Is there a reason why certain
46:51
Speaker 2: people were not even acknowledged and only a small portion
46:54
Speaker 2: were actually investigated? Well, without any real answers or documentation
46:58
Speaker 2: as to why, we can only assume that maybe Operation
47:01
Speaker 2: Flicker didn't result in more investigations or convictions because those
47:05
Speaker 2: involved were paid to move on and look the other way.
47:08
Speaker 2: With only that handful of convictions, it's almost as if
47:10
Speaker 2: they chose just a few people to investigate to make
47:13
Speaker 2: it appear as if Operation Flicker was an active success
47:16
Speaker 2: and they were working hard to combat By investigating this
47:19
Speaker 2: handful of individuals, they had no choice but to indict
47:22
Speaker 2: them based off what was found. Having some convictions was
47:25
Speaker 2: likely better than zero in their eyes, and made the
47:27
Speaker 2: operation look as if it was producing positive results. Some
47:31
Speaker 2: people theorized that Operation Flicker went nowhere because of overwhelming exposure,
47:36
Speaker 2: in other words, the overwhelming amount of shocking information that
47:39
Speaker 2: was potentially uncovered by investigators. We know that approximately fifty
47:43
Speaker 2: two hundred government employees and contractors who had purchased were
47:47
Speaker 2: initially discovered, only thirty five hundred cross checked, two hundred
47:50
Speaker 2: and sixty four identified, and only around fifty two investigated.
47:54
Speaker 2: But what kept bringing those numbers down? Well, it seems
47:56
Speaker 2: completely feasible that these numbers weren't exactly accurate. They may
48:00
Speaker 2: have uncovered a lot more information than what was told
48:02
Speaker 2: to the public, But why we're only fifty two people investigated.
48:06
Speaker 2: If they would have properly investigated everyone who showed up
48:08
Speaker 2: on their list, thousands of government employees could have been
48:11
Speaker 2: convicted of federal against miners. Not a good look for
48:15
Speaker 2: our government. Continuing any throw investigations during Operation Flicker could
48:19
Speaker 2: also have terminated thousands of government employees, which would have
48:22
Speaker 2: devastated the Department of Defense. It's hard to tell everything
48:25
Speaker 2: that was actually discovered and what they were and still
48:28
Speaker 2: are hiding in order to protect these government employees and contractors.
48:32
Speaker 2: Maybe their goal this entire time was only to weed
48:35
Speaker 2: out a few of the predators, or maybe what they
48:37
Speaker 2: unveiled was far worse than what they expected to preventing
48:40
Speaker 2: them from conducting official investigations in fear of the true
48:44
Speaker 2: number of predators or perpetrators they would end up with.
48:47
Speaker 2: And then you of course have theories like the fact
48:49
Speaker 2: that maybe they discovered a blackmail operation. Maybe they discovered compromising,
48:54
Speaker 2: you know, data and information on some powerful people working
48:57
Speaker 2: in Washington. Maybe they were paid off to let these
49:00
Speaker 2: rings exist in some capacity. I don't really know, but
49:03
Speaker 2: it's really really suspicious and really really fishy. Overall, Operation
49:07
Speaker 2: Flicker was supposed to eliminate the overwhelming amount of likely
49:11
Speaker 2: child predators within the Department of Defense and bring them
49:14
Speaker 2: to justice.
49:15
Speaker 3: But what ended up.
49:15
Speaker 2: Happening was a project that ended less than a year later,
49:18
Speaker 2: with a very small portion of investigations, a tiny handful
49:22
Speaker 2: of convictions, a lack of resources, and a refusal from
49:25
Speaker 2: investigators to hand over relevant documentation or answer any questions
49:29
Speaker 2: that the public might have had. How many of those
49:32
Speaker 2: predators are still out there working in the government to
49:35
Speaker 2: this day, that are still downloading and trading materials with
49:40
Speaker 2: each other. How many of them are still out there
49:42
Speaker 2: chatting online to young children? What's the real reason why
49:46
Speaker 2: Operation Flicker ended so abruptly without investigating everyone who was
49:50
Speaker 2: a potential suspect. Even more questions come up. Why did
49:53
Speaker 2: they lie and say that the investigations from the reopening
49:57
Speaker 2: were still active and that that was why they were
49:59
Speaker 2: prevented from producing documents through a Freedom of Information Act request.
50:03
Speaker 2: At the point when those requests were made, it had
50:05
Speaker 2: been years since anything had happened with the investigation, Yet
50:08
Speaker 2: they use that defense so they wouldn't have to hand
50:11
Speaker 2: over what they had To this day, anything related to
50:13
Speaker 2: the reopening of Operation flicker has still not been released,
50:17
Speaker 2: leaving us to make up our own opinions about what
50:19
Speaker 2: has been discovered. What exactly are they hiding with this
50:22
Speaker 2: whole thing, and why.
50:24
Speaker 3: Crazy crazy stuff?
50:25
Speaker 2: Guys, I don't really know what are they hiding. You
50:27
Speaker 2: got to ask yourself these questions. I'm just here to
50:30
Speaker 2: give you, guys information on the show and to let
50:33
Speaker 2: you make up your own minds about this stuff. I mean,
50:35
Speaker 2: it's hard to imagine somebody listening to this story, looking
50:38
Speaker 2: at these resources, taking in this information, and thinking that
50:41
Speaker 2: there's not something incredibly fishy going on here. Why would
50:45
Speaker 2: they let thousands of child predators go? Why are they
50:49
Speaker 2: covering up the documents. Why did they say they were
50:52
Speaker 2: reopening the case when they didn't. Why do they still
50:55
Speaker 2: redact the names of some of these perpetrators. Why are
50:58
Speaker 2: they protecting these predators? It makes no goddamn sense. And
51:01
Speaker 2: the fact that they didn't even investigate thousands of these
51:04
Speaker 2: people means that more than likely thousands of these individuals
51:08
Speaker 2: are still working in the United States government. They are
51:11
Speaker 2: still there trading the stuff with each other.
51:14
Speaker 3: Let that sink in.
51:15
Speaker 2: If you were a normal person and you were convicted
51:17
Speaker 2: of something like that hopefully you'd lose your job and
51:20
Speaker 2: you'd be in prison, you know. But thousands of these people,
51:23
Speaker 2: they were seen accessing these websites, they were tied to
51:26
Speaker 2: their military emails with their names, it was their credit
51:29
Speaker 2: card information.
51:30
Speaker 3: It was definitely them, but.
51:32
Speaker 2: They just did nothing with it, and they let them go.
51:34
Speaker 2: It's like, let's say your neighbors found murdered. When the
51:37
Speaker 2: police show up, they see the neighbor's dead body on
51:39
Speaker 2: the floor, and they see the neighbor's husband standing over
51:42
Speaker 2: her holding a huge bloody knife, and the husband's saying,
51:46
Speaker 2: ah ah, you know, he's just like standing there, dripping
51:49
Speaker 2: with blood. He's covered in blood. It's extremely obvious that
51:52
Speaker 2: he just murdered his wife. And the police just turn
51:54
Speaker 2: around and walk out the door. Then the guy can
51:57
Speaker 2: do whatever he wants with the body. He can go
51:59
Speaker 2: chop it up, go burn it, he can dispose of it,
52:01
Speaker 2: and no one ever asks him a question about it again.
52:03
Speaker 2: Nobody even brings up that his wife is missing. They
52:06
Speaker 2: just move on and nothing's ever said about it again.
52:08
Speaker 2: It's like she never existed in the first place. That's
52:10
Speaker 2: what happened here. Because these people were identified as having
52:13
Speaker 2: committed these crimes and then poof, like the government waived.
52:17
Speaker 2: It's a magic wand abracadabra boom. All the charges and
52:21
Speaker 2: investigations are dropped and gone and sealed forever, and even
52:24
Speaker 2: the mainstream media prompts to them for covering this at first,
52:27
Speaker 2: but then it's just gone and it disappears from public
52:29
Speaker 2: attention and interest.
52:31
Speaker 3: I don't know.
52:31
Speaker 2: As always, everybody, thank you for joining me today. If
52:34
Speaker 2: you're watching the show on YouTube, please make sure to
52:37
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52:48
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Speaker 2: on Apple Podcasts or Spotify, please leave me a five
52:55
Speaker 2: star review. I will be back next week with another
52:58
Speaker 2: episode of The Conspiracy Files. As always, everybody, keep that
53:02
Speaker 2: tinfoil hat on, stay suspicious, question everything, and I'll see
53:06
Speaker 2: you next week.