Latest / In the Valley of Giants / Hunted: Cyber Warfare and Combatting Stalking | Moshe Satt | ITVOG 13

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Hunted: Cyber Warfare and Combatting Stalking | Moshe Satt | ITVOG 13 · In the Valley of Giants

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79% of intimate partner homicides started with tracking.
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If you so 79% of those people would have known that they were
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being tracked. They could, they could have said
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so. CBS News, they interviewed the
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cousin of a of a murder victim and he had this mobile defender
0:18
technology. He would still be alive today.
0:19
We know that this is, if we save one life, just one life, this
0:24
whole thing is worth it. This whole thing is worth it.
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Even if there's a possibility of saving one life, this whole
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thing is worth it. Hope to save many lives.
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Hey, Moshe Sad is a pleasure to have you on the show today.
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Thank you so much for joining us.
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So I'm just going to introduce you a little bit.
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So Moshe Sad is a cyber security leader with over 24 years in the
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public sector, currently serving as CISO.
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I don't know what that means. You want to tell what that
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means? Sure, Chief Information Security
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Officer. OK, at New York City Department
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of Sanitation, where protects the world's largest municipal
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sanitation agency from cyber threats.
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Also an entrepreneur, having founded Mobile Defender
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Incorporated Incorporated, excuse me, which we are going to
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talk about a bit today to develop portable cybersecurity
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solutions that protect vehicles from GPS tracking and spoofing
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attacks. And academically, you're in the
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middle of pursuing a pH. D in computer science at NYU
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Center for Cybersecurity while researching privacy and
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security. You also teach graduate and
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undergraduate cybersecurity courses as an adjunct at NYU
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Tandon School of Engineering. And you hold multiple
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professional certifications including CCIS, ISO, SISSP, and
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CISM as well as others, which sounds great.
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I'm gonna put that in the show notes so people read it for
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themselves. A lot of TLA's three letter
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acronyms. A lot of TLA's three letter
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acronyms. Well, definitely sounds
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impressive that I can for sure say.
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Thank you very much. Thank you so much.
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So I really, I really would love to talk about, especially in
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this really fast moving world in regards to technology.
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I feel like, you know, the difference between the 1600s and
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the 1700s was fairly minor, but the difference between 1950 and
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today, it's just, it's just otherworldly.
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So in terms of your educational background, why don't you talk
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just a little bit more about that and maybe share as the
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years have gone on and you've even progressed in your
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education, how, how, how different are really, are things
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really on the ground, you know, as seeing someone who's up and
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coming in the educational sphere in regards to technology?
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Sure. Yeah, like, like you said, Ravi,
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and thank you so much for having me on.
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It's really an honor. The technology, especially
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today, as we all know with things like AI, artificial
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intelligence, it's it's moving extremely fast.
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And cybersecurity, I mean, fundamentally cybersecurity is,
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is about people. It's, it's not really about
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technology. When we talk about information
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security, there's, there's, there's two different terms that
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are used interchangeably. But, but cybersecurity, the word
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is more focused on technology, but information security is a
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little bit more broader. And it's, it's, and information
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in any form because at the end of the day, your, your persona
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and your, your identity today is like, is really kind of created
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and, and, and, and established online, right?
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We do everything online today. We're doing this online, we
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learn online, you know, we, we, we work online, we go to school
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online, etcetera. So those threats aren't just a,
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a technology problem anymore. They're they're a people
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problem. At the end of the day, if, if
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someone is going to steal my identity or my information or,
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or my company's information, this is a real world impact,
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right? This is this is effects people,
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people's lives, people's livelihoods, but many times
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people's medical information when I was at the, the fire
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department FDNY during COVID. So it was, it was, it was really
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that was kind of like Pako snufffish has kind of been a
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theme throughout my career. But that was like literally on
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the ground Pako snuffish because the idea was you had, you had
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limited number of hospital beds during COVID and they needed to,
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to save those, those hospital beds for, for, for obviously
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for, for COVID patients. So using technology, when, when,
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when someone in New York City, well, Elena called 911 and the
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ambulance showed up, we'd be able to use technology.
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And of course, the underpinning was cybersecurity and
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information security. People's medical information is
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some of the most sensitive information around, but we'd be
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able to treat them. The doctors would be able to
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treat them remotely through telehealth, through the
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ambulance on site and many times save a hospital bed for the for
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COVID in case in the case of of a situation or or was not a
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COVID call or, or or the OR the patient didn't need to be
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admitted. Whereas in the old days, you're
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talking about how technology changes so quickly.
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The government in the United States, it never allowed this
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kind of treatment before. But during COVID, they, they
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passed emergency regulations. They relaxed a HIPAA, which is
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in the United States, the law that protects people's medical
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information. So they relax those rules and.
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But at the end of the day, you can't, there's a balance.
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You can't completely throw away the baby with the bathwater, as
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they say, you have to still. You wanna treat people remotely,
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You wanna save a hospital bed for cover patients.
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But that doesn't mean that you do something in an insecure way.
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That doesn't mean that you do something in a way where
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someone's most most sensitive information possible their their
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medical history, their medical information could be, could be
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leaked or could be, could be stolen.
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So you have to protect patient privacy, not just the law, but
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it's the right, it's it's the right thing to do.
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That's just one example. Yeah.
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For example, the Wall Street Journal did a fantastic story a
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couple months ago about a someone who had his identity
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stolen and and it really severely affected his life and
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we could all imagine and certain spheres where it would make a
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bigger difference for him. He lost his job amongst many
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other things. But a person could lose also
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their right to get into their bank account, someone else can
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use their identity etc etc. So don't need to dream so much
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there. But let's say in the medical
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field, so why is having medical information secure so incredibly
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important? Is there really people that are
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vying for your medical background?
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So that what they're going to post it on LinkedIn.
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So why is that so critical? I do know that there's a part to
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that. There was a hack, I think over
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the last year where someone hacked a major system and
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deleted a whole bunch of information.
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So if you're a doctor and you're trying to take care of your
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patient and you've lost all the information in regards to that
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patient, obviously that's that's that's really life threatening.
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But is it really so aggressive or people, are hackers really
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out there trying to steal your medical information?
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Yeah, it's interesting because it actually touches on the
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potential HALA dimensions. We're familiar with the concept
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of has agria, right. So, so in cybersecurity, for
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example, in my job as my day job is to see.
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So we, I have access and people, IT professionals and security
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professionals have access to information that's, that's,
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that's sensitive. And we need to be able to to see
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this information in order to protect people and protect
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networks. But on the other hand, we know
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the concept of has AGREA that just the observation itself can
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can be an invasion. So it opens up ramifications not
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just with people's privacy, but also with we find the
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vulnerability in a piece of software and every piece of
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software out there, your phone right now, it's vulnerable.
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My phone, everyone's laptop and computer and phone are
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vulnerable. Maybe Apple and Google and
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Microsoft, etc, haven't let us know yet, but the question is,
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and this maps to some holic discussion about when are you
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obligated to speak up and when when do you keep quiet?
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If I speak up and I mentioned there's a vulnerability, well,
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on one hand, I now you could do something about it, you could
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protect yourself, but on the other hand, it's going to now
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trigger a whole floodgates of hackers exploiting the
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vulnerability. So, so to you know, to answer
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your question about like medical information, the it's the
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possibilities are are endless. Obviously in a, in a simple
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case, someone has an embarrassing a condition.
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Well, that's the true definition of privacy is when, when there's
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something that you know, privacy is like a subset of of security.
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I teach at NYU, a class called information security and
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privacy. So I first on the 1st lecture, I
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always say you have a house and the house has, you know, the,
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the roof is, is, is cyber security or information
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security. The walls are privacy.
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So it's necessary. Privacy is not, is necessary,
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but not sufficient, but it's a very important part of
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protecting someone's digital persona, someone's cyber life.
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So, so, so the, the embarrassment or the disclosure,
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it could affect employment conditions, right?
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Someone has something that they don't want their employer
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knowing because the truth be told, it, it, it shouldn't
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impact their work. It's, it's illegal for them to
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take an action. Unfortunately, we know many
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companies will do it anyways. How about trying to have it
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every time? Now you go online and you start
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getting ads popping up for this, for this, you know, for this
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condition. How about they exploit the fact
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that they know that you have something, that's something.
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Well, you know, someone has something and, and, and they
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start targeting you and, and, and, and they know you're, you
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know, you know, they know the person might be vulnerable to,
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to, you know, based on their condition.
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So there's so many, you know, fortunately, like creative and
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just, you know, plug that into AI now and it's a force
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multiplier. So AI today takes all these
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cyber threats that have been around forever, but it turns out
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it's a false, a force multiplier because it now just exacerbates
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it makes it much more real. You get a phone call and it
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sounds it's, it's a deep fake. It sounds exactly like your
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father, your mother, your, your sister, your brother, your wife,
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your spouse, your husband. And it's, and it's saying I'm in
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trouble. I need a ransom, right?
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They have, you know, you know, very scary.
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Very exactly, you know, perfect, a perfect voice clone.
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Listen, maybe most people we hope won't fall for it, but the
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hackers are counting on the few that will because even if they
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and they send a phishing e-mail, that's an e-mail that looks
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legitimate. It looks like it's your bank and
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you click on it and you give your credentials.
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The next thing you know, and God forbid your bank account balance
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starts dropping. In that situation, they know
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they'll only get one out of 1000.
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But when they're sending it to 100,000 people, right and then
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each attack they're getting thousands of dollars.
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It's a true business, the true business of the dark web, this
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evil, scary dark web that we talk about.
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It's, it's, it's real. So when it, when it comes to,
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you know, protecting people today, whether you know, we all
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have Oxala, we have, you know, we have ways of, of protecting
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ourselves physically. We have to be just as a vigilant
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today. When you know, well, you know,
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you all your information is, is there if someone was to change
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information about a patient who's in a hospital and they get
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the wrong medication, it's like, yeah, so very, very serious
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things. I was the HIPAA security officer
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during COVID. So by by law in the United
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States, if you're if an entity is a HIPAA covered, which means
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they're required to abide by a HIPAA rules.
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Basically anyone who builds medical and health insurance
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companies. So including the ambulance
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companies like like the Fire Department of New York, they
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required by law to have a HIPAA privacy officer was usually an
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attorney and a HIPAA security officer, which is a cyber
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security person. And that was the role that I had
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in addition to being Cecil. And a lot of these issues, as I
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mentioned, came up. They could continue to come up.
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Were there a significant amount of attacks during your time
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doing that? There's always attacks.
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Thank God, nothing that was successful that we know about.
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But it's constantly it's constantly saying that and we,
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you know, is Indian, you know, Al Damria, right?
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And and and and 111 shot is, is, is is, you know, Martin
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Steinhats, right? You have you have to save
11:46
someone who's drowning, right? But it's, it's, it's, it's more
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than just like actively doing an act of saving.
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You also have to you could learn until assignment is that you
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don't just stand there, build systems, build things that in
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the future. Now this week's partially by a
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fee, right? Why is it called by a fee,
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right. But yeah, yeah, yeah.
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And it was is it talks about the tier of Jacob Vino.
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Why is it called vice, right. So the measure, you know, picks
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up, but the measure says Jacob Vino Lomace, right.
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And then what happens? So he tells the Prime Minasha,
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right? He says, right, that that that
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that I won't be here to to protect you, but I want to make
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sure there's a system in place, even if it's not me personally,
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my Gayle will be there today. It's the same thing here, right?
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We have to, we have to have systems that are that we build,
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that are there and ready when we have it's ties into my company,
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mobile defender. We're obviously we're going to
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talk about it, but it's it's it's building technology that
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even if I can't physically be there to protect the, the woman
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from from being stalked and and and God forbid, attacked by her,
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you know, by her ex, I can build something hallucinogy.
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I have a hive that that we, we, we learned the dispute's part,
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the measures learn Yakova being a little Mesa right?
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We, it's about, it's about how we continue our, our, our, our,
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our chain of, of protection and of and of and of security.
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Do you experience that now in the corporate level?
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I don't know if you're allowed to talk about it, but it it are
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you even? And when you're working in
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sanitation, are there attacks and do you have to respond at
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all hours of the night or how does that work?
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Yeah, Right now I'm in New York. Right now it's snowing.
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And so we're the first of the first responders.
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So what happens if when we get significant cells, So we've had
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already a few significant cell storms this this year.
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And what happens? So if the police and the fire
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and the ambulance right then basically someone calls
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emergency services, the US nine O 1, they can't get down the
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street because the street is, is passable because of the snow.
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So lowly no, so, so, so someone, someone, someone could someone
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who needs an ambulance or needs a fire truck or police, It could
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be very, very, very serious. So, so we, we have, we are out
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there right now. We're out there.
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We mean my, my agency, the S&Y and we're very computerized.
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We're very high attack. So we Speaking of GPS, we have
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hundreds and hundreds of vehicles.
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We pre stage them throughout the city because we don't want
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everyone coming from one location or it's all 5 boroughs
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of New York, you know, almost 9 million people.
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So we have very sophisticated algorithms that figure out we're
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going to put our assets right. We have value hundreds of
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vehicles, not just the plows, but the salt spreaders and the
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and briners and, and, and not only do we pre stage, but we
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track in real time through through GPS and we're able to
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reposition assets. We're able to see with cameras,
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were able to see exactly what's going on and, and, and basically
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to keep to keep New York running.
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So, so while we're how does cyber come into play?
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We talk about cybersecurity is the CIA triad.
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And it's not just the the the spy agency, but it's also I
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teach my students confidentiality, integrity,
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availability, the CIA triad. Those are the the the
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fundamentals of cybersecurity. Well, in here when Speaking of
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the day job in terms of sanity, and I've been working for the
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city for a very long time. But again, we mentioned the fire
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department. I also worked at the Police
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Department was also in charge of 911 cyber security, the
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founding, the founding leader for that.
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It's a bad availability primarily.
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Yes, there's a confidentiality. We want to make sure your
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information isn't stolen. Yes, there's an integrity.
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We want to make sure your information isn't modified in an
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unauthorized way. But most importantly when it
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comes to providing critical life saving public safety services
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for 911. When I was in charge of 911
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cybersecurity, we opened the 2nd 911 call center and dispatch
15:28
center in the Bronx. It was a billion dollar
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facility. After 911 this they realized
15:32
that they can't have everything in in Manhattan or or or
15:36
downtown Brooklyn, which is almost kilo Manhattan very
15:39
close. So they said where can we put
15:40
something? It's still in New York City, you
15:43
know, proper, but as as far away from so they put it in the Bronx
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and they built thing had to be able to survive like like a
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nuclear blast. I guess it was a billion dollar.
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What was the idea there? The idea is that now we're gonna
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start taking our own calls. You can't even drop a single
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call for you. If one call is hacked or gets
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somehow lost or dropped, that person could die as simple as
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that. And again, it's not just the
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calls coming in tonight one it's also dispatching out.
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So it's calls come in the both the both sides of that.
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But are there, are there anarchists?
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I'm saying, like I understand why someone wants to steal your
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information, to steal your money or whatever, but are there
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anarchists? Are there people that are
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chopping to stop 911 calls? Yeah, yeah, so, so many times
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terrorists will try to do both a physical and a cyber at the same
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time. So what better attack and you
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know, don't try this at home, but what better attack.
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And at the same time as a as Lolita.
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Unfortunately we've had in New York City is, is unfortunately
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the epicenter and, and I would argue it within New York, the,
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the biggest target in the world is New York City.
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And I would argue within New York, the biggest target is the
16:44
91 centre because in addition to causing some kind of physical
16:48
attack, they also take down the systems, they also take down the
16:51
communications. So now those people that would
16:54
be responding to save people can't respond as efficiently, as
16:58
quickly as effectively. Sure, 100%.
17:02
We had another thing we you know, we never had text 9 to 9/1
17:05
until until a few years ago I was involved with the project.
17:07
You only know someone can't they're in a position where they
17:10
can't call 911, they can't speak or maybe they're disabled of New
17:15
York City realized they need ability and I know and I think
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it's 100 right, the emergency line.
17:22
But in any case, you need, yeah, that's very important thing from
17:26
a cyber perspective, someone who wants to hack 911 and again,
17:31
don't try this at home, but can send a malicious text message
17:34
into the 911 call center and the minute the operator opens the
17:40
message, boom, game over, right? Like.
17:42
Does that happen? Are there really Are there?
17:45
And there have been attacks and all the time and in New York,
17:48
we, you know, again, we've had we have very, very strong
17:50
security. But in some parts of the country
17:53
here in the US was they've also caused nine O 1 to be overloaded
17:58
because your phone, you accidentally download some kind
18:02
of virus on your phone and your phone starts starts texting.
18:05
You know, you could send a lot more texts than you can call,
18:08
right? So your phone repeatedly starts
18:10
spamming the 901 call center. So now multiply that by
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thousands of phones as this virus, this worm starts
18:18
spreading different virus and worms.
18:19
The worm spreads by itself without any human interaction.
18:22
So now this thing goes viral literally.
18:25
And next thing you know, they're getting spammed and their
18:28
systems can't handle it. So the system.
18:30
Doesn't doesn't that sicken you? Like, I understand why someone
18:34
steal someone else's money. It's wrong.
18:36
It's completely wrong, but it doesn't it doesn't make you sick
18:38
to your stomach, Right. But like messing with a 911
18:41
center, I mean, that's like, that's yeah.
18:43
Yeah, yeah. And we tried to study, we tried
18:45
to go into the psychology, you know, this ties a lot into
18:47
psychology because we try to understand in general, why do
18:50
people do bad things? Why do criminals do?
18:52
There's many different reasons. And in the in cybersecurity, we
18:54
just try to we always, you always have to.
18:57
We always think like an attacker because the best a defender is
19:01
going to be someone knows how, knows how to put book in office.
19:03
You have to say, what are they after?
19:05
Are they after money, right? Which, like you said, that's
19:07
many, many times the motivation. Are they after, you know,
19:10
anarchy and destruction and damage?
19:13
Is it like politically motivated, right?
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There's different, you know, reasons.
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And then when you know the reason or you try to attend, we
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have this concept called AP TS. These are advanced persistent
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threats. These are groups that are super
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well funded. They have basically unlimited
19:27
resources. They're closely affiliated with
19:30
nations, States, and there's so many of them that they give them
19:33
numbers and they're, I think already up to 3 digits.
19:35
These Apts and some of them very famous.
19:38
And they got to the point where people have trouble US in the in
19:41
the field with trouble like memorizing all APT 28 is, is, is
19:46
this group that's affiliated with Russia.
19:48
So they so they start using animals, where an animal will be
19:50
the country and then there'll be an adjective.
19:52
Way for who is this attack hole and this APT is what what
19:55
they're attacking again 911 centers.
19:57
They're attacking everything. Yeah, they're attacking.
19:59
They're attacking governments, military.
20:01
So Cozy Bear is probably one of the arguably the most famous 1
20:04
affiliate with Russia, right? Anything Bear is Russia.
20:06
So there'll be Sleepy Bear and Cozy Bear and Hungry Bear.
20:09
You like different? US is in there, everyone's in
20:12
there. Bottom line is that these Apts
20:15
have unlimited time, unlimited resources, all my money.
20:18
So it's not about whether they'll be successful.
20:20
They have almost 100%. So there's a Gartner Magic
20:24
Quadrant, so up in the upper right corner of this, a few
20:26
countries that if if you're targeted by those countries or
20:29
by AP TS village country, you have no, there's no way you're
20:32
going to stop it, right. So, so, so stop trying to figure
20:35
out how to stop it and figure out what you're going to do when
20:37
you're going to attack. So in that quadrant game,
20:38
Israel, you have USA you have yeah, yeah, Russia, China, these
20:44
if any of those AP TS advanced resistance threats that are that
20:47
are very loose, very loosely or very closely, I should say,
20:51
affiliated with these, with these with these countries, you
20:53
have no, you have no hope on on, on, on stopping the attack.
20:57
So you can try take your, the limited money you have because
21:00
they have unlimited money, unlimited resources.
21:02
You on the I'm on the defense side.
21:04
I have to figure out, well, what are they after?
21:06
Because I can't protect everything.
21:08
So I have to prioritize take the limited money.
21:10
If they're after, if I think they're after, if I'm a
21:12
pharmaceutical company and I think they're trying to steal
21:15
the the secrets of the next, you know, to the next, you know,
21:18
Ozempic or something, or the next or the next life, the next
21:22
life saving drug. Let's say I'm going to put my my
21:26
my protections there, right? I'm going to target.
21:29
I'm going to you know, I can't, you know, protect everything
21:31
that's you think we're. Doing that to other countries,
21:33
you think there's, you think there's.
21:34
Yeah, there's. That, but we're attacking the
21:36
infrastructure. You think we're having hospital
21:38
somewhere else? So this is the concept of
21:40
hacking back and it also gets into Halaki, right, because
21:45
right, we know like a den of a row, Dave, right, right, you're
21:47
allowed to you're allowed to preemptively attack, right.
21:50
So by by us and especially if it's going to translate, if it's
21:53
going to go from from cyber to Connecticut, we see cyber
21:56
attacks that turn into real world attacks where we see like
21:58
in Ukraine, right where where the power grid goes out right
22:01
due to a cyber. So 100 we have the capability
22:05
and so does and so does Israel and so does, you know, Russia
22:08
and China, they have 100% they have the capability, whether
22:11
they choose to use it, they have to be very careful because a lot
22:14
of these attacks use once and then it's and that's it.
22:17
You get one shot with a famous Stuxnet attack, which was
22:22
against Iran. So basically Israel and the US
22:25
is never 100% confirmed, but basically that's what's the
22:29
accepted the truth. So they figured out a way to
22:34
hack the nuclear plants to basically spin out of control,
22:41
right? But more than hacking that, they
22:43
also hacked the video systems that the people monitoring it.
22:46
Everything looked normal, just like in the old in movies when
22:50
the guard and they hacked the, the security camera and the
22:53
guard's looking and everything looks good, right?
22:54
And he's looking at a loop. It's a loop, right?
22:57
It's not live, It's a loop. So, so, so they have the cable,
23:00
but they have to be very careful because if they, if they don't
23:02
use it in the, in the most opportunities.
23:04
Look what happened with the pagers right?
23:06
In, in Lebanon, right? So at some point you have
23:08
something in your arsenal. And I'm not on the military
23:11
side. I don't have security clearance,
23:13
but it's a very affiliate. It's a very related topic as as
23:17
was thought to happen with the, with the pager and the radios,
23:20
you know, with, with Hezbollah, the idea is that if you think
23:23
that you have, you're waiting for that best time.
23:26
But sometimes that best time will, will be no time if you
23:29
don't use it now, right? If you think like there aren't
23:31
these days, you have no choice many times.
23:33
But most of these operations are planned out for years and years
23:36
in advance. And they have so, so the
23:40
government's, even our government and here in the US,
23:42
they, they know about, there was a famous Shadow Brokers attack.
23:46
So the United States government knew about a very critical
23:49
vulnerability in Windows, right? Windows is the world's most
23:52
popular operating system. They knew about this
23:54
vulnerability that could take over your sensibility.
23:56
Did they tell us about it? 100% not.
23:58
They wanted to use it to attack our enemies, right?
24:02
What happened, unfortunately, is the hackers stole the tools
24:05
that, that, that they, NSA had and they use it against us.
24:10
So here's an example. They sat on it waiting for the
24:13
best time to use it. And guess what happened?
24:15
They never used it because the tools were stolen and not, and
24:17
when the tools sold, we had no protection.
24:19
They they could have warned, they could have told us, they
24:20
could have said, hey, Microsoft. But it gets back to that thing
24:23
about do you say something? You don't say something, right?
24:26
When it comes to national security, it's a whole nother
24:29
ball game. Interesting topic.
24:32
Definitely. Let me talk to a moment, Moshe
24:34
said. Is 20 years old.
24:35
Why Cybersecurity? How did you choose this Ave.
24:38
Cybersecurity is, like I said, it really ties into saving and
24:42
helping people. So al tamo, you really felt that
24:45
Al tamo Dariyeva. Yeah, it's what can I do sitting
24:48
at a computer, How can I help somebody?
24:53
How It's more than the facet. Many times it's helping, but
24:57
many times it's saving someone. And especially now mobile
25:00
Defender where we're literally saving people's lives with the
25:03
anti tracking technology that we have.
25:06
That's what it was. And and you know, I always
25:08
wanted to, to, to, to, I wanted to be in the IDF, you know, as
25:12
far as rookie when I was in there.
25:13
So I was very public service oriented.
25:16
I wanted to be that's all and everything that's great.
25:18
But but to be able to use Shun gives us, gives every, everyone
25:24
individual talents. And the idea is 1 understanding
25:27
what you know, what you have everyone, everyone has their,
25:30
their, their special tools that they can, that they can, that
25:35
they can help, you know, to save, to save the world, right.
25:38
Like RIP Tarfen said. So basically, when you, if you
25:42
don't know what they are, then that's, that's half the battle
25:44
figuring out. But everyone has those special
25:47
gifts and so sounds, but then how do you use them?
25:49
How do you put them in into place?
25:51
Yeah, the, as the Internet again became the way we live, the way
25:54
we learn, the way, the way we study, the way we communicate
25:58
everything, right? It became even even more
26:00
serious. It's always been, it's always
26:02
been an idea of, of, of, of, of helping people now with, with
26:06
smart devices and everyone has a phone and every and, and, and,
26:09
and, and, and, and there's on your, your car and your, your
26:13
home and, and wherever you go, there's something tracking you,
26:16
something watching you. The threats are just just, you
26:19
know, unimaginable. And, and turns out that
26:22
unfortunately bad actors are now using these devices to, to
26:26
physically target people, track people, stalk people, and then
26:30
God forbid, attack people. So now it's, it's just become
26:33
super, super real. It was cool when it was like
26:35
saving your, your, your data from being stolen, but it's even
26:38
cooler now. And it's like saving, saving
26:40
someone's life. There's no comparison.
26:43
So, and that was my background, you know, when I was at the
26:46
Police Department. So I built systems for NYPD that
26:50
were like, you know, that were life saving systems we had in
26:53
the beginning, we didn't have, you know, when someone calls
26:56
nine O 1. And I'm sure it's the same in
26:58
when someone calls 100 in, in Israel, it's, it actually sends
27:02
your location. But the question is, can they do
27:05
anything with that, right? Can they somehow?
27:07
So I, I built a system that was able to send to the officers in
27:13
the field, the location of the person who was calling that many
27:16
times the person calling, it's not the person who needs help.
27:19
Many times it's someone passing by, but in many cases it's the
27:21
person who needs help who's calling, right.
27:23
So we had situation. So, so yeah, I worked with,
27:26
with, with the, with the officers to, to, to get that in
27:29
there. And, and then what happens is
27:30
someone is on a boat. This is a true story.
27:32
Someone was on a, a canoe in, in Jamaica Bay.
27:35
And there's been many examples. There's just one story.
27:37
The canoe, the kayak, sorry, the kayak flipped over in the
27:40
Jamaica Bay in Queens and they called 91 and said, what's your?
27:44
The first thing I ask you, what's your location used to be?
27:47
What's your emergency? But they say no, what's your, I
27:49
want to get that out quick, right?
27:50
Because even if I don't know what's going on, I need to know
27:53
where you are so at least I can send someone.
27:54
Is it Jamaica Bay? That's the address.
27:58
That doesn't help much. So they send helicopters, they
28:02
send harbor where where go to that system boom, boom, boom
28:07
pings on Google Maps finds where it saves a persons life.
28:10
That was one example. Another example, someone climbs
28:12
up a bridge. He had a little too much to
28:15
drink and he climbed up the bridge and it was and it was a
28:18
jumper situation where so I worked closely with ESU that
28:21
just like the slot that emerged and normally I would send the
28:24
choppers aviation. It was raining.
28:26
They couldn't send out the copters.
28:28
Aviation was down through the weather.
28:30
They send the trucks from both Brooklyn is the Williamsburg
28:33
Bridge send from Brooklyn side, Manhattan side.
28:35
They can't find the guy. He calls 901 back again.
28:37
He has a little too much trick. He says, ha, ha, ha, you miss
28:40
me? They said we have this new
28:41
system. Let's look.
28:42
They see, oh, he's on top of the Manhattan tower of the
28:44
Williamsburg. They climb up the very
28:46
specialized units and they pull him down.
28:47
They saved his life. So it's, it's so many stories
28:49
like like this, using, using technology to save lives.
28:53
It's it's, it's really, it's what keeps me calm.
28:56
Well, I think that's very impressive.
28:57
So I didn't even know that, you know, technology is using the
28:59
applications in my ignorance, but to lean into my ignorance.
29:01
So I don't know much about mobile Defender.
29:03
I want you to tell me about it. I think we should switch over to
29:05
that. But yeah, as you explain it, I
29:07
want you to answer one thing again, my ignorance, OK.
29:10
If I'm not mistaken, I think actually I'll say the story here
29:14
because I think it's it's amazing.
29:15
But I had a transport once. Ellie's guitar, your son, OK, it
29:19
is a big guitar, starts transporting it for him.
29:21
And I'm in the car and then all of a sudden like my phone like
29:25
lights up and I don't know what it's lighting up about.
29:28
And it's like, oh, there's a tracker in your vehicle.
29:31
You should just be like aware. And I'm like, what do you mean
29:32
there's a tracker in my vehicle? So I'm like looking around and
29:35
the only thing that's changed is this really big guitar case.
29:37
So, so I understand that part of the application of mobile app
29:41
defenders. And I actually, I want you to
29:42
really flush it out because I won't understand it more.
29:44
Is the technical when you're being tracked?
29:46
But are there already things in place and how are you different
29:48
and you know what's coming to the table?
29:50
Right. So basically we we fill a gap.
29:53
So, so you mentioned the tracking, that's the air tag.
29:56
And, and you know, we have solutions Apple for air tags,
29:59
right? Those little round discs that
30:02
Apple sells. And there's tile trackers,
30:04
there's different trackers after your phone can warn you about
30:07
those, whether you have an iPhone, whether you have
30:10
Android. But the trackers that abusers
30:12
and stalkers actually use, yes, people do use air tags, but
30:18
they're, they're not, they don't, they're not, they don't
30:20
work as well because they, they're use Bluetooth
30:23
technology, but they're the ones that are the, the, the
30:25
professional abusers. And I'm being facetious when I
30:29
say it, but, but the, the ones that work best for, for stalking
30:32
people and for, you know, tracking people are the ones
30:35
that use the, the cellular networks, right?
30:38
So they actually have like a little SIM card in it.
30:41
So you can think of it almost as like a miniature cell phone.
30:44
They're very cheap. You could buy them on Amazon
30:46
for, for for $20. They come in a waterproof
30:49
magnetic case. Don't you?
30:51
Don't many times the what we call the attacker, the abuser
30:54
many times, usually it's a he and unfortunately usually the
30:57
victim is a she not always, but two to one women are victims of
31:00
domestic violence 2 to one over men.
31:03
So many times the abuser, the attacker has access to the
31:06
inside of the vehicle. It's a shared vehicle, you know,
31:09
etcetera. But, but they don't need that
31:11
because they could just stick it underneath the bumper and on, on
31:13
the news and here in New York on TV did a, did a special
31:17
investigative report because they, they said when they heard
31:20
about mobile defender solution for this, they said, we have to
31:23
get the word out. This is because there's never
31:25
been a solution to this. So you mentioned you get the
31:27
alert for the air tech, but it had there been the GPS cellular
31:31
4G tracker, which again is really, really inexpensive, $20
31:36
on Amazon. And that lets the attacker
31:39
through an app monitor no matter where you go, as long as long as
31:42
you have a solid signal. And where, where don't we have a
31:45
solid signal today, right? The attacker can see where you
31:48
are. And then, and you know, in 17,
31:50
it's a crazy statistic, 79% of intimate partner homicides
31:57
started with tracking 79%. That's why.
32:00
So if you so 79%, so those people would have known that
32:04
they were being tracked. They could have said so.
32:06
And CBS News, they interviewed the cousin of a murder victim,
32:11
happened to be a the male victim in this case.
32:14
And she says the cousin says had he had this mobile defender
32:18
technology would still be alive today.
32:19
So we know that this if we save one life, just one life, this
32:24
whole thing is worth it. This whole thing is worth it.
32:26
Even if there's a possibility of saving one life, this whole
32:29
thing is worth it. We hope to save to save many
32:33
lives. National network to end domestic
32:36
violence and then EDV. So they are the organization in
32:39
the United States for for domestic violence survivors.
32:42
So I was in Seattle, I was presenting my conference paper.
32:46
I'm a PAPHD student at NYUI teach at NYU and in order to
32:50
graduate, we have to publish more importantly than graduating
32:53
is is again helping people. So they, I was in Seattle and I
32:56
just presented at the conference the peer reviewed research and
33:00
they contact NNEDV national and domestic.
33:02
As I said, we need what you have yesterday.
33:05
Our survivors need this yesterday.
33:06
They represent the whole country.
33:07
They all the domestic violence organizations at the state level
33:10
fall under this NNEDV which which is they.
33:14
It's past, it's past. I think this is Peace of Mind
33:16
also. I mean could you imagine God
33:18
forbid for knowing someone that was a victim of such a thing or
33:21
being tracked before? It gives you a lot of Peace of
33:23
Mind to know. That you know you have
33:24
protection 100 percent, 100% and they said we said we never had a
33:28
solution for this. We had a solution for air tax.
33:30
We didn't have a solution for the, for the cellular, the 4G
33:33
LTE GPS trackers, we sit on Apple and Googles board.
33:38
So we have their ear just so just just let's, let's, let's
33:42
make it happen. And by the way, a person
33:43
shouldn't have to download an app to save their life.
33:45
So Airtag, you get an alert. You don't have a special app.
33:49
You know, in the back of the day, only iPhone gave an alert.
33:51
Now Android also, you don't have to download that.
33:53
That's what I want for this too. I want right.
33:55
I, well, you shouldn't have the, the, the, the victim, the
33:58
survivor should not or, or anyone, right?
34:00
Like you said, even someone who's just concerned about their
34:02
own. They shouldn't, it shouldn't be
34:04
built in. It should be.
34:05
It should be built into either the phone or the car.
34:07
There's no solution. There's no solution right now.
34:10
And so, so there hasn't been any, any solution that works
34:14
there. There's been devices that claim
34:16
that they can. And then the researchers tested
34:18
them in my lab and in our lab under Professor Danny Huang.
34:22
He's my advisor and NYUM lab is what it's called.
34:25
So they tested all these different spying devices.
34:27
You go to an Airbnb, how do you know if there's a, it might be a
34:30
hidden camera, right? Big problem.
34:33
So hidden mic, I hidden right. And so all types of spy devices
34:37
when it came to these GPS trackers, they didn't find
34:40
anything that worked until now. And we, we, we tested this very,
34:44
very scientifically in a lab, but within one statistical order
34:47
of magnitude of an R-squared of almost 1.
34:49
So basically a linear relationship showing, proving
34:51
this out. And, and that's why this thing
34:53
really went viral. So news stations around the
34:55
whole country pick this up. And I'm so good they did because
34:58
we have to get the word out right now.
35:00
We're building the app. So again, it shouldn't.
35:02
We really want this built into the phone itself through and an
35:05
EDV. And we're going to talk to the,
35:07
the we're going to talk to Apple, we're going to talk to
35:09
Google and we're going to make it happen.
35:11
They'll, they'll force them to have it.
35:12
I mean, you want to believe the tech companies with all the
35:15
things people say about big tech, but you want to believe
35:17
that they have not just a desire, but an Arharius to, to
35:20
protect people, to save people's lives.
35:22
So you want to believe that that even if, if it costs them a
35:25
couple dollars, they're pretty sure they can afford it.
35:29
How could you put a price on somebody's life anyway?
35:31
So 79% of homicides from intimate partner homicides is
35:35
from started with with tracking. And by the way, in the United
35:39
States every year just united it's a global problem.
35:41
By the way, 11 and a half million people are are stalked
35:45
through technology every year in the United States.
35:48
That's a federal government number of the seven of the of
35:51
the of the seven and a half million, a good percentage of
35:54
it, hundreds and hundreds of thousands is through trackers.
35:57
OK. And like I said, the users, the
36:00
attackers are not just using the air tags.
36:03
And I said this on the TV interview when they interviewed
36:05
me, I was driving my car and I was showing them the solution.
36:08
It's on YouTube and then share a link.
36:10
I said if I'm an attacker and I know your phone is gonna tell
36:12
you when you have an air tag, am I gonna use an air tag?
36:15
Obviously I'm gonna use the one thing that until mobile
36:19
defender, there was, there was, there was no solution, right?
36:23
I'm going to use that thing. And that's what they're doing.
36:25
And there's so many, so many, so many said cases and, and, and
36:28
then it's it's it's around the world.
36:30
So, yeah. So this has been my kind of my
36:32
new calling and very, you know, very passionate about it.
36:35
We really need to move quickly. It's, it's again, it's, it's,
36:41
it's an idea that if as we speak, people are being stalked
36:44
and tracked and majority of those cases very, it turns into
36:48
physical attacks. In many cases, they lose, people
36:51
lose their lives. We have, we have to, to, to move
36:54
very quickly on this. And, and, and, and to me, I
36:58
every day that we don't have, you know, that this thing isn't
37:01
out there. And again, we're working very,
37:03
very with my limited, you know, funds and team, right, doing
37:08
doing the best I can. I'm just one person.
37:10
I'm a CEO, but I'm also I'm also the only employee.
37:14
So so I'm doing it all. But I could definitely use the
37:17
help. I could use the funding right
37:19
way. It's, it's, it's we have, we
37:22
have, I guess I have interest from, from, from the advocacy
37:24
groups from, from the organizations that are, are
37:27
there to help people. And then even the vehicle
37:30
companies have reached out, one of the major vehicle companies
37:34
reached out and they were actually asking about a
37:36
different problem that is related.
37:38
I'll talk about it very quickly. Is the spoofing problem where
37:40
you're driving in, in, in, in Rachel, I am right.
37:43
But the attacker is spoofs and the car thinks you're in Tel
37:47
Aviv, right? What could go wrong there?
37:50
So long list of things that can go wrong.
37:51
So in a self driving car, whether it's a fully autonomous
37:54
or semi autonomous, obviously. And by the way, these devices
37:57
are very inexpensive, $50.00 in Amazon to jam or spoof.
38:01
Jamming is you know, you can't see anything but spoofing as it
38:04
puts you somewhere else. All of a sudden the car thinks
38:06
it's gonna drive off a Cliff. It makes a hard and guess what
38:08
it well and it drives. Crazy.
38:10
Does that happen? Is that something?
38:11
So that's something. So that's, that's something,
38:12
yeah. Is this is this successful?
38:14
Was it working? Successful.
38:15
Yeah, yeah, you know, they have on again, don't try this at
38:18
home, but the certain websites you can go on for for less than
38:21
$50 and buy one of these vices. It's shutting down airports.
38:24
It's shutting down airports. So planes in both vehicles.
38:26
People are stealing $100,000 of, of cargo from trucks.
38:31
And then of course, the trucks are tracked, right?
38:33
But they spoof it. So they, they a big problem in
38:35
Mexico. They take the truck, they take
38:37
all the hundreds of thousands of goods on the truck.
38:40
But the people watching the truck, just like the bank video
38:43
that we spoke earlier, still shows the truck is on its route,
38:46
even though it's not. It's a spoof, right?
38:48
And by the time they find out, it's too late.
38:51
So that's a related problem. We have two patents, provisional
38:55
patents. We have a patent for the tracker
38:56
detection that we've been talking about, but also for the
38:58
spoofing. By the way, in the EU and in
39:01
Asia and many parts of the world, they're not allowed to
39:03
sell cars without anti GPS spoofing.
39:06
It's called UN Regulation 155. It's a law in 42 countries, US.
39:10
It's not the law here. It's not the US.
39:12
OK, just not the US it's but the insurance companies here want it
39:15
anyways. They'll either give you a
39:17
discount if you have it or they'll demand it because how
39:20
easy it is to spoof and how dangerous it is when your car or
39:24
whatever vehicle. OK, but it but it sounds like it
39:26
sounds like at least for the spoofing.
39:27
There are other solutions. It sounds like for.
39:29
Traffic spoofing, our solutions, it's moving ours, but they're
39:31
very expensive, so my solution is very inexpensive.
39:35
So, yeah, for tracking with only one for the spoofing, there are
39:38
military grade solutions that costs 100, you know, up to
39:41
$100,000. And for car companies to embed
39:45
that into every vehicle isn't, it's not cost effective.
39:48
So they came to me, a big car company came to me in Seattle
39:51
and we met with them and said, hey, could we embed this into
39:53
our cars. And at the time I didn't even
39:55
have the patent for this poofing.
39:57
But I was thinking about the problem after they came to me
40:00
and. And you know, it came to me so
40:02
and and it's a very inexpensive solution.
40:05
In fact, it it. Were you granted, were you
40:07
granted both both patents? So there's provisional means you
40:09
file with the Patent Office and it holds your place in line and
40:12
then you you get fully granted once you can do this conversion.
40:15
So the conversion has to happen within a year.
40:17
So Amritsashem it's 1 was filed in August.
40:20
The 2nd for the anti tracking was in August.
40:22
The anti spoofing was October. So by basically by August,
40:26
amidst the strength of this new year, so.
40:28
You you apply you apply for international patent patent.
40:30
So, and then we also, yeah, yeah.
40:32
So then we'll also do this PCT, there's this treaty.
40:35
Every country in the world is part of this, this treaty, PCD
40:38
patent cooperation treaty. And yeah, we'll file for that,
40:42
for that too. NYU, my university where I where
40:45
I go to school and where I teach, it actually owns these
40:48
patents because I invented both, both, both things, but they own
40:53
the IP. That's the way it works in
40:54
academia. Why do they own the IP?
40:56
In academia, if you're a PhD student and I'm actually an
40:59
exception or should be an exception cuz I'm a part time
41:01
PhD student Most of the time. Full time PhD student.
41:04
Most PhD students do a full time.
41:05
You can't really do research part time.
41:08
How I make it work? I do a lot of juggling full time
41:12
students. Research is paid for by the
41:15
university so every university. But unfortunately my research
41:19
was not but they still own it. It's okay with a license.
41:22
It's a mobile defender exclusive license.
41:25
My company NYU owns 4% of the company and 4% so and I'm the
41:31
CEO of 96% today. Happy to get investors and
41:35
dilute that, but but that's fine.
41:37
We are we are licensed, licensed.
41:39
This is welcome to America where you have to get your own
41:41
invention license license back to you, right?
41:44
That's that's an amazing thing. Yeah, here.
41:47
OK, well tell me how a little bit, how it actually works.
41:49
How does multiple defender actually work?
41:51
Right, right. So the idea is that what I
41:54
realized was that, and this was again, the presentation in
41:57
Seattle, it's there's a video that you can actually watch me
42:00
giving the whole spiel. The idea is that we're, we're
42:02
looking at these cellular signals.
42:05
They're using 4G to, to send, you know, it's getting the GPS
42:08
signal where, where you, where you are, where the vehicle is,
42:11
But then it has to send that phone home, right?
42:13
It has to send that back to the app, to the cloud and it uses
42:16
the cellular network. So what I realized was, you
42:18
know, these devices, they, they, it's all about battery life,
42:21
right? They, you don't want to have to
42:23
be changing the battery in your tracker every day or even every
42:26
week. So they usually last around 30
42:28
days. And for an attacker, that's a
42:30
great thing, right? Because he only has to sneak and
42:33
get it in there, get it under the bumper and replace, recharge
42:37
it every month. And maybe he only needs to do it
42:40
for a month or less. But in order to save better
42:43
life, they don't transit continuously.
42:44
They transit on regular intervals, very specific
42:47
intervals. So I was able to first of all
42:51
realize that and say, well, if I could look for something that
42:54
is, you know, kind of your phone is transmitting whatever it
42:57
wants and there's really no rhyme or reason.
42:59
If you could look at the radio spectrum, you would just see
43:03
these spikes and the, and the video on CBS, they show the,
43:06
they show me driving, I show you, I show the spikes.
43:08
These trackers are very, very careful to only transmit every
43:11
minute on the minute, sometimes every 5 minutes, depends on how
43:14
much, how paranoid they want to be about saving battery.
43:17
But they're, they're like clockwork every minute on the
43:20
minute, right? And we tested 5 different brands
43:23
of, of trackers. So that's The thing is kind of
43:26
the secret sauce. Well, OK, they're transmitting
43:29
every minute, but how do I know where they're transmitting the
43:31
radio? This spectrum is massive and
43:33
there's hundreds of thousands of frequencies.
43:37
If I have to scan and monitor everything, by the time I get to
43:41
where it is, it's because it's a very short transmission, very
43:44
brief for like maybe 500 milliseconds, maybe less, 300
43:49
milliseconds. I'll miss it.
43:51
I'll miss it. So that, so I came up with,
43:53
with, with a way of figuring out based on where you are.
43:57
So it looks at the cell towers around you says, oh, I'm in
44:00
Ursulayam and I have a database, there's a Crowdsource database
44:05
of cell tower. Why do we have something?
44:06
Because people want to know people when they switch
44:08
carriers, right? You want to know if you're going
44:09
to get good, you know, get 4 or 5 bars, right?
44:13
So you go on like these websites like cellmapper.net, these
44:16
different free open, you know what we call Crowdsource.
44:20
So people regularly contribute. So it's always up-to-the-minute
44:24
because there's even apps that will automatic auto magically,
44:27
as we say, update that. Bottom line is you could say I'm
44:29
in the old city right now. I'm and I want to know the
44:33
towers. And not only do I want to know
44:34
what towers, I want to know the frequencies.
44:36
It's all, it's all there. If I know what's around me, I
44:39
don't have to scan everything. I could just do a very targeted
44:42
scan and I could just scan the transmission from the device to
44:47
the tower. It's called the uplink.
44:48
I don't want to listen to the tower.
44:50
The tower is talking to 100 phones, 1000 phones at one time.
44:54
That's like sitting in the basement address, you know, by
44:56
the mirror Lakewood right and trying to listen to 1:00 to.
45:01
To one that's EF, sure, EF. Sure.
45:03
So so I but however, if I, if I listen to the uplink, the
45:06
uplink, which is it's a two way transition to the tower, to the
45:09
device, the device, the tower, let me focus on the
45:12
communication between the device, the tower.
45:13
It's a very, very low power signal.
45:15
But guess what, if it's with me, if it's in my car or under my
45:18
car, as even though it's so weak, it's going to be strong to
45:21
me because I'm so close. The way radio signals work,
45:23
obviously the closer you are, the stronger it is.
45:25
So I'm like, OK, let me figure out what is the upland
45:28
frequencies? How do I figure out?
45:29
Again, it's all based on where you are.
45:31
So Step 1, where are you? Oh, I'm in your slime in the old
45:34
city. OK, here's the towers that are
45:37
around me. OK, what carriers are on those
45:40
towers? OK, it's whatever, whatever
45:42
carriers. OK, great.
45:44
But frequencies, OK, what are the uplink?
45:46
Right, all that is done and behind the scenes and then when
45:49
it goes to actually scan for the device, it's a very, very
45:52
targeted scan. It's only got to scan one or two
45:56
small ranges, relatively small ranges.
45:58
And maybe even if it if it missed it on the first minute,
46:01
it'll get it on, it'll, it'll, it'll catch, you know, maybe it
46:04
takes a minute just to to get loaded up, you know, for the app
46:07
to initialize. But after about one minute, it's
46:12
gonna, it's gonna catch it. And how does it know?
46:14
It's the question I get asked all the time.
46:16
How do you know? It's like the tracker?
46:17
Maybe it's my phone, but your phone isn't transmitting.
46:20
You said yeah, exactly. It's.
46:21
The free every minute, every minute.
46:23
And and also the strength. The strength if I'm driving,
46:26
what happens if the guy next to me has a tracker?
46:29
How do I know it's not like a tracker on his car?
46:30
Well, guess what? As he drives away from me, or as
46:33
I drive away from him or as we drive away from each other, it's
46:35
gonna, the signal's gonna get weaker.
46:37
But if a strong signal as I'm driving, the signal stays super
46:41
strong and doesn't change in the strength doesn't change in the
46:45
in in the time what we call the amplitude and the and the, you
46:48
know, the interval, then it must be with me the same way that you
46:50
get the air tag, right? You know, air tag again, it's
46:53
gonna work and it's gonna the air tag doesn't use like the
46:56
cell towers, the air tag. They're just looking for
46:59
something with a signature of air tag.
47:00
You can't do that with the GPS trackers right until my.
47:03
Paper you don't take it, it'll take mobile defender then a few
47:07
minutes to pick it up because it's gonna have to make sure
47:08
that it's it's at those different intervals.
47:11
Yeah, it'll take, it'll take like one minute because the
47:13
tracker is typically transmit every minute, right or less.
47:16
But typically there was a corner case.
47:19
How does mobile defender not know that someone just turned on
47:21
a phone at that one minute mark? Right, so they're gonna see that
47:24
that, that it's very it's a super strong signal.
47:27
So it must be close. Now, yes, we could put our
47:30
phones in airplane mode if we want to to, you know, to kind of
47:33
rule out the, you know, you don't need to, you don't need to
47:36
because even if it was your phone at that one minute mark,
47:39
your phone is not going to transmit exactly with that level
47:42
of signal exactly 1 minute later.
47:44
So let's say you turn it on and you detect it, you detect a
47:47
strong signal immediately. So already you're suspecting
47:50
because because of the because of the strength of the signal
47:52
and because of these specific frequency bands.
47:54
By the way, I didn't mention that these I, what we call IoT
47:57
Internet of Things device use special parts of the radio
47:59
spectrum that are like a subset of the regular cell phone
48:02
frequencies. Interesting, so that also tips
48:04
you off. So that tips your phone wouldn't
48:07
be transmitting over there. So, but still, you know, we
48:10
have, we, we have, let's say a pretty high probability, but you
48:13
know, it gets better as we go, right?
48:14
A minute later, right now, the probability just jumped from 50%
48:18
to 90%, you know, and the and and and.
48:21
Sure, if I if I was a bad guy, So what I would do and it's I
48:25
still wouldn't breakthrough you, but what I would do is I would
48:26
create a device that would operate in all frequencies like
48:30
the same one as a regular phone. So then you wouldn't catch it.
48:32
But then my issue would be is that you still catch me at the
48:34
one minute mark because why am I only transmitting it every
48:36
minute? Yeah, yeah.
48:37
And, and of course, the like, you know, the, the, the CIA, the
48:40
NSA, you know, the Mossad, sure they can customize and try to
48:44
play the cat and mouse game. And, and, and we will still,
48:47
it'll be a little bit harder, but we'll probably find it might
48:51
take a couple more minutes. But that off the shelf, the one
48:53
we're targeting is the off the shelf, the device, the one you
48:57
buy from Amazon that the attacker is not working for, you
49:01
know, for Shabbat, No. Matter.
49:04
You'll catch him anyway you can. Write and we'll catch him
49:05
anyways. We'll catch.
49:07
I had a meeting with CIA. Actually, they say they they
49:12
read the paper and they said could we talk to you?
49:15
And they probably don't. They probably don't want to be
49:17
saying this, but did. You sign NDA.
49:19
And inside NDA, nothing. And it was very interesting.
49:22
They said, they said, you know, you know, in the streets of New
49:26
York where you see car washes, they said many times that's not
49:29
a car wash, it's a CIA facility. They said the car pulls in and
49:33
we do it. We it comes out clean because if
49:35
it didn't come out clean, people would wonder, like it would look
49:37
really suspicious, right, If the car came out of a car wash and
49:40
it was, you know, just as dirty. But inside they're actually
49:43
doing a full spectrum scan for. But like, let's say they think
49:46
there's a bug, any kind of bug tracker or listening device
49:49
camera or whatever. He said you would never know.
49:52
Then he says car wash. It looks like a car wash.
49:54
It feels like a car wash. It sounds like a car.
49:56
It's it's not a car wash, it's one of their facilities.
49:58
It's a car wash plus. Exactly.
50:00
And it's a super high tech anecolic chamber as it's known,
50:04
where they have a very sophisticated millions of
50:06
dollars and they do those scans and because they need to
50:10
obviously make sure that they're, and I'm sure it's not
50:13
just the US have some all over the place.
50:15
He also said that and he was like a cyber, a cyber guy.
50:18
So he said, you know, if he just has like a crazy idea that pops
50:22
into his head, like he he can call.
50:24
He says there's two of them in the country.
50:25
It's almost like like cue from James Bond.
50:28
You can call up and say, can you build me this thing?
50:30
And they're like, sure, yeah, we'll we'll build it.
50:32
And they just build it. So any crazy idea he has.
50:36
So yeah, it was an interesting conversation.
50:38
But that was interesting. He said yeah, yeah.
50:41
Most of this we're almost out of time.
50:42
I got 2 questions I have to ask you though.
50:44
Have you ever walked around using your technology and picked
50:47
up signals? Yeah, Yeah.
50:48
That was part of our testing. So we first tested in the lab
50:51
and just to baseline it, then we tested out in the field.
50:54
So we tested both driving and walking because people sometimes
50:58
get a tracker. You know, like, did you get a
51:01
ping? Did you get a ping and then you
51:03
found a tracker like in the real world.
51:04
Have you done that yet? So we haven't had a situation
51:07
where like a hidden we these are trackers that we were, we knew
51:10
about because we were yeah, we were, we were testing that we
51:13
wanted to, we wanted to make sure that we we first could find
51:15
our own trackers. In terms of walking around, no,
51:18
but driving around, yes. Driving around, yes.
51:21
And but like I said, maybe someone has a tracker on, on,
51:24
you know, people buy trackers to track their own vehicles.
51:27
They they want to track their team, team sign to make sure
51:29
they're, you know, you know, not just where they're driving, but
51:32
you know, monitoring speed. There's legitimate reasons to
51:35
have talking. About New York and you just flip
51:36
out your app every once in a while, doesn't?
51:39
So, yeah, I mean, it's it's interesting, yeah, as we get
51:45
this out there, sure. People it's all about, you know,
51:48
visibility and and what we call situational awareness.
51:51
So, so yeah, people are going to people are going to people don't
51:54
know people enjoy today has the anti air tag, the Bluetooth
51:58
tracker built in. And I was just showing somebody
52:03
last night. I said you can go there and you
52:05
can say scan and show me what's around me.
52:07
And it goes, that's for Bluetooth.
52:08
It doesn't do anything for these cellular trackers, right?
52:11
Hopefully Google and Apple will build this in.
52:14
And when they build it in, it shouldn't just be me.
52:16
It shouldn't just be a professor at NYU.
52:18
It should be anyone, whether it's a woman who's or anyone
52:22
who's, you know, concerned about their privacy.
52:25
They should be able to scan for these things and it should be
52:27
operating constantly in real time, right?
52:29
They shouldn't have to download an app.
52:31
They shouldn't even have to trigger a scan.
52:33
It should just be and and yeah, if people could have fun, they
52:36
can make it like a treasure hunt, you know, just like a
52:38
Pokémon Go. We can do a tracker, tracker go
52:42
and here you get points for finding them.
52:44
And you know, we can turn it into a fun a fun thing, but.
52:48
So the main reason I had you on is we got, you know, is I really
52:51
think this is a very I think it's a wild idea.
52:54
I think it's a really important idea.
52:55
I think it, it, it's not an exaggeration to say that there's
52:58
aspects of the Cochranefish absolutely built into it.
53:01
So it's, it's, it's cost of an the holocake level as well, you
53:04
know, and, and I'm happy that you're having time on the air.
53:06
Can what are you looking for business wise?
53:08
I mean, you love to spread open those shares.
53:10
What are you looking for? If people are interested, what
53:12
can they, what can they think about?
53:14
Yeah. I mean, we want to get this
53:16
thing out there and they want to get this out onto like you said,
53:18
the street. We want this, this has to be out
53:20
on the street. We need, we need people to get
53:22
this technology, whatever is going to help, you know,
53:24
expedite that obviously, you know, funding is, is very
53:27
helpful because we can, we can accelerate our, you know, our,
53:29
our development, our, our deployment, you know, and, and
53:32
we can, you know, have the ability.
53:34
We want to we want to catch the attention of big tech and we
53:38
want, you know, we have a way of going through, like I said, an
53:41
NEDB national network end as well as we still need to show,
53:44
you know, address in the, you know, like the TV special was,
53:48
was with this like like $150.00 device you could buy.
53:52
People shouldn't have to even purchase that.
53:54
People should be able. It should just be something that
53:56
is all in one, a standard, right?
53:59
So it takes some development, there's some hardware, there's
54:03
some software to get that all not just to build the first one,
54:07
but to now start building it out and getting it out there, right.
54:10
So whether we build it or a company helps us build it,
54:15
whether we license it to a company, there's different ways
54:17
of going about at the end of the day, right?
54:20
We need, like I said, a one man team and, and we need, we need
54:24
to, to accelerate. We need to accelerate the, the,
54:27
the, the development of the deployment.
54:28
Like I said, the app is, is, is almost ready.
54:30
Well, you need, but we still need there's a hardware piece of
54:33
it that there's a cost. It's a very it's a low cost, but
54:37
there's a cost to it and multiplied by how many people in
54:40
the world need this. So investors, of course, are
54:44
gonna be helpful because investors are gonna help, are
54:46
gonna help us be successful. We hope to be back on on.
54:50
We may be back on another on another TV program that next
54:53
week, another national. I don't want to, you know, say
54:57
it before it's official, but we may be back on TV next week on a
55:01
major national network. Why don't you jump on Shark
55:04
Tank? This sounds like a great.
55:05
Shirt so so yeah sure I mean anything at the end of yeah get
55:09
just because people don't even know that this thing is out
55:12
there so just get it you know getting the word out getting the
55:14
message out right getting getting a licensing deals with
55:18
with big tech getting licensing with maybe with the vehicle
55:21
companies. Why not embed this into a into a
55:23
vehicle right there's there's R&D that has to be done where we
55:27
you know where my company has to prove out because you know Honda
55:30
Toyota, Ford, etcetera. They they they they're not gonna
55:34
they want to see this thing working right and it's more than
55:37
an algorithm is is arguably the most important part right like
55:40
figuring out how to do it. Thank God that we did that, but
55:43
now showing that it works and, you know, getting a car, doing a
55:47
prototype and imagine it's this is and especially with the
55:49
spoofing, the spoofing, like I said, it's a law and and, and
55:52
it's a law. So, so they wanna see, they
55:54
wanna see it built in. So, so there's a lot of R&D
55:57
costs to, to, to, to getting everything spun up.
56:00
But but things are gonna happen, you know, mid term very fast.
56:03
Once, once the prototypes are, are are built, built out and we
56:06
get more, you know, more media coverage and, and, and again,
56:10
once the manufacturers, the OEMs is really what we're targeting.
56:14
And there's also the telematics companies, the companies that
56:17
sell software that manage these fleets of vehicles.
56:19
We actually just spoke to one of the leaders, a billion dollar
56:23
company, a leader in the telematics, and they said we
56:26
have a big problem in in Mexico with cargo theft and they
56:30
actually have anti jamming. So if they just lose eyes on
56:34
their, you know, again, big trucking companies use their
56:37
software. So yeah, they go dark, right?
56:39
They say, oh, I can't see my truck.
56:40
They have an alert for that, but they don't have a solution for
56:42
the spoofing because again, those solutions that are out
56:45
there are military grade solutions.
56:46
They cost like $100,000 a pop, right?
56:49
They need something very, very effective and very inexpensive.
56:52
So they said we're interested, we're gonna hopefully rinse them
56:55
talking to them again because they again, the spoofing thing
56:57
is, you know, the truck goes off course, someone steals the
57:00
truck, but they spoof it and your and your your map still
57:03
shows, you know, the truck on course when it's really not.
57:07
So that's a big problem in, in in their Mexico market.
57:10
So yeah, it's yeah. So, so it's exciting.
57:14
It's, it's, you know, a lot of work that has to be done in
57:18
terms of getting getting these prototypes and getting in front
57:21
of these companies and and demoing.
57:23
But in recent time, we'll, we'll, we'll get there, but we
57:27
could use the support from anyone who wants to get
57:28
involved. It's clearly, I guess that even
57:30
if we end up just saving one life, this whole thing is worth
57:33
it, right? Multiply by how many we could.
57:35
It's it's something that I I can't even believe that, like as
57:40
we speak this, this thing is happening When, when, when I
57:43
have a solution like to me, like I have I, I that keeps me up at
57:47
night. Like I don't like, like my can't
57:49
figure out how to how to how to save people's lives with this.
57:53
That's great, but now like have them.
57:55
Please help me to get this out there.
57:57
Help me to get the the support from from whether it's you know,
58:00
investors or so most. Partners the the the gamar tells
58:03
us that we are not profits, but we are the children of profits.
58:07
Ain't no no to VM of all the banana VM.
58:08
Well, I'm not a prophet, but I'm the son of a prophet and I think
58:12
that you're going to be very successful and help a lot of
58:14
people. So then I'm going to ask you as
58:16
my final question, question this.
58:17
What's it like being on the precipice of success?
58:21
It's it's exciting, but it's also it's a it's a
58:23
responsibility. You feel like you, like I just
58:26
said, you, you feel like you have something, you know, you
58:28
have something. It's been scientifically
58:29
validated. That's great.
58:31
So, so Barkha sham. But but now getting it out.
58:34
There validated. And so it's, it's, it's, it's
58:38
the press, It's, it's the success is, is again, when we
58:41
say that the first life, when the first person we when the
58:44
news, Mr. Sham does the story, right.
58:47
They did the story about how this could save lives because
58:49
there's this new technology, the next story they're gonna do.
58:53
And unfortunately, they interviewed someone, a cousin of
58:55
someone who didn't have the technology and lost life.
58:57
The next story is when they interviewed the person who says,
58:59
you know what? I found the tracker that that my
59:02
abuser and my soccer was, was, was, was was going to was
59:06
tracking me, was going to do this horrible thing to me.
59:07
So that's that's the precipice of success.
59:10
So I feel to me that that that I can't wait.
59:12
It's about this success is going to be defined by the by by the,
59:17
the lives we saved. So it feels very exciting, but
59:21
also, like I said, almost like a stress that we like, like we, we
59:24
have it, but we we need to get it out there.
59:26
And why is it not out there? Right.
59:29
So it's, it's, it's exciting times, but it's also the, the,
59:33
the challenging time because it's, we need to, we need to
59:36
really just deliver. We need to deliver.
59:38
If I was a big, if I was Apple, I was Google, that would be
59:40
done. It would be a done deal, right?
59:42
And I'm not Apple and Google. We need to get their attention.
59:45
We need to, we need to get it embedded right.
59:47
It should, it should be something that is just
59:50
automatic. The same way you got the alert
59:52
from my son's guitar case, right?
59:54
The survivor should also get the alert from from their phone or,
59:58
or their vehicle or whatever. So it feels like we're close,
1:00:03
but we need to get over that last hill because the last hill
1:00:06
is when we actually start saving the lives, right?
1:00:08
Ladies and gentlemen, Moshe sat mobile.
1:00:10
Thank you so much Ruby. Thank you so much for being with
1:00:12
us. Thank you very much.
1:00:14
Thank you, everybody. All the best.
1:00:15
Thank you. Bye.
1:00:16
Bye.