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The New North: The Eight States Shaping a New European Security · Global Insights

• 0:00
  SPEAKER_03: Russia is the existential threat.
• 0:03
  SPEAKER_03: Which then also raises the question, what is it that then still holds the Transatlantic Alliance together?
• 0:14
  SPEAKER_04: Welcome everybody.
• 0:15
  SPEAKER_04: I'm Courtney Doggert, president of Network 2020.
• 0:18
  SPEAKER_04: As fears grow that Russia's war could spill into NATO territory, one grouping of European countries has been at the forefront of aid to Ukraine and acutely aware of the Russian threat.
• 0:29
  SPEAKER_04: The Nordic Baltic VII, or NB-8.
• 0:32
  SPEAKER_04: Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iceland.
• 0:37
  SPEAKER_01: But that said, they are not a power bloc.
• 0:41
  SPEAKER_01: They are not a unitary actor in any meaningful shape and form.
• 0:46
  SPEAKER_01: They all have their own foreign and security policies.
• 0:52
  SPEAKER_04: As a share of GDP, these countries are among the top donors to Ukraine in the world.
• 0:57
  SPEAKER_04: How eight countries became leaders in European security, and whether that leadership can survive economic and political turbulence is what we'll explore today.
• 1:06
  SPEAKER_03: It's about trying to do the maximum ourselves in order to protect our security interests.
• 1:22
  SPEAKER_04: Which brings us to our central question.
• 1:29
  SPEAKER_04: Or will EU bureaucracy and internal division count how far wartime urgency can carry them?
• 1:38
  SPEAKER_00: This is Global Insights by Network 2020.
• 1:52
  SPEAKER_04: So we have three terrific guests today to help us answer this question.
• 1:57
  SPEAKER_04: First, I'm very pleased to welcome Dr.
• 1:59
  SPEAKER_04: Hiskey Haukala.
• 2:01
  SPEAKER_04: Dr.
• 2:01
  SPEAKER_04: Haukala's expertise bridges analysis and practice.
• 2:05
  SPEAKER_04: Notably, he worked in the office of the President of the Republic of Finland during the NATO accession years, so it can help us understand political and security strategies.
• 2:15
  SPEAKER_04: Next, I am pleased to welcome Dr.
• 2:16
  SPEAKER_04: Jakob Funk Kierkegaard.
• 2:19
  SPEAKER_04: And lastly, it is a pleasure to welcome Dr.
• 2:21
  SPEAKER_04: Christi Reich.
• 2:22
  SPEAKER_04: Dr.
• 2:22
  SPEAKER_04: Reich has studied small state leadership and worked in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and can help us better understand the intersection of security and alliances.
• 2:33
  SPEAKER_04: So welcome to each of you.
• 2:34
  SPEAKER_04: It's a real pleasure to have you here today.
• 2:41
  SPEAKER_04: We're fresh off a few big events, including the NATO summit in Ankara last month, where President Trump again spoke of withdrawing U.S.
• 2:49
  SPEAKER_04: troops from Europe alongside his continued interest in claiming Greenland.
• 2:53
  SPEAKER_04: I also just mentioned the NBA summit in Ukraine that resulted in helpful but not necessarily transformative aid given US gaps.
• 3:03
  SPEAKER_04: So, what does a more assertive, more autonomous NBA look like if Washington's commitment keeps softening?
• 3:11
  SPEAKER_04: And where is the greatest risk in that trajectory?
• 3:15
  SPEAKER_01: Well, first of all, thank you for the invitation and thank you for having me on this webinar.
• 3:21
  SPEAKER_01: It's a particular pleasure to be here together with these colleagues and friends, dare I say.
• 3:28
  SPEAKER_01: This is a very important question that we are, of course, thinking very, very closely about here in Northern Europe, including obviously all the countries of the NBA.
• 3:39
  SPEAKER_01: What is the role they can realistically be expected to play and what are the sort of the risks and opportunities going forward?
• 3:47
  SPEAKER_01: I think to begin with, and to begin with the sort of the positive side of things, we can definitely see a sort of a positive new dynamic dynamic in the in the region and especially between the countries sort of slated the NBA.
• 4:02
  SPEAKER_01: The NATO integration of Finland and Sweden has clearly, I would change, I would argue, changed the military and even the political geography in northern Europe, allowing these countries to increasingly come together.
• 4:15
  SPEAKER_01: They are also, as you mentioned in your introductory remarks, uh probably some of the highest per capita uh supporters to Ukraine.
• 4:23
  SPEAKER_01: Uh they work very, very hard also on the diplomatic front, trying to ensure uh that the gulf between uh over the Atlantic doesn't become too big when it comes to dealing with these some of these key questions.
• 4:38
  SPEAKER_01: So increasingly they are uh they are a force to be reckoned with.
• 4:42
  SPEAKER_01: There is uh, I would say, increasing cohesion when it comes to these countries, a willingness to work together, a growing realization that our security is mutually codependent, and and and and and we have to be able to see eye to eye and make a meaningful impact also in terms of security and and diplomacy.
• 5:03
  SPEAKER_01: But that said, they are not a power block.
• 5:07
  SPEAKER_01: They are not a unitary actor in any meaningful shape and form.
• 5:12
  SPEAKER_01: They all have their own foreign and security policies, they all have their own niches and roles to play in the wider European theater, which always has to be kept in mind when we are talking about security in Northern Europe, being the European Union, and obviously, first and foremost, NATO.
• 5:30
  SPEAKER_01: They also have their own bilateral relations with the United States of America in terms of security, defense cooperation, and so on and so forth.
• 5:39
  SPEAKER_01: And and increasingly, I think they can be expected to play and work well together, but their ability to, let's say, hang together in light of the growing external pressures from the region, the Russian uh the menace, the increasing role of China, which should be also acknowledged in this respect, but also the the changing face of American domestic and foreign politics that definitely also affects the regional dynamics in this neck of the woods, most probably will be the key in determining what these countries can actually achieve together and how far they are perhaps pushed in order to find the common ground in light of these external pressures and challenges that are clearly mounting as we speak.
• 6:30
  SPEAKER_04: Thank you.
• 6:30
  SPEAKER_04: And I'd like to stick with one of those challenges for a moment and kind of zoom out and get a little historical perspective with both you, Hiskey and Christi.
• 6:41
  SPEAKER_04: Heeskey, you recently had an article on foreign affairs where you argue with Samuel Charop that Europe collectively misjudged Russian intentions after the Cold War, and that the peace dividend assumption turned out wrong.
• 6:54
  SPEAKER_04: And Christy, your own writing really argues that Estonia's strategic view never really changed after 1991.
• 7:00
  SPEAKER_04: So there was nothing to unlearn.
• 7:02
  SPEAKER_04: So, Christy, just starting with you, do you think that large parts of Europe m misjudged Russia and got this wrong?
• 7:10
  SPEAKER_04: Or did the Nordic Baltic states just have less wiggle room in the first place?
• 7:16
  SPEAKER_04: And then I'd like to hear Christy first and then Hisky, your take.
• 7:22
  SPEAKER_03: Well, first of all, uh very glad to join the conversation.
• 7:25
  SPEAKER_03: Thanks for the invitation.
• 7:28
  SPEAKER_03: So indeed, um during the post-Cold War period, which uh I would say is over by now, the Western policy vis-a-vis Russia was never quite united, but uh there was a strong shared view, especially in Western Europe, that uh it was important to engage uh Russia, to develop uh dialogue, to pursue economic cooperation and interdependence.
• 7:56
  SPEAKER_03: And the hope was that uh that was the way then to manage the relationship, to achieve shared security and stability, and perhaps even to integrate uh Russia in the European uh space.
• 8:13
  SPEAKER_03: But uh the Baltic states uh together with Poland were always rather skeptical of this uh view, but they were in the margins of the broader European uh approach.
• 8:26
  SPEAKER_03: Uh their own experience uh was that Russia was still, even in the 1990s, and trying to cling on to its uh sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space.
• 8:39
  SPEAKER_03: And uh, for example, it was not at all uh willing to withdraw its troops uh from the Baltic states.
• 8:46
  SPEAKER_03: It did it in 1994 under Western pressure, but it was uh not something that it actually preferred to do.
• 8:54
  SPEAKER_03: And then Russia was never quite uh happy about uh the eastern enlargement of uh NATO in particular.
• 9:01
  SPEAKER_03: It had less of an issue with the EU.
• 9:03
  SPEAKER_03: Uh but uh I think it turned out uh when Ukraine started to um uh seek membership in both organizations, NATO and the European Union, that uh Russia actually did have a problem with uh both.
• 9:20
  SPEAKER_03: And graduate with a Russian approach uh and then more if uh so uh I think we may have lost Christy for a moment.
• 9:49
  SPEAKER_04: So Husky, why don't we just turn to you for your take?
• 9:53
  SPEAKER_03: Yeah and what it takes to manage the So now it's of course the challenge to maintain that uh unity uh because what we see happening is is that uh I think the US and Europe are somewhat moving uh further away on how they see Russia.
• 10:17
  SPEAKER_03: Uh the latest uh security strategy of the United States uh does not uh define Russia as a threat to the US, whereas as you also said in your introduction for countries in our region and in uh northern Europe, Russia is the existential threat, which then also raises the question what is it that then still holds the transatlantic alliance uh together?
• 10:43
  SPEAKER_03: Do we still have a strong enough uh uh shared understanding of the security environment?
• 10:50
  SPEAKER_03: Um we also have questions about the value bases, is the shared values uh still uh there or are we drifting apart even in that respect?
• 11:01
  SPEAKER_03: But indeed, uh when it comes to interests, security interests, um I think the Nordic politic states uh try to be very pragmatic here.
• 11:11
  SPEAKER_03: They try to keep uh the United States uh engaged in the region, keep it engaged also in uh the attempt to achieve uh peace in uh Ukraine because uh we still see the role of the US as indispensable, but at the same time, uh I think the question is more and more pressing like uh what are the vulnerabilities and risks that come with the dependence?
• 11:36
  SPEAKER_03: And uh are there ways to mitigate the risks?
• 11:39
  SPEAKER_03: That's why we invest so much in defense in uh all the Nordic Baltic countries.
• 11:45
  SPEAKER_03: That's why we are such uh strong supporters of Ukraine.
• 11:49
  SPEAKER_03: It's about trying to do the maximum ourselves in order to protect our security interests, while we try to keep the US involved, but uh we are increasingly uncertain about uh whether it uh uh holds or not.
• 12:04
  SPEAKER_04: Thank you for that.
• 12:05
  SPEAKER_04: And I hope we can dig into some of those other questions later about alliances.
• 12:10
  SPEAKER_04: Hiskey, your take.
• 12:13
  SPEAKER_01: Yes, thank you.
• 12:14
  SPEAKER_01: Uh I would love to be in a position to report the amazing foresight of Finland in terms of seeing the eternal Russia threat and and and sort of being among the vanguard um assessing this threat correctly.
• 12:30
  SPEAKER_01: But to be frank, I think in the 1990s in particular, and still well into the 2000s, Finland bought into this uh positive mutual interdependence paradigm and uh and was uh trying to be fairly constructive and pragmatic in relations with Russia with the view of somehow binding this difficult and sometimes even menacing neighbor into the wider Euro-Atlantic space, however you want to define it.
• 13:00
  SPEAKER_01: What sort of probably differentiates us from the the rest of the sort of the European mainstream was perhaps the Finnish slowness.
• 13:09
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, I don't want to say stupidness, but slowness in terms of drawing some key conclusions.
• 13:15
  SPEAKER_01: And for example, the fact that we did not join NATO in the 1990s and 2000s was actually a factor that favoured Finland paradoxically, because we missed the train of optimizing our national defense and our preparedness to the sort of the out-of-area expeditionary warfighting uh insurgencies in in faraway places because we weren't part of NATO.
• 13:42
  SPEAKER_01: We had to retain our national defense and our capabilities, and because we weren't in a position to enjoy the Article V guarantees until 2023, when we finally joined NATO, we had to retain national defense and and and more on top of that.
• 13:59
  SPEAKER_01: So, in a way, it was our sluggishness in in sort of joining the mainstream of the of the Euro-Atlantic defense uh integration that paradoxically favored Finland because we were actually one of the rare countries in Europe who still had national defense capabilities when the security environment took a turn turn for worse.
• 14:23
  SPEAKER_01: And and this probably explains uh the our situation.
• 14:28
  SPEAKER_01: But but when it comes to Russia, I think our learning curve has been equally steep as it has to been to many of us.
• 14:35
  SPEAKER_01: Uh the bitter disillusionment already beginning in the naughty and spilling over to the to the era when when Russia really started to get aggressive against Ukraine starting in 2014 has been a series of rude awakenings for Finland as well, entailing readjusting our defense position and obviously accepting that security is an investment that is very, very expensive but always worth doing in our geographical position.
• 15:07
  SPEAKER_04: That's a great segue to Jacob because we need to talk about the expensive investments of security.
• 15:14
  SPEAKER_04: Um I'll start in one place though, which is with you, Jacob, which is the MBA and their very strong financial position overall.
• 15:25
  SPEAKER_04: They have some of Europe's strongest balance sheets, triple A ratings in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the lowest government debt in the EU and Estonia, I think, um, a 1.9 trillion plus sovereign wealth fund in Norway.
• 15:39
  SPEAKER_04: So we've talked a little bit about um the MBA not being quite such that strong block as Heeskey pointed out earlier.
• 15:49
  SPEAKER_04: But does that financial strength actually translate into influence over European defense industrial decisions?
• 15:58
  SPEAKER_02: Oh, I I would certainly uh argue that it does.
• 16:02
  SPEAKER_02: First of all, it there is a power of example, and uh Europe has the, if you like, dumb luck of having uh we can debate whether there's a relationship between these two things, but it is a general fact that among the uh European countries and certainly the members of the EU, uh, those countries with fiscal space available are also the ones that are relatively adjacent to Russia, uh, so that they both feel uh the existential threat that both Christy and Hiskey talked about, and they have the capacity to do something about it.
• 16:42
  SPEAKER_02: There isn't really among the eight this sort of existential political question of guns or butter.
• 16:51
  SPEAKER_02: These countries can actually afford to do both and have stepped up, both in terms of the uh national bilateral contributions to Ukraine, and obviously also on their uh national defense uh rearmament or uh defense expenditure increases.
• 17:11
  SPEAKER_02: And if you're looking at the European countries, um I doubt we can add Poland, lightly Germany, the Netherlands, but beyond that, I don't think there are any other countries outside the eight that are gonna be anywhere near the total 5% commitment.
• 17:31
  SPEAKER_02: Uh, and this is very clearly a function of their fiscal strength.
• 17:36
  SPEAKER_02: And I think it it spills over also in one other element uh that we're heading into right now, which will be of a very uh acute importance, uh, which is the next long-term EU budget, where uh a number of these countries are major net contributors to the EU budget.
• 17:59
  SPEAKER_02: And when the priorities of the next seven-year EU budget are being uh basically hammered out, which will happen over the next six to twelve months, it is at the end of the day uh to a disproportionately large degree the net contributing countries that, if you like, help shape that outcome.
• 18:23
  SPEAKER_02: Now, size matters.
• 18:24
  SPEAKER_02: There's no doubt that uh, you know, Germany is at the end of the day, the country that sits at the end of the table very often when it comes to EU uh fiscal decisions.
• 18:36
  SPEAKER_02: But to the extent that um the new government under Friedrich Merz, I would say, politically shares uh the concerns about Russia uh to a far larger degree than, let's be honest, prior German governments and chancellors did.
• 18:54
  SPEAKER_02: I think uh the NA-8 has a really a strong, a good opportunity to also affect the priorities of Germany, of Netherlands, and the other main net contributors to the EU budget, which will help, I think, ensure that uh the priorities that they care about, which are focused on defense capabilities, uh strengthening the relationship and support for Ukraine are also reflected in the overall political prioritizations in the coming budget at the EU level.
• 19:30
  SPEAKER_02: There's very clearly a role.
• 19:32
  SPEAKER_02: Well, even if I completely agree with what Hiski said, these are not a unitary actor bloc.
• 19:38
  SPEAKER_02: They have specific individual national interests.
• 19:42
  SPEAKER_02: That's always the case uh when you're talking about EU budget considerations, but they all share this fundamental realization of the existential threat for the region from Russia.
• 19:57
  SPEAKER_02: And I do believe that will shine through uh in the coming EU budget negotiation.
• 20:03
  SPEAKER_02: And then perhaps one last thing, which is that there is always this um tribulally or often futile attempt at fully integrating uh European defense procurement.
• 20:17
  SPEAKER_02: It's never gonna happen at the uh overall EU level.
• 20:21
  SPEAKER_02: But I think if you're looking at the good, the best case scenarios for uh coalition of the willing defense procurement integration, it's gonna happen among the N8s.
• 20:36
  SPEAKER_02: Like what we have seen, for instance, when you're looking at the integration of Nordic Air Forces, uh, maintenance, ammunition procurement, uh joint procurement of Finnish armored personnel vehicles, and these types of things.
• 20:52
  SPEAKER_02: So that's another area where because they all are investing a lot, they always they all have uh a relatively large increase in defense expenditure.
• 21:01
  SPEAKER_02: There is a hope that quite a lot will be done together.
• 21:05
  SPEAKER_02: Uh and that again will, if you like, show uh send a signal to the rest of Europe.
• 21:12
  SPEAKER_04: So we'll keep an eye out for that budget.
• 21:14
  SPEAKER_04: Christy, I'd like to turn back to you with a quick question about alliances and security.
• 21:20
  SPEAKER_04: So you've argued that the three pillars of security, the transatlantic relationship, EU integration, and international law are all under strain simultaneously.
• 21:31
  SPEAKER_04: In your opinion, of these three, which is most likely to break first?
• 21:38
  SPEAKER_03: This is uh indeed uh the very big question for the foreign policies of uh of the NBA countries.
• 21:46
  SPEAKER_03: Let me first build on what uh Jakob just uh said.
• 21:49
  SPEAKER_03: Indeed, in the EU framework, the Nordic Baltic countries constitute a like minded group that uh do put now a very strong emphasis.
• 22:00
  SPEAKER_03: on security and defense.
• 22:02
  SPEAKER_03: However, this is also one of the sources of kind of tension within the EU because this view is not quite shared across all of the European Union about how much we should prioritize the security and defense.
• 22:21
  SPEAKER_03: The kind of butter versus guns question is more painful in in some of the European countries than it is in our region, where it is kind of more, I think, obvious to a vast majority of the population that we really need to invest in defense and we can also afford to do so.
• 22:39
  SPEAKER_03: Not that it's not painful and there are difficult choices to be made, but we are doing them.
• 22:44
  SPEAKER_03: But then in the EU we have these uh dividing lines and uh the more kind of pressed our region feels on on the security issues uh I think the more difficult it uh becomes then to to bridge uh these uh these different uh perspectives so that's uh that's the tension for the EU but then looking at uh the two other so to say pillars that I have uh written about uh the transatlantic alliance and then international law these used to be mutually supportive at the times when the US played the role of uh uh leadership in uh in the rules-based international order but uh this is no longer the case and uh there are tracks uh in both of the transatlantic relationship and in the way the whole international system of multilateralism international law is uh functioning uh we don't have now any of the major powers interested in uh maintaining uh the post-World War II order uh rather what we see is this uh kind of revisionist uh action uh not only by Russia but even by the United States which means that uh these these two pillars the transatlantic relationship then the international law and the rules-based order they are both eroding while they are also moving further apart from each other which really puts us in a very awkward position because the non aquatic states being small countries in a vulnerable geopolitical uh position we would really like to keep both so we try to do what is possible to still hold on to both of these pillars and not do anything ourselves that would further contribute to their erosion but I'm afraid it's uh becoming increasingly difficult.
• 24:49
  SPEAKER_03: I don't expect a collapse of any of these uh big pillars it's just further erosion that is difficult to manage and then trying to do even more together um regionally as a group of like-minded countries is one way to kind of uh mitigate uh the risks and uh try to strengthen our uh security in this situation and then um we are I think hoping that uh Europe can take more of a role in uh European defense and I'm not saying that the EU would take over the role of NATO rather what I mean is that uh Europe has to take more responsibility for its own defense primarily still in the framework of NATO but this is now the big uh question for European defense uh whether Europeans are able to take on this responsibility which then uh can kind of mitigate uh the problem of dependence uh on the US and then actually it can also help maybe to keep the US uh engaged in in European uh security so I think here again our region has a kind of common view on uh how to move ahead what should be the the strategy of uh Europe but uh the challenge is then to persuade all of the European countries that indeed uh this is uh this is the way to go thank you and staying on that defense piece uh jacob turning back to you we've talked a lot about guns and butter I'd love to just dig into that a little bit more so raising that defense spending to NATO's 5% of GDP target really as Christy pointed out means competing directly with things like pensions and healthcare even in some of these wealthy fiscally disciplined states that do have aging populations so where in your mind does public support for that trade-off stand right now and can it be sustained over the long term I mean I think I would think I mean I think the gist of what Christy said that we in the NB8 are taking you know are facing these prioritizations, facing these choices and clearly opting for a buildup of defense.
• 27:18
  SPEAKER_02: But again as I mentioned earlier we have the capacity to do so unfortunately I think the basic reality is that other countries further south are not going to make those same choices.
• 27:29
  SPEAKER_02: You are not going to have a every European member state of NATO get anywhere near even never mind the three and a half never mind the five percent they're not going to get anywhere near that number uh you will be lucky to have maybe a half a percentage point increase from a very low base.
• 27:51
  SPEAKER_02: If Spain for instance gets to two percent Italy maybe a little above if France retains its current defense spending level over the last decade or so of somewhere between two and a half I think we should be lucky I personally don't expect uh the UK to be fiscally able to uh meet these targets either I think Germany will I think Poland will I think other Romania quite likely as well but the these other countries particularly in southern Europe are going to make uh different choices they're not going to meet these targets and as Christy said this is already bringing uh schisms into the EU uh we you know one of the reasons why for instance it's not the only reason but one of the reasons why Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez is not particularly popular uh in uh Nordic uh in northern European countries is you know he said it very explicitly last year he basically said quoted in the Financial Times I think it was he said well our main concern in Spain is not the Russian army coming charging down the Pyrenees end quote which is of course uh a real political correct assessment by a Spanish prime minister but it is not one that you know reflects the similar type of uh reflections or choices as we're seeing in northern Europe so this certainly does have I think potentially a very it has the potential to reshape the EU especially once we get into what will be a very thorny debate also about uh Ukrainian accession um but as I said fundamentally not everybody in the EU or indeed among the European NATO members are gonna make the same choices as the NB8.
• 29:52
  SPEAKER_02: They're gonna choose to keep issuing butter rather than buy more guns because they face that direct trade-off that's just the reality and then lots of rhetoric and lots of playing with the fiddling around with the numbers and these types of things they will get nowhere near 5% that's for sure fair enough yes different domestic priorities for sure um Heeske turning back to you and uh almost trying to go full circle and what and just for the those listening we will get to audience questions shortly so if you have any questions please feel free to put them in the QA box.
• 30:31
  SPEAKER_04: But Heeskey we talked about briefly the Ankara summit where President Trump again renewed his charge to claim Greenland where the US is also a guarantor of NATO's Article 5 and as I just mentioned this source of direct pressure on Denmark over Greenland.
• 30:51
  SPEAKER_04: So how is the NBA planning for a US that might not be a reliable ally on this specific issue well um how can you plan for the unthinkable?
• 31:06
  SPEAKER_01: I mean uh I don't think most probably you can and therefore I would I would um like to reframe the issue by perhaps reminding our American friends and colleagues that the United States most probably does not have better friends and allies than the countries of the north and uh and the countries in the NBA perhaps being the particular case in point.
• 31:32
  SPEAKER_01: We are very strong partners in terms of security and defense that as has been discussed here today we invest more than average to defense capabilities and I would like to think that the northern Europeans back a punch also in other fields of security be it cyber or comprehensive or our ability to understand and withstand hybrid activities and hybrid pressure and so on and so forth.
• 32:01
  SPEAKER_01: I would also like to think that we are important economic partners to the United States we are a significant entity in terms of economic power when we are combined the Nordics and the Baltics together we have some of the leading technologies in the world actually because of our climate northern Europe is becoming the hub in terms of data centers which are increasingly actually owned and operated by American companies and I could go on and on and on with this list where our complementarity our ability to work together and produce mutual benefits also to I think to the amazing benefit of the United States is not in question and not in doubt.
• 32:48
  SPEAKER_01: But all of these things would be in doubt if the United States chose to pursue a very aggressive course when it came to Greenland because that would disrupt it would be a a thorough shock to the system and to the very heart of international law and and most probably would force all of us to reconsider our relations with the United States because we we have the ties that bind here in the region we have the solidarity and I think we would have to then show our displeasure with this course of action.
• 33:23
  SPEAKER_01: So I think I would invite the Americans to take a broader perspective into the mix and not only look at the Greenland but look at our wider partnership of at everything that is at stake and look for ways to deal with the genuine concerns that the current administration has in a way that ensures that we can work together and come closer together and ensure that the Greenland question is taken care of but also that our friendship and partnership is deepened and and not put into jeopardy thank you very well said what I'd like to do now before I turn to the audience QA and again I see some questions coming in so please feel free to add them if you would like to the QA box.
• 34:09
  SPEAKER_04: I'd love to just do a really quick lightning round signal check with each of you um so a one-word answer if you can or one sentence max if you can um and I'll start with you and then we'll go Huskey Christy Jakob so one are we closer to a NATO Russia confrontation than we were a year ago well by definition if you assume that there will be a Russia-NATO confrontation then as time goes on we come closer to that point in time but I think instead of speculating about these eventualities I would be more comfortable asking the question are we in a position to fully deter and stop this from happening?
• 34:58
  SPEAKER_01: And that I think invites the question of what we can do more and I think there's still plenty we can do more on the political level and also in terms of actual military capabilities and preparations and and here I think the onus of our activities should be how we can ensure that this nightmare scenario will never come to pass.
• 35:21
  SPEAKER_02: Fantastic Christy Yeah well um I fully agree and uh actually I still think that uh a military attack by Russia against the NATO country is highly unlikely that the deterrence is still there but of course it requires uh even more efforts by Europeans uh to keep it credible and uh not just investing in defense but then also our messaging uh has to convey our will to defend it's kind of psychological uh readiness so psychological defense is also something where Europe has not been I think as as strong as it uh should be and Jakob well I mean I I think first of all if you add to the confrontation between NATO and Russia the issues of hybrid conflict a hybrid war we're already there I think that's very clear from recent events at Leipzig Airport and other uh other sabotage uh activities inside NATO but I think we also have to be uh honest with ourselves that uh this is one one of the reasons why I think no deal is much better than a bad deal for Ukraine because as long as the war in Ukraine goes on and uh Ukraine is evidently able and willing to fight it the probability of a Russian you know mil direct military attack on NATO I think is zero but once the war in Ukraine ends and Putin has to decide whether he sends his uh battle hardened uh whatever we choose to call it army home or shifts it's elsewhere that is where this issue will come to it for fortunately we're not well fortunately on for we're not there yet anymore but that's the point uh in which this becomes acute and that's precisely what Hiski writes about in his article um I'll start with you on this one Jakob and then we can go Jakob Christy which single MBA country should we be watching most closely over the next year I would say I would say that probably the biggest one uh Sweden but on the other hand interestingly enough the one country that may make the biggest changes is actually Iceland uh with the uh referendum this coming weekend which potentially sets in motion EU accession with the possible implications of also uh affecting the domestic debate on that issue in Norway so I I would from that point of view I I would say actually Iceland is the is the one that has the politically uh the most interesting uh near-term if you like scenarios thanks christyakov kind of stole my point but let me then uh try a different one um I think Denmark is interesting precisely because of the issue of Greenland which we already addressed I think uh in the case of Denmark we really see uh how far this pragmatism of uh the Nordic Baltic countries is being stretched and Denmark really has tried uh everything to direct this uh uh escalation of tensions over Greenland into a NATO framework find a way to you know deal with the tensions uh so that uh you calm down the situation you find some kind of uh pragmatic uh way to discuss uh whatever uh concerns the US may have and still we can't be sure of course uh what will happen next uh the whole issue may come uh back again and uh then in that case it would really be a very severe test not only to yeah to our relationship Denmark's relationship with the US but uh also uh NATO and this principle of territorial integrity is of course uh something that our countries cannot make uh compromises on and this also actually goes for Ukraine and and it's um really uh uh worrying to see that uh there have been signals from the US that the US might be ready to accept Ukraine just uh giving away some of its uh territory and even kind of um uh legalizing that uh move but if this is something that the US uh could find acceptable it would also be uh very hard for countries in our region to digest.
• 40:20
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you and his key well I think the answers were so good so probably it's my turn to to give a less good answer.
• 40:28
  SPEAKER_01: But I I would look at Norway.
• 40:30
  SPEAKER_01: They are the NBA chairman in 2027 if I remember correctly so they will have a formal role most definitely worth watching and I would like to see Iceland voting to reinstate their accession negotiations and uh and Norway following suit because I know the un the European Union doesn't always have the best reputation over that side of the Atlantic but I think it's still the key in terms of ensuring that Europeans can rise to the occasion and and generate the necessary economic resources and also the ability to function in the wider field of comprehensive security.
• 41:12
  SPEAKER_01: And I think it would help immensely if we had a strong Nordic Baltic voice not only in inside NATO but also inside the European Union fantastic thank you I know it wasn't really fair to make you go last on there.
• 41:30
  SPEAKER_04: There were a lot of great answers.
• 41:31
  SPEAKER_04: Thank you.
• 41:32
  SPEAKER_04: And Hiski I'd like to turn to you with this question just because one theme that keeps coming up is this idea of what happens after the Ukraine war is over and where does Russia go from here?
• 41:43
  SPEAKER_04: And I know you've done a lot of thinking about this where would you like to see the NBA go in terms of their strategy when um when addressing the future after the the Russia's war in Ukraine well what I would like to see and I what I think is imperative that we do see going forward is the NBA fully immersed in a functioning transatlantic alliance.
• 42:12
  SPEAKER_01: I mean this is the this is the the most important thing I think for European security and stability that we manage to recalibrate the security relationship in a manner that results in a in a well coordinated and executed transition of of responsibilities when it comes to carrying the main burden for European defense.
• 42:37
  SPEAKER_01: And uh and I would be I would not look to Spain as to be the first responder and the the bulk of European defense going forward.
• 42:46
  SPEAKER_01: I don't think anyone really expects that but of course we expect everyone to chip in and to contribute as part of the sort of the NATO planning process.
• 42:56
  SPEAKER_01: However that will be recalibrated going forward and probably it will entail in any case a sort of a less nuanced role when it comes to the United States in terms of conventional military capabilities in particular but this process can be done well or it can be done horribly badly and I think it is all our in all our interest that it's done with the best sort of planning and best sort of mutual understanding what we are trying to achieve here.
• 43:24
  SPEAKER_01: And this is actually asking for quite a bit in the current political circumstances and the turbulence that we seem to be witnessing in the transatlantic relations.
• 43:36
  SPEAKER_01: So in my mind the NB8 can be amazingly important and valuable contributor to this process but to end up in a place where we start to look at the NB8 in terms of some kind of a Plan B or C or plan NB8 if you like for that matter to sort of to make up for the shortcomings in the wider European security systems then we are increasingly on dire straits and it's not a happy scenario I think for the countries in question nor is it a good one for transatlantic or European security and stability and therefore we should tread rather carefully when we talk about these issues and then try to ensure that we make sensible decisions going forward.
• 44:24
  SPEAKER_04: Well that seems like a great place to conclude um and so what I'd like to just wrap with I just want to say thank you first of all you all were tremendous offered tremendous insights you helped us explore how the role of the Nordic Baltic eight has changed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine what might happen after any sort of potential peace agreement and what their influence means for the European Union, for NATO and the greater security leadership of the continent.
• 44:55
  SPEAKER_04: So Yuski, Kristi, Yakov, thank you so much for bringing your different perspectives to this conversation and thank you for everyone who joined us today.
• 45:05
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you so much on this episode of Global Insights you can subscribe to Global Insights on podcasts, Spotify or wherever you get your money for more analysis, events and ways to connect with our community, click on the link in the description