Latest / Philosophy / 023 - Part IV The Universe XXIII Some Great Philosophies of the Past
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twenty three of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The sleebrivox
- 0:04Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Part four The Universe,
- 0:09Speaker 1: Chapter twenty three. Some great philosophies of the past. Our
- 0:14Speaker 1: discussions hitherto have been concerned very largely with man. But man,
- 0:20Speaker 1: on his own account, is not the true subject matter
- 0:23Speaker 1: of philosophy. What concerns philosophy is the universe as a whole.
- 0:28Speaker 1: Man demands consideration solely as the instrument by means of
- 0:32Speaker 1: which we acquire knowledge of the universe. And that is
- 0:35Speaker 1: why it is human beings as capable of knowledge that
- 0:39Speaker 1: have concerned us mainly in past chapters, rather than as
- 0:42Speaker 1: centers of will or of emotion. We are not in
- 0:46Speaker 1: the mood proper to philosophy so long as we are
- 0:49Speaker 1: interested in the world only as it affects human beings.
- 0:53Speaker 1: The philosophic spirit demands an interest in the world for
- 0:56Speaker 1: its own sake. But since we apprehend the world to
- 1:00Speaker 1: our own senses and think about it with our own intellect,
- 1:03Speaker 1: the picture that we acquire is inevitably colored by the
- 1:07Speaker 1: personal medium through which it comes to us. Consequently, we
- 1:11Speaker 1: have to study this medium, namely ourselves, in order to
- 1:15Speaker 1: find out, if we can, what elements in our picture
- 1:18Speaker 1: of the world are contributed by us, and what elements
- 1:21Speaker 1: we may accept as representative of outside fact. Previous chapters
- 1:26Speaker 1: have studied cognition both as an outwardly observable reaction and
- 1:31Speaker 1: as it appears to introspection. In the chapters that remain,
- 1:35Speaker 1: we shall be concerned with what we can know about
- 1:38Speaker 1: the universe in view of the nature of the instrument
- 1:41Speaker 1: that we have to employ. I do not think we
- 1:44Speaker 1: can know as much as many philosophers of the past
- 1:47Speaker 1: have supposed, but I think it is worthwhile to have
- 1:50Speaker 1: in our minds an outline of their systems. I shall
- 1:54Speaker 1: therefore begin by setting forth a few typical philosophical constructions
- 1:59Speaker 1: of earlier set injuries. Modern philosophy is generally taken as
- 2:04Speaker 1: beginning with Descartes, who flourished in the first half of
- 2:07Speaker 1: the seventeenth century. We have already had occasion in chapter
- 2:11Speaker 1: sixteen to consider his argument. I think therefore I am,
- 2:15Speaker 1: But now we will deal with him somewhat more generally.
- 2:19Speaker 1: He inaugurated two movements, one in metaphysics, one in theory
- 2:24Speaker 1: of knowledge. In metaphysics, he emphasized the gulf between mind
- 2:29Speaker 1: and matter or between soul and body. In theory of knowledge,
- 2:33Speaker 1: he advocated a critical scrutiny of premises. These two movements
- 2:38Speaker 1: had different histories, each of them interesting. The science of
- 2:42Speaker 1: dynamics was rapidly developing in Descartes's time and seemed to
- 2:46Speaker 1: show that the motions of matter could be calculated mathematically
- 2:50Speaker 1: given sufficient data. As the motions of matter include our
- 2:54Speaker 1: bodily acts, even speaking and writing, it seemed as if
- 2:59Speaker 1: the consequence must be a materialistic theory of human behavior.
- 3:04Speaker 1: His consequence, however, was distasteful to most philosophers, and they
- 3:09Speaker 1: therefore invented various ways of escaping from it. Descartes himself
- 3:13Speaker 1: thought that the will could have certain direct physical effects.
- 3:17Speaker 1: He thought that the brain contains a fluid called the
- 3:20Speaker 1: animal spirits, and that the will could influence the direction
- 3:24Speaker 1: of its motion, though not the velocity. In this way,
- 3:28Speaker 1: he was still able to hold that the will is
- 3:30Speaker 1: effective in the manner in which common sense supposes it
- 3:34Speaker 1: to be. But this view did not fit in it
- 3:36Speaker 1: all well with the rest of his philosophy. He held that,
- 3:40Speaker 1: apart from the supreme substance, namely God, there are two
- 3:45Speaker 1: created substances mind and matter, that the essence of mind
- 3:49Speaker 1: is thought, and that the essence of matter is extension.
- 3:53Speaker 1: He made these two substances so different that interaction between
- 3:57Speaker 1: them became difficult to understand, and his followers decided that
- 4:01Speaker 1: there is never any effect either of mind on matter
- 4:05Speaker 1: or of matter on mind. The motives for this development
- 4:10Speaker 1: were various. Perhaps the most important was the development of physics.
- 4:14Speaker 1: Immediately after Descartes's time, a law was discovered called the
- 4:19Speaker 1: conservation of momentum. This states that if a system of
- 4:23Speaker 1: bodies is in any sort of motion and is free
- 4:26Speaker 1: from outside influences, the amount of motion in any direction
- 4:31Speaker 1: is constant. This showed that the kind of action of
- 4:35Speaker 1: the will on the animal spirits which Descartes had assumed,
- 4:39Speaker 1: was contrary to the principles of dynamics. It seemed to
- 4:43Speaker 1: follow that mind cannot influence matter, and it was inferred
- 4:47Speaker 1: that matter cannot influence mind. Since the two were regarded
- 4:51Speaker 1: as co equal substances, it was held that each goes
- 4:55Speaker 1: its own way according to its own laws. The fact
- 4:59Speaker 1: that our arm oose when we will it to move
- 5:02Speaker 1: was regarded as analogous to the fact that two perfectly
- 5:05Speaker 1: accurate clocks strike at the same moment, though neither has
- 5:09Speaker 1: any effect upon the other. The series of mental events
- 5:12Speaker 1: in the series of physical events were parallel, each going
- 5:16Speaker 1: at the same rate as the other. Therefore, they continued
- 5:19Speaker 1: to synchronize in spite of their independence of each other.
- 5:24Speaker 1: Spinosa sought to make this parallelism less mysterious by denying
- 5:28Speaker 1: that there are two separate substances, mind and matter. He
- 5:32Speaker 1: maintained that there is only one substance, of which thought
- 5:35Speaker 1: and extension are attributes, But there seemed still no good
- 5:40Speaker 1: reason why the events belonging to the two attributes should
- 5:43Speaker 1: develop along parallel lines. Spinosa is in many ways one
- 5:48Speaker 1: of the greatest philosophers, but his greatness is rather ethical
- 5:52Speaker 1: than metaphysical. Accordingly, he was regarded by contemporaries as a
- 5:56Speaker 1: profound metaphysician, but a very wicked man. The notion of
- 6:02Speaker 1: the impossibility of interaction between mind and body has persisted
- 6:06Speaker 1: down to our own day. One still hears of psychophysical parallelism,
- 6:11Speaker 1: according to which to every state of the brain, a
- 6:14Speaker 1: state of mind corresponds and vice versa, without either acting
- 6:18Speaker 1: on the other. This whole point of view, though not
- 6:22Speaker 1: exactly that of Descartes derives from him. It has a
- 6:26Speaker 1: number of sources, religious, metaphysical, and scientific, but there seems
- 6:31Speaker 1: no ground whatever for regarding it as true. Take first
- 6:36Speaker 1: the rigid determinism of traditional physics, which was to have
- 6:39Speaker 1: been avoided. Spinoza rightly perceived that this could not be
- 6:43Speaker 1: avoided by such methods, and therefore accepted determinism in the
- 6:48Speaker 1: psychical as in the physical realm. If everything we say
- 6:53Speaker 1: is determined by physical causes, our thoughts are only free
- 6:56Speaker 1: when we tell lies. So long as we say what
- 6:59Speaker 1: we think, our thoughts also can be inferred from physics.
- 7:03Speaker 1: The philosophy which I advocate escapes this consequence in several ways.
- 7:09Speaker 1: In the first place, causality does not involve compulsion, but
- 7:13Speaker 1: only a law of sequence. If physical and mental events
- 7:17Speaker 1: run parallel, either may with equal justice be regarded as
- 7:21Speaker 1: causing the other, and there is no sense in speaking
- 7:24Speaker 1: of them as causally independent. Thus the Cartesian dualism does
- 7:29Speaker 1: not have the pleasant consequences which were intended. In the
- 7:33Speaker 1: second place, modern physics has become less deterministic than the
- 7:37Speaker 1: physics of the past few centuries. We do not know,
- 7:41Speaker 1: for example, what makes a radioactive atom explode or an
- 7:45Speaker 1: electron jump from a larger to a smaller orbit. In
- 7:49Speaker 1: these matters we only know statistical averages. Take next the
- 7:54Speaker 1: view that mind and matter are quite disparate. This we
- 7:58Speaker 1: have criticized already upon a notion that we know much
- 8:02Speaker 1: more about matter than we do, and in particular upon
- 8:05Speaker 1: the belief that the space of physics can be identified
- 8:08Speaker 1: with the space of sensible experience. This belief is absent
- 8:13Speaker 1: in Leibniz, who however, never quite realized what his own
- 8:17Speaker 1: view was. It is not absent in Kant, who realized
- 8:21Speaker 1: that the space of sensible experience is subjective and inferred
- 8:25Speaker 1: that the space of physics is subjective. Since Kant, no
- 8:30Speaker 1: one seems to have thought clearly about space until Einstein
- 8:33Speaker 1: and Minkowski. The separation of physical and sensible space logically
- 8:39Speaker 1: carried out shows the groundlessness of traditional views about mind
- 8:43Speaker 1: and matter. This part of Descartes's philosophy, therefore, though it
- 8:48Speaker 1: accelerated the progress of physics, must be regarded as metaphysically
- 8:52Speaker 1: an aberration. The other part of Descartes's philosophy, namely the
- 8:57Speaker 1: emphasis upon methodical doubt and consequently upon theory of knowledge,
- 9:02Speaker 1: has been more fruitful. The beginning of a philosophic attitude
- 9:07Speaker 1: is the realization that we do not know as much
- 9:09Speaker 1: as we think we do, and to this Descartes contributed. Notably,
- 9:14Speaker 1: we have seen that he set to work to doubt
- 9:16Speaker 1: all he could, but found that he could not doubt
- 9:19Speaker 1: his own existence, which he therefore took as the starting
- 9:23Speaker 1: point of his constructive system. He supposed that the most
- 9:27Speaker 1: certain fact in the world is I think. This was unfortunate,
- 9:32Speaker 1: since it gave a subjective bias to modern philosophy. As
- 9:36Speaker 1: a matter of fact, I seems to be only a
- 9:39Speaker 1: string of events, each of which separately is more certain
- 9:42Speaker 1: than the whole. And think is a word which Descartes
- 9:46Speaker 1: accepted is indefinable, but which really covers complicated relations between events.
- 9:53Speaker 1: When is an event a thought? Is there some intrinsic
- 9:56Speaker 1: characteristic which makes it a thought? Art would say yes,
- 10:01Speaker 1: and so in most philosophers I should say no. Take
- 10:06Speaker 1: for example, a visual and an auditory sensation. Both are
- 10:10Speaker 1: thoughts in Descartes's sense. But what have they in common?
- 10:15Speaker 1: Two visual sensations have an indefinable common quality viz. That
- 10:20Speaker 1: which makes them visual. Two auditory sensations likewise, but a
- 10:25Speaker 1: visual and an auditory sensation have in common, if I
- 10:29Speaker 1: am not mistaken, no intrinsic property, but a certain capacity
- 10:33Speaker 1: for being known without inference. This amounts to saying that
- 10:38Speaker 1: they are mnemic causes of a certain kind of event
- 10:41Speaker 1: called a cognition, and that they have moreover, a certain
- 10:44Speaker 1: formal similarity to the cognition which they cause. Therefore, instead
- 10:49Speaker 1: of taking the general I think as our basis, we
- 10:52Speaker 1: ought to take the particular occurrences which are known without inference,
- 10:56Speaker 1: among which sensations, or rather perceptions, will be included. These occurrences,
- 11:02Speaker 1: as we have already seen, may be regarded with equal
- 11:06Speaker 1: justice as physical and mental. They are parts of chains
- 11:09Speaker 1: of physical causation, and they have mnemic effects, which are cognitions.
- 11:14Speaker 1: The former fact makes us call them physical, the latter mental.
- 11:18Speaker 1: Both Quite truly, it is the particular events which are certain,
- 11:23Speaker 1: not the I think, which Descartes made the basis of
- 11:26Speaker 1: his philosophy. It is not correct to regard the ultimate
- 11:31Speaker 1: certainties as subjective, except in the sense that there are
- 11:34Speaker 1: events in that part of space time in which our
- 11:37Speaker 1: body is and our mind. Also, I should say, a
- 11:41Speaker 1: new turn was given to the Cartesian type of metaphysics
- 11:44Speaker 1: by Leibnitz sixteen forty six to seventeen sixteen, who, like Descartes,
- 11:50Speaker 1: was supremely eminent both in mathematics and in philosophy. Leibnitz
- 11:56Speaker 1: rejected the view that there is only one substance as
- 11:59Speaker 1: Spinosa Hell, or only two other than God, as the
- 12:03Speaker 1: Orthodox followers of Descartes maintained. He also rejected the dualism
- 12:07Speaker 1: of mind and matter, holding that there are innumerable substances,
- 12:12Speaker 1: all in a greater or less degree mental, and none
- 12:15Speaker 1: in any degree material. He maintained that every substance is immortal,
- 12:20Speaker 1: and that there is no interaction between one substance and another,
- 12:24Speaker 1: this last being a view derived from the Cartesian independence
- 12:28Speaker 1: of mind and matter. He also extended to his many
- 12:32Speaker 1: substances the belief in parallelism which had existed for the
- 12:36Speaker 1: two substances of the Cartesians. He called his substances monads,
- 12:42Speaker 1: and maintained that every monad mirrors the universe and develops
- 12:46Speaker 1: along lines which correspond point by point with those along
- 12:50Speaker 1: which every other monad is developing. A man's soul or
- 12:54Speaker 1: mind is a single monad, while his body is a
- 12:58Speaker 1: collection of monads, each meant in some degree, but less
- 13:01Speaker 1: so than the monad which is his soul. Inferior monads
- 13:06Speaker 1: mirror the world in a more confused way than higher
- 13:08Speaker 1: ones do, but there is some element of confusion in
- 13:12Speaker 1: the perception of even the most superior monads. Each monad
- 13:16Speaker 1: mirrors the world from its own point of view, and
- 13:19Speaker 1: the difference between points of view is compared to a
- 13:22Speaker 1: difference of perspective. Matter is a confused way of perceiving
- 13:26Speaker 1: a number of monads. If we perceived clearly, we should
- 13:30Speaker 1: see that there is no such thing as matter. Leibnitz's
- 13:34Speaker 1: system had great merits and great demerits. The theory that
- 13:38Speaker 1: matter is a confused way of perceiving something non material
- 13:42Speaker 1: was an advance upon anything to be found in his predecessors.
- 13:47Speaker 1: He had, though only semi consciously, the distinction between physical
- 13:51Speaker 1: and perceptual space. There is a space in each monad's
- 13:56Speaker 1: picture of the world, and there is also the assemblage
- 13:59Speaker 1: or pattern of points of view. The latter corresponds to
- 14:03Speaker 1: what I have called physical space, the former to perceptual space.
- 14:08Speaker 1: Leibniz maintained, as against Newton, that space and time consist
- 14:13Speaker 1: only of relations, a view which has achieved a definitive
- 14:16Speaker 1: triumph in Einstein's theory of relativity. The weak point of
- 14:21Speaker 1: his system was what he called the pre established harmony
- 14:24Speaker 1: in virtue, of which all the monads, so to speak,
- 14:28Speaker 1: kept step in spite of the fact that they were
- 14:30Speaker 1: windowless and never acted upon each other. Perception, for Leibnitz
- 14:36Speaker 1: was not an effect of the object perceived, but a
- 14:39Speaker 1: modification arising in the perceiving monad and running parallel with
- 14:43Speaker 1: what was happening in the perceived object. This view would
- 14:47Speaker 1: never have seemed plausible but for the anterior Cartesian theory
- 14:51Speaker 1: of the mutual independence of mind and matter. And if
- 14:55Speaker 1: Leibnitz himself developed, as he believed, in complete independence of
- 15:00Speaker 1: all other created things, it is not clear what good
- 15:04Speaker 1: reasons he could have had for believing in the existence
- 15:07Speaker 1: of anything except himself, since by his own theory, his
- 15:11Speaker 1: experiences would remain unchanged if everything else were annihilated. In fact,
- 15:17Speaker 1: he was only able to refute this possibility by bringing
- 15:20Speaker 1: in theological considerations, which, whether valid or not, are out
- 15:25Speaker 1: of place in philosophy. For this reason, his doctrines, ingenious
- 15:31Speaker 1: as they were, found little acceptance in France and England,
- 15:35Speaker 1: though in Germany they prevailed in a modified form until
- 15:38Speaker 1: the time of Kant. The systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and
- 15:43Speaker 1: Leibniz have one very important characteristic in common, namely that
- 15:48Speaker 1: they all depend upon the category of substance. This is
- 15:53Speaker 1: a concept which has developed out of the common sense
- 15:56Speaker 1: notion of thing. A substance is that which has qualities
- 16:00Speaker 1: and is in general supposed to be indestructible, though it
- 16:04Speaker 1: is difficult to see why it acquired its hold over metaphysicians,
- 16:08Speaker 1: partly because both matter and the soul were held to
- 16:11Speaker 1: be immortal, and partly through a hasty transference to reality
- 16:16Speaker 1: of ideas derived from grammar. We say Peter is running,
- 16:21Speaker 1: Peter is talking, Peter is eating, and so on. We
- 16:25Speaker 1: think that there is one entity, Peter, who does all
- 16:28Speaker 1: these things, and that none of them could be done
- 16:31Speaker 1: unless there were someone to do them, but that Peter
- 16:34Speaker 1: might quite well do none of them. Similarly, we assign
- 16:37Speaker 1: qualities to Peter. We say he is wise, and tall,
- 16:41Speaker 1: and blonde, and so on. All these qualities we feel
- 16:45Speaker 1: cannot subsist by themselves in the void, but only when
- 16:48Speaker 1: there is a subject to which they belong, but Peter
- 16:52Speaker 1: would remain Peter even if he became foolish and short
- 16:55Speaker 1: and dyed his hair. Thus, Peter, who is regarded as
- 16:59Speaker 1: a substance, is self subsistent as compared with his qualities
- 17:03Speaker 1: and states, and he preserves his substantial identity throughout all
- 17:07Speaker 1: sorts of changes. Similarly, in the material world, an atom
- 17:12Speaker 1: is supposed, or rather was supposed until recently, to preserve
- 17:16Speaker 1: its identity throughout all time, however it might move in
- 17:21Speaker 1: whatever combinations it might form with other atoms. The concept
- 17:25Speaker 1: of motion, upon which all physics seemed to depend was
- 17:29Speaker 1: only strictly applicable to a substance which preserves its identity
- 17:33Speaker 1: while changing its spatial relations to other substances. Thus, substance
- 17:39Speaker 1: acquired an even firmer hold upon physics than upon metaphysics. Nevertheless,
- 17:45Speaker 1: the notion of substance at any rate, in any sense
- 17:48Speaker 1: involving permanence, must be shut out from our thoughts if
- 17:52Speaker 1: we are to achieve a philosophy in any way adequate
- 17:55Speaker 1: either to modern physics or to modern psychology. Modern physics,
- 18:00Speaker 1: both in the theory of relativity and in the Heisenberg
- 18:03Speaker 1: Schrodinger theories of atomic structure has reduced matter to a
- 18:07Speaker 1: system of events, each of which lasts only for a
- 18:10Speaker 1: very short time. To treat an electron or a proton
- 18:14Speaker 1: as a single entity has become as wrong headed as
- 18:17Speaker 1: it would be to treat the population of London or
- 18:20Speaker 1: New York as a single entity. And in psychology equally,
- 18:24Speaker 1: the ego has disappeared as an ultimate conception, and the
- 18:28Speaker 1: unity of a personality has become a peculiar causal nexus
- 18:32Speaker 1: among a series of events. In this respect, grammar and
- 18:37Speaker 1: ordinary language have been shown to be bad guides to metaphysics.
- 18:41Speaker 1: A great book might be written showing the influence of
- 18:44Speaker 1: syntax on philosophy. In such a book, the author could
- 18:48Speaker 1: trace in detail the influence of the subject predicate structure
- 18:52Speaker 1: of sentences upon European thought, more particularly in this matter
- 18:57Speaker 1: of substance. And it must be understood that the same
- 19:01Speaker 1: reasons which lead to the rejection of substance lead also
- 19:05Speaker 1: to the rejection of things and persons as ultimately valid concepts.
- 19:10Speaker 1: I say I sit at my table, but I ought
- 19:13Speaker 1: to say one of a certain string of events causally
- 19:17Speaker 1: connected in the sort of way that makes the whole
- 19:19Speaker 1: series that is called a person has a certain spatial
- 19:22Speaker 1: relation to one of another string of events causally connected
- 19:26Speaker 1: with each other in a different way, and having a
- 19:29Speaker 1: spatial configuration of the sort denoted by the word table.
- 19:33Speaker 1: I do not say so because life is too short,
- 19:36Speaker 1: but that is what I should say if I were
- 19:39Speaker 1: a true philosopher. Apart from any other grounds, the inadequacy
- 19:44Speaker 1: of the notion of substance would lead us to regard
- 19:47Speaker 1: the philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz as incompatible with
- 19:51Speaker 1: modern science. There is, of course, in all three a
- 19:56Speaker 1: great deal that does not depend upon substance, and that
- 19:59Speaker 1: still has value. But substance supplied the framework and a
- 20:03Speaker 1: good deal of the argumentation, and therefore introduces a fatal
- 20:07Speaker 1: defect into these three great systems. I dowtcome to the
- 20:12Speaker 1: triad of British philosophers Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, English, Irish
- 20:18Speaker 1: and Scotch respectively, perhaps from patriotic bias or from community
- 20:24Speaker 1: of national temperament, I find more that I can accept
- 20:27Speaker 1: and regard as still important in the writings of these
- 20:30Speaker 1: three men than in the philosophy of their continental predecessors.
- 20:35Speaker 1: Their constructions are less ambitious, their arguments more detailed, and
- 20:40Speaker 1: their methods more empirical. In all these respects, they show
- 20:44Speaker 1: more kinship with the modern scientific outlook. On the other hand,
- 20:48Speaker 1: Locke and Hume, if not Berkeley, approach philosophy too exclusively
- 20:53Speaker 1: from the side of psychology, and are concerned to study
- 20:56Speaker 1: man rather than the universe. Locke, with a contemporary and
- 21:01Speaker 1: friend of Newton. His great book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
- 21:06Speaker 1: was published at almost the same time as Newton's Principia.
- 21:10Speaker 1: His influence has been enormous, greater in fact, than his
- 21:14Speaker 1: abilities would seem to warrant. And this influence was not
- 21:17Speaker 1: only philosophical, but quite as much political and social. He
- 21:21Speaker 1: was one of the creators of eighteenth century liberalism, democracy,
- 21:26Speaker 1: religious toleration, freedom of economic enterprise, educational progress allow much
- 21:32Speaker 1: to him. The English Revolution of sixteen eighty eight embodied
- 21:36Speaker 1: his ideas. The American Revolution of seventeen seventy six and
- 21:41Speaker 1: the French Revolution of seventeen eighty nine expressed what had
- 21:44Speaker 1: grown in a century out of his teaching. And in
- 21:48Speaker 1: all these movements, philosophy and politics went hand in hand. Thus,
- 21:53Speaker 1: the practical success of Locke's ideas has been extraordinary. When
- 21:59Speaker 1: knowing all this, when comes to read Locke himself, it
- 22:02Speaker 1: is difficult to resist a feeling of disappointment. He is sensible, enlightened, minute,
- 22:08Speaker 1: but uninspired, and to moderns uninspiring. One has to remember
- 22:14Speaker 1: that his contemporaries found common sense exhilarating. After a century
- 22:19Speaker 1: of wars of religion and a long struggle with obscurantism,
- 22:23Speaker 1: Locke combated the doctrine of innate ideas, according to which
- 22:27Speaker 1: we learned only certain things by experience, but possessed our
- 22:31Speaker 1: abstract knowledge in virtue of our congenital constitution. He regarded
- 22:36Speaker 1: the mind at birth as a wax tablet upon which
- 22:40Speaker 1: experience proceeded to write. Undoubtedly he was, in this manner
- 22:45Speaker 1: more in the right than his opponents. Although the terms
- 22:48Speaker 1: in which the controversy was waged are not such as
- 22:51Speaker 1: a modern could employ. We should say that the innate
- 22:55Speaker 1: apparatus of man consists of reflexes rather than ideas. Also
- 23:00Speaker 1: that our sense, organs, our glands, and our muscles lead
- 23:03Speaker 1: to responses of certain kinds in which our own organization
- 23:07Speaker 1: plays a part of the same importance as that played
- 23:10Speaker 1: by the external stimulus. The element in our knowledge responses
- 23:14Speaker 1: that corresponds to our own bodily organization might perhaps be
- 23:19Speaker 1: regarded as representing what Locke's opponents meant by innate, But
- 23:23Speaker 1: it does not represent this at all accurately, so far
- 23:26Speaker 1: as our feelings towards it are concerned. The innate ideas
- 23:30Speaker 1: were the ideas to be proud of. They embraced pure mathematics,
- 23:34Speaker 1: natural theology, and ethics. But nobody is proud of sneezing
- 23:39Speaker 1: or coughing. And when Locke tried to show in detail
- 23:44Speaker 1: how our knowledge is generated by experience, he was liberating
- 23:48Speaker 1: philosophy from a great deal of useless lumber. Even if
- 23:51Speaker 1: his own doctrines were not altogether such as we can
- 23:54Speaker 1: now accept, Locke used his own principles only in ways
- 23:59Speaker 1: consistent with common sense. Berkeley and Hume both pushed them
- 24:03Speaker 1: to paradoxical conclusions. The philosophy of Berkeley, to my mind,
- 24:08Speaker 1: has not received quite the attention and respect that it deserves.
- 24:12Speaker 1: Not that I agree with it, but that I think
- 24:14Speaker 1: it ingenious and harder to refute than is often supposed. Berkeley,
- 24:19Speaker 1: as everyone knows, denied the reality of matter and maintained
- 24:24Speaker 1: that everything is mental. In the former respect, I agree
- 24:27Speaker 1: with him, though not for his reasons. In the latter respect,
- 24:31Speaker 1: I think his argument unsound and his conclusion improbable, though
- 24:35Speaker 1: not certainly false. However, I will leave the development of
- 24:39Speaker 1: my own views to a later chapter and confine myself
- 24:42Speaker 1: to Berkeley's argument. Berkeley contended that, when, for example, you
- 24:47Speaker 1: see a tree, all that you really know to be
- 24:50Speaker 1: happening is in you and is mental. The color that
- 24:54Speaker 1: you see, as Locke had already argued, does not belong
- 24:58Speaker 1: to the physical world, but is an effect upon you, produced,
- 25:02Speaker 1: according to Locke, by a physical stimulus. Locke held that
- 25:06Speaker 1: the purely spatial properties of perceived objects really belong to
- 25:10Speaker 1: the objects, whereas such things as color, softness, sound, et
- 25:15Speaker 1: cetera are effects in us. Berkeley went further and argued
- 25:20Speaker 1: that the spatial properties of perceived objects are no exception.
- 25:24Speaker 1: Thus the object perceived is composed entirely of mental constituents,
- 25:29Speaker 1: and there is no reason to believe in the existence
- 25:31Speaker 1: of anything not mental. He did not wish to admit
- 25:35Speaker 1: that a tree ceases to exist when we do not
- 25:38Speaker 1: look at it, so he maintained that it acquires permanence
- 25:41Speaker 1: through being an idea in the mind of God. It
- 25:45Speaker 1: is still only an idea, but not one whose existence
- 25:48Speaker 1: depends upon the accidents of our perceptions. The real objection
- 25:53Speaker 1: to Berkeley's view is rather physical than metaphysical. Light and
- 25:58Speaker 1: sound take time to travel from their sources to the precipient,
- 26:02Speaker 1: and one must suppose that something is happening along the
- 26:05Speaker 1: route by which they travel. What is happening along the
- 26:08Speaker 1: route is presumably not mental, for as we have seen,
- 26:12Speaker 1: mental events are those that have particular mnemic effects which
- 26:16Speaker 1: are connected with living tissue. Therefore, although Berkeley is right
- 26:21Speaker 1: in saying that the events we know immediately are mental,
- 26:24Speaker 1: it is highly probable that he is wrong as to
- 26:27Speaker 1: the events which we infer in places where there are
- 26:29Speaker 1: no living bodies. In saying this, however, we are anticipating
- 26:34Speaker 1: the results of a fuller discussion in a later chapter, Hume,
- 26:39Speaker 1: proceeding from a starting point essentially similar to that of
- 26:42Speaker 1: Locke and Berkeley, arrived at conclusions so skeptical that all
- 26:46Speaker 1: subsequent philosophers have shied away from them. He denied the
- 26:51Speaker 1: existence of the self question, the validity of induction, and
- 26:55Speaker 1: doubted whether causal laws could be applied to anything except
- 26:58Speaker 1: our own mental process. He is one of the very
- 27:02Speaker 1: few philosophers not concerned to establish any positive conclusions. To
- 27:08Speaker 1: a great extent, I think we must admit the validity
- 27:11Speaker 1: of his reasons for refusing to feel the usual certainties.
- 27:16Speaker 1: As regards the self, he was almost certainly right, as
- 27:20Speaker 1: we have already argued, a person is not a single entity,
- 27:24Speaker 1: but a series of events linked together by peculiar causal laws.
- 27:30Speaker 1: As regards induction, the question is very difficult, and I
- 27:33Speaker 1: shall devote a subsequent chapter to it. As regards causal laws,
- 27:38Speaker 1: the question, as we shall find later, is the same
- 27:41Speaker 1: as the question of induction. On both points, Hume's doubts
- 27:45Speaker 1: are not to be lightly dismissed. The usual modern criticism
- 27:50Speaker 1: of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume is that they were unduly atomistic.
- 27:55Speaker 1: They thought of the mind as a collection of ideas,
- 27:59Speaker 1: each as harmar and separate, as a billiard ball. They
- 28:02Speaker 1: had not the conception of continuous change or of integral processes.
- 28:07Speaker 1: Their causal units were too small. As we have already
- 28:11Speaker 1: seen in connection with gestaltzikology and with sentences, the causal
- 28:16Speaker 1: unit is often a configuration which cannot be broken up
- 28:20Speaker 1: without losing its distinctive causal properties. In this sense, it
- 28:26Speaker 1: is true that the traditional British philosophy was too atomistic.
- 28:30Speaker 1: But in another sense, I do not think it is true,
- 28:33Speaker 1: and I think much modern philosophy is confused on this point.
- 28:37Speaker 1: Although a configuration may lose its causal properties when broken
- 28:42Speaker 1: up into its elements, it nevertheless does consist of these
- 28:46Speaker 1: elements related in certain ways. Analysis into atoms is perfectly
- 28:51Speaker 1: valid so long as it is not assumed that the
- 28:54Speaker 1: causal efficacy of the whole is compounded out of the
- 28:57Speaker 1: separate effects of the separate atoms. It is because I
- 29:01Speaker 1: hold this view that I call the philosophy which I
- 29:04Speaker 1: advocate logical atomism. And to this extent I regard Locke, Berkeley,
- 29:10Speaker 1: and Hume as in the right as against their modern critics.
- 29:14Speaker 1: But this also is a topic which will be resumed
- 29:17Speaker 1: in a later chapter. Hume's criticism of the notion of
- 29:22Speaker 1: cause was what led Kant to his new departure. Kant's
- 29:26Speaker 1: philosophy is difficult and obscure, and philosophers still dispute as
- 29:30Speaker 1: to what he meant. Those who disagree with him are
- 29:34Speaker 1: held by his supporters to have misunderstood him. I must
- 29:37Speaker 1: therefore warn the reader that what follows is my view
- 29:40Speaker 1: of what he meant, and that there is no agreed view.
- 29:45Speaker 1: Kant maintained that in virtue of our mental constitution, we
- 29:49Speaker 1: deal with the raw material of sense impressions by means
- 29:52Speaker 1: of certain categories and by arranging it in space and time.
- 29:57Speaker 1: Both the categories and the space time arrangement are supplied
- 30:00Speaker 1: by us and do not belong to the world except
- 30:03Speaker 1: as known by us. But since our mental constitution is
- 30:07Speaker 1: a constant datum, all phenomena as known will be spatio
- 30:12Speaker 1: temporal and will conform to the categories. Among the latter,
- 30:17Speaker 1: cause is the most important. Thus, although there may be
- 30:21Speaker 1: no cause in the world as it is in itself,
- 30:24Speaker 1: a point on which Kand was inconsistent in the interest
- 30:28Speaker 1: of morals. Yet phenomena I eat, things as they seem
- 30:32Speaker 1: to us will always have other phenomena as their causes.
- 30:36Speaker 1: And although there is no time in the real world,
- 30:39Speaker 1: things as they appear to us will be some earlier
- 30:42Speaker 1: and some later. Space again is supplied by us, and
- 30:47Speaker 1: therefore geometry can be known a priori without our having
- 30:51Speaker 1: to study the outer world. Kan thought that Euclidean geometry
- 30:56Speaker 1: was quite certainly true, although it could not be proved
- 30:59Speaker 1: by logically alone, since Euclid's axioms could be denied without
- 31:03Speaker 1: self contradiction. It was on this question of geometry that
- 31:08Speaker 1: the weakness of consystem first became obvious. It was found
- 31:12Speaker 1: that we have no grounds for regarding Euclidean geometry as
- 31:16Speaker 1: quite true. Since Einstein we have positive grounds for regarding
- 31:21Speaker 1: it as not quite true. It appears that geometry is
- 31:25Speaker 1: just as empirical as geography. We depend upon observation if
- 31:29Speaker 1: we want to know whether the sum of the angles
- 31:31Speaker 1: of a triangle is to right angles, just as much
- 31:35Speaker 1: as if we want to know how much land there
- 31:37Speaker 1: is in the western hemisphere. With regard to the categories,
- 31:41Speaker 1: there are equally great difficulties. Let us take cause as
- 31:46Speaker 1: our illustration. We see lightning, and then we hear thunder.
- 31:50Speaker 1: As phenomena are seen and hearing are connected as cause
- 31:54Speaker 1: and effect. But we must not, if we are to
- 31:57Speaker 1: take the subjectivity of cause seriously, suppose that our seeing
- 32:02Speaker 1: or our hearing has an outside cause. In that case,
- 32:06Speaker 1: we have no reason to suppose that there is anything
- 32:08Speaker 1: outside ourselves. Nay more, what really happens when we see
- 32:14Speaker 1: is not, according to Kant, what we perceive by introspection,
- 32:18Speaker 1: what really happens is something without a date, without a
- 32:22Speaker 1: position in space, without causes, and without effects. Thus we
- 32:27Speaker 1: do not know ourselves any better than we know the
- 32:30Speaker 1: outside world. Space and time, and the categories interpose a
- 32:35Speaker 1: mirage of illusion which cannot be penetrated at any point.
- 32:40Speaker 1: As an answer to Hume's skepticism, this seems a somewhat
- 32:44Speaker 1: unsuccessful effort, and Kant himself later in the Critique of
- 32:49Speaker 1: Practical Reason, demolished much of his own edifice because he
- 32:53Speaker 1: thought that ethics at least must have some validity in
- 32:57Speaker 1: the real world. This part of his philosophy, however, is
- 33:01Speaker 1: usually ignored by his followers or apologetically minimized. Kant gave
- 33:07Speaker 1: a new turn to an old philosophical controversy as to
- 33:10Speaker 1: how far our knowledge is a priori and how far
- 33:13Speaker 1: it is based on experience. Kant admitted that without experience
- 33:18Speaker 1: we could know nothing, and that what we know is
- 33:20Speaker 1: only valid within the realm of experience. But he held
- 33:25Speaker 1: that the general framework of our knowledge is a priori
- 33:29Speaker 1: in the sense that it is not proved by means
- 33:31Speaker 1: of particular facts of experience, but represents the conditions to
- 33:35Speaker 1: which phenomena have to conform in order to be capable
- 33:38Speaker 1: of being experienced. Before his day, the tendency had been
- 33:43Speaker 1: for continental philosophers to regard almost everything as a priori,
- 33:48Speaker 1: while British philosophers regarded almost everything as empirical. But both
- 33:53Speaker 1: sides thought that what is a priori can be proved
- 33:56Speaker 1: by logic, at least in theory, whereas Kant well that
- 34:00Speaker 1: mathematics is a priori and yet synthetic i e. Not
- 34:05Speaker 1: capable of being proved by logic. In this he was
- 34:09Speaker 1: misled by geometry. Euclidean geometry considered as true is synthetic,
- 34:15Speaker 1: but not a priori. Considered merely as deducing consequences from premises,
- 34:21Speaker 1: it is a priori but not synthetic. The geometry of
- 34:25Speaker 1: the actual world, as required by engineers is empirical. The
- 34:30Speaker 1: geometry of pure mathematics, which does not inquire into the
- 34:34Speaker 1: truth of the axioms but merely shows their implications, is
- 34:37Speaker 1: an exercise impure logic. It should be said, however, that
- 34:42Speaker 1: if the correct analysis of knowledge bears any resemblance at
- 34:46Speaker 1: all to that which has been suggested in this book,
- 34:48Speaker 1: the whole controversy between empiricists and a priorists becomes more
- 34:53Speaker 1: or less unreal. All beliefs are caused by external stimuli.
- 34:59Speaker 1: When they are as potentarticular as the stimuli, they are
- 35:02Speaker 1: of the sort which an empiricist might regard as proved
- 35:05Speaker 1: by experience. But when they are more general, difficulties arrive.
- 35:11Speaker 1: A foreigner arrives in America and sees the immigration officials,
- 35:15Speaker 1: who lead him to the generalization that all Americans are rude.
- 35:19Speaker 1: But a few minutes later the porter upsets this induction
- 35:22Speaker 1: in the hope of a tip. Thus, sometimes a given
- 35:26Speaker 1: belief will be caused by one event and destroyed by another.
- 35:31Speaker 1: If all the events in a man's life, so far
- 35:34Speaker 1: as they affect the belief in question, are such as
- 35:37Speaker 1: to cause it, he counts the belief true. The more
- 35:41Speaker 1: general a belief is, the more events are relevant to it,
- 35:44Speaker 1: and therefore the more difficult it is for it to
- 35:47Speaker 1: be such as a man will long consider true. Roughly speaking,
- 35:52Speaker 1: the beliefs which count as a priori will be those
- 35:55Speaker 1: which well might have been upset by subsequent events, but
- 35:58Speaker 1: in fact were confirmed. Here as elsewhere, we are driven
- 36:03Speaker 1: to the view that theory of knowledge is not so
- 36:06Speaker 1: fundamental as it has been considered since Kant. There is
- 36:11Speaker 1: one more traditional controversy which I wish to consider, namely,
- 36:15Speaker 1: between monists and pluralists. Is the universe one? Or is
- 36:20Speaker 1: it many? If many, how intimately are they interconnected? The
- 36:25Speaker 1: monistic view is very old. It is already complete in
- 36:29Speaker 1: Parmenides fifth century BC. It is fully developed in Spinoza, Hegel,
- 36:34Speaker 1: and Bradley. The pluristic view, on the other hand, is
- 36:38Speaker 1: found in Heraclitus, the atomists, Leibniz, and the British empiricists.
- 36:44Speaker 1: For the sake of definiteness, let us take the monistic
- 36:47Speaker 1: view as found in Bradley, who is in the main
- 36:50Speaker 1: a follower of Hegel. He maintains that every judgment consists
- 36:54Speaker 1: in assigning a predicate to reality as a whole. The
- 36:58Speaker 1: whole is the subject of every press etiquette. Suppose you
- 37:02Speaker 1: start by saying Tommy has a cold in the head.
- 37:05Speaker 1: This may not seem to be a statement about the
- 37:08Speaker 1: universe as a whole, but according to Bradley, it is.
- 37:12Speaker 1: If I may be allowed to set forth his argument
- 37:14Speaker 1: in popular language, which his followers might resent, I should
- 37:18Speaker 1: put it something like this. First of all, who is Tommy?
- 37:23Speaker 1: He is a person with a certain nature, distinguished from
- 37:26Speaker 1: other persons. By that nature, he may resemble others in
- 37:30Speaker 1: many respects, but not at all, so that you cannot
- 37:33Speaker 1: really explain who Tommy is unless you set forth all
- 37:37Speaker 1: his characteristics. But when you try to do this, you
- 37:41Speaker 1: are taken beyond Tommy. He is characterized by relations to
- 37:45Speaker 1: his environment. He is affectionate or rebellious or thirsty, noisy
- 37:50Speaker 1: or quiet, and so on. All of these qualities involve
- 37:54Speaker 1: his relations to others. If you try to define Tommy
- 37:58Speaker 1: without mentioning anything outside him, you will find this quite impossible. Therefore,
- 38:03Speaker 1: he is not a self subsistent being, but an unsubstantial
- 38:07Speaker 1: fragment of the world. The same thing applies even more
- 38:11Speaker 1: obviously to his nose and his cold. How do you
- 38:15Speaker 1: know he has a cold because material substances of a
- 38:19Speaker 1: certain kind pass from his nose to his handkerchief, which
- 38:22Speaker 1: would not be possible if he alone existed. But now,
- 38:27Speaker 1: when you take in the environment with a view to
- 38:29Speaker 1: defining Tommy and his nose and his cold, you find
- 38:33Speaker 1: that you cannot define his immediate environment without taking account
- 38:36Speaker 1: of its environment, and so on, until at last you
- 38:40Speaker 1: have been forced to include the whole world. Therefore, Tommy's
- 38:43Speaker 1: cold is in reality a property of the world. Since
- 38:47Speaker 1: nothing short of the world is sufficiently substantial to have properties,
- 38:52Speaker 1: we may put the argument in a more abstract form.
- 38:56Speaker 1: Everything which is part of the world is constituted in
- 38:59Speaker 1: part by its relations to other things. But relations cannot
- 39:03Speaker 1: be real. Bradley's argument against relations is as follows. First,
- 39:09Speaker 1: he argues that if there are relations, there must be
- 39:12Speaker 1: qualities between which they hold. This part of the argument
- 39:16Speaker 1: need not detain us. He then proceeds, but how the
- 39:21Speaker 1: relation can stand to the qualities is, on the other side, unintelligible.
- 39:26Speaker 1: If it is nothing to the qualities, then they are
- 39:29Speaker 1: not related at all. And if so, as we saw,
- 39:33Speaker 1: they have ceased to be qualities and their relation is
- 39:35Speaker 1: a nonentity. But if it is to be something to them,
- 39:40Speaker 1: then clearly we shall require a new connecting relation. For
- 39:44Speaker 1: the relation hardly can be the mere adjective of one
- 39:47Speaker 1: or both of its terms, or at least as such,
- 39:51Speaker 1: it seems indefensible and being something itself if it does
- 39:56Speaker 1: not itself bear a relation to the terms, in what
- 40:00Speaker 1: intelligible way will it succeed in being anything to them?
- 40:04Speaker 1: But here again, we are hurried off into the eddy
- 40:06Speaker 1: of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go
- 40:09Speaker 1: on finding new relations without end. The links are united
- 40:14Speaker 1: by a link, and this bond of union is a
- 40:17Speaker 1: link which also has two ends, and these require each
- 40:20Speaker 1: a fresh link to connect them with the old. The
- 40:24Speaker 1: problem is to find how the relation can stand to
- 40:27Speaker 1: its qualities, and this problem is insoluble. I cannot deal
- 40:33Speaker 1: adequately with this argument without abstruse technicalities which would be
- 40:37Speaker 1: out of place. I will, however, point out what seems
- 40:41Speaker 1: to me the essential error. Bradley conceives a relation as
- 40:45Speaker 1: something just as substantial as its terms, and not radically
- 40:49Speaker 1: different in kind. The analogy of the chain with links
- 40:54Speaker 1: should make us suspicious, since it clearly proves, if it
- 40:57Speaker 1: is valid, that chains are impossib and yet as a
- 41:01Speaker 1: fact they exist. There is not a word in his
- 41:05Speaker 1: argument which would not apply to physical chains. The success
- 41:09Speaker 1: of links are united not by another link, but by
- 41:12Speaker 1: a spatial relation. I think Bradley has been misled unconsciously
- 41:18Speaker 1: by a circumstance to which I alluded in an earlier chapter,
- 41:22Speaker 1: namely the fact that the word for a relation is
- 41:25Speaker 1: a substantial as the words for its terms. Suppose A
- 41:29Speaker 1: and B are two events, and A precedes B. In
- 41:34Speaker 1: the proposition A precedes B. The word precedes is just
- 41:39Speaker 1: as substantial as the words A and b. The relation
- 41:43Speaker 1: of the two events A and B is represented in
- 41:47Speaker 1: language by the time or space order of the three
- 41:50Speaker 1: words A precedes and b. But this order is an
- 41:56Speaker 1: actual relation, not a word for relation. The first step
- 42:00Speaker 1: in Bradley's regress does not actually have to be taken
- 42:04Speaker 1: in giving verbal expression to a relation, and the word
- 42:07Speaker 1: for a relation does not have to be related to
- 42:10Speaker 1: the words for its terms. But this is a linguistic
- 42:14Speaker 1: not a metaphysical fact, and the regress does not have
- 42:17Speaker 1: to go any further. It should be added that as
- 42:21Speaker 1: Bradley himself recognizes, his difficulties break out afresh when he
- 42:25Speaker 1: comes to consider the relation of subject and predicate when
- 42:29Speaker 1: a character is assigned to reality, and that he is
- 42:32Speaker 1: therefore compelled to conclude that no truth is quite true.
- 42:37Speaker 1: A conclusion of this sort, based upon an extremely abstract
- 42:42Speaker 1: argument makes it natural to suspect that there is some
- 42:45Speaker 1: error in the argument. Pluralism is the view of science
- 42:50Speaker 1: and common sense, and is therefore to be accepted if
- 42:53Speaker 1: the arguments against it are not conclusive. For my part,
- 42:58Speaker 1: I have no doubt whatever that it is the true view,
- 43:01Speaker 1: and that monism is derived from a faulty logic inspired
- 43:05Speaker 1: by mysticism. This logic dominates the philosophy of Hegel and
- 43:09Speaker 1: his followers. It is also the essential basis of Bergson's system,
- 43:14Speaker 1: although it is seldom mentioned in his writings. When it
- 43:18Speaker 1: is rejected, ambitious metaphysical systems such as those of the
- 43:22Speaker 1: past are seen to be impossible. End of Chapter twenty
- 43:26Speaker 1: three