Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1960 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
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- 0:001960 Letter Warren E Buffett 52O2 Underwood Ave., Omaha, NE
- 0:07The General Stock Market in 1960 A year ago I commented on the
- 0:11somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow
- 0:15Jones Industrial Average, which had advanced from 583 to 679, or
- 0:2116.4%. Although practically all
- 0:24investment companies showed gains for that year, less than
- 0:2710% of them were able to match or better the record of the
- 0:30industrial average. The Dow Jones utility average
- 0:34had a small decline, and the railroad average recorded a
- 0:37substantial one. In 1960, the picture was
- 0:40reversed. The industrial average declined
- 0:43from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends, which
- 0:50would have been received through ownership of the average still
- 0:53left it with an overall loss of 6.3%.
- 0:57On the other hand, the utility average showed a good gain and
- 1:01while all the results are not now available, my guess is that
- 1:04about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the
- 1:08industrial average. The majority of investment
- 1:11companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in
- 1:15the range of ±5%. On the New York Stock Exchange,
- 1:20653 common stocks registered losses for the year, while 404
- 1:25showed gains results in 1960. My continual objective in
- 1:29managing partnership funds is to achieve a long term performance
- 1:33record superior to that of the Industrial Average.
- 1:36I believe this average over a period of years will more or
- 1:40less parallel the results of leading investment companies.
- 1:44Unless we do achieve this superior performance, there is
- 1:47no reason for existence of the partnerships.
- 1:50However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we
- 1:54might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a
- 1:57relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the
- 2:01average. Rather, it is likely that if
- 2:03such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better than
- 2:06average performance in stable or declining markets, an average or
- 2:11perhaps even poorer than average performance in rising markets.
- 2:15I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the average
- 2:1930% to be much superior to a year when both we and the
- 2:23average advanced 20% / a period of time.
- 2:26There are going to be good and bad years.
- 2:28There is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed
- 2:32about the sequence in which they occur.
- 2:34The important thing is to be beating par A4 on a par 3 hole
- 2:38is not as good as A5 on a par 5 hole and it is unrealistic to
- 2:43assume we are not going to have our share of both par threes and
- 2:46par fives. The above dose of philosophy is
- 2:49being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year
- 2:52and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my
- 2:56measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known
- 2:59limitations. With this background, it is not
- 3:02unexpected that 1960 was a better than average year for us
- 3:06as contrasted within overall loss of 6.3% for the industrial
- 3:11average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating
- 3:16throughout the year. Our results for the four
- 3:18complete years of partnership operation after expenses but
- 3:21before interest to limited partners or allocation to the
- 3:25general partner are year partnerships operating.
- 3:28Entire Year Partnership gained Dow Jones Gain 1957 three 10.4%
- 3:34- 8.4 percent 1958 by 40.9 percent 38.5% Nineteen 59625.9
- 3:44percent 19.9% Nine nineteen 6722.8% - 6.3%.
- 3:52It should be emphasized again that these are the net results
- 3:55to the partnership. The net results to the limited
- 3:58partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they
- 4:00had selected. The overall gain or loss is
- 4:03computed on a market to market basis after allowing for any
- 4:07money added or withdrawn. Such a method gives results
- 4:11based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the
- 4:15partnership at the beginning of the year and what would have
- 4:18been realized upon liquidation at year end.
- 4:20And is different of course from our tax results which value
- 4:25securities at cost and realize gains or losses only win.
- 4:29Securities are actually sold on a compounded basis.
- 4:32The cumulative results have been year partnership gained Dow
- 4:36Jones gain nineteen 5710.4% - 8.4% nineteen 5855.6 percent
- 4:4426.9% Nineteen 5995.9% Fifty 2.2% Nineteen 61140.6% forty
- 4:552.6%. Although four years is entirely
- 4:58too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence
- 5:01there is points toward confirming the proposition that
- 5:04our results should be relatively better in moderately declining
- 5:08or static markets. To the extent that this is true,
- 5:12it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively,
- 5:15although decidedly less conventionally invested than if
- 5:19we owned blue chip securities during a strongly rising market.
- 5:23For the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching
- 5:27their performance. Multiplicity of partnerships.
- 5:30A preceding table shows that the family is growing.
- 5:33There has been no partnership which has had it consistently
- 5:36superior or inferior record compared to our group average.
- 5:40But there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to
- 5:43keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in
- 5:47about the same proportions. This variation, of course, to be
- 5:52eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one
- 5:55large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate
- 5:58much detail and a moderate amount of expense.
- 6:01Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the
- 6:05next few years. The problem is that various
- 6:08partners have expressed preferences for varying
- 6:10partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without
- 6:14unanimous consent of partners. Advance payments.
- 6:17Several partners have inquired about adding money during the
- 6:20year to their partnership. Although an exception has been
- 6:23made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements
- 6:27during mid year where we have more than one family represented
- 6:30among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed
- 6:33partnerships, an additional interest can only be acquired at
- 6:37the end of the year. We do accept advance payments
- 6:39during the year toward a partnership interest and pay
- 6:42interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the
- 6:46end of the year. At that time, subject to
- 6:49amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus
- 6:53interest is added to the partnership capital and
- 6:55thereafter participates in profits and losses.
- 6:59Sanborn Map 10 Last year mention was made of an investment which
- 7:03accounted for a very high and unusual proportion, 35% of our
- 7:08net assets. Along with the comment that I
- 7:10had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960, this
- 7:15hope materialized. The history of an investment of
- 7:17this magnitude may be of interest to you.
- 7:20Sanborn Map Company is engaged in the publication and
- 7:23continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of
- 7:28the United States. For example, the volumes Mapping
- 7:31Omaha would weigh perhaps 50 lbs and provide minute details on
- 7:35each structure. The map would be revised by the
- 7:38paste over method showing new construction, changed occupancy,
- 7:42new Fire Protection facilities, change structural materials,
- 7:46etcetera. These revisions would be done
- 7:48approximately annually and a new map would be published every 20
- 7:53or 30 years. When further paced overs became
- 7:56impractical, the cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha
- 7:59customer would run around $100 per year.
- 8:03This detailed information showing diameter of water mains,
- 8:06underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of
- 8:10roof, etcetera was primarily of use to fire insurance companies.
- 8:15They're underwriting departments located in a central office
- 8:19could evaluate business by agents nationally.
- 8:22The theory was that a picture was worth 1000 words and such
- 8:25evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the
- 8:29degree of conflagration, exposure in an area, advisable
- 8:33reinsurance procedure, etcetera. The bulk of Sanborn's business
- 8:37was done with about 30 insurance companies, although maps were
- 8:41also sold to customers outside the insurance industries, such
- 8:45as Public Utilities, mortgage companies and taxing
- 8:48authorities. For 75 years, the business
- 8:50operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with
- 8:54profits realized in every year, accompanied by almost complete
- 8:58immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort.
- 9:02In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry
- 9:05became fearful that Sanborn's profits would become too great
- 9:09and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn's board
- 9:13of directors to act in a watchdog capacity.
- 9:17In the early 1950s, a competitive method of
- 9:19underwriting known as karting made inroads on Sanborn's
- 9:23business and after tax profits of the map business fell from an
- 9:27average annual level of over $500,000 in the late 1930s to
- 9:32under $100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in
- 9:38the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost
- 9:42complete elimination of what had been sizable stable earning
- 9:46power. However, during the early 1930s,
- 9:49Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio.
- 9:53There were no capital requirements to the business so
- 9:56that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project.
- 9:59Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested,
- 10:04roughly half in bonds and half in stocks.
- 10:07Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment
- 10:10portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.
- 10:14Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two
- 10:17factors. In 1938, when the Dow Jones
- 10:21Industrial Average was in the 100 to 120 range, Sanborn sold
- 10:25at $110 per share. In 1958, with the average in the
- 10:30550 area, Sanborn sold at $45 per share.
- 10:35Yet during that same period, the value of the Sanborn investment
- 10:39portfolio increased from about $20 per share to $65 per share.
- 10:44This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938
- 10:49was placing a positive valuation of $90.00 per share on the MAP
- 10:53business, $110 less the $20 value of the investments
- 10:58unrelated to the MAP business. In a year of depressed business
- 11:02and stock market conditions, in the tremendously more vigorous
- 11:06climate of 1958, the same MAP business was evaluated at a -,
- 11:1020 dollars, with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more
- 11:14than $0.70 on the dollar for the investment portfolio.
- 11:17With the MAP business thrown in for nothing, How could this come
- 11:21about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938,
- 11:25possessed a wealth of information of substantial value
- 11:28to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed
- 11:31information they had gathered over the years would have cost
- 11:3510s of millions of dollars. Despite carting over $500
- 11:38million of fire premiums were underwritten by mapping
- 11:42companies. However, the means of selling
- 11:45and packaging Sanborn's product information had remained
- 11:48unchanged throughout the year, and finally, this inertia was
- 11:52reflected in the earnings. 11 The very fact that the
- 11:55investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize, in the
- 11:59eyes of most directors, the need for rejuvenation of the MAP
- 12:03business. Sanborn had a sales volume of
- 12:06about $2,000,000 per year and owned about $7,000,000 worth of
- 12:11marketable securities. The income from the investment
- 12:14portfolio was substantial, The business had no possible
- 12:18financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with
- 12:21the price paid for MAPS, and the stockholders still received
- 12:24dividends. However, these dividends were
- 12:27cut five times in eight years, although I could never find any
- 12:31record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or directors
- 12:34and committee fees prior to my entry on the board.
- 12:38Of the 14 directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance
- 12:42industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000
- 12:47shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with
- 12:50very large companies, which would suggest the financial
- 12:53wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest
- 12:57holding in this group was 10 shares.
- 12:59In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned
- 13:03small blocks of stock, but these were token investments in
- 13:06relation to the portfolios in which they were held.
- 13:09Before the past decade, the insurance companies have been
- 13:12only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.
- 13:17The 10th director was the company attorney, who held 10
- 13:20shares. The 11th was a banker with 10
- 13:22shares who recognized the problems of the company,
- 13:26actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings.
- 13:29The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn, who
- 13:33owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware
- 13:38of the problems of the business but kept in a subservient role
- 13:42by the board of directors. The final member of our cast was
- 13:45a son of a deceased president of Sanborn.
- 13:48The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock.
- 13:52In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business,
- 13:57demanded the top position in the company, was turned down and
- 14:01submitted his resignation, which was accepted.
- 14:04Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of
- 14:07stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other
- 14:11large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares dispersed among
- 14:15customers of a brokerage firm and one of about 8000.
- 14:18These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a
- 14:22separation of the investment portfolio from the MAP business,
- 14:25as did we. Subsequently, our holdings
- 14:28including associates were increased through open market
- 14:31purchases to about 24,000 shares in the total represented by the
- 14:36three groups increased to 46,000 shares.
- 14:40We hope to separate the two businesses, realize the fair
- 14:43value of the investment portfolio and work to re
- 14:46establish the earning power of the MAP business.
- 14:49There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply MAP
- 14:52profits through utilization of Sanborns wealth of raw material
- 14:57in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to
- 15:00the most usable form for the customer.
- 15:03There was considerable opposition on the board to
- 15:05change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider.
- 15:10Although management was in complete accord with our plan.
- 15:13And a similar plan had been recommended by Booz Allen and
- 15:17Hamilton management experts to avoid a proxy fight which very
- 15:21probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would
- 15:24have been certain of winning, and to avoid time delay.
- 15:27With a large portion of Sanborn's money tied up in blue
- 15:30chip stocks, which I didn't care for at current prices, a plan
- 15:33was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who
- 15:37wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the
- 15:40fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock,
- 15:45involving 50% of the 1600 stockholders, was exchanged for
- 15:49portfolio securities at fair value.
- 15:52The MAP business was left with over dollars L 25,000,000 in
- 15:56government and municipal bonds as a reserve fund and a
- 16:00potential corporate capital gains tax of over $1 million was
- 16:04eliminated. The remaining stockholders were
- 16:06left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially
- 16:10higher earnings per share and an increased dividend rate.
- 16:14Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated
- 16:18description of this investment operation.
- 16:21However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding
- 16:25our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring 12
- 16:30our results over a short span of time, such as a year.
- 16:33Such control situations may occur very infrequently.
- 16:36Our bread and butter business is buying undervalued securities
- 16:40and selling when the undervaluation is corrected,
- 16:43along with investment in Special Situations where the profit is
- 16:47dependent on corporate rather than market action.
- 16:50To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is
- 16:53possible that more opportunities will be available in control
- 16:57situations. The auditors should be mailing
- 16:59your financial statement and tax information within about a week.
- 17:03If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or
- 17:07this letter, be sure to let me know.
- 17:09Warren E Buffett January 30th, 61131960 Letter Buffett
- 17:15Partnership Ltd, 810 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha 31, Nebraska July.