Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 014 - Air Operations 1962 Interdiction Strikes and Reconnaissance
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- 0:01Speaker 1: Chapter thirteen of Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:05Speaker 1: five by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a
- 0:09Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:14Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:20Speaker 1: Chapter thirteen, Air Operations, nineteen sixty two. Interdiction, strikes and reconnaissance.
- 0:29Speaker 1: In World War II and the Korean conflict, interdiction had
- 0:33Speaker 1: slowed the flow of enemy forces, supplies, and equipment into
- 0:38Speaker 1: and within battle areas in Vietnam. According to General anthus,
- 0:43Speaker 1: the most lucrative targets were Vietcong training areas, troop concentrations,
- 0:47Speaker 1: supply depots, and sampams. Admiral Felt and General O'Donnell had
- 0:52Speaker 1: the same impression. Interdiction Air attacks against Vietcong base areas
- 0:58Speaker 1: held a special attraction because as the Vietnamese ground forces
- 1:01Speaker 1: seldom penetrated to them, yet air interdiction was very complex.
- 1:07Speaker 1: The viet Cong rarely wore distinctive uniforms, and they mingled
- 1:10Speaker 1: freely with civilians. To tell them from the general populace
- 1:14Speaker 1: called for timely intelligence and reliable aerial reconnaissance Unfortunately, the
- 1:20Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force owned but two C forty sevens rigged
- 1:24Speaker 1: with cameras for day photography. The single Air Photo Intelligence
- 1:28Speaker 1: Center and its twelve photo observers were situated in the
- 1:32Speaker 1: J two Division of the Joint General Staff. The L
- 1:35Speaker 1: nineteen observers could do visual reconnaissance, but the best of
- 1:39Speaker 1: them were being shifted to tactical fighters. Able Mabel RF
- 1:44Speaker 1: one O one's operated out of Don Maon Airport near Bangkok, Thailand.
- 1:49Speaker 1: They sustained a daily soortee rate of two point eight
- 1:52Speaker 1: flights and photographed high priority areas of interest to MacFee
- 1:56Speaker 1: and the Vietnamese. When over South Vietnam, these planes, as
- 2:00Speaker 1: a rule, staged through Tonsenut, where they turned over their
- 2:03Speaker 1: film to the small US Air Force Photoprocessing Cell for interpretation.
- 2:08Speaker 1: Although the RF one O one was good for general
- 2:10Speaker 1: reconnaissance of clearly fixed targets, it was not suited to
- 2:14Speaker 1: spotting an enemy who hid under heavy foliage by day
- 2:17Speaker 1: and moved at night. Furthermore, processing and interpreting the photography
- 2:22Speaker 1: in Saigon, then delivering it to requesting units by U. S.
- 2:25Speaker 1: Army courier plane usually took several days. Some ground commanders
- 2:30Speaker 1: complained that the interval between a request and a delivery
- 2:34Speaker 1: was at times thirty to forty five days. Intelligence from
- 2:38Speaker 1: members of the enemy forces was needed, and it was scarce.
- 2:43Speaker 1: Starting in December nineteen sixty one, US intelligence advisers did
- 2:47Speaker 1: their best to teach their methods to Vietnamese. Besides the
- 2:52Speaker 1: forty four specialists in mac V J two intelligence, two
- 2:56Speaker 1: hundred thirty Americans worked with Vietnamese units in the field.
- 3:00Speaker 1: Unproductive from the US Air Force point of view, mac
- 3:03Speaker 1: v intelligence was oriented toward ground operations. Normally, Vietnamese interrogations
- 3:09Speaker 1: of prisoners should have yielded significant information, but the law
- 3:14Speaker 1: authorized the military to hold prisoners only two days before
- 3:18Speaker 1: handing them over to provincial authorities for a court hearing.
- 3:22Speaker 1: This was not time enough to learn about enemy activities.
- 3:25Speaker 1: Vulnerable to air interdiction, Vietnamese Army units in the field,
- 3:29Speaker 1: provincial officials, and covert agents could request Saigon for specific strikes.
- 3:35Speaker 1: If Sigon approved, Vietnamese pilots were free to attack these targets,
- 3:40Speaker 1: usually marked by air observers, while U s Air Force
- 3:43Speaker 1: officers were not empowered to question and approved strike. General
- 3:48Speaker 1: anthus asked for positive control by radar or forward air controllers.
- 3:52Speaker 1: When Farmgate aircraft took part. Targets were often described in
- 3:56Speaker 1: vague terms like groups of huts, troop consentrations, or VC's
- 4:01Speaker 1: strong points, and were frequently hidden under jungle cover. In
- 4:06Speaker 1: spite of precautions, air strikes were dangerous, particularly in heavily
- 4:11Speaker 1: populated and poorly mapped regions. In January nineteen sixty two,
- 4:16Speaker 1: for example, Vietnamese officers wanted an air strike at dawn
- 4:20Speaker 1: on the Vietcong held village of Batu in the Perrotsbeak,
- 4:24Speaker 1: close to the Cambodian border in War Zone Sea. Because
- 4:29Speaker 1: the Vietnamese could not handle pre dawn takeoffs, farm Gate
- 4:32Speaker 1: was asked to fly the mission. At first, Colonel Gleeson,
- 4:36Speaker 1: farm Gate commander, thought the target too close to Cambodia,
- 4:40Speaker 1: but accepted the task when the Vietnamese labeled it crucial.
- 4:44Speaker 1: Radar at Toanzanut monitored the flight, warning the planes as
- 4:47Speaker 1: they neared the canal that supposedly was the border. The
- 4:51Speaker 1: aircraft failed to receive the message, but an SC forty
- 4:55Speaker 1: seven that had performed weather reconnaissance was flying back and
- 4:58Speaker 1: forth over the canal to mo from another c forty
- 5:02Speaker 1: seven positioned along the border. Colonel Gleason led and an
- 5:06Speaker 1: airborne coordinator directed the strike. As eight T twenty eights
- 5:11Speaker 1: and three B twenty six's bombed, rocketed, napalmed, and strafed.
- 5:16Speaker 1: The Minister of Defense and the three Corps commander watched
- 5:20Speaker 1: from a C forty seven. The farm Gate commander felt
- 5:24Speaker 1: sure no one had made a mistake. Yet a few
- 5:26Speaker 1: days later the Cambodian government charged T twenty eights with
- 5:30Speaker 1: having crossed the frontier, killed a villager and injured three others.
- 5:35Speaker 1: The Vietnamese Defence Minister shrugged off the protest, saying that
- 5:39Speaker 1: the whole area was a VC hotbed. The State Department, however,
- 5:44Speaker 1: wished to prevent disruption of Vietnamese Cambodian relations. At American insistence,
- 5:50Speaker 1: Saigon apologized and awarded compensation. General Anthos second Advon Commander
- 5:57Speaker 1: forbade farm Gate to strike within five miles of the
- 5:59Speaker 1: border during daylight and ten miles at night. Moreover, a
- 6:04Speaker 1: forward air controller airborne or on the ground had to
- 6:08Speaker 1: mark the targets. These restrictions might have afforded the Viet
- 6:11Speaker 1: Kong complete sanctuary along the border, but the rules did
- 6:15Speaker 1: not apply to Vietnamese pilots who could operate more freely.
- 6:19Speaker 1: Toward the end of January, all available Vietnamese and farm
- 6:23Speaker 1: gate planes at Benhois, Pleis, Coup, and Dinang simultaneously attacked
- 6:28Speaker 1: fourteen carefully pinpointed targets in five areas. After action reports
- 6:34Speaker 1: revealed good results, the Defence Minister said the strikes were
- 6:38Speaker 1: so timely inaccurate that the Viet Kong suspected spies in
- 6:42Speaker 1: their midst All the same, top American officials had nagging
- 6:46Speaker 1: doubts about the validity of the targets selected by the Vietnamese.
- 6:51Speaker 1: They stressed to the Joint General Staff the value of intelligence,
- 6:55Speaker 1: proper controls, and serious post strike assessments. Admiral Felt sink
- 7:01Speaker 1: Pack knew the problems of bombing areas where friendly and
- 7:05Speaker 1: hostile people intermingled. Impressed by Vietnamese officers who wanted to
- 7:10Speaker 1: avoid using weapons against innocent persons, he sponsored better air
- 7:14Speaker 1: ground communications for close air support. At the Secretary of
- 7:18Speaker 1: Defense conference on February nineteenth, nineteen sixty two, General Anthus
- 7:23Speaker 1: showed how air interdiction hurt the viet Cong. Defense Secretary
- 7:28Speaker 1: Macnamara evinced interest in using flares for strikes to relieve
- 7:32Speaker 1: outposts under night assault. He ordered sink Pack and macvee
- 7:37Speaker 1: to furnish Hamlet's cheap but efficient, short range VHFFM voice
- 7:42Speaker 1: radios so they could call for help when attacked. The
- 7:45Speaker 1: Secretary warned that US advisors were to do nothing that
- 7:49Speaker 1: the Vietnamese could do for themselves, and were to risk
- 7:52Speaker 1: hazards only when inescapable. Well managed interdiction based on hard
- 7:57Speaker 1: intelligence worked remarkably well. On March second, the two Corps
- 8:02Speaker 1: commander requested an immediate strike against a group of Vietcong
- 8:06Speaker 1: holding a meeting in the village of Hanya. The Air
- 8:10Speaker 1: Operation Center validated the request and dispatched two Vietnamese eighty
- 8:14Speaker 1: six's and a farm gate B twenty six. They killed
- 8:18Speaker 1: at least twelve. Even so, the issue of haphazard air
- 8:23Speaker 1: attacks lived on. Two U S. Army advisers informed Army
- 8:27Speaker 1: Brigadier General Harvey J. Jablonski the mac v J four
- 8:31Speaker 1: logistics that the Vietcong were exploiting strafing and bombing attacks
- 8:36Speaker 1: for propaganda purposes. By removing just the killed and wounded males,
- 8:41Speaker 1: they gave the villagers the idea that the women and
- 8:43Speaker 1: children left behind were the targets and victims of air strikes.
- 8:47Speaker 1: Jablonsky passed this information onto Ambassador Nolting, who on March
- 8:52Speaker 1: third met with Generals Harkins, Tams, Jablonski, and Anthus, Nolting
- 8:58Speaker 1: at first thought of kirk tailing air activity, but Jablonsky
- 9:02Speaker 1: would not cite instances of air attack. Harkins then pointed
- 9:06Speaker 1: out that tighter curbs would benefit merely the Vietcong. General
- 9:11Speaker 1: Jablonsky in Hawaii repeated the charge he had made in Saigon,
- 9:15Speaker 1: and the question was re examined at the Secretary of
- 9:17Speaker 1: Defense Conference of March twenty first. Ambassador Nolting urged close
- 9:23Speaker 1: scrutiny to prevent killing innocent people, and Defense Secretary Macnamara
- 9:27Speaker 1: agreed to allow air operations to go on under strict
- 9:31Speaker 1: controls and stringent intelligence criteria. Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary of
- 9:37Speaker 1: State for Far Eastern Affairs, later defined this decision as
- 9:41Speaker 1: the worst of two worlds. Military men disturbed by air
- 9:45Speaker 1: restrictions and diplomats fretting about propaganda benefits to the enemy.
- 9:50Speaker 1: To assist the Vietnamese in gathering better intelligence of air
- 9:54Speaker 1: force interest, Admiral felt authorized, and the Air Force sent
- 9:59Speaker 1: a detachment, the sixty four to ninety ninth Support Group
- 10:02Speaker 1: to Saigon. Six officer and six enlisted intelligence specialists arrived
- 10:07Speaker 1: in March, but two officers were unqualified and removed. Denied
- 10:12Speaker 1: direct access to enemy prisoners. The others could ask questions
- 10:16Speaker 1: only through Vietnamese interrogators. An additional obstacle was the lengthy
- 10:22Speaker 1: procedure in processing a request for a pre planned interdiction strike.
- 10:26Speaker 1: The second Advon Intelligence Directorate could propose a target, and
- 10:30Speaker 1: the Joint General Staff's Air Photo Intelligence Center researched and
- 10:34Speaker 1: prepared data sheets and folders. One copy went to the
- 10:38Speaker 1: Province chief for checking, a second to the Air Operations
- 10:42Speaker 1: Center for preliminary planning. Field Command next decided if the
- 10:46Speaker 1: target was susceptible to ground action, which took precedence over air.
- 10:51Speaker 1: These steps could consume several days or several weeks. Actually,
- 10:55Speaker 1: most intelligence rose from the Ground Force Division and province
- 10:59Speaker 1: chief law. These authorities often suggested targets to the Core Commander,
- 11:04Speaker 1: who routed the requests to the operation center. Yet, no
- 11:08Speaker 1: matter how intelligence generated strikes, the province chief was the key.
- 11:13Speaker 1: He alone determined whether bombing a target would imperil his people.
- 11:18Speaker 1: To pinpoint Vietcong radio transmitters for air intelligence, The Air
- 11:22Speaker 1: Force delivered a C fifty four to Vietnam in March
- 11:26Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two. The transport featured infrared detectors, cameras, and
- 11:31Speaker 1: a high frequency direction finder. About the same time, the
- 11:36Speaker 1: US Army Security Agency put airborne radio homing units in
- 11:40Speaker 1: three Army L twenties. During their first operational flight on
- 11:44Speaker 1: the twelfth of April, the C fifty four and L
- 11:47Speaker 1: twenties came upon far more Vietcong radio transmitters than expected. However,
- 11:53Speaker 1: the direction finding equipment could not give a precise fix
- 11:57Speaker 1: on the radio sites. The Vietcong radios were short range,
- 12:01Speaker 1: low power sets, and they operated in periodic short bursts,
- 12:05Speaker 1: though the American equipment was not advanced enough to place
- 12:08Speaker 1: the signals accurately. The C fifty four flew one hundred
- 12:12Speaker 1: two special missions in ten months. The cameras worked fine
- 12:16Speaker 1: for ordinary photography, but the infrared and the direction finder
- 12:20Speaker 1: did poorly. The US Air Force pilots could return fire
- 12:25Speaker 1: against a known source in self defense, but needed to
- 12:29Speaker 1: be very careful, for they rarely knew a source's exact location.
- 12:33Speaker 1: In the daytime farm gate planes could not fire unless
- 12:37Speaker 1: under positive control of a Vietnamese forward air controller, and
- 12:40Speaker 1: cooperation with Vietnamese L nineteen controllers was frequently difficult. In addition,
- 12:47Speaker 1: the elaborate reconnaissance and the target marking no doubt alerted
- 12:50Speaker 1: the viet Cong to impending strikes. This impeded action against
- 12:55Speaker 1: an already elusive foe. In the spring of nineteen sixty two,
- 12:59Speaker 1: interdiction focused on small groups of guerrillas and sampans near
- 13:04Speaker 1: Vietnamese army positions. Then late in May, the Joint General
- 13:08Speaker 1: Staff and mac V targeted the Yosa Warzone headquarters area
- 13:13Speaker 1: of Inner Zone V. With utmost care, they identified authenticated
- 13:19Speaker 1: and pinpointed nineteen targets spread over an area of two
- 13:22Speaker 1: hundred and thirty square miles. As a final validation, a
- 13:26Speaker 1: plane flew a Vietcong defector over the area. Vietnamese and
- 13:31Speaker 1: American aircraft eleven B twenty six's, eleven eighty sixes and
- 13:35Speaker 1: two T twenty eights took off on May twenty seven.
- 13:40Speaker 1: Bad weather obscured five of the targets, but the planes
- 13:43Speaker 1: made repeated strikes on the other fourteen, regardless of the
- 13:47Speaker 1: careful preparations. A B twenty six pounded the friendly village
- 13:51Speaker 1: of Dacquet, killing four persons and demolishing a dozen buildings.
- 13:56Speaker 1: The strike pilots saw no Viet Kong on any of
- 13:58Speaker 1: their runs, but bomb damage assessment photography showed a command
- 14:02Speaker 1: post wiped out, fourteen other structures burned and destroyed, and
- 14:07Speaker 1: thirty damaged. The Vietnamese field commanders hailed the attack as
- 14:12Speaker 1: a total success and no Deniu. President Diem's brother reported
- 14:16Speaker 1: about four hundred enemy killed. Some Vietcong defectors later credited
- 14:21Speaker 1: their change of heart to the bombings. Both PACAF and
- 14:27Speaker 1: Second ADVON were willing to accept the mission of disrupting
- 14:30Speaker 1: Vietcong's security in base areas beyond the reach of ground forces.
- 14:35Speaker 1: The American Embassy in Saigon nonetheless questioned the wisdom of
- 14:39Speaker 1: the attacks. Some US observers were positive that air power
- 14:43Speaker 1: at Dokket had killed no more than fifty of the enemy.
- 14:48Speaker 1: The commander of inner' s own v had escaped, innocence
- 14:52Speaker 1: had been killed. Consequently, General anthus ordered farm Gate no
- 14:57Speaker 1: longer to fly free area missions without afford controller. As
- 15:02Speaker 1: spring wore on, a more extreme belief nudged aside assertions
- 15:06Speaker 1: of how air interdiction hurt pacification because it endangered guiltless people.
- 15:12Speaker 1: On April fifteen, Macvie published the first extensive Vietcong order
- 15:16Speaker 1: of battle, listing eighteen battalions, seventy nine companies, and one
- 15:21Speaker 1: hundred thirty seven platoons. The overall strength was put at
- 15:26Speaker 1: sixteen thousand, three hundred five, less than the twenty five
- 15:29Speaker 1: thousand estimated by the Vietnamese. But backing up the regular
- 15:33Speaker 1: troops were paramilitary organizations of around ten thousand part time guerrillas,
- 15:39Speaker 1: and over the first two weeks of May one thousand
- 15:42Speaker 1: to eighteen hundred more Viet Cong had stolen into his
- 15:44Speaker 1: own d from Laos to form a new battalion. After
- 15:48Speaker 1: weighing this information, macv J two Intelligence concluded that air
- 15:53Speaker 1: interdiction had no military effect on the Viet Cong. What then,
- 15:58Speaker 1: could isolate the Viet coom from the populace who furnished
- 16:01Speaker 1: them food and other supplies, or from their logistics routes
- 16:05Speaker 1: that brought them weapons, ammunition, medical materials, and fresh troops.
- 16:11Speaker 1: There was no other way than by air interdiction and
- 16:13Speaker 1: ground thrusts into enemy base areas. Admiral felt desired these
- 16:18Speaker 1: missions continued. He especially wanted Vietnamese rangers and regular units
- 16:23Speaker 1: to fight guerrilla style in the Vietcong war zones. It is,
- 16:27Speaker 1: of course basic to our side, Felt told General Harkens
- 16:31Speaker 1: that the initiative be denied the VC. Our concept is
- 16:35Speaker 1: to harass them, push them down, and extend them far
- 16:39Speaker 1: beyond the capabilities of their logistics support, thus destroying them.
- 16:44Speaker 1: On the other hand, Harkins deemed nearly all of the
- 16:47Speaker 1: ground commanders too in experience for large scale efforts, and
- 16:50Speaker 1: the rangers lack leaders for extended field operations. Unlike the army,
- 16:56Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force could carry the war into the
- 16:59Speaker 1: jungle areas the Vietcong. What the pilots needed was valid
- 17:03Speaker 1: target intelligence. In August, Colonel Ralphe Newman, air liaison officer
- 17:09Speaker 1: with Vietnamese Air Force Field Command, instructed liaison officers to
- 17:13Speaker 1: work closely with the ground forces of division and regimental levels.
- 17:17Speaker 1: The aim was to identify targets for interdiction, chiefly for
- 17:21Speaker 1: Vietnamese planes returning from sorties with unused ordnance. Most crews
- 17:26Speaker 1: hesitated to land with bombs and rockets hanging outside the aircraft,
- 17:30Speaker 1: and since nineteen fifty eight, had jettisoned them on vacant
- 17:33Speaker 1: land near the airfields. Aware of this waste, General Anthus
- 17:37Speaker 1: proposed assigning pre planned targets, preferably in Zone D, so
- 17:42Speaker 1: at least the munitions would fall on Vietcong territory. Anthus
- 17:46Speaker 1: and the air liaison officers pressured I and two Corps
- 17:50Speaker 1: to accept this proposal. They stressed that a backlog of
- 17:54Speaker 1: such targets would ease scheduling, distribution and use of aircraft,
- 17:58Speaker 1: as well as keep the Vitea Kong off balance. By
- 18:02Speaker 1: September nineteen sixty two, however, the suggestion was still hanging fire.
- 18:07Speaker 1: Admiral Felt asked General Harkins, MACV commander whether area denial
- 18:11Speaker 1: methods might make Zone D too hot for the Vietcong.
- 18:15Speaker 1: Felt advised entire extent of techniques and devices available for
- 18:20Speaker 1: such purpose should be used. We have in mind, for example,
- 18:23Speaker 1: scatter bombing with butterfly bombs proven lethal in Korea, and
- 18:28Speaker 1: other type air force minds. We also visualize use of
- 18:31Speaker 1: chemical irritants and defoliants to expose targets for air strikes.
- 18:36Speaker 1: In other words, we want to destroy or drive sick, starved, blistered,
- 18:41Speaker 1: and blasted Vietcong from Zone D so that we can
- 18:44Speaker 1: scoop them up outside of their nest or prevent them
- 18:47Speaker 1: from setting foot in the area again. Thus spurred MACV
- 18:51Speaker 1: and the Joint General Staff started to target war Zones
- 18:55Speaker 1: D and X headquarters of Vietcong in her Zone V
- 18:58Speaker 1: for an intensive air cacase campaign. On October three, the
- 19:02Speaker 1: Fifth Division submitted one hundred twenty nine specific targets. President
- 19:07Speaker 1: DM next ordered a five day bombing attack in Zone
- 19:10Speaker 1: D to begin on November first, followed by a Special
- 19:13Speaker 1: Forces ground penetration. He also called for the I and
- 19:17Speaker 1: two Corps to cooperate in a similar bombing and to
- 19:20Speaker 1: follow up penetration into War Zone X, which lay in
- 19:23Speaker 1: the mountains dividing the two corps. Gradually, the corp commanders
- 19:27Speaker 1: and Field Command obtained many more targets through military channels.
- 19:31Speaker 1: Provincial chiefs designated free areas for air attack. Vietnamese crews
- 19:36Speaker 1: could strike these areas without a forward air controller, but
- 19:40Speaker 1: farm Gate had to have targets marked by a Vietnamese
- 19:43Speaker 1: l Nineteen review of the free areas came when Vietnam
- 19:47Speaker 1: strained relations with Cambodia worsened. Feeling threatened by both South
- 19:51Speaker 1: Vietnam and Thailand. Cambodia on August twentieth, nineteen sixty two,
- 19:56Speaker 1: had appealed to President Kennedy for a neutral status like
- 19:59Speaker 1: that of law. President Diem resented the implication that South
- 20:03Speaker 1: Vietnam was an aggressor. He said there was little question
- 20:07Speaker 1: that Vietcong redoubts drew support from across the border. Vietnamese
- 20:11Speaker 1: troops who carried out sporadic raids into Cambodia had captured
- 20:15Speaker 1: Communist weapons and ammunition destined for the Vietcong. Undeterred. Prince
- 20:20Speaker 1: Nordom Sianuuk, Cambodian Chief of State, charged on September tenth,
- 20:24Speaker 1: that Vietnamese amphibious craft under air cover had violated his
- 20:28Speaker 1: country's soil. Any more such aggressive acts, he threatened, would
- 20:32Speaker 1: lead to sever diplomatic relations, recognition of North Vietnam, and
- 20:37Speaker 1: closer ties with China. Five weeks later, Vietnamese naval forces
- 20:41Speaker 1: moved against the island of Fukuok, near the Cambodian coast.
- 20:45Speaker 1: They seized seventeen tons of ingredients for making explosives. Sianook's
- 20:51Speaker 1: threat to invite Chinese assistance startled the State Department. Ambassador
- 20:55Speaker 1: Nolting met with President Diem and stressed there must be
- 20:58Speaker 1: no military action that might bring Chinese Communist forces onto
- 21:02Speaker 1: Vietnam's flank. In compliance, the Joint General Staff banned ground
- 21:07Speaker 1: and air operations within ten kilometers of the Cambodian border.
- 21:11Speaker 1: If a river, road or other physical feature clearly marked
- 21:15Speaker 1: the border, Vietnamese forces could pursue the enemy to within
- 21:18Speaker 1: two and one half kilometers, otherwise the chase would cease
- 21:22Speaker 1: at eight kilometers. Vietnamese pilots could open fire on a
- 21:26Speaker 1: hostile aircraft ten kilometers inside South Vietnam if certain that
- 21:30Speaker 1: the plane would fall inside Vietnamese territory if shot down.
- 21:35Speaker 1: Though the border restrictions did not sit well with Vietnamese officials,
- 21:39Speaker 1: Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Joint Chiefs of
- 21:42Speaker 1: Staff wondered whether the restraints went far enough militarily. Rusk
- 21:47Speaker 1: cabled Nolting, there is general agreement that success lies not
- 21:51Speaker 1: in drawing tight court on sanitaire in Magino manner along
- 21:54Speaker 1: vaguely defined frontier, but primarily in working outwards from rural
- 21:59Speaker 1: areas and secondarily threw strikes against VC strongholds. Usefulness of latter,
- 22:06Speaker 1: when carried out near frontier, must be considered less important
- 22:10Speaker 1: than political diplomatic problem. The Joint chiefs suggested a new
- 22:14Speaker 1: name be found for free areas. Admiral Felt did not object,
- 22:18Speaker 1: and Second Air Division formerly Second Advon commenced to call
- 22:22Speaker 1: them approved interdiction targets to General Anthus, sponsorship of area
- 22:28Speaker 1: denial by Admiral Felt smacked of indiscriminate bombing. Even in
- 22:33Speaker 1: Zone D, it was impossible to note positively that all
- 22:36Speaker 1: victims were via Coong. When Felt proposed having C one
- 22:40Speaker 1: three's dropped ten thousand pounds of napalm on marked targets
- 22:43Speaker 1: during a ground defensive endo Zone D, Secretary Rusk objected.
- 22:48Speaker 1: He wanted napalm confined to high priority targets that were
- 22:51Speaker 1: clearly Vietcong installations. Moreover, the State Department retained the right
- 22:56Speaker 1: to pass on all plans meaning to use napalm in
- 22:59Speaker 1: large amounts. In the end, General Harkins withheld US Air
- 23:04Speaker 1: Force aircraft from delivering napalm and Zone D and allowed
- 23:08Speaker 1: the Vietnamese to do so. Ambassador Nolting supported this decision.
- 23:13Speaker 1: The curbs put on Americans made it hard to carry
- 23:15Speaker 1: the war to the heart of the enemy sanctuaries. The
- 23:18Speaker 1: best that General Anthos could do was to allow F
- 23:21Speaker 1: one O twos to fly across Zone D at night,
- 23:24Speaker 1: breaking the sound barrier and causing sonic booms. It may
- 23:27Speaker 1: not destroy anything, Anthos said, but I can say positively
- 23:31Speaker 1: there has been considerable VC sleep lost in the last
- 23:34Speaker 1: few weeks. Scarcely less important than interdiction was US Air
- 23:39Speaker 1: Force support of Vietnamese ground operations. Air Force officers constantly
- 23:44Speaker 1: offered air support to ground commanders through the Tactical Air
- 23:47Speaker 1: Control System. To sell this support, steps were taken to
- 23:51Speaker 1: strengthen the Air Operations Center at Tomsonut and the radar
- 23:54Speaker 1: facilities at Denang and Pleaikoup, procure and employ American Air
- 23:59Speaker 1: Liaison Office and forward air controllers, and persuade locally powerful
- 24:04Speaker 1: Army commanders to coordinate with air forces. In general, these
- 24:08Speaker 1: commanders were jealous of their authority, secretive about their plans,
- 24:12Speaker 1: and inexperienced an applying tactical air support. Inasmuch as the
- 24:16Speaker 1: Air Operation Center depended on day to day knowledge of
- 24:19Speaker 1: Vietnamese ground operations. U S Army and Vietnamese liaison officers
- 24:24Speaker 1: were assigned to the center. In February nineteen sixty two,
- 24:27Speaker 1: the idea was to inject tactical air into operational planning
- 24:31Speaker 1: at the outset. If Vietnamese ground commanders had but an
- 24:35Speaker 1: inkling of how the support system was supposed to work. U. S.
- 24:39Speaker 1: Army advisers had not the air experience to qualify them
- 24:42Speaker 1: as air liaison officers. They refused to accept the tactical
- 24:46Speaker 1: air control system outright, and from the US Air Force
- 24:49Speaker 1: view were quick to criticize slow to help. Bolstering of
- 24:54Speaker 1: the Joint Operation Center was one of the benefits accruing
- 24:57Speaker 1: from the April nineteen sixty two visit of General Lafe.
- 25:01Speaker 1: He ordered several U. S Air Force officers assigned to
- 25:04Speaker 1: the centre, Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Bowers assuming the duties
- 25:07Speaker 1: of Deputy Director. These officers monitored and encouraged the submission
- 25:12Speaker 1: of daily requirements for air support and allocated sortees on
- 25:16Speaker 1: the basis of available aircraft. Quite a few things weakened
- 25:20Speaker 1: centralized control of tactical aircraft in experienced personnel and unreliable
- 25:25Speaker 1: equipment bread problems. In April, for example, communications between Tonsonut
- 25:30Speaker 1: and Danang remained out for three days, moving aircraft from
- 25:34Speaker 1: rotational duty Danang and Playcup demanded special approval from Vietnamese
- 25:39Speaker 1: Air Force headquarters. Consequently, the Air Operations Center could not
- 25:44Speaker 1: route these planes rapidly to areas of greater need. Also,
- 25:48Speaker 1: the Center was heavily committed to operations requested by Field
- 25:51Speaker 1: Command and three Corps. This led Iicorp at Danang and
- 25:54Speaker 1: two CORP at plaikup to look upon the eighty sixes
- 25:58Speaker 1: at these fields as theirs to use without telling the Center. Likewise,
- 26:02Speaker 1: the fighter squadron and Trang now and then flew T
- 26:05Speaker 1: twenty eight strikes in response to local requests without the
- 26:08Speaker 1: Center's knowledge. When General anthus made staff visits to Corps, Division,
- 26:13Speaker 1: regimental and battalion headquarters, he found little understanding of how
- 26:17Speaker 1: the tactical air control system was meant to function. Attempts
- 26:22Speaker 1: to bring helicopter activities under the Air Operation Center did
- 26:25Speaker 1: not go well. General Harkins in April directed armed tactical
- 26:29Speaker 1: aircraft to accompany helicopter assault missions. He was therefore certain
- 26:34Speaker 1: that the Center was wholly aware of all U. S
- 26:36Speaker 1: Army flight operations in the country. Yet Army ground liaison
- 26:40Speaker 1: officers readily admitted that the MACV order for escort planes
- 26:44Speaker 1: was observed only about ten percent of the time. The
- 26:47Speaker 1: figure of ten percent was misleading, seeing that these ground
- 26:51Speaker 1: operations mostly involved small forces of company or platoon size
- 26:55Speaker 1: in very brief firefights. Since the Air Operations Center was
- 26:59Speaker 1: unable to coordinate all air operations, it could not wholly
- 27:02Speaker 1: exploit available air support. Data on ground operations being planned
- 27:07Speaker 1: was often not to be had. The commanders were sensitive
- 27:10Speaker 1: to Vietcong espionage and personally drew up and launched actions
- 27:14Speaker 1: with scant notice, even to their own staffs. A few
- 27:18Speaker 1: commanders went so far as to suspect the Center to
- 27:21Speaker 1: be a Vietcong source of information, and with reason. The
- 27:25Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force dispatched fragmentary operations orders from Tonsonute to
- 27:30Speaker 1: its squadrons in the clear. Because the teletype circuits were
- 27:34Speaker 1: possibly insecure, there were inevitable leaks. US Army officers disliked
- 27:40Speaker 1: the tactical air control system, deeming it too rigid. Accordingly,
- 27:44Speaker 1: there was no realistic policy governing the relationship between fixed
- 27:48Speaker 1: wing aircraft and helicopters. In June, Macvee gave General anthus
- 27:53Speaker 1: coordinating authority over all air operations. In July, General Harkins
- 27:59Speaker 1: ordered helicopter support missions to have proper air escort unless
- 28:03Speaker 1: the helicopter unit commander judged it unnecessary. In August, Admiral
- 28:07Speaker 1: Felt considered it essential to have every type of air
- 28:10Speaker 1: operation coordinated by the Air Operation Center and to have
- 28:14Speaker 1: air cover from fixed wing aircraft for each helicopter operation.
- 28:18Speaker 1: Not until December nineteen sixty two did the latter requirement
- 28:22Speaker 1: go into force. Air strikes close to friendly troops called
- 28:27Speaker 1: for close cooperation between air missions and the movement and
- 28:30Speaker 1: fire of ground units. As in Korea, tactical air control
- 28:35Speaker 1: parties came to be used. The Air Force applied a
- 28:38Speaker 1: seasoned fighter pilot to serve as the air liaison member
- 28:41Speaker 1: of the control party. The Army furnished the vehicles and mechanics,
- 28:46Speaker 1: radio gear, and operators. The an VRC thirty ground mobile
- 28:50Speaker 1: radio jeep carried the air liaison officer and Army members
- 28:54Speaker 1: of the control party. The vehicles radios linked with the
- 28:57Speaker 1: forward air controller and the strike pilots above, and with
- 29:00Speaker 1: ground and air units. The control party's work was thwarted
- 29:04Speaker 1: whenever the jeep was slowed or stopped by cut and
- 29:07Speaker 1: mired roads, ambush parties, and jungles and swamps. A further
- 29:12Speaker 1: frustration was the meager experience of Vietnamese in coordinating air
- 29:16Speaker 1: ground operations. The shortage of L nineteen pilots prevented the
- 29:20Speaker 1: assignment of air liaison officers to ground units. The foremost
- 29:24Speaker 1: need was to secure sufficient two man L nineteen crews
- 29:28Speaker 1: pilot and observer to place eighty six strike aircraft on
- 29:32Speaker 1: the target. So in lieu of an air liaison officer,
- 29:35Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force sometimes designated an L nineteen crew
- 29:39Speaker 1: to serve as forward air controller for a ground unit
- 29:42Speaker 1: during a single operation. The pilot and observer repaired to
- 29:45Speaker 1: the unit, received briefings on the planning action and tried
- 29:49Speaker 1: to become familiar with the procedures and terrain. The crew
- 29:52Speaker 1: then returned home to conduct other air control and reconnaissance missions.
- 29:56Speaker 1: On the day of the operation, however, the L nineteen
- 29:59Speaker 1: crew flew by back and controlled air strikes for the
- 30:01Speaker 1: ground unit. Unable to operate at night. L nineteen crews
- 30:06Speaker 1: in daytime usually flew at three thousand to five thousand feet,
- 30:10Speaker 1: far too high for good surveillance and target marking. The
- 30:13Speaker 1: air observer marked targets for fighters by radio direction or
- 30:16Speaker 1: hand thrown smoke grenade, commonly by both methods, criticism and
- 30:21Speaker 1: penalty awaited an L nineteen crew if ground fire damaged
- 30:24Speaker 1: the plane. The observer was subject to severe punishment if
- 30:28Speaker 1: he aired in marking a target, and friendly casualties resulted.
- 30:33Speaker 1: To communicate with regular troops, the Civil Guard and the
- 30:36Speaker 1: self defense Core units, L nineteens carried an PRC ten
- 30:42Speaker 1: Army radios lashed to their back seats. Because the plane
- 30:45Speaker 1: could power only its own radios or the PRC ten,
- 30:49Speaker 1: the crew could not converse with strike aircraft and ground forces.
- 30:53Speaker 1: At the same time, the PRC ten lash up was
- 30:56Speaker 1: a poor makeshift, and ground units wanted man pack radios
- 31:00Speaker 1: that could mesh with existing UHF VHF airborne sets. No
- 31:05Speaker 1: such radios were obtainable. In nineteen sixty two, the US
- 31:08Speaker 1: Agency for International Development was giving large numbers of radios
- 31:12Speaker 1: to provincial paramilitary forces. These sets were the commercially procured
- 31:17Speaker 1: HT one and TR twenty, with characteristics similar to those
- 31:22Speaker 1: of the PRC ten. As an interim measure, mag refitted
- 31:26Speaker 1: US Army helicopters and Vietnamese and farmgate aircraft with the
- 31:30Speaker 1: ANARC forty four Army radio. This set could tie in
- 31:34Speaker 1: with the PRC ten HT one and TR twenty. Complications
- 31:39Speaker 1: of this sort piled Beside the general insufficiency of the
- 31:43Speaker 1: L nineteens, they were often simply unavailable. In April, for example,
- 31:48Speaker 1: farm Gate pilots arrived over the target and could see
- 31:51Speaker 1: a firefight on the ground, but the Vietnamese controller never
- 31:54Speaker 1: showed up. Toward the end of nineteen sixty two, farm
- 31:58Speaker 1: Gate received two L two twenty eight a's later known
- 32:01Speaker 1: as U ten a's for forward air controller duty. They
- 32:06Speaker 1: were too costly for such use. Moreover, farm Gates still
- 32:09Speaker 1: had to have Vietnamese air observers or air guides on
- 32:12Speaker 1: the ground to mark targets for strikes. Three U. S
- 32:16Speaker 1: Army helicopter companies, each attached to a corps, enabled troops
- 32:20Speaker 1: to move swiftly against the Viet Cong on the way
- 32:23Speaker 1: to the target areas. The chopper pilots liked to fly
- 32:26Speaker 1: at seven hundred feet and hug the terrain. Their success
- 32:30Speaker 1: led Secretary of Defense McNamara to deploy a marine squadron
- 32:34Speaker 1: of twenty four UH thirty four D helicopters to Vietnam. Afterwards,
- 32:39Speaker 1: he moved two more Army H twenty one companies to
- 32:42Speaker 1: the country, plus a company of fifteen armed UH one
- 32:46Speaker 1: A and UH one B helicopters from Okinawa and Thailand.
- 32:50Speaker 1: Manned by Americans. These gunships were to deliver suppressive fire,
- 32:54Speaker 1: now deemed to be self defense. In September nineteen sixty two,
- 32:59Speaker 1: the Joint Chief of Staff ordered all helicopter gunships bearing
- 33:03Speaker 1: US markings to carry a Vietnamese observer. In July nineteen
- 33:08Speaker 1: sixty two, strike aircraft flew one hundred thirty nine combat
- 33:12Speaker 1: sorties in support of helicopters. Farmgate, now commanded by Lieutenant
- 33:17Speaker 1: Colonel Eugene H. Muller Junior, perfected tactics whereby two T
- 33:21Speaker 1: twenty eight supported each helicopter flight. One T twenty eight
- 33:25Speaker 1: swooped down to two hundred feet, flew slightly ahead of
- 33:28Speaker 1: the leading helicopter, and made slow turns to search for
- 33:31Speaker 1: the enemy. The second T twenty eight stayed above the formation,
- 33:35Speaker 1: set to make a firing pass on a target. As
- 33:38Speaker 1: the helicopters approached in trail for landing, the strike aircraft
- 33:42Speaker 1: flew on each side and straight the flanks to suppress
- 33:45Speaker 1: enemy fire. Despite Admiral Felt's belief that transport helicopters constantly
- 33:50Speaker 1: required fighter escort, General Harkins authorized helicopter gunships to operate
- 33:55Speaker 1: alone if need be bad weather now and then grounded
- 33:58Speaker 1: strike aircraft, but not necessarily helicopters. In addition, escorts were
- 34:02Speaker 1: hard put to fly slowly enough to stay with the helicopters.
- 34:06Speaker 1: Seeking to put U S Army air operations under the
- 34:09Speaker 1: Tactical Air Control System, General Anthos warned Hearkens against fighting
- 34:13Speaker 1: two distinct air wars. On the other hand, army officers
- 34:17Speaker 1: tended to see armed helicopters best used when under a
- 34:20Speaker 1: ground commander's control and carrying out local operations. In August,
- 34:25Speaker 1: Macvie gave the Tactical Air Control System supremacy solely over
- 34:30Speaker 1: air traffic control. The Vietcong ambushed four hundred sixty two
- 34:35Speaker 1: road convoys during the first seven months of nineteen sixty two,
- 34:39Speaker 1: most of them in three corps north of Saigon and
- 34:42Speaker 1: near Zoe d On the morning of June sixteenth, some
- 34:46Speaker 1: four to five hundred Vietcong took up ambush positions along
- 34:50Speaker 1: the road to Pinhoi, about five kilometers south of Ben Kott,
- 34:54Speaker 1: opening fire on the convoy in mid morning. The Communists
- 34:58Speaker 1: killed two American advisors and twenty three Vietnamese. The column
- 35:02Speaker 1: requested air support, and three hours elapsed before the strike
- 35:06Speaker 1: units at Benhois got orders to take off. By that time,
- 35:10Speaker 1: the enemy was withdrawing towards Zone D. Even so a
- 35:14Speaker 1: B twenty six and two eighty six's under L nineteen
- 35:17Speaker 1: control killed fifty enemy and enabled pursuing Vietnamese troops to
- 35:21Speaker 1: recover nearly all the equipment and weapons stolen from the convoy.
- 35:26Speaker 1: Air Force officers pointed out to Vietnamese commanders that a
- 35:29Speaker 1: single L nineteen over the convoy would probably have cited
- 35:33Speaker 1: and reported the enemy, and no doubt would have prevented
- 35:36Speaker 1: the ambush. On July fourteenth, a Vietcong battalion ambushed a
- 35:41Speaker 1: convoy en route from Saigon to Fuklong, killing twenty five persons,
- 35:46Speaker 1: including a US Army adviser, and wounding twenty nine others.
- 35:50Speaker 1: The convoy had not asked for air cover. In fact,
- 35:53Speaker 1: neither two Corps nor Field Command had known that the
- 35:56Speaker 1: column was on the road. The request for air support
- 36:00Speaker 1: came one and a half hours after the fighting erupted.
- 36:03Speaker 1: By then, the gorillas had long been gone. General anthus
- 36:08Speaker 1: emphasized to Macvie the advantages of air cover for convoys
- 36:12Speaker 1: and rail movements. Not only would tactical air enhance security,
- 36:17Speaker 1: it would also absorb Vietnamese and farm gate sorties currently unused.
- 36:22Speaker 1: At General Harkins's suggestion, President D. M. In August directed
- 36:26Speaker 1: his army commanders to call on the Vietnamese Air Force
- 36:29Speaker 1: to protect trains and convoys conveying arms, ammunition, and other
- 36:34Speaker 1: critical cargo. The simple presence of the unarmed L nineteen
- 36:39Speaker 1: often broke up an ambush. On August third, two L
- 36:43Speaker 1: nineteen spy two hundred guerrillas lying in wait between Quang
- 36:46Speaker 1: Nai and Dnang for an ammunition train headed north. When
- 36:50Speaker 1: the planes appeared, the Vietcong fled. Later that month, an
- 36:55Speaker 1: L nineteen stopped the first vehicle of a convoyage as
- 36:57Speaker 1: short of an explosive charge. In contrast to the thirty
- 37:02Speaker 1: two requests for convoy escort from January to July nineteen
- 37:06Speaker 1: sixty two, there were five hundred six between August and
- 37:10Speaker 1: October doing most of the train and truck convoy escort.
- 37:14Speaker 1: L nineteens flew ahead of the movement and searched for
- 37:17Speaker 1: signs of ambush. They radioed for ground or air reinforcement
- 37:21Speaker 1: as required, except for the compulsory combat air cover for
- 37:25Speaker 1: high priority cargoes. Tactical aircrafts selected to escort usually stayed
- 37:30Speaker 1: on ground alert. The combination of planes devoted to this
- 37:34Speaker 1: duty constituted about ten percent of the total tactical air effort.
- 37:39Speaker 1: Convoys would have incurred less damage had they kept traveled
- 37:42Speaker 1: to days and hours when aircraft were on hand to
- 37:44Speaker 1: afford cover and protection. The technique was effective from July on.
- 37:50Speaker 1: No train or convoy escorted by air ran into Ambush
- 37:53Speaker 1: For several months. Helicopter assault operations proved more complex than
- 37:59Speaker 1: train or convoy escorts. On August thirtieth, KORPS mounted an
- 38:03Speaker 1: air ground operation fifty five miles south of Denang. Plans
- 38:08Speaker 1: envisioned ten Vietnamese H thirty fours and twelve U S
- 38:11Speaker 1: Army H twenty one's to lift two hundred rangers and
- 38:14Speaker 1: two hundred Special Forces troops to the battle area. Four
- 38:18Speaker 1: T twenty eights would fly helicopter escort, while four eighty six's,
- 38:23Speaker 1: four T twenty eights and one B twenty six ready
- 38:26Speaker 1: the landing zone. A CV two Cariboo out of d
- 38:29Speaker 1: Nang was to be the airborne command post. The KORPS
- 38:33Speaker 1: air liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Byron R. Callan pointed out
- 38:37Speaker 1: in vain that the Caribou lacked the fuel capacity for
- 38:40Speaker 1: orbiting during the whole operation. The plane would have to
- 38:43Speaker 1: return to Danang for refueling. Early on d Day six,
- 38:48Speaker 1: C one twenty three's ferried two hundred Vietnamese troops from
- 38:51Speaker 1: Dnang to Kwang Nai to join the others. The Cariboo
- 38:55Speaker 1: command post checked the weather in the battle area and
- 38:58Speaker 1: signaled for the first Hella lift of two hundred troops.
- 39:01Speaker 1: The strike planes made their pre landing attacks, but by
- 39:05Speaker 1: the time the helicopters came fog had rolled into some
- 39:07Speaker 1: of the landing areas. The Cariboo sent the helicopters back
- 39:11Speaker 1: to Kwang Nai. When the fog lifted, the Cariboo called
- 39:15Speaker 1: for the mission to continue. Although the four T twenty
- 39:18Speaker 1: eights escorting the helicopters completed another pre landing strike, the
- 39:23Speaker 1: Vietcong opened up on the choppers with sharp fire. A
- 39:26Speaker 1: damaged H twenty one escaped to an emergency landing area.
- 39:30Speaker 1: After the crew was rescued, A T twenty eight destroyed
- 39:33Speaker 1: the craft to avert its capture. Subsequent to the safe
- 39:37Speaker 1: landing of a second wave of helicopters, The Caribou needed
- 39:41Speaker 1: to go to Danang for refueling. While it was away
- 39:44Speaker 1: for over an hour, orbiting fighters relayed messages to the commander,
- 39:48Speaker 1: but he was out of direct contact with his troops.
- 39:51Speaker 1: The fighting on the ground was inconclusive, and in mid afternoon,
- 39:54Speaker 1: helicopters began extracting the forces. As the last chopper left
- 39:59Speaker 1: the scene, the Viet Kong opened fire, downing another H
- 40:03Speaker 1: twenty one. The wounded crewmen were rescued and a T
- 40:06Speaker 1: twenty eight shattered the copter on the ground. Why were
- 40:10Speaker 1: the T twenty eights unable to suppress the Viet Kong fire?
- 40:13Speaker 1: The Cariboo's limited communications for directing fighters and ground troops
- 40:18Speaker 1: were frequently interrupted for one reason or other. Target marking
- 40:21Speaker 1: was poor. An American forward air controller flew in L
- 40:25Speaker 1: nineteen over the area for three hours at two thousand feet.
- 40:29Speaker 1: His Vietnamese observer marked just one target, the smoke bomb,
- 40:32Speaker 1: missing by three thousand feet. Lastly, the delay between the
- 40:37Speaker 1: pre landing strikes and the first helicopter landing had likely
- 40:40Speaker 1: alerted the Viet Kong. At Denaang on September twenty second,
- 40:45Speaker 1: the second Division commander planned a helliborne attack to begin
- 40:48Speaker 1: on the twenty fourth. The six Vietnamese T twenty eights
- 40:52Speaker 1: on station could not muster the fire power for the
- 40:55Speaker 1: air support required, delayed until fresh aircraft arrived the operation
- 41:00Speaker 1: when on September twenty sixth. By then the Vietcong had
- 41:03Speaker 1: slipped away. The growing accuracy of viet Cong ground fire
- 41:07Speaker 1: against aircraft caused concern among US Air Force officers. The
- 41:12Speaker 1: toll of farm Gate planes shot down mounted a T
- 41:16Speaker 1: twenty eight on August twenty eighth, nineteen sixty two, a
- 41:19Speaker 1: U ten on October seventeenth, and a low flying B
- 41:22Speaker 1: twenty six on November fifth. Other aircraft were damaged following
- 41:27Speaker 1: a night napalm strike. Lieutenant Colonel Miles M. Doyle nursed
- 41:31Speaker 1: his B twenty six home after losing an engine to
- 41:34Speaker 1: thirty caliber rounds. To silence enemy gunners, the farm Gate
- 41:38Speaker 1: commander ordered his pilots to strafe while delivering ordnance at
- 41:42Speaker 1: low levels. Army pilots of armed helicopters were optimistic about
- 41:47Speaker 1: the defensive abilities of the UH one. The chopper carried
- 41:51Speaker 1: two eight tube two point seventy five inch rocket pods
- 41:55Speaker 1: and two thirty caliber machine guns, each mounted on a
- 41:58Speaker 1: landing skid. General anthus continued to plead for the UH
- 42:02Speaker 1: one and other U. S. Army aircraft to go under
- 42:05Speaker 1: the tactical air control system. Meanwhile, the Army used the
- 42:10Speaker 1: gunships for firepower formally furnished by artillery, explaining that the
- 42:14Speaker 1: UH one supplemented rather than replaced strike aircraft. A vital
- 42:19Speaker 1: adjunct to interdiction and close support was air reconnaissance, and
- 42:23Speaker 1: MAG in April nineteen sixty two, had projected a program
- 42:27Speaker 1: for the Vietnamese. Its centerpiece was the transfer to them
- 42:30Speaker 1: of four RT thirty three photojets. Since the State Department
- 42:35Speaker 1: did not at first object to the transfer, thirteenth Air
- 42:38Speaker 1: Force made ready to train pilots for the planes. Next,
- 42:42Speaker 1: MAG formally asked for the RT thirty three's together with
- 42:46Speaker 1: three RC forty sevens and fourteen RT twenty eight s.
- 42:50Speaker 1: The RC forty sevens would get photo coverage under way
- 42:53Speaker 1: at once, and small Vietnamese photo processing cells at Plaikoup
- 42:57Speaker 1: and Dnang could supplement the American facility at Tonsonut. Examining
- 43:02Speaker 1: the proposal in June, sink Pack recommended that three camera
- 43:06Speaker 1: equipped C forty sevens be secured, one for each CORPS.
- 43:10Speaker 1: Two able mable RF one O ons be completely committed
- 43:13Speaker 1: to missions in Vietnam, a Vietnamese photoprocessing cell be opened
- 43:17Speaker 1: at Tonsonut, and an austere US Air Force Reconnaissance technical
- 43:22Speaker 1: squadron be set up in Saigon for detailed photo interpretation
- 43:26Speaker 1: and target production for all of Southeast Asia. At the
- 43:30Speaker 1: Secretary of Defense conference in Hawaii on July twenty third,
- 43:33Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, Admiral Felt spoke out strongly for giving
- 43:37Speaker 1: the Vietnamese RT thirty three photojets. Mister McNamara was negative
- 43:42Speaker 1: because of the Geneva Accords, and he questioned the superiority
- 43:46Speaker 1: of the RT thirty three over conventional aircraft. General Harkins
- 43:50Speaker 1: favored the photojets, but suggested a compromise bring two US
- 43:55Speaker 1: Air Force R F one O ones to Vietnam and
- 43:57Speaker 1: furnish the Vietnamese RC forty seven and RT twenty eight bs.
- 44:02Speaker 1: Two weeks later, Admiral Felt urged the Joint Chiefs to
- 44:05Speaker 1: approve the RT thirty threes as superior reconnaissance planes needed
- 44:09Speaker 1: for intelligence. He noted that the Army had sent some
- 44:13Speaker 1: jet turbine powered UH one A helicopters to Vietnam. The
- 44:17Speaker 1: Admiral opposed RC forty sevens because in Laos they were
- 44:20Speaker 1: vulnerable to ground fire. He thought it difficult and expensive
- 44:24Speaker 1: to modify the RT twenty eight into a camera plane
- 44:27Speaker 1: that at best would have moderate performance. The State Department
- 44:31Speaker 1: now strenuously opposed jet photoplanes for the Vietnamese on political grounds,
- 44:36Speaker 1: and Secretary McNamara remained unconvinced that Admiral Felt had made
- 44:40Speaker 1: his case. Although the RT thirty threes stayed in the
- 44:44Speaker 1: military assistance program, three camera equipped RC forty sevens and
- 44:49Speaker 1: eighteen RT twenty eights arrived to buttress reconnaissance At Tomsonut,
- 44:54Speaker 1: the Vietnamese activated the seven hundred and sixteenth Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.
- 44:59Speaker 1: It accepted two SEE forty five photo aircraft, one having
- 45:03Speaker 1: a six inch and the other a twelve inch vertical camera.
- 45:06Speaker 1: While awaiting more planes, pilots of the seven hundred sixteenth
- 45:09Speaker 1: Squadron flew strike missions in T twenty eight. Not until
- 45:14Speaker 1: mid nineteen sixty four would the Vietnamese attain a fully
- 45:17Speaker 1: operational reconnaissance program. Meantime, the Air Force's thirteenth Reconnaissance Technical
- 45:24Speaker 1: Squadron thirteen officers and eighty four airmen would be formed
- 45:27Speaker 1: at Tonsonut until the Vietnamese could do their own air reconnaissance.
- 45:32Speaker 1: Able Mabel RF one oh ones were for a while
- 45:35Speaker 1: deployed to Saigon. In July nineteen sixty two, the Geneva
- 45:40Speaker 1: Agreement suspended aerial reconnaissance over Laos, and by October Able
- 45:45Speaker 1: Mabel was flying about eighty eight percent of its sorties
- 45:48Speaker 1: over Vietnam. This sparked the move in December of all
- 45:52Speaker 1: four RF one O ons to Tonsonut, where they continued
- 45:55Speaker 1: to fly two point eight sorties a day. Flying from
- 45:58Speaker 1: Vietnam rather than island widely expanded the total photo coverage
- 46:03Speaker 1: per soor TI. Detecting the Vietcong from the air demanded
- 46:07Speaker 1: night and infrared photography, sidelooking airborne radar and infrared snooper
- 46:12Speaker 1: scope techniques. Most of these methods were still in development.
- 46:16Speaker 1: In April nineteen sixty two, mac V had secured two
- 46:20Speaker 1: RB twenty six CE night photo aircraft for farm Gate,
- 46:24Speaker 1: the planes reaching Benhoit in May. During the last half
- 46:28Speaker 1: of nineteen sixty two, they gave good service in the
- 46:31Speaker 1: face of obstacles. Flash illuminant cartridges were in short supply.
- 46:36Speaker 1: Reflections from flooded rice paddies blurred night photos. A ground
- 46:40Speaker 1: accident on October twentieth put one RB twenty six C
- 46:44Speaker 1: permanently out of action. The coming of the Army's twenty
- 46:48Speaker 1: third Special Air Warfare Detachment to Nitrangue in September nineteen
- 46:52Speaker 1: sixty two reinforced reconnaissance. The detachment had six ov Ie
- 46:58Speaker 1: Mohawk turboprop observation aircraft rigged with cameras and fifty caliber
- 47:03Speaker 1: machine guns. It further featured two portable laboratories to process
- 47:08Speaker 1: photographs at division headquarters and at remote locations. Split into
- 47:13Speaker 1: teams of two, the ov Ones assumed direct support of
- 47:17Speaker 1: Vietnamese ground units. The Mohawks flew mostly visual and photo reconnaissance,
- 47:22Speaker 1: but carried Vietnamese observers who could approve targets. General Anthos
- 47:27Speaker 1: felt it foolish to give aircraft to ground unit commanders.
- 47:31Speaker 1: When he protested to General Harkins, the reply was, we
- 47:34Speaker 1: must all be objective. A US Air Force forward air
- 47:38Speaker 1: controller with a twenty third division at Banmetoo noted in
- 47:42Speaker 1: November that the Mohawk detachment could make a nine hour
- 47:45Speaker 1: delivery on photo requests compared to the normal US Air
- 47:49Speaker 1: Force time of seven days. Apprized of this, anthus could
- 47:53Speaker 1: only hope that the US Air Force might not lose
- 47:56Speaker 1: assigned roles and missions because of a failure to resources
- 48:01Speaker 1: to perform them. Even with RF one O one's flying
- 48:04Speaker 1: from Tonsunut and the photo processing cell working at peak efficiency,
- 48:09Speaker 1: photo delivery took from three and a half to more
- 48:11Speaker 1: than five hours. The local Mohawks could deliver emergency photo
- 48:16Speaker 1: requests within two to three hours. Admiral Felt pondered the
- 48:20Speaker 1: status of the ov ones was their local employment and
- 48:24Speaker 1: economical use of force? Or did their presence ignore the
- 48:28Speaker 1: basic US policy of having Americans train the Vietnamese instead
- 48:33Speaker 1: of fighting their war for them. Yet, General Harkins cited
- 48:36Speaker 1: the excellent results chalked up by Mohawks and on December fourteenth,
- 48:41Speaker 1: asked for four more. Like the helicopter gunships. Harkins explained
- 48:46Speaker 1: the ov Ones complimented but did not compete with US
- 48:49Speaker 1: Air Force airpower. Nevertheless, by December nineteen sixty two, the
- 48:55Speaker 1: Army had one hundred ninety nine aircraft in Vietnam, the
- 48:58Speaker 1: Air Force sixty one. There were eight Army generals, three
- 49:03Speaker 1: Air Force, as the US Air Force Director of Plans noted,
- 49:07Speaker 1: it may be improper to say we are at war
- 49:09Speaker 1: with the army. However, we believe that if the army
- 49:13Speaker 1: efforts are successful, they may have a long term adverse
- 49:17Speaker 1: effect in the US military posture that could be more
- 49:20Speaker 1: important than the battle presently being waged with the viet Cong.
- 49:25Speaker 1: Both Army and Vietnamese Air Force aircraft remained outside the
- 49:30Speaker 1: tactical air control system as early as May nineteen sixty two.
- 49:35Speaker 1: Brigadier General Stephen D. McElroy, thirteenth Air Force Vice Commander,
- 49:40Speaker 1: commented on the situation to General Anthus, Air Force T
- 49:44Speaker 1: twenty eight's flew combat while Vietnamese T twenty eights were
- 49:48Speaker 1: on the ground. Army helicopters made combat lifts, while Vietnamese
- 49:53Speaker 1: thirty fours were unused, unreported, or transporting passengers. In response,
- 50:00Speaker 1: as acknowledged this sensitive subject, progress, he said can only
- 50:04Speaker 1: be measured in small units, meaning inches. A team from
- 50:09Speaker 1: the Royal Australian Air Force noticed the same condition. The
- 50:13Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force, along with the Navy, did not perform
- 50:17Speaker 1: up to its full potential. Perhaps this was due to
- 50:20Speaker 1: the absence of proper representation at senior military levels. Hence
- 50:24Speaker 1: there was no joint planning as practiced in more sophisticated
- 50:28Speaker 1: armed services, and air Force views and requirements received little consideration.
- 50:34Speaker 1: In June nineteen sixty two, the forty nine Vietnamese strike
- 50:37Speaker 1: aircraft flew but four hundred twelve of the one thy
- 50:41Speaker 1: twenty nine sorties of which they were capable. Too few
- 50:45Speaker 1: flight leaders, no desire to fly, combat, and scarce targets
- 50:49Speaker 1: were the causes. Flying fell off markedly during weekends, siesta hours, nights,
- 50:55Speaker 1: and bad weather. At any rate, the picture was not
- 50:58Speaker 1: entirely dismal. The four hundred twelve sorties in June were
- 51:02Speaker 1: a decided improvement over the one hundred fifty in January.
- 51:06Speaker 1: The signs were mixed as nineteen sixty two closed, but
- 51:10Speaker 1: it was unmistakably clear that the Republic of Vietnam so
- 51:14Speaker 1: shaky at the start of the year had not collapsed.
- 51:18Speaker 1: Even more encouraging was the attitude of the National Liberation Front,
- 51:22Speaker 1: Hanoi's political structure in South Vietnam. Its press release in
- 51:27Speaker 1: July nineteen sixty two called for the creation of a
- 51:30Speaker 1: neutral state. Much like laus was Hanoi thinking of abandoning
- 51:35Speaker 1: the effort to unify Vietnam by force? And what was
- 51:38Speaker 1: the meaning of Ho Chi Minh's quoted statement praising DM's
- 51:42Speaker 1: patriotism In nineteen fifty nine, Howard predicted the defeat of
- 51:47Speaker 1: South Vietnam in a year. In September nineteen sixty two,
- 51:51Speaker 1: he began saying that victory might take fifteen to twenty years.
- 51:55Speaker 1: Was he concerned that the Americans might bomb North Vietnam?
- 51:59Speaker 1: The war again since the viet Cong President, DM informed
- 52:02Speaker 1: the National Assembly on October ninth, had taken an incontestable
- 52:06Speaker 1: turn for the better. Later that month, Admiral Felt and
- 52:10Speaker 1: Ambassador Nolting bolstered DM by assuring him that the American
- 52:14Speaker 1: resolve to resist communism in Vietnam would not weaken. Obviously,
- 52:20Speaker 1: then the step up in US support for Vietnam that
- 52:23Speaker 1: had started late in nineteen sixty one seemed to be working.
- 52:28Speaker 1: End of Chapter thirteen,