Latest / Interfaiths / Interfaiths: Faith, Force, and Fiqh- Evaluating Hamas through Classical Islamic Law
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome back to the Deep Dive. We're going to
- 0:01get straight into it today, into, I think, one
- 0:04of the most intense and difficult global conversations
- 0:07happening right now. It really is. The conflict
- 0:09that followed the October 7th, 2023 Hamas assault
- 0:12on Israel is just agonizingly complex. But for
- 0:17so many, the debate really centers on the religious
- 0:20justification. Right, because Hamas explicitly
- 0:22invoked classical Islamic doctrines. They used
- 0:25the term jihad to justify their actions. And
- 0:27those actions included the mass Massacre of civilians,
- 0:30documented sexual violence, mutilation, and of
- 0:32course, mass hostage taking. And when a group
- 0:34makes such a profound claim to religious legitimacy
- 0:37for acts like that, I mean, it demands a really
- 0:40rigorous, impartial, scholarly review. So that's
- 0:43our mission for you today. We are not here to
- 0:45debate politics or weigh conflicting national
- 0:47narratives. No. We're using a very specific framework.
- 0:51We're looking at classical Islamic jurisprudence,
- 0:53or fiqh, to assess the conduct of the attackers
- 0:56against the faith's own established law of war.
- 0:59For this deep dive, we've really built our analysis
- 1:02on the work of leading academic authorities.
- 1:05People like Ahmed Al -Dawoodi, Karima Ben -Nun.
- 1:09Nazrin Badawi. And these are scholars who've
- 1:11gone directly into the pre -modern legal texts,
- 1:14into what's known as Siyar, the Islamist law
- 1:17of war, to see if these actions actually meet
- 1:20the standards Hamas claims to uphold. We're going
- 1:23to look at this from two angles, right? Exactly.
- 1:24Two critical legal dimensions. First, you have
- 1:27Jassad Bellum. Which is the right to wage war
- 1:29in the first place. Right. And second, Justin
- 1:31Bellow, which is all about the proper conduct
- 1:34within that war. And for any military action
- 1:37to be considered permissible under Islamic law,
- 1:39both of these have to be satisfied. Both have
- 1:42to be met. It's not one or the other. Okay, let's
- 1:44unpack this. And I think we should start with
- 1:46the foundations. Because what really surprised
- 1:48me in the research was how much Islamic law already
- 1:50contains principles we think of as, well, modern.
- 1:54It's this fascinating idea of convergence. Alda
- 1:57Woody's work really shows you that modern international
- 1:59humanitarian law, IHL, It's not some external
- 2:03concept being forced onto these traditions. So
- 2:06what's an example of that? How do they converge?
- 2:09Well, take the core principles we rely on today
- 2:11in IHL. Things like distinction, proportionality,
- 2:14taking precautions. Right. These ideas are echoed,
- 2:17I mean, deeply in the debates of pre -modern
- 2:19Muslim jurists. Distinction, the absolute need
- 2:24to distinguish between combatants and non -combatants.
- 2:26That was a central concern. The timeline here
- 2:30is just it's staggering. Banoon scholarship shows
- 2:33that Islamic law established these robust civilian
- 2:36protections more than a millennium before the
- 2:39Geneva Conventions were even thought of. A thousand
- 2:41years. Think about that. A thousand years of
- 2:43legal tradition already carving out noncombatants.
- 2:46Women. children the elderly clergy as a separate
- 2:51category that is entitled to immunity from attack
- 2:53so that's basically the foundation for our modern
- 2:55concept of the civilians right there in the tradition
- 2:57okay so that historical grounding is crucial
- 3:00but it brings up a huge question about interpretation
- 3:02if the tradition is so clear on protecting civilians
- 3:06how on earth do groups like hamas use the exact
- 3:09same sources to justify mass violence against
- 3:11them And this is where we, and you, the listener,
- 3:14have to apply what Badawi calls critical comparativism.
- 3:19Meaning? Meaning you have to remember that both
- 3:22the militant groups and the mainstream Muslim
- 3:24scholars who denounce them are all claiming to
- 3:27base their arguments on the original Islamic
- 3:30sources. So you can't just take their claim of
- 3:32being... authentic at face value. You have to
- 3:34look at what they're actually arguing. Precisely.
- 3:37You have to look at the substance. And Bennu
- 3:39helps frame this. She defines this kind of fundamentalism,
- 3:42not just as a religious movement, but as an extreme
- 3:45right movement that achieves political aims by
- 3:48manipulating religion. A political manipulation.
- 3:51Yes. And it often requires what she calls double
- 3:53discourse. You invoke the authority of religion.
- 3:56You cherry pick a verse here or there while you're
- 3:59actually pursuing intensely political secular
- 4:01goals. That sets the stage perfectly. So let's
- 4:04apply that critical framework to the first major
- 4:06test. Just ad bellum. The right to wage war,
- 4:09to put it plainly. Was jihad even permissible
- 4:12in the first place for this attack, according
- 4:14to the classical sources? Alda Woody's thesis
- 4:16here is unambiguous. Jihad in the sense of an
- 4:20international armed conflict is overwhelmingly
- 4:23defined as a defensive war. Defensive only? Yes.
- 4:27Justified only when Muslims face aggression or
- 4:30what the sources call fitna, severe persecution.
- 4:33It is not, historically or legally, a blank check.
- 4:37for aggressive warfare. And this isn't just an
- 4:39interpretation. It's rooted right in the Quran
- 4:41itself. It is. Verse 2 .190 is key. It conditions
- 4:46the permission to fight on engaging those who
- 4:49fight with you and do not exceed the limits.
- 4:51Those who fight with you. That's very specific.
- 4:53It's conditional. It establishes warfare as reactive.
- 4:56It puts the burden of proof on the attacker to
- 4:58show they were the victim of aggression first.
- 5:00Okay, but that leads to, well, a huge authority
- 5:03problem. Even if you could argue a state of aggression
- 5:05existed, who actually has the right to declare
- 5:08jihad? And that is the crucial point. Classical
- 5:11jurists universally treated jihad as an obligation
- 5:13of the Muslim ruler, the imam. It was a state
- 5:16function. It required governmental sanctions.
- 5:19So it's not something an individual or a group
- 5:21can just decide to do on their own? Absolutely
- 5:23not. It had to be a centralized authority, a
- 5:26ruler who could assess the situation, manage
- 5:28the resources, and critically ensure compliance
- 5:32with the rules of war. And Hamas, as a non -state
- 5:35armed group, operating outside the sanction of
- 5:38any recognized Muslim state authority. They fundamentally
- 5:41lack the classical authority to declare or prosecute
- 5:45a legitimate jihad. It's a non -starter. So if
- 5:49that authority is missing, what would classical
- 5:51jurists even call this kind of action? Well,
- 5:54they wouldn't call it jihad. They'd classify
- 5:56it as something far more serious, far more criminal.
- 5:58Which is? Armed action without the ruler's permission,
- 6:01especially involving this level of violence,
- 6:04would be categorized as ayurva, which is brigandage,
- 6:07or highway robbery. Corruption in the land. Yes,
- 6:11mischief and corruption in the land. These are
- 6:14serious crimes in Islamic law, not divinely sanctioned
- 6:17warfare. So from the perspective of the legal
- 6:19framework they claim to follow, their action
- 6:21is illegitimate before the first shot is even
- 6:23fired. That's the key takeaway from the Jost
- 6:25ad Bellum test. The authority is absent. But
- 6:28let's push this further. Let's say... For the
- 6:30sake of argument, they somehow cleared that hurdle
- 6:33of authority. The bigger issue for most people
- 6:35is the actions themselves. Of course. The sheer
- 6:38horror of what happened on October 7th targeting
- 6:40civilians, the mutilation, the sexual violence,
- 6:44this moves beyond legal authority into just,
- 6:47well, fundamental religious adherence. And this
- 6:50brings us to Jess and Bello. The conduct in war.
- 6:53Right. And on this, the classical sources aren't
- 6:56just restrictive. They are absolutely unequivocally
- 7:00categorical. How so? The law makes it, to use
- 7:03Alda Woody's phrase, abundantly clear that fighting
- 7:07must be directed solely against enemy combatants.
- 7:09That principle of distinction is non -negotiable.
- 7:12What are some of the specific prohibitions that
- 7:15the earliest sources lay down? They're incredibly
- 7:17specific. The Prophet Muhammad himself explicitly
- 7:20prohibited targeting women, children, the elderly,
- 7:24clergy, and anyone not actively participating
- 7:27in the fighting. These are the foundational protected
- 7:29categories. And it wasn't just a one -off instruction.
- 7:31We see it being institutionalized immediately
- 7:33after. Exactly. Look at the commands from the
- 7:35first caliph, Abu Bakr, to his army. He ordered
- 7:38them, do not commit treachery, do not mutilate,
- 7:41neither kill a child or aged a man or woman,
- 7:44do not cut down fruit -bearing trees. And when
- 7:47you look at the documented abuses of October
- 7:507th. The deliberate targeting of noncombatants,
- 7:53the reports of mutilation, the sheer destruction
- 7:55of life. These are direct violations of those
- 7:59ancient foundational commands. They are textbook
- 8:01examples of un -Islamic conduct. The victims,
- 8:05the women, the children, the elderly, the foreign
- 8:08workers, people at a music festival, they all
- 8:10fall squarely within those protected categories.
- 8:13Absolutely. And later jurists extended those
- 8:15protections even further to farmers, traders,
- 8:17craftsmen. Basically, anyone not holding a weapon
- 8:20is protected. There's just no ambiguity on this
- 8:22point. So this brings us to an argument you always
- 8:24hear in these situations, retaliation. The idea
- 8:27that, well, the enemy does it to us so we can
- 8:29do it to them. Does Islamic law permit retaliation
- 8:33against civilians? And that's a critical point
- 8:34of theology. The answer is a resounding absolute
- 8:37no. No exceptions. None. The Islamic rules of
- 8:40war are binding on the Muslim soldier regardless
- 8:42of the enemy's conduct. Compliance is a theological
- 8:46act. It's considered an act of worship. An act
- 8:49of worship. So it's not a reciprocal deal that
- 8:51you can just suspend if the other side breaks
- 8:54the rules. Exactly. The moral obligation is to
- 8:56God, not to the enemy. So the argument that Israeli
- 8:59actions, however one judges them, could ever
- 9:02justify Hamas's retaliation against civilians
- 9:05is completely nullified by the theological basis
- 9:08of CR. OK, let's talk about the hostage taking.
- 9:11This was a huge part of the attack. Seizing civilians,
- 9:15children, elderly people for political leverage.
- 9:18Classical Islamic law always required humane
- 9:20treatment towards the prisoners. The jurists
- 9:23debated what to do with captured combatants,
- 9:25whether to release them, ransom them. But humane
- 9:27treatment was a constant. But what about taking
- 9:29noncombatant hostages? Badawi points out that
- 9:32this specific tactic, seizing civilians for political
- 9:35leverage, is a modern tactical innovation. It
- 9:38finds no support, none in classical law. And
- 9:41abuse of captives. Torture. It was simply inconceivable
- 9:45in that framework. There's a famous story of
- 9:48Imam Malik, one of the greatest jurists, being
- 9:50asked about torturing prisoners. His response
- 9:52was just, I have not heard of that. Wow. It's
- 9:55a response that shows how deeply alien the concept
- 9:58was. So the seizure and abuse of women, children
- 10:00and the elderly for political aims is completely
- 10:04and totally outside the bounds of Islamic Justin
- 10:07Bellow. So let's bring this all to a head. We
- 10:09have two massive failures here. First. the lack
- 10:13of legitimate authority under Justin Bellum.
- 10:16A complete failure on that front. And then the
- 10:18spectacular, horrific failure to adhere to the
- 10:21core principles of conduct under Justin Bellum.
- 10:24And the conclusion from the scholars we've been
- 10:25looking at is definitive. Yeah. As Ben -Nun puts
- 10:27it, once those humanitarian precepts are violated,
- 10:30the targeting of women and children, the mutilation,
- 10:33the conflict, no longer qualified as permissible
- 10:36warfare because it was no longer Islamic. It
- 10:38stops being Islamic at that point. It ceases
- 10:40to be. according to its own rules. So is this
- 10:43just an academic argument, or do we see this
- 10:45reflected by mainstream religious authorities
- 10:47today? Oh, it's been thoroughly echoed. Major
- 10:50Islamic institutions around the world have not
- 10:52endorsed this conduct. You see an overwhelming
- 10:55scholarly consensus that jihad has to be bounded
- 10:58by law. It's not a blank check for slaughter.
- 11:01Can you point to anything specific? Sure. Look
- 11:03at documents like the Amman Message, signed by
- 11:06hundreds of top scholars, or statements from
- 11:09institutions like Al -Azhar in Cairo. They all
- 11:12affirm that noncombatants are not legitimate
- 11:14targets. So Hamas's claims are really a fringe,
- 11:17politically motivated interpretation that the
- 11:20scholarly majority rejects. Absolutely. And it
- 11:23just reinforces Binyon's point. Hamas is actively
- 11:25betweening the authentic Islamic tradition. They
- 11:28are engaging in the political manipulation of
- 11:29religion by cherry picking texts while ignoring
- 11:32the vast body of law that constrains violence.
- 11:35And for you, the listener, the implication here
- 11:36is pretty profound. When the international community
- 11:38talks about IHL compliance in Muslim contexts,
- 11:41it's not about imposing foreign Western values.
- 11:44Not at all. It's actually promoting the revival
- 11:47of neglected principles within the Islamic tradition
- 11:50itself. Principles of civilian immunity that
- 11:53have been there for a millennium. So to wrap
- 11:55this up. Our deep dive really shows that Hamas's
- 11:57claims to Islamic legitimacy completely fail
- 12:00when judged by their own jurisprudential standards.
- 12:03They do. The historical consensus against targeting
- 12:06civilians, against mutilation, against this kind
- 12:09of destruction of life is just clear and unequivocal
- 12:12in the classical sources. It makes the conduct
- 12:15not only illegal under IHL, but impermissible
- 12:19under the very law they claim to be championing.
- 12:21And that theological basis leaves us with a powerful
- 12:23point to think on. It does. Remember, these rules
- 12:26protecting civilians, treating prisoners humanely,
- 12:29they're based on divine commands. They're considered
- 12:31inviolable norms, acts of worship. So think about
- 12:34this. If Islamic law's humanitarian obligations
- 12:36are grounded in a theological command, not just
- 12:39reciprocity or politics, what does that really
- 12:41imply? What does it imply about the future? It
- 12:44implies a potential for truly robust interfaith
- 12:47dialogue, for lasting humanitarian protections
- 12:50that can transcend political divides. It's a
- 12:52moral standard that demands to be met no matter
- 12:54what the enemy does.