Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1963 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
Transcript
- 0:001963 monthly payments next year would be $435.
- 0:05None of the above, of course has any applicability to advance
- 0:09payments received during 1962 which do not participate in
- 0:14profits or losses but earn a straight 6%.
- 0:17Appendix A Dow Jones Industrial Average year closing Dow change
- 0:22for Dow dividend overall percentage year result from
- 0:25result. Dow Nineteen 56499.47 Nineteen
- 0:3257435.69 - 63.78 Twenty 1.61 - 42.17 - 8.4% Nineteen 58583.6
- 0:46Five 147.9620 Point 0 zero 167.9638 Point 5% Nineteen 59679
- 0:57Point 3695.7120.74100 Sixteen .4520% Nineteen 66115.8963 Point
- 1:094721.3642.11 minus 6.2% Nineteen 61731.1 four 115.2522 Point six
- 1:22one 137.8622 point 4 percent 6306 Two 561.2 eight 169.8611
- 1:33Point 00 EST -158.86 - 21.7 percent 28.
- 1:40Appendix B. Partnership Performance Your
- 1:43Partnership Result 1 Limited Partners Results 2195710.4
- 1:49percent 9.3% Nineteen 5840.9 percent 32.2% Nineteen 5925.9
- 1:58percent 20.9% Nineteen 6022.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6145.9
- 2:07percent 35.9%. 63062 minus 7.5% -. 7.5% one for 1957 to 61
- 2:18Consists of combined results of all predecessor limited
- 2:21partnerships operating throughout entire year after all
- 2:25expenses but before distributions to partners or
- 2:28allocations to the general partners. 2 For 1957 to 61
- 2:33computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results
- 2:37allowing for allocation to general partner based upon
- 2:40present partnership agreement. Appendix.
- 2:42See yearly results year. Massachusetts Inv Trust
- 2:47Investors Stock Lehman 2 Tricon 2 One One 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% -
- 2:5611.4% minus. 2.4 percent 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8
- 3:05percent 33.2 percent 19599 percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent
- 3:128.4% 1960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% Nineteen 6125.6
- 3:24percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5%. 63092 Twenty 3%
- 3:33-. 25.4% in a in A1 computed from changes in asset value plus
- 3:39any distributions to holders of record during year 2 from
- 3:43Moody's bank and finance Manual. 1962 Cumulative results years
- 3:48Massachusetts Investors. Lehman Tricont.
- 3:51Dow Limited. Inv Stock Partners Trust. 1957 -
- 3:5711.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent 1957 to
- 4:085826.4 percent 29.2 percent 24.7% Thirty percent 26.9% Forty
- 4:174.5% 1957 to 5937.8 percent 42.5 percent 34.8% Forty .9% Fifty
- 4:272.3 percent 74.7 percent 1957 to 6036.4 percent 41.6 percent
- 4:3638.2% 44.8 percent 42.9 percent 107.21957 to 6171.4 percent
- 4:4676.9% Seventy .8 percent 77.4 percent 74.9 percent 181.61957
- 4:57to 63,000 and 6231.9%. Thirty, 2% and a in a 37 percent
- 5:04160.5%. 29 Buffett Partnership Ltd 810 Kiwit Plaza, Omaha 31
- 5:13Nebraska November 1st, 1962 To my partners for 1963 here we go
- 5:20on the annual paper flurry. 2 Copies of an amended partnership
- 5:24agreement for 1963 are enclosed. The one with the general
- 5:28provisions attached is to be kept by you, and the other
- 5:31single page agreement should be returned.
- 5:34There are no substantive changes of any sort from last year's
- 5:37agreement. This amendment is merely to
- 5:40allow for a few new partners and in several places to reword in
- 5:44clearer, we hope, language provisions of the present
- 5:47agreement. Practically all of the rewording
- 5:49is in general provision 5, paragraph 7 in last year's
- 5:54agreement. Rather than have a separate
- 5:56amending document, we have incorporated the changes into
- 5:59one complete document embodying the entire agreement.
- 6:03We are also enclosing 2 commitment letters, one for you,
- 6:06one to be returned, on which you are to indicate your wishes
- 6:10regarding additions or withdrawals at January 1st.
- 6:13We would like to have the agreement and the commitment
- 6:16letter back by December 1st. However, the commitment letter
- 6:20can be amended right up until the end of the year, not after.
- 6:23So if you should have a change of plans and you have already
- 6:26mailed us your commitment letter, all you have to do is
- 6:29get in touch with me and I will make whatever changes you
- 6:32desire. Any withdrawals will be paid
- 6:34immediately after January 1st. Any additions must reach us by
- 6:39January 10th and should they be paid in during November, they
- 6:43will take on the status of advance payments and draw
- 6:45interest at the rate of 6% until year end.
- 6:49Please be sure the signature on your partnership agreement is
- 6:52notarized. Partners in Omaha may obtain the
- 6:55notarization at our office if they wish.
- 6:58Also, be sure to let us know by an appropriate circle on the
- 7:01commitment, let her whether you wish to receive monthly payments
- 7:04in 1963. In order to be sure everyone
- 7:07understands this, let me again state that these monthly
- 7:11payments are in no sense guaranteed earnings or anything
- 7:14of the sort. They represent a convenient form
- 7:18of regular withdrawal which to the extent we earn better than
- 7:216%, are payments from earnings and to the extent we don't are
- 7:26payments from capital. Complete tax information for
- 7:29your 1962 return will be in your hands by January 20th.
- 7:33If you should need an estimate of your tax position before that
- 7:37time, let me know and I will give you a rough idea.
- 7:40We will also send out a short letter on taxes in late
- 7:43December. Having read this far, you are
- 7:46entitled to a report on how we have done to date in 1962.
- 7:50For the period ending October 31st, the Dow Jones Industrials
- 7:54showed an overall loss including dividends received of
- 7:58approximately 16.8%. We intend to use the same method
- 8:03or valuing our controlling interest in Dempster Mill
- 8:06Manufacturing at this year in that we did at the end of last
- 8:09year. This involved applying various
- 8:11discounts to the balance sheet items to reflect my opinion as
- 8:15to what could be realized on a very prompt sale.
- 8:18Last year this involved a 40% discount on inventories, a 15%
- 8:23discount on receivables, estimated auction value of fixed
- 8:27assets, etcetera, which led to an approximate value or $35 per
- 8:32share. The successful conversion of
- 8:34substantial portions of the assets of Dempster to cash at
- 8:38virtually 100 cents on the dollar has been the high point
- 8:41of 1962. For example, inventory of $4.2
- 8:46million at last year end will probably be about $1.9 million
- 8:51this year end, reducing the discount on this item by about
- 8:54920,000 dollars, 40% of $2.3 million reduction.
- 9:00I will give this story my full journalistic treatment in my
- 9:03annual letter. Suffice to say at this point
- 9:05that applying the same discounts described above will probably
- 9:09result in a year end value of at least $50 per share.
- 9:13The extent of the asset. Conversion job can perhaps best
- 9:16be illustrated in a sentence by pointing out that whereas 30.
- 9:20We had $166,000 of cash and $2,315,000 of liabilities at
- 9:27November 30th, 1961 Dempster fiscal year end, we expect this
- 9:32year to have about $1 million in cash and investments of the type
- 9:36the partnership buys against total liabilities of $250,000.
- 9:42Prospects for further improvement in this situation in
- 9:441963 appear good and we expect a substantially expanded
- 9:49investment portfolio in Dempster next year.
- 9:52Valuing Dempster at $50 per share, our overall gain before
- 9:57any payments to partners to October 31st for the partnership
- 10:01has been 5.5%. This 22.3 percentage points
- 10:05advantage over the Dow, if maintained until the end of the
- 10:09year will be among the largest we have ever had.
- 10:12About 60% of this advantage was accomplished by the portfolio
- 10:16other than Dempster and 40% was the result of increased value at
- 10:21Dempster. I want all partners and
- 10:23prospective partners to realize the results described above are
- 10:26distinctly abnormal and will recur infrequently, if at all.
- 10:31This performance is mainly the result of having a large portion
- 10:34of our money in controlled assets and workout situations
- 10:38rather than general market situations at a time when the
- 10:41Dow declined substantially. If the Dow had advanced
- 10:44materially in 1962, we could have looked very bad on a
- 10:48relative basis and our success to date in 1962 certainly does
- 10:53not reflect any ability on my part to guess the market.
- 10:56I never try but merely reflects the fact that the high prices of
- 11:00generals partially forced me into other categories or
- 11:04investment. If the Dow had continued to
- 11:06soar, we would have been low man on the totem pole.
- 11:09We fully expect to have years when our method of operation
- 11:12will not even match the results of the Dow, although obviously I
- 11:16don't expect this on any long term basis or I would throw in
- 11:19the towel and by the Dow. I'll cut this sermon short with
- 11:23the conclusion that I certainly do not want anyone to think that
- 11:27the pattern of the last few years is likely to be repeated.
- 11:31I expect future performance to reflect much smaller advantages
- 11:34on average over the Dow. Each letter ends with the
- 11:37request that you let me know about anything that isn't clear.
- 11:41Please be sure that you do this. We are all geared up with
- 11:44secretarial help, a new typewriter, etcetera, and we
- 11:48want to be sure that this letter end agreement are understood by
- 11:51all. Cordially, Warren E Buffett Web
- 11:55BFPS. There are no prizes for being
- 11:58the last ones to get in the agreement and commitment letter,
- 12:01so please get to it as soon as possible.
- 12:04Remember, the commitment letter can be amended by a postcard or
- 12:07a phone call. We are just trying to get the
- 12:09bulk of the work out of the way well before December 31st so we
- 12:13can concentrate on getting the audit, tax information, etcetera
- 12:18out pronto. At Your end 31 Buffett
- 12:21Partnership Ltd, 810 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha 31, Nebraska
- 12:27January 18th, 1963 The ground rules Some partners have
- 12:32confessed that's the proper word, that they sometimes find
- 12:35it difficult to wade through my entire annual letter.
- 12:38Since I seem to be getting more long winded each year, I have
- 12:41decided to emphasize certain axioms on the first pages.
- 12:45Everyone should be entirely clear on these points.
- 12:48To most of you this material will seem unduly repetitious,
- 12:52but I would rather have nine partners out of 10 mildly bored
- 12:55than have one out of 10 with any basic misconceptions.
- 12:59One, in no sense, is any rate of return guaranteed to partners.
- 13:03Partners who withdraw 1/2 of 1% monthly are doing just that,
- 13:07withdrawing. If we earn more than 6% per
- 13:10annum over a period of years, the withdrawals will be covered
- 13:14by earnings and the principal will increase.
- 13:17If we don't earn 6%, the monthly payments are partially or wholly
- 13:21a return of capital. Two, Any year in which we fail
- 13:24to achieve at least a + 6% performance will be followed by
- 13:28a year when partners receiving monthly payments will find those
- 13:32payments lowered. 3 Whenever we talk of yearly gains or losses,
- 13:36we are talking about market values.
- 13:38That is how we stand with assets valued at market at year end
- 13:42against how we stood on the same basis at the beginning of the
- 13:46year. This may bear very little
- 13:48relationship to the realized results for tax purposes in a
- 13:51given year. For whether we do a good job or
- 13:54a poor job is not to be measured by whether we are plus or minus
- 13:58for the year. It is instead to be measured
- 14:01against the general experience in securities as measured by the
- 14:04Dow Jones Industrial Average, leading investment companies,
- 14:08etcetera. If our record is better than
- 14:10that of these yardsticks, we consider it a good year whether
- 14:14we are plus or minus. If we do poorer, we deserve that
- 14:18tomatoes 5. While I much prefer A5 year
- 14:21test, I feel three years is an absolute minimum for judging
- 14:25performance. It is a certainty that we will
- 14:27have years when the partnership performance is poorer, perhaps
- 14:31substantially so, than the Dow. If any three-year or longer
- 14:35period produces poor results, we all should start looking around
- 14:39for other places to have our money.
- 14:41An exception to the latter statement would be 3 years
- 14:44covering A speculative explosion in a bull market. 6.
- 14:48I am not in the business of predicting general stock market
- 14:51or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this or
- 14:55think it is essential to an investment program, you should
- 14:58not be in the partnership. 7. I cannot promise results to
- 15:01partners. What I can and do promise is
- 15:04that A our investments will be chosen on the basis of value,
- 15:08not popularity B that we will attempt to bring risk of
- 15:12permanent capital loss, not short term quotational loss, to
- 15:16an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each
- 15:20commitment and a diversity of commitments and C my wife,
- 15:25children and I will have virtually our entire net worth
- 15:28invested in the partnership. 32 our performance in 1962.
- 15:33I have consistently told partners that we expect to shine
- 15:36on a relative basis during minus years for the Dow, whereas plus
- 15:40years of any magnitude may find us blushing.
- 15:43This held true in 1962 because of a strong rally in the last
- 15:47few months. The general market as measured
- 15:50by the Dow really did not have such a frightening decline as
- 15:53many might think. From 7:31 at the beginning of
- 15:56the year, it dipped to 535 in June, but closed at 652.
- 16:02At the end of 1960, the Dow stood at 616.
- 16:06So you can see that while there has been a good deal of action
- 16:09the past few years, the investing public as a whole is
- 16:12not too far from where it was in 1959 or 1960 if one had owned
- 16:17the Dow last year. And I imagine there are a few
- 16:20people playing the high Flyers of 19 1961 who wish they had.
- 16:24They would have had a shrinkage in market value of 79.04 or
- 16:2910.8%. However, dividends up
- 16:32approximately 23.30 would have been received to bring the
- 16:36overall results from the Dow for the year to -7.6%.
- 16:41Our own overall record was plus 13.9%.
- 16:45Below we show the year by year performance of the Dow.
- 16:48The partnership before allocation to the general
- 16:50partner and the limited partners Results for all full years of
- 16:54Buffett partnership limited S and predecessor partnerships
- 16:58activities year Overall results from partnership results Limited
- 17:02partners Dow 1 Results Two 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3%
- 17:11nineteen. 5838.5% Forty .9 percent 32.2% 195920 percent
- 17:1925.9 percent 20.9 percent 1960 - 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6%
- 17:28Nineteen 6122.4 percent 45.9% Thirty 5.9 percent 1962 - 7.6
- 17:38percent 13.9 percent 11.9%. One for 1957 to 61 consists of
- 17:45combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships
- 17:49operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before
- 17:53distributions to partners or allocations to the general
- 17:56partner. 2 for 1957 to 61 computed on basis of preceding
- 18:01column of partnership results allowing for allocation to
- 18:04general partner based upon present partnership agreement.
- 18:08The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results
- 18:11in the same 3 categories as well as the average annual compounded
- 18:16rate year. Overall Results Partnership
- 18:18Results Limited Partners from Dow Results 1957 - 8.4 percent
- 18:2510.4 percent 9.3 percent 1957 to 5826.9 percent 55. .6%.
- 18:33Forty 4.5% 1957 to 5952.3 percent 95.9% Seventy 4.7
- 18:42percent 1957 to 6042.9 percent 140.6 percent 107.2 percent 1957
- 18:52to 6174.9 percent 251 percent 181.6% 1957 to 6261.6 percent
- 19:03299.8 percent 215.1% Annual compounded rate 8.3 percent 26
- 19:11percent 21.1% My unscientific opinion.
- 19:15Is that a margin of 10 percentage points per annum over
- 19:18the Dow is the very maximum that can be achieved with invested
- 19:21funds over any long period of years.
- 19:24So it may be well to mentally modify some of the above
- 19:27figures. Partners have sometimes
- 19:29expressed concern as to the effect of size upon performance.
- 19:33This subject was reflected upon in last year's Annual letter.
- 19:37The conclusion reached was that there were some situations where
- 19:40larger sums 33 helped in somewhere they hindered, but on
- 19:44balance I did not feel they would penalize performance.
- 19:47I promised to inform partners if my conclusions on this should
- 19:51change. At the beginning of 1957,
- 19:54combined limited partnership assets totaled $303,726 and grew
- 20:01to $7,178,500 at the beginning or 1962.
- 20:07To date, anyway, our margin over the Dow has indicated no
- 20:11tendency to narrow, as funds increase investment companies.
- 20:16Along with the results of the Dow, we have regularly included
- 20:19the tabulations on the two largest open end investment
- 20:23companies, mutual funds following a common stock policy
- 20:26and the two largest diversified closed and investment companies.
- 20:30These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust
- 20:34Investors Stock Fund, Tri, Continental Corporation, and
- 20:37Lehman Corporation, manage over $3 billion and are probably
- 20:41typical of most of the $20 billion investment company
- 20:45industry. My opinion is that their results
- 20:47parallel those of most bank trust departments and investment
- 20:51counseling organizations, which handle in aggregate vastly
- 20:55greater sums. The purpose of this tabulation,
- 20:58which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no
- 21:01pushover as an index of investment achievement.
- 21:05The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown
- 21:08commands annual fees of approximately $7,000,000, and
- 21:13this represents a very small fraction of the industry.
- 21:16Nevertheless, the public batting average of this highly paid
- 21:20talent indicates results slightly less favorable than the
- 21:23Dow in no census. This statement intended as
- 21:27criticism within their institutional framework and
- 21:30handling the many billions of dollars involved.
- 21:33I consider such average results virtually the only possible
- 21:36ones. Their merits lie in other than
- 21:39superior results. Both our portfolio and method of
- 21:42operation differ substantially from the companies mentioned
- 21:45above. However, most partners, as an
- 21:48alternative to their interest in the partnership, would probably
- 21:51have their funds invested in media producing results
- 21:54comparable with investment companies, and I therefore feel
- 21:58they offer a meaningful test of performance year.
- 22:01Massachusetts inv Investors Lehman 2.
- 22:04Tricon Dow Limited trust One stock 1-2 Partners 1957 -. 11.4%
- 22:12minus. 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3% 195842.7
- 22:23percent 47.5% Forty .8 percent 33.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2
- 22:31percent 19599 percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent
- 22:3820 percent 20.9% 1960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2
- 22:49percent 18.6% Nineteen 6125.6 percent 24.9 percent 23.6
- 22:57percent 22.5 percent 22.4 percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% -
- 23:0713.4% - 13.0% - 10.0% - 7.6 percent 11.9%.
- 23:15One computed from changes in asset value plus any
- 23:18distributions to holders of record during year 2 from 1962.
- 23:23Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 61 estimated for
- 23:281962 compounded year. Massachusetts Inv.
- 23:33Investor Lehman Tricon Dow Limited Trust Stock Partners
- 23:371957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent
- 23:481957 to 5826.4 percent 29.2 percent 24.7% Thirty percent
- 23:5626.9% Forty 4.5% 1957 to 5937.8 percent 42.5 percent 34.8% Forty
- 24:08.9% Fifty 2.3 percent 74.7 percent 1957 to 6036.4 percent
- 24:1641.6% Thirty 8.2 percent 44.8 percent 42.9 percent 107.2% 1957
- 24:26to 6171.3 percent 76.9% Seventy .8 percent 77.4 percent 74.9
- 24:36percent 181.6 percent 1957 to 6254.5% Fifty 3.2 percent 48.6%
- 24:46Fifty 9.7 percent 61.6 percent 215.1%. 34 Annual 7.5 percent
- 24:557.4 percent 6.8 percent 8.1 percent 8.3 percent 21.1%
- 25:02compounded rate The joys of compounding.
- 25:05I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the
- 25:08voyage Isabella originally under rode for Columbus was
- 25:12approximately $30,000. This has been considered at
- 25:15least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital
- 25:19without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from
- 25:23finding a new hemisphere. It must be pointed out that even
- 25:26had Squatter's rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly
- 25:30another. IBM figured very roughly, the
- 25:33$30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have
- 25:37amounted to something like $2 trillion.
- 25:40That's $2 trillion for those of you who are not government
- 25:43statisticians by 1962. Historical apologists for the
- 25:48Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations.
- 25:52Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the
- 25:55value of either living a long time or compounding your money
- 25:59at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly
- 26:02helpful to say on the former point.
- 26:04The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000
- 26:08at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10/20 and 30 years.
- 26:14It is always startling to see how relatively small differences
- 26:17in rates add up to very significant sums over a period
- 26:21of years. That is why even though we are
- 26:24shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points
- 26:27advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement.
- 26:31It can mean a lot of dollars over a decade or two. 5%, Ten
- 26:34percent, 15%. 10 Years 162,889 Dollars 259,374 Dollars
- 26:44$404,553.20 Years 265,328 Dollars 672,748 Dollars
- 26:56$1,636,640 30 Years 432,191 Dollars 1,744,930 Dollars
- 27:08$6,621,140 Our method of operation, our avenues of
- 27:15investment breakdown into 3 categories.
- 27:18These categories have different behavior characteristics, and
- 27:21the way our money is divided among them will have an
- 27:24important effect on our results relative to the Dow.
- 27:27In any given year, the actual percentage division among
- 27:31categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent
- 27:35accidental based upon availability factors.
- 27:38The first section consists of generally undervalued securities
- 27:42here and after called generals where we have nothing to say
- 27:45about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the
- 27:49undervaluation may correct itself.
- 27:51That over the years this has been our largest category of
- 27:54investment and more money has been made here than in either of
- 27:58the other categories. We usually have fairly large
- 28:01positions, 5% to 10% of our total assets in each of 5 or 6
- 28:06generals with smaller positions in another 10 or 15.
- 28:10Sometimes these work out very fast, many times they take
- 28:13years. It is difficult at the time of
- 28:16purchase to know any compelling reason why they should
- 28:19appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of
- 28:22glamour or anything pending which might create immediate
- 28:26favorable market action, they are available at very cheap
- 28:29prices. A lot of value can be obtained
- 28:31for the price paid. This substantial excess of value
- 28:34creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction.
- 28:38Combining this individual margin of safety with a diversity of
- 28:42commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and
- 28:46appreciation potential. We do not go into these generals
- 28:49with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually
- 28:53quite content selling out at some intermediate level between
- 28:56our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a
- 28:59private owner. Many times generals represent a
- 29:02form of coattail riding where we feel the dominating stockholder
- 29:06group has 35 plans for the conversion of unprofitable or
- 29:10underutilized assets to a better use.
- 29:13We have done that ourselves in Sanborn and Dempster, but
- 29:16everything else equal, we would rather let others do the work.
- 29:20Obviously, not only do the values have to be ample in a
- 29:23case like this, but we also have to be careful whose coat we are
- 29:26holding. The generals tend to behave
- 29:29market wise very much in sympathy with the Dow.
- 29:32Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to
- 29:35go down. During abrupt downward movements
- 29:37in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage
- 29:41wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I
- 29:44believe the generals will outperform the Dow and during
- 29:48sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our
- 29:52portfolio that turns and the best results.
- 29:55It is of course also the most vulnerable in a declining
- 29:59market. And in 1962, not only did we not
- 30:02make any money out of our general category, but I am even
- 30:06doubtful if it did better than the Dow.
- 30:08Our second category consists of workouts.
- 30:11These are securities whose financial results depend on
- 30:14corporate action rather than supply and demand factors
- 30:17created by buyers and sellers of securities.
- 30:20In other words, they are securities with a timetable
- 30:23where we can predict within reasonable error limits when we
- 30:27will get how much and what might upset the apple cart.
- 30:30Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations,
- 30:33reorganizations, spin offs, etcetera.
- 30:36I lead to workouts. An important source in recent
- 30:40years has been sell outs by oil producers to major integrated
- 30:43oil companies. This category will produce
- 30:46reasonably stable earnings from year to year to a large extent
- 30:50irrespective of the course of the Dow.
- 30:52Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large
- 30:55portion of our portfolio and workouts, we will look extremely
- 30:59good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or
- 31:02quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year.
- 31:05We were fortunate in that we had a good portion of our portfolio
- 31:08and workouts in 1962. As I have said before, this was
- 31:12not due to any notion on my part as to what the market would do,
- 31:16but rather because I could get more of what I wanted in this
- 31:19category than in the generals. This same concentration and
- 31:22workouts hurt our performance during the market advance in the
- 31:26second-half of the year. Over the years, workouts have
- 31:29provided our second largest category.
- 31:32At any given time we may be in 5/2/10 of these, some just
- 31:36beginning and others in the late stage of their development.
- 31:40I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our
- 31:43workout portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this
- 31:47category in terms of both eventual results and
- 31:50intermediate market behavior. For instance, you will note when
- 31:54you receive our audit report that we paid $75,000 of interest
- 31:59to banks and brokers during the year.
- 32:01Since our borrowing was at approximately 5%, this means we
- 32:05had an average of $1,500,000 borrowed from such sources.
- 32:10Since 1962 was a down year in the market, you might think that
- 32:14such borrowing would hurt results.
- 32:16However, all of our loans were to offset workouts and this
- 32:20category turned in a good profit for the year.
- 32:23Results excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed
- 32:27money usually fall in the 10% to 20% per annum range.
- 32:31My self-imposed standard limit regarding borrowing is 25% of
- 32:36partnership net worth, although something extraordinary could
- 32:40result in modifying this for a limited period of time.
- 32:43You will note on our year end balance sheet, part of the audit
- 32:47you will receive securities sold short totaling some $340,000.
- 32:52Most of this occurred in conjunction with a workout
- 32:55entered into late in the year. In this case, we had very little
- 32:58competition for a period of time and we're able to create a 10%
- 33:02or better profit gross not annualized for a few months tie
- 33:06up of money. The short sales eliminated the
- 33:09general market risk. The final category is I control
- 33:12situations where we either control the company or take a
- 33:16very large position an attempt to influence policies of the
- 33:19company. Such operations should
- 33:21definitely be measured on the basis of several years.
- 33:25In a given year they may produce nothing, as it is usually to our
- 33:28advantage to have the stock be stagnant market wise for a long
- 33:32period while we are acquiring it.
- 33:34These situations too, have relatively little in common with
- 33:38the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy
- 33:41into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop
- 33:44into a control situation if the price remains low enough for a
- 33:48long period. This might vary. 36 will happen.
- 33:52Usually it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of
- 33:56the company's stock and we sell at higher levels and complete a
- 34:00successful general operation. Dempster Mill Manufacturing
- 34:03Company. The high point of 1962 from a
- 34:06performance standpoint was our present control situation, 73%
- 34:11owned Dempster Mill. Dempster has been primarily in
- 34:14farm implements, mostly items retailing for $1000 or
- 34:18underwater systems, water well supplies and job plumbing.
- 34:23The operations for the past decade have been characterized
- 34:26by static sales, low inventory turnover and virtually no
- 34:30profits in relation to invested capital.
- 34:33We obtained control in August 1961 at an average price of
- 34:37about $28.00 per share, having bought some stock ass low as
- 34:41$16.00 in earlier years, but the vast majority in an offer of
- 34:4630.25 dollars in August. When control of a company is
- 34:50obtained, obviously what then becomes all important is the
- 34:53value of assets, not the market quotation for a piece of paper
- 34:58stock certificate. Last year our Dempster holding
- 35:01was valued by applying what I felt were appropriate discounts
- 35:04to the various assets. These valuations were based on
- 35:08their status as non earning assets and were not assessed on
- 35:11the basis of potential but on the basis of what I thought a
- 35:15prompt sale would produce at that date.
- 35:17Our job was to compound these values at a decent rate.
- 35:21The consolidated balance sheet last year and the calculation of
- 35:24Fair value are shown below. 000 Estimated Assets Book Valued
- 35:30Adjusted Liabilities Figure Valuation Cash 166 Dollars 100
- 35:36percent $166 Notes Payable $1230 Accts Correct Net 1040 Dollars
- 35:4685 percent 884 dollars Other Liabilities 1088 dollars
- 35:52Inventory $4203.60 percent $2522 PPDEXP Etcetera $82.25 percent
- 36:0421 dollars Current Assets 5491 Dollars $3593 Total Liabilities
- 36:122318 dollars Cash Value Life Ends 45 dollars $100.45 Network
- 36:20Per books 4601 dollars etcetera. EST Net Auction Value Net Plan
- 36:27Equipment 1383 dollars $800 Network AS 2120 dollars Adjusted
- 36:35to quickly realizable values Total Assets 6919 dollars $4438
- 36:43Shares outstanding 35.25 dollars 60,146 adj value per share
- 36:51Dempster's fiscal year ends November 30th and because the
- 36:54audit was unavailable in complete form, I approximated
- 36:58some of the figures and rounded to $35 per share last year.
- 37:03Initially, we worked with the old management toward more
- 37:06effective utilization of capital, better operating
- 37:09margins, reduction of overhead, etcetera.
- 37:12These efforts were completely fruitless.
- 37:15After spinning our wheels for about 6 months, it became
- 37:18obvious that while lip service was being given to our
- 37:21objective, either through inability or unwillingness,
- 37:25nothing was being accomplished. A change was necessary. 37 A
- 37:29good friend whose inclination is not toward enthusiastic
- 37:33descriptions highly recommended Harry Bottle four, our type of
- 37:37problem. On April 17th, 1962 I met Harry
- 37:41in Los Angeles, presented a deal which provided 4 rewards to him
- 37:45based upon our objectives being met, and on April 23rd he was
- 37:50sitting in the President's chair in Beatrice.
- 37:53Harry is unquestionably the man of the year.
- 37:55Every goal we have set for Harry has been met and all the
- 37:59surprises have been on the pleasant side.
- 38:01He has accomplished one thing after another that has been
- 38:03labeled as impossible and has always taken the tough things
- 38:07first. Our break even point has been
- 38:10cut virtually in half. Slow moving or dead merchandise
- 38:14has been sold or written off, marketing procedures have been
- 38:17revamped and unprofitable facilities have been sold.
- 38:21The results of this program are partially shown in the balance
- 38:24sheet below, which, since it's still represents non earning
- 38:28assets, is valued on the same basis as last year. 000
- 38:33Estimated Assets Book Valued Adjusted Liabilities Figure
- 38:37Valuation Cash 60 dollars 100 percent $60.00 Notes Payable
- 38:42$0.00 Marketable $758 MRKT 123,162 Dollars 834 Other
- 38:53Liabilities $346 Securities ACCTS REC Net $796.85 percent
- 39:02$676 Total Liabilities $346 Inventory $1634.60 percent
- 39:11$981.00 Cash Value Life Ends 41 Dollars 100% Forty $1.00 Net
- 39:18Worth Recoverable Income 170 dollars 100 percent $170 Per
- 39:24Books 4077 Dollars Tax PPD Exp Etcetera $14.25 percent $4.00 as
- 39:34adjusted to quickly $3125.00 Realizable values Add proceeds
- 39:40from $60.00 Potential exercise of option to Harry Bottle
- 39:45Current Assets 3473 dollars $2766 Shares outstanding 60,146
- 39:55Miscellaneous Invest 5 dollars 100% Five Dollars ad SHS
- 40:02potentially outstanding under option 2000 Total SHS 62,146.
- 40:10Net Plan Equipment $945 EST Net Auction $700.00 Value Adjusted
- 40:16Value per 51.26 dollars Share Total assets 4423 dollars 3471
- 40:26dollars. Three facts stand out.
- 40:29One, although net worth has been reduced somewhat by the house
- 40:31cleaning and write downs, $550,000 was written out of
- 40:36inventory. Fixed assets overall brought
- 40:39more than book value. We have converted assets to cash
- 40:42at a rate far superior to that implied in our year earlier
- 40:45valuation. 2 To some extent, we have converted the assets from
- 40:50the manufacturing business, which has been a poor business,
- 40:53to a business which we think is a good business.
- 40:56Securities Three. By buying assets at a bargain
- 40:59price, we don't need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get
- 41:02extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our
- 41:06investment philosophy. Never count on making a good
- 41:09sale. Have the purchase price be so
- 41:11attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results.
- 41:16The better sales will be the frosting on the cake. 38 On
- 41:19January 2nd, 1963, Dempster received an unsecured term loan
- 41:25of $1,250,000. These funds, together with the
- 41:30funds already freed up, will enable us to have a security
- 41:34portfolio of about $35 per share at Dempster, or considerably
- 41:38more than we paid for the whole company.
- 41:41Thus, our present valuation will involve a net of about $16.00
- 41:45per share in the manufacturing operation and $35 in a security
- 41:50operation comparable to that of Buffett Partnership Ltd.
- 41:54We of course, are devoted to compounding the $16.00 in
- 41:58manufacturing at an attractive rate and believe we have some
- 42:02good ideas as to how to accomplish this.
- 42:04While this will be easy if the business as presently conducted
- 42:08earns money, we have some promising ideas even if it
- 42:11shouldn't. It should be pointed out that
- 42:13Dempster last year was 100% an asset conversion problem and
- 42:17therefore completely unaffected by the stock market and
- 42:20tremendously affected by our success with the assets.
- 42:24In 1963, the manufacturing assets will still be important,
- 42:28but from a valuation standpoint, it will behave considerably more
- 42:32like a general since we will have a large portion of its
- 42:34money invested in generals, pretty much identical with those
- 42:38in Buffett Partnership Limited. For tax reasons, we will
- 42:42probably not put workouts in Dempster.
- 42:44Therefore, if the Dow should drop substantially, it would
- 42:47have a significant effect on the Dempster valuation.
- 42:50Likewise, Dempster would benefit this year from an advancing Dow,
- 42:54which would not have been the case most of last year.
- 42:57There is one final point of real significance for Buffett
- 43:00Partnership Limited. We now have a relationship with
- 43:03an operating man which could be of great benefit in future
- 43:07control situations. Harry had never thought of
- 43:09running an implement company 6 days before he took over.
- 43:13He is mobile, hard working and carries out policies once they
- 43:17are set. He likes to get paid well for
- 43:19doing well and I like dealing with someone who is not trying
- 43:22to figure how to get the fixtures in the executive
- 43:25washroom gold plated. Harry and I like each other and
- 43:29his relationship with Buffett Partnership Limited should be
- 43:32profitable for all of us. The question of conservatism
- 43:35because I believe it may be even more meaningful after the events
- 43:39of 1962. I would like to repeat this
- 43:41section from last year's letter. The above description of our
- 43:45various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how
- 43:49conservatively our portfolio is invested.
- 43:52Many people some years back thought they were behaving in
- 43:55the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long term
- 43:59municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced
- 44:03substantial market depreciation in many cases and most certainly
- 44:07has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
- 44:11Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many
- 44:15people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative
- 44:18manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of
- 44:21price, earnings ratios, dividend yields, etcetera.
- 44:25Without the benefit of hindsight, as in the bond
- 44:27example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger.
- 44:31There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion,
- 44:34about speculating as to just how high a multiplier greedy and
- 44:38capricious public will put on earnings.
- 44:41You will not be right simply because a large number of people
- 44:44momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply
- 44:47because important people agree with you.
- 44:49In many quarters, the simultaneous occurrence of the
- 44:52two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the
- 44:56test of conservatism. You will be right over the
- 44:59course of many transactions if your hypothesis are correct,
- 45:03your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct.
- 45:06True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and
- 45:10reason. 39 I might add that in no way does the fact that our
- 45:14portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more
- 45:17conservative or less conservative than standard
- 45:20methods of investing. This can only be determined by
- 45:23examining the methods or examining the results.
- 45:26I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our
- 45:30manner of investing is arises through evaluation of
- 45:34performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve
- 45:37A substantial decline in the Dow.
- 45:39Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960
- 45:45would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely
- 45:49conservative manner. I would welcome any partners
- 45:51suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack
- 45:56up. We have never suffered a
- 45:57realized loss of more than of 1% of total net assets.
- 46:01An hour ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total
- 46:05realized losses is something like 100 to one.
- 46:08Of course, this reflects the fact that on balance we have
- 46:11been operating in an up market. However, there have been many
- 46:14opportunities for lost transactions even in markets
- 46:18such as these. You may have found out about a
- 46:20few of these yourself. So I think the above facts have
- 46:23some significance. In 1962, we did realize a loss
- 46:27on one commitment or 1% and our ratio or realized gains to
- 46:32losses was only slightly over 3 to one.
- 46:35However, compared to more conventional, often termed
- 46:38conservative, which is not synonymous methods of common
- 46:41stock investing, it would appear that our method involved
- 46:44considerably less risk. Our advantage over the Dow was
- 46:48all achieved when the market was going down.
- 46:50We lost a bit of this edge on the way up.
- 46:53The usual prediction, I am certainly not going to predict
- 46:56what general business or the stock market are going to do in
- 46:59the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.
- 47:03I think you can be quite sure that over the next 10 years
- 47:07there are going to be a few years when the general market is
- 47:10plus 20% or 25% of few when it is minus on the same order and a
- 47:15majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the
- 47:19sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of
- 47:22any great importance for the long term investor.
- 47:26If you will take the first table on Page 3 and shuffle the years
- 47:29around, the compounded result will stay the same if the next
- 47:33four years are going to involve. Say a 40% -, 30 percent, 10% and
- 47:396% the. The order in which they fall is
- 47:42completely unimportant for our purposes as long as we all are
- 47:45around at the end of that for years.
- 47:48Over a long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow
- 47:51will probably produce something like 5% per year compounded from
- 47:55a combination of dividends and market value gain.
- 47:58Despite the experience of the last decade, anyone expecting
- 48:03substantially better than that from the general market probably
- 48:06faces disappointment. Our job is to pile up yearly
- 48:09advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too
- 48:13much about what are the absolute results in a given year are a
- 48:16plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which
- 48:19we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior
- 48:25to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced
- 48:2820%. For the reasons outlined in our
- 48:31method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are
- 48:35likely to be in declining or static markets.
- 48:38Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply
- 48:42varying amounts. There are bound to be years when
- 48:44we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can
- 48:48average 10 percentage points per year better than it, I will feel
- 48:52the results have been satisfactory.
- 48:54Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a
- 48:58year and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one
- 49:02year in the next 10, no one knows which one we should be
- 49:06down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged
- 49:11during the year, we would hope to be up.
- 49:13About 10 percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we
- 49:17would struggle to be up as much. It is certainly doubtful we
- 49:21could match a 20% or 25% advance from the December 31st 1962
- 49:27level. The consequence of performance
- 49:29such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow
- 49:32produces a 5% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope
- 49:37our results might be 15% per 40 year.
- 49:41The above expectations may sound somewhat rash and there is no
- 49:44question but that they may appear very much so when viewed
- 49:48from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970.
- 49:51Variations in any given year from the behavior described
- 49:55above would be wide even if the long term expectation was
- 49:59correct. Certainly, you have to recognize
- 50:02the possibility of substantial personal bias in such hopes.
- 50:06Miscellaneous This year marked the transition from the office
- 50:09off the bedroom to one a bit quite a bit more conventional.
- 50:13Surprising as it may seem, the return to a time clock life has
- 50:16not been unpleasant. As a matter of fact, I enjoy not
- 50:20keeping track of everything on the backs of envelopes.
- 50:23We are starting off this year with net assets of $9,405,400.
- 50:29At the start of 1962, Susie and I had three non marketable
- 50:34security investments of other than nominal size and two of
- 50:37these have been sold. The third will be continued
- 50:40indefinitely. From the proceeds of the two
- 50:43sales we have added to our partnership interests so that we
- 50:47now have an interest of $1,377,400.
- 50:52Also my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two
- 50:56brothers in law, father-in-law, 3 aunts, 4 cousins, 5 nieces and
- 51:01nephews have interests directly or indirectly totaling $893,600.
- 51:08Bill Scott, who has fit into our operation splendidly, has an
- 51:12interest with his wife of $167,400, a very large a portion
- 51:18of his net worth. So we are all eating our own
- 51:20cooking. You will know from the auditor's
- 51:22certificate that they made a surprise check during the year
- 51:25and this will be a continuing part of their procedure.
- 51:28Pete Marwick Mitchell and Company again did an excellent
- 51:32job on the audit, meeting our rather demanding time schedules.
- 51:36Susie was in charge of equipping the office, which means we did
- 51:39not follow my orange crate approach to interior decorating.
- 51:43We have an ample supply of Pepsi on hand and look forward to
- 51:47partners dropping in. Beth Fian continues to
- 51:49demonstrate why she is the High Priestess of the CPS Certified
- 51:53Professional Secretary. That is Group partners did a
- 51:56wonderful job of cooperating in the return of agreements and
- 52:00commitment letters and I am most appreciative of this.
- 52:04It makes life a lot easier. In closed you will find schedule
- 52:07A to your partnership agreement. You will be receiving your audit
- 52:11and tax figures very soon and if you have questions on any of
- 52:14this, be sure to let me hear from you cordially.
- 52:17Warren E Buffett 41 Buffett Partnership Ltd 810 Kiewit
- 52:23Plaza, Omaha 31, Nebraska July 10th, 1963 First half
- 52:29Performance During the first half of 1963, the Dow Jones
- 52:33Industrial Average here and after called the Dow advanced
- 52:36from 652.10 to 706.88. If one had owned the Dow during
- 52:43this period, dividends of 10.66 dollars would have been received
- 52:47bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to
- 52:51plus 10%. Our incantation has been one
- 52:55that short term results less than three years have little
- 52:57meaning particularly in reference to an investment
- 53:01operation such as ours that devotes a portion of resources
- 53:04to control situations. And two, that our results
- 53:07relative to the Dow and other common stock formed media will
- 53:11be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult
- 53:14time just matching such media and bubbling markets.
- 53:18Nevertheless, our first half performance excluding any change
- 53:22in Dempster valuation and its valuation did change.
- 53:25I'm saving this for dessert later in the letter was plus
- 53:2814%. This 14% is computed on total
- 53:32net assets, not non Dempster assets and is after expenses,
- 53:36but before monthly payments to those who take them to partners
- 53:40and allocation to the general partner.
- 53:42Such allocations are academic on an interim basis.
- 53:45What if we were also plus 14% at year end?
- 53:49The 1st 6% would be allocated to partners according to their
- 53:52Capital plus 3/4 of the balance of eight percent, 14% -, 6% or
- 53:59an additional 6%, giving the limited partners a + 12%
- 54:03performance. Despite the relatively pleasant
- 54:06results of the first half, the admonitions stated 2 paragraphs
- 54:10earlier hold in full force. At plus 14% versus plus 10% for
- 54:16the Dow, this six months has been a less satisfactory period
- 54:19than the first half of 1962 when we were -7.5% versus -21.7% for
- 54:27the Dow. You should completely
- 54:29understand. Our thinking in this regard,
- 54:31which has been emphasized in previous letters, during the
- 54:34first half we had an average net investment in generals, long
- 54:38positions in generals minus short positions in generals of
- 54:42approximately $5,275,000. Our overall gain from this net
- 54:48investment in generals for a description of our investment
- 54:51categories C the last annual letter was about $1,100,000 for
- 54:57a percentage gain from this category of roughly 21%.
- 55:01This again illustrates the extent to which the allocation
- 55:04of our resources among various categories affect short term
- 55:08results. In 1962, the generals were down
- 55:11for the year and only in outstanding performance by both
- 55:15of the other two categories. Workouts and controls gave us
- 55:19our unusually favorable results for that year.
- 55:22Now this year our workouts have done poorer than the Dow and
- 55:25have been a drag on performance as they are expected to be in
- 55:29rising markets. While it would be very nice to
- 55:32be 100% in generals in advancing markets and 100% in workouts in
- 55:37declining markets, I make no attempt to guess the course of
- 55:41the stock market in such a manner.
- 55:43We consider all three of our categories to be good businesses
- 55:46on a long term basis, although they're short term price
- 55:50behavior characteristics differ substantially in various types
- 55:53of markets. We consider attempting to gauge
- 55:56stock market fluctuations to be a very poor business on a long
- 56:00term basis and are not going to be in it either directly or
- 56:04indirectly through the process of trying to guess which of our
- 56:07categories is likely to do best in the near future.
- 56:11Investment companies. Shown below are the usual
- 56:13statistics on a cumulative basis for the Dow and Buffett
- 56:17Partnership Limited, including predecessor partnerships, as
- 56:20well As for the two largest open end mutual funds and two largest
- 56:24closed in 42 investment companies following a
- 56:28diversified common stock investment policy.
- 56:31Year down. Massachusetts Inv Trust
- 56:33Investors Stock Tricon 211-1957 minus 8.4% - 11.4% - 12.4%.
- 56:43-2.4% 19575826.9 percent 26.4 percent 29.2% Thirty percent
- 56:5319575952.3 percent 37.8 percent 42.5% Forty .9 percent
- 57:0219576042.9 percent 36.4 percent 41.6% Forty 4.8% 1950760174 .9%
- 57:15Seventy 1.3 percent 76.9% Seventy 7.4 percent 19576261.6
- 57:24percent 54.5% Fifty 3.2 percent 59.7% 1957 Sixty 3000 and
- 57:336377.8% Seventy 2.4 percent 69.3 percent 75.7% Annual 9.3 percent
- 57:448.7 percent 8.4 percent 9.1% Compounded rate year Lehman 2
- 57:50Partnership 3 Limited Partners Four 1957 - 11.4 percent 10.4
- 57:57percent 9.3% 19575824.7 percent 55.6% Forty 4.5 percent
- 58:071950750934 .8 percent 95.9% Seventy 4.7 percent 19576038.2
- 58:18percent 140.6 percent 107.2 percent 1950760170 .8 percent
- 58:25251 percent 181.6% 19576246.2 percent 299.8 percent 215.1
- 58:37percent 1957. Sixty, 3000 and 6360.8 percent
- 58:43355.8 percent 252.9% Annual, 7.6 percent 26.3 percent 21.4%
- 58:53Compounded rate Footnotes. One computed from changes in
- 58:57asset value plus any distributions to holders of
- 59:00record during year 2 from 1963. Moody's Bank and Finance Manual
- 59:05for 1957 to 62 estimated for first half 1963.
- 59:11Three for 1957 to 61 consists of combined results of all
- 59:16predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout an entire
- 59:19year after all expenses but before distributions to partners
- 59:23or allocations to the general partner.
- 59:26For for 1957 to 61 computed on basis of preceding column of
- 59:31partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner
- 59:35based upon present partnership agreement.
- 59:38The results continue to show that the most highly paid and
- 59:41respected investment advice has difficulty matching the
- 59:44performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks.
- 59:47This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment
- 59:52advisors and trust departments whose methods, reasoning and
- 59:55results largely parallel such investment companies.
- 59:59These media perform a substantial service to millions
- 1:00:02of investors in achieving adequate diversification,
- 1:00:06providing convenience and Peace of Mind, avoiding issues of
- 1:00:10inferior quality, etcetera. However, their services do not
- 1:00:14include and in the great majority of cases.
- 1:00:17Are not represented to include the compounding of money at a
- 1:00:20rate greater than that achieved by the general market.
- 1:00:23Our partnerships fundamental reason for existence is to
- 1:00:26compound funds at a better than average rate with less exposure
- 1:00:31to long term loss of capital than the above investment media.
- 1:00:34We certainly cannot represent that way we'll achieve this
- 1:00:37goal. We can and do say that if we
- 1:00:39don't achieve this goal over any reasonable period, excluding 43,
- 1:00:44an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation Dempster
- 1:00:48Mill Manufacturing Company. In our most recent annual
- 1:00:51letter, I described Harry Bottle as the man of the year.
- 1:00:55If this was an understatement, last year Harry did an
- 1:00:58extraordinary job of converting unproductive assets into cash,
- 1:01:02which we then of course began to invest in undervalued
- 1:01:06securities. Harry has continued this year to
- 1:01:09turn underutilized assets into cash, but in addition, he has
- 1:01:13made the remaining needed assets productive.
- 1:01:15Thus, we have had the following transformation and balance
- 1:01:18sheets during the last 19 months.
- 1:01:21November 30th 1961000 S Omitted Assets Book Figure Valued
- 1:01:27Adjusted Liabilities Valuation Cash 166 Dollars 100 Percent
- 1:01:33$166 Notes Payable 1230 Dollars ACCTS Rec 1040 Dollars 85
- 1:01:42percent 884 Dollars Other $1088 Net Liabilities Inventory
- 1:01:50$4203.60 percent $2522 PPD Exp Etcetera $82.25 percent $21.00
- 1:02:02Total $2318 Liabilities Current Assets 5491 Dollars $3593 Net
- 1:02:12Worth per Books $4601.00 Cash Value 45 Dollars 100 percent
- 1:02:19$45.00 as adjusted to 2120 dollars Life Ends, Etcetera
- 1:02:24Quickly Realizable Values Net Plant and 1383 dollars EST Net
- 1:02:32$800 The Equipment Auction Value Total Assets 6919 Dollars $4438
- 1:02:40Share 35.25 Dollars Outstanding 60146 adj Value per Share. 44
- 1:02:50November 30th 1962000 S Omitted Assets Book Figure Valued
- 1:02:56Adjusted Liabilities Evaluation Cash 60 Dollars 100 percent
- 1:03:01$60.00 Notes Payable $0.00 Marketable $758 MKT 123,162
- 1:03:11Dollars 834 Other $346 Securities Liabilities ACCTS Rec
- 1:03:19$796.85 percent $676 Total Liabilities $346 Net Inventory
- 1:03:29$1634.60 percent $981.00 Cash Value Life 41 Dollars 100% Forty
- 1:03:38$1.00 Net Worth Ends Recoverable 170 Dollars 100 percent $170 Per
- 1:03:45Books 4077 Dollars Income Tax PPD Exp Etcetera $14.25 percent
- 1:03:54$4.00 as adjusted to $3125.00 Quickly Realizable Values Add
- 1:04:01Proceeds $60.00 from potential exercise of Option 2 Hairy
- 1:04:07Bottle Current Assets 3473 Dollars 2766 Dollars $3185
- 1:04:16Shares Outstanding 60,146 Miscellaneous invest 5 dollars
- 1:04:24100% Five dollars Add SHS Potentially Outstanding under
- 1:04:29Option 2000 Total SHS 62,146 Net Plant and $945 EST Net $700.00
- 1:04:40ADJ Value per 51.26 dollars and Equipment Auction Value Share
- 1:04:46Total Assets 4423 dollars $3471.45 November 30th 1963000 S
- 1:04:58Omitted Assets Book Figure Valued Adjusted Liabilities
- 1:05:02Valuation Cash 144 Dollars 100 percent $144 Notes Payable 125
- 1:05:10Dollars Paid 7363 Marketable 1772 Dollars MKT 63,000 and 63
- 1:05:20dollars 2029 Other $394.00 Securities Liabilities ACCTS Rec
- 1:05:281262 Dollars 85 Percent $1073 Total $519 Net Liabilities
- 1:05:38Inventory $977.60 percent $586 PPDEXP Etcetera $12.25 percent
- 1:05:48$3 Net Worth Per Books $4582 Current Assets 4167 dollars
- 1:05:57$3835 as Adjusted to 4028 dollars Quickly Realizable
- 1:06:05Values Miscellaneous Invests 62 dollars 100 percent $62.00
- 1:06:10Shares Outstanding 62146 Net Plant and $872 EST Net $650 adj
- 1:06:20value Per 64.81 dollars equip Auction value.
- 1:06:24Share Total assets 5101 dollars $4547 I have included above the
- 1:06:32Conversion factors we have Previously Used in Valuing
- 1:06:35Dempster for BPL Purposes to reflect Estimated Immediate Sale
- 1:06:39values of non Earning assets as can be seen Harry has converted
- 1:06:44the assets at a Much more Favorable Basis than was implied
- 1:06:47by my Valuations this largely reflects Harry's expertise.
- 1:06:52And Perhaps to a minor degree my own conservatism in Valuation as
- 1:06:57can also be seen Dempster earned a very satisfactory operating
- 1:07:01profit in the first half as well as a substantial Unrealized gain
- 1:07:05in Securities and there is little Question that the
- 1:07:08operating business as now conducted has at least moderate
- 1:07:12Earning power on the vastly reduced assets needed to conduct
- 1:07:16it because of a very important seasonal factor.
- 1:07:19And also the Presence of a tax carry forward.
- 1:07:22However, the earning power is not nearly what might be
- 1:07:26inferred simply by a comparison of the 113062 and 63,000 and 63
- 1:07:33balance Sheets. Partly because of this
- 1:07:35seasonality, but more importantly because of possible
- 1:07:39developments in Dempster before 1963 year end, we have left our
- 1:07:43Dempster holdings at the same 51.26 dollars Valuation used at
- 1:07:48you're in 1962 in our figures for B dot P dot LS first half.
- 1:07:54However, I would be very surprised if it does not work
- 1:07:57out higher than this figure at your end. 1 sidelight for the
- 1:08:00Fundamentalists in our group. BPL owns 71.7% of Dempster
- 1:08:06acquired at a cost of 1,262,577.27 dollars on June
- 1:08:1430th, 1963. Dempster had a small safe
- 1:08:17deposit box at the Omaha National Bank containing
- 1:08:20securities worth 2,028,415.25 dollars.
- 1:08:26Our 71.7% share of 2,028,415.25 dollars amounts to 1,454,373.70
- 1:08:38dollars. Thus everything above ground and
- 1:08:41part of it underground is profit.
- 1:08:43My security analyst friends may find this a rather primitive
- 1:08:47method of accounting, but I must confess that I find a bit more
- 1:08:50substance in this fingers and toes method than in any
- 1:08:54prayerful reliance that someone will pay me 35 times next year's
- 1:08:58earnings. 46 Advance Payments In Advance withdrawals We accept
- 1:09:03advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6%
- 1:09:07interest from date of receipt until the end of the year.
- 1:09:10While there is no obligation to convert the payment to a
- 1:09:13partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the
- 1:09:17intent at the time of payment. Similarly, we allow partners to
- 1:09:20withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to
- 1:09:24year end and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until year
- 1:09:28end when it is charged against their capital account.
- 1:09:31Again, it is not intended that partners use US like a bank, but
- 1:09:36that they use the withdrawal right for unanticipated need for
- 1:09:39funds. The willingness to both borrow
- 1:09:42and lend at 6% may seem UN buffet like.
- 1:09:45We look at the withdrawal right as a means of giving some
- 1:09:48liquidity for unexpected needs and as a practical matter are
- 1:09:53reasonably sure it will be far more than covered by advance
- 1:09:56payments. Why then the willingness to pay
- 1:09:586% for advance payment money when we can borrow from
- 1:10:02commercial banks at substantially lower rates?
- 1:10:05For example, in the first half we obtained a substantial 6
- 1:10:08month bank loan at 4%. The answer is that we expect on
- 1:10:12a long term basis to earn better than 6%.
- 1:10:15The general partners allocation is 0 unless we do, although it
- 1:10:19is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure
- 1:10:23in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt A
- 1:10:26different attitude in the investment of money that can be
- 1:10:28expected to soon be a part of our equity capital.
- 1:10:31Then I can on short term borrowed money.
- 1:10:33The advance payments have the added advantage to us of
- 1:10:36spreading the investment of new money over the year rather than
- 1:10:40having it hit us all at once in January.
- 1:10:43On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short
- 1:10:47term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider
- 1:10:51it mutually profitable. On June 30th, 1963 we had a
- 1:10:55advance withdrawals of $21,832.00 in advance payments
- 1:11:01of 562,437.11 dollars taxes. There is some possibility that
- 1:11:08we may have fairly substantial realized gains this year.
- 1:11:11Of course, this may not materialize at all and actually
- 1:11:15does not have anything to do with our investment performance
- 1:11:18this year. I am an outspoken advocate of
- 1:11:21paying large amounts of income taxes at low rates.
- 1:11:25A tremendous number of fuzzy, confused investment decisions
- 1:11:28are rationalized through so-called tax considerations.
- 1:11:32My net worth is the market value of holdings less the tax payable
- 1:11:36upon sale. The liability is just as real as
- 1:11:39the asset unless the value of the asset declines.
- 1:11:42Ouch. The asset is given away, no
- 1:11:44comment or I die with it. The latter course of action
- 1:11:48would appear to at least border on a pyrrhic victory.
- 1:11:51Investment decisions should be made on the basis of the most
- 1:11:54probable comp compounding of after tax net worth with minimum
- 1:11:58risk. Any isolation of low basis
- 1:12:00securities merely freezes a portion of net worth at a
- 1:12:04compounding factor identical with the assets isolated.
- 1:12:07While this may work out either well or badly in individual
- 1:12:10cases, it is a nullification of investment management.
- 1:12:15The group experience holding various low basis securities
- 1:12:18well undoubtedly approximate group experience on securities
- 1:12:22as a whole, namely compounding at the compounding rate of the
- 1:12:25Dow. We do not consider this the
- 1:12:27optimum in after tax compounding rates.
- 1:12:30I have said before that if earnings from the partnership
- 1:12:33can potentially amount to a sizable portion of your total
- 1:12:36taxable income, the safe thing to do is to estimate this year
- 1:12:40the same tax you incurred last year.
- 1:12:42If you do this, you cannot run into penalties.
- 1:12:45In any event, tax liabilities for those who entered the
- 1:12:48partnership on 1163 will be minimal because of the terms of
- 1:12:53our partnership agreement first allocating capital gains to
- 1:12:57those having an interest in unrealized appreciation. 47 As
- 1:13:02in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st to
- 1:13:05partners and those who have indicated in interest to me by
- 1:13:08that time in becoming partners with the amendment to the
- 1:13:11Partnership agreement Commitment Letter 4.