Latest / Philosophy / 024 - XXIV Truth and Falsehood
Transcript
- 0:01Speaker 1: Chapter twenty four of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. The sleebrivox
- 0:04Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain truth and falsehood. The
- 0:09Speaker 1: question of truth and falsehood has been wrapped in unnecessary
- 0:13Speaker 1: mystery owing to a number of causes. In the first place,
- 0:17Speaker 1: people wish to think that their beliefs are more apt
- 0:20Speaker 1: to be truth than false, so that they seek a
- 0:22Speaker 1: theory that will show that truth is normal and falsehood
- 0:26Speaker 1: more or less accidental. In the second place, people are
- 0:30Speaker 1: very vague as to what they mean by belief or judgment,
- 0:34Speaker 1: though persuaded that they know beliefs or judgments to be
- 0:38Speaker 1: the objects to which the predicates true or false apply.
- 0:42Speaker 1: In the third place, there is a tendency to use
- 0:45Speaker 1: truth with a big T in the grand sense, as
- 0:49Speaker 1: something noble and splendid and worthy of adoration. This gets
- 0:54Speaker 1: people into a frame of mind in which they become
- 0:56Speaker 1: unable to think. But just as the grave diggers in
- 1:00Speaker 1: Hamlet became familiar with skulls, so logicians become familiar with truth.
- 1:06Speaker 1: The hand of little employment hath the daintier sense, says Hamlet. Therefore,
- 1:11Speaker 1: it is not from the logician that awe before truth
- 1:14Speaker 1: is to be expected. There are two questions in our
- 1:18Speaker 1: present subject. One, what are the objects to which the
- 1:22Speaker 1: predicates true and false apply? Two? What is the difference
- 1:27Speaker 1: between such as are true and such as are false.
- 1:31Speaker 1: We will begin with the first of these questions. Prima facie,
- 1:36Speaker 1: true in false apply to statements, whether in speech or
- 1:39Speaker 1: in writing. By extension, they are supposed to apply to
- 1:43Speaker 1: the beliefs expressed in those statements, and also to hypotheses
- 1:47Speaker 1: which are entertained without being believed or disbelieved. But let
- 1:53Speaker 1: us first consider the truth and falsehood of statements. Following
- 1:57Speaker 1: our practice of going as far as we can with
- 1:59Speaker 1: the behaviorists before falling back on introspection, we considered the
- 2:05Speaker 1: meaning of words earlier. Now we have to consider sentences.
- 2:10Speaker 1: Of course, a sentence may consist of a single word
- 2:13Speaker 1: or of a wink, but generally it consists of several words.
- 2:17Speaker 1: In that case, it has a meaning, which is a
- 2:19Speaker 1: function of the meanings of the separate words and their order.
- 2:24Speaker 1: A sentence which has no meaning is not true or false.
- 2:27Speaker 1: Thus it is only sentences, as vehicles of a certain
- 2:30Speaker 1: sort of meaning, that have truth or falsehood. We have,
- 2:34Speaker 1: therefore to examine the meaning of a sentence let us
- 2:39Speaker 1: take some very humble example. Suppose you look in a
- 2:42Speaker 1: timetable and find it there stated that a passenger train
- 2:46Speaker 1: leaves King's Cross for Edinburgh at ten a m. What
- 2:50Speaker 1: is the meaning of this assertion? I shudder when I
- 2:54Speaker 1: think of its complexity. If I were to try to
- 2:57Speaker 1: develop the theme adequately, I should be occupied with nothing
- 3:01Speaker 1: else till the end of the present volume, and then
- 3:04Speaker 1: I should have only touched the fringe of the subject.
- 3:07Speaker 1: Take first the social aspect. It is not essential that
- 3:11Speaker 1: anybody but the engineer and firemen should travel by the train,
- 3:15Speaker 1: though it is essential that others should be able to
- 3:18Speaker 1: travel by it if they fulfill certain conditions. It is
- 3:22Speaker 1: not essential that the train should reach Edinburgh. The statement
- 3:25Speaker 1: remains true if there is an accident or breakdown on
- 3:28Speaker 1: the way, but it is essential that the management of
- 3:32Speaker 1: the railway should intend it to reach Edinburgh. Take next
- 3:36Speaker 1: the physical aspect. It is not essential or even possible,
- 3:41Speaker 1: that the train should start exactly at ten. One might
- 3:45Speaker 1: perhaps say that it must not start more than ten
- 3:47Speaker 1: seconds before its time, or more than fifty seconds after.
- 3:52Speaker 1: But these limits cannot be laid down rigidly in countries
- 3:55Speaker 1: where unpunctuality is common, they would be much wider. Then
- 4:00Speaker 1: we must consider what we mean by starting, which no
- 4:03Speaker 1: one can define unless he has learnt the infinitesimal calculus.
- 4:08Speaker 1: Then we consider the definitions of King Cross in Edinburgh,
- 4:12Speaker 1: both of which are more or less vague terms. Then
- 4:15Speaker 1: we must consider what is meant by a train. Here
- 4:19Speaker 1: there will be first of all, complicated legal questions what
- 4:23Speaker 1: constitutes fulfillment of a railway company's obligation in the way
- 4:27Speaker 1: of running trains. Then there are questions as to the
- 4:31Speaker 1: constitution of matter, since evidently a train is a piece
- 4:35Speaker 1: of matter. Also, of course, there are questions as to
- 4:39Speaker 1: methods of estimating Greenwich time at King's Cross. Most of
- 4:44Speaker 1: the above points have to do with the meaning of
- 4:46Speaker 1: single words, not with the meaning of the whole sentence.
- 4:50Speaker 1: It is obvious that the ordinary mortal does not trouble
- 4:53Speaker 1: about such complications when he uses the words. To him,
- 4:57Speaker 1: a word has a meaning very far from prison, and
- 5:00Speaker 1: he does not try to exclude marginal cases. It is
- 5:05Speaker 1: the search for precision that introduces complications. We think we
- 5:09Speaker 1: attach a meaning to the word man, but we don't
- 5:12Speaker 1: know whether to include pithecanthropis erectus. To this extent, the
- 5:17Speaker 1: meaning of the word is vague. As knowledge increases, words
- 5:22Speaker 1: acquire meanings which are more precise and more complex. New
- 5:26Speaker 1: words have to be introduced to express the less complex
- 5:29Speaker 1: constituents which have been discovered. A word is intended to
- 5:33Speaker 1: describe something in the world. At first, it does so
- 5:36Speaker 1: very badly, but afterwards it generally improves. Thus, single words
- 5:42Speaker 1: embody knowledge, although they do not make assertions. In an
- 5:46Speaker 1: ideal logical language, there will be words of different kinds
- 5:51Speaker 1: first proper names. Of these, however, there are no examples
- 5:56Speaker 1: in actual language. The words which are called proper names
- 6:00Speaker 1: describe collections which are always defined by some characteristic Thus
- 6:05Speaker 1: assertions about Peter are really about everything that is Peterish.
- 6:11Speaker 1: To get a true proper name, we should have to
- 6:13Speaker 1: get to a single particular or a set of particulars,
- 6:16Speaker 1: defined by enumeration, not by a common quality. Since we
- 6:21Speaker 1: cannot acquire knowledge of actual particulars, the words we use
- 6:26Speaker 1: denote in the best language we can make either adjectives
- 6:29Speaker 1: or relations between two or more terms. In addition to these,
- 6:34Speaker 1: there are words indicative of structure. For example, in A
- 6:38Speaker 1: is greater than B, the words is and then have
- 6:41Speaker 1: no separate meaning, but merely serve to show the sense
- 6:45Speaker 1: of the relation greater, i e. That it goes from
- 6:49Speaker 1: A to B, not from B to A. Strictly speaking,
- 6:53Speaker 1: we are still simplifying. True adjectives and relations will require
- 6:58Speaker 1: particulars for their terms. The sort of adjectives we can know,
- 7:02Speaker 1: such as blue and round will not be applicable to particulars.
- 7:07Speaker 1: They are therefore analogous to the adjective populace applied to
- 7:11Speaker 1: a town. To say this town is populous means many
- 7:15Speaker 1: people live in this town. A similar transformation would be
- 7:20Speaker 1: demanded by logic in all the adjectives and relations we
- 7:23Speaker 1: can know empirically, that is to say, no word that
- 7:27Speaker 1: we could understand would occur in a grammatically correct account
- 7:31Speaker 1: of the universe. Leaving on one side the vagueness and
- 7:35Speaker 1: inaccuracy of words, let us ask ourselves, in what circumstances
- 7:40Speaker 1: do we feel convinced that we know a statement to
- 7:43Speaker 1: be true or false, as the case may be. A
- 7:46Speaker 1: present statement will be regarded as true if, for example,
- 7:50Speaker 1: it agrees with recollection or perception. A past statement, if
- 7:55Speaker 1: it raised expectations now confirmed. I do not mean to
- 7:59Speaker 1: say that These are the only grounds upon which we
- 8:01Speaker 1: regard statements as true. I mean that they are simple
- 8:05Speaker 1: and typical and worth examining. If you say it was
- 8:08Speaker 1: raining this morning, I may recollect that it was or
- 8:11Speaker 1: that it wasn't. One may perhaps say that the words
- 8:15Speaker 1: this morning are associated for me with the word raining
- 8:18Speaker 1: or with the words not raining, according to which occurs,
- 8:23Speaker 1: I judge your statement to be true or false. If
- 8:26Speaker 1: I have neither association, I do not judge your statement
- 8:29Speaker 1: either true or false unless I have material for an inference,
- 8:33Speaker 1: and I do not want to consider inference yet. If
- 8:37Speaker 1: you say the lights have gone out when I can
- 8:39Speaker 1: see the light shining, I judge that you speak falsely,
- 8:43Speaker 1: because my perception is associated with the words lights shining.
- 8:48Speaker 1: If you say the lights will go out in a minute,
- 8:51Speaker 1: you produce a certain familiar kind of tension called expectation,
- 8:55Speaker 1: and after a time, you produce a judgment that you
- 8:58Speaker 1: spoke falsely if the lights do not go out. These
- 9:02Speaker 1: are the ordinary direct ways of deciding on the truth
- 9:05Speaker 1: or falsehood of statements about past, present, or future. It
- 9:10Speaker 1: is necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect grounds for
- 9:14Speaker 1: accepting or rejecting statements pragmatism considers only indirect grounds. Broadly speaking,
- 9:22Speaker 1: it considers a statement false when the consequences of accepting
- 9:25Speaker 1: it are unfortunate, but this belongs to the region of inference.
- 9:30Speaker 1: I ask you the way to the station, you tell
- 9:33Speaker 1: me wrong, and I miss my train, I then infer
- 9:36Speaker 1: that you told me wrong. But if you say the
- 9:39Speaker 1: lights are out when I see them shining, I reject
- 9:42Speaker 1: your statement without inference. In this case, something in my
- 9:46Speaker 1: present circumstances is associated with words different from yours and
- 9:51Speaker 1: different in ways which I have learned to regard as
- 9:53Speaker 1: involving incompatibility. The ultimate test of falsehood is never so
- 9:59Speaker 1: I think the nature of the consequences of a belief,
- 10:03Speaker 1: but the association between words and sensible or remembered facts.
- 10:08Speaker 1: A belief is verified when a situation arises which gives
- 10:12Speaker 1: a feeling of expectedness in connection with it. It is
- 10:15Speaker 1: falsified when the feeling is one of surprise. But this
- 10:19Speaker 1: only applies to beliefs which await some future contingency for
- 10:23Speaker 1: verification or refutation. A belief which is an immediate reaction
- 10:28Speaker 1: to a situation. For example, when you are waiting for
- 10:32Speaker 1: a race to begin, and presently you say thereof has
- 10:35Speaker 1: no need of verification, but verifies other beliefs. And even
- 10:40Speaker 1: when the confirmation of a belief is in the future,
- 10:43Speaker 1: it is the expectedness, not the pleasantness, of the consequences,
- 10:47Speaker 1: that confirms the truth of the belief. I think it
- 10:51Speaker 1: is a mistake to treat belief as one kind of occurrence,
- 10:55Speaker 1: as is done in traditional psychology. The sort of belief
- 10:58Speaker 1: which is based upon men or perception alone differs from
- 11:02Speaker 1: the sort which involves expectation. When you find in the
- 11:06Speaker 1: timetable that a train leaves King's Cross at ten, your
- 11:10Speaker 1: belief that this statement occurs in the timetable does not
- 11:13Speaker 1: await future confirmation, but your belief about the train does.
- 11:18Speaker 1: You may go to King's Cross and see the train start.
- 11:22Speaker 1: A belief which concerns an event may be a recollection,
- 11:25Speaker 1: a perception, or an expectation. It may be none of
- 11:28Speaker 1: these in the case of an event which you have
- 11:30Speaker 1: not seen and do not expect to see, for example,
- 11:34Speaker 1: Caesar crossing the Rubicon or the abolition of the House
- 11:37Speaker 1: of Lords. But such beliefs always involve inference. I do
- 11:43Speaker 1: not at this stage consider logical and mathematical beliefs. Some
- 11:47Speaker 1: of which must be in a sense non inferential. But
- 11:51Speaker 1: I think we shall find that this sense is different
- 11:53Speaker 1: from that in which memories and perceptions are non inferential.
- 11:57Speaker 1: A belief, I should say, interpreted narrowly, is a form
- 12:01Speaker 1: of words related to an emotion of one of several kinds.
- 12:05Speaker 1: I shall give a broader meaning later. The emotion is
- 12:09Speaker 1: different according as the belief in bodies, a reminiscence, a perception,
- 12:13Speaker 1: an expectation, or something outside the experience of the believer. Moreover,
- 12:19Speaker 1: a form of words is not essential. Where the emotion
- 12:23Speaker 1: is present and leads to action relevant to some feature
- 12:26Speaker 1: of the environment, there may be said to be a belief.
- 12:30Speaker 1: The fundamental test of a belief of no matter what sort,
- 12:34Speaker 1: is that it causes some event which actually takes place
- 12:38Speaker 1: to arouse the emotion of expectedness or its opposite. I
- 12:43Speaker 1: do not now attempt to decide what an emotion is.
- 12:46Speaker 1: Doctor Watson gives a behavioristic account of emotions, which would,
- 12:50Speaker 1: if adopted, make my definition of belief purely behavioristic. I
- 12:56Speaker 1: have framed the definition so as not to involve a
- 12:58Speaker 1: decision on the question of introspection. The subject of truth
- 13:03Speaker 1: and falsehood may be subdivided as follows a formal theory.
- 13:08Speaker 1: Given the meanings of the component words, what decides whether
- 13:12Speaker 1: a sentence is true or false? B? Causal theory? Can
- 13:17Speaker 1: we distinguish between truth and falsehood by A Their causes?
- 13:22Speaker 1: B Their effects? C Individual and social elements? A statement
- 13:28Speaker 1: is a social occurrence, A belief is something individual. How
- 13:32Speaker 1: can we define a belief and what is it when
- 13:35Speaker 1: it is not composed of words? D? Consistency and truth?
- 13:41Speaker 1: Can we get outside the circle of beliefs or statements
- 13:45Speaker 1: to something else which shows them true not merely consistent?
- 13:48Speaker 1: In other words, what possible relation is there between propositions
- 13:53Speaker 1: and facts? It is very hard to disentangle these questions.
- 13:58Speaker 1: The first question as to formal theories leads to the
- 14:01Speaker 1: fourth as to the relation of propositions to facts. For example,
- 14:06Speaker 1: Brudus killed Caesar is true because of a certain fact?
- 14:10Speaker 1: What fact? The fact that Brudus killed Caesar. This keeps
- 14:15Speaker 1: us in the verbal realm and does not get us
- 14:17Speaker 1: outside it to some realm of non verbal fact by
- 14:20Speaker 1: which verbal statements can be verified. Hence our fourth problem arises.
- 14:25Speaker 1: But this leads to our second problem as to causes
- 14:28Speaker 1: and effects of what is true or false? For it
- 14:31Speaker 1: is here that we shall naturally look for the vital
- 14:34Speaker 1: relation between propositions and facts. And here again we must
- 14:39Speaker 1: distinguish between thinking truly and speaking truly. The former is
- 14:44Speaker 1: an individual affair, the latter a social affair. Thus all
- 14:48Speaker 1: our problems hang together. I will begin with c the
- 14:53Speaker 1: difference between a belief and a statement. By a statement,
- 14:57Speaker 1: I mean a form of words uttered or written with
- 15:00Speaker 1: a view to being heard or read by some other
- 15:02Speaker 1: person or persons, and not a question, interjection, or command,
- 15:07Speaker 1: but such as we should call an assertion. As to
- 15:10Speaker 1: the question what forms of words are assertions? That is
- 15:14Speaker 1: one for the Grammarian, and differs from language to language.
- 15:18Speaker 1: But perhaps we can say rather more than that. The distinction, however,
- 15:22Speaker 1: between an assertion and an imperative, is not sharp. In England,
- 15:27Speaker 1: notices say visitors are requested not to walk on the grass.
- 15:32Speaker 1: In America they say keep off. This means you. Effectively,
- 15:37Speaker 1: the two have the same meaning. Yet the English notice
- 15:40Speaker 1: consists only of a statement, while the American notice consists
- 15:44Speaker 1: of an imperative followed by a statement which must be
- 15:47Speaker 1: false if read by more than one person. In so
- 15:50Speaker 1: far as statements are intended to influence the conduct of
- 15:53Speaker 1: others they partake of the nature of imperatives or requests.
- 15:58Speaker 1: Their characteristic, however, is that they endeavor to affect their
- 16:02Speaker 1: aim by producing a belief which may or may not
- 16:05Speaker 1: exist in the mind of the speaker. Often, however, they
- 16:09Speaker 1: express a belief without stopping to consider the effect upon others. Thus,
- 16:14Speaker 1: a statement may be defined as a form of words
- 16:17Speaker 1: which either expresses a belief or is intended to create one.
- 16:21Speaker 1: Our next step, therefore, must be the definition of belief.
- 16:26Speaker 1: Belief is a word which will be quite differently defined
- 16:29Speaker 1: if we take an analytic point of view from the
- 16:31Speaker 1: way in which we shall define it, if we regard
- 16:33Speaker 1: the matter causally from the point of view of science.
- 16:37Speaker 1: The causal point of view is the more important. Beliefs
- 16:41Speaker 1: influence action in certain ways. What influences action in these
- 16:46Speaker 1: ways may be called a belief, even if analytically it
- 16:50Speaker 1: does not much resemble what would ordinarily be so called.
- 16:53Speaker 1: We may therefore widen our previous definition of belief. Consider
- 16:58Speaker 1: a man who goes to the house where he friend
- 17:00Speaker 1: used to live, and, finding he has moved, says, I
- 17:04Speaker 1: thought he still lived here, whereas he acted merely from
- 17:08Speaker 1: habit without thought. If we are going to use words causally,
- 17:12Speaker 1: we ought to say that this man had a belief,
- 17:14Speaker 1: and therefore a belief will be merely a characteristic of
- 17:18Speaker 1: a string of actions. We shall have to say a
- 17:21Speaker 1: man believes a certain proposition P if whenever he is
- 17:25Speaker 1: aiming at any result to which P is relevant, he
- 17:28Speaker 1: acts in a manner calculated to achieve the result if
- 17:32Speaker 1: P is true, but not otherwise. Sometimes this gives definite results,
- 17:37Speaker 1: sometimes not. When you call a telephone number, it is
- 17:41Speaker 1: clear that you believe that to be the number of
- 17:43Speaker 1: the subscriber you want, But whether you believe in the
- 17:46Speaker 1: conservation of energy or a future life may be harder
- 17:50Speaker 1: to decide. You may hold a belief in some contexts
- 17:54Speaker 1: and not in others, for we do not think in
- 17:56Speaker 1: accordance with the so called laws of thought. Believe, like
- 18:00Speaker 1: all other categories of traditional psychology, is a notion incapable
- 18:04Speaker 1: of precision. This brings me to the question whether the
- 18:09Speaker 1: truth or falsehood of a belief can be determined either
- 18:12Speaker 1: by its causes or by its effects. There is, however,
- 18:16Speaker 1: a preliminary difficulty. I said just now that a believes
- 18:20Speaker 1: P if he acts in a way which will achieve
- 18:22Speaker 1: his ends. If P is true, I therefore assume that
- 18:26Speaker 1: we know what is meant by truth. I assumed to
- 18:30Speaker 1: be definite that we know what is meant by truth
- 18:33Speaker 1: is applied to a form of words. The argument was
- 18:36Speaker 1: as follows. From observation of a person's acts, you infer
- 18:41Speaker 1: his beliefs by a process which may be as elaborate
- 18:44Speaker 1: as the discovery of Kepler's laws from the observed motions
- 18:47Speaker 1: of the planets. His beliefs are not assumed to be
- 18:51Speaker 1: states of mind, but merely characteristics of series of actions.
- 18:56Speaker 1: These beliefs, when ascertained by observation, can be expressed in words.
- 19:01Speaker 1: You can say, for example, this person believes that there
- 19:04Speaker 1: is a train from King's Cross at ten a m.
- 19:07Speaker 1: Having once expressed the belief in words of which the
- 19:10Speaker 1: meaning is known, you have arrived at the stage where
- 19:13Speaker 1: formal theories are applicable. Words of known meaning, put together
- 19:18Speaker 1: according to a known syntax are true or false in
- 19:21Speaker 1: virtue of some fact, and their relation to this fact
- 19:24Speaker 1: results logically from the meanings of the separate words and
- 19:27Speaker 1: the laws of syntax. This is where logic is strong.
- 19:33Speaker 1: It will be seen that according to what we have
- 19:35Speaker 1: said truth is applicable primarily to a form of words,
- 19:39Speaker 1: and only derivatively to a belief. A form of words
- 19:43Speaker 1: is a social phenomenon. Therefore the fundamental form of truth
- 19:47Speaker 1: must be social. A form of words is true when
- 19:50Speaker 1: it has a certain relation to a certain fact. What
- 19:54Speaker 1: relation to what fact? I think the fundamental relation is this.
- 20:00Speaker 1: The form of words is true if a person who
- 20:02Speaker 1: knows the language is led to that form of words
- 20:05Speaker 1: when he finds himself in an environment which contains features
- 20:09Speaker 1: that are the meanings of those words, and these features
- 20:12Speaker 1: produce reactions in him sufficiently strong for him to use
- 20:16Speaker 1: words which mean them. Thus, a train leaves King's Cross
- 20:20Speaker 1: at ten am is true if a person can be
- 20:23Speaker 1: led to say, it is now ten am, this is
- 20:26Speaker 1: King's Cross, and I see a train starting. The environment
- 20:30Speaker 1: causes words, and words directly caused by the environment, if
- 20:34Speaker 1: they are statements are true. What is called verification in
- 20:38Speaker 1: science consists in putting oneself in a situation where words
- 20:42Speaker 1: previously used for other reasons result directly from the environment.
- 20:47Speaker 1: Of course, given this basis, there are innumerable indirect ways
- 20:52Speaker 1: of verifying statements, but all I think depend upon this
- 20:56Speaker 1: direct way. The above theory may be thought very odd,
- 21:01Speaker 1: but it is partly designed to meet the fourth of
- 21:03Speaker 1: our previous questions, namely, how can we get outside words
- 21:08Speaker 1: to the facts which make them true or false. Obviously
- 21:12Speaker 1: we cannot do this within logic, which is imprisoned in
- 21:15Speaker 1: the realm of words. We can only do it by
- 21:18Speaker 1: considering the relations of words to our other experiences. And
- 21:22Speaker 1: these relations, in so far as they are relevant, can
- 21:25Speaker 1: hardly be other than causal. I think the above theory
- 21:29Speaker 1: as it stands is too crude to be quite true.
- 21:33Speaker 1: We must also bring in such things as expectedness, which
- 21:36Speaker 1: we discussed earlier. But I believe that the definition of
- 21:40Speaker 1: truth or falsehood will have to be sought along some
- 21:43Speaker 1: such lines. As I have indicated, I want, in conclusion,
- 21:48Speaker 1: to indulge in two speculations. The first concerns a possible
- 21:52Speaker 1: reconciliation of behaviorism and logic. It is clear that when
- 21:57Speaker 1: we have a problem to solve, we do not always
- 22:00Speaker 1: solve it as the rat does, by means of random movements.
- 22:04Speaker 1: We often solve it by thinking, i e. By a
- 22:08Speaker 1: process in which we are not making any overt movements.
- 22:12Speaker 1: The same thing was sometimes true of Kohler's chimpanzees. Now,
- 22:16Speaker 1: what is involved in the possibility of solving a problem
- 22:20Speaker 1: by verbal thinking? We put words together in various ways
- 22:24Speaker 1: which are not wholly random, but limited by previous knowledge
- 22:28Speaker 1: of the sort of phrase that is likely to contain
- 22:31Speaker 1: a solution of our problem. At last, we hit upon
- 22:34Speaker 1: a phrase which seems to give what we want. We
- 22:38Speaker 1: then proceed to an overt action of the kind indicated
- 22:41Speaker 1: by the phrase. If it succeeds, our problem is solved. Now,
- 22:46Speaker 1: this process is only intelligible if there is some connection
- 22:49Speaker 1: between the laws of syntax and the laws of physics,
- 22:53Speaker 1: using syntax in a psychological rather than grammatical sense. I
- 22:58Speaker 1: think this connection is assumed in logic and ordinary philosophy,
- 23:03Speaker 1: but it ought to be treated as a problem requiring
- 23:05Speaker 1: investigation by behaviorist methods. I lay no stress on this suggestion,
- 23:11Speaker 1: except as giving a hint for future investigations. But I
- 23:15Speaker 1: cannot think that the behaviorist has gone far towards the
- 23:18Speaker 1: solution of his problem until he has succeeded in establishing
- 23:22Speaker 1: a connection between syntax and physics. Without this, the efficacy
- 23:27Speaker 1: of thought cannot be explained on his principles. My second
- 23:31Speaker 1: speculation is as to the limitations which the structure of
- 23:35Speaker 1: language imposes upon the extent of our possible knowledge of
- 23:39Speaker 1: the world, I am inclined to think that quite important
- 23:43Speaker 1: metaphysical conclusions of a more or less skeptical kind can
- 23:48Speaker 1: be drawn from simple considerations as to the relation between
- 23:52Speaker 1: language and things. A spoken sentence consists of a temporal
- 23:56Speaker 1: series of events. A written sentence is a spatial series
- 24:00Speaker 1: of bits of matter. Thus it is not surprising that
- 24:04Speaker 1: language can represent the course of events in the physical world.
- 24:08Speaker 1: It can, in fact, make a map of the physical world,
- 24:11Speaker 1: preserving its structure in a more manageable form. And it
- 24:15Speaker 1: can do this because it consists of physical events. But
- 24:19Speaker 1: if there were such a world, as the mystic postulates,
- 24:23Speaker 1: it would have a structure different from that of language,
- 24:26Speaker 1: and would therefore be incapable of being verbally described. It
- 24:30Speaker 1: is fairly clear that nothing verbal can conform or confute
- 24:34Speaker 1: this hypothesis. A great deal of the confusion about relations
- 24:38Speaker 1: which has prevailed in practically all philosophies comes from the
- 24:42Speaker 1: fact that relations are indicated not by relations, but by words,
- 24:47Speaker 1: which are as substantial as other words. Consequently, in thinking
- 24:52Speaker 1: about relations, we constantly hover between the unsubstantiality of the
- 24:57Speaker 1: relation itself and the substantiality of the word. Take say,
- 25:02Speaker 1: the fact that lightning precedes thunder. We saw earlier that
- 25:06Speaker 1: to express this by a language closely reproducing the structure
- 25:10Speaker 1: of the fact, we should have to say simply lightning thunder,
- 25:15Speaker 1: where the fact that the first word precedes the second
- 25:18Speaker 1: means that what the first word means precedes what the
- 25:21Speaker 1: second word means. But even if we adopted this method
- 25:25Speaker 1: for temporal order, we should still need words for all
- 25:28Speaker 1: other relations, because we could not, without intolerable ambiguity, symbolize
- 25:34Speaker 1: them also by the order of our words. When we
- 25:38Speaker 1: say lightning precedes thunder, the word precedes has a quite
- 25:42Speaker 1: different relation to what it means from that which the
- 25:45Speaker 1: words lightning and thunder have to what they respectively mean.
- 25:50Speaker 1: Witgenstein says that what really happens is that we establish
- 25:54Speaker 1: a relation between the word lightning and the word thunder,
- 25:57Speaker 1: namely the relation of having the words between them. In
- 26:01Speaker 1: this way, he causes relations to be symbolized by relations.
- 26:06Speaker 1: But although this may be quite correct, it is sufficiently
- 26:10Speaker 1: odd to make it not surprising that people have thought
- 26:12Speaker 1: the word precedes means a relation. In the same sense,
- 26:16Speaker 1: which lightning means a kind of event. This view, however,
- 26:20Speaker 1: must be incorrect. I think it has usually been held
- 26:24Speaker 1: unconsciously and has produced many confusions about relations which cease
- 26:29Speaker 1: when it is exposed to the light of day, for example,
- 26:33Speaker 1: those which lead badly to condemn relations. In all this,
- 26:38Speaker 1: I have been considering the question of the relation between
- 26:40Speaker 1: the structure of language and the structure of the world.
- 26:44Speaker 1: It is clear that anything that can be said in
- 26:47Speaker 1: an inflected language can be said in an uninflected language. Therefore,
- 26:52Speaker 1: everything that can be said in language can be said
- 26:55Speaker 1: by means of a temporal series of uninflected words. This
- 27:00Speaker 1: is a limitation upon what can be expressed in words.
- 27:04Speaker 1: It may well be that there are facts which do
- 27:06Speaker 1: not lend themselves to this very simple schema. If so,
- 27:10Speaker 1: they cannot be expressed in language. Our confidence in language
- 27:15Speaker 1: is due to the fact that it consists of events
- 27:17Speaker 1: in the physical world, and therefore shares the structure of
- 27:21Speaker 1: the physical world, and therefore can express that structure. But
- 27:25Speaker 1: if there be a world which is not physical or
- 27:28Speaker 1: not in space time, it may have a structure which
- 27:31Speaker 1: we can never hope to express or to know. These
- 27:35Speaker 1: considerations might lead us to something like the Kantian a priori,
- 27:39Speaker 1: not as derived from the structure of the mind, but
- 27:43Speaker 1: is derived from the structure of language, which is the
- 27:45Speaker 1: structure of the physical world. Perhaps that is why we
- 27:49Speaker 1: know so much physics and so little of anything else. However,
- 27:54Speaker 1: I have lapsed into mystical speculation and will leave these possibilities,
- 27:59Speaker 1: since by the nature of the case I cannot say
- 28:02Speaker 1: anything true about them. End of Chapter twenty four