Latest / The Science of Being Great / Monadology-Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Transcript

Monadology-Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz · The Science of Being Great

0:00
Speaker 1: The Monodology prefatory Note. This is a LibriVox recording. All
0:05
Speaker 1: LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For information or
0:08
Speaker 1: to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recordings by Gary Gek.
0:15
Speaker 1: The Monadology by Godfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, translated by Robert Latta.
0:23
Speaker 1: Prefatory Note. The Monodology is one of the latest of
0:28
Speaker 1: the works of Leibniz, having been written at Vienna in
0:31
Speaker 1: seventeen fourteen, two years before his death. On this last
0:35
Speaker 1: visit of his to Vienna, he had met the soldier
0:38
Speaker 1: Prince Eugene of Savoy, who, probably through Queen Sophia Charlotte
0:43
Speaker 1: of Prussia, had heard of the one great work Leibnitz
0:46
Speaker 1: had hitherto published, The Theodicy, which appeared in seventeen ten.
0:50
Speaker 1: Having read the Theodicy, Prince Eugene begged Leibnitz to write
0:54
Speaker 1: for him a condensed statement of the main principles of
0:56
Speaker 1: his philosophy. And having obtained this in the a form
1:00
Speaker 1: either of what we now call the Monodology or of
1:04
Speaker 1: the principles of Nature and Grace, he was so delighted
1:08
Speaker 1: with it that he kept it like a jewel in
1:10
Speaker 1: a case, so that his friend Count Bonneval wrote to Leibnitz,
1:15
Speaker 1: perhaps with a touch of humorous exaggeration, he keeps you
1:19
Speaker 1: writing as the priests of Naples keep the blood of
1:22
Speaker 1: Saint Januarius. He lets me kiss it and immediately shuts
1:27
Speaker 1: it up again in its casket. The Monadology was written
1:31
Speaker 1: in French, but it was not published in its original
1:34
Speaker 1: form until eighteen forty, when Erdman, who had discovered the
1:39
Speaker 1: ms in the Royal Library at hanover printed it in
1:43
Speaker 1: his editions of the philosophical works of Leibnitz. German and
1:47
Speaker 1: Latin translations of it appeared in seventeen twenty and seventeen
1:51
Speaker 1: twenty one, and it was for a long time combined
1:54
Speaker 1: with the Principles of Nature and Grace. There being some
1:58
Speaker 1: doubt as to which of the two weredes the Treaty
2:00
Speaker 1: is written for Prince Eugene. The two writings are similar
2:04
Speaker 1: in scope and intention, and were probably written about the
2:07
Speaker 1: same time. Gerhard holds that the work written for Prince
2:10
Speaker 1: Eugene was not the Monodology, but the Principles of Nature
2:13
Speaker 1: and of Grace. The Principles of Nature and of Grace
2:16
Speaker 1: certainly appears to be the earlier of the two. As
2:19
Speaker 1: to its contents, the Monodology is to be regarded not
2:23
Speaker 1: as an introduction to the philosophy of Labnitz, but rather
2:26
Speaker 1: as a condensed statement of the principles expressed in many
2:29
Speaker 1: of his philosophical papers and expounded after a somewhat desultory
2:33
Speaker 1: fashion in the Theodicy. Leibnitz himself indicated this fact by
2:38
Speaker 1: putting on the margin of his manuscript of the Monodology
2:41
Speaker 1: a series of references to sections of the Theodicy in
2:44
Speaker 1: which his views are more fully expressed. Thus, Erdman says,
2:48
Speaker 1: the Monodology is in the German sense and encyclopedia of
2:53
Speaker 1: the philosophy of Labniz, and the full understanding of it
2:56
Speaker 1: presupposes some general knowledge of his thinking. It is not
3:00
Speaker 1: possible rightly to understand it as a first reading. The
3:04
Speaker 1: Monadology expounds a metaphysic of substance, and it may, for
3:08
Speaker 1: convenience be regarded as consisting of two main divisions, in
3:13
Speaker 1: the first of which an account is given of the
3:15
Speaker 1: essential nature of all the substances created and uncreated, which
3:20
Speaker 1: constitute the reality of the universe, while the second division
3:24
Speaker 1: explains the mutual relations through which they form one world.
3:28
Speaker 1: Section one to forty eight make up the first of
3:30
Speaker 1: these divisions, the second consisting of forty nine to ninety.
3:34
Speaker 1: In the first division, three principal parts may be discriminated
3:38
Speaker 1: A section one th eighteen, in which the nature of
3:41
Speaker 1: created monads is explained. B Section nineteen through thirty, in
3:46
Speaker 1: which three great classes of created monads are discriminated, in
3:50
Speaker 1: C Section thirty one through forty eight, in which the
3:53
Speaker 1: transition is made from the highest class of created monads,
3:57
Speaker 1: the self conscious, to the uncreated mode God, through the
4:01
Speaker 1: two great principles of reason, that of contradiction and that
4:06
Speaker 1: of sufficient reason. Thus, a philosophic view is taken of
4:10
Speaker 1: the whole universe considered as a hierarchy of individual beings.
4:14
Speaker 1: The second division of the monadology, in which the mutual
4:18
Speaker 1: relations of substance are more fully explained, may also be
4:22
Speaker 1: subdivided into three principal parts. A Forty nine through sixty
4:27
Speaker 1: expounding the general principles of interrelation of substances through the
4:32
Speaker 1: hypothesis of pre established harmony and of the doctrine of
4:36
Speaker 1: the best of all possible worlds. B Section sixty one
4:39
Speaker 1: through eighty two, explaining in more detail the relations of
4:42
Speaker 1: particular classes of substances to one another, in dealing with
4:45
Speaker 1: questions of organism, and of the relations of soul and body,
4:50
Speaker 1: including birth and death, and c. Sections eighty three through ninety,
4:54
Speaker 1: in which the whole system of relations is brought to
4:57
Speaker 1: unity in God, the distinction in ans harmony between efficient
5:02
Speaker 1: and final causes, which has been found to be the
5:05
Speaker 1: basis of the distinction between body and soul, being supplemented
5:09
Speaker 1: by analogous distinction and harmony between the physical realm of
5:12
Speaker 1: nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say,
5:16
Speaker 1: between God considered as architect and of the machine of
5:20
Speaker 1: the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine
5:25
Speaker 1: city of spirits. This brief analysis is to be taken
5:28
Speaker 1: merely as a suggestion of the line of thought in
5:31
Speaker 1: the Monadology. The texture of the work is so close
5:35
Speaker 1: that it is impossible to make perfectly satisfactory divisions in it.
5:39
Speaker 1: The translation is made from the text given by M. Bertrue,
5:43
Speaker 1: who has collated the mss at Hannover and corrected some
5:47
Speaker 1: errors of erdmin end of prefatory. Note the monodology. This
5:58
Speaker 1: is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the
6:02
Speaker 1: public domain. For information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox
6:07
Speaker 1: dot org. Recordings by Gary Gek. The Monadology by Godfried
6:13
Speaker 1: Wilhelm Leibniz, translated by Robert Latta. The monadology one. The
6:22
Speaker 1: monad of which we shall here speak is nothing but
6:25
Speaker 1: a simple substance which enters into compounds. By simple is
6:30
Speaker 1: meant without parts the Odyssey ten. Two. And there must
6:36
Speaker 1: be simple substances since there are compounds, For a compound
6:40
Speaker 1: is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things. Three. Now,
6:47
Speaker 1: where there are no parts, there can be neither extension,
6:51
Speaker 1: nor form, nor divisibility. These monads are real atoms of nature,
6:57
Speaker 1: and in a word, the elements of things. Four. No
7:01
Speaker 1: dissolution of these elements need be feared. And there is
7:04
Speaker 1: no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be
7:07
Speaker 1: destroyed by natural means the Odyssey eighty nine. Five. For
7:12
Speaker 1: the same reason, there is no conceivable way in which
7:15
Speaker 1: a simple substance can come into being by natural means,
7:19
Speaker 1: since it cannot be formed by the combination of parts
7:22
Speaker 1: composition six. Thus it may be said that a monad
7:27
Speaker 1: can only come into being or come to an end
7:30
Speaker 1: all at once. That is to say, it can come
7:33
Speaker 1: into being only by creation, and come to an end
7:36
Speaker 1: only by annihilation, while that which is compound comes into
7:41
Speaker 1: being or comes to an end by parts seven. Further,
7:46
Speaker 1: there is no way of explaining how a monad can
7:48
Speaker 1: be altered in quality or internally changed by any other
7:53
Speaker 1: created thing, since it is impossible to change the place
7:56
Speaker 1: of anything in it, or to conceive in any internal
8:00
Speaker 1: motion which could be produced, directed, increased, or diminished therein.
8:05
Speaker 1: Although all this is possible in the case of compounds
8:09
Speaker 1: in which there are changes among the parts, the monads
8:12
Speaker 1: have no windows through which anything can come in or
8:15
Speaker 1: go out. Accidents, cannot separate themselves from substances, nor go
8:21
Speaker 1: about outside of them, as the sensible species of the
8:25
Speaker 1: Scholastics used to do. Thus, neither substance nor accident can
8:30
Speaker 1: come into a monad from the outside. Eight. Yet, the
8:34
Speaker 1: monads must have some qualities, otherwise they could not even
8:38
Speaker 1: be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ
8:42
Speaker 1: in quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving
8:46
Speaker 1: any change in things, For what is in the compound
8:50
Speaker 1: can come only from the simple elements it contains, and
8:54
Speaker 1: the monads, if they had no qualities, would be indistinguishable
8:57
Speaker 1: from one another, since they do not differ in qui. Consequently,
9:01
Speaker 1: space being a plenum, each part of space would always
9:05
Speaker 1: receive in any motion exactly the equivalent of what it
9:09
Speaker 1: already had, and no one state of things would be
9:12
Speaker 1: discernible from another. Nine. Indeed, each modid must be different
9:17
Speaker 1: from every other, for in nature there are never two
9:21
Speaker 1: beings which are perfectly alike, and in which it is
9:24
Speaker 1: not possible to find an internal difference, for at least
9:27
Speaker 1: the difference founded upon an intrinsic quality denomination. Footnote. This
9:34
Speaker 1: is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. For Kant's criticism,
9:39
Speaker 1: see Critique of Pure Reason. Probably the first statement of
9:43
Speaker 1: the principle is to be found in the writings of
9:46
Speaker 1: Nicholas of Kuza fourteen oh one to fourteen sixty four.
9:51
Speaker 1: He says that there cannot be several things exactly the same,
9:55
Speaker 1: for in that case there would not be several things
9:58
Speaker 1: but the same thing itself. Therefore, all things both agree
10:02
Speaker 1: with and differ from one another. De Docta ignorantia three
10:08
Speaker 1: one quote all things must of necessity differ from one another.
10:14
Speaker 1: Among several individuals of the same species, there is necessarily
10:19
Speaker 1: a diversity of degrees of perfection. There is nothing in
10:23
Speaker 1: the universe which does not enjoy a certain singularity which
10:27
Speaker 1: is to be found in no other thing. Unquote, his
10:30
Speaker 1: theories are full of suggestions of Leibniz. Reference may also
10:36
Speaker 1: be made to a very interesting article by Zimmermann Nicholas
10:39
Speaker 1: Kuzanas als vordevr. Leibnitzens. There is no mention of Nicholas
10:46
Speaker 1: of Cuza in any of Leibniz's philosophical writings, but in
10:51
Speaker 1: a letter to the Acta Eruditorum sixteen ninety seven Leibniz
10:57
Speaker 1: refers to him as a mathematician. In te rins equalities
11:01
Speaker 1: are those which have in themselves, example, figure motion in
11:06
Speaker 1: the such, while extrins equalities are those which arise from
11:11
Speaker 1: their relations to other things, example, being perceived, desired, and
11:15
Speaker 1: the such. There are some modes which may be called
11:19
Speaker 1: internal because they are conceived to be in the substance
11:23
Speaker 1: as round, square, and others which may be called external
11:28
Speaker 1: because they are taken from something which is not in
11:30
Speaker 1: the substance as loved seen desired, which are names taken
11:35
Speaker 1: from the actions of another. And this is what is
11:39
Speaker 1: called in the school's external domination. End of footnote ten.
11:46
Speaker 1: I assume also as admitted, that every created being, as
11:50
Speaker 1: consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and further
11:54
Speaker 1: that this change is continuous. In each footnote, there is
11:59
Speaker 1: constant change in created substances. Even though there may appear
12:04
Speaker 1: to be no change. What appears to us as absence
12:07
Speaker 1: of change is really a very small degree of change.
12:10
Speaker 1: We have here an application of the law of continuity.
12:15
Speaker 1: End of footnote eleven. It follows from what has just
12:19
Speaker 1: been said that the natural changes of the monads come
12:23
Speaker 1: from an internal principle, since an external cause can have
12:27
Speaker 1: no influence upon their inner being the Odyssey three ninety six,
12:32
Speaker 1: four hundred twelve. But besides the principle of change, there
12:36
Speaker 1: must be a particular series of changes which constitutes, so
12:40
Speaker 1: to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple
12:44
Speaker 1: substances thirteen. This particular series of changes should involve a
12:49
Speaker 1: multiplicity in the unit, or in that which is simple.
12:53
Speaker 1: For as every natural change takes place, gradually something changes
12:58
Speaker 1: and something remains un changed, And consequently a simple substance
13:02
Speaker 1: must be effected and related in many ways, although it
13:06
Speaker 1: has no parts. Fourteen, the passing condition, which involves and
13:12
Speaker 1: represents a multiplicity in the unit or in the simple substance,
13:16
Speaker 1: is nothing but what is called perception, which is to
13:20
Speaker 1: be distinguished from apperception or consciousness, as will afterwards appear.
13:26
Speaker 1: In this matter, the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for
13:30
Speaker 1: a treats as non existent these perceptions of which we
13:33
Speaker 1: are not consciously aware. This has also led them to
13:37
Speaker 1: believe that minds alone are monads, and that there are
13:42
Speaker 1: no souls of animals nor other intelliques. Thus, like the crowd,
13:47
Speaker 1: they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and
13:52
Speaker 1: absolute death, which has made them fall again into the
13:56
Speaker 1: scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate from bodies, and has
14:01
Speaker 1: even confirmed ill balanced minds in the opinion that souls
14:06
Speaker 1: are mortal. Fifteen. The activity of the internal principle which
14:11
Speaker 1: produces change or passage from one perception to another, may
14:16
Speaker 1: be called appetition. It is true that desire cannot always
14:20
Speaker 1: fully attain to the whole perception at which it aims,
14:23
Speaker 1: but always obtains some of it, and attains to new perceptions. Sixteen.
14:29
Speaker 1: We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple substance,
14:34
Speaker 1: when we find that the least thought of which we
14:37
Speaker 1: are conscious involves a variety in its object. Thus, all
14:41
Speaker 1: those who admit that the soul is a simple substance
14:44
Speaker 1: should admit this multiplicity in the monad. And M. Bail
14:48
Speaker 1: ought not to have found any difficulty in this, as
14:51
Speaker 1: he has done in his dictionary article Rrarius seventeen. Moreover,
14:58
Speaker 1: it must be confessed that per perception and that which
15:01
Speaker 1: depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is
15:06
Speaker 1: to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing
15:10
Speaker 1: there were a machine so constructed as to think, feel,
15:13
Speaker 1: and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size,
15:17
Speaker 1: while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go
15:20
Speaker 1: into it as into a mill. That being so, we should,
15:24
Speaker 1: on examining its interior, find only parts which work upon
15:28
Speaker 1: one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.
15:32
Speaker 1: Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in
15:35
Speaker 1: a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought.
15:39
Speaker 1: For Further, nothing but this, namely, perceptions in their changes
15:45
Speaker 1: can be found in a simple substance. It is also
15:48
Speaker 1: in this alone that all internal activities of simple substances
15:52
Speaker 1: can consist. Eighteen. All simple substances or created monads might
15:58
Speaker 1: be called intellikes, for they have in them a certain perfection.
16:03
Speaker 1: They have a certain self sufficiency, which makes them the
16:07
Speaker 1: source of their internal activities, and so to speak, incorporeal automata. Nineteen.
16:15
Speaker 1: If we are to give the name of soul to
16:17
Speaker 1: everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense
16:21
Speaker 1: which I have explained, then all simple substances or created
16:25
Speaker 1: monads might be called souls. But as feeling is something
16:29
Speaker 1: more than a bare perception, I think it right that
16:32
Speaker 1: the general name of monads or inteloquies should suffice for
16:36
Speaker 1: simple substances which have perception only, and that the name
16:39
Speaker 1: of souls should be given only to those in which
16:42
Speaker 1: perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory. Footnote
16:47
Speaker 1: Memory is thus the sign of consciousness as distinct from
16:51
Speaker 1: unconscious perception. This is in harmony with the view emphasized
16:55
Speaker 1: by modern writers that conscious sensation presupposes me memory, because
17:01
Speaker 1: we can know one sensation only when it has been
17:03
Speaker 1: brought into comparison with others. Leibniz, in one of his
17:07
Speaker 1: early writings, suggestively remarks that the body is quote momentarily
17:11
Speaker 1: mind i e. Mind without memory unquote end a footnote
17:17
Speaker 1: twenty For we experience in ourselves a condition in which
17:21
Speaker 1: we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception, as when
17:26
Speaker 1: we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome
17:29
Speaker 1: with a profound, dreamless sleep. In this state, the soul
17:32
Speaker 1: does not perceptibly differ from a bare monad. But as
17:36
Speaker 1: the state is not lasting, the soul comes out of it.
17:38
Speaker 1: The soul is something more than a bare monad twenty one.
17:43
Speaker 1: And it does not follow that in this state the
17:46
Speaker 1: simple substance is without any perception. That indeed cannot be
17:51
Speaker 1: for the reasons already given. For it cannot perish, and
17:54
Speaker 1: it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way.
17:58
Speaker 1: And this affection is nothing but its perception. But when
18:02
Speaker 1: there is a great multitude of little perceptions in which
18:05
Speaker 1: there is nothing distinct, one is stunned. And when one
18:09
Speaker 1: turns consciously round in the same way several times in succession,
18:14
Speaker 1: whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and
18:18
Speaker 1: which keeps us from distinguishing anything death can for a
18:22
Speaker 1: time put animals into this condition twenty two. And as
18:27
Speaker 1: every present state of a simple substance is naturally a
18:30
Speaker 1: consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that
18:33
Speaker 1: its present is big with its future the Odyssey three
18:36
Speaker 1: point fifty twenty three. And as on waking from a stupor,
18:42
Speaker 1: we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had
18:45
Speaker 1: perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at
18:49
Speaker 1: all conscious of them. For one, perception can in a
18:52
Speaker 1: natural way come only from another perception, as emotion can
18:56
Speaker 1: in a natural way come from emotion the Odyssey four
18:59
Speaker 1: A one to five four three twenty four. And it
19:03
Speaker 1: thus appears that if we had our perceptions nothing marked,
19:06
Speaker 1: and so to speak, striking in highly flavored, we should
19:11
Speaker 1: also be in a state of stupor, and this is
19:13
Speaker 1: the state in which baramonads are twenty five. We see
19:18
Speaker 1: also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals from
19:22
Speaker 1: the care she has taken to provide them with organs,
19:25
Speaker 1: which collect numerous rays of light or numerous undulations of
19:29
Speaker 1: the air, in order by uniting them to make them
19:31
Speaker 1: have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in
19:35
Speaker 1: smell in taste, and in touch, and perhaps in a
19:38
Speaker 1: number of other senses which are unknown to us. And
19:41
Speaker 1: I will explain presently how that which takes place in
19:44
Speaker 1: the soul represents what happens in the bodily Organs twenty six.
19:50
Speaker 1: Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness which
19:54
Speaker 1: resembles reason, but which is to be distinguished from it.
19:58
Speaker 1: Thus we see that when animals have a person sception
20:00
Speaker 1: of something which strikes them, and of which they have
20:03
Speaker 1: formerly had a similar perception, they are led, by means
20:06
Speaker 1: of representation in their memory to expect what was combined
20:10
Speaker 1: with the thing in its previous perception, and they come
20:13
Speaker 1: to have feeling similar to those they had on the
20:16
Speaker 1: former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs,
20:19
Speaker 1: they remember the pain it has caused them, and they
20:22
Speaker 1: howl and run away. Twenty seven. And the strength of
20:27
Speaker 1: the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either
20:31
Speaker 1: from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions.
20:36
Speaker 1: For often a strong impression produces all at once the
20:39
Speaker 1: same effect as a long formed habit, or as many
20:43
Speaker 1: of the oft repeated ordinary perceptions twenty eight. In so
20:48
Speaker 1: far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to
20:51
Speaker 1: the principle of memory alone. Men act like the lower animals,
20:55
Speaker 1: resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere
21:00
Speaker 1: practice without theory. Indeed, in three fourths of our action
21:04
Speaker 1: we are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect
21:08
Speaker 1: that there will be daylight tomorrow, we do so empirically,
21:11
Speaker 1: because it has always so happened until now. It is
21:14
Speaker 1: only the astronomer who thinks it on the rational grounds
21:18
Speaker 1: twenty nine. But it is the knowledge of necessary and
21:21
Speaker 1: eternal truths that distinguish us from mere animals and gives
21:26
Speaker 1: us reason and the sciences, raising us to knowledge of
21:30
Speaker 1: ourselves and of God. Footnote. The necessary and eternal truths
21:35
Speaker 1: are the first principles of all rational knowledge. They are
21:39
Speaker 1: innate in us. They are in fact the very principles
21:42
Speaker 1: of our nature as of the universe, because it is
21:46
Speaker 1: our essence to represent the whole universe. Thus, consciousness or
21:51
Speaker 1: knowledge of these truths is knowledge of ourselves, and it
21:55
Speaker 1: is at the same time knowledge of God, who is
21:58
Speaker 1: the final reason of all things. End of footnote. And
22:02
Speaker 1: it is thus in us that is called the rational
22:05
Speaker 1: soul or mind thirty It is also through knowledge of
22:10
Speaker 1: necessary truths, and through their abstract expression, that we rise
22:14
Speaker 1: to acts of reflection, which make us think of what
22:17
Speaker 1: is called I, and observe that this or that is
22:21
Speaker 1: within us. In thus thinking of ourselves, we are thinking
22:26
Speaker 1: of being, of substance, of the simple, and the compound,
22:30
Speaker 1: of the immaterial, and of God himself, conceiving that what
22:35
Speaker 1: is limited in us is in Him without limits. In
22:38
Speaker 1: these acts of reflection furnish the chief objects of our
22:41
Speaker 1: reasonings thirty one. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles,
22:47
Speaker 1: That of contradiction in virtue, of which we judge false
22:51
Speaker 1: that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is
22:55
Speaker 1: opposed or contradictory to the false the Odyssey forty four
23:00
Speaker 1: one nine thirty two. And that of sufficient reason in virtue,
23:04
Speaker 1: of which we hold that there can be no real
23:07
Speaker 1: fact or existing, no statement true, unless there be a
23:10
Speaker 1: sufficient reason why it should be so, and not otherwise,
23:14
Speaker 1: although these reasons usually cannot be known by us the
23:17
Speaker 1: Odyssey forty four and one ninety six thirty three. There
23:22
Speaker 1: are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and
23:25
Speaker 1: those of fact, truths of reasoning are necessary and their
23:28
Speaker 1: opposite is impossible. Truths of fact are contingent, and their
23:32
Speaker 1: opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason
23:36
Speaker 1: can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple
23:40
Speaker 1: ideas and truths, until we come to those which are
23:42
Speaker 1: primary thirty four. It is thus that in mathematics, speculative
23:47
Speaker 1: theorems and practical canons are reduced by analysis to definitions, axioms,
23:53
Speaker 1: and postulates thirty five. In short, there are simple ideas
23:58
Speaker 1: of which no definition can be given. There are also
24:01
Speaker 1: axioms and postulates, in a word, primary principles which cannot
24:05
Speaker 1: be proved and indeed have no need of proof. And
24:10
Speaker 1: these are identical propositions whose opposite involves in express contradiction
24:16
Speaker 1: thirty six. But there must also be a sufficient reason
24:20
Speaker 1: for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say,
24:24
Speaker 1: for the sequence or connection of things which are dispersed
24:27
Speaker 1: throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing
24:31
Speaker 1: into particular reasons might go on in endless detail. Because
24:34
Speaker 1: of the immense variety of things in nature and the
24:37
Speaker 1: infinite division of bodies, there is an infinity of past
24:41
Speaker 1: and present forms and motions which go to make up
24:44
Speaker 1: the efficient cause of my present writing. And there is
24:48
Speaker 1: an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul
24:51
Speaker 1: which go to make its final cause thirty seven. And
24:56
Speaker 1: as all this detail again involves other prior or more
25:00
Speaker 1: detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar
25:03
Speaker 1: analysis to yield its own reason, we are no further forward,
25:07
Speaker 1: And the sufficient or final reason must be outside of
25:10
Speaker 1: the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite
25:15
Speaker 1: this series may be thirty eight. Thus, the final reason
25:19
Speaker 1: of things must be in a necessary substance in which
25:22
Speaker 1: the variety of particular changes exists only eminently as in
25:27
Speaker 1: its source. In this substance we call God the Odyssey
25:31
Speaker 1: seven thirty nine. Now, as this substance is a sufficient
25:36
Speaker 1: reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also
25:40
Speaker 1: connected together throughout, there is only one God. In this
25:43
Speaker 1: God is sufficient forty We may also hold that the
25:48
Speaker 1: supreme substance, which is unique, universal, and necessary, nothing outside
25:53
Speaker 1: of it being independent of it. This substance, which is
25:56
Speaker 1: pure sequence of possible being, must be limitable and must
26:01
Speaker 1: contain as much reality as is possible forty one. Whence
26:06
Speaker 1: it follows that God is absolutely perfect, for perfection is
26:10
Speaker 1: nothing but amount of positive reality in the strict sense,
26:14
Speaker 1: leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things
26:17
Speaker 1: which are limited, and where there are no bounds, that
26:20
Speaker 1: is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. Forty two.
26:25
Speaker 1: It follows also that created beings derive their perfections from
26:29
Speaker 1: the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from
26:32
Speaker 1: their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits.
26:37
Speaker 1: For it is in this that they differ from God.
26:40
Speaker 1: An instance of this original imperfection of created beings may
26:44
Speaker 1: be seen in the natural inertia of bodies. Forty three.
26:50
Speaker 1: It is farther true that in God there is not
26:53
Speaker 1: only the source of existences, but also that of essences
26:58
Speaker 1: in so far as they are real, that is to say,
27:00
Speaker 1: the source of what is real in the possible For
27:04
Speaker 1: the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths
27:07
Speaker 1: or the ideas on which they depend. And without Him
27:11
Speaker 1: there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things,
27:15
Speaker 1: And not only would there be nothing in existence, but
27:19
Speaker 1: nothing would even be possible Theodicy twenty forty four. For
27:25
Speaker 1: if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or
27:29
Speaker 1: rather in eternal truths. This reality must needs be founded
27:33
Speaker 1: in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence
27:37
Speaker 1: of necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, or in
27:42
Speaker 1: whom to be possible is to be actual forty five.
27:47
Speaker 1: Thus God alone or necessary being, has this prerogative that
27:53
Speaker 1: he must necessarily exist if he is possible, And as
27:57
Speaker 1: nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which in
28:00
Speaker 1: no limits, no negation, in consequently no contradiction, this his
28:05
Speaker 1: possibility is sufficient of itself to make known the existence
28:11
Speaker 1: of God. A priori. We have thus proved it through
28:15
Speaker 1: the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago
28:19
Speaker 1: we proved it also a posteriori, since there exist contingent
28:24
Speaker 1: beings which can have their final or sufficient reason only
28:29
Speaker 1: in the necessary Being, which has the reason of its
28:32
Speaker 1: existence in itself. Forty six. We must, not, however, imagine,
28:37
Speaker 1: as some do, that eternal truths, being dependent on God,
28:41
Speaker 1: are arbitrary and depend on His will, as Descartes and
28:45
Speaker 1: afterwards m Hoira appear to have held that is true
28:49
Speaker 1: only of contingent truths, of which the principle is fitness
28:53
Speaker 1: or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths depend solely
28:57
Speaker 1: on His understanding and are are its inner object. Forty seven.
29:02
Speaker 1: Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple
29:06
Speaker 1: substance of which all created or derivative monads are products
29:11
Speaker 1: and have their birth, so to speak, through continual vulgarations
29:15
Speaker 1: of the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the
29:19
Speaker 1: receptivity of the created being, of whose essence it is
29:23
Speaker 1: to have limits. Forty eight. In God there is power,
29:28
Speaker 1: which is the source of all, also knowledge, whose content
29:32
Speaker 1: is the variety of the ideas, and finally will, which
29:36
Speaker 1: makes changes or products. According to the principle of the best,
29:40
Speaker 1: these characteristics correspond to what in the created monads forms
29:44
Speaker 1: the ground or basis, to the faculty of perception, and
29:49
Speaker 1: to the faculty of appetition. But in God these attributes
29:53
Speaker 1: are absolutely infinite or perfect, and in the created monads
29:57
Speaker 1: or the inteloques, there are only imitations of these attributes.
30:01
Speaker 1: According to the degree of perfection of the monad forty nine,
30:06
Speaker 1: a created thing is said to act outwardly in so
30:09
Speaker 1: far as it has perfection, and to suffer or be
30:13
Speaker 1: passive in relation to another in so far as it
30:16
Speaker 1: is imperfect. Thus activity action is attributed to a monad
30:22
Speaker 1: in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passivity
30:26
Speaker 1: passion in so far as its perceptions are confused. Fifty
30:32
Speaker 1: And one created thing is more perfect than another. In
30:35
Speaker 1: this that there is found in the more perfect that
30:38
Speaker 1: which serves to explain a priori what takes place in
30:42
Speaker 1: the less perfect. And it is on this account that
30:45
Speaker 1: the former is said to act upon the latter. Fifty one.
30:50
Speaker 1: But in simple substances, the influence of one monad upon
30:53
Speaker 1: another is only ideal, and it can have its effect
30:57
Speaker 1: only through the mediation of God. In so far as
31:00
Speaker 1: in the ideas of God, any monad rightly claims that God,
31:05
Speaker 1: in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should
31:08
Speaker 1: have regard to it. For since one created monad cannot
31:11
Speaker 1: have any physical influence upon the inner being of another,
31:15
Speaker 1: it is only by this means that the one can
31:17
Speaker 1: be dependent on the other. Fifty two. Accordingly, among created things,
31:22
Speaker 1: activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances,
31:28
Speaker 1: finds in each reasons which oblige him to adapt the
31:31
Speaker 1: other to it. And consequently, what is active in certain
31:34
Speaker 1: respects is passive from another point of view. Fifty two Accordingly,
31:40
Speaker 1: among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God,
31:45
Speaker 1: comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige
31:49
Speaker 1: him to adapt the other to it. And consequently, what
31:53
Speaker 1: is active in certain respects is passive from another point
31:56
Speaker 1: of view, active in so far as what we distinctly
31:59
Speaker 1: know in and it serves to explain what takes place
32:02
Speaker 1: in another, and passive so far as the explanation of
32:06
Speaker 1: what takes place in it is to be found in
32:09
Speaker 1: that which is distinctly known in another. Fifty two. Accordingly,
32:14
Speaker 1: among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God,
32:20
Speaker 1: comparing two simple substances finds in each reasons which oblige
32:24
Speaker 1: him to adapt the other to it. And consequently, what
32:27
Speaker 1: is active in certain respects is passive from another point
32:31
Speaker 1: of view, active in so far as what we distinctly know.
32:33
Speaker 1: It serves to explain what takes place in another in
32:37
Speaker 1: so far as what we distinctly know, and it serves
32:39
Speaker 1: to explain what takes place in another, and passive in
32:42
Speaker 1: so far as the explanation of what takes place in
32:45
Speaker 1: it is to be found in that which is distinctly
32:48
Speaker 1: known in another. Fifty three Now, as the ideas of
32:53
Speaker 1: God there is an infinite number of possible universes, it
32:57
Speaker 1: as only one of them can be actual, there must
32:59
Speaker 1: be a sufficient reason for the choice of God which
33:02
Speaker 1: leads him to decide upon one rather than another fifty four.
33:07
Speaker 1: And this reason can be found only in the fitness
33:10
Speaker 1: or in the degrees of perfection that these worlds possess,
33:14
Speaker 1: since each possible thing has the right to aspire to
33:17
Speaker 1: existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains
33:20
Speaker 1: in Germ. Fifty five. Thus, the actual existence of the
33:26
Speaker 1: best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this,
33:30
Speaker 1: that his goodness makes him choose it, and his power
33:33
Speaker 1: makes him produce it. Fifty six. Now, this connection or
33:37
Speaker 1: adaptation of all created things to each, and of each
33:41
Speaker 1: to all, means that each simple substance has relations which
33:45
Speaker 1: express all the others. Inconsequently that it is a perpetual,
33:50
Speaker 1: living mirror of the universe. Fifty seven. And as the
33:54
Speaker 1: same town looked at from various sides, appears quite different
33:58
Speaker 1: and becomes as it were, numerous and aspects. Even so,
34:02
Speaker 1: as a result of the infinite number of simple substances,
34:05
Speaker 1: it is as if there were so many different universes,
34:09
Speaker 1: which nevertheless are nothing but aspects of a single universe
34:14
Speaker 1: according to the special point of view of each monad
34:19
Speaker 1: fifty eight And by this means there is obtained as
34:23
Speaker 1: great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order.
34:28
Speaker 1: That is to say, it is the way to get
34:31
Speaker 1: as much perfection as possible. Fifty nine Besides no hypothesis.
34:38
Speaker 1: But this which I venture to call proved fittingly exalts
34:42
Speaker 1: the greatness of God. And this m Bell recognized when
34:46
Speaker 1: in his Dictionary article Rrarius he raised objections to it,
34:51
Speaker 1: in which indeed he was inclined to think that I
34:54
Speaker 1: was attributing too much to God, more than it is
34:57
Speaker 1: possible to attribute. But he was unable to give any
35:01
Speaker 1: reason which could show the impossibility of the universal harmony,
35:04
Speaker 1: according to which every substance exactly expressed all others through
35:08
Speaker 1: the relation it has with them. Sixty Further, in what
35:12
Speaker 1: I have just said, there may be seen the reasons
35:15
Speaker 1: a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are.
35:19
Speaker 1: For God, in regulating the whole, has have regard to
35:22
Speaker 1: each part, and in particular to each monad, whose nature
35:25
Speaker 1: being to represent nothing, can confine it to the representing
35:29
Speaker 1: of only one part of things, though it is true
35:32
Speaker 1: that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety
35:36
Speaker 1: of particular things in the whole universe, and can be
35:39
Speaker 1: distinct only as regards a small number of things, namely
35:43
Speaker 1: those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to
35:47
Speaker 1: each of the monads. Otherwise each monad would be a deity.
35:51
Speaker 1: It is not as regards their object, but as regards
35:54
Speaker 1: the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object,
35:57
Speaker 1: that the monads are limited a confuse way. They all
36:01
Speaker 1: strive after the infinite, the whole, but they are limited
36:06
Speaker 1: and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions. Sixty
36:11
Speaker 1: one and the compounds are in this respect analogous with
36:16
Speaker 1: simple substances. For all is a plenum, and thus all
36:20
Speaker 1: matter is connected together, and in the plenum every motion
36:24
Speaker 1: has an effect upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance,
36:29
Speaker 1: so that each body not only is affected by those
36:33
Speaker 1: which are in contact with it, and in some way
36:35
Speaker 1: feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but
36:38
Speaker 1: is also mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which
36:43
Speaker 1: it itself is in immediate contact. Wherefore follows that this
36:47
Speaker 1: intercommunication of things extends to any distance, however great, and
36:52
Speaker 1: consequently every body feels the effect of all that takes
36:56
Speaker 1: place in this universe, so that he who sees all
36:59
Speaker 1: might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even
37:03
Speaker 1: what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present
37:07
Speaker 1: that which is far off, as well in time as
37:09
Speaker 1: in place Cynthia Panta. As Hypocrates said, but a soul
37:15
Speaker 1: can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly.
37:19
Speaker 1: It cannot all at once enroll everything that is unfolded
37:22
Speaker 1: in it, for its complexity is infinite sixty two. Thus,
37:28
Speaker 1: although each created monad represents the whole universe, it represents
37:33
Speaker 1: more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and
37:37
Speaker 1: of which it is the antiloche. And as this body
37:40
Speaker 1: expresses the whole universe through the connection of all matter
37:43
Speaker 1: in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe
37:47
Speaker 1: in representing this body, which belongs to it in a
37:50
Speaker 1: special way. The Odyssey four hundred sixty three. The body
37:55
Speaker 1: belonging to a monad, which is its intilloche or its soul, constitutes,
38:01
Speaker 1: along with the anteloque, what may be called a living being,
38:06
Speaker 1: and along with the soul, what is called an animal.
38:10
Speaker 1: Now this body of a living being or of an
38:13
Speaker 1: animal is always organic. For as every monad is, in
38:18
Speaker 1: its own way a mirror of the universe, and as
38:22
Speaker 1: the universe is ruled according to a perfect order, there
38:25
Speaker 1: must also be order in that which represents it, i e.
38:29
Speaker 1: In the perceptions of the soul. And consequently there must
38:33
Speaker 1: be order in the body through which the universe is
38:36
Speaker 1: represented in the soul sixty four. Thus, the organic body
38:42
Speaker 1: of a living being is a kind of divine machine
38:45
Speaker 1: or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For
38:53
Speaker 1: a machine made by the skill of man is not
38:56
Speaker 1: a machine in each of its parts. For instance, the
38:59
Speaker 1: two of a brass wheel has its parts or fragments,
39:02
Speaker 1: which are for us not artificial products, and which do
39:06
Speaker 1: not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they
39:10
Speaker 1: give no indication of the use for which the wheel
39:12
Speaker 1: was intended. But the machines of nature, namely living bodies,
39:17
Speaker 1: are still machines in their smallest parts. Add infinitum, it
39:21
Speaker 1: is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art,
39:25
Speaker 1: that is to say, between the divine art and ours
39:28
Speaker 1: the Odyssey one thirty four, one forty six, one ninety
39:32
Speaker 1: four four three sixty five. And the author of Nature
39:37
Speaker 1: has been able to employ this divine and infinitely wonderful
39:41
Speaker 1: power of art, because each portion of matter is not
39:44
Speaker 1: infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is actually subdivided
39:50
Speaker 1: without end, each part into further parts, of which each
39:55
Speaker 1: has the same motion of its own. Otherwise it would
39:58
Speaker 1: be impossible for each portion of mine matter to express
40:00
Speaker 1: the whole universe sixty six. Whence it appears that in
40:07
Speaker 1: the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures,
40:10
Speaker 1: living beings, animals, in telichies souls sixty seven. Each portion
40:18
Speaker 1: of matter may be conceived as like a garden full
40:21
Speaker 1: of plants, and like a pond full of fishes. But
40:24
Speaker 1: each branch of every plant, each member of every animal,
40:28
Speaker 1: each drop of its liquid parts, is also some such
40:32
Speaker 1: garden or pond sixty eight. And though the earth and
40:38
Speaker 1: the air, which are between the plants of the garden,
40:41
Speaker 1: or the wetter, which is between the fish of the pond,
40:44
Speaker 1: be neither plant nor fish, yet they also contain plants
40:48
Speaker 1: and fishes, but mostly so minute as to be imperceptible
40:52
Speaker 1: to us. Sixty nine. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile,
41:00
Speaker 1: dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, save in
41:06
Speaker 1: appearance somewhat as it may appear to be in a
41:09
Speaker 1: pond at a distance in which one would see a
41:11
Speaker 1: confused movement, and as it were swarming of fish in
41:15
Speaker 1: the pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves seventy Hence,
41:22
Speaker 1: it appears that each living body has a dominant inteloque,
41:26
Speaker 1: which in an animal is the soul. But the members
41:28
Speaker 1: of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals,
41:34
Speaker 1: each of which has also its dominant inteloque or soul
41:40
Speaker 1: Seventy one. But it must not be imagined, as has
41:43
Speaker 1: been done by some who have misunderstood my thought, that
41:47
Speaker 1: each soul has a quantity or portion of matter belonging
41:50
Speaker 1: exclusively to itself or attached to it forever, and that
41:54
Speaker 1: it consequently owns other inferior living beings which are devoted
41:59
Speaker 1: forever to its service. For all bodies are in a
42:02
Speaker 1: perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them
42:06
Speaker 1: and passing out of them continually Seventy two. Thus the
42:11
Speaker 1: soul changes its body only by degrees, little by little,
42:15
Speaker 1: so that it is never all at once deprived of
42:17
Speaker 1: all its organs. And there is often metamorphosis in animals,
42:21
Speaker 1: but never metempsychosis or transmigration of souls, Nor are their
42:26
Speaker 1: souls entirely separate from bodies, nor embodied spirits alone completely
42:32
Speaker 1: without bodies seventy three. It also follows from this that
42:38
Speaker 1: there never is absolute birth nor complete death in the
42:42
Speaker 1: strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from
42:45
Speaker 1: the body. What we call births are developments and growths,
42:50
Speaker 1: while what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions seventy four.
42:57
Speaker 1: Philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms,
43:00
Speaker 1: intilokees or souls, but nowadays it has become known, through
43:04
Speaker 1: careful studies of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic
43:08
Speaker 1: bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefication,
43:12
Speaker 1: but always come from seeds in which there was undoubtedly
43:16
Speaker 1: some preformation. And it is held that not only the
43:20
Speaker 1: organic body was already there before conception, but also a
43:24
Speaker 1: soul in this body, and in short, the animal itself,
43:28
Speaker 1: and that by means of conception, this animal has merely
43:31
Speaker 1: been prepared for the great transformation involved in its becoming
43:34
Speaker 1: an animal of another kind. Something like this is indeed
43:38
Speaker 1: seen apart from birth, as when worms become flies and
43:42
Speaker 1: caterpillars become butterflies seventy five. The animals of which some
43:49
Speaker 1: are raised by means of conception to the rank of
43:52
Speaker 1: larger animals, may be called spermatic. But those among them
43:56
Speaker 1: which are not so raised but remain in their own kind,
44:00
Speaker 1: that is, the majority, are born multiply and are destroyed
44:04
Speaker 1: like the large animals, And it is only a few
44:07
Speaker 1: chosen ones that pass to a greater theater Seventy six.
44:13
Speaker 1: But this is only half of the truth. And accordingly
44:17
Speaker 1: I hold that if an animal never comes into being
44:19
Speaker 1: by natural means, no more does it come to an
44:22
Speaker 1: end by natural means, and that not only will there
44:26
Speaker 1: be no birth, but also no complete destruction or death
44:30
Speaker 1: in the strict sense. And these reasonings, made a posteriori
44:35
Speaker 1: and are drawn from experience, are in perfect agreement with
44:38
Speaker 1: my principles deduced a priori as above. Seventy seven. Thus
44:46
Speaker 1: it must be said that not only the soul mirror
44:50
Speaker 1: of an indestructible universe is indestructible, but also that the
44:55
Speaker 1: animal itself, though its mechanism machine, may often perish in
44:59
Speaker 1: part and take off or put on an organic slough
45:04
Speaker 1: seventy eight. These principles have given me a way of
45:07
Speaker 1: explaining naturally the union, or rather the mutual agreement of
45:11
Speaker 1: the soul in the organic body. The soul follows its
45:14
Speaker 1: own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws,
45:19
Speaker 1: and they agree with each other in virtue of the
45:21
Speaker 1: pre established harmony between all substances, since they are all
45:26
Speaker 1: representations of the one and the same universe. Seventy nine.
45:33
Speaker 1: Souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions, ends,
45:39
Speaker 1: and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient
45:43
Speaker 1: causes or emotions, and the two realms, that of efficient
45:48
Speaker 1: causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with
45:51
Speaker 1: one another. Eighty Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any
45:57
Speaker 1: force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity
46:02
Speaker 1: of force and matter. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion
46:05
Speaker 1: that the soul could change the direction of bodies. That
46:09
Speaker 1: is because in his time it was not known that
46:11
Speaker 1: there is a law of nature which affirms also the
46:13
Speaker 1: conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes
46:19
Speaker 1: noticed this, he would have come upon my system of
46:21
Speaker 1: pre established harmony eighty one. According to this system, bodies
46:27
Speaker 1: act as if to suppose the impossible there were no souls,
46:31
Speaker 1: and souls act as if there were no bodies, and
46:34
Speaker 1: both act as if each influenced the other eighty two.
46:40
Speaker 1: As regards minds or rational souls, though, I find that
46:44
Speaker 1: what I have just been saying is true of all
46:47
Speaker 1: living beings and animals, namely, that animals and souls come
46:50
Speaker 1: into being when the world begins, and no more come
46:53
Speaker 1: to an end when the world does. Yet there is
46:56
Speaker 1: this peculiarity in rational animals that their spermatic animalcules, so
47:01
Speaker 1: long as they are only spermatic, have merely ordinary or
47:05
Speaker 1: sensuous sensitive souls. But when those which are chosen, so
47:10
Speaker 1: to speak, attain to human nature through the actual conception,
47:15
Speaker 1: their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason
47:18
Speaker 1: and to the prerogative of minds eighty three. Among other
47:24
Speaker 1: differences which exist between ordinary souls and minds, some of
47:28
Speaker 1: which differences I have already noted, there is also this
47:33
Speaker 1: that souls in general are living mirrors or images of
47:36
Speaker 1: the universe of created beings, but that minds are also
47:41
Speaker 1: images of the deity or author of nature himself, capable
47:46
Speaker 1: of knowing the system of the universe and to some extent,
47:49
Speaker 1: of imitating it through architectonic ensembles, each mind being like
47:54
Speaker 1: a small divinity in its own sphere. Eighty four. It
48:00
Speaker 1: is that this enables spirits to enter into a kind
48:03
Speaker 1: of fellowship with God, and brings it about that in
48:06
Speaker 1: each relation to them, he is not only what an
48:09
Speaker 1: inventor is to his machine, which is the relation of
48:13
Speaker 1: God to other created things, but also what a princes
48:17
Speaker 1: to his subjects, and indeed what a father is to
48:20
Speaker 1: his children eighty five. Whence it is easy to conclude
48:25
Speaker 1: that the totality of all spirits must compose the city
48:29
Speaker 1: of God, that is to say, the most perfect state
48:32
Speaker 1: that is possible under the most perfect of monarchs. Eighty six.
48:38
Speaker 1: This city of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a
48:43
Speaker 1: moral world in the natural world, and is the most
48:46
Speaker 1: exalted and most divine among the works of God. And
48:50
Speaker 1: it is in that the glory of God really consists,
48:54
Speaker 1: for he would have no glory where not his greatness
48:56
Speaker 1: and his goodness known and admired by spirits. It is
49:00
Speaker 1: also in relation to his divine city that God specially
49:04
Speaker 1: has goodness, while his wisdom and his power are manifested everywhere.
49:09
Speaker 1: Eighty seven. As we have shown above, there is a
49:12
Speaker 1: perfect harmony between the two realms of nature, one of
49:15
Speaker 1: efficient and the other of final causes. We should here
49:19
Speaker 1: notice also another harmony between the physical realm of nature
49:23
Speaker 1: and the moral realm of grace, that is to say,
49:26
Speaker 1: between God considered as architect of the mechanism machine of
49:30
Speaker 1: the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine
49:34
Speaker 1: city of spirits. Eighty eight. A result of this harmony
49:39
Speaker 1: is that things lead to grace by the very ways
49:42
Speaker 1: of nature, and that this globe, for instance, must be
49:45
Speaker 1: destroyed and renewed by natural means at the very time
49:49
Speaker 1: when the government of spirits requires it for the punishment
49:53
Speaker 1: of some in the reward of others. Eighty nine. It
49:57
Speaker 1: may also be said that God, as are architect, satisfies
50:01
Speaker 1: in all respects God as lawgiver, and thus that sins
50:05
Speaker 1: must bear their penalty with them through the order of nature,
50:08
Speaker 1: and even in virtue of the mechanical structure of things.
50:12
Speaker 1: And similarly that noble actions will attain their rewards by
50:15
Speaker 1: ways which, on the bodily side, are mechanical, although this
50:19
Speaker 1: cannot and ought not always to happen immediately. Ninety Finally,
50:28
Speaker 1: under this perfect government, no good action will be unrewarded,
50:32
Speaker 1: and no bad one unpunished, and all should issue in
50:35
Speaker 1: the well being of the good. That is to say
50:38
Speaker 1: of those who are not malcontents in this great state,
50:40
Speaker 1: but who trust in providence after having done their duty,
50:44
Speaker 1: and who love and imitate as is meet the author
50:47
Speaker 1: of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation of his perfections,
50:52
Speaker 1: as is the way of genuine love, which takes pleasure
50:56
Speaker 1: in the happiness of the beloved. This it is which
51:01
Speaker 1: leads wise and virtuous people to devote their energies to
51:04
Speaker 1: everything which appears in harmony with the presumptive or antecedent
51:09
Speaker 1: will of God, and yet makes them content with what
51:12
Speaker 1: God actually brings to pass by his secret, consequent and positive,
51:18
Speaker 1: decisive will. Recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the
51:24
Speaker 1: order of the universe, we should find that it exceeds
51:27
Speaker 1: all the desires of the wisest men, and that it
51:31
Speaker 1: is impossible to make it better than it is. Not
51:34
Speaker 1: only as a whole and in general, but also for
51:37
Speaker 1: ourselves in particular. If we are attached as we ought
51:42
Speaker 1: to be, to the author of all, not only as
51:45
Speaker 1: to the architect and efficient cause of our being, but
51:49
Speaker 1: as to our master and to the final cause, which
51:53
Speaker 1: ought to be the whole aim of our will, and
51:55
Speaker 1: which alone can make our happiness. It is not to
52:01
Speaker 1: be taken as meaning that it is impossible to make
52:04
Speaker 1: the world better than it is at this time or
52:07
Speaker 1: any particular moment of time. Leibniz is speaking of the
52:11
Speaker 1: world as a system, including all time, and accordingly he
52:15
Speaker 1: does not exclude progress in time. End of footnote end
52:22
Speaker 1: of the Monedology recording by Gary Gek of the Gary
52:27
Speaker 1: Gek Podcast at www dot garygek dot com.