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Indian Frontier Policy, an Historical Sketch-General Sir John Miller Adye · The American Trail

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Speaker 1: Preface and Chapter one of Indian Frontier Policy. This is
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Speaker 1: a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
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Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
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Speaker 1: Indian Frontier Policy and Historical Sketch by General Sir John Addai,
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Speaker 1: gcb RA read for LibriVox dot org by David Barnes. Preface.
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Speaker 1: The subjects of our policy on the Northwest frontier of
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Speaker 1: India is one of great importance as affecting the general
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Speaker 1: welfare of our Eastern Empire, and especially interesting at the
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Speaker 1: present time, when military operations on a considerable scale are
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Speaker 1: being conducted against a combination of the independent tribes along
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Speaker 1: the frontier. It must be understood that the present condition
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Speaker 1: of affairs is no mere sudden outbreak on the parts
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Speaker 1: of our turbulent neighbours. Its causes lie far deeper, and
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Speaker 1: are the consequences of events in bygone years. In the
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Speaker 1: following pages, I have attempted to give a short historical
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Speaker 1: summary of its varying phases, in the hope that I
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Speaker 1: may thus assist the public in some degree to understand
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Speaker 1: its general bearings and to form a correct opinion of
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Speaker 1: the policy which should be pursued in the future. John
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Speaker 1: Adai General Chapter one. Events prior to and including the
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Speaker 1: First Afghan War of eighteen thirty nine to forty one,
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Speaker 1: covering proposed invasion of India by Napoleon, the first mission
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Speaker 1: of Burns to Kabul, its failure, First Afghan War eighteen
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Speaker 1: thirty nine to forty one, its vicissitudes and collapse. In
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Speaker 1: considering the important and somewhat intricate subject of policy on
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Speaker 1: the northwestern frontier of our Indian Empire, it will be desirable,
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Speaker 1: in the first place, to give a concise history of
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Speaker 1: the events which have guided our action, and which, for
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Speaker 1: many years past have exercised a predominating influence in that
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Speaker 1: part of our eastern dominion. Speaking generally, it may, I
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Speaker 1: think be said that the main features of our policy
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Speaker 1: on the northwestern frontier have been determined by the gradual
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Speaker 1: advance of Russia southwards, and partly also by the turbulent
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Speaker 1: character of the people of Afghanistan and of the independent
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Speaker 1: tribes who inhabit the great region of mountains which lie
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Speaker 1: between Russia and ourselves. These two circumstances, the first having
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Speaker 1: been the most powerful, have led us into great wars
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Speaker 1: and frontier expeditions, which as a rule have been costly
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Speaker 1: and in some cases unjust, and their consequences have not
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Speaker 1: tended to strengthen our position, either on the frontier or
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Speaker 1: in India itself. It will be well, therefore, to give
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Speaker 1: an outline of the Russian conquests in Central Asia to
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Speaker 1: the north of Afghanistan, and also of our dealings with
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Speaker 1: the rulers of Kabul in bygone years, and we shall
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Speaker 1: then be better able to judge of our present position
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Speaker 1: and to determine the principles which should guide our northwestern
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Speaker 1: frontier policy. One of the first threats of invasion of
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Speaker 1: India early in the century was planned at Tilsit, and
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Speaker 1: is thus described by k in History of the War
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Speaker 1: in Afghanistan. Whilst the followers of Alexander and Napoleon were
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Speaker 1: abandoning themselves to convivial pleasures, those monarchs were spending quiet
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Speaker 1: evenings together discussing their future plans and projecting joint schemes
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Speaker 1: of conquest. It was then that they made meditated the
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Speaker 1: invasion of Hindustan by a confederate army uniting on the
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Speaker 1: plains of Persia, and no secret was made of the
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Speaker 1: intention of the two great European potentates to commence in
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Speaker 1: the following spring a hostile demonstration contre le possession de
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Speaker 1: la compay desand the peril, however, was averted by a
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Speaker 1: treaty at Tehran in March eighteen o nine, in which
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Speaker 1: the Shah of Persia covenanted not to permit any European
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Speaker 1: force whatever to pass through Persia towards India or towards
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Speaker 1: the ports of that country, and so the visionary danger
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Speaker 1: passed away. The old southern boundary of Russia in Central
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Speaker 1: Asia extended from the north of the Caspian by Aurenburg
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Speaker 1: and Orsk across to the old Mongolian city of Semipalatinsk,
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Speaker 1: and was guarded by a cordon of forts and Ossac outposts.
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Speaker 1: It was about two thousand miles in length and quote
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Speaker 1: abotted on the great Kirgis step, and to a certain
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Speaker 1: extent controlled the tribe's pasturing in the vicinity, but by
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Speaker 1: no means established the hold of Russia on that pathless
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Speaker 1: and for the most part lifeless waste unquote. Quarterly Review,
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Speaker 1: October eighteen sixty five. During all the earlier years of
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Speaker 1: the century, while we were establishing our power in India.
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Speaker 1: Constant intrigues and wars occurred in Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia,
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Speaker 1: and rumors were occasionally heard of threats against ourselves, which
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Speaker 1: formed the subject of diplomatic treatment from time to time.
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Speaker 1: But in reality the scene was so distant that our
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Speaker 1: interests were not seriously affected, and it was not until
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Speaker 1: eighteen thirty six that they began to exercise a powerful
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Speaker 1: influence as regards our policy on the Northwest frontier. In
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Speaker 1: that year, Lord Auckland was Governor General and Captain Alexander
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Speaker 1: Burns was sent on a commercial mission up the Indus
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Speaker 1: and through the Kaiber Pass to Kabul, where he was
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Speaker 1: received in a friendly manner by the Amir Dost Mohammad.
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Speaker 1: It must be borne in mind that neither Sinned nor
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Speaker 1: the Punjab was then under our rule, so that our
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Speaker 1: frontiers were still far distant from Afghanistan. It was supposed
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Speaker 1: at the time that Russia was advancing southward towards India
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Speaker 1: in league with Persia, and the mission of Burns was
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Speaker 1: in reality political, its object being to induce the Emir
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Speaker 1: to enter into a friendly alliance. Dost Mohammed was quite
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Speaker 1: willing to meet our views and offered to give up
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Speaker 1: altogether any connection with the two powers named it. However,
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Speaker 1: soon became apparent that our interests were by no means identical.
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Speaker 1: His great object, as we found, being to recover the
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Speaker 1: Peshawar district, which had been taken a few years previously
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Speaker 1: by Runjit Singh, while we, on the other hand, courted
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Speaker 1: his friendship, chiefly in order that his country might prove
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Speaker 1: a barrier against the advance of Russia and Persia. These
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Speaker 1: respective views were evidently divergent, and the issues doubtful. When
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Speaker 1: suddenly a Russian envoy, Vikovich, also on a so called
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Speaker 1: commercial mission, arrived at Kabul, offering the Amir money and
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Speaker 1: assistance against the Sikhs. This altered the aspect of affairs.
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Speaker 1: Burns wrote to the Governor General that the Russians were
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Speaker 1: evidently trying to outbid us. Still, some hope remained until
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Speaker 1: definite instructions arrived from Lord Auckland, declining to mediate with
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Speaker 1: or to act against Runjit Singh, the ruler of Punjab.
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Speaker 1: The Amir felt that we made great demands on him,
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Speaker 1: but gave him nothing in return. It then became evident
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Speaker 1: that the mission of Burns was a failure. And in
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Speaker 1: April eighteen thirty eight he returned to India. It was
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Speaker 1: our first direct effort to provide against a distant and
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Speaker 1: unsubstantial danger, and it failed. But unfortunately we did not
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Speaker 1: take the lesson to heart. In the meantime, the Shah
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Speaker 1: of Persia, instigated by Russia, besieged Herat, and after months
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Speaker 1: of fruitless effort, and in consequence of our sending troops
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Speaker 1: to the Persian Gulf, the Shah at length withdrew his army.
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Speaker 1: It was not only the hostile efforts of the Shah
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Speaker 1: on Herat in eighteen thirty eight which were a cause
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Speaker 1: of anxiety to the Indian government, but as k Rites
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Speaker 1: in War in Afghanistan quote, far out in the distance,
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Speaker 1: beyond the mountains of the Hindu Kush, there was the
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Speaker 1: shadow of a great northern army, tremendous in its indistinctness,
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Speaker 1: sweeping across the wilds and deserts of Central Asia towards
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Speaker 1: the frontiers of Hindustan. That great northern army, as we
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Speaker 1: now know but did not know then, was the column
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Speaker 1: of Perovsky, which had left Auremburg for the attempted conquest
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Speaker 1: of Kiva, but which subsequently perished from the hardships and
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Speaker 1: pestilence in the snowy wastes of the Basuk Desert north
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Speaker 1: of the Aral. In view of all the circumstances of
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Speaker 1: the supposed designs of Russia and Persia, and of the
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Speaker 1: hostility and incessant intrigues in Afghanistan, the Government of India
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Speaker 1: were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst the authorities differed widely
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Speaker 1: as to the policy to be pursued. Lord Auckland, however,
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Speaker 1: at length decided on the assemblage of a British force
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Speaker 1: for service across the Indus. In his manifesto, issued in
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Speaker 1: December eighteen thirty eight, he first alluded to the Burns
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Speaker 1: mission and the causes of its failure. He then referred
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Speaker 1: to the claims of Shah Suja, a former ruler of
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Speaker 1: Afghanistan who had been living for some years in exile
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Speaker 1: within our territories, and said we had determined, in co
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Speaker 1: operation with the Sikhs, to restore him to power as
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Speaker 1: Emir of Kabul. It was arranged that Shah Suja should
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Speaker 1: enter Afghanistan with his own troops, such as they were
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Speaker 1: supported by a British army marching through sind and Baluchistan.
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Speaker 1: The Governor General expressed a hope that tranquility would thus
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Speaker 1: be established on the frontier and a barrier formed against
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Speaker 1: external aggression, and he ended by proclaiming that when the
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Speaker 1: object was accomplished, the British Army would be withdrawn. This
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Speaker 1: was indeed a momentous decision. The Commander in Chief in India,
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Speaker 1: Sir Henry Fane, had already given an adverse opinion, saying
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Speaker 1: that quote every advance you make beyond the soot ledge,
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Speaker 1: in my opinion, adds to your military weakness. On the
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Speaker 1: decision becoming known in England, many high authorities and the
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Speaker 1: public generally disapproved of the expedition. The Duke of Wellington
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Speaker 1: said that quote our difficulties would commence where our military
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Speaker 1: successes ended, and that quote the consequences of crossing the
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Speaker 1: Indus wants to settle a government in Afghanistan will be
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Speaker 1: a perennial march into that country. The Marquis of Wellesley
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Speaker 1: spoke of quote the folly of occupying a land of rocks, sands,
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Speaker 1: deserts and snow. Sir Charles Metcalfe from the first protested
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Speaker 1: and said, quote depend upon it. The surest way to
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Speaker 1: bring Russia down upon ourselves is for us to cross
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Speaker 1: the Indus and meddle with the countries beyond it. Mister
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Speaker 1: Elphinstone wrote, quote, if you send twenty seven thousand men
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Speaker 1: up the Bolam to Kandahar and can feed them, I
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Speaker 1: have no doubt you can take Kandahar and Kabul and
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Speaker 1: set up Sujar. But as for maintaining him in a poor, cold,
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Speaker 1: strong and remote country among a turbulent people like the
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Speaker 1: Afghans I own, it seems to me to be hopeless.
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Speaker 1: If you succeed, you will, I fear, weaken the position
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Speaker 1: against Russia. The Afghans are neutral and would have received
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Speaker 1: your aid against invaders with gratitude. They will now be
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Speaker 1: disaffected and glad to join any invader to drive you out.
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Speaker 1: Mister Tucker of the Court of Directors wrote to the
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Speaker 1: Duke of Wellington, quote, we have contract in an alliance
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Speaker 1: with Shah Suja, although he does not possess a rood
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Speaker 1: of ground in Afghanistan nor a rupee which he did
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Speaker 1: not derive from our bounty as a quondam pensioner. He
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Speaker 1: added that even if we succeed, we must maintain him
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Speaker 1: in the government by a large military force eight hundred
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Speaker 1: miles from our frontier and our resources. The above were
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Speaker 1: strong and weighty opinions and arguments against the rash and
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Speaker 1: distant enterprise on which the Government of India were about
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Speaker 1: to embark. But there is more to be said independently
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Speaker 1: of the result in Afghanistan itself. It must be borne
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Speaker 1: in mind that the proposed line of march of the
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Speaker 1: army necessarily led through sind and Baluchistan, countries which, whatever
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Speaker 1: their former position may have been, were then independent both
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Speaker 1: of the emir and of ourselves. The force from Bengal,
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Speaker 1: consisting of about nine thousand, five hundred men of all
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Speaker 1: arms with thirty eight thousand camp followers, accompanied by Shah
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Speaker 1: Suja's leve, left Ferozopaur in December, and, crossing the Indus,
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Speaker 1: arrived at Dadur, the entrance to the Bolam Pass in
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Speaker 1: March eighteen thirty nine. Difficulties with the Emirs of sinned
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Speaker 1: that once arose, chiefly as to our passage through their territories,
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Speaker 1: but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they were informed that
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Speaker 1: quote the day they connected themselves with any other power
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Speaker 1: than England would be the last of their independence, if
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Speaker 1: not of their rule. Kay's War in Afghanistan. The army
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Speaker 1: then advanced through the Bolam and reached Queta on March
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Speaker 1: the twenty sixth, but here again obstacles similar in character
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Speaker 1: to those just described occurred, and so Alexander Burns visited
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Speaker 1: the ruler of Beluchistan, the Khan of Kelat, demanding assistance,
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Speaker 1: especially as to supplies of food. The prince, with prophetic truth,
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Speaker 1: pointed out that though we might restore Shahsuja, we would
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Speaker 1: not carry the Afghans with us and would fail in
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Speaker 1: the end. He alluded to the devastation which our march
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Speaker 1: had already caused in the country. But having been granted
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Speaker 1: a subsidy, unwillingly consented to afford us assistants, and the army,
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Speaker 1: leaving possible enemies in its rear, passed on and reached
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Speaker 1: Kandahar without opposition in April. At the end of June
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Speaker 1: it recommenced its march northwards, and Guzni, having been stormed
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Speaker 1: and captured our troops without further fighting, arrived at Kabul
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Speaker 1: on April the sixth. Dost Mohammad, deserted for the time
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Speaker 1: by his people fled northward over the Hindu Kush, finding
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Speaker 1: at tempt one prairie refuge in Bokhara, and Sharsuja reigned
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Speaker 1: in his stead. So far, the great Expedition had apparently
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Speaker 1: accomplished its object, and the success of the tripartite treaty
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Speaker 1: between ourselves, the Sikhs and the New Emir had been
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Speaker 1: successfully carried out almost entirely. However, by ourselves as the
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Speaker 1: predominant partner. The time therefore would seem to have arrived when,
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Speaker 1: in fulfillment of Lord Auckland's proclamation, the British Army should
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Speaker 1: be withdrawn from Afghanistan. For the moment, this appeared to
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Speaker 1: be the case, but in reality it was not so,
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Speaker 1: and our position soon became dangerous, then critical, and at
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Speaker 1: last desperate. In the first place, the long line of
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Speaker 1: communication was liable at any time to be interrupted, as
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Speaker 1: already mentioned. Then again, the arrival of Sharsuja had excited
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Speaker 1: no enthusias SASM, and the very fact that we were
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Speaker 1: foreigners in language, religion, and race rendered our presence hateful
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Speaker 1: to his subjects. In short, the new Amir was and
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Speaker 1: continued to be a mere puppet, supported in authority by
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Speaker 1: British bayonets. These conditions were apparent from the first day
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Speaker 1: of his arrival and grew in intensity until the end.
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Speaker 1: Sharhsuja himself soon discovered that his authority over his people
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Speaker 1: was almost nominal, and although he chafed at our continued
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Speaker 1: presence in the country, he also felt that the day
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Speaker 1: of our departure would be the last of his reign
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Speaker 1: and that our withdrawal was, under the circumstances impossible. But
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Speaker 1: the situation was equally complicated from our own point of view. If,
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Speaker 1: as originally promised, the British troops were withdrawn, the failure
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Speaker 1: of the expedition would at once become a par garrant
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Speaker 1: by the anarchy, which would ensue. On the other hand,
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Speaker 1: to retain an army in the far distant mountains of
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Speaker 1: Afghanistan would not only be a breach of faith, but
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Speaker 1: while entailing enormous expense, would deprive India of soldiers who
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Speaker 1: might be required elsewhere. After lengthy consideration, it was decided
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Speaker 1: to reduce the total of our force in the country,
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Speaker 1: while retaining a hold for the present on Kabul, Ghuzni
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Speaker 1: and Kandahar. Together with the passes of the Kaiba and Bolam.
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Speaker 1: In short, the British army was weakly scattered about in
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Speaker 1: a region of mountains amongst a hostile people, and with
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Speaker 1: its long lines of communication, insufficiently guarded. Both in a
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Speaker 1: military and a political point of view, the position was
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Speaker 1: a false and dangerous one. General Sir John Keene, who
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Speaker 1: was about to return to India, writing at the time,
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Speaker 1: said quote mark my words, it will not be long
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Speaker 1: before there is here some signal catastrophe. During the summer
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Speaker 1: of eighteen forty there were troubles both in the Kaiber
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Speaker 1: and Bolam passes. In the former, the tribes, incensed at
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Speaker 1: not receiving sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts and plundered our stores,
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Speaker 1: while in Baluchistan matters were so serious that a British
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Speaker 1: force was sent and captured Kelat, the Khan being killed
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Speaker 1: and part of his territory handed over to Sharsuja footnote.
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Speaker 1: In the Life of Sir Robert Sandman, recently published, it
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Speaker 1: is stated that the alleged treachery of Mehrab Khan which
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Speaker 1: cost him his life, was on subsequent inquiry not confirmed.
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Speaker 1: End footnote. Rumours from Central Asia also added to our anxieties.
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Speaker 1: Although the failure of the Russian attempt on Kiva became
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Speaker 1: known some months later. It excited apprehension at the time
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Speaker 1: amongst our political officers in Kabul. Sir Alexander Burns, during
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Speaker 1: the winter of eighteen thirty nine expressed opinions which were
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Speaker 1: curiously inconsistent with each other. I maintained that man to
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Speaker 1: be an enemy to his country who recommends a soldier
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Speaker 1: to be stationed west of the Indus, while at the
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Speaker 1: same moment he advocated the advance of our troops over
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Speaker 1: the Hindu Kush into balk so as to be ready
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Speaker 1: to meet the Russians in the following May. Sir William
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Speaker 1: mc norton, the chief political officer in Karbul, went still further,
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Speaker 1: and in April eighteen forty not only urged a march
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Speaker 1: on Bokhara, but also contemplated sending a mission to Kokand
20:54
Speaker 1: in order, as he said quote, to frustrate the knavish
20:58
Speaker 1: tricks of the Russians in that Our position, however, at
21:04
Speaker 1: that time, was sufficiently precarious without adding to our anxieties
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Speaker 1: by distant expeditions in Central Asia. Even had the Russians
21:14
Speaker 1: established themselves in the principalities which at that time was
21:18
Speaker 1: not the case. Not only was Afghanistan itself seething with
21:22
Speaker 1: treachery and intrigues from one end to the other, but
21:26
Speaker 1: the Sikhs in the Punjab, our nominal allies, had since
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Speaker 1: the death of Runjit Singh, become disloyal and out of hand.
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Speaker 1: Baluchistan was in tumult. The tribes in the Kaiba, ever
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Speaker 1: ready for mischief, incessantly threatened our communications, so that we
21:46
Speaker 1: were certainly in no condition to enter upon further dangerous
21:49
Speaker 1: expeditions against distant, imaginary foes. Sir Jasper Nichols, the Commander
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Speaker 1: in Chief, strongly objected to any advance quote. In truth,
22:03
Speaker 1: we are much weaker now than in eighteen thirty eight. Unquote.
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Speaker 1: During the latter months of eighteen forty and in eighteen
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Speaker 1: forty one, matters became steadily worse, and all Afghanistans seemed
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Speaker 1: ripe for revolt. We are in a stew here, wrote
22:23
Speaker 1: Sir William mc norton. In September, it is reported that
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Speaker 1: the whole country on this side of the Oxus is
22:30
Speaker 1: up in favor of Dost Mohammad, who is certainly advancing
22:34
Speaker 1: in great strength. Again. In a letter to Lord Auckland.
22:39
Speaker 1: He said, quote that affairs in this quarter have the
22:42
Speaker 1: worst possible appearance unquote, and he quoted the opinion of
22:47
Speaker 1: Sir Willoughby Cotton that quote, unless the Bengal troops are
22:52
Speaker 1: instantly strengthened, we cannot hold the country unquote. At this
22:58
Speaker 1: critical period, however, Dost Mohammad was heavily defeated at Baymian
23:03
Speaker 1: on the Hindu Kush, voluntarily surrendering shortly afterwards, and for
23:08
Speaker 1: the moment prospects looked brighter, But the clouds soon gathered
23:13
Speaker 1: again and the end was at hand. The Governor General
23:18
Speaker 1: of India had throughout the whole war wisely and steadfastly
23:22
Speaker 1: resisted the proposed further operations in Central Asia, and the
23:27
Speaker 1: Court of Directors in London wrote as follows, We pronounce
23:32
Speaker 1: our decided opinion that for many years to come, the
23:36
Speaker 1: restored monarchy will have need of a British force in
23:40
Speaker 1: order to maintain peace in its own territory and prevent
23:43
Speaker 1: aggression from without. And they go on, We again desire
23:48
Speaker 1: you seriously to consider which of the two alternatives, a
23:52
Speaker 1: speedy retreat from Afghanistan or a considerable increase of the
23:57
Speaker 1: military force in that country, you may feel it your
24:00
Speaker 1: duty to adopt. We are convinced that you have no
24:04
Speaker 1: middle course to pursue with safety and with honor. The
24:10
Speaker 1: Government of India, hesitating to the last, failed in adopting
24:14
Speaker 1: either of the alternatives. In November eighteen forty one, Sir
24:21
Speaker 1: Alexander Burns was treacherously murdered by a mob in Kabul,
24:26
Speaker 1: which was followed by an insurrection and the defeat of
24:29
Speaker 1: our troops. General Elphinstone, who was in command, writing to
24:34
Speaker 1: Sir w mc norton on November twenty fourth, said that
24:38
Speaker 1: quote from the want of provisions and forage, the reduced
24:43
Speaker 1: state of our troops, the large number of wounded and sick,
24:47
Speaker 1: the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill situated cantonment
24:52
Speaker 1: we occupy, the near approach of winter, our communications cut
24:57
Speaker 1: off no prospect of relief, and the whole country in
25:01
Speaker 1: arms against us. I am of opinion that it is
25:04
Speaker 1: not feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country,
25:08
Speaker 1: and that you ought to avail yourself of the offer
25:11
Speaker 1: to negotiate that has been made to you. This was conclusive.
25:19
Speaker 1: Our envoy early in December met the Afghan chiefs and
25:23
Speaker 1: agreed that we should immediately evacuate the country and that
25:27
Speaker 1: Dost Mohammad, who was in exile in India, should return.
25:32
Speaker 1: On December twenty third, Sir William mc norton was treacherously
25:37
Speaker 1: murdered at a conference with the Afghan Serdars within sight
25:41
Speaker 1: of the British cantonment, and then came the end. The
25:46
Speaker 1: British force at Kabul, leaving its guns, stores and treasure behind,
25:52
Speaker 1: commenced its retreat on January sixth, eighteen forty two, but
25:57
Speaker 1: incessantly attacked during its mark, and almost annihilated in the
26:02
Speaker 1: Cord Kabul Pass. It ceased to exist as an organized body.
26:08
Speaker 1: General Elphinstone and other officers invited to a conference by
26:12
Speaker 1: Akbar Khan were forcibly detained as hostages, and on January thirteenth,
26:19
Speaker 1: a solitary Englishman, Dr. Brydon arrived at Jalalabad, being, with
26:24
Speaker 1: the exception of a few prisoners, the sole remaining representative
26:29
Speaker 1: of the force. I have given this short sketch of
26:34
Speaker 1: the First Afghan War, because, disastrous as it was, the
26:39
Speaker 1: causes of our failure were due throughout far more to
26:43
Speaker 1: rash and mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the
26:47
Speaker 1: British troops engaged. K in his history gives a clear
26:52
Speaker 1: summary of its original object and unfortunate results. The expedition
26:58
Speaker 1: across the Indus was on undertaken with the object of
27:01
Speaker 1: creating in Afghanistan a barrier against the encroachment from the west.
27:07
Speaker 1: The advance of the British army was designed to check
27:11
Speaker 1: the aggression of Persia on the Afghan frontier and to
27:14
Speaker 1: baffle Russian intrigues by the substitution of a friendly for
27:19
Speaker 1: an unfriendly power in the countries beyond the Indus. After
27:24
Speaker 1: an enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left every
27:28
Speaker 1: town and village in Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before
27:33
Speaker 1: the British Army crossed the Indus, the English name had
27:37
Speaker 1: been honoured in Afghanistan. Some dim traditions of the splendor
27:42
Speaker 1: of mister Elphinstone's mission had been all that the Afghans
27:46
Speaker 1: associated with their thoughts of the English nation. But in
27:50
Speaker 1: their place we left galling memories of the progress of
27:54
Speaker 1: a desolating army. The history of the war from the
27:59
Speaker 1: first to last deserves careful consideration, and if the lessons
28:05
Speaker 1: taught by it are taken to heart, they will materially
28:09
Speaker 1: assist in determining the principles which should guide our policy
28:13
Speaker 1: on the northwest frontier of India. End of Chapter one,
28:25
Speaker 1: Chapter two of Indian Frontier Policy. This is a LibriVox recording.
28:31
Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
28:35
Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit librevox dot org. Indian
28:41
Speaker 1: Frontier Policy and Historical Sketch by General Sir John Addai,
28:46
Speaker 1: g C b RA. Chapter two. Events prior and leading
28:52
Speaker 1: up to the Second Afghan War, covering the conquest of Kiva,
28:57
Speaker 1: Bakara and Kokand by Russia, British conquest of sind and
29:01
Speaker 1: the Punjab, Our policy with the frontier tribes, the Treaty
29:06
Speaker 1: of eighteen fifty seven with Dos Mohammad sha Ali succeeds
29:11
Speaker 1: as Amir eighteen sixty eight, the War of eighteen seventy eight,
29:16
Speaker 1: Abdul Rahman becomes Amir withdrawal of British Army from Afghanistan
29:20
Speaker 1: eighteen eighty one. For a few years subsequent to the war,
29:25
Speaker 1: our foreign policy happily remained free from complications, and it
29:30
Speaker 1: will be desirable now to refer shortly to the progress
29:33
Speaker 1: of Russia in Central Asia and of her conquests of
29:36
Speaker 1: the decaying principalities of Kiva, Pukhara and Kokand previous to
29:43
Speaker 1: eighteen forty seven, the old boundary line of Russia south
29:47
Speaker 1: of Orenburg abutted on the Great Kirghiz Step, a zone,
29:52
Speaker 1: as the late Sir h Rawlinson told us of almost
29:55
Speaker 1: uninhabited desert stretching two thousand miles from west to east
30:00
Speaker 1: and nearly one thousand from north to south, which had
30:03
Speaker 1: hitherto acted as a buffer between Russia and the Mohammedan
30:06
Speaker 1: principalities below the Aral footnote Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan, eighteen seventy eight.
30:16
Speaker 1: It was in eighteen forty seven, contemporaneously with our final
30:19
Speaker 1: conquest of the Punjab, that the curtain rose on the
30:23
Speaker 1: aggressive Russian drama in Central Asia, which is not yet
30:27
Speaker 1: played out. Russia had enjoyed the nominal dependency of the
30:31
Speaker 1: Kirghi's Cossacks of the Little Horde, who inhabited the western
30:35
Speaker 1: division of the Great Step since seventeen thirty, but except
30:39
Speaker 1: in the immediate vicinity of the Ouremburg line, she had
30:42
Speaker 1: little real control over the tribes. In eighteen forty seven
30:46
Speaker 1: to forty eight, however, she erected three important fortresses in
30:50
Speaker 1: the very heart of the Step. These important works, the
30:54
Speaker 1: only permanent constructions which had hitherto been attempted south of
30:58
Speaker 1: the line, enabled Russia for the first time to dominate
31:02
Speaker 1: the western portion of the steppe and to command the
31:05
Speaker 1: great routes of communication with Central Asia. But the Step
31:09
Speaker 1: forts were after all a mere means to an end.
31:12
Speaker 1: They formed the connecting link between the old frontiers of
31:15
Speaker 1: the Empire and the long coveted line of the Jack Surtes,
31:19
Speaker 1: and simultaneously, with their erection, arose fort Aralsk near the
31:24
Speaker 1: ombuschor of the river. Footnote extract from Quarterly Review, October
31:31
Speaker 1: eighteen sixty five. The Russians, having thus crossed the Great
31:36
Speaker 1: Desert tract and established themselves on the Jack Surtes siir Daria,
31:41
Speaker 1: from that time came permanently into contact with the three
31:44
Speaker 1: Carnates of Central Asia, and their progress since that date
31:48
Speaker 1: has been comparatively easy and rapid. The principalities had no
31:54
Speaker 1: military organization which would enable them to withstand a great power.
31:58
Speaker 1: Their troops and those of Russia were frequently in conflict
32:02
Speaker 1: of late years, but the battles were, in a military
32:05
Speaker 1: sense trivial, and the broad result is that Russia has
32:08
Speaker 1: been for some years predominant throughout the whole region, and
32:12
Speaker 1: her frontiers are now continuous with the northern provinces of
32:16
Speaker 1: both Afghanistan and Persia. It is this latter point which
32:21
Speaker 1: is the important one so far as we're concerned. But
32:24
Speaker 1: before entering into its details, it will be well to
32:27
Speaker 1: consider the nature of the great country over which Russia
32:30
Speaker 1: now rules. Until within the last few years our information
32:35
Speaker 1: as to its general character was very limited, but the
32:38
Speaker 1: accounts of numerous recent travelers all concur in describing it
32:42
Speaker 1: as consisting, for the most part of sterile deserts, deficient
32:47
Speaker 1: in food, forage, fuel, and water. There are a certain
32:51
Speaker 1: number of decayed ancient cities here and there, and there
32:55
Speaker 1: are occasional oases of limited fertility, but the general condition
33:00
Speaker 1: are as just described, with the exception of the one
33:04
Speaker 1: railway from the Caspian to samarkand the means of transport
33:08
Speaker 1: are chiefly pack animals. Speaking roughly, the dominions of Russia
33:13
Speaker 1: in Central Asia south of Orenburg may be taken as
33:16
Speaker 1: almost equal in geographical extent to those of our Indian Empire.
33:21
Speaker 1: But there is this striking difference between the two, that
33:25
Speaker 1: whilst the population of India is computed at two hundred
33:27
Speaker 1: and fifty millions, that as Central Asia, even at the
33:31
Speaker 1: highest computation, is only reckoned at four or five millions,
33:35
Speaker 1: of whom nearly half are nomadic. That is, they wander
33:39
Speaker 1: about not from choice, but in search of food and pasturage.
33:43
Speaker 1: The extreme scantiness of the population is of itself a
33:47
Speaker 1: rough measure of the general desolation. The military position of
33:51
Speaker 1: Russia in Central Asia, therefore, is that of a great
33:54
Speaker 1: but distant power, which, during the last fifty years has
33:58
Speaker 1: overrun and taken possession of extended territories belonging to fanatical
34:03
Speaker 1: Mohammedan tribes. The people themselves are, many of them warlike
34:08
Speaker 1: and hostile, but they are badly armed, have no discipline, training,
34:13
Speaker 1: or leaders, and are not therefore in a position to
34:16
Speaker 1: withstand the advance of regular troops. Consequently, Russia is enabled
34:21
Speaker 1: to hold the country with a comparatively small force of
34:25
Speaker 1: scattered detachments, which are however supplied with arms, munitions, and stores,
34:30
Speaker 1: under great difficulties from far distant centers and her troops
34:35
Speaker 1: are practically incapable of concentration. Indeed, the farther they go,
34:39
Speaker 1: the weaker they become, the very magnitude of the area
34:43
Speaker 1: being an additional cause of weakness. This is a condition
34:47
Speaker 1: somewhat precarious in itself, and would certainly not appear to
34:50
Speaker 1: be an alarming one as a basis of attack against
34:53
Speaker 1: our Empire, even were India close at hand. While Russia, however,
34:59
Speaker 1: was depleting the subjugation of the principalities and advancing her
35:03
Speaker 1: frontiers until they became conterminous with the northern provinces of
35:07
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and Persia, the government of India, by the Great
35:11
Speaker 1: Wars of eighteen forty three and forty nine, having annexed
35:15
Speaker 1: sind and the Punjab, advanced our frontiers in a similar manner,
35:20
Speaker 1: so that the people both of Beluchistan and Afghanistan, hitherto
35:24
Speaker 1: far remote from our dominions, now became our neighbours. In
35:29
Speaker 1: the Life of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, a very
35:33
Speaker 1: interesting account is given not only of the nature of
35:36
Speaker 1: the country along the border, but of the policy pursued
35:40
Speaker 1: for many years with the independent tribes. It says, by
35:44
Speaker 1: the conquest of Sind in eighteen forty three and the
35:47
Speaker 1: annexation of the Punjab in eighteen forty nine, the northwest
35:51
Speaker 1: frontier of India was advanced across the River Indus to
35:55
Speaker 1: the foot of the rocky mountains which separate the plains
35:58
Speaker 1: of the Indus Valley from them the higher plateaus of
36:01
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and Klat. These mountain ranges formed a vast, irregular
36:06
Speaker 1: belt of independent or semi independent territory extending from Cashmir
36:11
Speaker 1: southward to the sea near Karachi, a total length of
36:15
Speaker 1: about twelve hundred miles. The belt of territory above described
36:21
Speaker 1: was inhabited by fierce marauding tribes, often at war with
36:26
Speaker 1: each other, ever and anon harrying the plains of Punjab
36:29
Speaker 1: and Sind and the constant terror of the trade caravans
36:33
Speaker 1: during their journey through the passes. The policy pursued for
36:38
Speaker 1: many years is thus described quote. The disasters of the
36:43
Speaker 1: First Afghan War and the tragical episode of Kalat were
36:47
Speaker 1: fresh in men's recollections and created a strong feeling against
36:52
Speaker 1: political interference with tribes beyond our border. Accordingly, from the
36:57
Speaker 1: very first, the system of border dea fence maintained by
37:01
Speaker 1: the Punjab government was not purely military, but partly military,
37:05
Speaker 1: partly political and conciliatory. While the passes were carefully watched,
37:11
Speaker 1: every means was taken for the promotion of friendly intercourse.
37:16
Speaker 1: Roads were made, steamers started on the Indus, and inundation
37:20
Speaker 1: canals developed along the border. So long as they were friendly,
37:25
Speaker 1: the tribesmen had free access to our territory, could hold land,
37:29
Speaker 1: enlist in our army, and make free use of our markets.
37:33
Speaker 1: As a result, the deadly hatred formerly prevailing between the
37:37
Speaker 1: Sikhs and the hill tribes soon disappeared. Raids became exceptional,
37:42
Speaker 1: cultivation increased. The bazaars of our frontier stations teemed with
37:47
Speaker 1: Afghans with trains of laden camels, who, at the close
37:51
Speaker 1: of the season returned laden with our goods. Disputes were
37:55
Speaker 1: voluntarily referred by independent tribesmen for the arbitration of Britain. Such,
38:01
Speaker 1: it is stated in the Life of Sir Robert Sandoman,
38:04
Speaker 1: were the results of Lawrence's frontier policy, and no words
38:08
Speaker 1: are required to emphasize these excellent arrangements, which remained in
38:12
Speaker 1: force for many years. Before leaving this part of the subject.
38:17
Speaker 1: It may be as well to anticipate a little and
38:20
Speaker 1: to allude to the successful part taken by Sir Robert
38:23
Speaker 1: Sandman in eighteen seventy six on his appointment as our
38:26
Speaker 1: agent to the Khan of Kalat. It is important, in
38:30
Speaker 1: the first place to mention that whilst in Afghanistan the
38:33
Speaker 1: tribes all along the frontier were for the most part
38:36
Speaker 1: independent of the Emir of Kabul and were ruled by
38:39
Speaker 1: their own jurgas or councils, in Baluchistan the mode of
38:44
Speaker 1: government was so far different that the chiefs, whilst acknowledging
38:48
Speaker 1: the Khan as their hereditary ruler, were entitled not only
38:52
Speaker 1: to govern their own tribes, but to take part in
38:55
Speaker 1: the general administration of the country as the constitutional advisers
38:59
Speaker 1: of the paris Amount chief. The dangers arising from the
39:03
Speaker 1: vicinity of three powerful kingdoms Persia, Afghanistan and sind had,
39:09
Speaker 1: no doubt led them to perceive the necessity of cooperation,
39:13
Speaker 1: which was established about the middle of the eighteenth century.
39:17
Speaker 1: Although the Constitution as above described secured to the confederated
39:21
Speaker 1: tribes nearly a century of prosperity and peaceful government, it
39:26
Speaker 1: so happened that for some years before eighteen seventy six,
39:29
Speaker 1: owing to the weakness of the then ruler and partly
39:33
Speaker 1: to turbulence of the chiefs, the government of the country
39:36
Speaker 1: fell into disorder and the commerce through the Bolam Pass
39:40
Speaker 1: altogether ceased. From eighteen seventy two to eighteen seventy six,
39:46
Speaker 1: Lord Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and one of his
39:49
Speaker 1: last acts before leaving was the appointment of Colonel Sandman
39:53
Speaker 1: as our envoy, with a view to mediate between the
39:56
Speaker 1: Khan and his subordinates, and which proved successful. The principal
40:01
Speaker 1: terms which were finally accepted by the Khan and his
40:04
Speaker 1: tribal chiefs were that their foreign policy was to be
40:08
Speaker 1: under our guidance and we were also to be the
40:11
Speaker 1: referee in case of internal disputes. That the commerce of
40:15
Speaker 1: the Bolan was to be opened and protected, the annual
40:18
Speaker 1: subsidy hitherto granted to the Khan of five thousand pounds
40:22
Speaker 1: being doubled to cover the necessary expenditure. And finally that
40:27
Speaker 1: a British agent with a suitable contingent should be established
40:31
Speaker 1: at Queta. It is important to observe that the negotiations
40:35
Speaker 1: were conducted throughout in a spirit of cooperation and that
40:38
Speaker 1: their beneficial results remain in force to the present day.
40:43
Speaker 1: The policy pursued for many years on the Afghan frontier,
40:47
Speaker 1: although regulated by the same general principles as in Kerlat,
40:51
Speaker 1: was not altogether so rapidly accomplished or so entirely successful.
40:56
Speaker 1: The circumstances were in some degree different and less simple.
41:00
Speaker 1: In the first place, the frontier was eight hundred miles
41:03
Speaker 1: long and was inhabited by Afghan tribes who were more
41:06
Speaker 1: predatory and intractable than the Baluchis. They were not only
41:11
Speaker 1: independent of each other, but for the most part acknowledged
41:14
Speaker 1: no allegiance to the Amir of Kabul. Border disputes therefore
41:19
Speaker 1: had to be settled with individual chiefs, and no opportunity
41:24
Speaker 1: was offered for our mediation in internal feuds or for
41:27
Speaker 1: joint agreement on external policy, as was so successfully accomplished
41:32
Speaker 1: by Sanderman in Baluchistan. There was no general federation with
41:36
Speaker 1: which we could enter into negotiation. As a consequence, we
41:40
Speaker 1: were compelled to maintain a large force and fortified posts
41:44
Speaker 1: along the frontier, and many punitive expeditions became necessary from
41:49
Speaker 1: time to time against lawless, offending tribes. Still on the
41:54
Speaker 1: whole and considering the difficulties of the situation, the policy
41:58
Speaker 1: of conciliation so obsodies and of non interference with their
42:02
Speaker 1: internal affairs gradually succeeded. Raids, once chronic, became exceptional and
42:08
Speaker 1: were dealt with rather as matters of frontier policy than
42:11
Speaker 1: of war footnote see Parliamentary papers Afghanistan eighteen seventy eight,
42:18
Speaker 1: page thirty and Balutistan number three, eighteen seventy eight. It
42:23
Speaker 1: must also be remembered as an additional complication that in
42:27
Speaker 1: annexing the Punjab, although it is essentially the country of
42:30
Speaker 1: the Sikhs, who are Hindus, the inhabitants of the Transendus
42:35
Speaker 1: districts are, for the most part what are termed Punjabi Mussulmen,
42:39
Speaker 1: that is, Afghans in race, religion, and language. From what
42:44
Speaker 1: has been said as to our dealings with the border tribes,
42:47
Speaker 1: it will be evidence that while our difficulties were continuous
42:51
Speaker 1: and often serious, still they were chiefly local, and that
42:55
Speaker 1: the defense of the Empire on that frontier against foreign
42:58
Speaker 1: aggression depended in a great measure on our relations with
43:02
Speaker 1: the ruler of Afghanistan itself. When Dost Mohammed, after the
43:06
Speaker 1: Great War, returned in eighteen forty three to his former
43:10
Speaker 1: position as Emir of that distracted country. It was hardly
43:14
Speaker 1: to be expected that, although acquiescing in his reinstatement, we
43:18
Speaker 1: should be regarded by him in a friendly light. Still,
43:22
Speaker 1: some years passed away without any important change in our
43:25
Speaker 1: relative positions one way or the other. In eighteen fifty five,
43:31
Speaker 1: Lord Dalhousie was Governor General and a treaty was made
43:35
Speaker 1: with Dost Mohammed, by which both parties agreed to respect
43:38
Speaker 1: each other's territories. In January eighteen fifty seven, a still
43:43
Speaker 1: more important one followed. We were then once more at
43:46
Speaker 1: war with Persia, and at a meeting between Sir John
43:49
Speaker 1: Lawrence and the Emir, an agreement was entered into that
43:52
Speaker 1: Dost Mohammed, acting in cooperation with US, should receive ten
43:57
Speaker 1: thousand pounds a month for military purposes to continue during
44:01
Speaker 1: the war. That English officers should reside in his country
44:05
Speaker 1: temporarily to keep the Indian government informed, but not to
44:09
Speaker 1: interfere with the administration, and that when peace ensued, they
44:13
Speaker 1: should be withdrawn and a native agent alone remain as
44:16
Speaker 1: our representative. Footnote in view of the strong objection to
44:21
Speaker 1: the presence of English officers in Afghanistan. Sir John Lawrence
44:25
Speaker 1: intimated to the Viceroy of India that he had given
44:28
Speaker 1: an assurance to Dost Mohammed that it should not be
44:30
Speaker 1: enforced unless imperatively necessary. End footnote. It is important to
44:37
Speaker 1: note that this friendly treaty was made at Peshwar just
44:40
Speaker 1: before the Great Mutiny, and that the Emir, though urged
44:44
Speaker 1: by his people to attack us in our hour of danger,
44:47
Speaker 1: remained faithful and would not allow them to cross the border.
44:52
Speaker 1: Dost Mohammed died in June eighteen sixty three, and for
44:57
Speaker 1: some years after his death, family feuds and in Testine
45:00
Speaker 1: wars occurred as to his successor, during which we carefully
45:04
Speaker 1: abstained from interference and were prepared to acknowledge the de
45:08
Speaker 1: facto ruler. Ultimately, in eighteen sixty eight, his son Shea
45:13
Speaker 1: Ali established his authority in Afghanistan and was acknowledged accordingly.
45:18
Speaker 1: Lord Lawrence was then the Viceroy, and in a dispatch
45:22
Speaker 1: to the Secretary of State expressed his views as regards
45:25
Speaker 1: the advances of Russia, after pointing out that they were
45:28
Speaker 1: now paramount in Central Asia, he suggested a mutual agreement
45:33
Speaker 1: as to our respective spheres and relations with the tribes
45:36
Speaker 1: and nations with whom we were now both in contact.
45:40
Speaker 1: And he went on to welcome the civilizing effect of
45:42
Speaker 1: Russian government over the wild tribes of the Steps, and
45:46
Speaker 1: pointed out that if Russia were assured of our loyal
45:49
Speaker 1: feeling in these matters, she would have no jealousy in
45:52
Speaker 1: regard of our alliance with the Afghans. The Secretary of State,
45:58
Speaker 1: Sir Stafford Northcote replied, quote that the conquests which Russia
46:03
Speaker 1: had made and apparently is still making in Central Asia
46:06
Speaker 1: appear to be the natural result of the circumstances in
46:09
Speaker 1: which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground
46:13
Speaker 1: whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the
46:18
Speaker 1: part of this country. It is a great misfortune that
46:23
Speaker 1: such sensible, conciliatory views did not continue to guide our
46:27
Speaker 1: policy in the events which a few years later led
46:30
Speaker 1: us into the Second Great War in Afghanistan. Sheer Ali
46:35
Speaker 1: did not inherit the great qualities of his father, and
46:38
Speaker 1: was also somewhat discontented that we had not abetted his
46:41
Speaker 1: cause during the internal troubles in Afghanistan. However, in eighteen
46:46
Speaker 1: sixty nine, he met Lord Mayo at Umbala, and after
46:50
Speaker 1: careful discussion, it was agreed that we should abstain from
46:53
Speaker 1: sending British officers across the frontier and from interfering in
46:58
Speaker 1: Afghan affairs. Our desire was that a strong, friendly and
47:02
Speaker 1: independent government should be established in that country. It was
47:06
Speaker 1: further decided to give sheer Ali considerable pecuniary assistance and
47:12
Speaker 1: presence of arms from time to time. The Emir, while
47:16
Speaker 1: gratified at these results, wished us also to give a
47:19
Speaker 1: dynastic pledge as to his lineal descendants, which however, was
47:23
Speaker 1: not acceded to. In eighteen seventy three, Lord Northbrook was
47:28
Speaker 1: Viceroy of India and a further conference took place at
47:32
Speaker 1: Similar with the Amir's Prime Minister, chiefly as to the
47:35
Speaker 1: northern Afghan frontier in Badakistan and Wakhan, which were at
47:40
Speaker 1: the time somewhat uncertain and a matter of dispute with Russia.
47:44
Speaker 1: This somewhat delicate question was however, settled in a friendly
47:48
Speaker 1: manner by Lord Granville, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
47:53
Speaker 1: Prince Gortschakov's final dispatch to him on the subject was
47:56
Speaker 1: as follows, footnote Central Asia eighteen seventy three v. C.
48:01
Speaker 1: Six nine nine quote. The divergence which existed in our
48:05
Speaker 1: views was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the
48:09
Speaker 1: dominion of sher Ali. The English government includes within them
48:13
Speaker 1: Badakistan and Wakan, which, according to our views, enjoyed a
48:17
Speaker 1: certain independence. Considering the difficulty experienced in establishing the facts
48:22
Speaker 1: in all their details in these distant parts, considering the
48:26
Speaker 1: greater facilities which the British government possesses for collecting precise detail,
48:31
Speaker 1: and above all, considering our wish not to give to
48:34
Speaker 1: this question of detail greater importance than is due to it,
48:38
Speaker 1: we do not refuse to accept the boundary line laid
48:41
Speaker 1: down by England. We are the more inclined to this
48:44
Speaker 1: act of courtesy as the English government engages to use
48:48
Speaker 1: all its influence with sher Ali in order to induce
48:51
Speaker 1: him to maintain a peaceful latitude, as well as to
48:54
Speaker 1: insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or
48:57
Speaker 1: further conquest. Influence is indisputable. It is based not only
49:03
Speaker 1: on the material and moral ascendency of England, but also
49:07
Speaker 1: on the subsidies for which shier Ali is indebted to her.
49:10
Speaker 1: Such being the case, we see in this assurance a
49:13
Speaker 1: real guarantee for the maintenance of peace. Prince Gortchakov admitted
49:21
Speaker 1: more than once that the Emperor of Russia looked upon
49:24
Speaker 1: Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere of Russian influence and
49:29
Speaker 1: within that of ours, at the same time claiming similar
49:33
Speaker 1: independence for Russia in Central Asia. During the next few
49:37
Speaker 1: years subsequent to the similar conference, shier Ali, though he
49:42
Speaker 1: had received considerable assistance from US, both in money and arms,
49:46
Speaker 1: was not altogether satisfied, and one or two incidents occurred
49:50
Speaker 1: during that period which gave him Umbridge. Lord Northbrook, the
49:54
Speaker 1: Viceroy in eighteen seventy five, was not unaware of the
49:57
Speaker 1: somewhat cold and capricious spirit the Emir, but in writing
50:01
Speaker 1: to London, he pointed out that sheer Ali's situation was difficult,
50:06
Speaker 1: not only from the risk of revolution at home, but
50:09
Speaker 1: also of attack from abroad, and that on the whole
50:12
Speaker 1: he was to be relied on. A change, however, was
50:16
Speaker 1: coming over the scene, and our policy reverted from conciliation
50:20
Speaker 1: to compulsion. It was a critical period in the history
50:24
Speaker 1: of frontier policy and demands careful consideration. It must not
50:30
Speaker 1: be forgotten that although amongst those best qualified to judge,
50:34
Speaker 1: the majority had long been opposed to advance and conquest
50:38
Speaker 1: in territories beyond our northwest frontier, and entertained but little
50:43
Speaker 1: fear of Russian aggressive power. Still there were others, men
50:47
Speaker 1: of long experience, who had filled higher positions in India,
50:51
Speaker 1: who held different views. And it is probable that not
50:55
Speaker 1: only successive British governments, but the public generally, who have
50:59
Speaker 1: no time for carefully weighing the diverse aspects of the subject,
51:03
Speaker 1: were influenced, sometimes one way, sometimes another. In the many
51:08
Speaker 1: difficulties connected with our worldwide empire, this must always be
51:12
Speaker 1: more or less the case. For instance, the late Sir
51:15
Speaker 1: h Rawlinson, a few years before the Second Afghan War,
51:20
Speaker 1: took a very alarmist view of the progress of Russia,
51:23
Speaker 1: not only in Central Asia, but also in Asia Minor.
51:26
Speaker 1: He considered that her advance from Orenburg was only part
51:30
Speaker 1: of one great scheme of invasion, and he averred that
51:34
Speaker 1: the conquest of the Caucasus had given her such a
51:37
Speaker 1: strong position that there was no military or physical obstacle
51:41
Speaker 1: to the continuous march of Russia from the Arexes to
51:44
Speaker 1: the Indus. Footnote Parliamentary Papers Afghanistan eighteen seventy eight. He
51:51
Speaker 1: described it as the unerring certainty of a law of nature.
51:55
Speaker 1: But throughout he ignores distances, blots out the mountains, deserts
52:00
Speaker 1: and arid plains of Persia and Afghanistan, and takes no
52:04
Speaker 1: account of the warlike races who would bar the path.
52:07
Speaker 1: It requires a very large map to embrace all the
52:11
Speaker 1: details of this widespread strategy. Some account has already been
52:16
Speaker 1: given of the weakness, in a military point of view,
52:19
Speaker 1: of Russia in Central Asia, and of the distance of
52:22
Speaker 1: her scattered troops from the main resources of the Empire.
52:26
Speaker 1: But in addition it must be remembered that the mountains
52:29
Speaker 1: of Afghanistan also form a natural and enduring barrier against
52:34
Speaker 1: a further advance. The great Hindu Kush Range, running all
52:39
Speaker 1: along the northern part of that country, forms indeed the
52:42
Speaker 1: real scientific frontier between the two empires. The few passes
52:47
Speaker 1: over its snowy crests, ranging from twelve thousand to eighteen
52:51
Speaker 1: thousand feet high, and only open for a few months
52:54
Speaker 1: in the year. Another supposed line of advance for a
52:59
Speaker 1: Russian army, namely by the Pamirs, has of late years
53:03
Speaker 1: been brought forward, but its main features are more discouraging
53:06
Speaker 1: than those of any other. This elevated region consists of
53:10
Speaker 1: a mass of bare, snow capped mountains attaining elevations of
53:15
Speaker 1: over twenty five thousand feet, intersected by plateau, almost as
53:20
Speaker 1: devoid of vegetation as the mountains themselves. The lakes are
53:24
Speaker 1: about twelve thousand feet above sea level. The population is
53:28
Speaker 1: scanty and consists chiefly of nomads in search of food
53:32
Speaker 1: and pasture during the short summer, so that although the
53:35
Speaker 1: Russians might, if unopposed, possibly move in small isolated detachments
53:41
Speaker 1: carrying their own food and munitions over the Pamirs, it
53:44
Speaker 1: would only be to lose themselves in the gorges of
53:47
Speaker 1: the Himalayas. The conditions above mentioned are for the most
53:52
Speaker 1: part permanent. Russia may not and probably has not, any
53:56
Speaker 1: intention of trying to invade and conquer India, but she
54:00
Speaker 1: has not the power, which is a far more important consideration.
54:06
Speaker 1: To return to the position of affairs previous to the
54:08
Speaker 1: Second Afghan War footnote see Afghanistan eighteen seventy eight, published
54:14
Speaker 1: by the Secretary State for India, pages one to eight,
54:17
Speaker 1: and following early in eighteen seventy five, Lord Northbrook, the
54:22
Speaker 1: Governor General, received a dispatch from the Government at Home,
54:26
Speaker 1: pointing out that the information received from Afghanistan, not only
54:30
Speaker 1: in respect to internal intrigues, but also as regards the
54:33
Speaker 1: influence of foreign powers, was scanty and not always trustworthy.
54:39
Speaker 1: He was therefore instructed to procure the assent of the
54:42
Speaker 1: Amir to the establishment of a British agency at Herat
54:46
Speaker 1: and also at Kandahar. The Viceroy of India and his council,
54:51
Speaker 1: having consulted various experienced officers on the subject, replied in
54:55
Speaker 1: June that in their opinion, the present time and circumstances
54:59
Speaker 1: were of unsuitable for taking the initiative. They pointed out
55:03
Speaker 1: that the Serdars and many of the people of Afghanistan
55:06
Speaker 1: would strongly object, and that in the Emir's somewhat insecure position,
55:11
Speaker 1: he could not afford to disregard their feelings in the matter.
55:14
Speaker 1: They advised patience and conciliation. In November eighteen seventy five,
55:20
Speaker 1: a second dispatch was received from England, reiterating the necessity
55:25
Speaker 1: of more complete information as to Afghanistan, especially in view
55:29
Speaker 1: of recent Russian advances in Central Asia and the Viceroy
55:33
Speaker 1: was directed to send a mission to Kabul without delay
55:36
Speaker 1: to confer with the Emir on Central Asia, and requesting
55:40
Speaker 1: that British officers should be placed on the frontier to
55:43
Speaker 1: watch the course of events. The Government of India in
55:47
Speaker 1: January eighteen seventy six again urged the undesirability of forcing
55:52
Speaker 1: the hands of the Amir and pointed out that his
55:55
Speaker 1: objections to English officers were not from a feeling of disloyalty,
56:00
Speaker 1: and that to force his hands was not desirable. They
56:03
Speaker 1: did not apprehend any desire of interference on the part
56:07
Speaker 1: of Russia, and they concluded by alluding to the careful
56:10
Speaker 1: conciliatory policy carried out by Lords Canning, Lawrence and Mayo
56:14
Speaker 1: as giving the best promise of peace and satisfactory results
56:18
Speaker 1: in Afghanistan. Consequently, they deprecated the proposed action by the
56:23
Speaker 1: Home Government in forcing British officers upon sheer Ali. In
56:28
Speaker 1: April eighteen seventy six, Lord Northbrook quitted India and was
56:32
Speaker 1: succeeded by Lord Lytton, and a further reply from Lord Salisbury,
56:37
Speaker 1: the Secretary of State for India, was received by the Viceroy.
56:41
Speaker 1: It reiterated that the government at home considered our transfrontier
56:45
Speaker 1: relations unsatisfactory, that permanent British agencies should be established in Afghanistan,
56:52
Speaker 1: and that we were willing to afford the a mere
56:54
Speaker 1: material support against unprovoked aggression, our object being to maintain
56:59
Speaker 1: a strong and friendly power in that country. The dispatch
57:03
Speaker 1: went on to say that should the Emir decline to
57:06
Speaker 1: meet our request, he should be informed that he was
57:09
Speaker 1: isolating himself from US at his peril. The next step
57:13
Speaker 1: was taken in May when the Amir was invited to
57:16
Speaker 1: receive a special mission, which he politely declined. In October,
57:21
Speaker 1: our native agent at Kabul came to similar and had
57:24
Speaker 1: an interview with Lord Lytton, who reiterated the demands of
57:28
Speaker 1: the British government, pointing out that in the event of
57:31
Speaker 1: a refusal, there was nothing to prevent our adjoining Russia
57:35
Speaker 1: in wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether, of which
57:39
Speaker 1: sher Ali was duly informed. In January eighteen seventy seven,
57:44
Speaker 1: a final effort was made to come to terms, and
57:47
Speaker 1: Sir Louis Pelly and the Afghan Prime Minister Nor Muhammad
57:51
Speaker 1: had a conference at Peshawar. The first and indeed the
57:55
Speaker 1: only point discussed was the demand that British representatives should
58:00
Speaker 1: reside in Afghanistan, which was a sine qua non. Normahammad
58:05
Speaker 1: pathetically pleaded that Lords Lawrence, Mayo and Northbrook successive viceroys,
58:10
Speaker 1: had all in turn promised that this should not be
58:13
Speaker 1: insisted on, and he ended by saying that shier Ali
58:16
Speaker 1: would rather perish than submit. It was evident that further
58:20
Speaker 1: discussion was useless and the conference was closed Normahammad, who
58:25
Speaker 1: was ill, dying shortly afterwards in March eighteen eighty seven,
58:31
Speaker 1: our native agent at Kabul was withdrawn and direct communication
58:35
Speaker 1: with shier Ali ceased. I have given above resume of
58:41
Speaker 1: the correspondence in eighteen seventy five to seventy seven and
58:45
Speaker 1: of the abortive efforts to induce the Emir to comply
58:48
Speaker 1: with our demands, because it is evident that if he
58:51
Speaker 1: continued to resist, compulsion must almost inevitably ensue. At about
58:57
Speaker 1: the same time, Quetta in the bolamb was occupied by
59:00
Speaker 1: a considerable British force, which was naturally regarded as a
59:04
Speaker 1: threat on Afghanistan. A concentration of troops also took place
59:09
Speaker 1: in the northern Punjab, and preparations were made for the
59:13
Speaker 1: construction of bridges over the Indus. All these were indications
59:17
Speaker 1: of coming war. It must also be noted that our
59:20
Speaker 1: relations with Russia in Europe were much strained at the time,
59:25
Speaker 1: so that probably the preparations in India were in some
59:27
Speaker 1: degree due to the apprehension of war in other parts
59:30
Speaker 1: of the world. In the summer of eighteen seventy eight,
59:35
Speaker 1: a Russian envoy arrived at Kabul, which under the circumstances
59:40
Speaker 1: is hardly to be wondered at. Some months, however, elapsed
59:44
Speaker 1: and it was not until November eighteen seventy eight that
59:47
Speaker 1: war was declared. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, in his proclamation,
59:51
Speaker 1: stated that for ten years we had been friendly to
59:55
Speaker 1: Shi Ali, had assisted him with money and arms, and
59:59
Speaker 1: had secured for him formal recognition of his northern frontier
1:00:02
Speaker 1: by Russia. It went on to state that in return,
1:00:07
Speaker 1: he had requited us with active ill will, had closed
1:00:11
Speaker 1: the passes and allowed British traders to be plundered, and
1:00:14
Speaker 1: had endeavored to stir up religious hatred against us. It
1:00:18
Speaker 1: then pointed out that whilst refusing a British mission, he
1:00:22
Speaker 1: had received one from Russia, and ended by saying that
1:00:25
Speaker 1: we had no quarrel with the Afghans, but only with
1:00:28
Speaker 1: ser Ali himself. From official correspondents published subsequently footnote Parliamentary Papers, Afghanistan,
1:00:37
Speaker 1: eighteen eighty one, number two, Chapter two eight one one,
1:00:42
Speaker 1: it appeared that in entering Afghanistan our chief object at
1:00:45
Speaker 1: the outset was to establish what was called a strategical
1:00:49
Speaker 1: triangle by the occupation of Kabul, Ghuzni and Jalalabad. And
1:00:54
Speaker 1: it was stated that by holding this position, entrenched behind
1:00:58
Speaker 1: a rampart of mountains, we should have the power of
1:01:01
Speaker 1: debouching on the plains of the Oxus against Russia and
1:01:04
Speaker 1: Central Asia. It is difficult, said Lord Lytton, to imagine
1:01:09
Speaker 1: a more commanding strategical position. The events of war, however,
1:01:14
Speaker 1: soon put an end to this somewhat fanciful strategy. In
1:01:19
Speaker 1: November eighteen seventy eight, the British forces entered the country
1:01:23
Speaker 1: by three main routes, the Kaiber, the Korum and the Bolam,
1:01:28
Speaker 1: and hard fighting at once ensued on the two northern ones.
1:01:32
Speaker 1: The results were immediate. Sheer Ali fled northwards and died
1:01:36
Speaker 1: soon after. His son Yakub Khan assumed temporarily the position
1:01:41
Speaker 1: of Amir but in the convulsed state of the country
1:01:45
Speaker 1: he possessed little real power or authority. In May eighteen
1:01:49
Speaker 1: seventy nine he met the British authorities at Gundermuk and
1:01:53
Speaker 1: after considerable consideration, signed a treaty, the chief points of
1:01:58
Speaker 1: which were as follows. The foreign affairs of Afghanistan were
1:02:02
Speaker 1: to be under our guidance and we undertook to support
1:02:05
Speaker 1: the Emir against foreign aggression. British agents were to reside
1:02:09
Speaker 1: in the country, The Korum, Pishin and Sibi valleys were
1:02:13
Speaker 1: assigned to the British government, and finally, Yakoub Khan was
1:02:18
Speaker 1: to receive an annual subsidy of sixty thousand pounds. So far,
1:02:24
Speaker 1: it would appear as if the campaign had at once
1:02:26
Speaker 1: realized the main objects of British policy, but tragic events
1:02:31
Speaker 1: rapidly followed. Active hostilities were resumed and the Treaty of
1:02:36
Speaker 1: Gondermuk became mere waste paper. As a result of the treaty,
1:02:41
Speaker 1: Sir Lewis Kavenieri footnote Afghanistan eighteen eighty one number one
1:02:48
Speaker 1: was appointed our envoy and accompanied by a few officers
1:02:51
Speaker 1: and a small escort, arrived at Kabul in July being
1:02:55
Speaker 1: received in a friendly manner by the Emir, although influences
1:02:59
Speaker 1: added to his presence in the capital soon became apparent. Suddenly,
1:03:04
Speaker 1: on September third, the British residence, he was attacked by
1:03:08
Speaker 1: several Afghan regiments, and after a desperate resistance, Kaviniari and
1:03:13
Speaker 1: the whole of his officers and escort perished. This deplorable event,
1:03:19
Speaker 1: of course, upset all previous arrangements and led to an
1:03:23
Speaker 1: immediate resumption of hostilities. Our troops at once advanced and
1:03:28
Speaker 1: captured Kabul, Yakub Khan voluntarily abdicating and becoming an exile
1:03:33
Speaker 1: in India. Guzni also was occupied shortly afterwards by our
1:03:37
Speaker 1: advance from Kandahar. The government in India, in a dispatch
1:03:42
Speaker 1: in January eighteen eighty, pointed out that in view of
1:03:46
Speaker 1: the complete change in the political situation, it was necessary
1:03:50
Speaker 1: in the first place fully to establish our military position
1:03:54
Speaker 1: in the country. They acknowledged that the hopes entertained of
1:03:58
Speaker 1: establishing a strong, friendly and independent kingdom on our frontier
1:04:02
Speaker 1: had collapsed, and that Afghanistan had fallen to pieces at
1:04:06
Speaker 1: the first blow, its provinces being now disconnected and masterless.
1:04:12
Speaker 1: In view of these unexpected results. They went on to
1:04:15
Speaker 1: recommend the permanent separation of the provinces under separate rulers, and,
1:04:20
Speaker 1: having regard to the special difficulties connected with Herat, advocated
1:04:25
Speaker 1: its being handed over to Persia. This was indeed a
1:04:30
Speaker 1: policy of despair. Lord Hartington, who had become Secretary of
1:04:36
Speaker 1: State for India, writing in May eighteen eighty, summed up
1:04:39
Speaker 1: the situation as follows. It appears that as the result
1:04:44
Speaker 1: of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force,
1:04:49
Speaker 1: and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all
1:04:52
Speaker 1: that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of
1:04:55
Speaker 1: the state, which it was desired to see strong, friendly
1:04:58
Speaker 1: and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in
1:05:03
Speaker 1: regard to one of its provinces, and a condition of
1:05:06
Speaker 1: anarchy throughout the remainder of the country. Long and careful
1:05:12
Speaker 1: consideration was naturally given to the solution of the difficulty
1:05:16
Speaker 1: in which this country found itself. Owing to the untoward
1:05:19
Speaker 1: circumstances just related, two important decisions were, however, ultimately arrived
1:05:25
Speaker 1: at footnote Afghanistan eighteen eighty one one. One that authority
1:05:32
Speaker 1: in Afghanistan and the unity of its provinces should as
1:05:36
Speaker 1: far as possible, be restored by the appointment of a
1:05:38
Speaker 1: new Amir. And Abdul Rahman, a nephew of Sher Ali,
1:05:43
Speaker 1: who had been for twelve years in exile in Bakara,
1:05:46
Speaker 1: was invited to Kabul and was supported by US in
1:05:49
Speaker 1: assuming the title. The chief conditions were that his foreign
1:05:53
Speaker 1: policy was to be under our guidance, that no English
1:05:57
Speaker 1: officers were to reside as our representatives in our Afghanistan,
1:06:01
Speaker 1: and that he was to receive a subsidy. Two that
1:06:05
Speaker 1: the British troops should be withdrawn as soon as the
1:06:08
Speaker 1: pacification of the country would permit. This decision was recommended
1:06:12
Speaker 1: not only by the Viceroy, the Marquis of Rippon, but
1:06:15
Speaker 1: by the higher officers who had held command during the war.
1:06:20
Speaker 1: Sir Donald Stewart, who was in Chief Command, and Sir
1:06:23
Speaker 1: Frederic Roberts both concurred in our withdrawal from the country.
1:06:27
Speaker 1: The Kaiber Pass was to be held by subsidized tribes,
1:06:31
Speaker 1: and the Korum Valley to be altogether abandoned, the independence
1:06:35
Speaker 1: of the tribes being in each case recognized. Sir John Watson,
1:06:40
Speaker 1: who was in command in that valley, pointed out that
1:06:42
Speaker 1: as a route from India into Afghanistan it was practically useless.
1:06:47
Speaker 1: As a further argument in favor of withdrawal, it may
1:06:50
Speaker 1: be well to allude to the fact that the men
1:06:52
Speaker 1: of our native regiments were sick of serving in Afghanistan,
1:06:56
Speaker 1: far away from their homes, and that it would be
1:06:59
Speaker 1: impolitic to keep them there. Some differences of opinion existed
1:07:05
Speaker 1: as to whether we should relinquish possession of Kandahar, but
1:07:08
Speaker 1: as it was four hundred miles from the Indus in
1:07:11
Speaker 1: a foreign country, and as our remaining there would not
1:07:14
Speaker 1: only be hateful to the Afghans, but in a military
1:07:17
Speaker 1: sense would be dangerous and costly. Its final abandonment was
1:07:21
Speaker 1: decided on the Valley of pishin between Kandahar and Quetta,
1:07:26
Speaker 1: being alone retained by the British government. So ended the
1:07:30
Speaker 1: Great War of eighteen seventy eight to eighty. At its
1:07:34
Speaker 1: close we had over seventy thousand men in Afghanistan or
1:07:38
Speaker 1: on the border in reserve, and even then we really
1:07:41
Speaker 1: only held the territory within range of our guns. The
1:07:45
Speaker 1: whole country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy. Whilst
1:07:49
Speaker 1: the total cost of the war exceeded twenty million sterling,
1:07:53
Speaker 1: being about the same amount as had been expended in
1:07:56
Speaker 1: the former Great War of eighteen thirty nine to forty one.
1:08:01
Speaker 1: The military operations in themselves have been conducted throughout with
1:08:04
Speaker 1: great skill in a most difficult country, and the troops,
1:08:08
Speaker 1: both British and Native, had proved themselves admirable soldiers. But
1:08:13
Speaker 1: as regards the policy which led us into war, it
1:08:16
Speaker 1: appears to have been as unjust in principle as it
1:08:19
Speaker 1: was unfortunate in result. The facts, however, speak for themselves.
1:08:28
Speaker 1: End of Chapter two, Chapter three of Indian Frontier Policy.
1:08:43
Speaker 1: This is a LibriVox recording. All liberrivox recordings are in
1:08:47
Speaker 1: the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please
1:08:51
Speaker 1: visit librevox dot org. Indian Frontier Policy and Historical Sketch
1:08:59
Speaker 1: by General Sir John Adai, gcb RA. Chapter three Frontier
1:09:05
Speaker 1: Policy since the Second Afghan War, including the expedition to Chitrau,
1:09:11
Speaker 1: covering further advance of Russia merv occupied Sir West Ridgeway's
1:09:18
Speaker 1: Frontier Commission of eighteen eighty five, the Durand Agreement with
1:09:22
Speaker 1: Abdul Rahman, the chitral Expedition of eighteen ninety five and
1:09:26
Speaker 1: its results a sudden outbreak of frontier tribes eighteen ninety seven.
1:09:33
Speaker 1: The reaction after the war naturally inclined the authorities in
1:09:37
Speaker 1: both countries to leave frontier policy alone at all events.
1:09:42
Speaker 1: For the time. Our professed object for years had been
1:09:46
Speaker 1: to make Afghanistan strong, friendly, and independent. The first had
1:09:51
Speaker 1: certainly not been accomplished, and the other two were doubtful still.
1:09:56
Speaker 1: By patients, conciliation and subsidies, we might, in the course
1:10:00
Speaker 1: of time that the wounds we had inflicted would gradually
1:10:03
Speaker 1: be healed and a more stable condition ensued. For a
1:10:09
Speaker 1: short period it was so, But then the old bugbear
1:10:12
Speaker 1: of Russian advance over the dreary wastes of Central Asia
1:10:16
Speaker 1: again supervened and exercised its malign influence on our policy.
1:10:22
Speaker 1: In eighteen eighty one and the following years, Russia, whilst
1:10:26
Speaker 1: completing her conquests and improving her communications in the southwestern
1:10:31
Speaker 1: part of Central Asia, became involved in somewhat prolonged hostilities
1:10:36
Speaker 1: with the Tekee Turkemans, ending in their subjugation and in
1:10:40
Speaker 1: the occupation of the long desolate strip of country extending
1:10:44
Speaker 1: eastwards from the Caspian which had hitherto been independent. A
1:10:49
Speaker 1: railway was gradually constructed from the vicinity of Krasnovodsk on
1:10:54
Speaker 1: the Caspian towards Samarkand. Merv, formerly a city of importance,
1:10:59
Speaker 1: but of late, a mere village in the desert, was
1:11:02
Speaker 1: also occupied. These acquisitions of Russia, accomplished in districts far
1:11:07
Speaker 1: removed from India, would not appear to involve any special
1:11:11
Speaker 1: consideration on our part. But as the southern frontiers of
1:11:15
Speaker 1: Russia thus became conterminous for a long distance with northern
1:11:19
Speaker 1: Persia and also with some districts of Afghanistan, their new
1:11:23
Speaker 1: position was regarded as possibly involving designs against our Indian Empire,
1:11:28
Speaker 1: and remonstrances were made by US, more especially as regards
1:11:32
Speaker 1: the occupation of Merv footnote Central Asia number two, eighteen
1:11:37
Speaker 1: eighty five. In a strategical point of view, the question
1:11:41
Speaker 1: would not appear to be of much importance and would
1:11:44
Speaker 1: probably have dropped. But in early eighteen eighty five the
1:11:48
Speaker 1: Russians attacked and drove the Afghan troops out of Peenje,
1:11:52
Speaker 1: a small, hitherto almost unknown village in the desert. It
1:11:57
Speaker 1: was a high handed measure, and the relations between between
1:12:00
Speaker 1: the two governments, British and Russian, which were already rather strained,
1:12:04
Speaker 1: became critical, and war at one moment appeared to be
1:12:07
Speaker 1: almost inevitable. It is not necessary, nor would it be desirable, now,
1:12:13
Speaker 1: to recapitulate the details of this serious crisis, because, happily,
1:12:18
Speaker 1: owing to the prudence exercised by both governments, the danger
1:12:22
Speaker 1: gradually passed away, a joint commission being agreed on to
1:12:26
Speaker 1: meet on the frontier and to report as to its delimitation.
1:12:30
Speaker 1: It may, however, be as well to mention that it
1:12:33
Speaker 1: seems rather doubtful whether Pejay at the time absolutely belonged
1:12:37
Speaker 1: to Afghanistan. Frontiers in the east are proverbially uncertain and shifting,
1:12:43
Speaker 1: and in our own official maps, not very long before
1:12:46
Speaker 1: the occurrences in question, it was marked as outside the
1:12:50
Speaker 1: Afghan border. Colonel Stewart, reporting in eighteen eighty four on
1:12:55
Speaker 1: the northern frontier of Afghanistan and alluding to Pejay, said
1:12:59
Speaker 1: that it was inhabited by Turkmans, and he thus described
1:13:03
Speaker 1: the position. The state of affairs seems to have been
1:13:07
Speaker 1: that the Turkmans acknowledged that they were squatting on Afghan
1:13:10
Speaker 1: land and were liable to pay taxes, and each year
1:13:14
Speaker 1: they paid something as an acknowledgment of Afghan rights. But
1:13:17
Speaker 1: so long as this was done, the Afghans looked upon
1:13:20
Speaker 1: them as a protection against the Teke further north, and
1:13:23
Speaker 1: left them very much to themselves. The appointment of a
1:13:30
Speaker 1: joint commission of Russian and British officers to delimit the
1:13:33
Speaker 1: northern frontiers of Afghanistan proved of great value, not only
1:13:38
Speaker 1: in gaining information regarding districts hitherto but little known, but
1:13:42
Speaker 1: also because its conjoint work tended to engender feelings of
1:13:46
Speaker 1: respect and goodwill between the two nations concerned. Its labours
1:13:51
Speaker 1: commenced in the autumn of eighteen eighty five, and the
1:13:55
Speaker 1: report of Sir west Ridgeway, the British commissioner, is full
1:13:59
Speaker 1: of interest and encouragement. In an article in the Nineteenth
1:14:03
Speaker 1: Century of October eighteen eighty seven, on the completion of
1:14:07
Speaker 1: his work, he gives some details of the country and
1:14:10
Speaker 1: also of the position of Russia in Central Asia, which
1:14:13
Speaker 1: are worth quoting. As to the Afghan border, he says,
1:14:17
Speaker 1: quote the three or four hundred miles of country through
1:14:20
Speaker 1: which the new northwestern frontier of Afghanistan runs is a sandy, treeless,
1:14:26
Speaker 1: waterless desert, except where it is traversed from south to
1:14:30
Speaker 1: north by the heiry Rood, the Myrgab and the Oxus.
1:14:34
Speaker 1: The only cultivable land is on the banks of these rivers.
1:14:38
Speaker 1: But in springtime, after the winter snows have melted, the
1:14:42
Speaker 1: intervening plains afford good grazing for sheep. But perhaps the
1:14:47
Speaker 1: most important part of his article is his view of
1:14:50
Speaker 1: the position of Russia in Central Asia. Quote. If any
1:14:54
Speaker 1: Russian general were so reckless as to attempt the invasion
1:14:58
Speaker 1: of India, lying on the single line of lightly constructed
1:15:02
Speaker 1: rails which connects the Caspian with the Oxus, and which
1:15:06
Speaker 1: are liable in sommer to be blocked by the moving
1:15:08
Speaker 1: sands of the desert, and in winter by the falling
1:15:11
Speaker 1: snows of heaven. If relying on this frail and precarious base,
1:15:17
Speaker 1: he were to move an army through the barren plains
1:15:19
Speaker 1: bordering the Oxus, and leaving in his rear the various,
1:15:23
Speaker 1: hostile and excited races of Central Asia, he were to
1:15:27
Speaker 1: cross the difficult passes of the Hindu Kush and entangle
1:15:31
Speaker 1: his army into the barren mountain homes of the fanatical
1:15:34
Speaker 1: and treacherous Afghan. Then, indeed, our fortunate generals may well
1:15:39
Speaker 1: congratulate themselves that the Lord has delivered the enemy into
1:15:43
Speaker 1: their hand. Whilst, however, his conclusions as to the military
1:15:50
Speaker 1: weakness of Russia in that part of the world are
1:15:52
Speaker 1: clear and decisive enough, he at the same time does
1:15:56
Speaker 1: full justice to the good work which she is carrying
1:15:59
Speaker 1: out in that vast area. He says, quote, hitherto, Russia's
1:16:04
Speaker 1: advance in Central Asia has been the triumph of civilization.
1:16:09
Speaker 1: Wherever she has planted her flag, slavery has ceased to exist.
1:16:14
Speaker 1: This was keenly brought home to us in the course
1:16:16
Speaker 1: of our travels. For hundreds of miles before we reached
1:16:19
Speaker 1: her At, we found the country desolated and depopulated by
1:16:23
Speaker 1: Turkmen raids. While even in the Herat Valley we continually
1:16:27
Speaker 1: came across the fathers and brothers of men who had
1:16:30
Speaker 1: been carried off from their peaceful fields by man stealing
1:16:34
Speaker 1: Turkmans and sold into slavery many hundred miles away. All
1:16:39
Speaker 1: this has ceased since the Russian occupation of merv The
1:16:43
Speaker 1: cruel slave trade has been stamped out. Lord Salisbury, speaking
1:16:50
Speaker 1: in eighteen eighty seven at the conclusion of the frontier
1:16:53
Speaker 1: delimitation happily described the situation as follows. Quote. I value
1:17:00
Speaker 1: the settlement for this reason. Not that I attach much
1:17:03
Speaker 1: importance to the square miles of desert land with which
1:17:06
Speaker 1: we have been dealing, and which probably after ten generations
1:17:09
Speaker 1: of mankind, will not yield the slightest value to any
1:17:13
Speaker 1: human being. But the settlement indicates on both sides that
1:17:17
Speaker 1: spirit which in the two governments is consistent with continued peace.
1:17:22
Speaker 1: There is abundant room for both governments, if they would
1:17:25
Speaker 1: only think so. What a pity that some statesmen could
1:17:30
Speaker 1: not have persuaded England to that effect fifty years before.
1:17:36
Speaker 1: During the next few years, no events of special importance
1:17:40
Speaker 1: occurred to affect our general frontier policy in India so
1:17:44
Speaker 1: far as Russia and Afghanistan proper are concerned. The ample
1:17:48
Speaker 1: information we now possess of the relative power and position
1:17:51
Speaker 1: of each country, and the experience gained in bygone wars,
1:17:56
Speaker 1: enable us to form a correct judgment of the great
1:17:59
Speaker 1: strength of our ms in the East. And it is
1:18:02
Speaker 1: to be hoped that in the future we shall hear
1:18:04
Speaker 1: less of those alarmist views which have so frequently led
1:18:08
Speaker 1: us into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions. Russia and England
1:18:13
Speaker 1: are now happily on friendly terms, and Abdul Rahman, the
1:18:17
Speaker 1: Amir of Kabul, although his position is difficult in the
1:18:20
Speaker 1: midst of a turbulent people, has proved himself a loyal neighbour.
1:18:26
Speaker 1: But another cloud has appeared on the horizon, and our
1:18:29
Speaker 1: troubles with the intervening frontier tribes are now apparently worse
1:18:33
Speaker 1: than ever. From accounts already given of those who dwell
1:18:37
Speaker 1: along the border, it is evident that although our differences
1:18:40
Speaker 1: with them during past years have been frequent and often serious,
1:18:44
Speaker 1: they have been more or less of a local character.
1:18:47
Speaker 1: Troublesome as our neighbours have proved still, they have no
1:18:51
Speaker 1: power of inflicting serious injury or of endangering our rule.
1:18:56
Speaker 1: Under these circumstances, the best policy, while firm repressing their
1:19:01
Speaker 1: predatory interests, is to leave them alone. In the absence
1:19:06
Speaker 1: of full official information as to the origin of recent
1:19:09
Speaker 1: difficulties which have culminated in the present frontier war, it
1:19:14
Speaker 1: is only possible to speak in general terms. It may
1:19:17
Speaker 1: be mentioned in the first place, that, owing to the
1:19:20
Speaker 1: uncertain line of demarcation between the territories of the Emir
1:19:24
Speaker 1: of Kabul and those of his independent tribal neighbours. Constant
1:19:28
Speaker 1: feuds and local hostilities occurred from time to time in
1:19:32
Speaker 1: the mountains, and with a view of defining their respective spheres,
1:19:37
Speaker 1: the Government of India in eighteen ninety three sent a
1:19:40
Speaker 1: mission to Kabul for the purpose. This in itself would
1:19:43
Speaker 1: appear to have been a reasonable step, and the Durand
1:19:47
Speaker 1: Agreement which ensued but which has not been published, would,
1:19:51
Speaker 1: it was hoped, tend to a cessation of conflicts between
1:19:55
Speaker 1: the Emir's subjects and their neighbours. But there is a
1:19:58
Speaker 1: further aspect of the question. So far as is known,
1:20:02
Speaker 1: not only were the respective borders laid down, but it
1:20:05
Speaker 1: is understood that in many cases the intervening tribes are
1:20:09
Speaker 1: now assumed to be what is termed within the sphere
1:20:13
Speaker 1: of British influence. In maps recently published presumably with some authority,
1:20:19
Speaker 1: vast mountainous districts are now included in this somewhat mysterious phrase,
1:20:24
Speaker 1: for instance, the Korum Valley, the Samana Range, the countries
1:20:29
Speaker 1: of the Euphrates and the Momans, the districts of Chitral, Bajor, deer, Swat,
1:20:35
Speaker 1: Bonnair and others are all included within it, and in
1:20:39
Speaker 1: many instances fortified positions occupied by British troops are to
1:20:43
Speaker 1: be found either within or along their borders. Surely this
1:20:48
Speaker 1: opens out a wide question, and it would be interesting
1:20:52
Speaker 1: to know whether in the discussions at Kabul the chiefs
1:20:55
Speaker 1: of the intervening tribes were present, and whether they acquiesced
1:20:59
Speaker 1: not only in the n new boundaries, but also in
1:21:01
Speaker 1: being included as within our sphere of influence. It is
1:21:05
Speaker 1: evident it should have been a tripartite and not a
1:21:08
Speaker 1: dual agreement. It is perfectly well known and has been
1:21:12
Speaker 1: proved by long experience, that these frontier tribes value their
1:21:16
Speaker 1: independence and liberties beyond everything else and will not submit
1:21:21
Speaker 1: peacefully to interference. And if they were not consulted in
1:21:24
Speaker 1: the arrangements just described, we may begin to trace the
1:21:28
Speaker 1: origin of the present crisis. Although as I have explained,
1:21:33
Speaker 1: we are unable from want of official information to deal
1:21:36
Speaker 1: fully with the larger topic of recent border policy, we have,
1:21:40
Speaker 1: at all events ample details as regards the Chitrall question
1:21:44
Speaker 1: in the parliamentary papers published footnote Northwest Frontier Chitrae eighteen
1:21:50
Speaker 1: ninety five. It appears that so long ago as eighteen
1:21:55
Speaker 1: seventy six, the ruler of Chitree voluntarily tendered his allegiance
1:21:59
Speaker 1: to them the Maharaja of Kashmir, and endeavoured, but without
1:22:03
Speaker 1: success to persuade the neighboring chiefs of Swat, Bajur and
1:22:07
Speaker 1: Deir to follow his example. Now, Chitraal and Kashmir are
1:22:12
Speaker 1: not only far apart, but are separated by lofty mountain
1:22:15
Speaker 1: ranges inhabited by other tribes, so that this sudden offer
1:22:20
Speaker 1: of vassilage appears rather inexplicable. It transpired, however, a few
1:22:25
Speaker 1: years afterwards, that his real motive in seeking the friendship
1:22:29
Speaker 1: of Kashmir was due to his fear of aggression by
1:22:31
Speaker 1: the Amir of Kabul footnote ibid, Page forty six. The
1:22:37
Speaker 1: government of India at the time encouraged this somewhat sentimental friendship, and,
1:22:43
Speaker 1: in order to obtain influence over the intervening tribes, established
1:22:47
Speaker 1: a fort at Gilgit, in an almost inaccessible position, not
1:22:51
Speaker 1: far from the snowy crests of the Hindu Kush. The position, however,
1:22:56
Speaker 1: proved to be costly and also dangerous from unfriendly neighbours.
1:23:00
Speaker 1: And as after three years experience no special object was attained,
1:23:05
Speaker 1: it was withdrawn in eighteen eighty one. In eighteen eighty nine,
1:23:10
Speaker 1: the old fears of possible Russian aggression again revived and
1:23:14
Speaker 1: Gilgit was reoccupied with the strong detachment of Kashmir troops
1:23:19
Speaker 1: accompanied by several English officers. The government of India pointed
1:23:23
Speaker 1: out that the development of Russian military resources in Asia
1:23:27
Speaker 1: rendered it necessary to watch the passes over the mountains
1:23:31
Speaker 1: in order to prevent what was called a kudu mains
1:23:34
Speaker 1: from the north. In short, they dreaded the march of
1:23:37
Speaker 1: a Russian army over the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush,
1:23:41
Speaker 1: a region where nature has constructed for us perhaps one
1:23:44
Speaker 1: of the most formidable frontiers in the world. Friendship with
1:23:49
Speaker 1: the ruler of Chitraal was also cultivated. He was given
1:23:52
Speaker 1: an annual subsidy and a present of five hundred snyders,
1:23:56
Speaker 1: being visited also by English officers. Was even contemplated at
1:24:01
Speaker 1: the time to construct a direct road from his capital
1:24:04
Speaker 1: to our frontier near Peshawar, but as he was suspicious
1:24:08
Speaker 1: and as his neighbours in Swat, Bajur and others would
1:24:12
Speaker 1: probably have objected, the suggestion was happily postponed. In October
1:24:18
Speaker 1: eighteen ninety two, the ruler of Chitrall died and after
1:24:23
Speaker 1: the usual family contests and intrigues, nisamul Mulk, his son,
1:24:28
Speaker 1: established his authority in the country. In January eighteen ninety three,
1:24:33
Speaker 1: Dr Robertson arrived at Chitrall as our representative, accompanied by
1:24:38
Speaker 1: two officers and fifty sikhs. Although he was received in
1:24:42
Speaker 1: a friendly manner by the new ruler, his account of
1:24:45
Speaker 1: the state of affairs in April was discouraging and ominous.
1:24:49
Speaker 1: He wrote, we seem to be on a volcano here.
1:24:54
Speaker 1: Matters are no longer improving. The atmosphere of chitral is
1:24:58
Speaker 1: one of conspiracy and intrigue. A few weeks later he
1:25:03
Speaker 1: gave a more cheerful account, and although he described the
1:25:06
Speaker 1: people as fickle, he considered that Englishmen were safe. It
1:25:10
Speaker 1: became evident, however, that the Nizam ul Mulk was weak
1:25:14
Speaker 1: and unpopular, and Dr Robertson described the country as quote
1:25:18
Speaker 1: in a distracted state and torn by factions. The reports
1:25:24
Speaker 1: of our agent, in short, would seem to prove that
1:25:26
Speaker 1: he was in a false and dangerous position. With a
1:25:29
Speaker 1: small escort far away in the mountains, about two hundred
1:25:34
Speaker 1: miles from our frontier. In January eighteen ninety five, the
1:25:39
Speaker 1: Nizam was murdered by his brother, and the whole country
1:25:42
Speaker 1: at once again fell into anarchy. Dr Robertson, who had
1:25:47
Speaker 1: been temporarily absent but had returned in February, was besieged
1:25:51
Speaker 1: in a fort with his escort, which however had been
1:25:54
Speaker 1: increased to about two hundred ninety men. The crisis had
1:25:58
Speaker 1: come at last, and there was no time to spare.
1:26:02
Speaker 1: A strong force under Sir Robert Lowe was assembled at
1:26:06
Speaker 1: Peshawar and crossed the frontier on April first. It must
1:26:10
Speaker 1: be pointed out that in proceeding to Chitraal, the British
1:26:13
Speaker 1: troops had necessarily to pass through a difficult mountainous country
1:26:18
Speaker 1: inhabited by independent tribes, and the Government of India issued
1:26:22
Speaker 1: a proclamation in which they pointed out that their sole
1:26:25
Speaker 1: object quote is to put an end to the present
1:26:29
Speaker 1: and to prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitraal territory,
1:26:33
Speaker 1: and that as soon as this object has been attained,
1:26:35
Speaker 1: the force would be withdrawn. The proclamation went on to
1:26:40
Speaker 1: say that the government quote have no intention of permanently
1:26:44
Speaker 1: occupying any territory through which Murakhan's misconduct may now force
1:26:49
Speaker 1: them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of
1:26:52
Speaker 1: the tribes. The military operations were conducted with great skill
1:26:58
Speaker 1: and rapidity, and Doctor Robertson's small garrison, which at one
1:27:02
Speaker 1: time had been hard pressed, was saved. A small force
1:27:06
Speaker 1: under Colonel Kelley, which had left Gilged, having by a
1:27:10
Speaker 1: daring and successful march, arrived just before the main body
1:27:14
Speaker 1: from Peshawar. The short campaign having thus accomplished its object,
1:27:19
Speaker 1: the gradual withdrawal of the British troops in accordance with
1:27:22
Speaker 1: the proclamation would seem to have been a natural sequence
1:27:26
Speaker 1: in the weak, distracted state of the country, and in
1:27:29
Speaker 1: the assumed necessity of not losing our influence in those
1:27:33
Speaker 1: distant regions. The Government of India, however, considered that a
1:27:37
Speaker 1: road from our frontier to Chitrial should be made and
1:27:41
Speaker 1: certain positions retained in order to guard it. This vital
1:27:45
Speaker 1: question having been carefully considered at home, the Secretary of
1:27:49
Speaker 1: State for India on June thirteenth, eighteen ninety five, telegraphed
1:27:53
Speaker 1: to the Viceroy that Her Majesty's government regretted they were
1:27:56
Speaker 1: unable to concur in the proposal. He went on to
1:28:00
Speaker 1: say that quote no military force or European agent shall
1:28:04
Speaker 1: be kept at Chitraw, that Chitrall should not be fortified,
1:28:09
Speaker 1: and that no road should be made between Peshwar and Chitraw.
1:28:13
Speaker 1: He added that all positions beyond our frontier should be
1:28:17
Speaker 1: evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed. It so happened that
1:28:23
Speaker 1: within a few days of this important decision, a change
1:28:27
Speaker 1: of government occurred at home and the question was reconsidered,
1:28:31
Speaker 1: and on August the ninth, fresh instructions were telegraphed to India,
1:28:35
Speaker 1: by which it was ordered that British troops should be
1:28:38
Speaker 1: stationed at the Malakund Pass leading into Swat, and that
1:28:42
Speaker 1: other posts up to and including Chitraw should also be
1:28:46
Speaker 1: held and a road made through the country. In short,
1:28:50
Speaker 1: the previous decision was entirely reversed. Before going further, it
1:28:55
Speaker 1: may be as well to point out that this is
1:28:57
Speaker 1: no mere question between one political party and another. It
1:29:02
Speaker 1: goes far beyond that, and we may feel assured that
1:29:05
Speaker 1: in considering the subject, both governments were actuated by a
1:29:08
Speaker 1: desire to do what was considered best in the interests
1:29:11
Speaker 1: of the Indian Empire. Still, it is I think impossible
1:29:16
Speaker 1: not to regard the ultimate decision as very unfortunate and
1:29:21
Speaker 1: as likely to lead to serious consequences. In a mere
1:29:24
Speaker 1: military point of view. It was a repetition of the
1:29:27
Speaker 1: policy pursued of recent years of establishing isolated military posts
1:29:32
Speaker 1: in countries belonging to others or in their vicinity, inevitably
1:29:36
Speaker 1: tending to aggravate the tribes, and which in time of trouble,
1:29:41
Speaker 1: instead of increasing our strength, are and have been the
1:29:44
Speaker 1: cause of anxiety to ourselves. Therefore, not only as a
1:29:48
Speaker 1: matter of policy, but in a purely military sense, the
1:29:51
Speaker 1: arrangement was dangerous. I would further observe that many officers,
1:29:57
Speaker 1: both civil and military, men the highest character and long
1:30:01
Speaker 1: experience in the punjabandits borders, did not hesitate to express
1:30:06
Speaker 1: their opinions at the time that retribution would speedily follow,
1:30:10
Speaker 1: and their anticipations appeared now to have been verified. Suddenly,
1:30:15
Speaker 1: not many weeks ago, the people of Swat, who were
1:30:17
Speaker 1: said to be friendly, violently attacked our position on the Malakund, losing,
1:30:22
Speaker 1: it is said three thousand men in the attempt, and
1:30:26
Speaker 1: also nearly captured a fortified post a few miles distant
1:30:30
Speaker 1: at Chakdara. Not only that, but this unexpected outbreak was
1:30:34
Speaker 1: followed by hostilities on the part of the tribes in Bajur,
1:30:38
Speaker 1: and by the Mohmans north of Peshawar, and also by
1:30:42
Speaker 1: the Aphrades, who, subsidized by ours, had for years guarded
1:30:46
Speaker 1: the celebrated Kaiba. Again, the tribes of the Samana range
1:30:50
Speaker 1: and others to the west of Kohat rose in arms,
1:30:54
Speaker 1: and a very large force of British troops had to
1:30:57
Speaker 1: be pushed forward in all haste to quell this great
1:31:00
Speaker 1: combined attack on the part of our neighbours. General Sir
1:31:04
Speaker 1: Neville Chamberlain, perhaps the greatest living authority on frontier questions,
1:31:09
Speaker 1: has written quite recently pointing out that never previously had
1:31:13
Speaker 1: there been a semblance of unity of action amongst the
1:31:16
Speaker 1: different tribesmen footnote Saturday Review, thirtieth of October eighteen ninety seven.
1:31:24
Speaker 1: There surely must have been some very strong feeling of
1:31:27
Speaker 1: resentment and injustice which brought so many tribesmen for the
1:31:31
Speaker 1: first time to combine in opposition to what they evidently
1:31:35
Speaker 1: considered an invasion of their country. As regards the Euphrates,
1:31:39
Speaker 1: who are spoken of as treacherous and faithless, it must
1:31:42
Speaker 1: be borne in mind that in eighteen eighty one we
1:31:45
Speaker 1: specially recognized their independence footnote Afghanistan, Number one, eighteen eighty one,
1:31:52
Speaker 1: page fifty seven, and have ever since subsidized them for
1:31:56
Speaker 1: the special purpose of guarding the commerce through the Kaiber,
1:32:00
Speaker 1: a duty which they have faithfully carried out until the
1:32:02
Speaker 1: present summer. Lord Lytton, who was Viceroy when the arrangement
1:32:07
Speaker 1: was proposed at the end of the war, wrote in
1:32:10
Speaker 1: eighteen eighty footnote ibid, Page sixty two quote, I sincerely
1:32:15
Speaker 1: hope that the Government of India will not be easily
1:32:18
Speaker 1: persuaded to keep troops permanently stationed in the Kaiba. I
1:32:22
Speaker 1: feel little doubt that such a course would tend rather
1:32:25
Speaker 1: to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of
1:32:29
Speaker 1: troops would be a constant provocation to attack. Large bodies
1:32:33
Speaker 1: would die like flies. I believe that the past tribes themselves,
1:32:38
Speaker 1: if properly managed, will prove the best guardians of the pass,
1:32:43
Speaker 1: and be able as well as willing to keep it
1:32:45
Speaker 1: open for us if we make it worth their while
1:32:47
Speaker 1: to do so. Many of these very men and those
1:32:52
Speaker 1: of other tribes on the frontier have for years enlisted
1:32:56
Speaker 1: in our ranks and have proved to be good soldiers.
1:32:59
Speaker 1: Repair peat that some strong cause must have influenced them
1:33:03
Speaker 1: suddenly to break out into war. Until the present military
1:33:08
Speaker 1: operations have been brought to a close, and until full
1:33:12
Speaker 1: official information has been given of the circumstances which have
1:33:16
Speaker 1: led to them, it is not possible to pronounce a
1:33:19
Speaker 1: final judgment. Still, it seems to me that we have
1:33:22
Speaker 1: strong grounds for believing that the border policy of late
1:33:26
Speaker 1: years has in many instances been too aggressive and regardless
1:33:30
Speaker 1: of the rights of the tribes, and that the course
1:33:33
Speaker 1: finally pursued of the retention of fortified posts through Swat
1:33:38
Speaker 1: and Bajur to Chitral has been the ultimate cause which
1:33:42
Speaker 1: has excited the people against us and produced so great
1:33:46
Speaker 1: and costly a boarder war. It must also not be
1:33:49
Speaker 1: forgotten that even now we are merely on the fringe,
1:33:52
Speaker 1: as it were, of the question, and that if we
1:33:55
Speaker 1: persist in forcing ourselves forward, we shall have many a
1:33:59
Speaker 1: costly campaign to undertake far away in distant, little known regions,
1:34:04
Speaker 1: more difficult and more inaccessible, Even than those in which
1:34:07
Speaker 1: we now find ourselves. On the whole, it appears to
1:34:12
Speaker 1: me that we should, as far as possible, withdraw our
1:34:15
Speaker 1: isolated posts, so many of which are either within the
1:34:19
Speaker 1: tribal region or along its borders. It is sometimes argued
1:34:24
Speaker 1: that any withdrawal on our part would have a demoralizing
1:34:27
Speaker 1: effect on the tribes, who would ascribe our retirement to
1:34:30
Speaker 1: inability to maintain our positions. Footnote Chitraw, eighteen ninety five,
1:34:36
Speaker 1: page sixty two. The best reply will perhaps be to
1:34:40
Speaker 1: quote the words of Lord Hartington, when under similar circumstances
1:34:44
Speaker 1: it was decided in eighteen eighty one to retire from Kandahar,
1:34:48
Speaker 1: he said footnote Afghanistan number one, eighteen eighty one, page
1:34:53
Speaker 1: ninety two. Quote. The moral effect of a scrupulous adherence
1:34:58
Speaker 1: to declarations which have been made, and a striking and
1:35:02
Speaker 1: convincing proof given to the people and Princes of India
1:35:06
Speaker 1: that the British government have no desire for further annexation
1:35:09
Speaker 1: of territory could not fail to produce a most salutary
1:35:13
Speaker 1: effect in removing the apprehensions and strengthening the attachment of
1:35:18
Speaker 1: our native allies throughout India and on our frontiers. These
1:35:24
Speaker 1: remarks may now be brought to a close. My object
1:35:28
Speaker 1: throughout has been to give an historical summary of the
1:35:31
Speaker 1: various wars and expeditions in which we have been engaged
1:35:35
Speaker 1: during the present century on the northwest frontier of India,
1:35:39
Speaker 1: and of the causes which have led to them. My
1:35:42
Speaker 1: observations are founded on parliamentary official papers and on other
1:35:46
Speaker 1: works of authority, and I hope they may prove useful
1:35:49
Speaker 1: to the public, who have, not, as a rule, time
1:35:53
Speaker 1: to study the intricate details of this difficult subject. I
1:35:57
Speaker 1: have endeavored to prove that the tribes on the frontier
1:36:00
Speaker 1: and the people of Afghanistan have no real power of
1:36:03
Speaker 1: injuring our position in India. And turbulent as they may be,
1:36:07
Speaker 1: a policy of patience, conciliation and subsidies is far more
1:36:12
Speaker 1: likely to attain our object than incessant, costly expeditions into
1:36:16
Speaker 1: their mountains. Our influence over them is already great and
1:36:21
Speaker 1: is increasing year by year. By carefully maintaining the principles
1:36:25
Speaker 1: I have sketched out, we shall gradually obtain their friendship
1:36:29
Speaker 1: and also their support should other dangers ever threaten our dominions.
1:36:34
Speaker 1: We are the rulers of a great empire in the East,
1:36:37
Speaker 1: with its heavy duties and responsibilities, and in devoting ourselves
1:36:42
Speaker 1: to the welfare of the millions under our sway, and
1:36:45
Speaker 1: in developing the resources of the country, we shall do
1:36:48
Speaker 1: far more for the happiness of the people and the
1:36:51
Speaker 1: security of the Empire than by squandering our finances in
1:36:55
Speaker 1: constant expeditions beyond its borders. End of Indian Frontier Policy
1:37:02
Speaker 1: and historical sketch by General Sir John Adai g C
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Speaker 1: b R A