Latest / The Decision Advantage / Maritime Security and Regional Alliances in the Horn of Africa
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- Brian: Welcome to the Decision Advantage, a fusion intelligence podcast by Fernand Consulting. I'm Brian Leclerc, and today I have the honor of welcoming Mr. Solomon Ki Maita, lecturer of international relations and diplomacy at KTEC University Nairobi. Solomon, welcome to the show. Solomon Kimaita: Thank you for having me. Brian: Right. Well Solomon, could you tell us a bit about your experience at the university and your work as a certified professional mediator and specialist in peace and conflict? Solomon Kimaita: Thank you. I'm pretty much engaged in international relations and diplomacy, specializing in peace and conflict. I've also got some certification in professional mediation, where I engage in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. My research interest is in regional security, diplomacy, as well as geopolitical interest in the Horn of Africa. Brian: Now we wanted to have you on today to focus on maritime security in the Red Sea and around the Horn of Africa. Given your background and perspective on the ground, let's start right there at the strait. Western discussions of Bab El Mundeb usually focus on shipping lanes. How do the people and governments along the strait see its importance and what do outsiders most often miss? Solomon Kimaita: Thank you Brian. From a regional perspective, believe the Bal El-Madeb is a strategic gateway and this connects the Red Sea to the Gulf as well as to the Indian Ocean. It also links the Suez Canal to the Asian markets and it is also a gateway to the European markets. So for the governments in the Horn of Africa, They look at it from a perspective of sovereignty. They look at it from a perspective of national income. They're also looking at it in terms of access to markets and also geopolitical influence. For the communities around this trade, it represents a source of livelihoods. These are the fish, these are the engaging small trade and other sources of income. I believe there are two things that outsiders miss out of this. Number one, they just look at the Balalbandeb as a trade corridor. But for many other actors within the region, this is a strategic space that is surrounded by countries, surrounded by governments, and it has a lot of political interest, competing political interest among the actors. The other key thing that most outsiders miss is the strategic importance of the Strait of Amos, which is distinct to the countries around the Strait of Amos. For Djibouti and Ethiopia, that is a means of access to the external market. Ethiopia is a land-lord country. It depends very much on the Bal Elmandeb, you for the Amachadais to get into the country and out of the country. For Eritrean Somali, the same case. It is a main source of livelihood. And for many other countries, this is a source of, you know, spillover effects over conflicts, which may affect their livelihoods and economies. Brian: Right. And you mentioned just the fishing. Yeah, I think that's something that the from the Western perspective, no one's really thinking about that. It's it's all trade lanes and it's it's more than that for those communities, right? Yeah. Solomon Kimaita: There are also quite a number of concerns with the fishing. There is the rise of illegal fishing right now, which many countries are trying to control. Unfortunately, most African countries do not have that capacity, so they still have to depend on the Western countries for much support to get everything right in the Red Sea. Brian: What risks do Western businesses and governments underestimate when operating in or near the horn or being dependent on traffic moving through the Red Sea and and which risks do they overstate? Solomon Kimaita: Thank you. At the top of my mind I see two to three risks that are underestimated. Number one, there is the risk of a prolonged disruption. Most businesses and governments plan for short-term security disruptions, but they, in most cases, overlook the prolonged conflicts. And these have caused long-term commercial disruptions, as well as security disruptions. So the thing is to plan for long-term, as opposed to plan for an event kind of security disruption. The second thing that is underestimated is the assumption that the region is politically heterogeneous or uniform. The Horn of Africa has multiple countries and they have different political systems, political risks and different other aspects. So the moment the region is assessed as a single security actor, then there is the risk of coming up with wrong policies as well as many other assessments. So the risk, I mean the secret is just to look at the on as a diversified countries. that risk could be ignoring the question of local legitimacy. In most cases, Western governments do not consider consulting the local actors or the local people. And so they come up with projects or undertakings that do not reflect the interest of the local people. And this undermines the legitimacy of these projects. So in terms of sustainability, these projects may not hold in the long term. So those three risks would be underestimated. Now, on the other hand, we have risks that are overstated by the Western countries. Number one, as I've already said, there is the risk of treating the Horn of Africa as uniformly dangerous. not all countries in the Horn of Africa are dangerous. So there could be some risk in Djibouti, but Kenya could be safe. There could be some risk in Somalia, but most probably Eritrea could be safe on some fronts. So there is need to look into that so that we don't condemn the Horn of Africa as entirely dangerous. The second risk is the assumption that military protection can actually resolve all the issues in the maritime security. Well, military security is good, but when it comes to addressing the structural issues that affect the North Africa, then there could be need for a little more consideration of a dialogue or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. So while on one hand, the military security can address the need to maintain order. There is need to look into dialogue so as we are able to address the underlying issues for sustainability purposes. Brian: So do you see any good ways to further that communication? Solomon Kimaita: Yes, number one, I think it is important to consider country to country assessment so that you are able to understand the specific security concerns in each country. And there is also need to look at it from a different political and economic risks. Whatever most probably affects Djibouti in terms of economic interests might not necessarily affect Kenya or Ethiopia. There is also need for doing what I would call a contigous test so that you are able to see what would be the cost, for instance, of rerouting vessels. If the Bell Elmadeb is not safe, what could be the probable cost of rerouting There is also need to develop credible partnerships with the locals and these would involve a lot of consultations so that you are able to understand what do the locals in Kenya, what do the locals in Somali, what do the locals in Ethiopia need. so that any projects or any undertaking is still a means to fit those needs. And this is likely to improve a lot of legitimacy and acceptability of the projects. There is also need to strengthen diplomatic relations between the Horn of Africa and many other actors that are involved, and especially the Western countries. While most of the Horn of African countries are struggling in matters of governance and security, I believe that Western countries can step in this space and help them to overcome those challenges for the mutual benefit of these countries. So I believe putting in place those particular aspects would improve the interactions between the West and the Horn of Africa. Brian: Right. Right. Now when regional leaders look at security and economic partnerships, how do they weigh Western reliability against actors like China and Turkey and and other Gulf states? And are those calculations shifting right now due to the political landscape of things? Solomon Kimaita: Thank you. That's a good question. One of the things that is happening not just in the whole of Africa but the entire of Africa is that the governments are becoming increasingly realistic or pragmatic. They are not just aligning for the sake of aligning. They are aligning because of a particular interest. Now, when you look at China, for instance, many African countries are working with China because of infrastructure development, you know, that is improving connectivity, as well as some countries are also considering security measures, for instance, Djibouti. Djibouti is one of the countries that is hosting quite a lot of military bases within the Horn of Africa. When you look at other countries like Turkey, they have a specific interest in specific countries. For instance, in Somalia, they've been working in terms of strengthening defense cooperation between Turkey and Somalia, military training, and this is geared towards stabilizing Somalia, which could be a promising market for Turkey. For most of the Gulf countries, they have diverse interests. Some of them are trying to position themselves as mediators. We've seen countries like Qatar. They're also looking at a market where they can be able to diversify their interests. They are not only looking at energy security, they're also trying to diversify. Matters of food security come into question and all that. For the Western countries, I believe they still retain an advantage because they have technological advancements, have superior intelligence gathering mechanisms, they also retain superior maritime security dynamics, and so they still remain indispensable when it comes to the Horn of Africa. So the point is there is significant shift. And what most African countries are insisting on is to be treated as equal and valuable partners. And the relationships should guarantee mutual returns or mutual advantages to both the Horn of Africa and the Western countries. Brian: Do you see that shifting? Do you do you think that's happening more? Solomon Kimaita: Yes, I see a lot of shifts. And this is because for a long time, the Western countries have been assumed to be quote unquote a bit rigid in terms of engaging African countries. And the Eastern bloc, the China, seems to be more lenient. And that works very well with African countries. There is also a lot of shifts in interest in African countries, regional interest, political interest, and economic interest. Politically, African countries do not want lectures about democracy and all that. It's something that we've already captured. What we need is to have the autonomy to make decisions. And that could be one of the factors that is informing the shift. Economically, most African countries, including the Horn of Africa, are focusing on strengthening regional integration for the purposes of enhancing their bargaining capacity in the globalized world. So we are not really focusing on aid. We are focusing on partners that can actually help us strengthen the regional integration mechanisms and all that. From a regional point of view, we have a lot of security concerns. We have a lot of commercial interest. So again, it is for the Western countries to realign their priorities or their policies to reflect the interest of the African countries. And I believe that could be one of the factors, some of the factors that are defining that change. Brian: Right. When we all work together, things work better, right? Solomon Kimaita: Exactly. Brian: So to wrap up, is there something that you'd want Western executives to better understand from your perspective that we haven't already covered? Solomon Kimaita: Yes, thank you, thank you. There are quite a number of things that the Western countries or executives should be able to capture. Number one is not to separate maritime security from the political and economic realities in the countries surrounding the Bal Elmandeb. Most probably when Western countries tend to focus more on the security aspects, they miss many other aspects. The economic interest of these countries, the livelihood aspects over these countries, the sovereign issues, the state sovereignty issues of these countries, and so on and so forth. So if Western countries are to get it right in the Horn of Africa, then they have to look at the Horn of Africa wholesomely, if I would put it that way, where security issues are not separated from the economic, political, and regional dynamics. The second thing is for the Western countries not to look at the Horn of Africa as wholesomely dangerous. I believe we've been able to dispel that notion that yes, there are some Horn of African countries that are quite insecure, but that does not mean that every other country in the Horn of Africa is insecure. So a case-to-case analysis of different countries would give them opportunities to know where to venture into. I believe in as much as there are security concerns, there are lot of opportunities in the Horn of Africa and that can only be understood if there is a case to case analysis of different countries. That being is the need for reciprocity. While African countries or the Horn of African countries are opening up their markets and their borders, there is need for the Western countries to reciprocate that. As I've said earlier, the Horn of African countries as well as the entire of Africa countries are now becoming much aware of their strategic interest within the international arena. and the desire to be treated as valuable and equal partners. So that reciprocity must be there. And this is going to guarantee long-term relations. It is going to guarantee mutual security needs. And I believe that is going to strengthen the relationship between the Western countries and the Horn of Africa. Yes, I think that would be my take on Brian: Mm-hmm. Solomon Kimaita: the Western countries. Brian: Okay. Well great. that all makes sense. So well thank you for coming on the show from from the other side of the world. Solomon Kimaita: Thank you for having me. Brian: All right. Well thank you for tuning in today, and a reminder that all of our podcasts are available on YouTube, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other services. And you can find links to all those and more at podcast.fern.com. I'm Brian Leclerc, and this has been another episode of The Decision Advantage. Thanks for tuning in.