Latest / Defensive Line Shorts / The Defensive Line Shorts — Episode 4: Adversary-in-the-middle phishing
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_00: Hello, and welcome back to The Defensive Line Shorts,
- 0:03SPEAKER_00: the 10-minute series where we pick one security control,
- 0:06SPEAKER_00: or one breach from history, and dig into it properly.
- 0:10SPEAKER_00: Last time on the Shorts, we talked about passkeys.
- 0:12SPEAKER_00: Today, we're looking at the attack that makes passkeys so important,
- 0:17SPEAKER_00: adversary-in-the-middle phishing.
- 0:19SPEAKER_00: I'm Carter, and I'm an intelligence analyst.
- 0:21SPEAKER_00: I track how attacks work, who's using them, and where they're heading next.
- 0:25SPEAKER_00: With me, as always, is Lizzie.
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: Thanks, Carter.
- 0:28SPEAKER_01: I'm Lizzie and I'm a Blue Teamer.
- 0:31SPEAKER_01: I'll be pulling out the lessons for Defenders and being honest
- 0:34SPEAKER_01: about what each control costs to run.
- 0:36SPEAKER_00: Before we start, a quick note.
- 0:38SPEAKER_00: This briefing is drafted and read by AI, but reviewed and edited by humans.
- 0:44SPEAKER_00: So, what is AITM phishing?
- 0:47SPEAKER_00: Traditional phishing used a fake login page that simply collected passwords.
- 0:51SPEAKER_00: MFA largely killed that off because a password on its own wasn't enough.
- 0:56SPEAKER_00: Adversary in the middle is the answer attackers came up with.
- 0:59SPEAKER_00: Instead of a fake page, the attacker runs a reverse proxy.
- 1:03SPEAKER_00: It sits between the victim and the real login page and passes everything through
- 1:07SPEAKER_00: in both directions.
- 1:08SPEAKER_00: So the victim sees their genuine company sign-in page with the right logo and
- 1:12SPEAKER_00: the right background.
- 1:14SPEAKER_00: They type their password.
- 1:15SPEAKER_00: The real service sends an MFA prompt.
- 1:18SPEAKER_00: They approve it, and they're logged in.
- 1:20SPEAKER_00: But the proxy has seen all of it.
- 1:22SPEAKER_00: Most importantly, it captures the session cookie that the service issues after MFA succeeds.
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: The attacker loads that cookie into their own browser, and they're in.
- 1:31SPEAKER_00: No password prompt, no MFA.
- 1:34SPEAKER_00: What worries me most is how easy this has become.
- 1:37SPEAKER_00: Evil Ginks is an open source framework built for this.
- 1:41SPEAKER_00: Evil Proxy, Tycoon,
- 1:42SPEAKER_00: and others are sold as phishing as a service with templates, hosting, and support.
- 1:47SPEAKER_00: You don't need to be skilled to run an AITM campaign anymore.
- 1:50SPEAKER_00: You need a subscription.
- 1:52SPEAKER_00: And the lure isn't just email.
- 1:54SPEAKER_00: We see links sent over text message,
- 1:56SPEAKER_00: phone calls where the attacker talks the victim through verifying their account,
- 2:00SPEAKER_00: QR codes that move the victim onto their phone,
- 2:03SPEAKER_00: and messages in Teams from external accounts.
- 2:06SPEAKER_00: In January 2026,
- 2:08SPEAKER_00: Microsoft described a multi-stage campaign against energy sector organizations.
- 2:12SPEAKER_00: It used SharePoint file share links as the lure, then created inbox rules to hide replies.
- 2:18SPEAKER_00: Once one mailbox fell, it sent hundreds more phishing emails to that person's contacts.
- 2:23SPEAKER_00: And resetting passwords didn't fix it because the stolen sessions stayed valid.
- 2:28SPEAKER_00: So what do attackers do with the mailbox once they're in?
- 2:31SPEAKER_00: Mostly, it's about money.
- 2:33SPEAKER_00: Business email compromise is the classic outcome.
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: They read threads about invoices and payments,
- 2:38SPEAKER_00: then step into a real conversation and ask for bank details to be changed.
- 2:43SPEAKER_00: Because the email comes from a genuine account in a genuine thread, it's very convincing.
- 2:48SPEAKER_00: Other groups use the access to register their own MFA method
- 2:51SPEAKER_00: so they can come back later,
- 2:53SPEAKER_00: or to search for passwords and data that help them move further in.
- 2:56SPEAKER_00: Lizzie, where would you put your effort?
- 2:59SPEAKER_01: Right at the sign-in, because that's the only place you can properly stop it.
- 3:03SPEAKER_01: My number one control is phishing-resistant MFA, which in practice means passkeys.
- 3:09SPEAKER_01: As we said in the passkeys episode, a passkey is tied to the real website's domain.
- 3:14SPEAKER_01: The proxy's domain is different, so the passkey simply won't work there.
- 3:18SPEAKER_01: The attack fails before a session exists.
- 3:21SPEAKER_01: I'd start with admins,
- 3:23SPEAKER_01: and then every user for remote access,
- 3:25SPEAKER_01: because A. ITM is just as happy to take an ordinary user's session.
- 3:30SPEAKER_01: And it has to be enforced.
- 3:32SPEAKER_01: If you're an entra shop,
- 3:33SPEAKER_01: authentication strengths and conditional access let you require
- 3:36SPEAKER_01: a phishing-resistant method for particular apps or users.
- 3:40SPEAKER_01: If you're not, look for the equivalent policy in your identity provider.
- 3:44SPEAKER_01: The point is that the weaker methods can't be chosen as a fallback.
- 3:48SPEAKER_01: Otherwise, the kit just offers the user a different option.
- 3:51SPEAKER_01: My second control is device-based access.
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: If only company-managed,
- 3:55SPEAKER_01: compliant devices can reach your key apps,
- 3:58SPEAKER_01: then a stolen cookie on the attacker's laptop is much less useful.
- 4:02SPEAKER_01: Token protection goes further by binding the session to the device it was issued to.
- 4:07SPEAKER_01: But I want to be careful here.
- 4:08SPEAKER_01: These don't stop AITM.
- 4:10SPEAKER_01: The password and MFA are still phished.
- 4:13SPEAKER_01: What they do is limit what the attacker can do with the stolen session.
- 4:17SPEAKER_01: That's blast radius reduction, and it's still very worth having.
- 4:21SPEAKER_01: And it's rarely all or nothing.
- 4:23SPEAKER_01: Many organizations need a BYOD route for some staff, so you're making trade-offs.
- 4:29SPEAKER_00: And attackers are already routing around both of those.
- 4:32SPEAKER_00: The trend I'd point to is attacks that don't need a proxy at all.
- 4:36SPEAKER_00: Device code phishing,
- 4:37SPEAKER_00: which we covered on the weekly show just last week,
- 4:40SPEAKER_00: sends victims to the genuine Microsoft login page with a code to enter.
- 4:44SPEAKER_00: The login is real, so even a passkey works, and the attacker gets a valid token.
- 4:50SPEAKER_00: Then there's Consent Phishing, which asks users to grant a malicious app access.
- 4:54SPEAKER_00: And InfoStealer malware takes session cookies straight off the device.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: My assessment?
- 5:00SPEAKER_00: As passkeys spread,
- 5:01SPEAKER_00: pure AITM kits will get less effective, and we'll see more of these alternatives.
- 5:06SPEAKER_00: But AITM will be around for years
- 5:08SPEAKER_00: because most organizations haven't enforced phishing-resistant sign-in yet.
- 5:12SPEAKER_01: Which is why I'd add a few more layers behind the sign-in.
- 5:16SPEAKER_01: I'd also think about finance processes because that's where the money goes.
- 5:20SPEAKER_01: If a supplier asks to change bank details,
- 5:23SPEAKER_01: the rule should be a callback to a number you already hold,
- 5:26SPEAKER_01: never a number from the email.
- 5:28SPEAKER_01: That's not a technical control,
- 5:30SPEAKER_01: but it breaks the business email compromise payoff even when
- 5:33SPEAKER_01: the account has been taken over.
- 5:35SPEAKER_01: Shorter session lifetimes help.
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: If a stolen session expires in hours rather than weeks, the attacker's window shrinks.
- 5:42SPEAKER_01: Tune it by risk.
- 5:43SPEAKER_01: You don't want to annoy everyone with constant prompts,
- 5:46SPEAKER_01: but sensitive apps and admin portals can have much tighter limits.
- 5:50SPEAKER_01: Then there's a simple one.
- 5:51SPEAKER_01: Consolidate on single sign-on.
- 5:53SPEAKER_01: Every app with its own separate login is another page an attacker can proxy
- 5:58SPEAKER_01: and another place you can't enforce passkeys.
- 6:00SPEAKER_01: Pulling apps behind one identity provider means one set of strong rules.
- 6:05SPEAKER_01: On email,
- 6:05SPEAKER_01: I'd start with what your platform already gives you
- 6:08SPEAKER_01: and make sure it's configured properly.
- 6:10SPEAKER_01: Link scanning and impersonation protection catch a lot.
- 6:13SPEAKER_01: If you've still got a problem after that,
- 6:15SPEAKER_01: specialist tools that sit on top of your mail platform can add value.
- 6:19SPEAKER_01: For browsers,
- 6:20SPEAKER_01: there are tools that spot phishing pages inside the browser itself,
- 6:23SPEAKER_01: such as push security.
- 6:25SPEAKER_01: That's useful because the lure might arrive by text or Teams, not email.
- 6:30SPEAKER_01: And it helps on personal devices where you can't install much else.
- 6:33SPEAKER_01: Finally, detection and response, but only if you've got a SOC or a managed service watching.
- 6:39SPEAKER_01: Look for new inbox rules,
- 6:41SPEAKER_01: sign-ins from odd locations straight after a normal one,
- 6:44SPEAKER_01: and new MFA methods being registered.
- 6:46SPEAKER_01: And when you respond, revoke sessions, not just passwords.
- 6:50SPEAKER_01: That's exactly the lesson from the Microsoft campaign.
- 6:53SPEAKER_01: If you don't have that capability, spend the money on pass keys first.
- 6:57SPEAKER_01: And after an incident, check for anything the attacker left behind.
- 7:01SPEAKER_01: Forwarding rules, new app consents, and any MFA method they registered.
- 7:06SPEAKER_01: Those let them walk straight back in.
- 7:08SPEAKER_01: And on user awareness, it helps, but it's minor.
- 7:12SPEAKER_01: These pages look real because they are real.
- 7:15SPEAKER_01: The one message I would give staff is,
- 7:17SPEAKER_01: if you're ever asked to approve a sign-in you didn't start, report it.
- 7:21SPEAKER_00: So, three takeaways.
- 7:23SPEAKER_00: A. ITM phishing steals the session, not just the password, and it's now cheap and easy to run.
- 7:30SPEAKER_00: Passkeys, enforced by policy, are the control that actually stops it.
- 7:34SPEAKER_00: And device, session, and token control That's
- 7:41SPEAKER_00: this episode of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 7:44SPEAKER_00: If you'd like our weekly look at the threat landscape,
- 7:46SPEAKER_00: subscribe to The Defensive Line Weekly on Substack
- 7:49SPEAKER_00: and wherever you get your podcasts.
- 7:51SPEAKER_00: Until next time, stay defensive!