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Discourse on Metaphysics - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz · The Aeneid

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  Speaker 1: Section one of Discourse on Metaphysics. This is a LibriVox recording.
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  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
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  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Discourse
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  Speaker 1: on Metaphysics by Godfried Wilhelm Leibniz, translated by George Montgomery,
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  Speaker 1: Section one one concerning the divine perfection and that God
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  Speaker 1: does everything in the most a desirable way. The conception
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  Speaker 1: of God, which is the most common and the most
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  Speaker 1: full of meaning, is expressed well enough in the words
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  Speaker 1: God is an absolutely perfect being. The implications, however, of
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  Speaker 1: these words, fail to receive sufficient consideration. For instance, there
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  Speaker 1: are many different kinds of perfection, all of which God possesses,
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  Speaker 1: and each one of them pertains to him in the
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  Speaker 1: highest degree. We must also know what perfection is. One
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  Speaker 1: thing which can surely be affirmed about it is that
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  Speaker 1: those forms or natures which are not susceptible of it
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  Speaker 1: to the highest degree, say, the nature of numbers or
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  Speaker 1: of figures, do not permit of perfection. This is because
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  Speaker 1: the number which is the greatest of all, that is
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  Speaker 1: the sum of all the numbers, and likewise the greatest
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  Speaker 1: of all figures, imply contradictions. The greatest knowledge, however, and
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  Speaker 1: omnipotence contain no impossibility. Consequently, power and knowledge do admit
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  Speaker 1: of perfection, and in so far as they pertain to God,
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  Speaker 1: they have no limits. Whence, it follows that God, who
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  Speaker 1: possesses supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner,
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  Speaker 1: not only metaphysically, but also from the moral standpoint and
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  Speaker 1: with respect to ourselves. It can be said that the
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  Speaker 1: more we are enlightened and informed in regard to the
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  Speaker 1: works of God, the more will we be disposed to
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  Speaker 1: find them excellent in conforming entirely to that which we
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  Speaker 1: might desire. Two against those who hold that there is
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  Speaker 1: in the works of God no goodness, or that the
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  Speaker 1: principles of goodness and beauty are arbitrary. Therefore I am
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  Speaker 1: far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that
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  Speaker 1: there are no principles of goodness or perfection in the
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  Speaker 1: nature of things or in the ideas which God has
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  Speaker 1: about them, and who say that the works of God
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  Speaker 1: are good only through the formal reason that God has
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  Speaker 1: made them. If this position were true, God, knowing that
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  Speaker 1: he is the author of things, would not have to
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  Speaker 1: regard them afterwards and find them good, As the Holy
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  Speaker 1: Scripture witnesses. Such anthropological expressions are used only to let
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  Speaker 1: us know that excellence is recognized in regarding the works themselves,
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  Speaker 1: even if we do not consider their evident dependence on
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  Speaker 1: their author. This is confirmed by the fact that it
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  Speaker 1: is in reflecting upon the works that we are able
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  Speaker 1: to discover the one who wrought They must therefore bear
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  Speaker 1: in themselves his character. I confess that the contrary opinion
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  Speaker 1: seems to me extremely dangerous and closely approaches that of
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  Speaker 1: recent innovators, who hold that the beauty of the universe
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  Speaker 1: and the goodness which we attribute to the works of
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  Speaker 1: God are chimeras of human beings who think of God
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  Speaker 1: in human terms. In saying therefore, that things are not
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  Speaker 1: good according to any standard of goodness, but simply by
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  Speaker 1: the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys,
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  Speaker 1: without realizing it, all the love of God and all
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  Speaker 1: his glory. For why praise him for what he has
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  Speaker 1: done if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary?
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  Speaker 1: Where will be his justice and his wisdom? If he
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  Speaker 1: has only a certain despotic power, If arbitrary will takes
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  Speaker 1: the place of reasonableness, and if in accord with the
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  Speaker 1: definition of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing
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  Speaker 1: to the most powerful. Besides, it seems that every act
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  Speaker 1: of willing supposes some reason for the willing, and this reason,
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  Speaker 1: of course, must precede the act. This is why, accordingly,
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  Speaker 1: I find so strange those expressions of certain philosophers who
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  Speaker 1: say that the eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry, and
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  Speaker 1: consequently the principles of goodness, of justice, and of perfection,
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  Speaker 1: are effects only of the will of God. To me,
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  Speaker 1: it seems that all these follow from his understanding, which
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  Speaker 1: does not depend upon his will any more than does
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  Speaker 1: his essence. Three. Against those who think that God might
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  Speaker 1: have made things better than he has, no more am
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  Speaker 1: I able to approve of the opinion of certain modern
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  Speaker 1: writers who boldly maintained that that which God has made
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  Speaker 1: is not perfect in the highest degree, and that He
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  Speaker 1: might have done better. It seems to me that the
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  Speaker 1: consequences of such an opinion are wholly inconsistent with the
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  Speaker 1: glory of God. Would he minus malam habet racion, m
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  Speaker 1: boni it aminus bonum habit racion and Mali I think
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  Speaker 1: that one acts imperfectly if he acts with less perfection
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  Speaker 1: than he is capable of. To show that an architect
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  Speaker 1: could have done better is to find fault with his work. Furthermore,
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  Speaker 1: this opinion is contrary to the Holy scriptures when they
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  Speaker 1: assure us of the goodness of God's work. For if
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  Speaker 1: comparative perfection was sufficient, then in whatever way God accomplished
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  Speaker 1: his work, since there is an infinitude of possible imperfections,
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  Speaker 1: it would always have been good in comparison with the
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  Speaker 1: less perfect. But a thing little praiseworthy when it can
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  Speaker 1: be praised only in this way. I believe that a
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  Speaker 1: great many passages from the divine writings and from the
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  Speaker 1: Holy Fathers will be found favoring my position, while hardly
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  Speaker 1: any will be found in favor of that of these
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  Speaker 1: modern thinkers. Their opinion is, in my judgment, unknown to
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  Speaker 1: the writers of antiquity, and is a deduction based upon
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  Speaker 1: the too slight acquaintance which we have with the general
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  Speaker 1: harmony of the universe and with the hidden reasons for
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  Speaker 1: God's conduct. In our ignorance, therefore, we attempted to decide
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  Speaker 1: audaciously that many things might have been done better. These
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  Speaker 1: modern thinkers insist upon certain hardly tenable subtleties, for they
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  Speaker 1: imagine that nothing is so perfect that there might not
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  Speaker 1: have been something more perfect. This is an error. They think, indeed,
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  Speaker 1: that they are thus safeguarding the liberty of God, as
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  Speaker 1: if it were not the highest liberty to act in perfection,
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  Speaker 1: according to the sovereign reason. For to think that God
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  Speaker 1: acts in anything without having any reason for his willing,
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  Speaker 1: even if we overlook the fact that such actions seemed impossible,
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  Speaker 1: is an opinion which conforms little to God's glory. For example,
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  Speaker 1: let us suppose that God chooses between A and B,
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  Speaker 1: and that he takes A without any reason for preferring
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  Speaker 1: it to be I say that this action on the
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  Speaker 1: part of God is at least not praiseworthy, For all
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  Speaker 1: praise ought to be founded upon reason, which ex HYPOTHESI
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  Speaker 1: is not present here. My opinion is that God does
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  Speaker 1: nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified. Four,
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  Speaker 1: That love for God demands on our part complete satisfaction
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  Speaker 1: with and acquiescence in that which He has done. The
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  Speaker 1: general knowledge of this great truth that God acts always
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  Speaker 1: in the most perfect and most desirable manner possible, is
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  Speaker 1: in my opinion the basis of the love which we
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  Speaker 1: owe to God in all things. For he who loves
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  Speaker 1: seeks his satisfaction in the felicity or perfection of the
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  Speaker 1: object loved, and in the perfection of his actions. Iidem
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  Speaker 1: verlee edidem nole vera amikitia est. I believe that it
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  Speaker 1: is difficult to love God truly when one, having the
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  Speaker 1: power to change his disposition, is not disposed to wish
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  Speaker 1: for that which God desires. In fact, those who are
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  Speaker 1: not satisfied with what God does seem to me like
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  Speaker 1: dissatisfied subjects, whose attitude is not very different from that
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  Speaker 1: of rebels. I hold therefore that on these principles, to
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  Speaker 1: act conformably to the love of God, it is not
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  Speaker 1: sufficient to force oneself to be patient. We must be
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  Speaker 1: really satisfied with all that comes to us according to
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  Speaker 1: His will. I mean this acquiescence in regard to the past.
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  Speaker 1: For as regards the future, one should not be a
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  Speaker 1: quietest with the arms folded open to ridicule, awaiting that
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  Speaker 1: which God will do. According to the surface in which
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  Speaker 1: the ancients called Logosayagov the lazy reason, it is necessary
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  Speaker 1: to act conformably to the presumptive will of God, as
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  Speaker 1: far as we are able to judge of it, trying
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  Speaker 1: with all our might to contribute to the general welfare,
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  Speaker 1: and particularly to the ornamentation and to the perfection of
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  Speaker 1: that which touches us, or of that which is nigh,
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  Speaker 1: and so to speak at our hand. For if the
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  Speaker 1: future shall perhaps show that God has not wished our
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  Speaker 1: good intention to have its way, it does not follow
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  Speaker 1: that He has not wished us to act as we have.
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  Speaker 1: On the contrary, since He is the best of all masters,
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  Speaker 1: He ever, demands only the right intentions, and it is
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  Speaker 1: for him to know the hour and the proper place
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  Speaker 1: to let good designs succeed. Five in what the principles
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  Speaker 1: of the divine perfection consist, and that the simplicity of
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  Speaker 1: the means counterbalances the richness of the effects. It is sufficient, therefore,
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  Speaker 1: to have this confidence in God that he has done
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  Speaker 1: everything for the best, and that nothing will be able
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  Speaker 1: to injure those who love him. To know, in particular, however,
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  Speaker 1: the reasons which have moved Him to choose this order
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  Speaker 1: of the universe to permit sin to dispense his salutary
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  Speaker 1: grace in a certain manner. This passes the capacity of
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  Speaker 1: a finite mind. Above all, when such a mind has
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  Speaker 1: not come into the joy of the vision of God.
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  Speaker 1: Yet it is possible to make some general remarks touching
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  Speaker 1: the course of providence in the government of things. One
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  Speaker 1: is able to say, therefore, that he who acts perfectly
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  Speaker 1: is like an excellent geometer who knows how to find
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  Speaker 1: the best construction for a problem. Like a good architect
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  Speaker 1: who utilizes his location and the funds destined for the
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  Speaker 1: building in the most advantageous manner, leaving nothing which shocks
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  Speaker 1: or which does not display that beauty of which it
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  Speaker 1: is capable. Like a good householder who employs his property
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  Speaker 1: in such a way that there shall be nothing uncultivated
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  Speaker 1: or sterile, Like a clever machinist who makes his production
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  Speaker 1: in the least difficult way possible, And like an intelligent
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  Speaker 1: author who encloses the most of reality in the least
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  Speaker 1: possible compass. Of all beings, those which are the most
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  Speaker 1: perfect and occupy the least possible space, that is to say,
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  Speaker 1: those which interfere with one another the least are the
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  Speaker 1: spirits whose perfections are the virtues. That is why we
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  Speaker 1: may not doubt that the felicity of the spirits is
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  Speaker 1: the principal aim of God, and the he puts this
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  Speaker 1: purpose into execution as far as the general harmony will permit.
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  Speaker 1: We will recur to this subject again. When the simplicity
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  Speaker 1: of God's way is spoken of, reference is specially made
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  Speaker 1: to the means which he employs. And on the other hand,
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  Speaker 1: when the variety, richness, and abundance are referred to, the
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  Speaker 1: ends or effects are had in mind. Thus one ought
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  Speaker 1: to be proportioned to the other, just as the cost
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  Speaker 1: of a building should balance the beauty and grandeur which
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  Speaker 1: is expected. It is true that nothing costs God anything,
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  Speaker 1: just as there is no cost for a philosopher who
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  Speaker 1: makes hypotheses in constructing his imaginary world, because God has
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  Speaker 1: only to make a decrease in order that a real
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  Speaker 1: world come into being. But in matters of wisdom, the
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  Speaker 1: decrees or hypotheses meets the expenditure in proportion, as they
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  Speaker 1: are more independent of one another. The reason wishes to
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  Speaker 1: avoid multiplicity in hypotheses or principles, very much as the
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  Speaker 1: simplest system is preferred in astronomy. Six. That God does
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  Speaker 1: nothing which is not orderly, and that it is not
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  Speaker 1: even possible to conceive of events which are not regular.
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  Speaker 1: The activities or the acts of will of God are
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  Speaker 1: commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But it is well
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  Speaker 1: to bear in mind that God does nothing out of order. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: that which passes for extraordinary is so only with the
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  Speaker 1: regard to a particular order established among the created things.
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  Speaker 1: For as regards the universal order, everything conforms to it.
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  Speaker 1: This is so true that not only does nothing occur
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  Speaker 1: in this world which is absolutely irregular, but it is
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  Speaker 1: even impossible to conceive of such an occurrence. Because let
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  Speaker 1: us suppose, for example, that someone jots down a quantity
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  Speaker 1: of points upon a sheet of paper helter skelter. As
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  Speaker 1: to those who exercise the ridiculous art of geomancy. Now
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  Speaker 1: I say that it is possible to find a geometrical
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  Speaker 1: line whose concepts shall be uniform and constant, that is,
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  Speaker 1: in accordance with a certain formula, and which line, at
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  Speaker 1: the same time shall pass through all of those points,
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  Speaker 1: and in the same order in which the hand jotted
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  Speaker 1: them down. Also, if a continuous line be traced, which
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  Speaker 1: is now straight, now circular, and now of any other description,
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  Speaker 1: it is possible to find a mental equivalent a formula
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  Speaker 1: or an equation common to all the points of this line,
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  Speaker 1: by virtue of which formula that changes in the direction
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  Speaker 1: of the line must occur. There is no instance of
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  Speaker 1: a face whose contour does not form part of a
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  Speaker 1: geometric line, and which cannot be traced entire by a
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  Speaker 1: certain mathematical motion. But when the formula is very complex,
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  Speaker 1: that which conforms to it passes for irregular. Thus we
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  Speaker 1: may say that in whatever manner God might have created
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  Speaker 1: the world, it would always have been regular and in
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  Speaker 1: a certain order. God, however, has chosen the most perfect,
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  Speaker 1: that is to say, the one which is at the
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  Speaker 1: same time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena,
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  Speaker 1: as might be the case with a geometric line whose
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  Speaker 1: construction was easy, but whose properties and effects were extremely
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  Speaker 1: remarkable and of great significance. I use these comparisons to
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  Speaker 1: picture a certain imperfect resemblance to the divine wisdom, and
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  Speaker 1: to point out that which may at least raise our
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  Speaker 1: minds to conceive in some sort what cannot otherwise be expressed.
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  Speaker 1: I do not pretend at all to explain thus the
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  Speaker 1: great mystery upon which depends the whole universe. Seven that
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  Speaker 1: miracles conform to the regular order, although they go against
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  Speaker 1: the subordinate regulations concerning that which God desires or permits,
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  Speaker 1: and concerning general and particular intentions. Now, since nothing is
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  Speaker 1: done which is not orderly, we may say that miracles
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  Speaker 1: are quite within the order of natural operations. We use
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  Speaker 1: the term natural of these operations because they can form
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  Speaker 1: to certain subordinate regulations, which we call the nature of things.
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  Speaker 1: For it can be said that this nature is only
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  Speaker 1: a custom of God's which he can change on the
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  Speaker 1: occasion of a stronger reason than that which moved him
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  Speaker 1: to use these regulations as regards general and particular intentions.
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  Speaker 1: According to the way in which we understand the matter,
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  Speaker 1: it may be so dead on the one hand, that
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  Speaker 1: everything is in accordance with his most general intention, or
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  Speaker 1: that which best conforms to the most perfect order he
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  Speaker 1: has chosen. On the other hand, however, it is also
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  Speaker 1: possible to say that he has particular intentions which are
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  Speaker 1: exceptions to the subordinate regulations above mentioned of God's laws. However,
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  Speaker 1: the most universal, that is, that which rules the whole
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  Speaker 1: course of the universe, is without exceptions. It is possible
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  Speaker 1: to say that God desires everything which is an object
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  Speaker 1: of his particular intention. When we consider the objects of
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  Speaker 1: his general intentions, however, such as are the modes of
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  Speaker 1: activities of created things, and especially of the reasoning creatures
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  Speaker 1: with whom God wishes to cooperate, we must make a distinction.
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  Speaker 1: For if the action is good in itself, we may
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  Speaker 1: say that God wishes it and at times commands it,
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  Speaker 1: even though it does not take place. But if it
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  Speaker 1: is bad in itself and becomes good only by accident,
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  Speaker 1: through the course of events, and especially after chastisement and
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  Speaker 1: satisfaction have corrected its malignity and rewarded the un ill
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  Speaker 1: with interest in such a way that more perfection results
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  Speaker 1: in the whole train of circumstances than would have come
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  Speaker 1: if that ill had not occurred. If all this takes place,
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  Speaker 1: we must say that God permits the evil, and not
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  Speaker 1: that he desired it. Although he has co operated by
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  Speaker 1: means of the laws of nature which he has established,
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  Speaker 1: he knows how to produce the greatest good from them. Eight.
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  Speaker 1: In order to distinguish between the activities of God and
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  Speaker 1: the activities of created things, we must explain the conception
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  Speaker 1: of an individual substance. It is quite difficult to distinguish
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  Speaker 1: God's actions from those of his creatures. Something that God
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  Speaker 1: does everything. Others imagine that He only conserves the force
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  Speaker 1: which He has given to created things. How far can
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  Speaker 1: we say either of these opinions is right in the
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  Speaker 1: first place, Since activity and passivity pertained properly to individual
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  Speaker 1: substances actiones sun suppositorum, it will be necessary to explain
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  Speaker 1: what such a substance is. It is indeed true that
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  Speaker 1: when several predicates are attributes of a single subject, and
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  Speaker 1: this subject is not an attribute of another, we speak
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  Speaker 1: of it as an individual substance. But this is not enough,
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  Speaker 1: and such an explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore
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  Speaker 1: inquire what it is to be an attribute in reality
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  Speaker 1: of a certain subject. Now it is evident that every
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  Speaker 1: true predication has some basis in the nature of things.
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  Speaker 1: And even when a proposition is not identical, that is,
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  Speaker 1: when the predicate is not expressly contained in the subject,
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  Speaker 1: it is still necessary that it be virtually contained in it.
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  Speaker 1: And this is what the philosophers call in essay, saying
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  Speaker 1: thereby that the predicate is in the subject. Thus, the
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  Speaker 1: content of the subject must always include that of the
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  Speaker 1: predicate in such a way that if one understands perfectly
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  Speaker 1: the concept of the subject, he will know that the
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  Speaker 1: predicate appertains to it. Also. This being so, we are
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  Speaker 1: able to say that this is the nature of an individual,
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  Speaker 1: substance or a complete being, namely, to afford a conception
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  Speaker 1: so complete that the concept shall be so vision for
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  Speaker 1: the understanding of it, and for the deduction of all
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  Speaker 1: the predicates of which the substances or may become the subject. Thus,
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  Speaker 1: the quality of king which belonged to Alexander the Great,
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  Speaker 1: an abstraction from the subject, is not sufficiently determined to
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  Speaker 1: constitute an individual, and does not contain the other qualities
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  Speaker 1: of the same subject, nor everything which the idea of
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  Speaker 1: this prince includes. God. However, seeing the individual concept or
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  Speaker 1: hexaeity of Alexander, sees there at the same time the
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  Speaker 1: basis and the reason of all the predicates which can
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  Speaker 1: be truly uttered regarding him, For instance, that he will
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  Speaker 1: conquer darius and porous, even to the point of knowing
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  Speaker 1: our priori and not by experience, whether he died a
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  Speaker 1: natural death or by poison, facts which we can learn
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  Speaker 1: only through history. When we carefully consider the connection of things,
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  Speaker 1: we see also the possibility of saying that there was
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  Speaker 1: always in the soul of Alexander marks of all that
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  Speaker 1: had happened to him, and evidences of all that would
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  Speaker 1: happen to him, and traces even of everything which occurs
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  Speaker 1: in the universe, although God alone could recognize them all. Nine,
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  Speaker 1: That every individual substance expresses the whole universe in its
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  Speaker 1: own manner, and that in its full concept is included
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  Speaker 1: all its experiences, together with all the attendant circumstances, and
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  Speaker 1: the whole sequence of exterior events. There follow from these
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  Speaker 1: considerations several noticeable paradoxes, among others, That it is not
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  Speaker 1: true that two substances may be exactly alike and differ
• 18:28
  Speaker 1: only numerically solo numero. And that what Saint Thomas says
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: on this point regarding angels and intelligences quadibi omni individuum
• 18:37
  Speaker 1: sid Spekier's infuma is true of all substances, provided that
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: the specific difference is understood as geometers understand it in
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: the case of figures. Again, that a substance will be
• 18:48
  Speaker 1: able to commence only through creation and perish only through annihilation.
• 18:53
  Speaker 1: That a substance cannot be divided into two, nor can
• 18:56
  Speaker 1: one be made out of two, and that thus the
• 18:58
  Speaker 1: number of substances neither augments nor diminishes through natural means,
• 19:02
  Speaker 1: although they are frequently transformed. Furthermore, every substance is like
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: an entire world, and like a mirror of God, or
• 19:09
  Speaker 1: indeed of the whole world, which it portrays, each one
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: in its own fashion, almost as the same city is
• 19:15
  Speaker 1: variously represented according to the various situations of Him who
• 19:19
  Speaker 1: is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in some
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: sort as many times as there are substances, and the
• 19:26
  Speaker 1: glory of God is multiplied in the same way by
• 19:28
  Speaker 1: as many wholly different representations of His works. It can,
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: indeed be said that every substance bears in some sort
• 19:36
  Speaker 1: the character of God's infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates
• 19:40
  Speaker 1: him as much as it is able to. For it expresses,
• 19:43
  Speaker 1: although confusedly, all that happens in the universe, past, present
• 19:47
  Speaker 1: and future, deriving thus a certain resemblance to an infinite
• 19:51
  Speaker 1: perception or power of knowledge. And since all other substances
• 19:54
  Speaker 1: express this particular substance and accommodate themselves to it, we
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: can say that it exerts its power upon on all
• 20:00
  Speaker 1: the others in imitation of the omnipotence of the Creator.
• 20:05
  Speaker 1: Ten That the belief in substantial forms has a certain
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: basis in fact, but that these forms effect no changes
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: in the phenomena, and must not be employed for the
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: explanation of particular events. It seems that the ancients, able men,
• 20:20
  Speaker 1: who were accustomed to profound meditations and taught theology and
• 20:23
  Speaker 1: philosophy for several centuries, and some of whom recommend themselves
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: to us on account of their piety, had some knowledge
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: of that which we have just said. And this is
• 20:32
  Speaker 1: why they introduced and maintained that substantial forms so much
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: decried today. But they were not so far from the
• 20:40
  Speaker 1: truth nor so open to ridicule, as the common run
• 20:42
  Speaker 1: of our new philosophers imagine. I grant that the consideration
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: of these forms is of no service in the details
• 20:49
  Speaker 1: of physics, and ought not to be employed in the
• 20:51
  Speaker 1: explanation of particular phenomena. In regard to this last point,
• 20:56
  Speaker 1: the schoolmen were at fault, as were also the physicians
• 20:59
  Speaker 1: of times pasted to followed their example, thinking they had
• 21:02
  Speaker 1: given the reason for the properties of a body in
• 21:04
  Speaker 1: mentioning the forms and qualities without going to the trouble
• 21:07
  Speaker 1: of examining the manner of operation, as if one should
• 21:10
  Speaker 1: be content to say that a clock had a certain
• 21:12
  Speaker 1: amount of clockness derived from its form, and should not
• 21:15
  Speaker 1: inquire in what that clockness consisted. This is indeed enough
• 21:20
  Speaker 1: for the man who buys it, provided he surrenders the
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: care of it to some one else. The fact, however,
• 21:25
  Speaker 1: that there was this misunderstanding and misuse of the substantial forms,
• 21:29
  Speaker 1: should not bring us to throw away something whose recognition
• 21:31
  Speaker 1: is so necessary in metaphysics, since without these we will
• 21:35
  Speaker 1: not be able, I hold, to know the ultimate principles,
• 21:38
  Speaker 1: nor to lift our minds to the knowledge of the
• 21:40
  Speaker 1: incorporeal natures and of the marvels of God. Yet, as
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: the geometer does not need to encumber his mind with
• 21:47
  Speaker 1: the famous puzzle of the composition of the continuum, and
• 21:50
  Speaker 1: as no moralist, and still less a jurist or a
• 21:52
  Speaker 1: statesman has need to trouble himself with the great difficulties
• 21:56
  Speaker 1: which arise in conciliating free will with the providential activity
• 21:59
  Speaker 1: of God. Since the geometer is able to make all
• 22:02
  Speaker 1: his demonstrations, and the statesman can complete all his deliberations
• 22:06
  Speaker 1: without entering into these discussions which are so necessary and
• 22:08
  Speaker 1: important in philosophy and theology. So in the same way
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: the physicists can explain his experiments now using simpler experiments
• 22:17
  Speaker 1: already made, now employing geometrical and mechanical demonstrations, without any
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: need of the general considerations which belong to another sphere.
• 22:25
  Speaker 1: And if he employs the co operation of God, or
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: perhaps of some soul or animating force, or something else
• 22:30
  Speaker 1: of a similar nature, he goes out of his path
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: quite as much as that man, who, when facing an
• 22:35
  Speaker 1: important practical question, would wish to enter into profound argumentations
• 22:39
  Speaker 1: regarding the nature of destiny and of our liberty, a
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: fault which men quite frequently commit without realizing it when
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: they comber their minds with considerations regarding fate, and thus
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: they are even sometimes turned from a good resolution or
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: from some necessary provision. Eleven that the opinions of the
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: theologians and of the so called scholastic philosoph are not
• 23:00
  Speaker 1: to be wholly despised. I know that I am advancing
• 23:05
  Speaker 1: a great paradox in pretending to resuscitate in some sort
• 23:08
  Speaker 1: the ancient philosophy, and to recall Postliminio, the substantial forms
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: almost banished from our modern thought. But perhaps I will
• 23:17
  Speaker 1: not be condemned lightly when it is known that I
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: have long meditated over the modern philosophy, and that I
• 23:22
  Speaker 1: have devoted much time to experiments in physics and to
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: the demonstrations of geometry, and that I too, for a
• 23:29
  Speaker 1: long time, was persuaded of the baselessness of those beings, which, however,
• 23:34
  Speaker 1: I was finally obliged to take up again in spite
• 23:36
  Speaker 1: of myself, and as though by force. The many investigations
• 23:41
  Speaker 1: which I carried on compelled me to recognize that our
• 23:44
  Speaker 1: moderns do not do sufficient justice to Saint Thomas and
• 23:47
  Speaker 1: to the other great men of that period, and that
• 23:50
  Speaker 1: there is in the theories of the scholastic philosophers and
• 23:53
  Speaker 1: theologians far more solidity than is imagined, provided that these
• 23:57
  Speaker 1: theories are employed apropos and in their place. I am
• 24:01
  Speaker 1: persuaded that if some careful and meditative mind were to
• 24:05
  Speaker 1: take the trouble to clarify and direct their thoughts in
• 24:07
  Speaker 1: the manner of analytic geometers, he would find a great
• 24:10
  Speaker 1: treasure of very important truths wholly demonstrable. Twelve. That the
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: conception of the extension of a body is in a
• 24:19
  Speaker 1: way imaginary and does not constitute the substance of the body.
• 24:24
  Speaker 1: But to resume the thread of our discussion, I believe
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: that he who will meditate upon the nature of substance
• 24:30
  Speaker 1: as I have explained it above, will find that the
• 24:33
  Speaker 1: whole nature of bodies is not exhausted in their extension,
• 24:36
  Speaker 1: that is to say, in their size, figure, and motion,
• 24:40
  Speaker 1: but that we must recognize something which corresponds to soul,
• 24:43
  Speaker 1: something which is commonly called substantial form. Although these forms
• 24:47
  Speaker 1: affect no change in the phenomena any more than do
• 24:49
  Speaker 1: the souls of beasts, that is, if they have souls.
• 24:53
  Speaker 1: It is even possible to demonstrate that the ideas of size, figure,
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: and motion are not so distinctive as is imagined, that
• 25:00
  Speaker 1: they stand for something imaginary relative to our perceptions, as
• 25:03
  Speaker 1: due although to a greater extent the ideas of color, heat,
• 25:07
  Speaker 1: and the other similar qualities in regard to which we
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: may doubt whether they are actually to be found in
• 25:12
  Speaker 1: the nature of things outside us. This is why these
• 25:16
  Speaker 1: latter qualities are unable to constitute substance. And if there
• 25:20
  Speaker 1: is no other principle of identity in bodies than that
• 25:22
  Speaker 1: which has just been referred to a body would not
• 25:25
  Speaker 1: subsist more than for a moment. The souls and the
• 25:30
  Speaker 1: substance forms of other bodies are entirely different from intelligent souls,
• 25:34
  Speaker 1: which alone know their actions, and not only do not
• 25:37
  Speaker 1: perish through natural means, but indeed always retain the knowledge
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: of what they are, a fact which makes them alone
• 25:43
  Speaker 1: open to chastisement or recompense, and makes them citizens of
• 25:47
  Speaker 1: the republic of the universe, whose monarch is God. Hence,
• 25:51
  Speaker 1: it follows that all the other creatures should serve them,
• 25:54
  Speaker 1: a point which we shall discuss more amply later thirteen.
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: As the individual concept of each person includes once for
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: all everything which can ever happen to him, in it
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: can be seen a priori the evidences or the reasons
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: for the reality of each event, and why one happens
• 26:12
  Speaker 1: sooner than the other. But these events, however certain, are
• 26:16
  Speaker 1: nevertheless contingent, being based on the free choice of God
• 26:19
  Speaker 1: and of his creatures. It is true that their choices
• 26:23
  Speaker 1: always have their reasons, but they incline to the choices
• 26:26
  Speaker 1: under no compulsion of necessity. But before going further, it
• 26:31
  Speaker 1: is necessary to meet a difficulty which may arise regarding
• 26:34
  Speaker 1: the principles which we have set forth. In the preceding
• 26:38
  Speaker 1: we have said that the concept of an individual substance
• 26:40
  Speaker 1: includes once for all everything which can ever happen to it,
• 26:43
  Speaker 1: and that in considering this concept, one will be able
• 26:46
  Speaker 1: to see everything which can truly be said concerning the individual,
• 26:50
  Speaker 1: just as we are able to see in the nature
• 26:52
  Speaker 1: of a circle all the properties which can be derived
• 26:54
  Speaker 1: from it. But does it not seem that in this
• 26:58
  Speaker 1: way the difference between contingent and necessary truths will be destroyed,
• 27:02
  Speaker 1: that there will be no place for human liberty, and
• 27:05
  Speaker 1: that an absolute fatality will rule as well over all
• 27:08
  Speaker 1: our actions as over all the rest of the events
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: of the world. To this, I reply that a distinction
• 27:13
  Speaker 1: must be made between that which is certain and that
• 27:15
  Speaker 1: which is necessary. Every One grants that future contingencies are assured,
• 27:20
  Speaker 1: since God foresees them, But we do not say, just
• 27:23
  Speaker 1: because of that, that they are necessary. But it will
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: be objected that if any conclusion can be deduced infallibly
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: from some definition or concept, it is necessary. And now,
• 27:34
  Speaker 1: since we have maintained that everything which is to happen
• 27:37
  Speaker 1: to anyone is already virtually included in his nature or concept,
• 27:41
  Speaker 1: as all the properties are contained in the definition of
• 27:43
  Speaker 1: a circle. Therefore, the difficulty still remains. In order to
• 27:48
  Speaker 1: meet the objection completely, I say that the connection or
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: sequences of two kinds, the one absolutely necessary, whose contrary
• 27:56
  Speaker 1: implies contradiction, occurs in the eternal verities, like the truth
• 28:00
  Speaker 1: of geometry. The other is necessary only ex hypothesy, and
• 28:04
  Speaker 1: so to speak, by accident, and in itself it is
• 28:07
  Speaker 1: contingent since the contrary is not implied. This latter sequence
• 28:12
  Speaker 1: is not founded upon ideas wholly pure and upon the
• 28:14
  Speaker 1: pure understanding of God, but upon his free decrees and
• 28:18
  Speaker 1: upon the processes of the universe. Let us give an example.
• 28:22
  Speaker 1: Since Julius Caesar will become perpetual dictator and master of
• 28:25
  Speaker 1: the Republic and will overthrow the liberty of Rome, this
• 28:28
  Speaker 1: action is contained in his concept. For we have supposed
• 28:31
  Speaker 1: that it is in the nature of such a perfect
• 28:33
  Speaker 1: concept of a subject to involve everything in fact, so
• 28:37
  Speaker 1: that the predicate may be included in the subject, which
• 28:39
  Speaker 1: posit in esse Subjector we may say that it is
• 28:43
  Speaker 1: not in virtue of this concept or idea that he
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: is obliged to perform this action, since it pertains to
• 28:49
  Speaker 1: him only because God knows everything but it will be
• 28:52
  Speaker 1: insisted in reply that his nature or form responds to
• 28:55
  Speaker 1: this concept, and since God imposes upon him this personality,
• 28:59
  Speaker 1: he is compelled henceforth to live up to it. I
• 29:02
  Speaker 1: could reply by instancing the similar case of the future contingencies,
• 29:06
  Speaker 1: which as yet have no reality save in the understanding
• 29:09
  Speaker 1: and will of God, and which, because God has given
• 29:12
  Speaker 1: them in advance, this form must needs correspond to it.
• 29:16
  Speaker 1: But I prefer to overcome a difficulty rather than to
• 29:19
  Speaker 1: excuse it by instancing other difficulties. And what I am
• 29:22
  Speaker 1: about to say will serve to clear up the one
• 29:24
  Speaker 1: as well as the other. It is here that must
• 29:26
  Speaker 1: be applied the distinction in the kind of relation. And
• 29:29
  Speaker 1: I say that that which happens conformably to these decrees
• 29:32
  Speaker 1: is assured, but that it is not therefore necessary. And
• 29:36
  Speaker 1: if any one did the contrary, he would do nothing
• 29:38
  Speaker 1: impossible in itself, although it is impossible ex hypothesy that
• 29:42
  Speaker 1: that other happen. For if any one were capable of
• 29:45
  Speaker 1: carrying out a complete demonstration by virtue of which he
• 29:48
  Speaker 1: could prove this connection of the subject, which is Caesar,
• 29:51
  Speaker 1: with the predicate, which is his successful enterprise, he would
• 29:55
  Speaker 1: bring us to see, in fact, that the future dictatorship
• 29:57
  Speaker 1: of Caesar had its basis in his concept or nature,
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: so that one would see there a reason why he
• 30:03
  Speaker 1: resolved to cross the rubicon rather than to stop, and
• 30:06
  Speaker 1: why he gained instead of losing the day at Farcelus,
• 30:09
  Speaker 1: and that it was reasonable, and by consequence assured that
• 30:12
  Speaker 1: this would occur. But one would not prove that it
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: was necessary in itself, nor that the contrary implied a
• 30:18
  Speaker 1: contradiction almost in the same way in which it is
• 30:21
  Speaker 1: reasonable and assured that God will always do what is best,
• 30:24
  Speaker 1: although that which is less perfect is not thereby implied.
• 30:28
  Speaker 1: For it would be found that this demonstration of this
• 30:30
  Speaker 1: predicate as belonging to Caesar, is not as absolute as
• 30:33
  Speaker 1: are those of numbers or of geometry, but that this
• 30:36
  Speaker 1: predicate supposes a sequence of things which God has shown
• 30:39
  Speaker 1: by his free will. This sequence is based on the
• 30:43
  Speaker 1: first free decree of God, which was to do always
• 30:45
  Speaker 1: that which is the most perfect, and upon the decree
• 30:48
  Speaker 1: which God made following the first one, regarding human nature,
• 30:52
  Speaker 1: which is that men should always do, although freely, that
• 30:55
  Speaker 1: which appears to be the best. Now, every truth which
• 30:58
  Speaker 1: is founded upon this kind of decree is contingent, although certain,
• 31:02
  Speaker 1: for the decrees of God do not change the possibilities
• 31:05
  Speaker 1: of things. And as I have already said, although God
• 31:08
  Speaker 1: assuredly chooses the best, this does not prevent that which
• 31:12
  Speaker 1: is less perfect from being possible in itself, although it
• 31:16
  Speaker 1: will never happen. It is not its impossibility, but its imperfection,
• 31:19
  Speaker 1: which causes him to reject it. Now nothing is necessitated
• 31:23
  Speaker 1: whose opposite is possible. One will then be in a
• 31:26
  Speaker 1: position to satisfy these kinds of difficulties, however great they
• 31:30
  Speaker 1: may appear, and in fact they have not been less
• 31:32
  Speaker 1: vexing to all other thinkers who have ever treated this matter.
• 31:36
  Speaker 1: Provided that he considers well that all contingent propositions have
• 31:39
  Speaker 1: reasons why they are thus rather than otherwise. Or indeed,
• 31:43
  Speaker 1: what is the same thing, that they have proof a
• 31:46
  Speaker 1: priori of their truth, which render them certain, and show
• 31:48
  Speaker 1: that the connection of the subject and predicate in these
• 31:51
  Speaker 1: propositions as its basis in the nature of the one
• 31:53
  Speaker 1: and of the other. But he must further remember that
• 31:57
  Speaker 1: such contingent propositions have not the demonstrations necessity, since their
• 32:01
  Speaker 1: reasons are founded only on the principle of contingency or
• 32:04
  Speaker 1: of the existence of things, that is to say, upon
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: that which is or which appears to be the best
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: among several things equally possible. Necessary truths, on the other hand,
• 32:15
  Speaker 1: are founded upon the principle of contradiction, and upon the
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: possibility or impossibility of the essences themselves, without regard here
• 32:22
  Speaker 1: to the free will of God or of creatures. Fourteen.
• 32:27
  Speaker 1: God produces different substances according to the different views which
• 32:30
  Speaker 1: he has of the world, and by the intervention of
• 32:33
  Speaker 1: God the appropriate nature of each substance brings it about
• 32:36
  Speaker 1: that what happens to one corresponds to what happens to
• 32:39
  Speaker 1: all the others, without, however, their acting upon one another Directly.
• 32:44
  Speaker 1: After having seen to a certain extent in what the
• 32:47
  Speaker 1: nature of substances consists, we must try to explain the
• 32:50
  Speaker 1: dependence they have upon one another and their actions and passions.
• 32:55
  Speaker 1: Now tis first of all very evident that created substances
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: depend upon God, who press deserves them, and can produce
• 33:01
  Speaker 1: them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we
• 33:04
  Speaker 1: produce our thoughts. For when God turns so to say,
• 33:07
  Speaker 1: on all sides and in all fashions, the general system
• 33:10
  Speaker 1: of phenomena which he finds it good to produce for
• 33:12
  Speaker 1: the sake of manifesting His glory, and when he regards
• 33:16
  Speaker 1: all the aspects of the world in all possible manners,
• 33:18
  Speaker 1: since there is no relation which escapes his on nincience.
• 33:21
  Speaker 1: The result of each view of the universe as seen
• 33:24
  Speaker 1: from a different position is a substance which expresses the
• 33:27
  Speaker 1: universe conformably to this view, provided God sees fit to
• 33:31
  Speaker 1: render his thought effective and to produce the substance. And
• 33:34
  Speaker 1: since God's vision is always true, our perceptions are always true,
• 33:38
  Speaker 1: and that which deceives us are our judgments, which are
• 33:41
  Speaker 1: of us. Now we have said before, and it follows
• 33:45
  Speaker 1: from what we have just said that each substance is
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: a world by itself, independent of everything else excepting God. Therefore,
• 33:53
  Speaker 1: all our phenomena, that is, all things which are ever
• 33:55
  Speaker 1: able to happen to us, are only consequences of our being.
• 34:00
  Speaker 1: Now as the phenomena maintain a certain order conformably to
• 34:02
  Speaker 1: our nature, or so to speak, to the world which
• 34:05
  Speaker 1: is in us. From whence it follows that we can,
• 34:08
  Speaker 1: for the regulation of our conduct, make useful observations which
• 34:11
  Speaker 1: are justified by the outcome of the future phenomena. And
• 34:14
  Speaker 1: as we are thus able often to judge the future
• 34:17
  Speaker 1: by the past, without deceiving ourselves. We have sufficient grounds
• 34:20
  Speaker 1: for saying that these phenomena are true, and we will
• 34:23
  Speaker 1: not be put to the task of inquiring whether they
• 34:25
  Speaker 1: are outside of us, and whether others perceive them. Also. Nevertheless,
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: it is most true that the perceptions and expressions of
• 34:33
  Speaker 1: all substances inter correspond, so that each one, following independently
• 34:38
  Speaker 1: certain reasons or laws which he has noticed, meets others
• 34:41
  Speaker 1: which are doing the same. As when several have agreed
• 34:44
  Speaker 1: to meet together in a certain place on a set day,
• 34:47
  Speaker 1: they are able to carry out the plan if they wish. Now,
• 34:50
  Speaker 1: although all express the same phenomena, this does not bring
• 34:53
  Speaker 1: it about that their expressions are exactly alike. It is
• 34:56
  Speaker 1: sufficient if they are proportional. When several spectators think they
• 35:01
  Speaker 1: see the same thing and are agreed about it, although
• 35:04
  Speaker 1: each one sees or speaks according to the measure of
• 35:06
  Speaker 1: his vision. It is God alone, from whom all individuals
• 35:10
  Speaker 1: emanate continually, and who sees the universe not only as
• 35:13
  Speaker 1: they see it, but besides in a very different way
• 35:16
  Speaker 1: from them, who is the cause of this correspondence in
• 35:18
  Speaker 1: their phenomena, and who brings it about that that which
• 35:21
  Speaker 1: is particular to one is also common to all, otherwise
• 35:24
  Speaker 1: there would be no relation. In a way, then we
• 35:28
  Speaker 1: might properly say, although it seems strange that a particular
• 35:32
  Speaker 1: substance never acts upon another particular substance, nor is it
• 35:35
  Speaker 1: acted upon by it, that which happens to each one
• 35:38
  Speaker 1: is only the consequence of its complete idea or concept,
• 35:42
  Speaker 1: since this idea already includes all the predicates and expresses
• 35:45
  Speaker 1: the whole universe. In fact, nothing can happen to us
• 35:48
  Speaker 1: except thoughts and perceptions, and all our thoughts and perceptions
• 35:52
  Speaker 1: are but the consequence contingent. It is true of our
• 35:54
  Speaker 1: precedent thoughts and perceptions in such a way that were
• 35:58
  Speaker 1: I able to consider directly all that happens or appears
• 36:00
  Speaker 1: to me at the present time, I should be able
• 36:03
  Speaker 1: to see all that will happen to me, or that
• 36:05
  Speaker 1: will ever appear to me. This future will not fail me,
• 36:08
  Speaker 1: and will surely appear to me, even if all that
• 36:11
  Speaker 1: which is outside of me were destroyed, save only that
• 36:14
  Speaker 1: God and myself were left. Since, however, we ordinarily attribute
• 36:19
  Speaker 1: to other things in action upon us, which brings us
• 36:21
  Speaker 1: to perceive things in a certain manner, it is necessary
• 36:24
  Speaker 1: to consider the basis of this judgment and to inquire
• 36:26
  Speaker 1: what there is of truth in it. Fifteen. The action
• 36:32
  Speaker 1: of one finite substance upon another consists only in the
• 36:35
  Speaker 1: increase in the degrees of the expression of the first,
• 36:37
  Speaker 1: combined with a decrease in that of the second, in
• 36:40
  Speaker 1: so far as God has in advance fashioned them so
• 36:42
  Speaker 1: that they will act in accord. Without entering into a
• 36:47
  Speaker 1: long discussion, it is sufficient for reconciling the language of
• 36:50
  Speaker 1: metaphysics with that of practical life to remark that we
• 36:53
  Speaker 1: preferably attribute to ourselves and with reason, the phenomena which
• 36:57
  Speaker 1: we express the most perfectly, and that we attribute to
• 37:00
  Speaker 1: other substances those phenomena which each one expresses the best. Thus,
• 37:05
  Speaker 1: a substance which is of an infinite extension, in so
• 37:07
  Speaker 1: far as it expresses all, becomes limited in proportion to
• 37:10
  Speaker 1: its more or less perfect manner of expression. It is thus,
• 37:14
  Speaker 1: then that we may conceive of substances as interfering with
• 37:16
  Speaker 1: and limiting one another. And hence we are able to
• 37:19
  Speaker 1: say that in this sense they act upon one another,
• 37:22
  Speaker 1: and that they, so to speak, accommodate themselves to one another.
• 37:26
  Speaker 1: For it can happen that a single change which augments
• 37:29
  Speaker 1: the expression of the one may diminish that of the other. Now,
• 37:32
  Speaker 1: the virtue of a particular substance is to express well
• 37:35
  Speaker 1: the glory of God, and the better it expresses it,
• 37:38
  Speaker 1: the less is it limited. Everything. When it expresses its
• 37:41
  Speaker 1: virtue or power, that is to say, when it acts,
• 37:44
  Speaker 1: changes to better and expands just in so far as
• 37:47
  Speaker 1: it acts. When therefore, a change occurs by which several
• 37:50
  Speaker 1: substances are affected, in fact, every change affects them all,
• 37:54
  Speaker 1: I think we may say that those substances which, by
• 37:57
  Speaker 1: this change pass immediately to a greater degree of perfection
• 38:00
  Speaker 1: or to a more perfect expression, exert power and act,
• 38:04
  Speaker 1: while those which pass to a lesser degree disclose their
• 38:07
  Speaker 1: weakness and suffer. I also hold that every activity of
• 38:11
  Speaker 1: a substance which has perception implies some pleasure, and every
• 38:14
  Speaker 1: passion some pain, except that it may very well happen
• 38:17
  Speaker 1: that a present advantage will be eventually destroyed by a
• 38:19
  Speaker 1: greater evil. Whence it comes that one may sin in
• 38:22
  Speaker 1: acting or exerting his power and in finding pleasure. Sixteen.
• 38:28
  Speaker 1: The extraordinary intervention of God is not excluded in that
• 38:31
  Speaker 1: which our particular essences express because their expression includes everything.
• 38:36
  Speaker 1: Such intervention, however, goes beyond the power of our natural
• 38:39
  Speaker 1: being or of our distinct expression, because these are finite
• 38:43
  Speaker 1: and follow certain subordinate regulations. There remains for us at
• 38:48
  Speaker 1: present only to explain how it is possible that God
• 38:51
  Speaker 1: has influence at times upon men or upon other substances
• 38:54
  Speaker 1: by an extraordinary or miraculous intervention. Since it seems that
• 38:58
  Speaker 1: nothing is able to happen which is extraord ordinary or supernatural.
• 39:01
  Speaker 1: Inasmuch as all the events which occur to the other
• 39:03
  Speaker 1: substances are only the consequences of their natures, we must
• 39:08
  Speaker 1: recall what was said above in regard to the miracles
• 39:10
  Speaker 1: in the universe. These always conform to the universal law
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: of the general order, although there may contravene the subordinate regulations.
• 39:18
  Speaker 1: And since every person or substance is like a little
• 39:20
  Speaker 1: world which expresses the great world, we can say that
• 39:24
  Speaker 1: this extraordinary action of God upon this substance is nevertheless miraculous,
• 39:28
  Speaker 1: although it is comprised in the general order of the universe,
• 39:30
  Speaker 1: in so far as it is expressed by the individual
• 39:32
  Speaker 1: essence or concept of this substance. This is why, if
• 39:37
  Speaker 1: we understand in our natures all that they express. Nothing
• 39:40
  Speaker 1: is supernatural in them, because they reach out to everything,
• 39:43
  Speaker 1: an effect, always expressing its cause, and God being the
• 39:46
  Speaker 1: veritable cause of the substances. But as that which our
• 39:50
  Speaker 1: natures express the most perfectly pertains to them in a
• 39:53
  Speaker 1: particular manner, that being their special power, and since they
• 39:57
  Speaker 1: are limited, as I have just explained, many things there
• 40:00
  Speaker 1: are which surpass the powers of our natures, and even
• 40:03
  Speaker 1: of all limited natures. As a consequence, to speak more clearly,
• 40:08
  Speaker 1: I say that the miracles and the extraordinary interventions of
• 40:10
  Speaker 1: God have this peculiarity that they cannot be foreseen by
• 40:14
  Speaker 1: any created mind, however enlightened. This is because the distinct
• 40:18
  Speaker 1: comprehension of the fundamental order surpasses them all, while on
• 40:22
  Speaker 1: the other hand, that which is called natural depends upon
• 40:25
  Speaker 1: less fundamental regulations, which the creatures are able to understand.
• 40:29
  Speaker 1: In order then that my words may be as irreprehensible
• 40:32
  Speaker 1: as the meaning I am trying to convey, it will
• 40:34
  Speaker 1: be well to associate certain words with certain significations. We
• 40:39
  Speaker 1: may call that which includes everything that we express, and
• 40:41
  Speaker 1: which expresses our union with God himself, nothing going beyond
• 40:44
  Speaker 1: it our essence, but that which is limited in us
• 40:48
  Speaker 1: may be designated as our nature or our power, And
• 40:51
  Speaker 1: in accordance with this terminology, that which goes beyond the
• 40:54
  Speaker 1: natures of all created substances is supernatural. An example of
• 41:01
  Speaker 1: a subordinate regulation in the law of nature, which demonstrates
• 41:04
  Speaker 1: that God always preserves the same amount of force, but
• 41:07
  Speaker 1: not the same quantity of motion. Against the Cartesians and
• 41:10
  Speaker 1: many others, I have frequently spoken of subordinate regulations or
• 41:15
  Speaker 1: of the laws of nature, and it seems that it
• 41:18
  Speaker 1: will be well to give an example. Unnew philosophers are
• 41:22
  Speaker 1: unanimous in employing that famous law that God always preserves
• 41:25
  Speaker 1: the same amount of motion in the universe. In fact,
• 41:28
  Speaker 1: it is a very plausible law, and in times past
• 41:31
  Speaker 1: I held it for indubitable. But since then I have
• 41:34
  Speaker 1: learned in what its fault consists. Monsieur des Cartes and
• 41:38
  Speaker 1: many other clever mathematicians have thought that the quantity of motion,
• 41:42
  Speaker 1: that is to say, the velocity multiplied by the mass
• 41:44
  Speaker 1: of the moving body, is exactly equivalent to the moving force,
• 41:48
  Speaker 1: or to speak, in mathematical terms, that the force varies
• 41:51
  Speaker 1: as the velocity multiplied by the mass. Footnote on mass.
• 41:55
  Speaker 1: This term is employed here for the sake of clearness,
• 41:58
  Speaker 1: Leibniz did not possess the concept mass, which was enunciated
• 42:02
  Speaker 1: by Newton in the same year in which the present
• 42:04
  Speaker 1: treatise was written sixteen eighty six. Leibniz uses the terms body,
• 42:09
  Speaker 1: magnitude of body, et cetera. The technical expression mass occurs
• 42:13
  Speaker 1: once only in the writings of Leibniz, in a treatise
• 42:16
  Speaker 1: published in sixteen ninety five, and was there doubtless borrowed
• 42:20
  Speaker 1: from Newton. For the history of the controversy concerning the
• 42:23
  Speaker 1: Cartesian and Leibnizian measure of force, Sea Marks, Science of Mechanics, Chicago,
• 42:28
  Speaker 1: eighteen ninety three, pages two seven to two et sec. Translator. Now,
• 42:34
  Speaker 1: it is reasonable that the same force is always preserved
• 42:36
  Speaker 1: in the universe. So also looking to phenomena, it will
• 42:40
  Speaker 1: be readily seen that a mechanical perpetual motion is impossible,
• 42:44
  Speaker 1: because the force in such a machine, being always diminished
• 42:47
  Speaker 1: a little by friction, and so ultimately destined to be
• 42:49
  Speaker 1: entirely spent, would necessarily have to recoup its losses, and
• 42:53
  Speaker 1: consequently would keep on increasing of itself without any new
• 42:56
  Speaker 1: impulsion from without. And we see furthermore that the force
• 42:59
  Speaker 1: of a body is diminished only in the proportion as
• 43:02
  Speaker 1: it gives up force, either to a contiguous body or
• 43:05
  Speaker 1: to its own parts, in so far as they have
• 43:07
  Speaker 1: a separate movement. The mathematicians to whom I have referred
• 43:11
  Speaker 1: to think that what can be said of force can
• 43:13
  Speaker 1: be said of the quantity of motion. In order, however,
• 43:16
  Speaker 1: to show the difference, I make two suppositions. In the
• 43:19
  Speaker 1: first place, that a body falling from a certain height
• 43:21
  Speaker 1: acquires a force enabling it to remount to the same height,
• 43:24
  Speaker 1: provided that its direction is turned that way, or provided
• 43:27
  Speaker 1: that there are no hindrances. For instance, a pendulum will
• 43:31
  Speaker 1: rise exactly to the height from which it has fallen,
• 43:33
  Speaker 1: provided that the resistance of the air and of certain
• 43:36
  Speaker 1: other small particles do not diminish a little its acquired force.
• 43:41
  Speaker 1: I suppose in the second place, that it will take
• 43:43
  Speaker 1: as much force to lift a body A weighing one
• 43:46
  Speaker 1: pound to the height c D four feet as to
• 43:49
  Speaker 1: raise a body B weighing four pounds to the height
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: e f one foot. These two suppositions are granted by
• 43:56
  Speaker 1: our new philosophers. It is therefore manifest that the body
• 44:00
  Speaker 1: body A falling from the height c D acquires exactly
• 44:03
  Speaker 1: as much force as the body B falling from the
• 44:05
  Speaker 1: height e F. For the body B at F, having,
• 44:08
  Speaker 1: by the first supposition, sufficient force to return to E,
• 44:11
  Speaker 1: has therefore the force to carry a body of four
• 44:13
  Speaker 1: pounds to the distance of one foot e F. And likewise,
• 44:17
  Speaker 1: the body A at D, having the force to return
• 44:19
  Speaker 1: to C, has also the force required to carry a
• 44:22
  Speaker 1: body weighing one pound its own weight back to C
• 44:25
  Speaker 1: a distance of four feet. Now, by the second supposition,
• 44:29
  Speaker 1: the force of these two bodies is equal. Let us
• 44:32
  Speaker 1: now see if the quantity of motion is the same
• 44:33
  Speaker 1: in each case. It is here that we will be
• 44:36
  Speaker 1: surprised to find a very great difference. For it has
• 44:38
  Speaker 1: been proved by Galileo that the velocity acquired by the
• 44:41
  Speaker 1: full c D is double the velocity acquired by the
• 44:44
  Speaker 1: fall EF, although the height is four times as great.
• 44:49
  Speaker 1: Multiplying therefore the body A whose mass is one by
• 44:51
  Speaker 1: its velocity which is two, the product or the quantity
• 44:54
  Speaker 1: of movement will be two. And on the other hand,
• 44:57
  Speaker 1: if we multiply the body B, whose mass is four
• 44:59
  Speaker 1: by its velocity which is one, the product or quantity
• 45:03
  Speaker 1: of motion will befall. Hence the quantity of the motion
• 45:06
  Speaker 1: of the body A at the point D is half
• 45:08
  Speaker 1: the quantity of the motion of the body B at
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: the point F. Yet their forces are equal, and there
• 45:13
  Speaker 1: is therefore a great difference between the quantity of motion
• 45:15
  Speaker 1: and the force. This is what we set out to show.
• 45:19
  Speaker 1: We can see, therefore, how the forceoughts to be estimated
• 45:22
  Speaker 1: by the quantity of the effect which it is able
• 45:24
  Speaker 1: to produce, for example, by the height to which a
• 45:27
  Speaker 1: body of certain weight can be raised. This is a
• 45:30
  Speaker 1: very different thing from the velocity which can be imparted
• 45:32
  Speaker 1: to it. And in order to impart to it, double
• 45:35
  Speaker 1: the velocity we must have double the force. Nothing is
• 45:38
  Speaker 1: simpler than this proof. And Monsieur des Cartes has fallen
• 45:41
  Speaker 1: into error here only because he trusted too much to
• 45:43
  Speaker 1: his thoughts, even when they had not been ripened by reflection.
• 45:47
  Speaker 1: But it astonishes me that his disciples have not noticed
• 45:49
  Speaker 1: this error. And I am afraid that they are beginning
• 45:52
  Speaker 1: to imitate little by little certain peripatetics whom they ridicule,
• 45:55
  Speaker 1: and that they are accustoming themselves to consult rather than
• 45:58
  Speaker 1: books of their master, than reason or an eighteen. The
• 46:02
  Speaker 1: distinction between force and the quantity of motion is, among
• 46:05
  Speaker 1: other reasons, important as showing that we must have recourse
• 46:08
  Speaker 1: to metaphysical considerations in addition to discussions of extension, if
• 46:12
  Speaker 1: we wish to explain the phenomena of matter. This consideration
• 46:17
  Speaker 1: of the force distinguished from the quantity of motion is
• 46:19
  Speaker 1: of importance not only in physics and mechanics for finding
• 46:23
  Speaker 1: the real laws of nature and the principles of motion,
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: and even for correcting many practical errors which have crept
• 46:28
  Speaker 1: into the writings of certain able mathematicians, but also in metaphysics.
• 46:33
  Speaker 1: It is of importance for the better understanding of principles,
• 46:36
  Speaker 1: because motion, if we regard only its exact and formal meaning,
• 46:40
  Speaker 1: that is, change of place, is not something entirely real,
• 46:43
  Speaker 1: And when several bodies change their places reciprocally, it is
• 46:47
  Speaker 1: not possible to determine by considering the bodies alone to
• 46:50
  Speaker 1: which among them movement or repose is to be attributed,
• 46:53
  Speaker 1: as I could demonstrate geometrically if I wished to stop
• 46:56
  Speaker 1: for it now. But the force, or the proximate cause
• 47:00
  Speaker 1: of these changes is something more real, and there are
• 47:02
  Speaker 1: sufficient grounds for attributing it to one body rather than
• 47:05
  Speaker 1: to another, and it is only through this latter investigation
• 47:08
  Speaker 1: that we can determine to which one the movement must appertain. Now,
• 47:13
  Speaker 1: this force is something different from size, from form, or
• 47:16
  Speaker 1: from motion, and it can be seen from this consideration
• 47:19
  Speaker 1: that the whole meaning of a body is not exhausted
• 47:21
  Speaker 1: in its extension together with its modifications. As our moderns
• 47:24
  Speaker 1: persuade themselves, we are therefore obliged to restore certain beings
• 47:28
  Speaker 1: or forms which they have banished. It appears more and
• 47:32
  Speaker 1: more clear that although all the particular phenomena of nature
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: can be explained mathematically or mechanically by those who understand them,
• 47:38
  Speaker 1: yet nevertheless the general principles of a corporeal nature, and
• 47:42
  Speaker 1: even of mechanics, are metaphysical rather than geometric, and belong
• 47:46
  Speaker 1: rather to certain indivisible forms or natures as the causes
• 47:49
  Speaker 1: of the appearances, than to the corporeal mass or to extension.
• 47:53
  Speaker 1: This reflection is able to reconcile the mechanical philosophy of
• 47:57
  Speaker 1: the moderns with the circumspection of those intelligent and minus
• 48:00
  Speaker 1: well meaning persons who, with a certain justice, fear that
• 48:03
  Speaker 1: we are becoming too far removed from immaterial beings, that
• 48:06
  Speaker 1: we are thus prejudicing piety end of section one, Section
• 48:17
  Speaker 1: two of Discourse on Metaphysics. This LibriVox recording is in
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: the public domain. Discourse on Metaphysics by Gottfried VILLEM. Leibniz,
• 48:27
  Speaker 1: translated by George Montgomery, Section two nineteen, The Utility of
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: final causes in Physics. As I do not wish to
• 48:39
  Speaker 1: judge people in ill part, I bring no accusation against
• 48:42
  Speaker 1: our new philosophers who pretend to banish final causes from physics.
• 48:47
  Speaker 1: But I am nevertheless obliged to avow that the consequences
• 48:50
  Speaker 1: of such a banishment appear to me dangerous, especially when
• 48:53
  Speaker 1: joined to that position which I refuted at the beginning
• 48:56
  Speaker 1: of this treatise. That position seemed to go the length
• 48:59
  Speaker 1: of discuss dudding final causes entirely as though God proposed
• 49:03
  Speaker 1: no end and no good in his activity, or as
• 49:05
  Speaker 1: if good were not to be the object of his will.
• 49:08
  Speaker 1: I hold on the contrary, that it is just in
• 49:10
  Speaker 1: this that the principle of all existences and of the
• 49:13
  Speaker 1: laws of nature must be sought. Hence God always proposes
• 49:16
  Speaker 1: the best and most perfect. I am quite willing to
• 49:19
  Speaker 1: grant that we are liable to error when we wish
• 49:22
  Speaker 1: to determine the purposes or counsels of God. But this
• 49:25
  Speaker 1: is the case only when we try to limit them
• 49:27
  Speaker 1: to some particular design, thinking that He has had in
• 49:30
  Speaker 1: view only a single thing, while in fact he regards
• 49:33
  Speaker 1: everything at once. As for instance, if we think that
• 49:36
  Speaker 1: God has made the world only for us, it is
• 49:38
  Speaker 1: a great blunder, although it may be quite true that
• 49:41
  Speaker 1: He has made it entirely for us, and that there
• 49:43
  Speaker 1: is nothing in the universe which does not touch us,
• 49:45
  Speaker 1: and which does not accommodate itself to the regard which
• 49:48
  Speaker 1: He has for us, according to the principle laid down above. Therefore,
• 49:52
  Speaker 1: when we see some good effect or some perfection which
• 49:54
  Speaker 1: happens or which follows from the works of God, we
• 49:57
  Speaker 1: are able to say assuredly that God has purposed it,
• 50:00
  Speaker 1: for He does nothing by chance, and is not like us,
• 50:03
  Speaker 1: who sometimes fail to do well. Therefore, far from being
• 50:06
  Speaker 1: able to fall into error in this respect, as do
• 50:09
  Speaker 1: the extreme statesmen who postulate too much foresight in the
• 50:12
  Speaker 1: designs of princes, or as do commentators who seek for
• 50:15
  Speaker 1: too much erudition in their authors, it will be impossible
• 50:19
  Speaker 1: to attribute too much reflection to God's infinite wisdom and
• 50:22
  Speaker 1: there is no matter in which error is less to
• 50:24
  Speaker 1: be feared, provided we confine ourselves to affirmations, and provided
• 50:28
  Speaker 1: we avoid negative statements which limit the designs of God.
• 50:33
  Speaker 1: All those who see the admirable structure of animals find
• 50:35
  Speaker 1: themselves led to recognize the wisdom of the author of things.
• 50:39
  Speaker 1: And I advise those who have any sentiment of piety,
• 50:41
  Speaker 1: and indeed of true philosophy, to hold aloof from the
• 50:44
  Speaker 1: expressions of certain pretentious minds, who, instead of saying that
• 50:48
  Speaker 1: eyes were made for seeing, say that we see because
• 50:51
  Speaker 1: we find ourselves having eyes. When one seriously holds such
• 50:55
  Speaker 1: opinions which hand everything over to material necessity or to
• 50:58
  Speaker 1: a kind of chance, although either alternative ought to appear
• 51:02
  Speaker 1: ridiculous to those who understand what we have explained above,
• 51:05
  Speaker 1: it is difficult to recognize an intelligent author of nature.
• 51:09
  Speaker 1: The effect should correspond to its cause, and indeed it
• 51:12
  Speaker 1: is best known through the recognition of its cause, So
• 51:15
  Speaker 1: that it is reasonable to introduce a sovereign intelligence ordering things,
• 51:19
  Speaker 1: and in place of making use of the wisdom of
• 51:21
  Speaker 1: this sovereign being, to employ only the properties of matter
• 51:24
  Speaker 1: to explain phenomena, as if in order to account for
• 51:28
  Speaker 1: the capture of an important place by a prince, the
• 51:30
  Speaker 1: historian should say that it was because the particles of
• 51:32
  Speaker 1: powder in the cannon, having been touched by a spark
• 51:35
  Speaker 1: of fire, expanded with the rapidity capable of pushing a hard,
• 51:38
  Speaker 1: solid body against the walls of the place, while the
• 51:41
  Speaker 1: little particles which composed the brass of the cannon were
• 51:44
  Speaker 1: so well interlaced that they did not separate under this impact.
• 51:48
  Speaker 1: As if he should account for it in this way,
• 51:49
  Speaker 1: instead of making us see how the foresight of the
• 51:51
  Speaker 1: conqueror brought him to choose the time and the proper means,
• 51:55
  Speaker 1: and how his ability surmounted all obstacles. Twenty A noteworthy
• 52:01
  Speaker 1: disquisition in Plato's Fido against the philosophers who were too materialistic.
• 52:07
  Speaker 1: This reminds me of a fine disquisition by Socrates in
• 52:10
  Speaker 1: Plato's Fido, which agrees perfectly with my opinion on this subject,
• 52:13
  Speaker 1: and seems to have been uttered expressly for our two
• 52:16
  Speaker 1: materialistic philosophers. This agreement has led me to a desire
• 52:20
  Speaker 1: to translate it, although it is a little long. Perhaps
• 52:23
  Speaker 1: this example will give some of us an incentive to
• 52:26
  Speaker 1: share in many of the other beautiful and well balanced
• 52:28
  Speaker 1: thoughts which are found in the writings of this famous author.
• 52:32
  Speaker 1: Footnote there is a gap here in the manuscript intended
• 52:35
  Speaker 1: for the passage from Plato, the translation of which Leibniz
• 52:38
  Speaker 1: did not supply translator twenty one. If the mechanical laws
• 52:44
  Speaker 1: depended upon geometry alone, without metaphysical influences, the phenomena would
• 52:49
  Speaker 1: be very different from what they are now. Since the
• 52:53
  Speaker 1: wisdom of God has always been recognized in the detail
• 52:55
  Speaker 1: of the mechanical structures of certain particular bodies, it should
• 52:59
  Speaker 1: also be shown in the general economy of the world
• 53:01
  Speaker 1: and in the constitution of the laws of nature. This
• 53:05
  Speaker 1: is so true that even in the laws of motion
• 53:07
  Speaker 1: in general, the plans of this wisdom have been noticed.
• 53:10
  Speaker 1: For if bodies were only extended masses and motion were
• 53:13
  Speaker 1: only a change of place, and if everything ought to
• 53:16
  Speaker 1: be and could be deduced by geometric necessity from these
• 53:19
  Speaker 1: two definitions alone, it would follow, as I have shown elsewhere,
• 53:23
  Speaker 1: that the smallest body on contact with a very large
• 53:25
  Speaker 1: one at rest, would impart to it its own velocity,
• 53:28
  Speaker 1: and yet without losing any of the velocity that it
• 53:31
  Speaker 1: had a quantity of other rules wholly contrary to the
• 53:34
  Speaker 1: formation of a system would also have to be admitted.
• 53:37
  Speaker 1: But the decree of the divine wisdom in preserving always
• 53:40
  Speaker 1: the same force and the same total direction, has provided
• 53:43
  Speaker 1: for a system. I find, indeed, that many of the
• 53:46
  Speaker 1: effects of nature can be accounted for in a twofold way,
• 53:50
  Speaker 1: that is to say, by a consideration of efficient causes,
• 53:53
  Speaker 1: and again independently by a consideration of final causes. An
• 53:56
  Speaker 1: example of the latter is God's decree to always carry
• 53:59
  Speaker 1: out his plans by the easiest and most determined way.
• 54:03
  Speaker 1: I have shown this elsewhere in accounting for the catoptic
• 54:06
  Speaker 1: and dioptric laws, and I will speak more at length
• 54:09
  Speaker 1: about it in what follows twenty two reconciliation of the
• 54:14
  Speaker 1: two methods of explanation, the one using final causes and
• 54:17
  Speaker 1: the other efficient causes, thus satisfying both those who explain
• 54:22
  Speaker 1: nature mechanically and those who have recourse to incorporeal natures.
• 54:27
  Speaker 1: It is worth while to make the preceding remark in
• 54:29
  Speaker 1: order to reconcile those who hope to explain mechanically the
• 54:32
  Speaker 1: formation of the first tissue of an animal and all
• 54:35
  Speaker 1: the interrelation of the parts, with those who account for
• 54:38
  Speaker 1: the same structure by referring to final causes. Both explanations
• 54:42
  Speaker 1: are good. Both are useful not only for the admiring
• 54:45
  Speaker 1: of the work of a great artificer, but also for
• 54:47
  Speaker 1: the discovery of useful facts in physics and medicine. And
• 54:51
  Speaker 1: writers who take these diverse roots should not speak ill
• 54:54
  Speaker 1: of each other. For I see that those who attempt
• 54:57
  Speaker 1: to explain beauty by the divine anatomy redict duel those
• 55:00
  Speaker 1: who imagine that the apparently fortuitous flow of certain liquids
• 55:03
  Speaker 1: has been able to produce such a beautiful variety, and
• 55:06
  Speaker 1: that they regard them as overbold and irreverent. These others,
• 55:10
  Speaker 1: on the contrary, treat the former as simple and superstitious,
• 55:13
  Speaker 1: and compare them to those ancients who regarded the physicists
• 55:16
  Speaker 1: as impious when they maintained that not Jupiter thundered, but
• 55:20
  Speaker 1: some material which is found in the clouds. The best
• 55:23
  Speaker 1: plan would be to join the two ways of thinking.
• 55:26
  Speaker 1: To use a practical comparison. We recognize and praise the
• 55:30
  Speaker 1: ability of a workman not only when we show what
• 55:32
  Speaker 1: designs he had in making the parts of his machine,
• 55:35
  Speaker 1: but also when we explain the instruments which he employed
• 55:38
  Speaker 1: in making each part. Above all, if these instruments are
• 55:40
  Speaker 1: simple and ingeniously contrived, God is also a workman, able
• 55:45
  Speaker 1: enough to produce a machine still a thousand times more
• 55:48
  Speaker 1: ingenious than as our body, by employing only certain quite
• 55:51
  Speaker 1: simple liquids, purposely composed in such a way that ordinary
• 55:55
  Speaker 1: laws of nature alone are required to develop them so
• 55:58
  Speaker 1: as to produce such a marvelous a feat. But it
• 56:01
  Speaker 1: is also true that this development would not take place
• 56:04
  Speaker 1: if God were not the author of nature. Yet I
• 56:07
  Speaker 1: find that the method of efficient causes, which goes much
• 56:10
  Speaker 1: deeper and is in a measure more immediate and our priori,
• 56:14
  Speaker 1: is also more difficult when we come to details, and
• 56:16
  Speaker 1: I think that our philosophers are still very frequently far
• 56:19
  Speaker 1: removed from making the most of this method. The method
• 56:23
  Speaker 1: of final causes, however, is easier and can be frequently
• 56:26
  Speaker 1: employed to find out important and useful truths which we
• 56:29
  Speaker 1: should have to seek for a long time if we
• 56:32
  Speaker 1: were confined to that other more physical method of which
• 56:34
  Speaker 1: anatomy is able to furnish many examples, it seems to
• 56:38
  Speaker 1: me that Snelius, who was the first discoverer of the
• 56:41
  Speaker 1: laws of refraction, would have waited a long time before
• 56:44
  Speaker 1: finding them. If he had wished to seek out first
• 56:47
  Speaker 1: how light was formed, but he apparently followed that method
• 56:50
  Speaker 1: which the ancients employed for catoptics, that is, the method
• 56:53
  Speaker 1: of final causes. Because while seeking for the easiest way
• 56:58
  Speaker 1: in which to conduct a ray of light from one
• 56:59
  Speaker 1: give point to another given point by reflection from a
• 57:02
  Speaker 1: given plane, supposing that that was the design of nature,
• 57:06
  Speaker 1: they discovered the equality of the angles of incidence and reflection,
• 57:10
  Speaker 1: as can be seen from a little treatise by Heliodorus
• 57:12
  Speaker 1: of Larissa, and also elsewhere. This principle Monsieur Snellius I believe,
• 57:17
  Speaker 1: and afterwards, independently of him, Monsieur Fermand applied most ingeniously
• 57:22
  Speaker 1: to refraction. For since the race, while in the same media,
• 57:25
  Speaker 1: always maintained the same proportion of signs, which in turn
• 57:28
  Speaker 1: corresponds to the resistance of the media, it appears that
• 57:32
  Speaker 1: they follow the easiest way, or at least that way
• 57:34
  Speaker 1: which is the most determinate for passing from a given
• 57:37
  Speaker 1: point in one medium to a given point in another medium.
• 57:40
  Speaker 1: That demonstration of this same theorem, which Monsieur de cart
• 57:43
  Speaker 1: has given using efficient causes, is much less satisfactory. At least,
• 57:48
  Speaker 1: we have grounds to think that he would never have
• 57:50
  Speaker 1: found the principle by that means if he had not
• 57:53
  Speaker 1: learned in Holland of the discovery of Snelius twenty three.
• 57:58
  Speaker 1: Returning to immaterial subset instances, we explain how God acts
• 58:02
  Speaker 1: upon the understanding of spirits, and ask whether one always
• 58:05
  Speaker 1: keeps the idea of what he thinks about. I have
• 58:09
  Speaker 1: thought it well to insist a little upon final causes,
• 58:12
  Speaker 1: upon incorporeal natures, and upon an intelligent cause with respect
• 58:16
  Speaker 1: to bodies, so as to show the use of these
• 58:18
  Speaker 1: conceptions in physics and in mathematics. This for two reasons, first,
• 58:23
  Speaker 1: to purge from mechanical philosophy the impiety that is imputed
• 58:26
  Speaker 1: to it. Second to elevate it to nobler lines of thought,
• 58:29
  Speaker 1: the thinking of our philosophers, who incline to materialistic considerations alone. Now, however,
• 58:36
  Speaker 1: it will be well to return from corporeal substances to
• 58:38
  Speaker 1: the consideration of immaterial natures, and particularly of spirits, and
• 58:42
  Speaker 1: to speak of the methods which God uses to enlighten
• 58:45
  Speaker 1: them and to act upon them. Although we must not
• 58:48
  Speaker 1: forget that there are here, at the same time certain
• 58:51
  Speaker 1: laws of nature in regard to which I can speak
• 58:53
  Speaker 1: more amply elsewhere. It will be enough for now to
• 58:57
  Speaker 1: touch upon ideas and to inquire if we see everything
• 58:59
  Speaker 1: in God, and how God is our light. First of all,
• 59:03
  Speaker 1: it will be in place to remark that the wrong
• 59:05
  Speaker 1: use of ideas occasions many errors. For when one reasons
• 59:09
  Speaker 1: in regard to anything, he imagines that he has an
• 59:12
  Speaker 1: idea of it. And this is the foundation upon which
• 59:15
  Speaker 1: certain philosophers, ancient and modern, have constructed a demonstration of
• 59:19
  Speaker 1: God that is extremely imperfect. It must be they say
• 59:23
  Speaker 1: that I have an idea of God or of a
• 59:25
  Speaker 1: perfect being, since I think of him, and we cannot
• 59:27
  Speaker 1: think without having ideas. Now, the idea of this being
• 59:31
  Speaker 1: includes all perfections, and since existence is one of these perfections,
• 59:35
  Speaker 1: it follows that he exists. But I reply, inasmuch as
• 59:39
  Speaker 1: we often think of impossible chimeras, for example, of the
• 59:42
  Speaker 1: highest degree of swiftness, of the greatest number, of the
• 59:45
  Speaker 1: meeting of the concoid with its base or determinant, such
• 59:48
  Speaker 1: reasoning is not sufficient. It is therefore in this sense
• 59:52
  Speaker 1: that we can say that there are true and false
• 59:54
  Speaker 1: ideas according as the thing which is in question is
• 59:56
  Speaker 1: possible or not. And it is when he is assured
• 1:00:00
  Speaker 1: of the possibility of a thing that one can boast
• 1:00:02
  Speaker 1: of having an idea of it. Therefore, the aforesaid argument
• 1:00:05
  Speaker 1: proves that God exists if he is possible. This is,
• 1:00:09
  Speaker 1: in fact an excellent privilege of the divine nature to
• 1:00:12
  Speaker 1: have need only of a possibility or an essence in
• 1:00:14
  Speaker 1: order to actually exist. And it is just this which
• 1:00:17
  Speaker 1: is called ends Arsay twenty four. What clear and obscure,
• 1:00:23
  Speaker 1: distinct and confused, adequate and inadequate, intuitive and assumed knowledge is,
• 1:00:29
  Speaker 1: and the definition of nominal, real, causal, and essential. In
• 1:00:34
  Speaker 1: order to understand better the nature of ideas, it is
• 1:00:36
  Speaker 1: necessary to touch somewhat upon the various kinds of knowledge.
• 1:00:40
  Speaker 1: When I am able to recognize a thing among others,
• 1:00:43
  Speaker 1: without being able to say in what its differences or
• 1:00:45
  Speaker 1: characteristics consist, the knowledge is confused. Sometimes indeed, we may
• 1:00:50
  Speaker 1: know clearly, that is, without being in the slightest doubt,
• 1:00:53
  Speaker 1: that a poem or picture is well or badly done.
• 1:00:56
  Speaker 1: Because there is in it, and I know not what
• 1:00:59
  Speaker 1: which sat as fires or shocks us, such knowledge is
• 1:01:03
  Speaker 1: not yet distinct. It is when I am able to
• 1:01:05
  Speaker 1: explain the peculiarities that a thing has, that the knowledge
• 1:01:09
  Speaker 1: is called distinct. Such is the knowledge of an assayer
• 1:01:12
  Speaker 1: who discerns the true gold from the false by means
• 1:01:15
  Speaker 1: of certain proofs or marks, which make up the definition
• 1:01:17
  Speaker 1: of gold. But distinct knowledge has degrees because ordinarily the
• 1:01:22
  Speaker 1: conceptions which enter into the definitions will themselves have need
• 1:01:25
  Speaker 1: of definition and are only known confusedly. When at length,
• 1:01:30
  Speaker 1: everything which enters into a definition or into distinct knowledge
• 1:01:33
  Speaker 1: is known distinctly, even back to the primitive conception, I
• 1:01:37
  Speaker 1: call that knowledge adequate. When my mind understands at once
• 1:01:41
  Speaker 1: and distinctly all the primitive ingredients of a conception, then
• 1:01:45
  Speaker 1: we have intuitive knowledge. This is extremely rare, as most
• 1:01:49
  Speaker 1: human knowledge is only confused or indeed assumed. It is
• 1:01:53
  Speaker 1: well also to distinguish nominal from real definition. I call
• 1:01:57
  Speaker 1: a definition nominal when there is doubt whether an exact
• 1:01:59
  Speaker 1: concern of it is possible, as for instance, when I
• 1:02:03
  Speaker 1: say that an endless screw is a line in three
• 1:02:05
  Speaker 1: dimensional space whose parts are congruent or fall one upon another. Now,
• 1:02:10
  Speaker 1: although this is one of the reciprocal properties of an
• 1:02:12
  Speaker 1: endless screw, he who did not know from elsewhere of
• 1:02:15
  Speaker 1: what an endless screw was could doubt if such a
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 1: line were possible. Because the other lions whose ends are congruent,
• 1:02:21
  Speaker 1: there are only two. The circumference of a circle and
• 1:02:24
  Speaker 1: the straight line are plain figures, that is to say,
• 1:02:27
  Speaker 1: they can be described in Plano. This instance enables us
• 1:02:32
  Speaker 1: to see that any reciprocal property can serve as a
• 1:02:34
  Speaker 1: nominal definition. But when the property brings us to see
• 1:02:37
  Speaker 1: the possibility of a thing, it makes the definition real.
• 1:02:40
  Speaker 1: And as long as one has only a nominal definition,
• 1:02:43
  Speaker 1: he cannot be sure of the consequences which he draws,
• 1:02:46
  Speaker 1: because if it conceals a contradiction or an impossibility, he
• 1:02:49
  Speaker 1: would be able to draw the opposite conclusions. That is
• 1:02:52
  Speaker 1: why truths do not depend upon names and are not arbitrary,
• 1:02:56
  Speaker 1: as some of our new philosophers think. There is also
• 1:02:59
  Speaker 1: a considerable difference among real definitions. For when the possibility
• 1:03:03
  Speaker 1: proves itself only by experience, as in the definition of quicksilver,
• 1:03:07
  Speaker 1: whose possibility we know because such a body, which is
• 1:03:10
  Speaker 1: both an extremely heavy fluid and quite volatile, actually exists,
• 1:03:14
  Speaker 1: the definition is merely real and nothing more. If, however,
• 1:03:18
  Speaker 1: the proof of the possibility is our priori, the definition
• 1:03:21
  Speaker 1: is not only real but also causal, as for instance,
• 1:03:24
  Speaker 1: when it contains the possible generation of a thing. Finally,
• 1:03:27
  Speaker 1: when the definition, without assuming anything which requires a proof
• 1:03:31
  Speaker 1: our priori of its possibility, carries the analysis clear to
• 1:03:34
  Speaker 1: the primitive conception, the definition is perfect or essential twenty five.
• 1:03:41
  Speaker 1: In what cases knowledge is added to me a contemplation
• 1:03:43
  Speaker 1: of the idea. Now it is manifest that we have
• 1:03:48
  Speaker 1: no idea of a conception when it is impossible, and
• 1:03:51
  Speaker 1: in case the knowledge where we have the idea of
• 1:03:54
  Speaker 1: it is only assumed, we do not visualize it, because
• 1:03:57
  Speaker 1: such a conception is known only in like manner as
• 1:03:59
  Speaker 1: conceptions internally impossible, and if it be in fact possible,
• 1:04:04
  Speaker 1: it is not by this kind of knowledge that we
• 1:04:06
  Speaker 1: learn its possibility. For instance, when I am thinking of
• 1:04:10
  Speaker 1: a thousand or of a chiliagone, I frequently do it
• 1:04:13
  Speaker 1: without contemplating the idea. Even if I say a thousand
• 1:04:16
  Speaker 1: is ten times a hundred, I frequently do not trouble
• 1:04:19
  Speaker 1: to think what ten and a hundred are, because I
• 1:04:21
  Speaker 1: assume that I know, and I do not consider it
• 1:04:24
  Speaker 1: necessary to stop just at present to conceive of them. Therefore,
• 1:04:28
  Speaker 1: it may well happen, as it in fact does happen
• 1:04:30
  Speaker 1: often enough that I am mistaken in regard to a
• 1:04:33
  Speaker 1: conception which I assume that I understand, although it is
• 1:04:36
  Speaker 1: an impossible truth, or at least is incompatible with others
• 1:04:39
  Speaker 1: with which I join it, and whether I am mistaken
• 1:04:42
  Speaker 1: or not, this way of assuming our knowledge remains the same.
• 1:04:46
  Speaker 1: It is then, only when our knowledge is clear in
• 1:04:48
  Speaker 1: regard to confused conceptions, and when it is intuitive in
• 1:04:52
  Speaker 1: regard to those which are distinct, that we see its
• 1:04:54
  Speaker 1: entire idea. Twenty six ideas are are all stored up
• 1:05:00
  Speaker 1: within us Plato's doctrine of reminiscence. In order to see
• 1:05:05
  Speaker 1: clearly what an idea is, we must guard ourselves against
• 1:05:08
  Speaker 1: a misunderstanding. Many regard the idea as the form or
• 1:05:12
  Speaker 1: the differentiation of our thinking, and according to this opinion,
• 1:05:15
  Speaker 1: we have the idea in our mind in so far
• 1:05:17
  Speaker 1: as we are thinking of it at each separate time
• 1:05:20
  Speaker 1: that we think of it. Anew, we have another idea,
• 1:05:22
  Speaker 1: although similar to the preceding one. Some, however, take the
• 1:05:26
  Speaker 1: idea as the immediate object of thought, or as a
• 1:05:29
  Speaker 1: permanent form which remains even when we are no longer
• 1:05:31
  Speaker 1: contemplating it. As a matter of fact, our soul has
• 1:05:35
  Speaker 1: the power of representing to itself any form or nature
• 1:05:38
  Speaker 1: whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it. And I
• 1:05:41
  Speaker 1: think that this activity of our soul is, so far
• 1:05:44
  Speaker 1: as it expresses some nature, form or essence properly the
• 1:05:47
  Speaker 1: idea of the thing. This is in us, and is
• 1:05:51
  Speaker 1: always in us, whether we are thinking of it or no.
• 1:05:54
  Speaker 1: Our soul expresses God and the Universe and all essences,
• 1:05:57
  Speaker 1: as well as all existences. Position is in accord with
• 1:06:01
  Speaker 1: my principles that naturally nothing enters into our minds from outside.
• 1:06:06
  Speaker 1: It is a bad habit we have of thinking as
• 1:06:08
  Speaker 1: though our minds received certain messengers, as it were, or
• 1:06:11
  Speaker 1: as if they had doors or windows. We have in
• 1:06:14
  Speaker 1: our minds all those forms for all periods of time.
• 1:06:17
  Speaker 1: Because the mind at every moment expresses all its future thoughts,
• 1:06:20
  Speaker 1: and already thinks confusedly of all that of which it
• 1:06:22
  Speaker 1: will ever think distinctly, nothing can be taught us of
• 1:06:25
  Speaker 1: which we have not already in our minds. The idea.
• 1:06:28
  Speaker 1: This idea is, as it were, the material out of
• 1:06:30
  Speaker 1: which the thought will form itself. This is what Plato
• 1:06:34
  Speaker 1: has excellently brought out in his Doctrine of Reminiscence, a
• 1:06:37
  Speaker 1: doctrine which contains a great deal of truth, provided that
• 1:06:40
  Speaker 1: it is properly understood and purged of the error of
• 1:06:42
  Speaker 1: pre existence, and provided that one does not conceive of
• 1:06:45
  Speaker 1: the soul as having already known and thought at some
• 1:06:48
  Speaker 1: other time what it learns and thinks now. Plato has
• 1:06:53
  Speaker 1: also confirmed his position by a beautiful experiment. He introduces
• 1:06:57
  Speaker 1: a small boy whom he leads by short steps to
• 1:07:00
  Speaker 1: extremely difficult truths of geometry bearing on incommensurables, all this
• 1:07:05
  Speaker 1: without teaching the boy anything, merely drawing out replies by
• 1:07:08
  Speaker 1: a well arranged series of questions. This shows that the
• 1:07:12
  Speaker 1: soul virtually knows those things, and needs only to be
• 1:07:15
  Speaker 1: reminded and am adverted to recognize the truths. Consequently, it
• 1:07:20
  Speaker 1: possesses at least the idea upon which those truths depend.
• 1:07:24
  Speaker 1: We may say even that it already possesses those truths,
• 1:07:27
  Speaker 1: if we consider them as the relations of the ideas
• 1:07:31
  Speaker 1: twenty seven. In what respect our souls can be compared
• 1:07:35
  Speaker 1: to blank tablets, and how conceptions are derived from the senses?
• 1:07:40
  Speaker 1: Aristotle preferred to compare our souls to blank tablets prepared
• 1:07:43
  Speaker 1: for writing, and he maintains that nothing is in the
• 1:07:46
  Speaker 1: understanding which does not come through the senses. This position
• 1:07:50
  Speaker 1: is in accord with the popular conceptions, as Aristotle's positions
• 1:07:53
  Speaker 1: usually are. Plato thinks more profoundly, such tenets or practicologies
• 1:07:58
  Speaker 1: are nevertheless allowable ordinary use. Somewhat in the same way
• 1:08:02
  Speaker 1: as those who accept the Copernican theory still continue to
• 1:08:05
  Speaker 1: speak of the rising and setting of the sun, I find,
• 1:08:08
  Speaker 1: indeed that these usages can be given a real meaning,
• 1:08:10
  Speaker 1: containing no error, quite in the same way as I
• 1:08:13
  Speaker 1: have already pointed out that we may truly say particular
• 1:08:16
  Speaker 1: substances act upon one another. In this same sense, we
• 1:08:20
  Speaker 1: may say that knowledge is received from without through the
• 1:08:23
  Speaker 1: medium of the senses, because certain exterior things contain or express,
• 1:08:27
  Speaker 1: more particularly the causes which determine us to certain thoughts.
• 1:08:31
  Speaker 1: Because in the ordinary uses of life, we attribute to
• 1:08:34
  Speaker 1: the soul only that which belongs to it most manifestly
• 1:08:37
  Speaker 1: and particularly, and there is no advantage in going further. When, however,
• 1:08:42
  Speaker 1: we are dealing with the exactness of metaphysical truths, it
• 1:08:45
  Speaker 1: is important to recognize the powers and independence of the soul,
• 1:08:49
  Speaker 1: which extend infinitely further than is commonly supposed. In order therefore,
• 1:08:54
  Speaker 1: to avoid misunderstandings, it would be well to choose separate
• 1:08:57
  Speaker 1: terms for the two. These expressions which are in the soul,
• 1:09:00
  Speaker 1: whether one is conceiving of them or not, may be
• 1:09:03
  Speaker 1: called ideas, while those which one conceives of or constructs
• 1:09:06
  Speaker 1: may be called conceptions conceptress. But whatever terms are used,
• 1:09:11
  Speaker 1: it is always false to say that all our conceptions
• 1:09:14
  Speaker 1: come from the so called external senses, because those conceptions
• 1:09:18
  Speaker 1: which I have of myself and of my thoughts, and
• 1:09:20
  Speaker 1: consequently of being, of substance, of action, of identity, and
• 1:09:24
  Speaker 1: of many others, came from an inner experience. Twenty eight.
• 1:09:31
  Speaker 1: The only immediate object of our perceptions which exists outside
• 1:09:34
  Speaker 1: of us is God, and in him alone is our light.
• 1:09:39
  Speaker 1: In the strictly metaphysical sense, no external cause acts upon
• 1:09:42
  Speaker 1: us excepting God alone, and he is in immediate relation
• 1:09:45
  Speaker 1: with us only by virtue of our continual dependence upon him.
• 1:09:49
  Speaker 1: Whence it follows that there is absolutely no other external
• 1:09:52
  Speaker 1: object which comes into contact with our souls and directly
• 1:09:55
  Speaker 1: excites perceptions in us. We have in our soul's ideas
• 1:09:59
  Speaker 1: of everything only because of the continual action of God
• 1:10:02
  Speaker 1: upon us. That is to say, because every effect expresses
• 1:10:05
  Speaker 1: its cause, and therefore the essences of our souls are
• 1:10:08
  Speaker 1: certain expressions, imitations or images of the divine essence, divine thought,
• 1:10:12
  Speaker 1: and divine will, including all the ideas which are there contained.
• 1:10:17
  Speaker 1: We may say, therefore, that God is for us the
• 1:10:19
  Speaker 1: only immediate external object, and that we see things through Him.
• 1:10:24
  Speaker 1: For example, when we see the sun or the stars,
• 1:10:26
  Speaker 1: it is God who gives to us and preserves in
• 1:10:28
  Speaker 1: us the ideas, And whenever our senses are affected according
• 1:10:31
  Speaker 1: to his own laws in a certain manner, it is
• 1:10:33
  Speaker 1: he who, by his continual concurrence, determines our thinking. God
• 1:10:38
  Speaker 1: is the sun and the light of souls lumen illuminus
• 1:10:42
  Speaker 1: omnem hominem benientem in hunk mundum. Although this is not
• 1:10:46
  Speaker 1: the current conception, I think I have already remarked that
• 1:10:50
  Speaker 1: during the Scholastic period many believed God to be the
• 1:10:52
  Speaker 1: light of the soul intellectus again's animai rasianales, following in
• 1:10:57
  Speaker 1: this the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, who are always
• 1:11:00
  Speaker 1: more Platonic than Aristotelian in their mode of thinking. The
• 1:11:04
  Speaker 1: Avaroists misused this conception, but others, among whom were several
• 1:11:08
  Speaker 1: mystic theologians and William of Saint Amour. Also, I think
• 1:11:12
  Speaker 1: understood this conception in a manner which ensured the dignity
• 1:11:15
  Speaker 1: of God and was able to raise the soul to
• 1:11:17
  Speaker 1: a knowledge of its welfare. Twenty nine. Yet we think
• 1:11:23
  Speaker 1: directly by means of our own ideas, and not through gods. Nevertheless,
• 1:11:28
  Speaker 1: I cannot approve of the position of certain able philosophers
• 1:11:31
  Speaker 1: who seem to hold that our ideas themselves are in
• 1:11:34
  Speaker 1: God and not at all in us. I think that
• 1:11:36
  Speaker 1: in taking this position they have neither sufficiently considered the
• 1:11:39
  Speaker 1: nature of substance which we have just explained, nor the
• 1:11:43
  Speaker 1: entire extension and independence of the soul, which includes all
• 1:11:46
  Speaker 1: that happens to it, and expresses God and with Him
• 1:11:49
  Speaker 1: all possible and actual beings, in the same way that
• 1:11:51
  Speaker 1: an effect expresses its cause. It is indeed inconceivable that
• 1:11:56
  Speaker 1: the soul should think using the ideas of something else.
• 1:11:59
  Speaker 1: The soul, when it thinks of anything, must be affected
• 1:12:01
  Speaker 1: effectively in a certain manner, and it must needs have
• 1:12:04
  Speaker 1: in itself an advance not only the passive capacity of
• 1:12:07
  Speaker 1: being thus affected, a capacity already wholly determined, but it
• 1:12:11
  Speaker 1: must have besides an active power by virtue of which
• 1:12:14
  Speaker 1: it has always had in its nature. The marks of
• 1:12:16
  Speaker 1: the future production of this thought, and the disposition to
• 1:12:19
  Speaker 1: produce it at its proper time. All of this shows
• 1:12:23
  Speaker 1: that the soul already includes the idea which is comprised
• 1:12:26
  Speaker 1: in any particular thought. Thirty how God inclines our souls
• 1:12:32
  Speaker 1: without necessitating them, that there are no grounds for complaint.
• 1:12:36
  Speaker 1: That we must not ask why Judas sinned, because this
• 1:12:39
  Speaker 1: free act is contained in his concept, the only question
• 1:12:42
  Speaker 1: being why Judas the sinner is admitted to existence preferably
• 1:12:45
  Speaker 1: to other possible persons. Concerning the original imperfection or limitation
• 1:12:50
  Speaker 1: before the fall, and concerning the different degrees of grace
• 1:12:55
  Speaker 1: regarding the action of God upon the human will, there
• 1:12:58
  Speaker 1: are many quite different considerations which it would take too
• 1:13:00
  Speaker 1: long to investigate here. Nevertheless, the following is what can
• 1:13:04
  Speaker 1: be said. In general, God, in cooperating with ordinary actions,
• 1:13:08
  Speaker 1: only follows the laws which he has established. That is
• 1:13:11
  Speaker 1: to say, he continually preserves and produces our beings, so
• 1:13:14
  Speaker 1: that the ideas come to us spontaneously or with freedom,
• 1:13:17
  Speaker 1: in that order which the concept of our individual substance
• 1:13:20
  Speaker 1: carries with itself. In this concept, they can be foreseen
• 1:13:25
  Speaker 1: for all eternity. Furthermore, by virtue of the decree which
• 1:13:29
  Speaker 1: God has made, that the will shall always seek the
• 1:13:31
  Speaker 1: apparent good in certain particular respects, in regard to which
• 1:13:35
  Speaker 1: this apparent good always has in it something of reality,
• 1:13:37
  Speaker 1: expressing or imitating God's will. He, without at all necessitating
• 1:13:42
  Speaker 1: our choice, determines it by that which appears most desirable.
• 1:13:47
  Speaker 1: For absolutely speaking, our wills, contrasted with necessity, is in
• 1:13:50
  Speaker 1: a state of indifference, being able to act otherwise or
• 1:13:54
  Speaker 1: wholly to suspend its action, either alternative being and remaining possible.
• 1:14:00
  Speaker 1: Therefore devolves upon the soul to be on guard against
• 1:14:02
  Speaker 1: appearances by means of a firm will, to reflect, and
• 1:14:06
  Speaker 1: to refuse to act or decide in certain circumstances, except
• 1:14:09
  Speaker 1: after mature deliberation. It is, however, true, and has been
• 1:14:14
  Speaker 1: assured from all eternity, that certain souls will not employ
• 1:14:17
  Speaker 1: their power upon certain occasions. But who could do more
• 1:14:21
  Speaker 1: than God has done? And can such a soul complain
• 1:14:24
  Speaker 1: of anything except itself? All these complaints after the deed
• 1:14:28
  Speaker 1: are unjust inasmuch as they would have been unjust before
• 1:14:31
  Speaker 1: the deed. Would this soul, a little before committing the
• 1:14:34
  Speaker 1: sin have had the right to complain of God as
• 1:14:36
  Speaker 1: though he had determined the sin. Since the determinations of
• 1:14:40
  Speaker 1: God in these matters cannot be foreseen, how would the
• 1:14:42
  Speaker 1: soul know that it was preordained to sin unless it
• 1:14:45
  Speaker 1: had already committed the sin. It is merely a question
• 1:14:48
  Speaker 1: of wishing to or not wishing to, and God could
• 1:14:51
  Speaker 1: not have set an easier or just a condition. Therefore,
• 1:14:55
  Speaker 1: all judges, without asking the reasons which have disposed a
• 1:14:57
  Speaker 1: man to have an evil, will consider only how far
• 1:15:00
  Speaker 1: this will is wrong? But you object, perhaps it is
• 1:15:03
  Speaker 1: ordained from all eternity that I will sin. Find your
• 1:15:07
  Speaker 1: own answer, perhaps it has not been. Now then, without
• 1:15:11
  Speaker 1: asking for what you are unable to know, and in
• 1:15:13
  Speaker 1: regard to which you can have no light, act according
• 1:15:16
  Speaker 1: to your duty and your knowledge. But someone will object
• 1:15:20
  Speaker 1: whence comes it then that this man will assuredly do
• 1:15:23
  Speaker 1: this sin. The reply is easy. It is that otherwise
• 1:15:27
  Speaker 1: he would not be a man. For God foresees from
• 1:15:30
  Speaker 1: all time that there will be a certain Judas, and
• 1:15:32
  Speaker 1: in the concept or idea of him, which God has
• 1:15:35
  Speaker 1: is contained this future free act. The only question therefore,
• 1:15:39
  Speaker 1: which remains is why this certain Judas the betrayer, who
• 1:15:42
  Speaker 1: is possible only because of the idea of God actually exists.
• 1:15:46
  Speaker 1: To this question, however, we can expect no answer here
• 1:15:49
  Speaker 1: on earth, excepting to say in general that it is
• 1:15:52
  Speaker 1: because God has found it good that he should exist.
• 1:15:54
  Speaker 1: Notwithstanding that sin which he foresaw, This evil will be
• 1:15:59
  Speaker 1: more than overbalanced. God will derive a greater good from it,
• 1:16:02
  Speaker 1: and it will finally turn out that this series of events,
• 1:16:05
  Speaker 1: in which is included the existence of this sinner, is
• 1:16:08
  Speaker 1: the most perfect among all the possible series of events.
• 1:16:11
  Speaker 1: An explanation in every case of the admirable economy of
• 1:16:14
  Speaker 1: this choice cannot be given while we are sojourners on earth.
• 1:16:18
  Speaker 1: It is enough to know the excellence without understanding it.
• 1:16:21
  Speaker 1: It is here that must be recognized altitude and m
• 1:16:24
  Speaker 1: di vitiarum, the unfathomable depth of the divine wisdom. Without
• 1:16:28
  Speaker 1: hesitating at a detail which involves an infinite number of considerations.
• 1:16:33
  Speaker 1: It is clear, however, that God is not the cause
• 1:16:35
  Speaker 1: of ill, For not only after the loss of innocence
• 1:16:38
  Speaker 1: by men, as original sin possessed the soul, but even
• 1:16:42
  Speaker 1: before that, there was an original limitation or imperfection in
• 1:16:45
  Speaker 1: the very nature of all creatures, which rendered them open
• 1:16:48
  Speaker 1: to sin and able to fall. There is therefore no
• 1:16:52
  Speaker 1: more difficulty in the supralapsarian view than there is in
• 1:16:56
  Speaker 1: the other views of sin. To this also, it seems
• 1:16:59
  Speaker 1: to me, can be reduced the opinion of Saint Augustine
• 1:17:01
  Speaker 1: and of other authors that the root of evil is
• 1:17:04
  Speaker 1: in the negativity, that is to say, in the lack
• 1:17:06
  Speaker 1: or limitation of creatures, which God graciously remedies by whatever
• 1:17:10
  Speaker 1: degree of perfection it pleases him to give. This grace
• 1:17:13
  Speaker 1: of God, whether ordinary or extraordinary, has its degrees and
• 1:17:16
  Speaker 1: its measures. It is always efficacious in itself to produce
• 1:17:20
  Speaker 1: a certain proportionate effect. And furthermore, it is always sufficient
• 1:17:24
  Speaker 1: not only to keep one from sin, but even to
• 1:17:26
  Speaker 1: effect his salvation, provided that the man cooperates with that
• 1:17:30
  Speaker 1: which is in him. It has not, always, however, sufficient
• 1:17:33
  Speaker 1: power to overcome the inclination, for if it did, it
• 1:17:37
  Speaker 1: would no longer be limited in any way. And this
• 1:17:39
  Speaker 1: superiority to limitations is reserved to that unique grace which
• 1:17:43
  Speaker 1: is absolutely efficacious. This grace is always victorious, whether through
• 1:17:47
  Speaker 1: its own self or through the congruity of circumstances. Thirty
• 1:17:52
  Speaker 1: one concerning the motives of election, concerning faith foreseen and
• 1:17:57
  Speaker 1: the absolute decree, and that it all reduce the question
• 1:18:00
  Speaker 1: why God has chosen and resolved to admit to existence
• 1:18:04
  Speaker 1: just such a possible person whose concept includes just such
• 1:18:07
  Speaker 1: a sequence of free acts and the free gifts of grace.
• 1:18:11
  Speaker 1: This at once puts an end to all difficulties. Finally,
• 1:18:16
  Speaker 1: the grace of God is wholly unprejudiced, and creatures have
• 1:18:19
  Speaker 1: no claim upon it. Just as it is not sufficient
• 1:18:22
  Speaker 1: in accounting for God's choice in his dispensations of grace
• 1:18:26
  Speaker 1: to refer to his absolute or conditional prevision of men's
• 1:18:29
  Speaker 1: future actions, so it is also wrong to imagine his
• 1:18:32
  Speaker 1: decrees as absolute with no reasonable motive. As concerns foreseen
• 1:18:37
  Speaker 1: faith and good works, it is very true that God
• 1:18:39
  Speaker 1: has selected none but those whose faith and charity he
• 1:18:42
  Speaker 1: foresees course se fide donatorum preskivide. The same question, however,
• 1:18:48
  Speaker 1: arises again as to why God gives to some rather
• 1:18:51
  Speaker 1: than to others the grace of faith or of good works,
• 1:18:55
  Speaker 1: as concerns God's ability to foresee not only the faith
• 1:18:58
  Speaker 1: and good deeds, but also their material and predisposition, or
• 1:19:01
  Speaker 1: that which a man on his part contributes to them.
• 1:19:04
  Speaker 1: Since there are as truly diversities on the part of
• 1:19:07
  Speaker 1: men as on the part of grace, and a man,
• 1:19:09
  Speaker 1: although he needs to be aroused to good and needs
• 1:19:12
  Speaker 1: to become converted, yet acts in accordance with his temperament
• 1:19:16
  Speaker 1: as regards his ability. To foresee, there are many who
• 1:19:19
  Speaker 1: say that God, knowing what a particular man will do
• 1:19:21
  Speaker 1: without grace, that is, without his extraordinary assistance, or knowing
• 1:19:25
  Speaker 1: at least what will be the human contribution, resolves to
• 1:19:28
  Speaker 1: give grace to those whose natural dispositions are the best,
• 1:19:31
  Speaker 1: or at any rate are the least imperfect and evil.
• 1:19:35
  Speaker 1: But if this were the case, then the natural dispositions,
• 1:19:37
  Speaker 1: in so far as they were good, would be like
• 1:19:39
  Speaker 1: gifts of grace, since God would have given advantages to
• 1:19:42
  Speaker 1: some over others, and therefore, since he would well know
• 1:19:46
  Speaker 1: that the natural advantages which he had given would serve
• 1:19:48
  Speaker 1: as motives for his grace or for his extraordinary assistance,
• 1:19:52
  Speaker 1: would not everything be reduced to his mercy. I think therefore,
• 1:19:56
  Speaker 1: that since we do not know how much and in
• 1:19:58
  Speaker 1: what way God regards natural dispositions in the dispensations of
• 1:20:01
  Speaker 1: his grace, it would be safest and most exact to say,
• 1:20:05
  Speaker 1: in accordance with our principles, and as I have already
• 1:20:08
  Speaker 1: remarked that there must needs be among possible beings the
• 1:20:11
  Speaker 1: person Peter or John, whose concept or idea contains all
• 1:20:14
  Speaker 1: that particular sequence of ordinary and extraordinary manifestations of grace,
• 1:20:19
  Speaker 1: together with the rest of the accompanying events and circumstances,
• 1:20:22
  Speaker 1: and that it has pleased God to choose him among
• 1:20:25
  Speaker 1: an infinite number of persons equally possible for actual existence.
• 1:20:29
  Speaker 1: When we have said this, there seems nothing left to ask,
• 1:20:32
  Speaker 1: and all difficulties vanish. For in regard to that great
• 1:20:36
  Speaker 1: and ultimate question why it has pleased God to choose
• 1:20:38
  Speaker 1: him among so great a number of possible persons, it
• 1:20:41
  Speaker 1: is surely unreasonable to demand more than the general reasons
• 1:20:44
  Speaker 1: which we have given. The reasons in detail surpass our ken. Therefore,
• 1:20:50
  Speaker 1: instead of postulating an absolute decree, which, being without reason,
• 1:20:53
  Speaker 1: would be unreasonable, and instead of postulating reasons which do
• 1:20:57
  Speaker 1: not succeed in solving the difficulties, and in turn have
• 1:21:00
  Speaker 1: need themselves of reasons, it will be best to say,
• 1:21:03
  Speaker 1: with Saint Paul, that there are for God's choice certain
• 1:21:06
  Speaker 1: great reasons of wisdom and congruity which he follows, Which reasons, however,
• 1:21:11
  Speaker 1: are unknown to mortals, and are founded upon the general order,
• 1:21:14
  Speaker 1: whose goal is the greatest perfection of the world. This
• 1:21:17
  Speaker 1: is what is meant when the motives of God's glory
• 1:21:20
  Speaker 1: and of the manifestation of His justice are spoken of,
• 1:21:23
  Speaker 1: as well as when men speak of His mercy and
• 1:21:26
  Speaker 1: his perfection in general, that immense vastness of wealth in
• 1:21:30
  Speaker 1: fine with which the soul of the same Saint Paul
• 1:21:33
  Speaker 1: was so thrilled thirty two. Usefulness of these principles in
• 1:21:38
  Speaker 1: matters of piety and of religion. In addition, it seems
• 1:21:43
  Speaker 1: that the thoughts which we have just explained, and particularly
• 1:21:46
  Speaker 1: the great principle of the perfection of God's operations, and
• 1:21:49
  Speaker 1: the concept of substance, which includes all its changes, with
• 1:21:52
  Speaker 1: all its accompanying circumstances, far from injuring, serve rather to
• 1:21:57
  Speaker 1: confirm religion, serve to dissipate great difficult to inflame souls
• 1:22:01
  Speaker 1: with a divine love, and to raise the minds to
• 1:22:04
  Speaker 1: a knowledge of incorporeal substances, much more than the present
• 1:22:07
  Speaker 1: day hypotheses. For it appears clearly that all other substances
• 1:22:12
  Speaker 1: depend upon God, just as our thoughts emanate from our
• 1:22:15
  Speaker 1: own substances. That God is all in all, and that
• 1:22:18
  Speaker 1: He is intimately united to all created things in proportion,
• 1:22:22
  Speaker 1: however to their perfection, that it is he alone who
• 1:22:25
  Speaker 1: determines them from without by his influence. And if to
• 1:22:28
  Speaker 1: act is to determine directly, it may be said in
• 1:22:31
  Speaker 1: metaphysical language that God alone acts upon me, and he
• 1:22:34
  Speaker 1: alone causes me to do good or ill, other substances
• 1:22:37
  Speaker 1: contributing only because of his determinations. Because God, who takes
• 1:22:41
  Speaker 1: all things into consideration, distributes his bounties, and compels created
• 1:22:45
  Speaker 1: beings to accommodate themselves to one another. Thus God alone
• 1:22:50
  Speaker 1: constitutes the relation or communication between substances. It is through
• 1:22:55
  Speaker 1: Him that the phenomena of the one meet and accord
• 1:22:57
  Speaker 1: with the phenomena of the others, so that they be
• 1:23:00
  Speaker 1: a reality in our perceptions. In common parlance, however, an
• 1:23:04
  Speaker 1: action is attributed to particular causes in the sense that
• 1:23:07
  Speaker 1: I have explained above, because it is not necessary to
• 1:23:10
  Speaker 1: make continual mention of the universal cause when speaking of
• 1:23:13
  Speaker 1: particular cases. It can be seen also that every substance
• 1:23:17
  Speaker 1: has a perfect spontaneity, which becomes liberty with intelligent substances.
• 1:23:22
  Speaker 1: Everything which happens to it is a consequence of its
• 1:23:25
  Speaker 1: idea or its being, and nothing determines it except God only.
• 1:23:30
  Speaker 1: It is for this reason that a person of exalted
• 1:23:32
  Speaker 1: mind and revered saintliness may say that the soul ought
• 1:23:35
  Speaker 1: often to think as if there were only God and
• 1:23:38
  Speaker 1: itself in the world. Nothing can make us hold through
• 1:23:41
  Speaker 1: immortality more firmly than this independence and vastness of the soul,
• 1:23:45
  Speaker 1: which protects it completely against exterior things. Since it alone
• 1:23:49
  Speaker 1: constitutes our universe, and together with God, is sufficient for itself,
• 1:23:53
  Speaker 1: it is as impossible for it to perish save through annihilation,
• 1:23:56
  Speaker 1: as it is impossible for the universe to destroy itself,
• 1:24:00
  Speaker 1: the universe whose animate and perpetual expression it is. Furthermore,
• 1:24:04
  Speaker 1: the changes in this extended mass, which is called our body,
• 1:24:07
  Speaker 1: cannot possibly affect the soul, nor can the dissipation of
• 1:24:10
  Speaker 1: the body destroy that which is indivisible. Thirty three explanation
• 1:24:16
  Speaker 1: of the relation between the soul and the body, a
• 1:24:19
  Speaker 1: matter which has been regarded as inexplicable or else as miraculous.
• 1:24:23
  Speaker 1: Concerning the origin of confused perceptions, we can also see
• 1:24:28
  Speaker 1: the explanation of that great mystery, the union of the
• 1:24:31
  Speaker 1: soul and the body. That is to say, how it
• 1:24:33
  Speaker 1: comes about that the passions and actions of the one
• 1:24:36
  Speaker 1: are accompanied by the actions and passions, or else the
• 1:24:38
  Speaker 1: appropriate phenomena of the other. For it is not possible
• 1:24:43
  Speaker 1: to conceive how one can have an influence upon the other,
• 1:24:45
  Speaker 1: and it is unreasonable to have recourse at once to
• 1:24:48
  Speaker 1: the extraordinary intervention of the universal cause in an ordinary
• 1:24:51
  Speaker 1: and particular case. The following, however, is the true explanation.
• 1:24:57
  Speaker 1: We have said that everything which happens to a soul,
• 1:24:59
  Speaker 1: or or to any substance, is a consequence of its concept. Hence,
• 1:25:03
  Speaker 1: the idea itself, or the essence of the soul, brings
• 1:25:06
  Speaker 1: it about that all of its appearances or perceptions should
• 1:25:09
  Speaker 1: be borne out of its nature and precisely in such
• 1:25:11
  Speaker 1: a way that they correspond of themselves to that which
• 1:25:14
  Speaker 1: happens in the universe at large, but more particularly and
• 1:25:17
  Speaker 1: more perfectly to that which happens in the body associated
• 1:25:20
  Speaker 1: with it, because it is in a particular way and
• 1:25:23
  Speaker 1: only for a certain time, according to the relation of
• 1:25:26
  Speaker 1: other bodies to its own body, that the soul expresses
• 1:25:28
  Speaker 1: the state of the universe. This last fact enables us
• 1:25:32
  Speaker 1: to see how our body belongs to us, without however,
• 1:25:35
  Speaker 1: being attached to our essence. I believe that those who
• 1:25:39
  Speaker 1: are careful thinkers will decide favorably for our principles because
• 1:25:43
  Speaker 1: of this single reason, namely, that they are able to
• 1:25:46
  Speaker 1: see in what consists the relation between the soul and
• 1:25:49
  Speaker 1: the body, a parallelism which appears inexplicable in any other way.
• 1:25:54
  Speaker 1: We can also see that the perceptions of our senses,
• 1:25:56
  Speaker 1: even when they are clear, must necessarily contain certain confus
• 1:26:00
  Speaker 1: used elements. For as all the bodies in the universe
• 1:26:02
  Speaker 1: are in sympathy, ours receives the impressions of all the others.
• 1:26:06
  Speaker 1: And while our senses respond to everything, our soul cannot
• 1:26:09
  Speaker 1: pay attention to every particular. That is why our confused
• 1:26:13
  Speaker 1: sensations are the result of a variety of perceptions. This
• 1:26:17
  Speaker 1: variety is infinite. It is almost like the confused murmuring
• 1:26:21
  Speaker 1: which is heard by those who approach the shore of
• 1:26:23
  Speaker 1: a sea. It comes from the continual beatings of innumerable waves.
• 1:26:28
  Speaker 1: If now, out of the many perceptions which do not
• 1:26:31
  Speaker 1: at all fit together to make one no particular, one
• 1:26:34
  Speaker 1: perception surpasses the others, and if they make impressions about
• 1:26:37
  Speaker 1: equally strong or equally capable of holding the attention of
• 1:26:40
  Speaker 1: the soul, they can be perceived only confusedly. Thirty four
• 1:26:47
  Speaker 1: concerning the difference between spirits and other substances, souls or
• 1:26:50
  Speaker 1: substantial forms, that the immortality which men desire includes memory.
• 1:26:56
  Speaker 1: Supposing that the bodies which constitute are unum per se
• 1:27:00
  Speaker 1: as human bodies are substances and have substantial forms, and
• 1:27:04
  Speaker 1: supposing that animals have souls, we are obliged to grant
• 1:27:08
  Speaker 1: that these souls and these substantial forms cannot entirely perish,
• 1:27:12
  Speaker 1: any more than can the atoms or the ultimate elements
• 1:27:14
  Speaker 1: of matter. According to the position of other philosophers, for
• 1:27:17
  Speaker 1: no substance perishes, although it may become very different. Such
• 1:27:22
  Speaker 1: substances also express the whole universe, although more imperfectly than
• 1:27:26
  Speaker 1: do spirits. The principal difference, however, is that they do
• 1:27:30
  Speaker 1: not know that they are nor what they are. Consequently,
• 1:27:33
  Speaker 1: not being able to reason, they are unable to discover
• 1:27:36
  Speaker 1: necessary and universal truths. It is also because they do
• 1:27:40
  Speaker 1: not reflect regarding themselves that they have no moral qualities.
• 1:27:43
  Speaker 1: Whence it follows that undergoing a thousand transformations, as we
• 1:27:47
  Speaker 1: see a caterpillar change into a butterfly, the result from
• 1:27:50
  Speaker 1: a moral or practical standpoint is the same as if
• 1:27:52
  Speaker 1: we said that they perished in each case, and we
• 1:27:54
  Speaker 1: can indeed say it from the physical standpoint in the
• 1:27:57
  Speaker 1: same way that we say bodies perish in their dissolution.
• 1:28:01
  Speaker 1: But the intelligent soul, knowing that it is, and having
• 1:28:03
  Speaker 1: the ability to say that word I so full of meaning,
• 1:28:07
  Speaker 1: not only continues and exists metaphysically far more certainly than
• 1:28:11
  Speaker 1: do the others. But it remains the same from the
• 1:28:13
  Speaker 1: moral standpoint, and constitutes the same personality. For it is
• 1:28:17
  Speaker 1: its memory or knowledge of this ego which renders it
• 1:28:20
  Speaker 1: open to punishment and reward. Also, the immortality which is
• 1:28:24
  Speaker 1: required in morals and in religion, does not consist merely
• 1:28:27
  Speaker 1: in this perpetual existence which pertains to all substances. For
• 1:28:31
  Speaker 1: if in addition, there were no remembrance of what one
• 1:28:33
  Speaker 1: had been, immortality would not be at all desirable. Suppose
• 1:28:37
  Speaker 1: that some individual could suddenly become King of China on condition, however,
• 1:28:41
  Speaker 1: of forgetting what he had been, as though being born again.
• 1:28:45
  Speaker 1: Would it not amount to the same practically, or as
• 1:28:47
  Speaker 1: far as the effects could be perceived, as if the
• 1:28:50
  Speaker 1: individual were annihilated, and a king of China were the
• 1:28:53
  Speaker 1: same instant created in his place, the individual would have
• 1:28:56
  Speaker 1: no reason to desire this thirty five the excellence of spirits,
• 1:29:02
  Speaker 1: that God considers them preferable to other creatures, that the
• 1:29:05
  Speaker 1: spirits express God rather than the world, while other simple
• 1:29:08
  Speaker 1: substances express the world rather than God. In order however,
• 1:29:13
  Speaker 1: to prove by natural reasons that God will preserve forever
• 1:29:16
  Speaker 1: not only our substance but also our personality, that is
• 1:29:19
  Speaker 1: to say, the recollection and knowledge of what we are,
• 1:29:22
  Speaker 1: although the distinct knowledge is sometimes suspended during sleep and
• 1:29:25
  Speaker 1: in swoons, it is necessary to join to metaphysics moral considerations.
• 1:29:31
  Speaker 1: God must be considered not only as the principle and
• 1:29:33
  Speaker 1: the cause of all substances and of all existing things,
• 1:29:36
  Speaker 1: but also as the chief of all persons or intelligent substances,
• 1:29:40
  Speaker 1: as the absolute monarch of the most perfect city or republic,
• 1:29:43
  Speaker 1: such as is constituted by all the spirits together in
• 1:29:46
  Speaker 1: the universe, God being the most complete of all spirits
• 1:29:49
  Speaker 1: at the same time that He is greatest of all beings.
• 1:29:53
  Speaker 1: For assuredly the spirits are the most perfect of substances
• 1:29:55
  Speaker 1: and best express the Divinity. Since all the nature, purpose, virtue,
• 1:30:00
  Speaker 1: and function of substances is as has been sufficiently explained
• 1:30:04
  Speaker 1: to express God and the universe. There is no room
• 1:30:07
  Speaker 1: for doubting that those substances which give the expression, knowing
• 1:30:10
  Speaker 1: what they are doing, and which are able to understand
• 1:30:12
  Speaker 1: the great truths about God and the universe, do express
• 1:30:15
  Speaker 1: God and the universe incomparably better than do those natures
• 1:30:19
  Speaker 1: which are either brutish and incapable of recognizing truths, or
• 1:30:22
  Speaker 1: are holy destitute of sensation and knowledge. The difference between
• 1:30:27
  Speaker 1: intelligent substances and those which are not intelligent is quite
• 1:30:30
  Speaker 1: as great as between a mirror and one who sees
• 1:30:34
  Speaker 1: as God is himself the greatest and wisest of spirits.
• 1:30:37
  Speaker 1: It is easy to understand that the spirits with which
• 1:30:39
  Speaker 1: He can so to speak enter into conversation and even
• 1:30:42
  Speaker 1: in its social relations, by communicating to them in particular
• 1:30:45
  Speaker 1: ways his feelings and his will, so that they are
• 1:30:48
  Speaker 1: able to know and love their benefactor, must be much
• 1:30:50
  Speaker 1: nearer to him than the rest of created things, which
• 1:30:53
  Speaker 1: may be regarded as the instruments of spirits. In the
• 1:30:56
  Speaker 1: same way, we see that all wise persons consider far
• 1:30:59
  Speaker 1: more the condition of a man than of anything else,
• 1:31:01
  Speaker 1: however precious it may be. And it seems that the
• 1:31:04
  Speaker 1: greatest satisfaction which a soul satisfied in other respects can
• 1:31:08
  Speaker 1: have is to see itself loved by others. However, with
• 1:31:11
  Speaker 1: respect to God, there is this difference, that his glory
• 1:31:14
  Speaker 1: and our worship can add nothing to his satisfaction, the
• 1:31:17
  Speaker 1: recognition of creatures being nothing but a consequence of His
• 1:31:20
  Speaker 1: sovereign and perfect felicity, and being far from contributing to it,
• 1:31:24
  Speaker 1: or from causing it, even in part. Nevertheless, that which
• 1:31:27
  Speaker 1: is reasonable in finite spirits is found eminently in Him.
• 1:31:31
  Speaker 1: And as we praise a king who prefers to preserve
• 1:31:33
  Speaker 1: the life of a man before that of the most
• 1:31:35
  Speaker 1: precious and rare of his animals, we should not doubt
• 1:31:38
  Speaker 1: that the most enlightened and most just of all monarchs
• 1:31:40
  Speaker 1: has the same preference. Thirty six. God is the monarch
• 1:31:46
  Speaker 1: of the most perfect republic composed of all the spirits,
• 1:31:49
  Speaker 1: and the happiness of this city of God is his
• 1:31:51
  Speaker 1: principal purpose. Spirits are, of all substances the most capable
• 1:31:56
  Speaker 1: of perfection, and their perfections are different in this that
• 1:31:59
  Speaker 1: they interfere with one another the least, or rather that
• 1:32:02
  Speaker 1: they aid one another the most. For only the most
• 1:32:05
  Speaker 1: virtuous can be the most perfect friends. Hence, it follows
• 1:32:09
  Speaker 1: that God, who in all things has the greatest perfection,
• 1:32:12
  Speaker 1: will have the greatest care for spirits, and will give
• 1:32:15
  Speaker 1: not only to all of them in general, but even
• 1:32:17
  Speaker 1: to each one in particular, the highest perfection which the
• 1:32:20
  Speaker 1: universal harmony will permit. We can even say that it
• 1:32:24
  Speaker 1: is because he is a spirit that God is the
• 1:32:26
  Speaker 1: originator of existences, for if he lacks the power of
• 1:32:29
  Speaker 1: will to choose what is best, there would have been
• 1:32:32
  Speaker 1: no reason why one possible being should exist rather than
• 1:32:34
  Speaker 1: any other. Therefore, God's being a spirit himself dominates all
• 1:32:39
  Speaker 1: the consideration which He may have toward created things. Spirits
• 1:32:43
  Speaker 1: alone are made in his image, being, as it were,
• 1:32:45
  Speaker 1: of his blood, or as children in the family, since
• 1:32:48
  Speaker 1: they alone are able to serve Him of free will
• 1:32:50
  Speaker 1: and to act consciously imitating the divine nature. A single
• 1:32:55
  Speaker 1: spirit is worth a whole world, because it not only
• 1:32:57
  Speaker 1: expresses the whole world, but it also knows it and
• 1:33:00
  Speaker 1: governs itself, as does God. In this way, we may
• 1:33:04
  Speaker 1: say that though every substance expresses the whole universe, yet
• 1:33:07
  Speaker 1: the other substances express the world rather than God, while
• 1:33:10
  Speaker 1: spirits express God rather than the world. This nature of
• 1:33:14
  Speaker 1: spirits so noble that it enables them to approach Divinity
• 1:33:17
  Speaker 1: as much as is possible for created things, as as
• 1:33:20
  Speaker 1: a result that God derives infinitely more glory from them
• 1:33:23
  Speaker 1: than from the other beings, or rather the other beings
• 1:33:26
  Speaker 1: furnished to spirits the material for glorifying him. This moral
• 1:33:30
  Speaker 1: quality of God, which constitutes him Lord and monarch of spirits,
• 1:33:33
  Speaker 1: influences him so to speak personally and in a unique way.
• 1:33:37
  Speaker 1: It is through this that he humanizes himself, that he
• 1:33:39
  Speaker 1: is willing to suffer anthropologies, and that he enters into
• 1:33:43
  Speaker 1: social relations with us. And this consideration is so dear
• 1:33:46
  Speaker 1: to him that the happy and prosperous condition of his empire,
• 1:33:49
  Speaker 1: which consists in the greatest possible felicity of its inhabitants,
• 1:33:52
  Speaker 1: becomes supreme among his laws. Happiness is to persons what
• 1:33:56
  Speaker 1: perfection is to beings. And if the dominant principle in
• 1:34:00
  Speaker 1: the existence of the physical world is the decree to
• 1:34:02
  Speaker 1: give it the greatest possible perfection, the primary purpose in
• 1:34:06
  Speaker 1: the moral world, or in the City of God, which
• 1:34:08
  Speaker 1: constitutes the noblest part of the universe, ought to be
• 1:34:12
  Speaker 1: to extend the greatest happiness possible We must not therefore
• 1:34:16
  Speaker 1: doubt that God has so ordained everything that spirits not
• 1:34:18
  Speaker 1: only shall live forever, because this is unavoidable, but that
• 1:34:22
  Speaker 1: they shall also preserve forever their moral quality, so that
• 1:34:25
  Speaker 1: His city may never lose a person, quite in the
• 1:34:28
  Speaker 1: same way that the world never loses a substance. Consequently,
• 1:34:32
  Speaker 1: they will always be conscious of their being, Otherwise they
• 1:34:35
  Speaker 1: would be open to neither reward nor punishment, a condition
• 1:34:38
  Speaker 1: which is the essence of a republic, and above all
• 1:34:40
  Speaker 1: of the most perfect republic, where nothing can be neglected.
• 1:34:44
  Speaker 1: In fine God being at the same time the most
• 1:34:46
  Speaker 1: just and the most debonnair of monarchs, and requiring only
• 1:34:49
  Speaker 1: a good will on the part of men, provided that
• 1:34:52
  Speaker 1: it be sincere and intentional, his subjects cannot desire a
• 1:34:55
  Speaker 1: better condition to render them perfectly happy. He desires only
• 1:34:59
  Speaker 1: that they love him. Thirty seven Jesus Christ has revealed
• 1:35:05
  Speaker 1: to men the mystery and the admirable laws of the
• 1:35:07
  Speaker 1: Kingdom of Heaven, and the greatness of the supreme happiness
• 1:35:10
  Speaker 1: which God has prepared for those who love him. The
• 1:35:14
  Speaker 1: ancient philosophers knew very little of these important truths. Jesus
• 1:35:18
  Speaker 1: Christ alone has expressed them divinely well, and in a
• 1:35:21
  Speaker 1: way so clear and simple that the dullest minds have
• 1:35:23
  Speaker 1: understood them. His Gospel has entirely changed the face of
• 1:35:27
  Speaker 1: human affairs. It has brought us to know the Kingdom
• 1:35:30
  Speaker 1: of Heaven, or that perfect republic of spirits, which deserves
• 1:35:33
  Speaker 1: to be called the City of God. He it is
• 1:35:37
  Speaker 1: who has discovered to us its wonderful laws. He alone
• 1:35:40
  Speaker 1: has made us see how much God loves us, and
• 1:35:42
  Speaker 1: with what care everything that concerns us has been provided for.
• 1:35:46
  Speaker 1: How God, inasmuch as he cares for the sparrows, will
• 1:35:49
  Speaker 1: not neglect reasoning beings who are infinitely more dear to Him.
• 1:35:53
  Speaker 1: How all the hairs of our heads are numbered. How
• 1:35:56
  Speaker 1: heaven and earth may pass away, but the word of
• 1:35:58
  Speaker 1: God and that which belongs to the means of our
• 1:36:00
  Speaker 1: salvation will not pass away. Our God has more regard
• 1:36:04
  Speaker 1: for the least one among intelligent souls than for the
• 1:36:06
  Speaker 1: whole machinery of the world. How we ought not to
• 1:36:10
  Speaker 1: fear those who are able to destroy the body, but
• 1:36:12
  Speaker 1: are unable to destroy the soul, since God alone can
• 1:36:15
  Speaker 1: render the soul happy or unhappy. And how the souls
• 1:36:19
  Speaker 1: of the righteous are protected by His hand against all
• 1:36:21
  Speaker 1: the upheavals of the universe, since God alone is able
• 1:36:24
  Speaker 1: to act upon them. How none of our acts are forgotten.
• 1:36:28
  Speaker 1: How everything is to be accounted for, even careless words,
• 1:36:31
  Speaker 1: and even a spoonful of water which is well used
• 1:36:34
  Speaker 1: in fact, how everything must result in the greatest welfare
• 1:36:37
  Speaker 1: of the good. For then shall the righteous become like suns.
• 1:36:40
  Speaker 1: And neither our sense nor our minds have ever tasted
• 1:36:43
  Speaker 1: of anything approaching the joys which God has laid up
• 1:36:45
  Speaker 1: for those that love him. End of Section two, end
• 1:36:52
  Speaker 1: of Discourse on Metaphysics by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, translated by
• 1:36:57
  Speaker 1: George Montgomery SA