Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Two small bugs in WordPress core added up to a takeover that needed no login
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Tuesday, the twenty-first of July.
- 0:07Two small bugs in WordPress core added up to a takeover that needed no login.
- 0:13A quick warning if you run WordPress.
- 0:16Two long-known building blocks of WordPress core, a batch A P I endpoint and a query filter, turned out to fi
- 0:24t together into a full takeover this week.
- 0:27No login needed.
- 0:31It also forced the update onto affected sites without asking permission first.
- 0:36That's the good news.
- 0:40Proof-of-concept exploit code is already public.
- 0:43And the security firm watchTowr says it's seeing the first signs of exploitation in the wild.
- 0:48WordPress runs a large share of the UK's small business, charity and parish council websites.
- 0:56So this is the one to check today, not at the next patch cycle.
- 1:00Next. Two bugs, no login required.
- 1:04The first bug is C V E twenty twenty-six, six three zero three zero.
- 1:11It's a mix-up in WordPress's R E S T A P I batch endpoint, slash wp-json slash batch slash v1, which lets sev
- 1:23eral sub-requests run in one call.
- 1:25It tracks those sub-requests in two lists that are meant to stay in step.
- 1:30Feed it a sub-request that errors out, and the two lists slip by one.
- 1:35A later request then gets processed under the wrong handler, one that was never meant to see unauthenticated
- 1:42input.
- 1:49The guest at the counter gets someone else's key.
- 1:52And nobody behind the desk notices.
- 1:55That confusion opens the door to the second bug, C V E twenty twenty-six, six zero one three seven.
- 2:04It's a S Q L injection in the author underscore underscore not underscore in parameter of WP_Query.
- 2:13The code expects an array there, and validates it as one.
- 2:17Hand it a string instead, and the validation is skipped.
- 2:21The raw value drops straight into the query.
- 2:24Chain the two together against a default WordPress install, and an anonymous visitor can reach remote code e
- 2:30xecution. No plugins, no theme customisation, no account.
- 2:35That applies to sites running 6.
- 2:389.0 to 6.9.4, or 7.0.0 to 7.
- 2:440.1. The older 6.8 line carries the S Q L injection, but it can't chain to remote code execution.
- 2:52WordPress shipped fixes in 6.
- 2:558.6, 6.9.5 and 7.0.2 on Friday.
- 3:00And finally. The patch that didn't wait to be asked.
- 3:04The genuinely useful decision here wasn't the fix.
- 3:08It was what WordPress did next.
- 3:10It switched on forced auto-updates for every affected site, whether or not the owner had opted into automatic
- 3:17updates at all.
- 3:23Think about a parish council or a small charity.
- 3:27They're running a five-year-old WordPress install, with no in-house I T.
- 3:32They were never going to patch this themselves within 24 hours of a public proof-of-concept landing.
- 3:38Compare that with the last fortnight of on-prem SharePoint and A D F S patching.
- 3:43The fix existed, but organisations still had to find it, test it and apply it themselves.
- 3:50And attackers walked through the gap in the meantime.
- 3:53Making the secure state the default, not an opt-in click, is what actually closes the window.
- 3:59Even so, if you run WordPress in the UK, confirm your version manually.
- 4:05Don't assume the forced push landed.
- 4:07WordPress hasn't said whether sites that switched auto-updates off entirely were reached.
- 4:13That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:18Thanks for listening.