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CLAUSEWITZ’S ON WAR: Philosophy of Success Through Strategy, Power & Purpose - Carl von Clausewitz · SECRETS OF SUCCESS & WEALTH: Hidden Laws of Money, Power & Success

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Carl Vaughan Klausowitz on War, eighteen seventy three, Book one, On the
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Nature of War, Chapter one, What is war? One introduction. We
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propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or
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part, and last of all the whole in all its relations. Therefore,
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to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us
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to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is
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particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts, their relation to
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the whole should be kept constantly. In View two definition, we shall not
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enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall
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keep to the element of the thing itself. To a duel, war is
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nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a
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unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do
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so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to
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compel the other to submit to his will. Each endeavors to throw his adversary
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and thus render him incapable of further resistance. War, therefore, is an
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act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will, violence arms
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itself with the inventions of art and science. In order to contend against violence,
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self imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning termed usages of international
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law accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say,
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physical force, for there is no moral force without the conception of states,
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and law is therefore the means. The compulsory submission of the enemy to
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our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully,
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the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities.
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In theory, it takes the place of the final object and puts it
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aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations free utmost use of force.
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Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming in overcoming
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an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of
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the art of war. However plausible this may appear, still it is an
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error which must be extirpated, For in such dangerous things as war, the
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errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use
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of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the
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intelligence. It follows that he who uses force unsparingly without reference to the bloodshed
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involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application.
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The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to
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extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force
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on each side. This is the way in which the matter must be viewed,
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and it is to no purpose. It is even against one's own interest
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to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair, because
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the horror of its elements excites repugnance. If the wars of civilized people are
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less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social
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condition, both of states and themselves, and in their relations to each other.
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Out of this social condition and its relations, war arises, and by
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it. War is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these
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things do not belong to war itself. They are only given conditions. And
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to introduce into the philosophy of war itself, a principle of moderation would be
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an absurdity. Two motives lead men to war, instinctive hostility and hostile intention.
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In our definition of war, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter
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of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to
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conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description bordering on mere instinct, without
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combining with it the idea of hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile
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intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any or at all events, by
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any extreme hostility of feeling. Amongst savages, views emanating from the feelings amongst
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civilized nations, those emanating from the understanding have the predominance. But this difference
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arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, and see and therefore is not to
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be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In
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short, even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other.
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We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the
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war of a civilized nation entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the
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government, and to imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all
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feeling of passion, in such a way that at last the physical masses of
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combatants would no longer be required. In reality, their mere relations would suffice
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a kind of algebraic action. Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until
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the facts of the last war Asterisk taught it better. If war is an
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act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. If it does
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not originate in the feelings, it reacts more or less upon them, and
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the extent of this reaction depends not on the degree of civilization, but upon
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the importance and duration of the interests involved. Therefore, if we find civilized
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nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries,
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this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on
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war, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude
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acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder the constant progress of improvements in
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the construction of firearms are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary,
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which lies at the bottom of the conception of war is in no way changed
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or modified through the progress of civilization. We therefore repeat our proposition that war
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is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds. As one side dictates
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the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action which logically
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must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the
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first extreme with which we meet. First reciprocal action for the aim is to
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disarm the enemy. We have already said that the aim of all action in
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war is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this,
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theoretically at least is indispensable. If our opponent is to be made to comply
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with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive
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to him than the sacrifice which we demand. But the disadvantages of this position
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must naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance. Otherwise
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the enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out in the prospect of a
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change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a
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continuation of the war should therefore be a change for the worse. The worst
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condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed.
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If therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of
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war, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that
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he is threatened with it. From this, it follows that the disarming or
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overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim
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of warfare. Now, war is always the shock of two hostile bodies in
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collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because
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an absolute state of endurance would not be making war. Therefore, what we
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have just said as to the aim of action in war applies to both parties.
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Here, then, is another case of reciprocal action. As long as
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the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me. Then I shall be
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no longer my own master. He will dictate the law to me as I
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did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a
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second extreme second reciprocal action five utmost exertion of powers. If we desire to
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defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance.
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This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely,
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the sum of available means and the strength of the will. The sum
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of the available means may be estimated in a measure as it depends, although
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not entirely upon numbers. But the strength of volition is more difficult to determine
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and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives.
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Granted, we have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of
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the power to be contended with. We can then take a review of our
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own means and either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or,
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in case we have not the resources to effect this, then do our best
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by increasing our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the same.
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Therefore, there is a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception,
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must create a fresh effort towards an extreme. This is the third case
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of reciprocal action, and a third extreme with which we meet third reciprocal action
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six modification in the reality. Thus, reasoning in the abstract, the mind
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cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme
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with a conflict of forces left to themselves and obeying no other but their own
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inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of war,
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an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means
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which we shall apply. This constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes,
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which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train
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of logical subtleties. If adhering closely to the absolute, we try to avoid
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all difficulties by a stroke of the pen and insist with logical strictness that in
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every case the extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be
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exerted in that direction. Such a stroke of the pen would be a mere
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paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world. Even supposing
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this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could easily be ascertained, still
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we must admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself to this kind of
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logical chimera. There would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power,
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which would be in opposition to other principles of state craft. An effort of
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will would be required disproportion to the proposed object, which therefore it would be
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impossible to realize. For the human will does not derive its impulse from logical
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subtleties. But everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality.
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In the former, everything must be subject to optimism, and we must
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imagine the one side as well as the other, striving after perfection and even
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attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? It will if one
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or becomes a completely isolated act which arises suddenly and is in no way connected
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with the previous history of the combatant states. Two, if it is limited
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to a single solution or to several simultaneous solutions, free if it contains within
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itself the solution, perfect and complete, free from any reaction upon it,
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through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it. Seven.
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War is never an isolated act. With regard to the first point,
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neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even
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as regards that factor in the sum of resistance, which does not depend on
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objective things viz. The will. This will is not an entirely unknown quantity.
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It indicates what it will be tomorrow by what it is today. War
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does not spring up quite suddenly. It does not spread to the full in
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a moment. Each of the two opponents can therefore form an opinion of the
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other in a great measure from what he is and what he does, instead
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of judging of him according to what he strictly speaking should be or should do.
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But now man, with his incomplete organization, is always below the line
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of absolute perfection, and thus these deficiencies, having an influence on both sides,
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become a modifying principle. Eight. War does not consist of a single
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instantaneous blow. The second point gives rise to the following considerations. If war
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ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally
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all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for
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an omission could not in any way be repaired. The utmost then that the
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world of reality could furnish as a guide for us, would be the preparations
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of the enemy, as far as they are known to us. All the
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rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is
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made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its
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phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow. And in
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this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and
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thus modifies the effort towards the extreme. Yet every war would necessarily resolve itself
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into a single solution or a sum of simultaneous results, if all the means
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required for the struggle were raised at once, or could be at once raised
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for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means. Then if all the means
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have been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be supposed. All
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hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first, and form in
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reality only its duration. But we have already seen that even in the preparation
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for Wore, the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception,
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a material standard, into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme. That
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therefore, in that way both parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction,
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remain below the line of extreme effort, and therefore all forces are not
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at once brought forward. It lies also in the nature of these forces and
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their application, that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time.
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These forces are the armies actually on foot, the country with its superficial
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extent and its population, and the allies In point of fact, the country,
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with its superficial area and the population, besides being the source of all
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military force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in war,
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providing either the theater of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same.
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Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a
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country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains,
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people and sida. In short, not the whole country, unless it is
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so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the war.
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Further, the co operation of allies does not depend on the will of
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the belligerents, and from the nature of the political relations of states to each
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other, this co operation is frequently not afforded until after the war has commenced,
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or it may be increased to restore the balance of power. That this
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part of the means of resistance, which cannot once be brought into activity in
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many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first
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be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power seriously affected by
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the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter.
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Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in
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a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of war. Now, this
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in itself furnishes no ground for relaxing our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the
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first result, because an unfavorable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one
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would purposely expose himself, and also because the first decision, although not the
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only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events, the greater
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it is in itself. But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men
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to take refuge in that expectation, owing to the repugnance in the human mind
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to making excessive efforts. And therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not
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taken for the first decision. With that energy which would otherwise be used.
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Whatever one belligerent omits from weakness becomes to the other a real objective ground for
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limiting his own efforts. And thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme
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tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale. Nine, the result
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in war is never absolute. Lastly, even the final decision of a whole
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war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered state often sees
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in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by
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means of political combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension and
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the vigor of the efforts made is evident in itself. Ten the probabilities of
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real life take the place of the conceptions of the extreme and the absolute.
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In this manner, the whole act of war is removed from the rigorous law
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of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be
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apprehended and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judge
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to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it,
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and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the
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real world, by the laws of probability. Once the belligerents are no longer
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mere conceptions but individual states and governments, once the war is no longer an
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ideal but a definite, substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data
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to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found from the character the
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measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is
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surrounded. Each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the
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designs of the other, and act accordingly. Eleven. The political object now
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reappears. Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration
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see number two viz. The political object of the war. The law of
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the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary to overthrow him, has hitherto
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to a certain extent, usurped the place of this end or object. Just
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as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward.
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If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations,
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then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential
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factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent,
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the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will
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employ. But the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require to be.
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Further, the smaller our political object, the less values shall we set
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upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up
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altogether. Thus, therefore the political object, as the original motive of the
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war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force
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and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in
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itself, but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states, because
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we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstraction. One and the same
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political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the
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same people at different times. We can therefore only admit the political object as
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the measure by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to
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move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It
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is easy to see that thus the result may be very different, according as
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these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigor into the action,
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or otherwise, it is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist
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between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect
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quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion. This applies to the efforts
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which the political object will call forth in the two states, and to the
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aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times, it may
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itself be that aim, as for example, the conquest of a province.
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At other times, the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of
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military action, than such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent
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for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace.
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But also in this due attention to the peculiar character of the states concerned,
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is always supposed there are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than
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the political object in order to secure the latter. The political object will be
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so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence
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in itself. The more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual
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feeling of hostility prevails in the two states from other causes. And therefore there
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are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive. If the aim
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of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will
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in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and in a greater degree the
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more the political object dominates. Thus it is explained how without any contradiction in
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itself, there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from
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a war of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation.
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This, however, leads to a question of another kind, which we have
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hereafter to develop an answer. Twelve. A suspension in the action of war,
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unexplained by anything said as yet, however insignificant the political claims mutually advanced,
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however weak the means put forth, however small the aim to which military
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action is directed, Can this action be suspended even for a moment. This
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is a question which penetrates deeply into the nature of the subject. Every transaction
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requires for its accomplishment a certain time, which we call its duration. This
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may be longer or shorter, according as the person acting throws more or less
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dispatch into his movements. About this more or less, we shall not trouble
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ourselves here. Each person acts in his own fashion. But the slow person
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does not protract the thing because he wishes to spend more time about it,
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but because by his nature he requires more time, and if he made more
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haste, would not do the thing so well. This time, therefore,
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depends on subjective causes, and belongs to the length so called of the action.
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If we allow now to every action in war this its length, then
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we must assume at first sight, at least that any expenditure of time beyond
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this length, that is, every suspension of hostile action, appears in absurdity.
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With respect to this, it must not be forgotten that we now speak
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not of the progress of one or other of the two opponents, but of
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the general progress of the whole action of the war thirteen. There is only
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one cause which can suspend the action, and this seems to be only possible
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on one side. In any case, if two parties have armed themselves for
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strife, then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it. As
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long now as they continue armed, that is, do not come to terms
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of peace, this feeling must exist, and it can only be brought to
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a standstill by either side by one single motive alone, which is that he
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waits for a more favorable moment for action. Now, at first sight,
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it appears that this motive can never exist except on one side, because it
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EO ipso must be prejudicial to the other. If the one has an interest
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in acting, then the other must have an interest in waiting. A complete
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equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action, for during this suspension,
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he who has the positive object, that is the assailant must continue progressing.
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For if we should imagine an equilibrium in this way, that he who
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has the positive object, therefore the strongest motive can at the same time only
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command the lesser means, so that the equation is made up by the product
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of the motive and the power. Then we must say, if no alteration
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in this condition of equilibrium is to be expected, the two parties must make
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peace. But if an alteration is to be expected, then it can only
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be favorable to one side, and therefore the other has a manifest interest to
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act without delay. We see that the conception of an equilibrium cannot explain a
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suspension of arms, but that it ends in the question of the expectation of
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a more favorable moment. Let us suppose therefore, that one of two states
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has a positive object, as for instance, the conquest of one of the
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enemy's provinces, which is to be utilized in the settlement of peace. After
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this conquest, his political object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases,
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and for him a pause ensues. If the adversary is also contented with this
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solution, he will make peace. If not, he must act. Now,
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if we suppose that in four weeks he will be in a better condition
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to act than he has sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action.
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But from that moment the logical course for the enemy appears to be to act
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that he may not give the conquered party the desired time. Of course,
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in this mode of reasoning, complete insight into the state of circumstances on both
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sides is supposed fourteen. Thus a continuance of action will ensue, which will
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advance towards a climax. If this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really existed,
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the effect would be that everything would again be driven towards the extreme. For
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irrespective of the effect of such incessant activity in inflaming the feelings and infusing into
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the whole a greater degree of passion, a greater elementary force, there would
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also follow from this continuance of action, a stricter continuity, a closer connection
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between cause and effect, and thus every single action would become of more importance
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and consequently more replete with danger. But we know that the course of action
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in war has seldom or never this unbroken continuity, and that there have been
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many wars in which action occupied by far the smallest portion of time employed,
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the whole of the rest being consumed in an action. It is impossible that
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this should be always an anomaly. Suspension of action in war must therefore be
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possible, that is no contradiction in itself. We now proceed to show how
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this is fifteen. Here therefore, the principle of polarity is brought into requisition.
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As we have supposed the interests of one commander to be always antagonistic to
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those of the other, we have assumed a true polarity. We reserve a
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fuller explanation of this for another chapter, merely making the following observation on it.
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At present. The principle of polarity is only valid when it can be
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conceived in one and the same thing, where the positive and its opposite,
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the negative, completely destroy each other. In a battle, both sides strive
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to conquer. That is true polarity, for the victory of the one side
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destroys that of the other. But when we speak of two different things which
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have a common relation external to themselves, than it is not the things,
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but their relations which have the polarity. Sixteen Pattack and defense are things differing
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in kind and of unequal force. Polarity is therefore not applicable to them.
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If there was only one form of war to wit the attack of the enemy,
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therefore no defense. Or in other words, if the attack was distinguished
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from the defense merely by the positive motive which the one has and the other
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has not, but the methods of each were precisely one and the same,
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then in this sort of fight, every advantage gained on the one side would
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be a corresponding disadvantage on the other, and true polarity would exist. But
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action in ward is divided into two forms, attack and defense, which,
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as we shall hereafter explain more particularly, are very different and of unequal strength.
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Polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a relation, in the
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decision, but not in the attack or defense itself. If the one commander
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wishes the solution put off, the other must wish to hasten it, but
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only by the same form of action. If it is A's interest not to
27:59
attack his enemy at present but four weeks hence, then it is Bee's interest
28:03
to be attacked not four weeks hence, but at the present moment. This
28:07
is the direct antagonism of interests, But it by no means follows that it
28:11
would be for Bee's interest to attack a at once that is plainly something totally
28:18
different. Seventeen. The effect of polarity is often destroyed by the superiority of
28:22
the defense over the attack, and thus the suspension of action in war is
28:27
explained if the form of defense is stronger than that of offense. As we
28:32
shall hereafter show, the question arises, is the advantage of a deferred decision
28:37
as great on the one side as the advantage of the defensive form on the
28:41
other. If it is not, then it cannot, by its counterweight,
28:44
overbalance the latter, and thus influence the progress of the action of the war.
28:49
We see therefore that the impulsive force existing in the polarity of interests may
28:55
be lost in a difference between the strength of the offensive and the defensive,
28:59
and thereby be ineffectual. If therefore, that side for which the present is
29:03
favorable is too weak to be able to dispense with the advantage of the defensive,
29:08
he must put up with the unfavorable prospects which the future holds out,
29:11
For it may still be better to fight a defensive battle in the unpromising future
29:15
than to assume the offensive or make peace at present. Now being convinced that
29:22
the superiority of the defensive asterisk rightly understood is very great, and much greater
29:30
than may appear at first sight, we conceive that the greater number of those
29:33
periods of an action which occur in war are thus explained without involving any contradiction.
29:38
The weaker the motives to action are, the more will those motives be
29:42
absorbed and neutralized by this difference between attack and defense. The more frequently therefore
29:48
will action in warfare be stopped, As indeed experience teaches eighteen. The second
29:55
ground consists in the imperfect knowledge of circumstances. But there is still another cause
30:00
which may stop action in war viz. An incomplete view of the situation.
30:06
Each commander can only fully know his own position. That of his opponent can
30:10
only be known to him by reports which are uncertain. He may therefore form
30:15
a wrong judgment with respect to it upon data of this description, and in
30:18
consequence of that error, he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative
30:23
rests with his adversary, when it lies really with himself. This one of
30:27
perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as untimely in action,
30:33
and hence it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate
30:37
action in war. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the
30:41
natural causes which may bring action in war to a standstill without involving a contradiction.
30:48
But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate
30:52
the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in
30:56
human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts
31:00
in general must contribute very much to delay action in war and to modify the
31:04
application of the principles pending our conduct. The possibility of a standstill brings into
31:11
the action of war and new modification inasmuch as it dilutes that action with the
31:15
element of time, checks the influence or sense of danger in its course,
31:18
and increases the means of reinstating a lost balance of force. The greater the
31:23
tension of feelings from which the war springs, the greater therefore the energy with
31:29
which it is carried on. So much the shorter will be the periods of
31:32
an action. On the other hand, the weaker the principle of warlike activity.
31:36
The longer will be these periods, for powerful motives increase the force of
31:41
the will, and this, as we know, is always a factor in
31:44
the product of force. Nineteen. Frequent periods of inaction in war remove it
31:49
further from the absolute and make it still more a calculation of probabilities. But
31:55
the slower the action proceeds in war, the more frequent and longer the period
32:00
of inaction, so much, the more easily can an error be repaired.
32:02
Therefore, so much the boulder a general will be in his calculations, so
32:07
much, the more readily will he keep them below the line of the absolute,
32:10
and build everything upon probabilities and conjecture. Thus, according as the course
32:16
of the war is more or less slow, more or less time will be
32:20
allowed for that which the nature of a concrete case particularly requires calculation of probability
32:25
based on given circumstances. Twenty. Therefore, the element of chance only is
32:30
wanting to make of war a game, and in that element it is least
32:35
of all deficient. We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of
32:38
war makes it a calculation of probabilities. Now there is only one single element
32:44
still wanting to make it a game, and that element it certainly is not
32:46
without it is chance. There is no human affair which stands so constantly and
32:52
so generally in close connection with chance as war. But together with chance,
32:58
the accidental, and along with that good luck, occupy a great place in
33:01
war twenty one. War is a game, both objectively and subjectively. If
33:07
we now take a look at the subjective nature of war, that is to
33:12
say, at those conditions under which it is carried on, it will appear
33:15
to us still more like a game. Primarily, the element in which the
33:20
operations of war are carried on is danger. But which of all the moral
33:23
qualities is the first in danger? Courage. Now, certainly courage is quite
33:30
compatible with prudent calculation, but still they are things of quite a different kind,
33:34
essentially different qualities of the mind. On the other hand, daring,
33:37
reliance on good fortune, boldness, rashness are only expressions of courage. And
33:43
all these propensities of the mind look for the fortuitous or accidental, because it
33:47
is their element. We see therefore, how from the commencement the absolute,
33:52
the mathematical as it is called, nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations
33:58
in the art of war, and that from the outset there is a play
34:00
of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all
34:06
the course and fine threads of its web, and makes war of all branches
34:09
of human activity the most like a gambling game twenty two. How this accords
34:15
best with the human mind in general. Although our intellect always feels itself urged
34:21
towards clearness and certainty, still our mind often feels itself attracted by uncertainty,
34:27
instead of threading its way with the understanding along the narrow path of philosophical investigations
34:31
and logical conclusions. In order, almost unconscious of itself, to arrive in
34:37
spaces where it feels itself a stranger, and where it seems to part from
34:40
all well known objects, it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms
34:45
of chance and luck, instead of living yonder on poor necessity. It revels
34:50
here in the wealth of possibilities. Animated thereby courage, then takes wings to
34:54
itself, and, daring in danger, make the element into which it launches
34:59
itself, as if fearless swimmer plunges into the stream. Shall theory leave it
35:04
here and move on self satisfied with absolute conclusions and rules, then it is
35:08
of no practical use. Theory must also take into account the human element.
35:15
It must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness.
35:19
The art of war has to deal with living and with moral forces, the
35:22
consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive. There
35:28
is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental, and just as much in the
35:31
greatest things as in the smallest as there is room for this accidental on the
35:37
one hand, so on the other there must be courage and self reliance in
35:39
proportion to the room available. If these qualities are forthcoming in a high degree,
35:45
the margin left may likewise be great. Courage and self reliance are therefore
35:52
principles quite essential to war. Consequently, theory must only set up such rules
35:57
as allow ample scope for all degrees and variety of these necessary and noblest of
36:01
military virtues. In daring there may still be wisdom and prudence as well,
36:07
only they are estimated by a different standard of value. Twenty three. War
36:12
is always a serious means for a serious object. Its more particular definition such
36:19
is war such the commander who conducts it such the theory which rules it.
36:23
But war is no pastime, no mere passion for venturing and winning, no
36:29
work of a free enthusiasm. It is a serious means for a serious object.
36:34
All that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all
36:37
that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of
36:42
imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means. The war
36:47
of a community of whole nations, and particularly of civilized nations, always starts
36:53
from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It
36:59
is therefore a political act. Now, if it was a perfect, unrestrained,
37:05
an absolute expression of force, as we have to deduce it from its
37:07
mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy, it would
37:12
step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it,
37:15
would set it aside and only follow its own laws. Just as a mind
37:20
at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which
37:23
has been given to it by preparatory arrangements. This is how the thing has
37:29
really been viewed hitherto. Whenever a want of harmony between policy and a conduct
37:32
of a war has led to theoretical distinctions of the kind. But it is
37:37
not so, and the idea is radically false. War in the real world,
37:43
as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself
37:46
at one single discharge. It is the operation of powers which do not develop
37:51
themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure, but which at
37:54
one time expands sufficiently to overcome the resistance opposed by inertia or friction, while
38:00
at another they are too weak to produce an effect. It is, therefore,
38:04
in a certain measure, a pulsation of violent force, more or less
38:07
vehement, consequently making its discharges and exhausting its powers more or less quickly,
38:14
in other words, conducting more or less quickly to the aim, but always
38:19
lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted on it in its course,
38:22
so as to give it this or that direction, in short, to be
38:25
subject to the will of a guiding intelligence. Now, if we reflect that
38:30
war has its root in a politial object, then naturally this original motive which
38:35
called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct.
38:40
Still, the political object is no despotic lawgiver. On that account,
38:45
it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, And though changes in
38:51
these means may involve modification in the political objective, the latter always retains a
38:55
prior right to consideration. Policy is interwoven with the whole action of war,
39:01
and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of
39:07
the forces liberated by it will permit. Twenty four war is a mere continuation
39:12
of policy by other means. We see therefore, that war is not merely
39:17
a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political
39:22
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this,
39:27
which is strictly peculiar to war, relates merely to the peculiar nature of
39:30
the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not
39:36
be incompatible with these means. The art of war in general, and a
39:39
commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a
39:44
trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases.
39:51
Still, it must always be regarded as only a modification of them,
39:53
For the political view is the object war is the means, and the means
39:59
must always include the object. In our conception twenty five diversity in the nature
40:05
of wars. The greater and the more powerful the motives of a war,
40:08
the more it affects the whole existence of a people, The more violent the
40:14
excitement which precedes the war by so much. The nearer will the war approach
40:17
to its abstract form, so much, the more will it be directed to
40:21
the destruction of the enemy, So much the nearer will the military and political
40:24
ends coincide so much, the more purely military and less political the war appears
40:30
to be. But the weaker the motives and the tensions so much, the
40:34
less will the natural direction of the military element, that is, force,
40:38
be coincident with the direction which the political element indicates. So much the more
40:44
must therefore, the war become diverted from its natural direction, the political object
40:50
diverge from the aim of an ideal war, and the war appear to become
40:53
political. But that the reader may not form any false conceptions, we must
40:59
here observe that by this natural tendency of war we only mean the philosophical,
41:02
the strictly logical, and by no means the tendency of forces actually engaged in
41:07
conflict, by which would be supposed to be included all the emotions and passions
41:12
of the combatants. No doubt, in some cases these also might be excited
41:16
to such a degree as to be with difficulty restrained and confined to the political
41:22
road. But in most cases such a contradiction will not arise, because by
41:25
the existence of such strenuous exertions a great plan in harmony Therewith would be implied.
41:31
If the plan is directed only upon a small object, then the impulses
41:36
of feeling amongst the masses will be also so weak that these masses will require
41:39
to be stimulated rather than repressed. Twenty six. They may all be regarded
41:45
as political acts. Returning now to the main subject. Although it is true
41:51
that in one kind of war the political element seems almost to disappear, whilst
41:54
in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we may still affirm that
42:00
the one is as political as the other. For if we regard the state
42:02
policy as the intelligence of the personified state, then amongst all the constellations in
42:07
the political sky whose movements it has to compute, those must be included which
42:12
arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great war.
42:19
It is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in
42:22
general, but the conventional conception of a cautious, subtle also dishonest craftiness averse
42:29
from violence, that the latter kind of war may belong more to policy than
42:32
the first twenty seven influence of this view on the right understanding of military history
42:38
and on the foundations of theory. We see, therefore, in the first
42:44
place, that under all circumstances, war is to be regarded not as an
42:47
independent thing, but as a political instrument. And it is only by taking
42:52
this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military
42:57
history. This is the only means of locking the great book and making it
43:00
intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how wars must differ in character according
43:07
to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed. Now,
43:12
the first, the grandest and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and
43:16
general exercises, is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he
43:21
engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make of
43:24
it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for
43:28
it to be. This is therefore the first, the most comprehensive of all
43:34
strategical questions. We shall enter into this more fully in treating of the plan
43:38
of a war for the present. We content ourselves with having brought the subject
43:43
up to this point, and having thereby fixed the chief point of view from
43:46
which war and its theory are to be studied twenty eight result for theory.
43:52
War is therefore not only chameleon like in character, because it changes its color
43:58
in some degree in each particular case, but it is also as a whole
44:02
in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it a wonderful trinity, composed
44:07
of the original violence of its elements hatred and animosity, which may be looked
44:12
upon as blind instinct, of the play of probabilities and chants, which make
44:16
it a free activity of the soul, and of the subordinate nature of a
44:20
political instrument by which it belongs purely to the reason. The first of these
44:27
three phases concerns more the people, the second more the general and his army,
44:31
the third more the government. The passions which break forth in war must
44:37
already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range which the display of
44:40
courage and talents shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on
44:45
the particular characteristics of the general and his army. But the political objects belong
44:50
to the government alone. These three tendencies, which appear, like so many
44:54
different law givers, are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject, and
44:59
at the same time variable in degree. A theory which would leave any one
45:02
of them out of account or set up any arbitrary relation between them, would
45:07
immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality that it might be regarded
45:13
as destroyed at once by that alone. The problem is, therefore, that
45:17
theory shall keep itself poised in a manner between these three tendencies, as between
45:22
three points of attraction. The way in which alone this difficult problem can be
45:28
solved, we shall examine in the Book on the Theory of War. In
45:31
every case, the conception of war as here defined, will be the first
45:36
ray of light, which shows us the true foundation of theory, and which
45:38
first separates the great masses and allows us to distinguish them from one another.