Latest / The Team House / Delta Force Commander | Pete Blaber | Ep. 243
Transcript
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- 0:37send us an email and we'll talk about special operations. Cobert ask me the
- 0:50Team House with your hopes. Jack Burphy like David Park. Hey, guys,
- 1:03welcome to episode two forty three of The Team House. I'm Jack Murphy
- 1:06here with Dave Park and our guest on tonight's show. Is the author of
- 1:11Common Sense Leadership Matters. This is book three in the series Toxic Leadership Destroys
- 1:18by Pete Labor. Pete served as a officer in Ranger Battalion and then in
- 1:22Delta Force and has gone on to have a successful career after the military,
- 1:26and we're really excited to have him here on the show to talk about his
- 1:30series of books and his career, especially his most recent book, which is
- 1:36about the operation in which Pat Tillman was tragically killed. So, Pete,
- 1:40thank you for joining us tonight. Thanks for having me, guys. So
- 1:46as usual on the show, we'll start off at the beginning. Pete,
- 1:49tell us a little bit about what your upbringing was like and that what led
- 1:53you towards military service. Sure so, born and raised o Park, Illinois,
- 2:01suburb outside of Chicago. Great place to grow up. I was a
- 2:07middle kid of nine kids. Still to this day, I amazed my parents
- 2:14and how the heck they did it. But my mom was an amazing task
- 2:20master. She used to have a big matrix of jobs that we had three
- 2:25days a week. I usually had to wash them, clean the bathrooms,
- 2:30and mop the floors, swabbing the decks. At an early age and you
- 2:36know, just a normal upbringing. Played baseball, football, hockey, probably
- 2:43my favorite pastime. Favorite what I think should have been a sport was bombing
- 2:50cars, throwing snowballs at cars. You know, it's the beginning of my
- 2:55I think infantryman life. I realized, I, you know, loved both
- 3:00the thrill of the hunt and the thrill of the chase. And so you
- 3:06know, I took it pretty seriously. UH and probably again UH caused my
- 3:12parents quite a few heartaches, you know, running home, hiding. Why
- 3:15are you hiding? Some guy would come flying through the yard, UH search
- 3:21it for us. In high school, I ran across country. UH,
- 3:27played hockey and ran cross country, and you know, the cross country was
- 3:32kind of an extension of that bombing cars. Uh, I used. People
- 3:38would go, why why are you running cross country? Uh? I said,
- 3:42well, I want to. I want to get to a state where
- 3:46nobody can catch me. And uh, I just I can run forever and
- 3:51and no one has any chance of catching me. And UH. You know,
- 3:55I think cross country does that. It gives you an incredible endurance.
- 4:00UH. You know, teaches you to deal with pain, uh in your
- 4:04own way. And you know it, it was, unbeknownst the time,
- 4:11one more step uh in the process on the way to uh, you know,
- 4:15join in the military and becoming an infantryman. I was not you know,
- 4:21like a lot of guys you talked to on the show. I certainly
- 4:25was not a model of scholastic excellence. Uh you know, I just just
- 4:31being in a classroom. All that stuff was not for me. My brothers
- 4:36and sisters were you know, super smart, straight A students, So you
- 4:44know, I was like the uh you know, the unspoken, semi retarded
- 4:49brother. Uh, you know, special led guy. You know. It
- 4:56was really just I could not stand, had no academic discipline, and just
- 5:00did not like being in the classroom. So I graduated high school, it
- 5:08was time to go to college. I went to Southern Illinois University, which
- 5:12is at the bottom of Illinois. It's the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi
- 5:17rivers. And I chose Southern Illinois not for its athletic programs, certainly not
- 5:27for its academic programs. I chose it because it was surrounded by the two
- 5:32hundred and seventy five thousand acres Shawnee National Forest. And you know, my
- 5:38first time down there, coming from a suburb of Chicago, I was,
- 5:43you know, just it was like Nirvana, you know, just this endless
- 5:48rolling hills, a place you could get lost in. You know, camp
- 5:55out, do whatever you wanted. And it was pretty much the you know,
- 6:00the focus of my college career too. Every weekend I was out hiking
- 6:05in places like Panther's Den and Devil's Kitchen. Uh, you know, just
- 6:13wilderness in every direction, explored it, and you know, just learned to
- 6:18navigate things like that. You know, right when I graduated high school and
- 6:27got into my first year of college, that was the Iran hostage rescue mission.
- 6:30And from that point on, you know, that was that was the
- 6:36thing that turned me towards the military. As I mentioned, I didn't know
- 6:42anything about the military. There was no military around Illinois. I don't think
- 6:47I ever even saw a camouflage truck when I was growing up, So I
- 6:53really knew nothing about it. But when that happened, and you know,
- 6:58the news came out about what up, and it just had an incredible effect
- 7:01on me. That that eight you know, American heroes died in the middle
- 7:06of desert one. They gave their life to save to save the hostages in
- 7:15Iran. And so, you know, I was again a runner. I
- 7:19was doing triathlons in college by that point. So I would just go on
- 7:26long runs and and think about my future and think about, you know,
- 7:30what a great country I lived in, what an unbelievable upbringing I had,
- 7:35And you know, my conclusion was, I need to pay something back to
- 7:40the country. And you know, in my last two years of college,
- 7:45I started going to recruiters to try to figure out what, you know,
- 7:48what was out there. And you know, Jack, I heard you on
- 7:54one of your podcasts say you didn't know anything, and I was the same
- 7:58way. I just did not know a thing about the military. So the
- 8:03first someone told me to go, you know, to the Air Force and
- 8:07fly jets, and I didn't want to do that, but there was an
- 8:09Air Force recruiter right there, and I went down talk to him, and
- 8:16it didn't take long for me to come to the conclusion that I was in
- 8:20the wrong recruiting office. So I started going to army recruiters and I put
- 8:26plural because it took me four recruiters to get one that would just give me
- 8:33what I wanted. They were all trying to get me to sign up for
- 8:37things I never heard of. And you know, I will add that I
- 8:43was shocked at the time because I, for some reason, I thought everyone,
- 8:48if you're in the Army. You're an infantryman. So when they started
- 8:52talking about tankers and artillery and medical corps and I was like, what,
- 9:01who does that? You know? And that's what they all they tried to
- 9:05get me into. And that's why I kept going to new recruiters and I
- 9:09finally found one. I still remember his name. The name was Terry's Story
- 9:16and he said, what do you want to do? And I said,
- 9:18well, I want to join Delta Force and he goes, well, you
- 9:20can't do that. You can't sign up for that. You could do that
- 9:24when you get in, but you got to have an MOS. And I
- 9:28said, well, like what and he said, well, you probably should
- 9:31go infantry and I said, yeah, that's what I want to do.
- 9:37So I signed up. My contract was for Infantry OCS, that's what it
- 9:45was called back then. And you know, when I graduated, I hopped
- 9:50on a train and it took me off the basic training. You have to
- 9:54make it through basic in order to go to o CS and then you know
- 9:58you're a PF. And if you make it through OCS, you get commissioned.
- 10:03If you don't, you go back to being a PFC. And you
- 10:07know OCS is at Fort Benning, so I would have gone, you know,
- 10:11across the post uh to a I T but I didn't. I made
- 10:16it through uh OCS. It was also a great experience, Like I said
- 10:22it was. It was torturous, but I was a an endurance athlete,
- 10:28so I could do like a thousand push ups at the time and uh and
- 10:33you know, never even wins, so it was uh. It was fun
- 10:37for me to go to o c S. And then of course my first
- 10:41while I was there, I started picking brains of prior service guys or guys
- 10:48who were going to o CS prior enlisted. They were. There were a
- 10:52couple of E seven's in there, and uh, I would ask them,
- 10:54Hey, how do I get I want to go to the rangers so that
- 10:58I can get to the unit. How do I get to the rangers?
- 11:03And they said, yeah, well you can't go to the rangers. You
- 11:05got to go somewhere else first. And I said, well where? And
- 11:09I said the quickest way is to go to Korea. Do a year in
- 11:11Korea and you can get to the regiment. And I did that. I
- 11:18went to first of thirty eighth Infantry CAMPOVI, Korea. Again amazing first tour
- 11:24of duty. I had, you know, great battalion commander, great Company
- 11:28commander Freddie Ruolf, great first sergeant, First Sartin Johnson, Vietnam veteran,
- 11:37did my three months on the DMZ. You know, you get to patrol
- 11:41with live ammal and layout live claymores. So really a cool thing, you
- 11:48know, in nineteen eighty six to be able to do that. And you
- 11:54know, I say that because in the eighties the prevailing was and was there
- 12:00would never be a war again. You know, you'd kind of missed everything,
- 12:05and a lot of us didn't really accept that, but you know,
- 12:09in the back of our heads we were like, oh my gosh, you
- 12:11know, I may never get to do see combat in my time in and
- 12:18so being able to patrol with live animal and layout live claymores was was a
- 12:24really really cool thing. And sure enough, you know, I applied to
- 12:28go to the regiment, I got accepted, came right back from Korea to
- 12:35Oakland, and then drove up to Fort Lewis, Washington. I was assigned
- 12:39to second Ranger Battalion. And back then they didn't have you know, RASP
- 12:46or RISP or whatever it's called now. You just went right to the battalion
- 12:50and you know I went there. I served four years. It was an
- 12:56incredibly formative period of my life. Uh. The both the battalion commanders I
- 13:03had, we were amazing. Uh. Colonel Ellis was my first one.
- 13:07My second one was Colonel John J. Mayer and uh, you know,
- 13:13he had an effect on me that would stay with me for my entire military
- 13:18career. Uh. He was just a fantastic battalion commander. Approachable. He
- 13:26would talk to PFCs the same way he would talk to the regimental commander when
- 13:31he when he came down. I was a you know, a junior lieutenant.
- 13:37Uh. And you know in the in the regiment, junior officers usually
- 13:43fear there battalion commander. I had no fear of my battalion commander. He
- 13:48was funny, he was full of wisdom. Uh. You know, he
- 13:52would he would uh he would correct you when you were wrong. But he
- 13:58was just an amazing guy and that permeated the entire battalion. It taught me
- 14:05what a command climate is. You know, command climate is based on the
- 14:11sum total of choices made by the leaders in that climate system. And it's
- 14:18a leader's job to monitor that climate. And he did that incredibly well.
- 14:24You know he would he would fire bad people, get rid of them right
- 14:31away. And you know, everything he did he had kind of a principle
- 14:35to And he once told me, you know, you could be the funniest,
- 14:43best guy to hang around with in the world as a commander, but
- 14:50if you turned a blind eye to toxic, tyrannical subordinates, you guys will
- 14:58despise you just as much as they despised that tyrant. And he said,
- 15:03one of your primary jobs is to get rid of those guys. That's what
- 15:07the guys are depending on you. They're going home every night miserable, going
- 15:11man, I hope the boss does something about this. And again, you
- 15:18know that stuck with me my whole career. He was incredibly tactically astute.
- 15:24You know, he taught me you never moved with any element without leaving us
- 15:30stay behind ambush, And my entire military career, I was always leaving stay
- 15:35behind ambushes. But his the real wealth of knowledge was not so much military
- 15:43but life knowledge and a spree to core knowledge. He would say, the
- 15:52best formal welfare for the troops is to get them home in time to eat
- 15:56dinner with their families. And has both been in the range of regiments.
- 16:00So you know, the tracks a lot of these, you know, borderline
- 16:04psychotic type A personalities who you know, they'll stay till ten thirty at night,
- 16:12you know, pushing pencils, pushing papers, uh, and trying to
- 16:17stay a little later than the guy you know in the next the next company
- 16:22or whatever. Uh. And so he would he not only said that,
- 16:26he enforced it. He would go around at six o'clock and and go,
- 16:30why why are you still here? You know, who's telling you to stay
- 16:33here? And he'd kicked you know, guys out of their out of their
- 16:37company areas, and you know, everyone, not just me. Uh loved
- 16:42that about him. Uh. You know. The other thing he caught me
- 16:47was to always talk calmly on the radio and uh, you know he did
- 16:52that during a big FTX where we were searching for you know, precious cargo.
- 17:00It was a nuclear device and I was a platoon leader and we found
- 17:04it and I got so excited. I got on the radio and squeeched,
- 17:11you know, I found the precious cargo. And you know it's embarrassing,
- 17:15uh to say the least, but only retrospectively. When he pointed it out
- 17:19to me, you know, after the mission was over, and he he
- 17:25said to me, look, it happens everybody. Just remember any time you
- 17:30go to push that, you know, you push the talk button, take
- 17:34a deep breath first, and speak calmly. When we speak calmly, we
- 17:40calm the way we act and calm like. Panic is contagious. And you
- 17:48know he's right, that's that's been proven by science. But you know,
- 17:52in aggregate again, Uh, it just had this amazing effect on me.
- 17:57My everywhere I went after that, I tried to you know, not mirror,
- 18:03but recreate that dynamic, that positive you know, command climate dynamic.
- 18:11And you know, along with that, you know, be in my behavior
- 18:17b like he was, which is you know, humble, unassuming you're not
- 18:21the center. It's these guys, the guys on the ground. Your job
- 18:25is to take care of them. And it served me well. My company
- 18:32command was the seventh Infantry Division, ford or At, California. Again one
- 18:38hundred and thirty of the greatest guys I could ever have asked for in a
- 18:42company. My first sergeant, another Vietnam veteran, first sergeant Carba Hall,
- 18:49fantastic guy. Taught me a lot two months into my command, we invaded
- 18:56Panama and we were seventh I das, so we didn't jump in. We
- 19:00flew in, uh and you know, I ended up in the center of
- 19:04the city. I got the mission to protect the new presidential uh palace president
- 19:11and Darrow was the president who had been in exile. He took over Panama
- 19:17and all of his exiled subordinates, and we just ran missions for about four
- 19:26or five days straight using the intelligence from these guys who were in exile.
- 19:32They just come to us and say, hey, you need to go over
- 19:33here to this uh, this grid, this location. Uh some of uh,
- 19:41some of Noriega's lieutenants are hiding there, and we captured a number of
- 19:47his subordinates. On one mission we were going it was a tipper that Noriego
- 19:53was hiding in the Communist Party headquarters and uh, you know, to get
- 20:00to our targets, we basically jogged down the street. We didn't have hum
- 20:06V's, and even if we did, I probably wouldn't have used them.
- 20:10You know, imagine trying to get a bunch of light infantrymen in and out
- 20:14of Humby's in a city. It was much quicker to just move it a
- 20:19fast pace. And it was on that mission that we were I had a
- 20:26platoon plus and then me and the first sergeant in the back, and we
- 20:30were about halfway there and all of a sudden, all held broke loose,
- 20:38you know, a firefight. Every guy in the platoon was firing his weapons.
- 20:44We were in the back, you know, so probably at that point
- 20:48strung out like an accordion, about a block and a half behind the lead
- 20:53guys. And you know, I was taught be patient, don't get right
- 20:57on the radio and start yelling sit rep. Let the front guys figure out
- 21:03what they got. Give him some time. So you know, I gave
- 21:06him, uh what seemed to me like a minute. Uh and uh and
- 21:11I just said, you know, one to six, this is zero six?
- 21:15What he got up there? And no answer. I tried it again,
- 21:18no answer. So me and the first sergeant started making our way to
- 21:22the front, which is incredibly difficult to do, uh in an urban environment,
- 21:27Uh, in a firefight, because you know, you're not a line
- 21:32of troops anymore. Everybody is all over the place. There's guys under cars,
- 21:37guys in doorways, guys behind garbage cans. Uh, and they're all
- 21:41shooting, so you know, the the potential to get shot was pretty high,
- 21:48but we weaved our way forward and until I came to the lieutenant and
- 21:52he was the front guy, laying down, you know, shooting his M
- 21:56sixteen, and uh, you know, I tapped him on the shoulder and
- 22:00I said, hey, man, what's going on? What do you got?
- 22:02What do you got? He goes, I'm not sure, sir,
- 22:04there's an enemy up there? And I go where and he's up there?
- 22:08And I said what do you mean up there? And he said that window
- 22:11over there. I said, you mean one of those curtains are flapping and
- 22:15he goes, yeah, he's behind that curtain. I said, you know
- 22:18they don't have air conditioning here that they keep their windows over that. That's
- 22:22just a curtain flapping in the wind. He goes, oh, I didn't
- 22:26know that. I said, why didn't you get on the radio and give
- 22:30me a sit round? And he said, well, it's too busy shooting
- 22:32my gun. So we immediately called ceasefire to the platoon, and you know,
- 22:38I didn't think much of it. I will add the building burned down,
- 22:45but we went to our target dry hole, got back and about four
- 22:52years later I was in the unit at the time. I was in an
- 22:56airport and I ran into a guy who I knew from the se with Ida
- 23:00and we started talking, and you know, you always search for common ground
- 23:04when you when you meet somebody. He was like, yeah, and I
- 23:07was in Panama and I was like, wow, I was too, and
- 23:11he said yeah, I was in the city and I was like, yeah,
- 23:14me too. And they started talking about this massive firefight he was in.
- 23:18I was like, where was it? And he gave me the intersection
- 23:22and that was the intersection between our two elements, the demarcation line. And
- 23:30from talking to him, I realized that it was his company on the other
- 23:37side of that building. I don't know if someone had an ad or someone
- 23:42saw something, but you know, one shot started it and it was a
- 23:49you know, friendly firefight. Very luckily no one was injured or killed in
- 23:56it. But you know, I totally at the school off it. It
- 24:00changed my mindset about firefights from that day forward, including you know all I
- 24:08was in the unit at the time, so it really changed every every situation
- 24:15I looked at differently and you know, asked hard questions of myself if I
- 24:22was in it or you know, if it was a kind of lesson learned
- 24:26historical thing, and you know, I started realizing how common friendly fire was
- 24:32and how easy it is in a combat environment to get into a friendly firefight.
- 24:38Pete. Let me let me just take a quick moment. We got
- 24:41to give a shout out to the sponsor of tonight's show, which is Vitamin
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- 25:10get them directly, So please go and check them out. We really appreciate
- 25:15it, and please also take a look at our Patreon the links down the
- 25:18description if you want to get these episodes ad free. We also want to
- 25:22do a couple of quick shouts Posterity side of works. Thank you very much.
- 25:25We were drinking you last show and we didn't call you out because we
- 25:27were too busy and enjoying your cider. But it's posterity side of works.
- 25:32This one. It's like I think small best sider, right, like it's
- 25:36good cider, kind of homemade in a way. It's this is in the
- 25:41garden and it's it's actually dedicated to our friend Dave Man who is on the
- 25:45show, who recommended this brand to us. And also want to thank Brett
- 25:48Allen for sending us his books Slide, Fox, Hollow and Coroy is here.
- 25:52We have not had a chance to read these yet. They have great
- 25:56resoot views on Amazon, so check them out if you look for something good
- 26:00to read. Thanks Brett. Actually I wanted to because a lot of your
- 26:03books are your books are about leadership, and you know, and you've talked
- 26:07about a couple of the influences, but I want to ask you, sort
- 26:11of going back in your leadership journey, what is it like showing up uh
- 26:18As as a butter bar, you know, lieutenant in an infantry unit in
- 26:25in Korea, which is at the time was the hottest thing going right,
- 26:29the like like you said, live ammunition and you like, were you given
- 26:34guidance in terms of because a lot of these guys are as old, if
- 26:37not older than you in you know, in your you know, in your
- 26:41platoon things like that. How does how does a young lieutenant manage that?
- 26:45Or were there things that you learned while you were there. It's got to
- 26:52be challenging, right, Yeah, yeah, it's you know, it's a
- 26:56great question, Dave. It's I mean, I think it's the right of
- 27:00passage, and it's it's a little tougher on those new guys for a reason.
- 27:06You've got to prove yourself. You've got to earn your credibility. And
- 27:11you know, I always felt that way. I always felt, you know,
- 27:17not not like deficient, but I knew I didn't have experience. And
- 27:23you know, my upbringing taught me I'm wrong more than I'm right. So,
- 27:30you know, in order to flip that ratio, you tap into this
- 27:37wealth of knowledge around you. And you know, I mentioned my first sergeants
- 27:44for a reason. I when I talked about my tour as a lieutenant at
- 27:48two seven five, I did not mention that the start major there was the
- 27:53same sergeant major for my whole four and a half years. Start Major Leon
- 27:57Guerrero, and he took it upon himself. You know, his job is
- 28:02to train all the n c os in the battalion and to mentor them.
- 28:07But he he took it to another level. He also, I believe,
- 28:12saw that his duty was to train the lieutenants, and he did. And
- 28:17I think that should be in you know, most certain majors should include that
- 28:22in their in their duty description. He's the guy who taught me, don't
- 28:27be in a hurry to die, you know. That's what happened on l
- 28:30Z x Ray. That lieutenant ran off his helicopter into the jungle. He
- 28:37saw a vietcom right on the edge of the jungle who took off running,
- 28:42and he ran after him, and his whole platoon ran after him. He
- 28:47never told them what he was running after. And when he finally stopped,
- 28:52they were surrounded. And l Z x Ray was really the you know,
- 28:56the battle to save the wayward platoon. And he taught us that, you
- 29:00know, and he would say to me all the time, and I was,
- 29:03I was that lieutenant. I was overly aggressive, uh, you know,
- 29:08subject to my aggressive impulsiveness. And he taught me, you know,
- 29:15don't be in a hurry to die. Leaders who are impulsive lead their people
- 29:19to their deaths. And uh, I never forgot that. You know,
- 29:25I packed that with me through my whole career and it saved me and my
- 29:29guys countless times. So, you know, as a butter bar, it's
- 29:33kind of the same thing. You got. You've got to earn your credibility
- 29:37obviously physically tactically, but you got to listen and you know, you've got
- 29:44the wealth of knowledge around you. Uh so it's only a matter of tapping
- 29:48into it, asking the right questions, and you know, be impatient because
- 29:52you're not gonna you're not gonna be a combat you know, hardened wise veteran
- 30:00in a few months or even a few years. You just got to keep
- 30:04building on that knowledge. Yeah, were there, whether it was in Korea
- 30:10or RAI battalion You've mentioned like some good leadership examples, were there, some
- 30:15blatantly whether it was on the officer side or in coside, some blatantly bad
- 30:18examples that were learning experiences for you. Well all my I think all my
- 30:27battalion commanders. I was very lucky. So my battank commander in Korea was
- 30:33an amazing Vietnam veteran. Uh you know, just I can't say anything but
- 30:41good things about him. Same thing when I got to the Ranger Regiment.
- 30:45Both my battalion commanders were great, you know, probably peers. You know,
- 30:52I learned more from peers and as a lieutenant captains, and there were
- 30:56plenty of those. There were you know, guys who were hypocras's, guys
- 31:00who you know, were a holes to their people. Uh, guys who
- 31:06were tactically incompetent. And you know, you learn vicariously from those guys,
- 31:11just like you do from the good guys. You you know, I'm never
- 31:15going to be that way. I'm never going to do that. I'm never
- 31:18going to treat people that way. And you know, you can really go
- 31:22to school off of off of those incompetent people, just like you can off
- 31:27of the incredibly competent ones. So, you know, most of my early
- 31:33military career, though, I'd have to say, I was just blessed with
- 31:37great senior leadership and senior noncommissioned officers. And by the the time, so
- 31:45you were in seventh IDA a company commander, when does when does the idea
- 31:51of like going to selection kind of come come to your head and you start
- 31:53thinking about going and making the leap. Yeah, so it was it was
- 31:59already in my head. I knew, you know, the criteria was you
- 32:01had to have a successful company command as an officer to go to selections.
- 32:07So you know, I was I would have stayed in that company for as
- 32:10long as they'd let me stay. But you know, the military, it's
- 32:14two years and out. And so as my two years were coming up,
- 32:20I started the process contacting the unit, you know, going through all the
- 32:27prerequisite stuff, and you know, seventh Idea was at Ford or so about
- 32:32a month before I finished command, the unit selection team was came out to
- 32:40California and I did my psych and PT test at the Presidio of San Francisco.
- 32:49It was still open as a military base. I ran my two mile
- 32:54part of the PT test underneath the Golden Gate Bridge with boots on, and
- 33:00you know, I was kind of a running machine at the time, so
- 33:02I was, you know, going to max Vio two, trying to set
- 33:07you know, my personal best record. But I can still remember running under
- 33:12that bridge, just going, man, I love the military. It's just
- 33:15such an amazing place to be. And you know, sure enough things worked
- 33:22out for me with the psyche and the PT test. I went to selection
- 33:27right after I got finished command. I think I'd finished command in August or
- 33:34September, and then I went to select the next selection, which was I
- 33:38believe October, and again fortunate didn't get injured, made it through that.
- 33:45And you know, I was in the unit in nineteen ninety one, so
- 33:51it was I was only at ord for the shortest possible period of time.
- 33:57I didn't have to serve as a staff officer. It was just command,
- 34:02go to tryouts, and then you know, off to the unit. And
- 34:07for a long time, I was, you know, the only one who
- 34:12in the unit from the Seventh Idea. Two more guys came a few years
- 34:15later before they shut it down, But yeah, that was that was my
- 34:22transition. I you know, it was because I I was influenced by Desert
- 34:27One before I even got in. I knew that was dealt on the ground.
- 34:30So even though I knew nothing about really what they were or how they
- 34:37operated, I knew from that day on that that's where I wanted to go
- 34:40in the military. So, you know, it worked out. So in
- 34:45nineteen ninety one, you get there, I mean, tell us a little
- 34:49bit about like what the vibe was in the unit at the time, what
- 34:52the mission was like, I mean, like if you can take us a
- 34:54little back in time, you know, to the mission and the culture of
- 34:58that era. Yeah. Yeah, it's an interesting time and it's uh,
- 35:02you know, it's it's there are some senior n CEOs who can explain it
- 35:07much better than me. They've explained it to me and you know, enlightened
- 35:10me on it. It was kind of a transitionary time, uh, because
- 35:15the military was still kind of transitioning. You know, you had the old
- 35:20the old school guys who were there in the early early days and you know,
- 35:25fire and MP fives and wearing those black watchcaps things like that. Uh.
- 35:31And this was definitely, you know, the step into the future.
- 35:37Everything was modernized, you know, weapons, como nods, uh had you
- 35:43know, we're taking those massive leaps in the nineties. So it was it
- 35:49was a really cool transitionary time. Uh. You know, my first I
- 35:53went right to a troop. I was a troop commander of my first job.
- 35:59And again, because I've seen a number of your episodes, two of
- 36:02the guys in my troupe, Harry Harrington and Dale Comstock, were both in
- 36:07there at the time, and I'm sure many more that you'd recognize, but
- 36:13those are the two I saw on your program. Just you know, A
- 36:20I think the unit was kind of you know, finding its its new way
- 36:25at the time. And uh, you know, missions were changing, uh,
- 36:30but a lot were staying the same. That you know, aircraft hostage
- 36:35rescue, aircraft takedown, those type things were the same. But you know,
- 36:39new missions were coming on the counter narcotics was you know, became the
- 36:47biggest mission for the military. A lot of people don't know that, but
- 36:52Bill Clinton you know, signed a Presidential decision directive making that the number one
- 36:59prior already uh for the military, and uh inevitably, you know, showing
- 37:06the changes. Uh, that's what ended up driving my first big missions.
- 37:12Uh. I went down into Colombia with the first groups after Pablo escaped.
- 37:20I did uh four tours in Colombia. I spent two Christmases there, uh
- 37:28and again incredibly incredibly formative. Uh, just you know, learning how to
- 37:35deal with embassy people, uh, learning up close how the CIA operates.
- 37:43You know, I was I was still a I was a senior captain at
- 37:46the time, which is rare and you'd usually the junior officers are majors.
- 37:52But because I had that you know, fast paced through command. I was
- 37:58still a senior captain. But here I was down in Colombia, you know,
- 38:01working out of an embassy. Uh I, you know, blending anywhere
- 38:07as one of the principals. So you know, I would wear a suit
- 38:10in the embassy and then I'd go out, you know, to visit my
- 38:15guys and spend time with them operationally. Uh in Metagine and Cali and all
- 38:22over that country. It was incredibly dangerous time to be down there. Pablo
- 38:27was blowing the ship out of the country. Uh So, you know,
- 38:30there were there were car bombs, there were mailbox bombs. We were armed
- 38:36all the time, you know, uh, even whether you're in a grocery
- 38:40store in Bogata or you know you're you're down in Medazine or or Cali.
- 38:49And so you know, again, just the building blocks I think of the
- 38:53future of the unit we're there, you know, forming teams based on you
- 39:00know, competencies, so you know, teams like a homogeneous team was not
- 39:07sent down there. Guys were picked from different squadrons. Language was a big
- 39:12part of that, but disposition was a big part of it too. You
- 39:16guys know this, you know, you get the full spectrum of people in
- 39:21any unit you go to. Uh, some guys are just not really capable
- 39:25or wired to be, you know, interacting in an embassy or interacting with
- 39:31foreign you know generals kernels, and you know, other guys are incredible at
- 39:39it. They're just you know, you you watch them in awe as they
- 39:44deal with these people. And so I learned a lot down there. Mostly
- 39:49it was it was about, you know, human hunting. Most of the
- 39:52lessons were how you find people who don't want to be found, you know,
- 39:58this tireless search for clues, and always tapping into anyone who has any
- 40:06kind type of information. Uh, you know, totally open mind about it,
- 40:10uh, not getting caught up in you know, a military approach to
- 40:15things. We saw ourselves down there. We we would often talk about,
- 40:21you know, what a cops do in America when they when they find you
- 40:27know, a futative they don't you know, call in uh two swat teams
- 40:32surround the place and then you know, begin an aerial attack. They just
- 40:37two or three guys, you know, figure out what they got. If
- 40:42it's a if it's a fleeting opportunity, they go in there and they and
- 40:45they interact with the environment. And that's what that was the big lesson for
- 40:52me, you know, and also patients. It takes time to find people
- 40:57is very difficult. You gotta have guys on the ground and you've got to
- 41:01listen to those guys uh religiously or you're never gonna You're never gonna find who
- 41:08you're looking for. Uh So just uh again, great tours I went.
- 41:14Uh, I actually went left Colombia on one tour, flew to New York
- 41:21and then flew to Mogadishu, Somalia for Somalia, and then when that ended,
- 41:30I flew back to Colombia, uh for another tour going after I believe
- 41:37the Cali cartel on that one did. Did did some of those like man
- 41:43hunting techniques that you your unit was developing and Colombia kind of transfer over to
- 41:47the the hunt for a deed and all those guys in mogod issue. Yeah,
- 41:52totally. And now you know again you had kind of uh, you
- 41:58know, your question about the the and the transition. You had, you
- 42:01know, these competing schools of thought and so you know, my school of
- 42:08thought in Mogadishu was different than you know, the Special Operations Command above us
- 42:15and the way they wanted that prosecuted, which was helicopter centric. And you
- 42:22know, if you talk to guys who were there at the time, they
- 42:25know, you know, I was already anti helicopter. And that's not anti
- 42:31helicopter pilot or anti get on a helicopter. I just don't believe. I
- 42:37believe it's the last resort as an assault platform. If you can get there
- 42:42on the ground, if you can sneak up and achieve surprise, do not
- 42:46default to the helicopter. And so my thing with Somalyu was, these helicopters
- 42:55are going to get us, are going to get blown out of the sky.
- 42:58We did before anyone went over there, before Sea Squadron went over there,
- 43:04we all did rehearsals, and in our nighttime rehearsals we did we timed
- 43:10infilling on a black op and infilling on a little bird. And you know,
- 43:15a little bird can break flair and hover in about five seconds. So
- 43:22if it's a roof or a balcony, you can unask those guys in about
- 43:25a total of ten seconds. A black op it takes forty five seconds for
- 43:31the best pilots to blake, break flare and hover, get the ropes down,
- 43:37or you know, land and so it's a huge amount of time,
- 43:42and you know, you're dealing with in a place where everyone has a gun.
- 43:47So our thinking was, you know, we should be going to the
- 43:52targets hidden inside. They were called SST's shit sucking trucks because they drove throughout
- 44:00Somalia and they were like garbage trucks. No one bothered them because they were
- 44:05sucking up all the shit. And uh, you know, my thought was
- 44:08in a bunch of the guys, It wasn't my idea, a number of
- 44:14a number of my guys came up with. It was, you know,
- 44:16let's let's go in low Viz, let's swing all the way around. Mogadishu
- 44:22is like an island, uh very abruptly turns into scrub desert. So you
- 44:28know, if we need to get to the other side of the city,
- 44:30let's make all huge arc around and then come in through the desert on the
- 44:36other side. But you know, the helicopter mentality, the the kind of
- 44:43Vietnam direct assault mentality was very prevalent with senior ranking people at the time,
- 44:50and and and you know that that kind of one out, but it was,
- 44:55you know, the same thing the guys uh were amazing. I know
- 45:00you've talked to guys before. You know, when we were in Mogadishu,
- 45:05we had pro tech helmets, plastic protech helmets. So the unit's always been
- 45:10at the forefront of research and development. You know, most of the you
- 45:16know, equipment and rigs that you see today were developed by guys in the
- 45:22unit, either sewing them up themselves or buying them off the shelves and then
- 45:27sewing and modifying them, which is the way the whole army should be in
- 45:31my opinion. And you know that was the other thing going back and forth
- 45:37between the Unit and the Rangers. I always thought the Rangers should go back
- 45:45to you know, the old school Rangers of the of the you know,
- 45:51early eighties, where they still had five point fifty cord in their boots,
- 45:54and you know, they too were allowed that leeway to uh, you know,
- 46:00where their equipment to different ways. And I know there's probably some senior
- 46:07ragers gas feed with me saying that, but I really believe that, you
- 46:13know, guys should be allowed to modify their equipment so that it's ergonomic.
- 46:17You maximize that ergonomic efficiency. You know, everyone's chest is different their arms,
- 46:23so uh, you know, let guys h explore, invent, you
- 46:30know, and let them build better equipment constantly, and that's what the unit
- 46:37did, uh, And that's what we did start even in Mogadishu, you
- 46:42know, the that was the last of the pro tech helmet modishu. They
- 46:46were never worn again. Pete. Uh. You know, just one thing
- 46:50I wanted to ask you, why have you here? Is something I was
- 46:53told ways back, but I never really got the whole story on was about
- 46:58Columbia and that before Pablo Escobar was eventually you know, killed by the Colombians,
- 47:06that we made like several attempts to like ramp up capture kill missions for
- 47:10him. I was just wondering if you had any like visibility on that.
- 47:17Yeah, you know, I'm not sure what exactly there might have been times
- 47:23that guys in metagine thought that was you know, the best course of action.
- 47:30But what I remember, uh is we were and no one told us
- 47:35this. We were being micromanaged down there by SOUTHCOM, which was in Panama
- 47:40at the time. So you know, you had a four star general in
- 47:45Panama with a bunch of two star general underlying staff officers and again you know
- 47:52there's no combat, so uh, this is like the only show in town,
- 47:57and they could not keep their fingers off it. But you know,
- 48:02we still operated very freely down there, and we came to the conclusion ourselves
- 48:08that uh, you know, unless it can't be avoided, we should stay
- 48:15out of any direct contact, direct action like mission. And that doesn't mean
- 48:22we can't take them all the way up to the breach point. We can't
- 48:25advise them. We had we had shared radios with them, uh, the
- 48:30a group on their HRT. But we, you know, in our own
- 48:37minds decided, hey, we're here to lead them, and these guys need
- 48:44to be the ones to get Pablo. And it makes the most sense for
- 48:47them, it makes the most sense for the mission and for their country.
- 48:52If it's us, it's going to open up Pandora's box of problems. So
- 48:59we were we were very much you know, said on that, and ultimately
- 49:04that's what happened, you know Pablo. People still are not clear on that,
- 49:07but that was one of percent you know Colombian mission. Those the young
- 49:15captain who was the son of the colonel who was in charge. He was
- 49:20out there. He was using you know, us provided direction finding equipment,
- 49:24but it was not any kind of magical technology. It was, you know,
- 49:30literally driving around helping you pick up a frequency and helping the voice on
- 49:36that frequency, the you know, the the troughs and the peaks on it
- 49:43match up to his voice profile that we had already embedded in the system.
- 49:47And that's what happened. And they, you know, they direction found him
- 49:52on his phone. Then they happened to see him up in an upstairs window
- 49:58called in the rest of the Colombians and uh and they they did that one
- 50:01hundred percent on their own. And then bouncing back to Somalia. I mean,
- 50:06were you there when the battle took place. We got there that night,
- 50:09so I was in a and that was c so we were it was
- 50:15actually the change overnight. We were there to relieve them. They were going
- 50:19home that next day, so we were there and then we took over.
- 50:24They were pretty much you know, decimated by the mission, so we took
- 50:30over the uh you know, hostage rescue mission to find Durant and rescue him.
- 50:37We flew, uh, you know, I don't know how many missions
- 50:40in and out of there, all on little birds. We didn't use any
- 50:44black Hawks. And you know, again a lot of breakthroughs and technology there
- 50:52lasers. We learned just how incredibly lethal and valuable lasers were, you know.
- 51:01I we were flying on one mission. We had four little birds.
- 51:07I was the second little bird, offset from the first, and we were
- 51:12flying nap of the earth and I looked forward. It was it was it
- 51:16just dark, you know, it just turned dark. And so I had
- 51:20my nods on and I saw ahead of the first helicopter this person run out
- 51:27of a house into the yard, and you know, it was a woman.
- 51:31She had something in her hand, and you know, I didn't know.
- 51:36I knew it wasn't a gun, but she had something in her hand.
- 51:37It could have been a spear or anything. And you know, with
- 51:40a helicopter at that height, you never know. And she pulled it back.
- 51:45It turned out it was a black frying pan, probably her most valuable
- 51:51possession. And she pulled this thing back to throw it, and I put
- 51:57my laser on it, and at the exact second I put on it,
- 52:00three other lasers zeroed in on it, and somebody shot and that frying pan
- 52:06flew out of her hand as she tried to throw it at the lead little
- 52:09bird. And I'll never forget that shot. I'll never forget, you know,
- 52:15seeing it that I could still see that picture in my nods and see
- 52:20those lasers converge on the frying pen. And so, you know, a
- 52:27lot of that technology was experimental at the time but just took off after that,
- 52:32and you know today every four as a laser on it. I don't
- 52:37think we ever have really talked about this aspect of Somalia. But so you
- 52:42get there right after the big battle, and were you guys like trying to
- 52:45keep the pressure obviously looking for Mike Durant, but also keeping the pressure on
- 52:49the militias. Was that the mission at the time, Yeah, it was.
- 52:53You know, it was crazy because there was a lot of political pressure
- 52:59coming down on the whole thing. If you guys remember, uh, you
- 53:01know, we wanted to go after our deed, but we didn't want,
- 53:06you know, to kill anybody or get anybody killed. It was crazy.
- 53:09There was no AC one thirty up. Uh, you know, just senseless
- 53:15decisions made at the national level. So it was kind of a flux period.
- 53:22No one knew what was going to happen with the mission. Uh,
- 53:25and so we just did what you know, any military guys to do.
- 53:30We just uh, Charlie Mike, let's let's continue with the same thing and
- 53:35search for both Adeed and Durant at the same time. You know, we
- 53:42had some there were just some amazing lessons learned on interoperability there. Uh,
- 53:47you know, a lot of things happened, uh with the rangers. They
- 53:52created a lot of uh, you know, a lot of conflict with those
- 53:57guys and uh, you know those interoperability things and a lot of them were
- 54:01personality driven. Again. You know, leaders who instead of being open and
- 54:10you know, accommodating, were rigid and narrowly focused on, you know,
- 54:17what they were going to do and how they were going to do it.
- 54:21And I think that ended up causing a lot of the chaos that occurred during
- 54:25that firefight. What so, do you think of a lot of that was
- 54:31personality driven? And again, and I'm gonna like throw some stuff out which
- 54:37may or may not be true, but were there like, were there officers
- 54:44that were of the rank higher whichever unit that thought that that should be respected.
- 54:47Were there rangers that were sort of the old school, were the best
- 54:52light infantry and you guys are long hairs and that should be respected. Were
- 54:54there any Delta personalities that were like we're Delta, shut the fuck up and
- 55:00and do what we say? Like what what were some of the elements that
- 55:04were going on if you if you know them? Yeah, I think you
- 55:07know the most were going on with the There was a company commander, ranger
- 55:13company commander, and the ranger battalion commander, and you know, the movie
- 55:15alludes to it a little bit, but uh, you know they were they
- 55:22were just they were they were I guess you said old school. They were
- 55:25old school. Uh. If we're going to do it our way, and
- 55:30that's it. And you know the rangers. Uh, when the firefight started,
- 55:37we're out there in a in a convoy, parked in a convoy and
- 55:40uh, you know, just everything was set up to go wrong. The
- 55:45battalion commander in his vehicle is leading that convoy. You know, that makes
- 55:52no sense when you know who puts a battalion commander in the front vehicle,
- 55:59you know, as a navigator and as a convoy commander. Nobody and that
- 56:07you know that, Uh, that caused a lot of the problems, certainly
- 56:12a lot of the casualties. Uh. They went back and forth through that
- 56:15kill zone I think three times. Uh, because he could not figure out
- 56:20he was getting he was being told where to go from a helicopter. So
- 56:24you know all of us have been in helicopter circling. No, you can't
- 56:29tell a guy in a city to take a left turn or a right turn
- 56:35and then you know, make your arc around to come around the other way.
- 56:37They they took a bunch of wrong turns. Uh. I think that
- 56:42front vehicle split from the convoy. Uh, you know, on its own,
- 56:46went down an alley away from the convoy. Uh. The only thing
- 56:52that stopped it was Uh, a Somali with an RPG at the far end
- 56:57of the alley popped out. So they threw the reverse and went back,
- 57:02and you know then there was just I'm not I can't speak credibly about the
- 57:07personality at the at the company level. I just know that there were unit
- 57:14guys in in that same building and that company commander would not answer his radio
- 57:22when guys were calling. Uh. One in one ranger bled out in there,
- 57:28and uh Scott Miller was the troop commander at the time. Uh,
- 57:34he was trying to call him and he wouldn't answer his radio. Uh.
- 57:37So you know who, I'm not being judgmental here, I'm just saying it
- 57:43was a huge interoperability problem. Yeah, and you know personalities. You can't
- 57:49come to any other conclusion than personalities because you know, in those situations,
- 57:54you know, rank means nothing. Your job is to make the best decision
- 58:00and solve any problem using logic and common sense that comes up. And if
- 58:06you've got to subordinate yourself to someone of lower rank or of another unit,
- 58:10who cares. You know, you're doing it in the name of of you
- 58:15know, the mission and your men. And so it always just amazes me
- 58:23when I hear stuff like that. And that had a big impression on me
- 58:27too. You know, I went to school off Somalia. It was the
- 58:31final nail for me. On helicopters, it was, you know, also
- 58:37a nail for you know, always search for that asymmetrical approach, that auto
- 58:44box approach. Do not default to what every enemy in the world expects America
- 58:50to do, which is to come in on our shiny helicopters and fast rope
- 58:54on the targets. Yeah, you know, just like Jack and I saw
- 59:00this in the in the g Y and I'm sure you know everybody else that
- 59:05too. How Like tactics evolved, like things that used people used to think
- 59:10where the standard sort of went by the wayside. Did you see that happen
- 59:15with Somalia too? Were there are just some like wake up calls uh in
- 59:19the community for you for you guys, Yeah, I think, uh,
- 59:23you know, our our professors, which is all the you know, troops
- 59:30are majors and team leaders. They totally went to school off on CQB.
- 59:37A number of things changed on CQB tactics and techniques. Uh, certainly,
- 59:43you know, you know, the probably one of the biggest lessons was,
- 59:46you know, never go on a daytime mission without your nods and without expecting
- 59:52you're going to be going on a nighttime mission. So you know, a
- 59:57lot of little things, a lot of equipment things I already mentioned the pro
- 1:00:00tech changed after that. And you know, I think the I think in
- 1:00:06general, the mindset because you know, it's very clear that that was the
- 1:00:13most intense combat since the Vietnam War, and it was kind of a wake
- 1:00:17up call, you know, to everybody that this is the new way,
- 1:00:22this is the you know, insurgent warfare. Total you know, asymmetrical sounds
- 1:00:28trite, but it's true. You're fighting against guys who aren't they don't have
- 1:00:32doctrine and they don't have tactics, techniques and procedures, and why you know,
- 1:00:38while you can smoke those guys and you know incomprehensible numbers, they're still
- 1:00:45very effective. They're swarming you, and you've got to be ready to defeat
- 1:00:51the swarm. And you know, there were a number of teams, unit
- 1:00:57teams who did that. They they did not stay put, which I which
- 1:01:05I also went to school off of. They they said, well, I'm
- 1:01:07not staying in this place. Let's go out and just move and destroy the
- 1:01:14enemy instead of letting them creep up and uh and destroy us. And they
- 1:01:19did that. Paul Howe who wrote a book about it, but he's an
- 1:01:23incredible warrior. And to me, did you okay? So he he I
- 1:01:31never forgot him. He gave a aar. He wasn't in my UH squadron,
- 1:01:37so I didn't know him that well. But you know, my my
- 1:01:40lesson from Samaria was almost everything he said about it and uh, and he
- 1:01:47the way he prosecuted, the way he reacted, the way he adapted with
- 1:01:53his team was the way I thought everyone should have should have performed why they
- 1:02:00were there, and uh, you know, he's you guys know, because
- 1:02:02you know him. He's an unbelievable warrior, unincredibly competent, incredibly intelligent and
- 1:02:10uh. And his his approach to me was the takeaway, never sit against
- 1:02:17the swarm. You know, it's like when you're being swarm by bees,
- 1:02:21you don't just sit still. Uh, you swat them back, you move
- 1:02:24around, you haul ass away from the swarm. Uh. And he did
- 1:02:29that. He took the fight to the enemy. And you know, he's
- 1:02:31very modest guy, but uh, you know what they what they did accounted
- 1:02:37for a lot of the casualties that the Somalis took there. And so after
- 1:02:45Somalia, you make it, you said, you went back to Columbia one
- 1:02:49more trip looking at the college cartel after the whole Escobar thing was settled,
- 1:02:54and and sort of what what was like the rest of your duration there before
- 1:02:58moving on to the next assignment. Yeah, so just you know, we
- 1:03:01went right from Colombia. Bosnia popped up next. And so you guys asked
- 1:03:07earlier about you know, influences on GAT. To me, the you know,
- 1:03:15the PhD in human hunting came in Bosnia. We called it the Living
- 1:03:19Laboratory. We now technology. We were able to operationalized technology. So there
- 1:03:27were no Google Maps at the time, but you know, there was special
- 1:03:30mapping software that you could put on a laptop, a Mini Libretto laptop and
- 1:03:37you know, hook it in inside your vehicle in a low vis way.
- 1:03:43We you know, we learned how to rig Lovis satellite antennas on top of
- 1:03:49our vehicles. The blending thing was huge. You know. You you were
- 1:03:53always basically undercover and you know, same thing just like just like police,
- 1:04:01you're not going to be successful unless you're out there hunting for clues. Uh,
- 1:04:06you know, piecing together clues, just like it's a case uh going
- 1:04:14back sharing everything you learn with your team, you know, picking up the
- 1:04:19knowledge, the understanding of the environment collectively, not individually, and you know,
- 1:04:28doing it while undercover in a you know, it was it was dangerous,
- 1:04:32but it was a fairly forgiving environment. So you know, we we
- 1:04:39could test anything out and test any concept out and we did and you know
- 1:04:44that went all right up really till nine to one one. Uh, that
- 1:04:49living laboratory. And so I've said this, I'm sorry to interrupt, but
- 1:04:56I get you to scoot like a little closer to the camera and do you
- 1:04:58have like a white and front of you if you can flip that around or
- 1:05:00something, because you're just like so washed out. I'm afraid we got you
- 1:05:03looking like a space alien on this uh, which I guess we could talk.
- 1:05:10I don't mind that. That's much that's much better. We can we
- 1:05:15can actually see you now. Yeah, okay, yeah, yeah, thank
- 1:05:19you for the yep. So what were we what were we talking about there
- 1:05:27about how things evolved during the Bosnia campaign and all the TTPs and technologies that
- 1:05:32you guys evolved. Yeah, so you know that's where we learned the Lovaz
- 1:05:39comms, the operating in a Lov's environment, and you know, guys on
- 1:05:45a continuous mission. We were there for a couple of years, two or
- 1:05:48three years, so you were rotating in and out and it was all pretty
- 1:05:55much n c O run our Our certain majors were the guys ran the safe
- 1:06:00houses. And it was very complex because you had all these low viz vehicles,
- 1:06:04you had a lot of weapons. A lot of us were you know,
- 1:06:11under aliases, so it took a lot of of of highly involved organization
- 1:06:20to keep things from you know, falling apart and to keep the continuity because
- 1:06:27you had to go out of your way to pass on knowledge. Uh,
- 1:06:31with each tour, each you know, new team that came over, we
- 1:06:36ended up settling on ninety to one hundred and twenty day tours, which we
- 1:06:42thought was you know, about the right number. Anything less was a little
- 1:06:45too short. Anything more, you know, started really burning guys out.
- 1:06:53But it really everything you know that I did with AFO, or a lot
- 1:06:58of what I did with AFO in Afghanistan was based on knowledge I learned in
- 1:07:03low V's Environment in Bosnia, and I, uh, you know, I
- 1:07:09want to turn to your book soon here, so I'm not going to go
- 1:07:12too deep into Afghanistan. But when that, uh, are you in Sean
- 1:07:19Naylar's book Not a Good Day to Die? Yes? Okay, so yeah,
- 1:07:25I'm I'm friends with Sean, So I mean maybe I can direct people
- 1:07:29towards his book because I not that I wouldn't love to talk to you about
- 1:07:32it here, but since like an hour and ten minutes in, I want
- 1:07:35to make sure that we have plenty of time to you know, unpack everything
- 1:07:38in your book. But before moving on, I mean, is there any
- 1:07:42anything about about the Bosnia campaign? Is there any particular operation that you'd like
- 1:07:46to highlight before we move on to the next thing. You know, I
- 1:07:53yeah, I think, uh, the the one of the big ops that
- 1:07:57I write about in my first book. Uh, the highlight is just how
- 1:08:01important humor is to imagination. And this kind of goes back to, uh,
- 1:08:09the climate that I talked about initially, and how important having that kind
- 1:08:14of climate is. Uh. You know, you guys know this. Every
- 1:08:17military guy who's watching this knows this. You know, we we survive off
- 1:08:24laughter, and you know, without laughter, Uh, you know, you're
- 1:08:29going to be stressed out, you're going to be a zombie, You're going
- 1:08:31to be frustrated. Uh. Military guys are you know, like a bunch
- 1:08:38of uh amateur comedians, you know, always trying to get a laugh out
- 1:08:44of even the you know, some of the darkest circumstances. And so when
- 1:08:49you're trying to plan an out, you know, one of the most famous
- 1:08:55uh you know bits of advice that old school senior leaders always give you is
- 1:09:02they say, all right, knock off the crap, we got to get
- 1:09:05serious. It's time to plan. And it turns out that's exactly opposite of
- 1:09:12the way our brains work, you know, humor and insight are indelibly linked.
- 1:09:16So humor makes you think of creative ideas and insights you'd never come up
- 1:09:23with unless you were laughing. And a lot of that has to do with
- 1:09:27contrarian thinking. The brain natural is a natural contrarian like machine. If I
- 1:09:33say black, you think white, just naturally. So what that emphasizes is
- 1:09:41even some of the dumbest, like most foolish ideas in history probably gave birth
- 1:09:50to some of the greatest and insightful ideas, especially in the military. And
- 1:09:57you know, we kind of I kind of knew that just from experience,
- 1:10:00that was always the way we operated, but Bosnia we took it to another
- 1:10:04level. And so, you know, trying to figure out how to stop
- 1:10:09a vehicle with a very one of the top three principles that we were going
- 1:10:16after over there, who is in the vehicle with this security detail and his
- 1:10:21daughter, you know, how do you stop it in a non kinetic way
- 1:10:28that will ensure that you're not going to kill that daughter while you're trying to
- 1:10:32capture this guy. And you know, we sat in a safe house,
- 1:10:36it was probably two three in the morning, and we just started brainstorming,
- 1:10:41and any idea was a good idea. And you know that's where I talk
- 1:10:46about like the idea of you know, a gorilla costume, and the idea
- 1:10:54was get some guy out there who just you know, makes them go,
- 1:11:00so pull their face up to the front windshield and go what in the fuck
- 1:11:02is that? And it's that moment where we had a special round. It
- 1:11:06was called a slam round. And I don't know what happened to this thing.
- 1:11:11It's a fantastic device. I believe the Austrians came up with it.
- 1:11:15It's like an RPG round. It's about that big the round, but it
- 1:11:21has a stick on it that fits right into your M four barrel and you
- 1:11:27fire that thing just like you fire a normal round. And it's called a
- 1:11:31slam round. It's like a RPG concussion grenade, so when it hits something,
- 1:11:39it's like a flashbang. It creates a concussive effect that knocks people out
- 1:11:45for about ten to fifteen seconds or knocks them incoherent. And you know,
- 1:11:50that ended up being the concept we came up with. The mission ended up
- 1:11:54changing based on whether and a few other things, but only through lap after
- 1:12:00and hilarity did we come up with that concept. And you know, anybody
- 1:12:05could come up. One of the one of the great ideas was came from
- 1:12:09one of the most junior guys in the group, which again shows that you
- 1:12:15know, you know, making good choices is about options, and the more
- 1:12:20options you have to choose from, the better your choices are going to be.
- 1:12:26And that's what we learned on that mission. It really that too stayed
- 1:12:29with me all through Afghanistan Iraq. If you're planning, you know, get
- 1:12:34comfortable, be like you guys are right now, sitting down in a good
- 1:12:40chair, having something to sit on, seriously and just you know, laugh
- 1:12:44because humor and insider and double link. So next time you hear someone say
- 1:12:48knock off the ship, it's time to get serious and start planning, you
- 1:12:53know, raise your hand and tell them that's not how the human brain works.
- 1:12:58I also like before we move in the book, because the book is
- 1:13:00you know, a lot of it has to do with later on the Gwat
- 1:13:04Uh well with uh Pet with Tilman. But I want to say that from
- 1:13:12from the unit, you went back to Ranger Battalion UH and you happened to
- 1:13:15be there at the same time I was. And I remember, like the
- 1:13:19whispers around the chow Hall because you know there was Pistol Pete, the guy
- 1:13:24you know who had you know, who was who was there. But also
- 1:13:28I think that your presence because that was a time when when Ranger Battalion was
- 1:13:32in the regiment, but particularly I think second Battalion, and I think part
- 1:13:36of it had to do with you being there and your influence is like you
- 1:13:41you mentioned like you got Jerry Barnhart there, you know, which was you
- 1:13:45know, a resource that Rangers hadn't had access to up unto that point in
- 1:13:50time. You know, the grace is like bringing civilian experts for these things
- 1:13:56that when you were there was also when we were allowed to go to the
- 1:13:59town actual Taylor and have Wooly Pete bags so in sewn into our rucksacks and
- 1:14:04you know, and have our web gear like altered. But that wasn't something
- 1:14:09that Rangers were that. That was something that there were people in range of
- 1:14:13Battalion that were actively resisting and fighting because it wasn't dress right dress. Yeah,
- 1:14:20now it's a great point. And uh, you know I was fortunately
- 1:14:25going back there because I knew now the you know, platoon sergeants and first
- 1:14:30sergeants were guys I was who were team leaders and squad leaders when I was
- 1:14:34there the first time, and so knowing them and being able to connect to
- 1:14:40them and uh and talk to them about you know, hey, what do
- 1:14:44we really need? What what do you what does the battalion need to you
- 1:14:48know, take that next step? Uh? So their feedback was amazing.
- 1:14:53Uh. Ted Kennedy, who's in my book, was incredible influence on me.
- 1:15:00You know, just one of these guys. You just cannot believe the
- 1:15:03wisdom that comes pouring out of them. So, you know, most of
- 1:15:08those things you mentioned, Dave were you know were uh ended up being executed
- 1:15:14because of feedback I got from those NCOs. You know. On the equipment
- 1:15:20side, since we've been talking about that, you know, I came back
- 1:15:26and showed did a demo of why the Rangers need to switch to an AK
- 1:15:31forty seven vest, which is you know what we used to wear before it
- 1:15:35was part of the mole system, before it was part you know, embedded
- 1:15:40in your body armor. We did a demonstration of trying to imt trying to
- 1:15:45get magazines and just showing you know this thing that the only reason the Rangers
- 1:15:51didn't have AK vest was because you know, they were too cool. And
- 1:15:57this is where the rangers, you know, the old school NCOs begin working,
- 1:16:03some of them against the system. You know, they just do not
- 1:16:08want to change. And you know, these guys would tell me that,
- 1:16:12they're like, hey, we've been telling them, you know for the last
- 1:16:15couple of years, we need to do CQB, we need to do target
- 1:16:18discrimination. And you know it's the sergeant majors who regiment and whatnot who come
- 1:16:27back and say, no, no, no, we're rangers. We kill
- 1:16:30everything on the target. We don't need to learn how to you know,
- 1:16:33discriminate targets. We don't need to shoot and move. And that was one
- 1:16:40of the other things that we did while I was there. We set up
- 1:16:44the first maneuver live fire shoot and move maneuver live fire range on Fort Lewis,
- 1:16:50where you know, you started on a fast rope that was between two
- 1:16:55trees about one hundred meters apart. You had to crawl that thing and whatever
- 1:16:59technique you wanted with your weapon. You came out. You shot from one
- 1:17:03hundred meters down a road at a target. You shot ten rounds, you
- 1:17:08picked up, you sprinted forward, you climbed up on top of what used
- 1:17:14to be. You know, they had those sheds over all the shooting positions.
- 1:17:18You climbed up on top of that, you took shots from Annealy position
- 1:17:23on that, you climbed back down, ran over, went through a pipe,
- 1:17:28and you know it was the purpose. When we brought in the regimental
- 1:17:32commander and the regimental staff, they were like, yeah, well, why
- 1:17:36do we need to do this? And the reason you need to do it
- 1:17:41is because you need to teach yourself how to shoot when you're out of breath,
- 1:17:46how to find that respiratory pause. And like, so we've been training
- 1:17:50all those years, we the entire military, you know, laying on ranges
- 1:17:55in a prone position, which is not how you shoot. You're all amp
- 1:18:00up when you're shooting, and that's the way you should train. And so
- 1:18:03we did. And again, you know, everything we did there was based
- 1:18:09on feedback from those senior n CEOs. Same thing with Barnhardt. You know,
- 1:18:14they've been trying to get someone to come and teach them shooting techniques,
- 1:18:19advanced shooting techniques for a while and so when I came, you know,
- 1:18:24they said, hey, how can we do this? And I was like,
- 1:18:28you know, we can do it. And since I was the S
- 1:18:30three. You know, it was only like twenty grand to get Barnhart or
- 1:18:34something, and we were spending you know, one hundred grand to rent them
- 1:18:40out site, you know it some obscure post and so you know, I
- 1:18:46just use that money to spend on Jerry Barnhart and new equipment and stuff like
- 1:18:51that, and so, you know, I think more than anything, it
- 1:18:55speaks of you know, the value of of you know, going back and
- 1:19:00forth between units, you know, especially on the NCO level. Greg Birch
- 1:19:08did that at the end of his career. He was the battalion and regimental
- 1:19:12I believe he was regimental stars major two. Yeah, he was in small
- 1:19:16in Afghanistan. So he he did that of his own accord. You know,
- 1:19:21he had already accomplished everything you could accomplish at the unit, and he
- 1:19:27did it because he started, you know where I started a company two seven
- 1:19:31five, and he wanted to go back. He's still to this day.
- 1:19:35You know, he loves rangers and sot Why because we see them, you
- 1:19:43know, as the future of the warrior class in the military, and so
- 1:19:48you know, they need they need sanity. Most of the time, rangers
- 1:19:54have all the right ideas. They just can't get those ideas and operation and
- 1:20:00uh, you know, sometimes you need a little bit of help to Yeah,
- 1:20:04it was a fascinating time because it was being pulled like taffy, you
- 1:20:08know, where you would have people like you come in and sort of be
- 1:20:12innovators and these other people who understood what needed to happen. And at the
- 1:20:15same time I had a platoon sergeant who said, we don't need to be
- 1:20:18doing this CQB. We need to do patrol based activities, right, that's
- 1:20:23what rangers do, you know, And it was a fascinating time for rangers.
- 1:20:28Yeah, yep, Pete. I would love to have you back again
- 1:20:32at some other time to talk about the rest of your career. I just
- 1:20:35don't I know if we get into it or I'm not gonna have any time
- 1:20:39left to talk about your book here, which I definitely want to get into.
- 1:20:44But if people your first book is The Men, the Mission in Me,
- 1:20:47Mission the Men and Me. Yep, the Mission of the Men and
- 1:20:50Me, So people can go and check that out if they want to hear
- 1:20:54a bit more about Afghanistan, and maybe I'm sure we can have you get
- 1:20:58a lot and if I remember right, you did a lot about Bosnia in
- 1:21:00there too, right and yes, yeah, big Bosnia. That that story
- 1:21:04that I just told is in there, and uh and then and then Nail
- 1:21:10Arts book is uh not a good day to die. So but what we
- 1:21:14didn't have peepe back again to talk about that stuff. So let's launch into
- 1:21:18this into book three common sense Leadership Matters. Tell us about like what was
- 1:21:24the genesis of this book, Like how did it come about? And why
- 1:21:27did you write it? Yeah? Thanks, it's uh so you know indirect
- 1:21:32strange thing, but uh, you know it started for me uh in Bagdad
- 1:21:39International Airport two thousand and three. Uh we Uh, I was actually commanding
- 1:21:45the unit. I went over to uh you know, our staging area for
- 1:21:50a RAQ as the ops officer. The unique commander had a brain aneurysm while
- 1:21:58jogging on like the second day we were there. So I became the unit
- 1:22:02commander for Iraq. And you know, of course Jaysuck was you know,
- 1:22:12waiting with baited breath as that happened. And you know, we ended up
- 1:22:17in filling into Iraq a huge indirect route into Iraq after the invasion, which
- 1:22:28was I don't know we were we were behind enemy lines and out in the
- 1:22:31field for I think twenty twenty six or twenty eight days, something like that.
- 1:22:38And when we came in, we went to Baggan International Airport, so
- 1:22:41it had just been taken you know, by the thunder run. We occupied
- 1:22:45that to begin going after you know, high value targets in the city,
- 1:22:50specifically Saddam and his henchmen. And so I was commanding, you know,
- 1:22:59in byapp and we were conducting NonStop ops. And the reason I you know,
- 1:23:05I recounted in the book, the reason I remember it so clearly is
- 1:23:10because on the thirtieth, yeah, thirtieth of May, we had what ended
- 1:23:18up being the biggest casualty producing you know op that we had had up to
- 1:23:25that point. Neither war and nobody died, but four guys were injured,
- 1:23:29two of them seriously on a target. And it was a target that you
- 1:23:35know, is they did everything right. They got in there, they took
- 1:23:40out the first four or five guys, and then you know, some craze
- 1:23:45dude came running out with his ak on automatic and spraying everybody and he hit
- 1:23:49four guys on that target. So those guys were flown back to Buyapp that
- 1:23:58night, and it was you know, a typical unit staff. I had
- 1:24:02like three guys with me, and so we ran out to the helicopters to
- 1:24:08take those four guys off the helicopters, and obviously, you know, we
- 1:24:13couldn't get four stretchers off quickly. And all of a sudden, all these
- 1:24:17rangers ran out, twelve rangers and started helping us, and we transloaded.
- 1:24:26We brought them into we had a j MOL set up there. We brought
- 1:24:30them in to be triaged. They were going to be flown out to Germany
- 1:24:35Critical Care Unit. But they were three iged right there. And you know,
- 1:24:41before one of the guys was put under with anesthesia, he said to
- 1:24:46me a panther, we sure could have used a few extra guys on the
- 1:24:50target. Some of these rangers for security would have would have been helpful.
- 1:24:55I was like, got it, Chris hanging in there, and I'll get
- 1:24:59working on that right away. So I you know, they put him under.
- 1:25:02I went back immediate request to Joint Special Operation Command. Hey, we
- 1:25:10would like a minimum of a couple squads put a platoon worth of rangers to
- 1:25:16help us out to isolate these targets. And you know that was I sent
- 1:25:24that mission up that night. Now, those guys carrying the stretchers in unbeknownst
- 1:25:30to me, and as they came out, I thank each one of them.
- 1:25:32I shook their hands, said, hey, really appreciate it. And
- 1:25:35you know when you when a unique guy like talks to a junior ranger there,
- 1:25:44you know they think it's they They were taken back. They were like,
- 1:25:47wow, this guy's thanking us. But I was genuinely appreciative of it.
- 1:25:54And that turned out to be. They were all from second Platoon,
- 1:25:59a company, and Tillman was one of the guys who was there. Wow.
- 1:26:03So the next night I was I was, you know, we were
- 1:26:09doing more ops. I was on the radio and I saw a ranger come
- 1:26:12in to our area. I was coincidentally, my top was set up in
- 1:26:18the Delta ticket counter area and so I heard his voice and I was like,
- 1:26:26I know that voice, and it was, you know, one of
- 1:26:28the guys I mentioned. I'm not gonna say his name because he's still active
- 1:26:33with another government agency, but I knew his name. He was a guy
- 1:26:38I work with in both my tours in two sem five and you know,
- 1:26:43I'll call him STARTINXT and I was like, startin next are you. You
- 1:26:45know, I was really happy to see him because not like personality wise,
- 1:26:51I was happy to see him because I thought it meant he was coming over
- 1:26:55as the lead NCO to be my isolation force. But that's not why he
- 1:27:00was over. He just looked at me and he said, Sir, can
- 1:27:02I talk to you in private? And I was like, yeah, sure.
- 1:27:05So I grabbed my long gun and we went out and walked, you
- 1:27:10know, along the inactive runway, and I said, what's on your mind?
- 1:27:14And he just went into this long litany of about the command climate in
- 1:27:19the second Battalion and how toxic it was. And you know, he gave
- 1:27:25me in numerous examples. They're in the book, and you know, he
- 1:27:30was very clear it wasn't it wasn't just one individual, so you know,
- 1:27:36and I try to get that across in the book. This is why climate
- 1:27:41is so so important to understand. It was multiple and you know, I
- 1:27:47said to him, well, what can I do to help. I've been
- 1:27:49out of the Rangers. You know, I left Dave while you were there.
- 1:27:54I left in ninety eight, so this is two thousand and three,
- 1:27:57so I've been out five years. I was like, you know, sur
- 1:28:00next, what can I do? And I'll do anything, but what do
- 1:28:02you need me to do? And he said, I don't know. Can
- 1:28:05you just talk to someone in our higher headquarters, maybe get someone to come
- 1:28:10down and take a look. Anything will help. And he was very apologetic,
- 1:28:15you know, about bothering me. I'm like, dude, you're not
- 1:28:17bothering me. Senseless leadership in a combat zone is as deadly serious as it
- 1:28:23gets. And so I told him I had to go back. We had
- 1:28:27a mission going going on on a target, so I had to go back.
- 1:28:31And I said to him, hey, look, you have my word.
- 1:28:35I will. I don't know what I'm going to do or how I'm
- 1:28:39going to do it, but I will find someone and I'm going to make
- 1:28:42it known, and we're going to get someone over there to check out what's
- 1:28:45going on. And you know, again back to this theme, because we've
- 1:28:48talked to two seven five, We've talked about, you know, our initial
- 1:28:55battalion. Like when he told me that it wasn't just a thing, you
- 1:28:58know, all these faith is, you know, went flying through my brain.
- 1:29:02I could see them and I just was like, man, you know,
- 1:29:05those guys are struggling, they're sucking. Those are good people. They
- 1:29:12don't deserve that. And again, you know, it's deadly serious when that
- 1:29:16shit happens in a combat zone. So and after him, two more NCOs
- 1:29:25grabbed me on the way to the chow hal and said the same thing.
- 1:29:27So that's three senior NCOs crossing command lines to tell someone about a problem.
- 1:29:34So you know, internally, I only thought about this later, not at
- 1:29:39the time, but it, you know, it tells you how serious it
- 1:29:43is, right because ranger NCOs, I mean, you got to be like
- 1:29:48waterboarding them to get them to complain about anything. They don't complain. H
- 1:29:55you know, you got to coerce a ranger NCO to tell you what's bothering,
- 1:30:00because you know, you learned to suck it up, and you learned
- 1:30:02that, you know, you don't complain. And so I knew, because
- 1:30:09I understood that about about you know, ranger noncommissioned officers, I knew this
- 1:30:14had to be pretty serious for them to do what they did. And you
- 1:30:19know, two nights later, I saw a senior ranger officer and I'm anonymizing
- 1:30:28him just because I anonymize a lot of the guys in the book with rangers.
- 1:30:32Know who he is, and I approached him. And I had a
- 1:30:36great relationship with this guy, you know, I had. I had been
- 1:30:42in l and O with him when I when I was the S three of
- 1:30:45the Rangers five years earlier. I knew him then he was in the Rangers,
- 1:30:49then he was a rank above me, and I knew him that whole
- 1:30:55time leading up to that. Uh never you know, I never served with
- 1:31:00him or anything like that, but I knew him and had a very good
- 1:31:02relationship. And I saw him and I said, he was the most senior
- 1:31:06guy and he was the only guy who was at byapp from our higher headquarters.
- 1:31:13So I said, hey, can I can I talk to you?
- 1:31:15And I pulled him aside and I said, look, here's I want to
- 1:31:19tell you what three very competent NCOs told me. And I think it's pretty
- 1:31:27serious, and you know, you can tell me what you think. And
- 1:31:30I laid out very carefully, trying to use their words, not to you
- 1:31:34know, in any way, throwing anything that wasn't said to me, anonymizing
- 1:31:42their names because I understood the ramifications and how you know, the regiment sometimes
- 1:31:49reacts when people complain, So you know, I told him all the examples.
- 1:31:57And he wasn't saying a thing, and it was dark eye and he
- 1:32:00was smoking a cigar at the time. I couldn't see his face. So
- 1:32:03I just stopped and said, you know, to let him talk, and
- 1:32:06he, you know, took another hit off his cigar, you know,
- 1:32:12blew the smoke out, hit me in the face, and then he stuck
- 1:32:15his finger in my chest and said, you don't know, you've been out
- 1:32:19of the regiment for five years, and you don't know anyone in that chain
- 1:32:23of command, So go back and tell your anonymous NCO sources to stay in
- 1:32:30their lane, to do what they're told to do. And if I did
- 1:32:33a nickel for every time a ranger in CEO complained about what he was told
- 1:32:39to do, I'd be a rich man. And he turned and walked away.
- 1:32:43And you know, I was not like, I had no expectation of
- 1:32:48what was going to happen there. I'd never done that before in that type
- 1:32:53of situation. But I was confident, you know, I felt like that
- 1:32:57was an emotional reaction by him, and I was confident that even the most
- 1:33:01selfish leader would with time consider what he had just said and consider the imp
- 1:33:10the implications of doing nothing, and from a selfish standpoint, go, hey,
- 1:33:15I probably need to look into this because you know, this guy could
- 1:33:18make me look bad. Uh, And so you know that's what I just
- 1:33:25I just trusted that something would happen, he would do something. Well,
- 1:33:30you know, I went back to commanding the unit. Within a week or
- 1:33:35two, Uh, someone came up and told me, hey, you know
- 1:33:39two some five just redeployed. By the way we are, request for augmentees
- 1:33:44was denied by a higher headquarters. So, uh, these guys were sitting
- 1:33:48around doing nothing. They they ended up doing nothing, but for some reason
- 1:33:56we you know, they weren't allowed to come and do missions with us.
- 1:34:00Wow, and they redeployed back to Fort Lewis. And my thinking at the
- 1:34:04time was that he must have looked into it, must have found this was
- 1:34:10going on, and that's why, because why else would you leave in the
- 1:34:14beginning phases of the Iraq War. Why would you fly back to Fort Lewis,
- 1:34:18especially when you know I've got guys getting shot because we don't have enough
- 1:34:24guys to isolate targets. So that was my conclusion, and I didn't think
- 1:34:30anything of it, you know, anytime after that, I did a tour.
- 1:34:36It was my war college year. After that, I was I was
- 1:34:41promotable to full colonel. I you know, pinned on when they gave me
- 1:34:46command of the unit. So I had to do my one year off and
- 1:34:51I so I basically was off the grid. And that next year I didn't
- 1:34:58know, you know what, if anything happened. And it was many many
- 1:35:04years later after I got out where you know, Krakauer wrote that book.
- 1:35:10And I finally read that book in twenty fifteen. And as I was reading
- 1:35:15it, and I didn't read it because a friend of mine said it was
- 1:35:19too political, don't waste your time with it. But I read it in
- 1:35:25twenty fifteen and I came across this passage where crack Hour had Pat Tillman's diaries,
- 1:35:33and he printed three of his passages from his diary and they were a
- 1:35:40byapp and so I'm reading it, and you know it's they're in the book.
- 1:35:45But he says, last night we helped carry in four wounded Delta Force
- 1:35:51guys. Somehow, you know, combat became more real. I never thought
- 1:35:58it would happen ever, know. And then his next passage was we're flying
- 1:36:04home at zero three point thirty tomorrow. I'm not sure at the time,
- 1:36:11thank fucking God. And so I read this and I was like, holy
- 1:36:15shit, Pat Tillman was. I didn't even know he was in second rate
- 1:36:19in battalion at the time when they were in Iraq, much less did I
- 1:36:25know he was one of the guys who carried the stretcher in. So,
- 1:36:28you know, I started talking to Ranger NCOs and going back and trying to
- 1:36:33piece this back together. Hey, whatever happened you know during that time,
- 1:36:39And again one of the guys I mentioned, Ted Kennedy, was you know,
- 1:36:45a huge source of enlightenment for me. He told me about you know,
- 1:36:50them returning to Fort Lewis what happened. And he also told me for
- 1:36:57the first time that the same chain of command that those guys came and complained
- 1:37:01about to me was in place in Afghanistan one year later. And that's when
- 1:37:10you know, I kind of realized, hey, wow, this is you
- 1:37:14know, what do I do with this information. He also told me that
- 1:37:17Missus Tillman was still investigating what happened. She was, you know, talking
- 1:37:23to a bunch of the guys. She she wanted to know anything anyone knew
- 1:37:28about it, And so I felt compelled to provide her with this information,
- 1:37:33not thinking it was some key clue or anything. I just felt compelled to
- 1:37:38tell her, you know about it, and to tell her that Pat carried
- 1:37:42my guys in and you know what a great guy was in Iraq. So
- 1:37:48you know, that conversation led to her reading my book and then saying to
- 1:37:55me, hey, you know, can you I have this these investigative documents.
- 1:38:00I know you were in Afghanistan, you were a ranger, you know
- 1:38:04all these people. Could you take a look at it and tell me what
- 1:38:08you think? And I said, you know, the only thing any of
- 1:38:13us could say to the mother of a fallen comrade, I said, you
- 1:38:15know, of course, And I drove up there that next day, four
- 1:38:20hundred miles and picked up the investigative documents, met her. You know,
- 1:38:28my first words to her were an apology for the army, and you know,
- 1:38:33just to tell her that we're not You know, everyone I've ever talked
- 1:38:39to is embarrassed about that. And you know, I have no idea what
- 1:38:44happened. But I'll read these documents and I'll tell you what I think,
- 1:38:48even if it's not what you may want to hear. Because at the time
- 1:38:54she was you know, she had been twisted into, you know, just
- 1:39:00wild ideas about what happened, and not not because she was delusional or something,
- 1:39:08but because she'd been lied to multiple times. She'd been told multiple stories
- 1:39:13about what happened. And so you know, that's human nature anytime, you
- 1:39:17know, when you're punching the nose. Once you learn when you're punching the
- 1:39:20nose twice, right, you know, it was like, hey, I'm
- 1:39:24done right, yeah, And so she was. And so I started reading
- 1:39:29the documents, talking to every ranger I could talk to. That was twenty
- 1:39:33seventeen. And you know, Jack, I think I said this to you
- 1:39:41in a separate conversation. You know what was a very difficult thing. I
- 1:39:46knew when I told her I'd look at it. When I got home.
- 1:39:50You know, three thousand, five hundred pages of documents. I spread them
- 1:39:54out my office and I just was like, hey, you know, I
- 1:39:58might as well get started, and I started reading one binder, and nine
- 1:40:01hours later and about one hundred sticky notes later, I was like just captivated
- 1:40:09by it. Uh, And I knew there was something there. I knew
- 1:40:13I needed to go talk to the rangers who were involved, and uh,
- 1:40:18you know that began my journey uh talking to those guys and and you know
- 1:40:25that that you know, uh, collectively both talking to her uh and talking
- 1:40:31to those rangers, UH just became one of the most rewarding things that I've
- 1:40:38ever done in my career. And you know, along the way, UH
- 1:40:45just fascinated by you know, the terrain, the circumstances, everything we've talked
- 1:40:50about already in this Uh, you know, was was very obvious. Uh
- 1:40:58was very obviously going on on the ground that day. You know, guys
- 1:41:02making great recommendations, common sense recommendations, being denied, being told no,
- 1:41:11you can't do that, or not even being answered on the radio, you
- 1:41:15know. And so as I accumulated that knowledge, it kind of came together
- 1:41:23with what I already knew about bad leadership and toxic leadership. And the more
- 1:41:29guys I talked through, the more it became, you know, just completely
- 1:41:32obvious. But the real breakthroughs, you know, were we're from talking to
- 1:41:40them and then just diving into the terrain, the timing, the radio logs,
- 1:41:46seeing what people really said, and you know, I started talking to
- 1:41:51the guys. It was a slow process at first because not many guys wanted
- 1:41:57to talk about it. It was difficult to find most of but with each
- 1:42:01guy I found, that guy led me to a couple more guys, and
- 1:42:06you know, patterns started to evail, just shocking patterns. You know,
- 1:42:14I don't have PTSD, so to me, it's I don't know what I
- 1:42:18can't like imagine what it is, just like depression. You know, people
- 1:42:24used to think depression is fake. We know it's not now and you can't
- 1:42:28imagine depression if you don't have it. And what shocked me was how many
- 1:42:32of these guys were absolutely devastated by what happened. And most of that devastation
- 1:42:40was built on guilt and frustration. And the frustration was they had no idea
- 1:42:48what happened. They never were allowed to see any of the investigative documents.
- 1:42:55They didn't know these decisions were being made behind the scene. They didn't know
- 1:42:59their opportunity was being told, no, you can't blow up the vehicle,
- 1:43:03keep going, uh, you know, just senseless ship on top of senseless
- 1:43:09ship. And uh, you know it had an effect on me, it
- 1:43:13really uh you know, instead of detouring me, it you know, hardened
- 1:43:19my uh resolve to get to the bottom of it and UH and help these
- 1:43:27guys out, Pete, can you because I think a lot of people now
- 1:43:30are very familiar with with UH Patowman being killed in fractricide. But can you
- 1:43:38lay out what the mission was, what the scenario was, and where these
- 1:43:44command decisions and the refusals of certain IT requests work. Can you sort of
- 1:43:49lay out what the scenario was for us? Yeah? Sure, so terrain.
- 1:43:55It starts with terrain. And you know, coincidentally, this area that
- 1:44:00the rangers were driving around looking for weapons cachets is what I believe. There
- 1:44:05might be another one. It might be tied, but there's probably no more
- 1:44:10dangerous hostile place in Afghanistan tribally terrain wise, same thing. There might be
- 1:44:18another chunk of terrain somewhere equally arduous as this area, but not more arduous.
- 1:44:27So both the terrain and the enemy are as bad as you can get
- 1:44:31at any time. And how do I know that? Because I thought,
- 1:44:35you know, the Battle of Shahikot known as Anaconda, and when we chased
- 1:44:40the foreign fighters, me and my RECKI guys followed the trail of tears on
- 1:44:45the thirteenth day as they the last remnants of the l KAEDA fighters fled.
- 1:44:50They fled west and it turned out, you know, I figured this out
- 1:44:55about a month in looking at the map. Where kat Tillman was killed was
- 1:45:00eight kilometers west of Takergar, which is, you know, the mountain where
- 1:45:05all those guys died in the you know, the medals of honor and everything.
- 1:45:10So we chase them right to the border, right through this area.
- 1:45:14And is we were in that area, we knew from intelligence, but we
- 1:45:17knew firsthand from being in it how hostile that area was. I had a
- 1:45:24safe house in Oregon as the AFO commander, and I also had waned Coust.
- 1:45:30So to get from Oregon to Coust, the straight line is to go
- 1:45:33right through this area. We would not go through it, and when we
- 1:45:38had to, which was twice, i'd go through twice. We only had
- 1:45:43one rule. Never go through in a convoy. Go through in lobiz vehicles
- 1:45:48by as much time as you can get through quickly, but do not look
- 1:45:54like an enemy convoy. Because these are the hardest core posh dunes that there
- 1:46:00are, and it's a smuggling haven between Pakistan and Afghanistan. So it's not
- 1:46:05just those tribes. There's other people passing through there all the time, and
- 1:46:11so I knew how dangerous and daunting it was. And so when I read
- 1:46:15their mission, you know, I still remember the moment. It was actually
- 1:46:20in this office, all the papers were on the floor. I dropped the
- 1:46:24binder that it was in, and just you know, shook my head in
- 1:46:30disgust that they were just randomly driving around to find weapons cachets and hoping that
- 1:46:38Osama bin Laden might be out back feeding one of the goats or something.
- 1:46:43And you know, it was the exact opposite thing we should have been doing.
- 1:46:47And it's not even so much the Rager's fault as it is the overall
- 1:46:54Afghanistan you know, strategy. Just the fact they were allowed to go in
- 1:46:59there to do that for no specific intelligence is mind boggling. And so these
- 1:47:06guys, the platoon and second Battalion, flew into flew into Bogram and within
- 1:47:15three days they were in their vehicles out driving around in the field without coming
- 1:47:21back into their base. What ended up being eight days. So these are
- 1:47:28brand new guys, most of them, a few of them had a prior
- 1:47:31tour. They were there for a couple of weeks in November of two thousand
- 1:47:38and three. But other than that, no real on the ground knowledge,
- 1:47:44and not just that the baseline ground elevation of this area is six thousand feet.
- 1:47:51So you know, lesson learned from Battle of Shahi code is you don't
- 1:47:56go into any area above three thousand feet unless you're proper acclimated. And you
- 1:48:01know, unknown lesson from that battle is most of those follow on forces that
- 1:48:09came in were also flown out with altitude sickness. And that's a lot of
- 1:48:15these foreign forces, the you know, other units, conventional units, and
- 1:48:20we were telling people that, we were saying, look, you need to
- 1:48:24come to gardens first and acclimate. It's you know, it's right at I
- 1:48:29think foury eight hundred feet and acclimate and then go in. But you know,
- 1:48:34we were blowing that off. So I would have stopped them just for
- 1:48:38lack of acclimation. But to go into that area and not understand how dangerous
- 1:48:45it was was, you know, already a formula for disaster. And when
- 1:48:50you read the interview notes, you know, you read the S three,
- 1:48:56the commander, these guys talking, they talk about this firefight they got in.
- 1:49:01They say, well, you know, it was just a you know
- 1:49:08happenstance. We had been in that area for eight days and all dry holes,
- 1:49:13you know, no enemy contact, and I feel comfortable sending guys back.
- 1:49:17Five hum v's back in there today. Well again, I dropped my
- 1:49:23binder when I read that, because in Afghanistan, if you're a history you
- 1:49:28know, if you've read the history of Afghanistan, you understand that eight days
- 1:49:32of no contact means they've been studying you for eight days and you are eight
- 1:49:39times more likely to be ambush because that's the only tactic they were using at
- 1:49:45the time. That's their tactic of choice, the far ambush. You know,
- 1:49:49you can go look online at the videos of how they did it to
- 1:49:53the Soviets. They are sizing you up, and you bet you can bet
- 1:49:59they were s those rangers up. So you know, on the day this
- 1:50:03mission happened, they had an inoperable hum V and they were at a border
- 1:50:09control point called Border Control Point five, right on the Pakistani Afghan border,
- 1:50:15and the platoon leader called it in and said, hey, this thing's deadlined,
- 1:50:18it won't start. Recommend we leave it here, or you can come
- 1:50:24pick it up in a helicopter and take it back to Couse. You know,
- 1:50:30deny, drag it with you. You guys have been your behind schedule,
- 1:50:35and you know the sink matrix, your platoon on the sink matrix is
- 1:50:41all red and we need to get back green. So you know, common
- 1:50:47sense and the response is senselessness. So these guys hooked up a deadlined hum
- 1:50:55V to another hum V using nylon straps and took off from that border control
- 1:51:02point five with a helipad, which, by the way, you know,
- 1:51:06a helicopter flew in the last spare part flew in the company commander and the
- 1:51:13is XO to tell the platoon leader, hey, you need to get back
- 1:51:15on schedule. The old man's really getting pissed, so off they go,
- 1:51:20and you know, guys, you can watch the video online. I've posted
- 1:51:26it online. It was the fourth investigation video the entire canyon. When you
- 1:51:32see this canyon, they literally were dragging a Humby through the equivalent of the
- 1:51:40Grand Canyon, like trying to get through the Grand Canyon with a Humby.
- 1:51:44And by this time it had no front wheels. It couldn't be steered,
- 1:51:49so it was elevated. It was just two wheels rolling and anyone who's done
- 1:51:55off roadwork knows. You know, trying to get a jinga truck with a
- 1:52:00hum vy on two wheels through that stuff is an exercise in futility. So
- 1:52:05their requests to blow the vehicle, you know, I should say they dragged
- 1:52:10it for four and a half hours that morning. Their average speed was one
- 1:52:15point five miles an hour, So you know that's important not just for understanding
- 1:52:21the futility of it, but think of the stress levels in those guys.
- 1:52:26You're in enemy territory going one point five miles an hour in the middle of
- 1:52:31mountains. Yeah, and to paint it for people, because those BCPs were
- 1:52:36generally on elevated locations. So when you say, like the Grand Caynans like
- 1:52:41they're they're towing something down switchbacks. Hand carved roads, yes, like that,
- 1:52:47hand carved roads that are one vehicle wide that when you're in the driver's
- 1:52:53seat or the past one one Toyota Tacoma wide, not one home right right
- 1:52:57exactly, you can look over the edge and see like the precipice, like
- 1:53:02it's right there was was the was the no to blow it in place and
- 1:53:09no to HeLa back it out? Was that coming from the battlespace owner was
- 1:53:13that coming from their direct chain of command? Where was that coming from?
- 1:53:17Yeah, so again important lesson year, which you know, was illuminated to
- 1:53:26me once again by these senior NCOs who whose comment was, if you want
- 1:53:32to know what went wrong in Afghanistan, start with the way we tried to
- 1:53:38command and control it. And in this case, here they were they had
- 1:53:43just switched this. Remember this is only two thousand and four, so we're
- 1:53:46only really two years into it, and we've already pretty much lost our way
- 1:53:53because I was, you know, with the first guys in in the winter
- 1:53:58of two thousand and one two. This is the spring of two thousand and
- 1:54:01four. And here's how the command and control was set up at the time.
- 1:54:08It was called the CFT concept, the cross functional team concept, and
- 1:54:13the cross functional team stipulated every staff was exactly the same around Afghanistan, and
- 1:54:19there were no more company talks, battalion talks. There were just these CFTs
- 1:54:26where everybody you brought all your staff officers, everybody was in one place.
- 1:54:32They lived off their VTCs that drove their schedule every day. So this platoon
- 1:54:40who on this day is they leave Border Control Point five, is the only
- 1:54:44platoon or so we thought out in the field at the time, the only
- 1:54:48rifle platoon, the other eight rifle platoons are back in planning the next dry
- 1:54:54hole. Their chain. The way they report is back to the first CFT,
- 1:55:00which is at Salerno and Cowst And it looks like all of them.
- 1:55:03There's ten everyone has a U table. There's ten staff officers on each side.
- 1:55:09Ten of them are supposed to be working on current ops and ten on
- 1:55:12future ops. Don't ask me how that, ever, was explained to anyone.
- 1:55:16I don't know. Every op is future in my opinion. So ten
- 1:55:20and ten and then the CFT commander behind him is the lower level command.
- 1:55:27So the CFT is a battalion commander or battalion S three in this case it
- 1:55:32was the S three, and behind him is the company commander and company XO.
- 1:55:38So when the platoon leader he drove I told you the four and a
- 1:55:43half hours out of BCP five, they pull into this town called Magara.
- 1:55:47It's a Pashtun town, you know, something out of the history books.
- 1:55:53One hundred years back. They've you know, barely ever seen a Westerner.
- 1:55:59And suddenly this convoy of ten vehicles with rangers in space age combat gear get
- 1:56:06out with a busted up vehicle, and that's where he's calling back for help
- 1:56:13and his you know, his first call is, hey, we got a
- 1:56:15deadline vehicle. It cannot go any further. Recommend we either blow it or
- 1:56:23you bring in a forty seven to lift it out. They said, Roger,
- 1:56:29got it. They reply an hour later. Okay, so you know
- 1:56:36this is another binder dropping moment for me as I'm reading it. One hour
- 1:56:42later they reply, you know, permission to blow the vehicle denied, and
- 1:56:47we don't have any helicopters. Well, you know, in the interviews,
- 1:56:53remember I'm reading present and you know future, I'm reading the interviews of what
- 1:56:59the chain of commands said about their decisions to investigators. In that interview,
- 1:57:06you know, the battalion commander said, hey, we don't blow vehicles.
- 1:57:10It's against army policy. You know, it's a it just provides propaganda to
- 1:57:15the enemy. And so you know that's why we denied it. Well,
- 1:57:21that's you know, preposterous. I had just blown up an M one a
- 1:57:28two tank, four point five million dollar tank in Iraq one year earlier because
- 1:57:34it flipped over and we were it would take about a week to get that
- 1:57:39thing out of the hole that was in right so I knew right away that
- 1:57:43was BSU and the helicopter. You know, no investigator could ever find a
- 1:57:48record of a request for a helicopter. I just told him no, keep
- 1:57:51dragging it. You know. It's very clear they were mad at this platoon
- 1:57:57because it had fallen behind scale and you guys know the sync matrix. And
- 1:58:02this is where I go back to. These are lessons we have to internalize
- 1:58:06for the future. This modern command and control model is not modern, it's
- 1:58:14antiquated, and in my opinion, this is an example of the first time
- 1:58:20in modern military history where we've gone backwards, and we've gone backwards because of
- 1:58:26technology in Vietnam, if those guys were out there driving around with those hum
- 1:58:31vis, their company commander, his FO, his two rtos and a small
- 1:58:36security team would have been on the highest centrally located hill, camping out until
- 1:58:44they came back in with a PRC seventy seven radio. But he would have
- 1:58:48been on that radio all the time and anything they needed he'd be giving him
- 1:58:53guidance or relaying it the hire to help them out. And in this case,
- 1:58:58this CFT concept looked exactly against that, because, as it turns out,
- 1:59:03many of these these lags in responses are in part due to the fact
- 1:59:11they've got these vtc's going on with the commanding General. So they're sitting in
- 1:59:15this talk Tactical Operation Center, you know, just enthralled with the VTC hanging
- 1:59:25on every word of the general. Right, these guys are struggling with the
- 1:59:29real world combat problem in the field, and they're either not answering them or
- 1:59:32going tell them to keep dragging it. Right, then, you know what
- 1:59:36I mean? What are they pussies? Right? And so and so these
- 1:59:41guys are told, no, you can't blow it, we can't lift it.
- 1:59:45We can get a wrecker out there, but the wrecker is not allowed
- 1:59:48to go off the KG highway. Again, some obscure someone made a sop
- 1:59:55for the wreckord, which is a tow truck, that it could not leave
- 1:59:59the Colsta Gardez Highway, which was fifteen kilometers from these guys. So what
- 2:00:06they come back and tell them after four and a half hours in Magara being
- 2:00:13sworn by civilians. It's hot, there's biting flies, they're out of water,
- 2:00:17they're low on food. And again for both you two and anyone watching
- 2:00:24this, you know, you can just imagine they're also probably red hot pissed
- 2:00:29off at this chain of command for the senselessness. They're told, not only
- 2:00:33do you got to keep tolling that vehicle, we want you to split the
- 2:00:39platoon because we need half the platoon to get to this other town called Mana
- 2:00:44as quickly as possible. No reason, no enemy. You know, it
- 2:00:48wasn't like they just saw Ubl there or one of his underlines. It was
- 2:00:55because the sink matrix was still red for Mana. So they told them,
- 2:01:00rush off, get the Mana. And you know that's it. We don't
- 2:01:03want to hear anything else out of you. And the lieutenant, you know,
- 2:01:10in my opinion, did a fantastic job. He gave three reasons why
- 2:01:15that didn't make sense. And one of the things I recommend in my book
- 2:01:19is we go to a new concept called logic of why that you don't just
- 2:01:25give an order. You always have to explain the logic of why it makes
- 2:01:29sense. And that's how our brains work. You can't persuade anyone unless they
- 2:01:33understand the logic of why. And that's usually threefold. Firstly, Secondly,
- 2:01:39thirdly, and the lieutenant, this is why it's a case study. He
- 2:01:44did exactly that. He said, here's why it doesn't make sense. First
- 2:01:48of all, we'll be splitting up the platoon and we don't have enough.
- 2:01:53We only have one satcom radio, so we're going to have we're not going
- 2:01:57to be able to talk to each other, and if something happens, one
- 2:02:00of them is going to be one of us is going to be left out
- 2:02:01there without any comms. Second of all, we can get to the target.
- 2:02:08Second of all, we can't even clear Mana until tomorrow morning, as
- 2:02:13per Battalion SOP. So why are we in a rush to get there before
- 2:02:16the sun goes down just so we can sit outside the town to clear it
- 2:02:20the next day. And thirdly, it's much faster if we all move together,
- 2:02:26go drop the vehicle off at the KG Highway, then turn around and
- 2:02:30come back and clear the town. And the answer was no, no logical.
- 2:02:36Why just know, do what you were told to do and continue mission.
- 2:02:42And so they did. They split the platoon up. It's a random
- 2:02:48split. They wanted certain guys back in the rear for planning. They wanted
- 2:02:53the mortars, the snipers, and a couple other specialty guys back. Well,
- 2:03:00the problem with that is when you're doing motorized ops, every vehicle is
- 2:03:05set up in a certain way with certain guys doing certain tasks. You know,
- 2:03:12there's gunners, there's guys who sit in the seats next to the gunners,
- 2:03:15and over time they come up with their SOPs of how to operate.
- 2:03:20They're also organic. You know, squads are together. There's half a squad
- 2:03:25in one vehicle, half in another. So when they split the platoon and
- 2:03:30they had to split it based on random criteria, they just disintegrated the organic
- 2:03:40nature of these teams. So now you had team leaders working for squad leaders
- 2:03:46they'd never worked for before. You had soldiers like Pat Tillman working for different
- 2:03:54team leaders and squad leaders. You had guys attached to different groups. Look,
- 2:04:00we trained to do that. That's not a kiss of death, but
- 2:04:03it's a very subtle yet important degradation of that unit's ability to deal with chaos
- 2:04:14and complexity, and in a in a situation where there's no time to even
- 2:04:18rehearse, to sit there and go okay, you you know, squad leaders,
- 2:04:23you're gonna do this. If this happens, you do that. They
- 2:04:26didn't even have time for that. They just took off because they had to
- 2:04:30get to Mana before sundown. And uh and you know that that takes us
- 2:04:35into the canyon at that point. What I don't understand, you know,
- 2:04:41from a leadership position, is how can you have an element out there?
- 2:04:45If you've only got one Satcom radio for this element? How can you have
- 2:04:49whether you're you know, your lead element or the element the stay behind.
- 2:04:53How can you have an element out there? Do you have no idea,
- 2:04:57no idea in the world, what their situation, you know, what their
- 2:05:00set rep is, they've on you know, same thing. That's why I
- 2:05:05said it's another binder dropping moment important And that's why you know, that's why
- 2:05:13the book is important, because it's a tactical book, and we've got to
- 2:05:18not just in this incident, but others like it. We've got to memorialize
- 2:05:23those lessons. You know, this is basic stuff, you know, transplanted
- 2:05:29into modern warfare. But it tells you that these principles are unassallable. You
- 2:05:34cannot divide your force randomly and arbitrarily. You can't send someone out to a
- 2:05:42place that doesn't make any sense just because you want to change a color on
- 2:05:47a sink matrix. You can't ignore your men in the field, you know,
- 2:05:55in the unit. When I got to the unit, one of the
- 2:05:58start majors gave me a briefing on it, and he said, hey,
- 2:06:01look, you know right now, we're not a war, but we send
- 2:06:04out a lot of singleton missions. When one guy is out is deployed,
- 2:06:12everybody back here in the rear is in support of that guy. So you
- 2:06:16might get a call at zero three in the morning to come in and it
- 2:06:20might be something incredibly you know, minimalistic, like this guy might need special
- 2:06:28laces for his boots that are in one of his kit bags in his locker,
- 2:06:33and we need to get them on a FedEx plane as quick as possible.
- 2:06:36When that happens, you you that's your mission, and you take it
- 2:06:41as serious as possible. And because I served in Columbia, I understood that.
- 2:06:45I understood both ends of it, you know, between my tours and
- 2:06:49while I was out there, and the unit always lived by that everybody in
- 2:06:55the rear is there to support the guys in the field. So this is
- 2:07:00one rifle platoon is in the field these CFTs, which I'm sorry, I
- 2:07:05you know, we got distracted. The command and control Arrangement's important to understand.
- 2:07:12You've got this CFT ten ten command in Salerno, which is COUST.
- 2:07:17They can't do anything unless the main CFT in Bogrum, which is set up
- 2:07:25the exact same way but on steroids because it's regimental headquarters, they can't do
- 2:07:30anything without its permission. And it doesn't stop there. They're connected with the
- 2:07:36CFT in ballod Iraq, which is our Joint Special Operations headquarters, and they
- 2:07:43can't do anything without the CFT in Blode telling them it's okay. So you
- 2:07:48know, it's untraceable, but it's it's not you know, it's it's not
- 2:07:55speculation to say that each of these requests, we're not just going to cows.
- 2:08:01They were going back to Bogram, back to Ballade, back down to
- 2:08:05Bogram, back down to cows, back out to these guys in the field.
- 2:08:09Yeah, and no, and it's uh and this is where you know,
- 2:08:15it becomes to me such a historic lesson. And you know, Jack,
- 2:08:22I saw a podcast you did where you talked about when you joined uh,
- 2:08:26you know, motivated by nine to one one and you know, I
- 2:08:31think you said on it people forget after nine one one, it was like
- 2:08:35World War three. Uh, you know, everyone was like, hey,
- 2:08:39we're at war. We're a war with the world. You know, this
- 2:08:43is this is it? Well, it was also like World War two,
- 2:08:46right, it was like Pearl Harbor. And it was also like Vietnam Gulf
- 2:08:52of Tonken, you know when when the ship hits the fan. In America,
- 2:08:58we're a freedom loving country, and most of us grow up like you
- 2:09:03did, Dave, like you did, like I did. We have our
- 2:09:05hardships, but we we have an unbelievable upbringing and we appreciate the freedom we're
- 2:09:13given. So when the time calls for someone to come protect those freedoms,
- 2:09:18patriots rise up and they say send me. And you know, I didn't
- 2:09:24fully appreciate it till I did this research. How two thousand and one did
- 2:09:30the same thing. And many of the members in this platoon were those guys,
- 2:09:35were those patriots, including Pat Tillman. And you know we're all young
- 2:09:39at that age. Okay. So I've heard people say, you know,
- 2:09:43you were a fool if you volunteer for Vietnam, And whenever I read that,
- 2:09:48I was like, man, I would have volunteered for Vietnam in a
- 2:09:52second, you know all the way through, and not because you know of
- 2:09:58some like policy principle, but because we want to protect freedom, and so
- 2:10:07you cannot understand the logic of why war happens or why our country goes to
- 2:10:15war. We trust that our civilian and military leaders are thinking those thoughts and
- 2:10:24are telling us the truth that we're going to war for a good reason and
- 2:10:28that this makes sense. So it's a contract. And those guys, those
- 2:10:33guys like that, those guys like Jack, that's our national treasure. These
- 2:10:37are the finest humans in our country. You know. There's only certain guys
- 2:10:43who will raise their hand to protect freedom, especially the freedoms of those who
- 2:10:50won't stand up and protect it themselves. So it's a small cohort. And
- 2:10:56when they do that, they don't really know what they're getting into. And
- 2:11:01that's just reality. It's not you know, it's not like a reflective of
- 2:11:07any of our intelligence. We have no idea whether you're eighteen, nineteen or
- 2:11:11twenty five when you're joining, and let's face it, when you're forty five
- 2:11:16in the military, you still don't fully understand why we're doing what we're doing.
- 2:11:22But at that age, you have no idea and you're trusting. So
- 2:11:26that's a contract with the leaders, the military and civilian leaders that from here
- 2:11:31on out, you're going to make good decisions and to the best of your
- 2:11:35ability, solve complex problems. That enabled those individuals that was national treasure to
- 2:11:43accomplish their purpose. And that was not the case here in Afghanistan and not
- 2:11:50the case here. And so when you hear about Pat Tillman, and you
- 2:11:54know, you can go on and look at his videos and they you know,
- 2:11:58your eyes of water as you listen to this great American after nine one
- 2:12:03one saying, Hey, my grandfather served, my uncles served. You know,
- 2:12:07my family has served throughout history. I love this country. I love
- 2:12:11the freedom it's given me. You know, my job is just it doesn't
- 2:12:16matter. And he was a pro football player and he joined he left that
- 2:12:20behind and he joined up and same thing. He's he's a metaphor for all
- 2:12:26the rest of us. That contract was in place there. But in order
- 2:12:31to make that contract legitimate, we've got to start holding these decision makers feet
- 2:12:35to the fire with accountability. And they have a job to do. And
- 2:12:41like I said, it's to make good decisions and solve complex problems in a
- 2:12:46way that takes care of the people that have volunteered, and that did not
- 2:12:50happen in this case. Pete, you mentioned, Sorry, Jack, Pete,
- 2:12:54you mentioned before the show that you know, people will raise issues,
- 2:12:58saying that the only people the only reason people care about this issue is because
- 2:13:05Tullman was a professional football player, he was a national figure, he was
- 2:13:07known. That's the only reason people care. And like you said, it's
- 2:13:11like, yeah, maybe, like that's a good thing though in the sense
- 2:13:15of there there's a personality that's showing the issues. Because if it weren't somebody
- 2:13:22who were known, these things happen. These things happen, you know,
- 2:13:26on a on a more regular base, on a more regular basis, that
- 2:13:31we would like and that and that people know, and the fact that there's
- 2:13:35a celebrity that is sort of like leading the way I was about to say,
- 2:13:41Dave, like, maybe the reason why it's so well known is because
- 2:13:46the government lied about it. Right, Then you're you're absolutely you're absolutely right
- 2:13:50that the government unfortunately lies about a lot of things. And maybe the reason
- 2:13:54why this story came to the prominence was because the government lied about someone who
- 2:13:58has had a level of notoriety and fame, right, Yeah, no,
- 2:14:05guys, that's that's it. And you know, he he's a great American.
- 2:14:13You know, he was already a great American before he joined. But
- 2:14:16you know what he did when he joined. That's why I used the comparison
- 2:14:20of World War Two, where you had you know, professional baseball players joining
- 2:14:26up, you know, flying bombers and stuff. That's a sacrifice. You
- 2:14:31know, he made a sacrifice. And you know, you can go back
- 2:14:35and look on YouTube. He never gave another interview after that interview he gave
- 2:14:41before he signed up. Even while he was in the Rangers, they were
- 2:14:46constantly pestering him. The battalion commander would call him in, and in fact,
- 2:14:50right before they deployed the Afghanistan, he called him in and and said,
- 2:14:56hey, look, got a great opportunity. We'd really like you to
- 2:15:01be in the army calendar. And you know, Tilman turned that down.
- 2:15:05And don't ask me what the army calendar is. I have no idea.
- 2:15:09I can't even imagine what it is today. But he didn't give an interview.
- 2:15:13He never wanted any attention, right, And when you talk to the
- 2:15:16guys, you see he's like, you know, he's one of the guys.
- 2:15:22He's but he's a guy everybody liked to talk to. Even the NCOs,
- 2:15:30the staff sergeant's squad leaders will tell you, you know, you he
- 2:15:37was just one of those guys. He was a great conversationalist. He was
- 2:15:43not a problem in any way. Uh, as I mentioned with myself,
- 2:15:48and I'm sure you guys were the same way. He was a warrior.
- 2:15:50He was aggressive by nature. He wanted to take the fight to the enemy.
- 2:15:56Uh. But you know, this guy made made an incredible sacrifice and
- 2:16:01he didn't want any credit, very humble, and so again it's not so
- 2:16:07important that he was a pro football player or you know anything about his background.
- 2:16:13He's a metaphor for all of these guys who joined to stand up for
- 2:16:18freedom. And if it weren't for him, if he was just Joe Schmidlap,
- 2:16:24we wouldn't have learned the lessons we learned from this, and we wouldn't
- 2:16:28have learned that. You know, toxicity destroys toxic leadership, and we've got
- 2:16:35to stop sticking our heads in the sand around toxic leadership. You know,
- 2:16:39how many of us and how many conversations have you had where guys go.
- 2:16:43Yeah, at that time, my Battalian commander was a fucking asshole beyond belief.
- 2:16:50Well, that guy should have been fired. Someone should have done something
- 2:16:54about that guy. Same thing, sergeant majors. You know, it doesn't
- 2:16:56matter what level for TOOM leaders, sergeants, it doesn't matter. Yeah,
- 2:17:01if you're toxic, you need to be out of here, because toxic leadership
- 2:17:07destroys. And that's what happened here. They just bad decision on top of
- 2:17:13bad decision, which just led these guys into chaos, into a situation where
- 2:17:20they you know, by the time it happened, there was really no hope
- 2:17:24for getting out of it. So can you, to the best of your
- 2:17:28ability, can you walk us through the events of that day. Yeah,
- 2:17:33So they took off, you know, at eighteen hundred exactly the so they
- 2:17:39split the platoon, as I said, into what they called two cereal Serial
- 2:17:43one, Serial two. Serial one took off first, they were that Pat
- 2:17:48Tillman was with them, the platoon leader was there, and they had to
- 2:17:54get the man out. So you know, I have maps in the book,
- 2:17:58and when you come on the comes to a y intersection, you got
- 2:18:01to go left to go to Mana and they took the left, and about
- 2:18:09a kilometer and a half after the y intersection, you come to the mouth
- 2:18:13of a canyon and it's one of the most dramatic terrain features you can imagine.
- 2:18:20You can watch it live on my YouTube channel. Just go to Pete
- 2:18:26Labor dot com or go to firefight dot Pete Labor dot com and you can
- 2:18:33watch a drive through during the investigation of the entire canyon and you just will
- 2:18:39not believe this terrain. You will not believe how difficult it is to drive
- 2:18:46any vehicle through it, much less a Jinga truck with a hum Vy.
- 2:18:50So they take off, they pass through that canyon, it's uneventful, nothing
- 2:18:56happens. They come out the other end of the canyon, Horseshoe Canyon,
- 2:19:01and they're at another creek intersection. If they go left, they're going down
- 2:19:07to Mana. They go right, they're going back up toward the KG Highway.
- 2:19:11They were a little bit disoriented, which is totally understandable. They did
- 2:19:16what all infantrymen do, They did a map check. While they were sitting
- 2:19:20there in their vehicles with their map check, the second platoon had taken off
- 2:19:26about seven to ten minutes after them. So they flew through the canyon Serial
- 2:19:33one. But Erio two, remember is got a Jinga truck dragging a humbe
- 2:19:37and they're in the lead in this cereal And now I don't even think they
- 2:19:43were going one point five miles an hour. I think it's less than that
- 2:19:46because some of the to get through this creek bed, you literally have to
- 2:19:52make right angle turns back and forth. And just imagine a Jinga truck to
- 2:19:58viewers who ever seen one, is the same as a dump truck, same
- 2:20:03size as the dump truck or the garbage truck that picks your garbage up each
- 2:20:07day. That's how big it is. And the weight's about the same.
- 2:20:13It's pulling a Humbye on its back wheels, so there's no maneuverability there,
- 2:20:18and so they're struggling to get through. But they were barely into the canyon
- 2:20:22Serial two when two explosions happened off to their right, which is cardinal direction
- 2:20:31north on the slope. There's you know, no one knows what those were.
- 2:20:37They could have been RPGs, they could have been mortars. If you
- 2:20:41read everyone's account, some guys say one, some say the other. It
- 2:20:46doesn't matter two explosions. One of them dislodged a rock you know, about
- 2:20:52the size of a humbee came flying down and so you can imagine watching this
- 2:20:58rock make its way down the side of this canyon wall, and you know,
- 2:21:05they they use common sense and and zeroed in on it, and it
- 2:21:09ended up going right between two vehicles. And about thirty seconds later RpK fire
- 2:21:16opened up from the ridge line, and you know, there's there's numerous accounts
- 2:21:22guys saw guys moving up there. Five guys in zero two and seven in
- 2:21:28zero one said they saw the guys running around. So Serial two's in the
- 2:21:33canyon. They're lined up behind this jinga truck TONAHMBE and they return fire.
- 2:21:43You know, deploy, suppress, report, that's what you're doing in ambush.
- 2:21:46But remember your first immediate action in an ambush is to drive out of
- 2:21:52the ambush or run out of the ambush if you can. They couldn't do
- 2:21:54that. So you know, all of that accumulated rests from BCP five through
- 2:22:03Magara is already you know, flooding their brains. Now the worst, the
- 2:22:09most traumatic stress inducing event that can happen to the human brain is occurring,
- 2:22:16and that's claustrophobia. They can't go left, they can't go right, they
- 2:22:20can't turn around, and they can't go forward. They can't even see forward,
- 2:22:24and they can barely see the tops of the canyon. Only around certain
- 2:22:28bends can they even see the trees that outline the crest of this canyon.
- 2:22:35So they do what they should do, which is, you know, suppressed
- 2:22:39the target to get them to stop shooting. Most of the guys just thought,
- 2:22:43you know, we're walking dead men, We're trapped. And literally when
- 2:22:48you watch the video, you can see that the enemy could have killed them
- 2:22:54with rocks instead of bullets. They could have just started avalanches and dislodge large
- 2:23:01boulders to do the same thing the bullets would have done. But they,
- 2:23:07you know, rangers being you know, expert machine gunners, they opened up
- 2:23:11with everything they had. Now it's important the terrain is just like every military
- 2:23:18engagement always comes back to terrain. So when I did my research on this,
- 2:23:24I spent over one hundred hours on Google Earth. And I don't want
- 2:23:30to make that sound like it was some really hard thing that I had to
- 2:23:35suck up. I was addicted to it. And if you go on Google
- 2:23:41Earth, and look at this slot canyon. You'll get addicted to it too,
- 2:23:45because it's absolutely amazing. But what you see in the slot canyon is
- 2:23:50it's shaped like a mushroom. So it goes up, over comes back and
- 2:23:56down, so exactly like a mushroom, up, out and over. And
- 2:24:00so they're driving and these are remember non gyro stabilized weapon systems. They're just
- 2:24:07on a stiff anchory, right, So the vehicle is in the toughest off
- 2:24:15road terrain on the planet, which means it's bouncing up and down. The
- 2:24:20driver is, you know, scared shills. He's doing what he should do,
- 2:24:24which is drive, but he's got to navigate left right, like you
- 2:24:28know, literally like a Formula one driver to get around these rocks and foulders
- 2:24:33strapped behind this jinga truck. So the guys in zero two, you know,
- 2:24:39it's it's when you understand what they went through before they came out,
- 2:24:43you begin to understand what happened when they came out, and you also understand
- 2:24:48what was happening to their fires. You know, the brain can't keep track
- 2:24:56of directions unless it has a known point to base it off of. So
- 2:25:01the you know, our neocortex. Our thinking brain has these things called grid
- 2:25:09cells that tell you where you're at based on a known location. So think
- 2:25:13north Star, snowcaped Peak off in the distance. It has to have that.
- 2:25:20But they're in a canyon, so they have no known point. They
- 2:25:24really can't tell anything unless they're looking at the risk compass, which you can't
- 2:25:28do because you're being shot at. So as they go around this mushroom,
- 2:25:33their bullets are, you know, going in directions where you know, they
- 2:25:41can't really predict where they're ending up. Now, let's cut. Let's leave
- 2:25:46those guys in the canyon to go to Serial run At one. Remember they
- 2:25:50were doing a map check when they heard those mortar or RPG rounds. As
- 2:25:54soon as they heard them, they hopped out of their vehicles and they were
- 2:25:58like, what the hell is that. They didn't know, but they could
- 2:26:01see the tracer fire arcing up out of the canyon. They knew it was
- 2:26:05coming from the canyon. Some of the guys just suspected it was Serio two,
- 2:26:11but most of them had no idea Serio two had turned around and was
- 2:26:16coming back in the same direction as them, So nobody knew that The other
- 2:26:22half of the platoon was the one in that firefight. Some guys suspected it,
- 2:26:26but no one knew it. So in the heat of the moment,
- 2:26:31they said, hey, let's go up to a position where we can get
- 2:26:35overwatch, where we can see what's happening and conduct overwatching fire in case it
- 2:26:41is Serial two to support them. So they ran up this path that was
- 2:26:46right next to their vehicles, a smoker run. It was about seven hundred
- 2:26:52feet and they ran until the path petered out, and then they had to
- 2:26:58stop because they were taking fire. They could see the enemy on the same
- 2:27:03northern ridge line that Seial two was shooting at, so they started shooting two.
- 2:27:09But as they did that, they began taking unbelievably heavy fire, which
- 2:27:15you know, the first investigation suspected was Serial two. And in my analysis,
- 2:27:20I believe the majority of those fires that were raining down on them were
- 2:27:26the crossfires from Serial two. Remember fifty KL two, forty G and saw
- 2:27:33along with mortars eighty fours. So all this ordinance is, you know,
- 2:27:39flying up and over these ridge lines, we can't discern which is enemy which
- 2:27:46is friendly, But they were definitely underneath the crossfire from Serial two. So
- 2:27:54these guys were in the canyon for about twelve minutes. You know, I
- 2:27:56told you it was less than one point five miles an hour. They're literally
- 2:28:01moving that slowly. The stress is building up. Zero one now is up
- 2:28:05on this spur, this elevated high ground. Unfortunately, the way the terrain
- 2:28:11is, you cannot see into the canyon from the top of this spur.
- 2:28:16And unfortunately if you do a line of sight analysis, their line of site
- 2:28:22radios also did not work, so they still had no comms. There are
- 2:28:28two purposes for running up there, to make comms with Serial two and to
- 2:28:31provide overwatch fire support were now you know, mixed by the terrain. But
- 2:28:39they didn't have a lot of time there wasn't you know, they were smoked.
- 2:28:46Remember I talked about equipment. They ran up there with flat bests and
- 2:28:48helmets. I believe you know that was the sop that anytime you left the
- 2:28:54vehicle you had to have that on. I would never you know, U
- 2:28:58less and should be. If you're running up into mountains after an insurgent enemy,
- 2:29:05you do not wear a flat best or a helmet unless you want to.
- 2:29:09You know, I think it should be personal choice, but you can't
- 2:29:13run up a mountain at six thousand and six thousand, five hundred feet with
- 2:29:18a flat best and helmet. So they were smoked when they got to the
- 2:29:20top of that ridge. Remember now they'd split the platoon. So Pat Tillman,
- 2:29:28he's a team leader. He's got one guy that's with him from his
- 2:29:31team and Afghan who decided to follow them up to the spur. And that's
- 2:29:37who he's in charge of. This squad is not his squad. He hasn't
- 2:29:41worked with them before. Squad leaders amazingly competent guy, you know, as
- 2:29:48good as they come. And Pat got up there, he assessed situation.
- 2:29:54The squad was already a raid by its two fire teams as per their wrestle.
- 2:30:00You know. That left Pat's team. What am I gonna do?
- 2:30:03Pat said, Hey, I'm gonna go down this this south side. There's
- 2:30:09a couple of big rocks over there. We're gonna get behind those and see
- 2:30:13what we can see in the squad leader. Yeah, sure sounds good.
- 2:30:16Uh he you know, he looked up. It looked like a good position
- 2:30:20and uh, Pat, a young private named O'Neill, and one Afghan ran
- 2:30:28down there and they took position behind a boulder, two boulders. As soon
- 2:30:33as they got there, they started taking fire from the south and Pat directed
- 2:30:37fires south. So this is now the opposite direction, other side of the
- 2:30:43canyon. Then everyone else is firing on the north side, and they're firing
- 2:30:48at it, you know, to no avail. Pat turns around he said,
- 2:30:54hey, I got an idea. When back up to the squad leader
- 2:30:56said hey, you mind if I drop my we drop our gear, we
- 2:31:01run down to the canyon and go up the other side to see if we
- 2:31:05can engage that enemy. Now, he never would have gotten up the other
- 2:31:09side. But as I point out the book, his idea to drop his
- 2:31:16you know, his helmet and his flat best and to go down to the
- 2:31:20canyon road, which is a creek, was actually a good idea, and
- 2:31:26you know, especially in retrospect, because the spot they were in was the
- 2:31:31most dangerous and deadly spot you know that could have been chosen. So the
- 2:31:37squad leader told him, no, you know, we don't. Those guys
- 2:31:41don't know where you're at. Stay put, and he did. So their
- 2:31:45imposition, they're they're down the spur about twenty five meters from this squad.
- 2:31:52The squad had stopped behind the military crest of the spur. Pat went over
- 2:31:58the military crest down to these boulders. No way, you know, for
- 2:32:03him to know what was about to happen, or the squad leader. So
- 2:32:07it's it's only a lesson, a retrospective lesson for infantrymen in the future,
- 2:32:13you know, in uncertainty. Uh, never give up that military crest always,
- 2:32:20you know, stay behind it, stay protected because you got options.
- 2:32:26And the problem with going down off the military crest is you have no options.
- 2:32:31And so they were down Pat Private O'Neill and the Afghan. Now the
- 2:32:37Afghan had just joined him that morning. No one knew him, no one
- 2:32:43knew anything about him. He would not he obviously didn't speak English, but
- 2:32:48you don't need to speak English in a firefight. There were thousands of rounds
- 2:32:54at this point, including mortar rounds arcing over their heads. Uh. You
- 2:32:58know, you could hear the sonic crack, which we all know. When
- 2:33:03you hear the sonic crack, that means the bullets under fifty meters above you.
- 2:33:09That's the noise it makes is it breaks the sound barrier. So these
- 2:33:13rounds are arcing over their heads mortar and two of three rounds are blowing up,
- 2:33:18and this Afghan is ten feet in front of the boulders, standing there
- 2:33:22with his AK forty seven, just unloaded with his magazines. And Pat and
- 2:33:28O'Neill tried to get them to come back to no avail. You know,
- 2:33:33they tried waving, which again is universal. They tried using their weapons,
- 2:33:39you know, to get them back, but he would not come back.
- 2:33:43He stood out ten feet directly in front of those two boulders, standing up,
- 2:33:48firing his AK across the road. Well, now we go back to
- 2:33:52Serio two in the canyon. They've been in there ten minutes, changing out
- 2:33:58barrels. Some guys have fired their basic load. They're coming out now going
- 2:34:05west, so they they've gone in every cardinal direction inside the canyon, so
- 2:34:11they're they're you know, uncertain of which way they're pointing. And remember they
- 2:34:16have no idea where Sereal one is and Serio one has no idea. That's
- 2:34:20even Serial two. So when they come out of the canyon, it suddenly
- 2:34:24opens up and the creek turns around a small spur that is, you know,
- 2:34:33a finger off of this larger spur they'reon, and that's the first time
- 2:34:39they turn and look in the same direction they've been shooting at the same main
- 2:34:43direction, which is north. They look north again and there's this Afghan bearded
- 2:34:50Afghan AK forty seven firing on auto right over their head. And as the
- 2:34:56first investigator says, he might even have been fired at that mistaking them as
- 2:35:01you know Taliban. So the squad leader, you know, comes around that
- 2:35:07corner and he's in that front passenger seat, in my opinion, and in
- 2:35:11a lot you know, a lot of the other squad leaders said the same
- 2:35:16thing. You know. He did what almost anyone would do. Who's been
- 2:35:22shooting at an enemy on the northern high ground for ten to twelve minutes and
- 2:35:26season Afghan on the northern high ground shooting in AK forty seven. He looked
- 2:35:33through his a COG site and dropped that guy. Unfortunately, his crew were
- 2:35:39all guys who hadn't worked with him, so they have no preset verbal and
- 2:35:46handing arm signals. All infantrymen know this. You shoot where your team leader
- 2:35:52or squad leader shoots. Went a dout, shoot where your team leader or
- 2:35:54squad leader shoots. So all of the cruiser weapons in the back turn earn
- 2:36:00to where the squad leader's shooting, which is at the Afghan who is ten
- 2:36:03feet directly in front of Pat Tillman and the range of private, and they
- 2:36:07open up and in that fuselage. Which happened. You know, I don't
- 2:36:13even think it was a full minute that they were shooting in that fuselage.
- 2:36:18Right at the end they Pat was hit and killed. And so in the
- 2:36:26investigative documents, you know, there's all this conjecture about you know, Pat
- 2:36:33and the private. They were yelling, they were waving their hands. Well,
- 2:36:39every guy in Serial two was deaf at this point. So you know,
- 2:36:45in the book, I point out that they had no ear protection on.
- 2:36:48They didn't have Pelkors on, which would have saved them. But the
- 2:36:52human ear can only take sound waves that are over one hundred and twenty seven
- 2:36:58deaths for thirty seconds. Anything beyond thirty seconds at one hundred and twenty seven
- 2:37:05decibels leads to temporary deafness. And that temporary deafness can last depending on the
- 2:37:11length and how far over one on twenty seven decibels you go, can last
- 2:37:16from a minute to an hour, to a day to a week. And
- 2:37:22so remember they're they're shooting everything they had for twelve minutes and with no ear
- 2:37:28protection. So they're all deaf, and in there it's right in all of
- 2:37:35their you know comments to investigators, you know, squad leaders saying well,
- 2:37:41and then I turned to you know Jones, but Jones was death, so
- 2:37:45I had to shake him, and every guy says the same thing. My
- 2:37:48my hearing didn't come back for five hours. You know. Some guy's ears
- 2:37:54were bleeding when they came out, So they're deaf. That's number one.
- 2:37:58So these guys on the spur, when you look down at the creek bed
- 2:38:03they came out of, it's clear as day because the creekbed is you know,
- 2:38:07all one, one monochromatic color. It's all can So the hum by,
- 2:38:13you can see that humb clear as day. When you look from the
- 2:38:18creek bed back at the spur, it's the exact opposite. The spur is
- 2:38:22this modeled rock formation of you know, both sandstone and lava. It's got
- 2:38:31black rock. It's all cracked up, so it's got shadows in between the
- 2:38:35cracks, and it's full of foliage, you know, rare in Afghanistan,
- 2:38:41but it's it's covered with foliage, green foliage. And so when I got
- 2:38:46to this part you know, I was, you know, up till I
- 2:38:50researched that part of it, I was pretty much yeah, you know,
- 2:38:54it sounds like then they made a mistake. They didn't do proper target discrimination.
- 2:38:58But what you learn when you see the video and you see the pictures
- 2:39:03that CID took, these high resolution pictures, you cannot see anybody on that
- 2:39:09spur. They're invisible, totally camouflage, even at one hundred, even at
- 2:39:13seventy five meters, even at thirty five meters. And then you add in
- 2:39:20the human eye. When the human eye is moving rattled up and down,
- 2:39:24left and right, it can't lock on to a specific target. So they're
- 2:39:28bouncing in a creek bed, firing their weapons, looking up at something that's
- 2:39:33completely camouflage, and all they can make out is in its last light.
- 2:39:39So that's the final thing. It's minutes before you had to flip your noods
- 2:39:43down and all they can see is this bearded Afghan fired is Aka, and
- 2:39:48they just did what they had been doing for twelve minutes and fired. And
- 2:39:54it's not you know, it's not saying they did the right thing or anything
- 2:39:58like that. It's not making excuses, it's just reality. And you have
- 2:40:03to apply reality in combat, especially if you're going to be judgmental about it.
- 2:40:09And you know, the chain of commands seized on that. It was
- 2:40:15a fat a company. It was an open and shutcase from the beginning.
- 2:40:18These guys fucked up. They they should have known, they they should have
- 2:40:24target discriminated, They should have seen them. How can you not see and
- 2:40:30hear someone yelling from one hundred meters away without doing any of the you know,
- 2:40:37the research, without applying practical common sense to a firefight. You know,
- 2:40:45they convicted these guys and set off, you know, a series of
- 2:40:50lies because I believe the chain of command saw it is Hey, this is
- 2:40:56the easy out. You know, it's not our decisions. It's not us
- 2:40:58telling to drag it, to split the platoon, to go to Mana for
- 2:41:03no reason. Uh you know, in the middle of the night. It's
- 2:41:07in the middle of the dusk. It's them for not properly. I told
- 2:41:15this to Steven Elliott, who he wrote that book Worse Story. He was
- 2:41:18on this mission. And I mean they fried the lowest ranking guys possible,
- 2:41:26the pl and a couple of privates and e fors right they did, and
- 2:41:33and so The really sad thing Jack about that is you know, I'm not
- 2:41:41a psychologist, but it's my belief from talking to all these guys that the
- 2:41:46majority of the PTSD in Steven's book, I think is a is a great
- 2:41:52uh you know, a piece. If you want to understand what happened,
- 2:41:56to read what he wrote in it. The peat TSD is more about the
- 2:42:01investigations and what happened to those guys because they got back to battalion. Remember
- 2:42:07Pat Tillman, the most famous soldier since you know, Elvis Presley was killed
- 2:42:16and they they fucking killed him. And you know, two guys who are
- 2:42:20unwitting and who don't have the knowledge, they end up doing the chain of
- 2:42:26commands dirty work and you know, basically ostracizing and outcasting this platoon. Uh
- 2:42:33you can read it in the book. Uh. You know my interviews with
- 2:42:35these guys, no one would talk to him, no one would look at
- 2:42:39him. Uh. They immediately began disintegrating. Guys you know who weren't forced
- 2:42:48out of the regiment left because you know, they couldn't They just you know,
- 2:42:54couldn't take the the that ostracization and the guilt that came along with it.
- 2:43:00So you know, on top of everything else, you know, these
- 2:43:05guys became additional casualties. And because you know, to a man, the
- 2:43:11guys I've talked to are you know, incredible human beings. They do what
- 2:43:18incredible human beings do, and they take that responsibility. They know they didn't
- 2:43:24do it, but they can't explain why it wasn't their fault. But even
- 2:43:30though they can't, they still take responsibility because they were there, they fired,
- 2:43:35they should have known, and then they got to live with that.
- 2:43:39And as the months and years go on, the only way you can live
- 2:43:43with that is through a bottle, is through drugs, is through depression.
- 2:43:46And you know that guilt adds up to PTSD. And you know, when
- 2:43:52I would talk to these guys and you know you can talk to Stephen about
- 2:43:58this, you know they'd be going along. I go, wait a minute,
- 2:44:01did you read any of the investigations? No, okay, let me
- 2:44:07tell you what was going on. Let me tell you what happened to set
- 2:44:11that up. And then I go through step by step and tell them,
- 2:44:16and then you know, I always ended up telling them you have nothing to
- 2:44:20be ashamed of. You were put into a situation where you had no way
- 2:44:26to get out of it. You had no way to figure out what was
- 2:44:30happening. You did what you were trained to do, and unfortunately you were
- 2:44:33put into a box that once you were in that box by the time they
- 2:44:39came out of that canyon. You can watch that video that I referenced and
- 2:44:43then ask yourself would I have fired? Because in the video it's a re
- 2:44:46enactment. The Humby comes around that last mini spur, looks up at the
- 2:44:54spur where the Afghan is in front of Pat Tillman, and they have a
- 2:44:58guy standing there, you know, an Afghan role player firing his weapon.
- 2:45:03You'll hear the weapon firing. It's an a k uh firing away. You
- 2:45:07cannot see anything, You have no idea what's up there, and so you
- 2:45:13have to ask yourself would I have shot? And you know, when I
- 2:45:16asked myself, uh, my answer is almost assuredly I would have shot.
- 2:45:22I can't and ylied to the American public. And then they kick these young
- 2:45:28men out of the regiment. Yeah, told them that they were being released
- 2:45:33for standards. Yeah, and ruined. Just again. The casualties jack are
- 2:45:41still occurring. You know, two of the guys still have suicidal thoughts.
- 2:45:48Uh, there's a number of them who can't work. They're in the prime
- 2:45:50of their life, they're in the prime of their earning life. These are
- 2:45:54go back to what we started with. These are are you know, national
- 2:45:58treasure. These aretriots who signed up after nine to one one And that's where
- 2:46:05that contract comes in. And that's why accountability. There should be accountability,
- 2:46:09and we need to make it the standard for the future. Yeah, you
- 2:46:15can be you can be a commander, you can be a general officer.
- 2:46:20But let me tell you, and you'll get all the accouterman that comes along
- 2:46:24with that, But let me tell you something. Something else comes wrong with
- 2:46:28it. Accountability. You better make good decisions, You better be able to
- 2:46:31solve complex problems, or you're going to pay the price as you deserve to.
- 2:46:37And that needs to happen because my suspicion is there's one hundred more examples
- 2:46:43of this or more in Afghanistan, in Iraq. And I've had a number
- 2:46:48of guys contact me. I've had Canadians contact me and say, you know,
- 2:46:54hey, this was the most enlightening thing I was in this firefight,
- 2:46:58this friendly firefight, and that's exactly what caused it to it was a toxic
- 2:47:03chain of command. You know, I've had guys from other units call and
- 2:47:09say the same thing, and you know, it's it's cathartic for them to
- 2:47:15hear this, But you know, the rest of us got to quit sticking
- 2:47:18our heads in the sand and start, you know, accepting that toxicity has
- 2:47:24no place in the military. It needs to be the number one priority for
- 2:47:28eradication. When you see toxicity, it needs to be reported. You have
- 2:47:35a duty to report that, you have a duty to do something about it.
- 2:47:39And we got to weed these people out before they kill more of our
- 2:47:43national treasure. That's that's the first aspect of it. But then in the
- 2:47:46aftermath of it, you have that the cover up is worse than the incident
- 2:47:54itself. Right that had they come out and said we made mistakes and this
- 2:48:00is what really happened this, this would have been a very different thing then
- 2:48:07had they lied about it for so long and tried to cover it up.
- 2:48:11And that's what as you mentioned earlier, you know, after you've been lied
- 2:48:13to once, it sets off the sort of perpetual feeling of like, well,
- 2:48:18what is the truth? Like am I lying to you? Now?
- 2:48:22Like? What what's going on? Here. Yeah, I know sput on
- 2:48:26and uh, you know there's a there's a moment in this it's you know,
- 2:48:33a huge crossroad. It's when Kevin Tillman, who's part of Serial two,
- 2:48:39uh and you know, his best friend and his brother in arms and
- 2:48:45brother in blood, he finds out he's been killed. He's back at Seleno.
- 2:48:50He's flown back with the bodies and the injured platoon leader and RTO and
- 2:48:56he's about to accompany patch by he backed to Bogram before it goes back to
- 2:49:03Germany and then the States. And he's standing on the ramp of the helicopter
- 2:49:09and the battalion commander and the S three come up and talk to him and
- 2:49:16they don't say anything about friendly fire. And this is forty hours after the
- 2:49:24event, and everyone suspected immediately, and within twenty four hours knew pretty much
- 2:49:33beyond the shadow of a doubt. Within thirty six hours in the er,
- 2:49:39you know, the squad leaders who did not shoot him were all taking responsibility
- 2:49:46for what happened. And so you know, in the initial hotwash, they
- 2:49:50knew that somehow they killed Pat Tillman. They could not describe it, but
- 2:49:56they knew it. So these guys know it, the battalion commander, the
- 2:50:01S three, and what do they do. They, in conjunction with the
- 2:50:05regimental commander, who they've already talked to and agreed, hey, don't tell
- 2:50:11Kevin, not yet, we don't know enough. They send him off without
- 2:50:16telling him everything they know. And all they had to do right there was
- 2:50:20go Kevin. You know, first off, there's nothing I could say that's
- 2:50:26gonna suage the sorrow that you have and you know, for the death of
- 2:50:31your brother. But I want you to know everything I know about what happened.
- 2:50:35Right now. The man next to your brother is convinced that he was
- 2:50:41killed by friendly fire. We don't know because this was a massive, chaotic
- 2:50:46firefight. We won't be able to confirm that until we get the ballistic the
- 2:50:50forensics back from the autopsy. But right now we believe that Pat was killed
- 2:50:56in the crossfire between zero one Serial two in the enemy. As soon as
- 2:51:01I get more information, I will call you and tell you what it is.
- 2:51:05And you know, good news bad news doesn't get any better with age.
- 2:51:11The only thing that could happen right there was you know, Kevin would
- 2:51:15have gone Buck And if anyone could understand the chaos. It was Kevin Tillman.
- 2:51:20He was in the rear of Serial two. His primary weapon malfunctioned,
- 2:51:26his secondary weapon had its butt stock torn off by the wall of the canyon,
- 2:51:31so he was firing his nine millimeter in the canyon up at the enemy
- 2:51:37fired eight rounds from a nine to mil. So if anyone could understand the
- 2:51:41chaos of that moment, it would have been him. And instead, you
- 2:51:46know, they didn't tell him. And you know, these are guys who
- 2:51:50loved to quote the Ranger Creed, but I'm pretty sure there's a line in
- 2:51:54the Ranger Creed where a ranger never lies through another ranger. And so to
- 2:51:58me, Robert Rogers standing orders. Yeah, so not telling Kevin right there
- 2:52:05is to me beyond comprehension, Like, you know, that's the moment.
- 2:52:11And if they'd done that, as soon as Kevin got back to Bogram,
- 2:52:15he got on the phone to his mom, Pat's wife Marie, he would
- 2:52:18have told them. You know, they want to know everything he know,
- 2:52:22which he told them at the time. You know what he knew, which
- 2:52:26was the beginning of this fake story, you know about what happened, and
- 2:52:33so even he was given you know, unwittingly giving misinformation. But he would
- 2:52:39have been able right there to tell you know, his mom, Pat's wife
- 2:52:46what really happened. And you know, they deserved that, They had every
- 2:52:50right to that knowledge, just like anyone else did. But they were deprived
- 2:52:56of it. And then somehow the chain of command thought it was a good
- 2:53:00idea to keep it secret for another thirty five days. So you know,
- 2:53:05this, this adds to the problem. You know, the platoon has internalized
- 2:53:11that they shot him, but they have no connect they have no contact and
- 2:53:16communication with Kevin, so they can't tell him. They've been told. The
- 2:53:20one guy that flew back to accompany Kevin and the body he was told do
- 2:53:24not say anything about friendly fire till we get all the facts. And you
- 2:53:31know, it just went on and on, got worse and worse, and
- 2:53:35you know, thirty five days turned into thirty five months, turned into almost
- 2:53:41twenty years because you know, this book just came out, it's nineteen years
- 2:53:46from when had happened. And the truth was always there, it was always
- 2:53:50in the guys, and you know there that's the added casualties. So none
- 2:53:56of these guys, there might be one two guys who had PTSD from this,
- 2:54:01not twenty or twenty plus guys, some who've had nervous breakdowns blaming themselves,
- 2:54:11were not allowed access to the truth, the information, and like good
- 2:54:18soldiers, took responsibility themselves and you know, had to live with that guilt
- 2:54:26and that frustration for almost twenty years. You know, we mentioned what happened
- 2:54:33to the pl and the enlisted that we're on that has there ever been any
- 2:54:39blowback for the senior leadership that were not on the mission that created these conditions?
- 2:54:46Did they just are they still getting promoted or were they still getting promoted
- 2:54:50through the system? Yeah? So the commanding general, so you know,
- 2:54:56the commanding general who was in charge of the investigation, the JASA command or
- 2:55:00read every had access to everything I had access to. So when you read
- 2:55:05those, you can read you can pick one investigation all except the one done
- 2:55:11by Regimental headquarters, So you can pick any of the other three. And
- 2:55:15you can't read that without going what the f man? How who makes these
- 2:55:22decisions? You can't not come to the conclusion that this chain of command was
- 2:55:26was toxic, uh, and that these guys were put into a situation that
- 2:55:33there was no way to come out of other than you know, the luckiest
- 2:55:39of luck in happenstance. I mean, they were set up to fail right
- 2:55:43there, and you know they didn't. They didn't say anything. They had
- 2:55:50the same information, they didn't say anything about it. And to me,
- 2:55:54you know, they went on the the The Jasi commander became a four star
- 2:56:00general, the regimental commander became a one star. Battalion commander became a two
- 2:56:03star. So they were not just promoted once or twice, some four or
- 2:56:07five times. And yeah, there was no accountability on any of them.
- 2:56:15And you know, still to this day what I would always you know,
- 2:56:20if I was to meet one of them face to face, I would say
- 2:56:24to him, Okay, even if you claim somehow ignorance, how could you
- 2:56:30never check up on the rest of the guys in this platoon. Anyone who
- 2:56:35hears this story knows how devastating this was. Anyone who honestly understands Pat Tillman
- 2:56:43in his place in this platoon in that he wasn't just admired, he was
- 2:56:46revered. And he was revered because he was a guy who was doing what
- 2:56:52all the rest of these guys did from all kinds of backgrounds. He had
- 2:56:56options, he had a multi million dollar contract. He gave it all up.
- 2:57:00And did he ever act condescending toward them, did he ever act like
- 2:57:03he was superior. No, he would go out of his way to help
- 2:57:07anyone out there, to give him advice, to give him some water,
- 2:57:11some food. Again. Steven Elliott's book, My favorite part of it is
- 2:57:16when he arrived in the regiment in two seven five. His first day,
- 2:57:22he's wandering through the battalion trying to find someone to tell him where to go,
- 2:57:26and he runs into the Pat Tillman and the stairwell, and you know,
- 2:57:30Pat's I can eat flour at the time, who normally would smoke the
- 2:57:33shit out of you, but Pat's like, hey man, welcome to the
- 2:57:37battalion. What do you need. Hey stand stairwell, come up, I'll
- 2:57:43show you where your room is. I'll get you in there. So no
- 2:57:46it sees you, so you get smoked. I mean, when you read
- 2:57:50this, you know your admiration for the guy just skyrockets. He was the
- 2:57:56kind of leader we need in the military, carrying humble, all those things.
- 2:58:03And you know, yet we we go and we we treated these leaders
- 2:58:09treated this thing. Uh, you know the way they did and allowed this
- 2:58:13to happen, and unfortunately it happened to a guy, uh you know who
- 2:58:18we have questions epitomized everything good about our military. Yeah, do you do
- 2:58:24you see a you know, as I think that you know, we've we've
- 2:58:28read and we've talked about the idea they're more like staff flag officers. They're
- 2:58:33more generals now than there ever have been. And and you know, the
- 2:58:37number of like you know, officers and Jay Socket, you know, at
- 2:58:41the at the staff level is incredible and stuff like that is there. Obviously
- 2:58:48offser you know, offscers are very important. Quality officers are very important.
- 2:58:52Officers make all the difference in those elements. But we also, like you
- 2:58:58know, we'll about the treatment of ofscers versus enlisted a lot of times in
- 2:59:03the sense of nobody's getting a SilverStar unless the officer gets a SilverStar. And
- 2:59:07then you know, wars are often based on rank. And then then we
- 2:59:11see times where these senior level officers can do no wrong right that that their
- 2:59:18careers are not going to be inhibited by any mistakes they made. Do you
- 2:59:22see a solution for sort of bringing the officer core and not all offscers?
- 2:59:30And I don't want to say this because a lot of officers are war fighters.
- 2:59:33But is there a solution to the admin officer, the political officer,
- 2:59:39to that kind of equation. Yeah, I think it's cultural. You know,
- 2:59:46we have to change the cultural where we look at it. To your
- 2:59:50point, in World War Two, I believe there were four four star generals
- 2:59:58in the army and today they're forty four. In World War Two we had
- 3:00:05I don't know the exact number. I believe it was like four million soldiers.
- 3:00:11Today we have four hundred and twenty five thousand, So we definitely have
- 3:00:15too many general officers. You know, in two thousand and two, two
- 3:00:20thousand and three in Afghanistan, you couldn't have The standard was no element can
- 3:00:28operate in Afghanistan nless it has a general officer in charge of it. And
- 3:00:33that's why, you know, my group and Anaconda Shahikte ended up with a
- 3:00:37one star Air Force general commanding us because you had to have a general.
- 3:00:43And I think we need to culturally eradicate that idea and go in the opposite
- 3:00:48direction to power down. You know, your history proves your you know,
- 3:00:58combat happens at the battalion level and below I'm not saying brigade commanders aren't important
- 3:01:05because they should be training battalions, but they're not the ones who should be
- 3:01:09running ops. And it should be company commanders, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants,
- 3:01:15and squad leaders who are making battlefield decisions. So we you know this
- 3:01:20again, one of the things that motivated me to memorialize it was as a
- 3:01:28historic lesson. We need to take this away. Our model is not the
- 3:01:33right model. If we're exporting that to Ukraine right now in these other places,
- 3:01:37then we're sabotaging them because this is not the model. The CFT massive
- 3:01:45talk with you know, a million dollars worth of fifty four inch screens and
- 3:01:52computers running the whole thing. That's not the model. We need to go
- 3:01:56backwards to the guy on the hill, uh, you know, who can
- 3:02:01talk and who feels the cold, who feels the altitude, who feels the
- 3:02:07threat of the enemy making the decisions. And so to me, it's a
- 3:02:13cultural thing, and culture happens from decisions you make. We need to make
- 3:02:18those decisions. We need to you know, make up our minds we're never
- 3:02:24going to allow this to happen again, and and also make it known to
- 3:02:28everyone that the reason that this thing went south Afghanistan was more to do with
- 3:02:35this command and control monstrosity we created than the enemy itself. Thanks Matthy,
- 3:02:43that's it's very insightful. Okay, so questions, cessar an Omen, Thank
- 3:02:50you very much, love the show, Thanks for making this happen. Has
- 3:02:54the gorilla idea or something similar ever been used outside of Bosnia? I don't
- 3:03:01know, I hope so I'm sure other I'm sure plenty of other guys have,
- 3:03:07uh have similar ideas. But you know it's uh to me, it's
- 3:03:13disguises, deception and diversion. Uh, you know, that's what it's about.
- 3:03:18Any form that takes uh you know, contextually should be open Uh.
- 3:03:26It should be open season. And that's what we need to train our future
- 3:03:30leaders to think out of the box, uh, to not be constrained by
- 3:03:35the you know, helicopter, the you know platoon, company, battalion,
- 3:03:41brigade model. Uh, you know, understand the problem and solve it uh
- 3:03:50in the most economical, efficient and sensible way possible, and sometimes that involves
- 3:03:56dressing up like an ape. Thanks again for the very generous donation, Sessa
- 3:04:03Omen. The Daily Mail ran a story that in early two thousands, the
- 3:04:09SAS was chosen over Delta for having more experience, was sent in to rescue
- 3:04:15a CIA agent in Afghasian britt tabloids. So grain of salt. But you
- 3:04:22have any thoughts on this in the year two thousand, that's in the early
- 3:04:28two thousands. Oh well, I mean two thousand and one was you know,
- 3:04:33my frame of reference starts at two thousand and one. We were the
- 3:04:37you know, along with the SF guys in the north, We were first
- 3:04:39in down in the dry lake beds south of Konda Heart. You know,
- 3:04:46I never heard of any mission like that. It was actually very difficult.
- 3:04:52The Brits were there, you know, in our staging base, but they
- 3:04:56were given very restrict guidance. They were only allowed to remember this is before
- 3:05:03anyone's on the ground. They were told they could only engage at target if
- 3:05:09it was had to do with poppy production and heroin trafficking. Wow. So
- 3:05:16the essays was, you know, begging us to find a way to get
- 3:05:22them in into the fight. And I don't know what happened there. You
- 3:05:26know, their commander I didn't deal with them much after that, but their
- 3:05:33commander, when I you know, when I went up to him and said,
- 3:05:35you know, this doesn't make any sense. You know, he was
- 3:05:41defending the anti drug mission pretty vociferously, so of course, yeah, I
- 3:05:46never heard of any other any other mission than that. I also want to
- 3:05:50give a quick shout out to one of our audience members. You may remember
- 3:05:54Paul Cunningham. He was my first pl when I was in Ratis. Oh
- 3:05:58yeah there, so uh good to see again, Paul. I hope you're
- 3:06:03doing well, buddy, Radioactive Lama. Thank you very much. Great content,
- 3:06:09guys, better than watching primetime TV. Well we should hope. So
- 3:06:15good job, guys. We need that primetime TV moolah. Uh, Mike,
- 3:06:20you're gonna get it. Thanks, thanks for this more peak. Mike
- 3:06:24Montgomery, thank you very much. Question, what was the conventional wisdom regarding
- 3:06:28Los Pepees while he was in Columbia hunting Escobar? Like conventional wisdom, I
- 3:06:37mean, the conventional wisdom was what they were doing was, you know,
- 3:06:46what should have been done. That was to my knowledge and and you know
- 3:06:52I was probably as close to it as any American, me and my guys.
- 3:06:56Uh, there were all kinds of c i A takes on who the
- 3:07:01lost Pepees were Dea. So they'll remember those two were kind of in charge
- 3:07:07of the mission down there and battling each other all the time. We were
- 3:07:13down there, you know, walking this fine line between them. We didn't
- 3:07:16care who got credit for anything. The Lost Pepees to me, was an
- 3:07:22uprising. It was Colombians, police officers, they're members of their federal law
- 3:07:31enforcement and their military who off duty, were getting together going, hey,
- 3:07:37you know the government's not going to stop this. The only way is for
- 3:07:41us to stop this, and we've got to take these guys out ourselves.
- 3:07:45And the Lost Pepees did just that, and they, you know, of
- 3:07:50all the things that brought Escobar to his knees, I believe the Lost Pepees
- 3:07:54was probably the most formidable. They took out a number of his lieutenant.
- 3:08:00It's there he did not feel safe, His family was not safe, and
- 3:08:07so he took all kinds of measures to get them safe, and ultimately those
- 3:08:13measures of what ended up getting him captured. So the Los Pepes to me,
- 3:08:18was just an organic uprising of people who had had enough of this guy
- 3:08:22blowing the shit out of airplanes, blowing up you know, cars in the
- 3:08:26middle of huge intersections, assassinating police officers by the hundreds. Uh, and
- 3:08:33they took matters in their own hand and uh and we're very effective. Sephar
- 3:08:43an Omen, thank you again. Were there Delta snipers on Overwatch when they
- 3:08:48took out Escobar? What are your thoughts on Mark Bowden's theory it was a
- 3:08:52unit bullet that killed him. I didn't know that was Mark Bowden's theory,
- 3:08:58but uh, and normally I would not comment, you know, so the
- 3:09:03fact I'm commenting should tell you that it wasn't our snipers. And I've already
- 3:09:09said it. You know, people who who you know, deny did the
- 3:09:16Colombians accomplish that on their own are people who you know, just cannot believe
- 3:09:24that other countries have freedom loving you know, warriors that can be just as
- 3:09:30effective when motivated as as we are. And that's what happened there. There
- 3:09:35was no snipers, you know, there was no unique guys anywhere near there
- 3:09:41at the time, and anyone else who claims there was is just you know,
- 3:09:46engaging in uh in in theory and you know, trying to trying to
- 3:09:54guess what happened and make it a little sexier than it was. J just
- 3:10:01gotscha. Thank you very much would you happen to know the origin of advanced
- 3:10:05force operations? Did that concept come from Meadows when he went into Iran nineteen
- 3:10:11eighty ahead of the Delta Force or the Delta Rescue Force. Yeah, I
- 3:10:18you know, so since you know I was the first AFO commander, I
- 3:10:24would just say it rose up organically. It was just common sense. We
- 3:10:28didn't even care. You could have called us soap dish, and you know
- 3:10:33it would have been this. We would have done the same thing we were
- 3:10:37before. That Advanced force operation was a verb, not a noun, right,
- 3:10:43and so it just meant going ahead of the main the main effort and
- 3:10:50prepped in the battlefield. And for clandestine ops, that means setting up safe
- 3:10:54houses, getting vehicles, doing you know low as rekis so that when the
- 3:11:01guys come in, you can you know, greet them, tell them the
- 3:11:03lay of the land. Uh, they have resources so they can operate.
- 3:11:07We turned it into a noun. We just called ourselves a fou. We
- 3:11:13were a conglomeration of all four services and some other government agency guys. So
- 3:11:22it was you know, necessity is the mother of invention, and uh common
- 3:11:28sense is the father. And and that's what you know, that's how AFO
- 3:11:33was born out of necessity and common sense. You know, you you mentioned
- 3:11:37Columbia, and then we talked about Bosnia. You know, you talk about
- 3:11:43like the c I A and the DEA who both had a lot of undercover
- 3:11:46sort of cover type work. And then in Bosnia, did you guys have
- 3:11:50a good working relationship with like the c I A, the d I A,
- 3:11:54uh, other intel units in common and whatnot where you weren't like creating
- 3:12:01this stuff. You weren't reinventing the wheel, but people were there kind of
- 3:12:05teaching you guys how to do this stuff. We had a great relationship.
- 3:12:11And you know after nine one one with the CIA, and that again was
- 3:12:16born out of Bosnia. We had worked with them extensively in Bosnia and so
- 3:12:22we knew each other and uh, many of the personalities knew each other.
- 3:12:28In my book, I talk about a guy code named Spider. You know,
- 3:12:31he was a very good friend of mine. We had we had operated
- 3:12:37together in Bosnia multiple times, along with other guys in the unit. He
- 3:12:41was a warrior, former marine. Uh, you know, we we trusted
- 3:12:46him, he trusted us. We shared information even you know, even information
- 3:12:52people were telling us not to share and you know, so that relationship worked
- 3:13:00because of you know, of personal relationships, and it stayed that way Afghanistan
- 3:13:07in the early phases, all the way to Iraq. He was in Iraq.
- 3:13:13He came up from the south, I came from the west and the
- 3:13:18north. We ended up meeting in bag Then International Airport right before the other
- 3:13:24event I talked about. So it was a good relationship. And it's always
- 3:13:28emphasized to maintain those relationships and to make sure that they they flourish. But
- 3:13:35they're very personality dependent, and so when you get someone in there who doesn't
- 3:13:41like whether it's an agency guy who doesn't like the army or the you know,
- 3:13:46navy or vice versa, then that relationship falters. Sessah Noman, thank
- 3:13:56you very much. Were there any other note? Were the innovations that came
- 3:14:01from the unit that you could that you can talk about during your time or
- 3:14:05after other than the police spike matts, well, dogs, we brought dogs,
- 3:14:13dogs, operational dogs. So a lot of people don't know this.
- 3:14:18There were operational dogs were the use of operational dogs was ended at the end
- 3:14:24of the Vietnam War, so I think that was seventy five. From seventy
- 3:14:28five to ninety eight, there were no operational dogs in the military. There
- 3:14:33were drug sniffing dogs, right, everyone remembers the you know, drug sniffing
- 3:14:41dogs. There were bombs sniffing dogs the MPs had. There were no operational
- 3:14:46dogs, you know. Back to Dale Comstock. Dale Comstock was a dog
- 3:14:52trainer and when he was in my troop, he he had a number of
- 3:14:56and I forget what kind of shepherds they were, but he had me out
- 3:15:01to his house, showed me these dogs, and he was like a lot
- 3:15:05of guys in the unit. They were saying, hey, we should get
- 3:15:07dogs. Look at all these things they could do. And so they planted
- 3:15:11that seed in my brain. When I became a squadron commander, I had
- 3:15:18in my squadron I had one guy who had been classically trained at Lachland Air
- 3:15:24Force Base. He was certified dog trainer, and I had two guys who
- 3:15:30were just kind of like amateurs. We did a brainstorming session. One of
- 3:15:35the big missions at the time was underground tunnels, and it was pretty obvious
- 3:15:41that, you know, dogs would make an incredible impact on that mission.
- 3:15:46So we flew out to Lachland Air Force Base, met with the colonel who
- 3:15:50was in charge of dog training and again no one gave us approval for this.
- 3:15:56We just did it and we told our concept and he was luckily he
- 3:16:03was a historical believer in dogs. He was like, finally, you know,
- 3:16:07somebody sees the light. He was, We'll support you guys whatever you
- 3:16:11need. Uh, just you know, And we had to get approval from
- 3:16:15him because in the DA PAM you can't have dogs unless Lachlan, the dog
- 3:16:22command at Lachlan says you can have him. So he signed off on it.
- 3:16:26My unit commander Cary Harrell, fantastic guy just recently passed away. He
- 3:16:33saw the you know, the potential in it too. He said, do
- 3:16:37it. You know it sounds kind of crazy, but go ahead and do
- 3:16:41it. So a week later we flew two guys off to Belgium, but
- 3:16:48to the finest Belgian melonise that money could buy. Began the training process and
- 3:16:56it was a process of discovery. You know, who's going to handle these
- 3:17:01dogs. If you bring in a dog handler, he's going to take a
- 3:17:05seat on a little bird, take a seat in a vehicle. You know
- 3:17:11what about small missions? And we quickly concluded that we needed to make operators
- 3:17:16dog handlers. And this was a controversial decision. There were a number of
- 3:17:22people even in the unit who thought it was heresy, but we did it
- 3:17:26anyway, went off the dog handling school, got some proof of concepts done
- 3:17:35right away. You could see the potential of these animals, and we got
- 3:17:41money to build kennels. And like I said, that was ninety eight.
- 3:17:45It took a while. The program was not solid. We went to Afghanistan,
- 3:17:52we took the dogs with us, but there were no specific uses immediately.
- 3:17:58Then Iraq happened two thousand and three, we took the dogs with us.
- 3:18:03We infilled with dogs. We had special vehicles that had air conditioners built
- 3:18:09into them because dogs are very heat sensitive. They were worth their weight in
- 3:18:15gold. As think about setting up a patrol base, a hide site in
- 3:18:20the desert. If you've got dogs that can detect by smell and hearing anyone,
- 3:18:28you know, five hundred meters away, that's an amazing force multiplier.
- 3:18:33And they were. But they made their mark back at our safe house,
- 3:18:39you know, once we got established in our safe house, once the country
- 3:18:43fell, we had a weird like I don't know if it was a suicidal
- 3:18:50attack. Two guys came in Ak's got into the perimeter. We had a
- 3:18:54big compound and we released the dog. Those were the first, uh you
- 3:19:03know, that was the first operational use of the dogs. I was there.
- 3:19:07I remember running up. All I could hear was gurgling and there was
- 3:19:13a guy laying there. Uh and AK forty seven five feet away and his
- 3:19:18face was in the Belgian Malinoi's mouth. It was Arco and he that was
- 3:19:26the gurgling. And from that point on it was dogs were on every raid.
- 3:19:33The first two dog casualties happened on the Oude and Cuse raid. Oude
- 3:19:39and Cuse were that are Saddam's sons. They were barricaded on the second floor
- 3:19:43of the house they were hiding in. The team went in, cleared the
- 3:19:50first floor, came to the stairwell, went up two steps, fuselage about
- 3:19:56automatic AK fire just pounded the top with the steps. Uh. They released
- 3:20:01the two dogs. Two dogs went up there. They could hear them.
- 3:20:07Uh you know, they could hear the dogs make contact with Udi and Kuse.
- 3:20:11The team followed after, uh you know, finished them off and uh.
- 3:20:18One of those dogs was the first casualty. He was hit by an
- 3:20:20a K round when he got to the top of the stairs. But again,
- 3:20:26you know another example, it's c QB. If you can have a
- 3:20:28dog, you know, uh move through these uh uh you know, fire
- 3:20:35funnels and and to tell you whether there's an enemy. They're they're worth their
- 3:20:39weight in gold. And uh they were and today everyone has them. You
- 3:20:45know, we probably got more dogs than we can handle in the military,
- 3:20:50but they've got their place and we should keep them there because they're they're an
- 3:20:54invaluable asset. Yeah, there's malano. They're no joke, like they are
- 3:21:00so courageous and yes, you're fearless. Yeah, yeah, very loyal.
- 3:21:07Uh. You know, they a lot of breakthroughs in training. Like I
- 3:21:11was skeptical that. You know, when you walk around one of those things,
- 3:21:15it's like walking around a mine field or a hand grenade with its pin
- 3:21:20pulled out and the spoon still and uh. You know, no matter how
- 3:21:24comfortable you are dogs, it's it. It'll shake you. But you know,
- 3:21:31these guys train these dogs, they acclimated them to the squadron and you
- 3:21:35could walk through the squadron, walk you know, through our bar area.
- 3:21:39Uh, and they were you know, they were they knew they were one
- 3:21:43of the team and that that did a lot for building trust of everybody.
- 3:21:48But it was a training breakthrough because up to that time, you know,
- 3:21:52dogs were you know, just just the handler and no one else could be
- 3:21:56around them. Yeah, yeah, yeah, I think that we have another
- 3:22:01mutual from two seven to five Kelly, who was very involved in the dog
- 3:22:05program, right. Uh yeah, yeah, yep. Uh. Nation would
- 3:22:13thank you very much for the donation. Clayton Jensen, good to see you,
- 3:22:16buddy. If you haven't watched Clayton's show, you should watch it.
- 3:22:20Uh he he caveats this question. He says, no specifics needed, just
- 3:22:24your overall opinion, and then he says, uh, you touched on sigan
- 3:22:28stuff used in Colombia, et cetera. What do you think about the evolution
- 3:22:33of the io guys, Ranger Ost and Jays Sauds over time? Uh?
- 3:22:43Yeah, well, the evolution is just natural. You know, they've they've
- 3:22:48they learned as they go along. They've become you know, more uh,
- 3:22:54you know, more mission focused and uh you know that's the key with all
- 3:22:58that all that electronic intelligence, you got to get it down in the hands
- 3:23:05of the operators. You got to test it out, you got to give
- 3:23:07it proof of concept, and if that all works, you know you can
- 3:23:11you can share it with larger groups. Jin Kelly, thank you very much.
- 3:23:18And this is the last question. Shuts up real quick. Yeah,
- 3:23:22I'm listening. Any plans to bring back the operational donkey like Merrill's Marauders.
- 3:23:31Well they did bring them. They bring them back in Afghanistan, the mules.
- 3:23:35I mean, SF was experimenting with them even before nine one one.
- 3:23:41Uh. We one of the teams in Shahiko, UH thought, you know,
- 3:23:48hey, the way to get our equipment up into the mountains is with
- 3:23:50the donkey. And I have a video of it. It's, uh,
- 3:23:54it's the team and me and two others chasing this donkey, uh, trying
- 3:24:00to you know, trying to corral it to see if we could use it.
- 3:24:05And it turns into just you know, a Keystone cop moment of hilarity.
- 3:24:09We're laughing so hard we can't even chase it anymore. And uh,
- 3:24:13and that's when we gave up on the donkey idea. But I think it's
- 3:24:16still has potential. All ideas like that, you know, I know they're
- 3:24:22they're trying to create robots now to carry equipment into uh, into difficult terrain.
- 3:24:28But you know, I think that's a long way off. And if
- 3:24:31the situation's right and you've got a well trained donkey and a guy who's handled
- 3:24:37donkeys before, I don't see why you wouldn't use it. Uh. And
- 3:24:43that's it. Ud, did we have anything on Patreon? So next uh,
- 3:24:50actually, the next the next episode is not going to be Friday.
- 3:24:52It's going to be Saturday, and we're gonna have John Dovey on the show,
- 3:24:56served in the s a d F and then say and really excited to
- 3:25:01talk to him. It's going to be a very unique interview. Pete,
- 3:25:05thank you for coming on the show spending your Friday evening with us. And
- 3:25:09again, his latest book is Common Sense Leadership Matters Toxic Leadership Destroys, a
- 3:25:15Case Study Book three. I hope you guys will go and check it out.
- 3:25:18And also the mission The Men and Me and then Common Sense Way,
- 3:25:24The Common Sense Way, right, yeah, yeah, so and it's a
- 3:25:30trilogy right in the sense that all focuses around the idea of leadership, both
- 3:25:37positive leadership and toxic leadership. Yeah. Just common yep, Common Sense leadership
- 3:25:43applied using military stories, real world military stories and uh, you know the
- 3:25:50last one brings up the toxic leadership destroyers point in it perfect And yeah,
- 3:25:58Pete, I'd love to have you back some time talk about the rest of
- 3:26:01your career and anything else. We'll have to do it again sometime. But
- 3:26:05I mean, thank you for coming on and doing this. Yeah, it
- 3:26:07was great tonight. Yeah, I enjoyed it too. Guys, you got
- 3:26:11a great show, and keep up the good work. Appreciate it. Yeah,
- 3:26:15thank you. And before we roll out anything else you want to plug
- 3:26:18websites, anything else, people should go check out. Where can they find
- 3:26:22it? You know? Yeah, I mean on that book, there's a
- 3:26:24lot of good stuff. Pictures of the spur. You can see, you
- 3:26:28know, the view that I described as the squad leader in the lead gungee
- 3:26:33looking up at the spur. Their color pictures. It's on Pete labor dot
- 3:26:39com and you can watch the video on firefight dot Pete labor dot com.
- 3:26:43I would recommend anybody who is interested in not just that event, but you
- 3:26:50know, driving off road or terrain to go watch that video. It's it's
- 3:26:56pretty amazing. And I also have the maps on there. That lay out
- 3:27:00up the sequence of events leading up to the firefight. So check it out
- 3:27:05and uh enjoy the terrain while you're checking it out, all right, thank
- 3:27:11you, and uh we will see all of you next Saturday. Thank you,
- 3:27:16and people will talk to you next time. Sounds good, Jack,
- 3:27:20Thanks, Thanks Dave, Thanks having a good night. You too,