Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) Q2 2025 Deep Value Analysis
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to the Deep Dive where we cut through the noise and
- 0:03give you the essential insights you need to be truly well
- 0:05informed. Today we're doing a really
- 0:07comprehensive deep dive into, well, one of modern finance's
- 0:11most singular and fascinating companies, Berkshire Hathaway
- 0:15Inc. Yeah.
- 0:16Our mission today is to really distill the most important bits
- 0:19from, you know, all the detailed financial reports and the
- 0:22strategic analysis out there. We want to help you understand
- 0:25Berkshire's unique model, where its earnings actually come from,
- 0:28the quality of its management which is pretty legendary, It's
- 0:31incredibly strong balance sheet and ultimately what it might
- 0:34genuinely be worth. Now, it's really important to
- 0:37remember this deep dive is based purely on publicly available
- 0:40sources. It's all for educational and
- 0:42informational purposes. Exactly.
- 0:44This is an investment advice. Not under any circumstances.
- 0:47We're here to inform, help you understand, right?
- 0:50But I mean, the track record is just incredible, isn't it?
- 0:52Berkshire Hathaway has significantly outperformed the
- 0:55S&P 500 for decades. Oh absolutely.
- 0:57The compound annual growth in market value between 1965 and
- 1:012023 was nearly 20%. Compare that to the S and PS
- 1:0510.2 over the same time. It's quite remarkable.
- 1:09It really is. OK, let's unpack this.
- 1:11OA, lot of people know the name Berkshire Hathaway, but how
- 1:15would you actually define what it is?
- 1:17It's more than just a standard company, right?
- 1:19That's that's a really crucial distinction.
- 1:22Yeah. Berkshire genuinely defies
- 1:25simple labels. It's not your typical
- 1:27conglomerate trying to, you know, force synergy between
- 1:30businesses. Think of it more like a highly
- 1:32decentralized investment vehicle, a holding company,
- 1:35essentially. The core strategy sounds simple,
- 1:37but it's incredibly effective. They acquire and then just hold
- 1:40businesses that have strong fundamentals, durable
- 1:43competitive advantages, what Buffett famously calls an
- 1:45economic Moat. Right, the Moat.
- 1:47Exactly. And critically management teams
- 1:50with high integrity, that's non negotiable for them.
- 1:53And the decentralization it's it's extreme.
- 1:55It's quite famous actually. The corporate office in Omaha
- 1:58famously lean minimal staff, day-to-day operations, strategic
- 2:02planning that's all handled by the managers of the subsidiaries
- 2:05themselves. Their main jobs really are
- 2:07simple, send in monthly financial statements and remit
- 2:11any excess cash back to Omaha. And the cash then gets
- 2:14reallocated by Buffett and the team.
- 2:16Precisely, it goes back to Omaha for reallocation across the
- 2:19whole Berkshire ecosystem, wherever they see the best
- 2:22opportunities. That structure, that
- 2:23decentralization, it sounds like it leads to just immense
- 2:28diversification of income. How does that actually look when
- 2:31you break it down? It's a perfect illustration of
- 2:33the strategy and yeah, a core reason for their resilience.
- 2:37If you look at the fiscal year 2024 revenue data, the
- 2:40diversification is striking. The insurance group, which many
- 2:43people associate strongly with Berkshire, is the largest
- 2:46segment, sure, about 28.3% of revenue, around $105 billion.
- 2:51OK, still a big chunk. A very big chunk, but it's far
- 2:53from the only piece. Manufacturing businesses bring
- 2:56in nearly 21%. That's $77 billion.
- 3:00Then you've got McLean Company, the wholesale distributor, at
- 3:0214%, or $52 billion. Pilot travel centers add another
- 3:0612.6%, almost $47 billion. Wow.
- 3:09It really spreads out. It does.
- 3:11And then there's service and retailing at nearly 11%,
- 3:14Berkshire Hathaway Energy at 7% and the BNSF railroad at over
- 3:186%. So that broad spread means if
- 3:20one area, say, hits a rough patch, others can often
- 3:23compensate. Exactly, it makes makes the
- 3:25whole entity incredibly resilient. 1 Sector faces
- 3:28headwinds, others often pick up the slack.
- 3:30That resilience is key. OK, so we've got the foundation
- 3:33of Berkshire unique model diversified.
- 3:36How did it actually perform recently?
- 3:38Let's dig into their Q12025 earnings because, well, those
- 3:42headline numbers can be tricky. Yeah, here's where it gets
- 3:44really interesting. And you're absolutely right, the
- 3:46headline numbers can be incredibly misleading.
- 3:49It's a point Warren Buffett himself makes constantly.
- 3:51Because of the accounting rules, right?
- 3:52Gap exactly. Under GAP Generally Accepted
- 3:55Accounting Principles, companies have to include unrealized gains
- 3:58and losses from their stock portfolio in their net income.
- 4:01So for Q12025, Berkshire reported the sharp decline in
- 4:05GAP net earnings. It went down to 4.6 Ojo billion
- 4:09dollars from 12.70 dollars the year before.
- 4:12A huge drop. Looks huge, but it was almost
- 4:15entirely due to a $5.0 billion investment loss, which included
- 4:20about $7.4 billion in unrealized losses from their massive stock
- 4:24holdings. Paper losses essentially based
- 4:27on market fluctuations. And Buffett says ignore that.
- 4:29He consistently tells investors to disregard those volatile
- 4:33figures because they don't reflect the actual health of the
- 4:36operating businesses. The far truer measure is
- 4:38operating earnings that strips out these big investment swings.
- 4:42OK, So what do those look like? For Q12025, operating earnings
- 4:45were $9.64 billion. Now that was a modest decline
- 4:50from $11.22 billion in Q12024, which is understandable given
- 4:54economic conditions, but it still shows that you know the
- 4:57consistent cash generating power of Berkshires diverse
- 5:00businesses, much clearer picture.
- 5:02That distinction is absolutely vital.
- 5:03JAB versus operating. Got it.
- 5:05So beyond that overall operating picture, what did you see when
- 5:08you look deeper into the individual segments?
- 5:11Yeah, it was definitely a mixed bag, as you'd expect with such
- 5:13diversity. Take the insurance group kind of
- 5:15a dual story there, underwriting income, the profit from actually
- 5:19writing policies that fell quite a bit, $1.34 billion, down from
- 5:23$2.60 billion. What was that?
- 5:26Partly a more challenging environment, but also some
- 5:28specific events. They had estimated $850 million
- 5:32in after tax losses just from the wildfires in Los Angeles, CA
- 5:36Catastrophe losses hit them, but on the flip side, insurance
- 5:40investment income actually rose, went up to $2.89 billion from
- 5:442.6 Syrian dollars. How come?
- 5:46That was a direct result of higher interest rates.
- 5:48All that cash Berkshire holds from premiums?
- 5:50The float? It was earning more interest
- 5:52while just sitting there waiting to pay claims.
- 5:54Interesting. What about the other big pieces?
- 5:56Railroad Energy. Well, BNSF Railway showed really
- 5:59impressive stability. Earnings actually ticked up
- 6:01slightly to $1.21 billion, very steady.
- 6:04Berkshire Hathaway Energy BHE, that was a real standout.
- 6:07Earnings surged to $1.1 million, way up from $717 million the
- 6:11year before. Shows the strength of this
- 6:13regulated utility model. And rest, manufacturing,
- 6:16service, retail. That huge varied segment
- 6:19reported largely flat earnings, about $3.06 billion.
- 6:24It kind of reflects the mixed economic currents impacting all
- 6:27those different businesses within it, from industrial stuff
- 6:29to consumer brands. Makes sense.
- 6:32And all this brings us to another one of Berkshire's huge
- 6:34strengths, that fortress balance sheet.
- 6:38Yeah. How's it looking these days?
- 6:40Still rock solid. Oh absolutely.
- 6:41Fortress is the right word. It's a cornerstone of their
- 6:44whole long term strategy. Their insurance float, that
- 6:47premium money they collect upfront and invest.
- 6:49It kept growing, reached $173 billion by the end of March
- 6:532025. That's just a massive amount of
- 6:56low cost capital for them to work.
- 6:57With it really is. And then there's the cash hoard,
- 6:59the massive cash and short term U.S.
- 7:01Treasury bill holdings. These are now a significant
- 7:04earnings contributor themselves. That other segment in their
- 7:07reporting, which includes income from these holdings, it's
- 7:09interest and dividend income just surged $869,000,000 in
- 7:14Q12025-UP dramatically from only $303 million the year before.
- 7:19Wow, just from interest on cash? Exactly.
- 7:21And by the end of Q2 2025, that cash pile had grown even larger,
- 7:27an astounding $344 billion. $344 billion.
- 7:31Yeah, it creates the sort of barbell effect.
- 7:34On one end you have these ultra safe assets, treasuries
- 7:38generating high pretty much risk free returns right now because
- 7:41of interest rates. On the other end, you have their
- 7:43super durable operating assets like the railroad, the energy
- 7:47utilities providing this stable earnings foundation.
- 7:50So they get yield from safety and stability from operations.
- 7:52Precisely, it lets them easily absorb short term bumps like
- 7:55from their stock market investments and gives them just
- 7:58immense flexibility options. And for you, the listener,
- 8:01understanding these things, the difference between gap in
- 8:03operating earnings, the power of that float, the sheer strength
- 8:07of the balance sheet. That's absolutely vital for
- 8:09getting a real read on Berkshire's actual performance.
- 8:12It's easy to get swayed by headlines, but this deeper look
- 8:15tells the real story. OK but even a fortress like
- 8:17Berkshire faces challenges right?
- 8:20It can't all be smooth sailing. What are the big risks on the
- 8:22horizon? No, you're right, there are
- 8:24definitely significant risks. The most profound 1, and it's
- 8:28widely discussed, is the long term risk around leadership
- 8:32transition. Meaning Warren Buffett's
- 8:34eventual departure. Exactly.
- 8:35He's 94. Gregory E Abel is the designated
- 8:38successor, We know that. But Buffett's eventual departure
- 8:41still introduces uncertainty about the unique culture, about
- 8:45that famed capital allocation skill.
- 8:48I mean, the 2024 annual report itself said the unavailability
- 8:52of key personnel, especially Mr. Buffett, could have a material
- 8:55adverse effect. They acknowledge it directly.
- 8:57It's candid, Wells. Well, there's the size problem.
- 9:00It's a recurring theme. Berkshire is just so immense now
- 9:04it's increasingly hard to find acquisitions big enough to
- 9:07actually move the needle on overall performance.
- 9:09Which? Explains that giant cash pile we
- 9:11just talked about. It's a primary reason, yes.
- 9:14Finding great businesses at reasonable prices that are large
- 9:17enough for Berkshire, that's a real challenge.
- 9:19Then you have short term risks, economic sensitivity.
- 9:22We saw earnings dip at places like Fruit of Alum Jazz Wares
- 9:26partly due to international trade policies impacting them.
- 9:30And of course, the insurance side is always exposed to
- 9:33potential mega catastrophes, like those LA wildfires hitting
- 9:37Q1 earnings. Right.
- 9:38Any regulatory stuff? Yeah, there's growing regulatory
- 9:41scrutiny, especially around climate related policies
- 9:44impacting BNSF and BHE, the railroad and energy segments.
- 9:48Together they account for over 90% of Berkshire's direct
- 9:51emissions. So that's definitely on the
- 9:52radar. OK, that's a good overview of
- 9:54the risks, but here's something I find fascinating.
- 9:57How does Berkshire Hathaway itself stack up against Warren
- 10:00Buffett's own very strict investment checklist?
- 10:03So what does this all mean when you hold Berkshire up to the
- 10:05Buffett Standard? That's a great question, and it
- 10:08leads to a really nuanced, almost paradoxical answer.
- 10:11While Berkshire absolutely embodies the spirit of a great
- 10:14Buffett style company, its sheer size and those gap accounting
- 10:18corks mean it's sometimes well fails its own founders
- 10:21quantitative tests. Really.
- 10:23How so? OK, let's run through some of
- 10:25the key quantitative criteria Buffett often talks about.
- 10:28First, valuation discipline. He likes a low PE ratio
- 10:32typically below 15 and price to book below 1.5, maybe even 1.2.
- 10:38On PE, Berkshire is a fail. Its gap PE is wildly volatile
- 10:42because of those investment gains and losses.
- 10:44It was even not applicable in 2022 because they had a net loss
- 10:48under GAAP. OK, so PE is out.
- 10:50What about price to book? That's borderline fail.
- 10:52It's consistently traded above 1.2 times book often above 1.5.
- 10:56It hit 1.51 in 2024, so by that metric it doesn't consistently
- 11:00look sale. Interesting.
- 11:01What about cash generation? Cash generation and allocation
- 11:04here, it's a clear pass. Positive free cash flow every
- 11:07year, yes, FCF as a percentage of revenue typically above 5%.
- 11:10Yes, Berkshire is a cash generating machine.
- 11:13Good. Growth and predictability, EPS.
- 11:15Growth and predictability. Looking at the EPS record, it's
- 11:18a fail again. That's because the Jap EPS jumps
- 11:21all over the place, impossible to show consistent growth there.
- 11:24Well. What about book Value Growth
- 11:25talks about that too? Right.
- 11:26And on the 10 year compound annual growth rate in book value
- 11:30per share, that's a pass. It grew at 11.1% from 2015 to
- 11:342024, meeting his benchmark of over 10%.
- 11:37OK. So mixed on growth, how about
- 11:39safety balance sheet? Balance sheet safety, This is
- 11:42another strong point. Debt to equity ratio less than
- 11:44.5. A definite pass.
- 11:46It was incredibly low at .1, 9, and 2024.
- 11:49Interest coverage needing to be greater than three times.
- 11:52Another resounding pass. It was extremely high over 22
- 11:55times in 2024. They can easily cover their
- 11:57debt. Rock solid there.
- 11:58Lastly, profitability and efficiency metrics, margins,
- 12:01ROEROIC. Right, profitability and
- 12:04efficiency, gross margin greater than 40%, that's a pass
- 12:07consistently very high, around 79% recently.
- 12:09When net profit margin. Fail too volatile because of
- 12:12gap. It was even negative in 2022.
- 12:15Doesn't meet the 20% plus consistency test.
- 12:18Return on equity Roe averaging 15% or more, also a fail.
- 12:22It averaged only about 10.4%. And return on invested capital
- 12:26ROI C or ROTC averaging 12% or more, That's a fail too,
- 12:29averaging around 7.2%. Wow.
- 12:32So the irony is palpable, isn't it?
- 12:34A company built on these strict value principles doesn't always
- 12:37check all the quantitative boxes using its founders own criteria.
- 12:40Exactly. It really underscores
- 12:42Berkshire's unique nature, its scale.
- 12:44Some standard rules of thumb just don't neatly apply anymore.
- 12:47The qualitative factors become even more important.
- 12:49Well, let's shift gears then and look directly at those
- 12:51qualitative strengths, things like the management, the
- 12:54governance structure that seems core to the Berkshire identity.
- 12:57Absolutely. This is where Berkshire truly
- 12:59shines and it's why so many people admire the company.
- 13:01Frankly, the management team is defined by incredible longevity
- 13:06and a really deep understanding of their businesses.
- 13:09You've got Warren Buffett still chairman and CEO at 94, Gregory
- 13:13Abel handling non insurance operations, Ajit Jain heading
- 13:16insurance, Mark Hamburg as CFO. Decades of experience at the
- 13:21top. And the culture they foster.
- 13:22It's remarkable for its transparency and honesty.
- 13:25Buffett's annual letters are legendary for their candor.
- 13:28I mean he famously used the words mistake or error 16 times
- 13:33just between 2019 and 2023 in those letters.
- 13:35Which is not typical corporate speak.
- 13:37Not at all. He contrasted himself with the
- 13:39usual happy talk. And they don't do the typical
- 13:42quarterly analyst calls either. Instead you get those multi hour
- 13:45Q&A sessions at the annual meeting.
- 13:47It treats shareholders like long term partners, not just numbers
- 13:50on a spreadsheet. And the alignment between
- 13:51management and shareholders, that seems crucial too.
- 13:54Exceptionally strong. Warren Buffett himself owns
- 13:5714.3% of the company, giving him over 30% of the voting power.
- 14:02The board members are required to have significant skin in the
- 14:05game through stock ownership and Buffett's salary.
- 14:08It's been a nominal $100,000 a year for decades.
- 14:12His incentive is purely tied to growing the long term value of
- 14:15the business for all shareholders.
- 14:17That strong alignment really stands out.
- 14:19So who actually owns the rest of Berkshire and how much influence
- 14:22do they have? Well beyond Buffett as the
- 14:23controlling shareholder, the big owners of the more liquid Class
- 14:26B shares are the usual large institutional players.
- 14:30Vanguard has about 11%, BlackRock around 8.3%, State St.
- 14:34over 5%. Mostly index funds tracking the
- 14:36market. Largely reflects Berkshire's
- 14:38huge weight in the major indices, yes.
- 14:40But what's interesting is despite this big institutional
- 14:42ownership, shareholder proposals that kind of clash with
- 14:46Berkshire's unique decentralized model, they consistently get
- 14:49defeated. Like what kinds of proposals?
- 14:50Things like demanding centralized reports on emissions
- 14:53or diversity metrics across the whole conglomerate.
- 14:57The board consistently recommends voting against them.
- 15:00Their argument, which aligns perfectly with the core
- 15:02strategy, is that those issues are best handled by the
- 15:05individual managers of the subsidiary businesses, not
- 15:08dictated from Omaha. And shareholders, including
- 15:11Buffett's controlling stake, seem to agree.
- 15:14That makes perfect sense within their philosophy.
- 15:16Now, Speaking of management's actions signalling things, one
- 15:20of those powerful signals they send is through share buybacks.
- 15:23Oh, it's an absolutely crucial signal for anyone watching
- 15:25Berkshire. Critically important.
- 15:27Remember, they amended the buyback program back in July
- 15:312018. Right, they removed that old
- 15:33rule limiting buybacks to 120% of book value.
- 15:36Exactly. And since then, up until March
- 15:392025, Berkshire spent nearly $78 billion buying back its own
- 15:43stock, a massive amount which significantly boosts the per
- 15:47share intrinsic value for the shareholders who remain.
- 15:50But something changed recently. A really dramatic shift, yes.
- 15:53In late 2024 and carrying into 2025, the share repurchase
- 15:58activity slowed dramatically. In fact, it basically halted
- 16:01completely for a period. And this happened just as the
- 16:04stock price was going up. Precisely.
- 16:06The timing isn't coincidental. This change, this halt and
- 16:10buybacks, it's one of the most direct and credible signals you
- 16:13can get from Warren Buffett himself.
- 16:15The authorization for buybacks is explicitly stated.
- 16:18Only repurchase shares when the stock trades below management's
- 16:22estimate of intrinsic value. So stopping the buybacks
- 16:25implies. It strongly implies that
- 16:27management no longer believe the stock offered a compelling
- 16:30discount to its intrinsic value at those higher prices.
- 16:33It's like a real time data point suggesting the shares might be
- 16:36fully valued or close to it in the current market.
- 16:39That's fascinating. It's like Buffet tell in the
- 16:41market. It's not cheap anymore.
- 16:43Through his actions, not just words.
- 16:44Exactly. It corroborates the whole idea
- 16:47that maybe Berkshire isn't the screaming bargain it might have
- 16:50been at other times. And it's interesting you
- 16:52mentioned other big name value investors earlier like Bill
- 16:55Ackman or Seth Klarman. They don't seem to hold
- 16:57Berkshire. And that absence might well be
- 17:00linked to this. The size problem makes it hard
- 17:03for Berkshire to grow rapidly, and if there isn't a significant
- 17:06discount to intrinsic value, it might not meet the criteria for
- 17:10funds like Pershing Square or Bopost Group, which often look
- 17:14for those specific types of opportunities.
- 17:16So these actions, these insights from leadership, they really can
- 17:19tell you so much more than just the numbers on a spreadsheet
- 17:22sometimes. Absolutely, especially with a
- 17:24company like Berkshire where management's integrity and
- 17:27signaling are so highly regarded.
- 17:29OK. So after covering all this
- 17:31ground, the model, the financials, the risks, the
- 17:34management, the signals, we arrive at the critical question
- 17:36for any investor, what about the actual intrinsic value?
- 17:41So what does this all mean for its true worth?
- 17:43Right, the bottom line? To get a handle on that, a
- 17:45discounted cash flow or DCF valuation analysis was done.
- 17:50Crucially, it focused on owner's earnings, which is the metric
- 17:54Buffett himself favors. Can you briefly explain owner's
- 17:57earnings again? How's it different from net
- 17:59income? Sure.
- 18:00Think of it as net income plus depreciation and amortization,
- 18:04which are non cash charges but minus the capital expenditures
- 18:09that are needed just to maintain the company's current level of
- 18:13operations, maintenance CapEx basically.
- 18:15So it's the cash leftover after keeping the business running as
- 18:18is? Exactly.
- 18:19It gives you a truer picture of the cash flow that's really free
- 18:22for the owners to potentially take out or reinvest for growth
- 18:26after accounting for the cost of just staying in place.
- 18:28It aims to strip out accounting noise and focus on real cash
- 18:32generation. OK.
- 18:33So applying that DCF model using owner's earnings, what did it
- 18:37suggest for Berkshire's value? Based on the analysis, the
- 18:40nominal or base case scenario pointed towards an intrinsic
- 18:43value of approximately $510.45 per Class B share. $510.45 per
- 18:49share And how does that compare to where the stock has been
- 18:51trading? Well, Berkshire stock price has
- 18:53certainly been elevated, often trading significantly above the
- 18:55levels suggested by applying a margin of safety.
- 18:58The margin of safety, how does that factor in?
- 19:00It's a core principle of value investing.
- 19:03You want to buy significantly below your estimate of intrinsic
- 19:06value to protect yourself if your estimate is wrong or things
- 19:09don't pan out as expected. If we apply a typical 25% margin
- 19:13of safety to that $510.45 estimate, OK, that would imply a
- 19:18potential buy price target of around $382.84 per share.
- 19:23$382.84 So a fair bit lower than the calculated intrinsic value
- 19:29providing that buffer. Exactly.
- 19:31That's the discipline. So, pulling it all together,
- 19:33what's the final investment thesis coming out of this deep
- 19:35dive in the source analysis? It's really one of, I'd say,
- 19:39cautious admiration. Berkshire Hathaway is undeniably
- 19:41a corporate fortress. Unparalleled financial strength,
- 19:44fantastic management integrity, a collection of really high
- 19:47quality cash generating businesses.
- 19:49You can't deny that. But at recent market prices, it
- 19:52doesn't necessarily fit the mold of a textbook deep value
- 19:55investment, primarily because of its immense size, which limits
- 19:59explosive growth potential and the volatility that gap
- 20:02accounting rules introduce, making traditional valuation
- 20:05metrics look messy. And as we discussed, Warren
- 20:08Buffett's own actions, slowing the buybacks, letting that cash
- 20:11pile grow seem to directly corroborate this assessment that
- 20:15it's not significantly undervalued right now.
- 20:18So what's the take away for someone thinking about
- 20:20Berkshire? Ultimately the view is that
- 20:22while Berkshire remains an absolutely exceptional quality
- 20:25core holding for a long term investor, maybe someone already
- 20:29holding it new capital might benefit from some patients
- 20:32waiting for a more opportune entry point, perhaps during a
- 20:34period of broader market stress, or a pullback in the share price
- 20:38might be prudent. That's historically when
- 20:40Berkshire has really shown and offered compelling long term
- 20:43value. What a really comprehensive deep
- 20:45dive into Berkshire Hathaway we've touched on so much.
- 20:48That unique decentralized structure, the diverse income,
- 20:50the vital difference between gap and operating earnings, the
- 20:53risks, how it stacks up against its own standards, and those
- 20:57powerful management signals like the buybacks.
- 20:59So here's the final thought for you, the listener to Baby
- 21:02Ponder. Given that immense $344 billion
- 21:06cash pile and that persistent size problem, the difficulty of
- 21:10finding acquisitions big enough to matter, what might be the
- 21:13next truly innovative way this unique company leverages its
- 21:16strengths is going to be a massive acquisition.
- 21:18We have even thought of some entirely new internal venture,
- 21:21or maybe something else entirely that just defies our current
- 21:24expectations. Something to think about and
- 21:26always remember. Reflect on that balance between
- 21:28numbers, the quantitative stuff, and the crucial qualitative
- 21:31aspects of any business. And please always conduct your
- 21:34own due diligence before making any investment decisions.
- 21:36That's right. All the analysis we discussed is
- 21:39based on publicly available sources.
- 21:40It could be subject to revisions or different interpretations.
- 21:43And crucially, this content is for educational purposes only.
- 21:47It absolutely does not constitute investment advice.
- 21:50Well said. Thanks for joining us on this
- 21:52deep dive.