Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / Why Iranians are "Afraid" of the Ceasefire | Behnam Ben Taleblu

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Why Iranians are "Afraid" of the Ceasefire | Behnam Ben Taleblu · Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani

• Amir Golshani: Welcome back. Today's guest is Behnam Ben Taleblu, Senior Director of the Iran Program and the Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is one of the sharpest Iran analysts working today with deep expertise on the Islamic Republic security doctrine, missile program, regional strategy, and the internal logic of the regime itself. His work consistently connects what happens inside Iran to what the regime does across the region. it's great to have you back on Beyond the Summit. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Great to be with you, Amir. A pleasure. Amir Golshani: The last time we spoke was February 27. And what stayed with me was how precise your reading was. We talked about scenarios, about escalation, about when this could go. And within hours, the moved in exactly the direction you warned about. Now here we are again, Friday, April 10. with the fragile ceasefire talks expected in Islamabad, with the fragile ceasefire talks expected in Islamabad, open questions about Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Strait of Hormuz, and above all, the future of Iran itself. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Well, ⁓ like I said, it's always a pleasure to be with you. And I had no idea that I had such strategic foresight because ⁓ it seemed to be like a matter of when rather than if the Trump administration attack. But we're in an entirely different phase. ⁓ The administration is now in a two and a half, if not three day ⁓ reported ceasefire the Islamic Republic. But even the word ceasefire ⁓ is highly because the one premise for this ⁓ being hotly debated. Will ships be able to still pass through the Strait of Hormuz? That's really debatable. Will this be linked to Lebanon? That is really debatable. will things stop going boom inside Iran? That's also quite debatable. Don't take it from me, take it from this posting we saw just a few days ago on Persian language social media, I think within ⁓ maybe a day to one day ⁓ when ceasefire was reported. And it was just a regular individual briefly connected to the internet and said, man, I can't sleep due to the sound of the ceasefire, meaning things are still being There still a war going on in the region. So ⁓ the thing I would say is that while the moments were at the inflection point we're at is historic, history yet has not been made. You know, why am I saying that the regime is defanged, but it is certainly not destroyed. ⁓ There a big difference between capabilities that are disabled and set back versus permanently taken offline. There is a difference between a regime that is looking to make amends and limp along rather than rebuild and survive for the purposes of taking revenge. And ultimately, all eyes will be on the next proximate political event, which is, I think, the highest level physical negotiations since the 1979 revolution, where indirectly you will have the vice president, the number two of the United States of America, indirectly being in negotiation with a government official of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The last highest level direct thing I can think of was a phone call between then President Barack Obama and then President Rouhani in September 2013 on the sidelines of the UNGA. But I can't think anything as high level or physical ⁓ as since hostage crisis, particularly the diplomacy ⁓ then, I think, State Department official Warren So suffice to say we're in a historical moment, but history has not yet been made. It is way too premature to talk about peace. Those who see this as the springboard to turn off the conflict in the region and move towards not just diplomacy, but deal making and normalization might with respect be missing the fact that we don't even know the framework for which these talks will be held. it President Trump's previously reported 15 points? Have those 15 points pre-February 28 held across the board now? it the newly reported Iranian 10 points first seen in Iranian traditional media like newspapers, then social media? Or is it a revised version of that as the White House and in particular the White House press secretary alleges? We don't even know the baseline ⁓ these talks. But what is critical ⁓ that the Islamic Republic is looking to engage not for the purposes of sanctions relief, but to secure physical and political survival. and that the Americans are looking to engage for the purposes of deconfliction and de-escalation to turn off a conflict that was initially about politics and security and quickly morphed into one that was about energy and economics. Amir Golshani: I really love what you said. Right now, let's break it down to smaller pieces to make it more understandable for the average audience that ⁓ either listening or watching. is it fair to say, that it is just a pause between phases of the same war? Behnam Ben Taleblu: potentially, it could be a pause between different phases of the same war or same phase of the same war. ⁓ You if we're going to look at history and be objective, ⁓ Donald has only strike the Islamic Republic of Iran when in the middle of negotiations. was the case in June and that was the case in February. So if past is prologue, once negotiations commence, the trend line indicates that that is a greater harbinger of military action than sanctions or some kind of other. diplomatic or political crisis. So there's that to note. The second is, does the administration think the next phase ought to be? Meaning let's pretend there is a deal. Let's pretend there is no deal. What is the next thing in the white house is Iran strategy. Is it just resuming the conflict that it already has the capabilities in the region for the president has been quite clear that he's keeping the assets in the region. as some sort of a deterrence to make sure that you can get an actual agreement rather than to have to bring them back and take them out and bring them back and take them out again. But if it's a political strategy, you know, what does post-war containment look like? What does post-war rollback look like? Is there a post-war covert strategy that we're not privy to and don't know about? And what will Israel's role be in all of this, given the fact that this is America negotiating Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: but also with an eye towards what Jerusalem has and hasn't been able to do in the past six weeks on the ground in Iran. Amir Golshani: Obviously, they're all great questions and a lot to think about. So realistically, who does this two week pause benefit from more? Is it the US allowing them to reposition assets drop ⁓ oil prices as we have already seen Or is it the IRGC resupplying maybe by the help of Russian and Chinese, Behnam Ben Taleblu: I think unfortunately, politically, any pause benefits the Islamic Republic and in particular the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps because it releases the momentum. takes the boot off the neck, even if the architecture is still there, even if the sword of Damocles is still there. you turn on and turn off the spigot of conflict of actual overt conventional military power, ⁓ does something to the psyche. And we have to remember the Islamic Republic's real war here is the media war, is the narrative war. And again, the administration's willingness and willingness to be seen as seeking a ceasefire and willingness to be seen as seeking an off ramp, as much as the administration has talked about destruction and energy and all the other rest of these things, has equal chapter and verse for seeking diplomacy and de-escalation. And unfortunately does redound to the political advantage of the IRGC and what's left of this national security deep state. Now you might say practically, what can the regime do with this? Literally, they won't be able to build back within a period of two weeks anyway. Sanctions relief is not coming in a matter of two weeks anyway. So materially, I would say it actually makes very little impact the Islamic Republic. But politically, it is huge. It is a geopolitical earthquake ⁓ these guys who ⁓ you can translate this better than I can, Vali. Amir Golshani: No. Behnam Ben Taleblu: They believe that they puffed their chest, that wind is on their double chin, that they can be hubristic about this ⁓ because they believe they have fought, at least in their view, even though they haven't seen exactly, there's still the fog of war, they haven't seen exactly how much they have lost militarily, but they have fought a regional military power and they have fought a global military power. to that end, the sense Amir Golshani: That's it. Behnam Ben Taleblu: of or desire for diplomacy or ceasefire from the administration feeds into that sense of self. Now, some might say that this could be a ploy or a trap by the Trump administration given the timeline. So we won't know. But politically, it benefits the Islamic Republic. Materially, it could benefit America because of one, the ability to calm oil prices and number two, the ability to more meaningfully resupply in terms of the logistics chain. This certainly benefits America. much more than it benefits Iran. My fear here is, you know, one group we haven't talked about, which is the Iranian people. I do believe that politically and perhaps, God forbid, psychologically, they may be the one to or who might feel the most embittered, embattled, and afraid by this pause. Amir Golshani: So I really love that. And you are one of the few people who always talk about Iranian people. I really appreciate that. So there are rumors that Pakistan is using euphemism to bridge the gap between the US 15 point plan and the 10 point counter proposal by Iranian side. In your experience, what a mediator, a mediator softens the language of a regime that just lost its supreme leader, is that a path to a to peace or a recipe for more dangerous misunderstanding. Behnam Ben Taleblu: It's at least in Pakistan's mind, and this is a very interesting phenomenon I think your viewers and listeners would benefit from. There is a whole constellation of countries that historically tried to play the role of mediator or moderator between Tehran and between Washington. Sometimes there's people, ⁓ there are businesses, but more often not there are countries with their own independent interests that are nested into the larger US-Iran strategic competition or even collaboration and cooperation. And Pakistan is no different in that sense than Turkey, which is no different than Qatar or Oman more importantly, or in the past, France and Germany more importantly, or even in the past Russia and even the EU. So to that end, we have to see and understand what are Pakistan's stakes in this regionally? ⁓ What they want from the U S to use this as a bid to generate leverage for in the future? Who are Pakistan's patrons and allies in 10th China? That matters very much for the future of great power competition and what Southwest Asia and even South Asia may look like in the next 20 years. So there's all these moving parts here that we have to be aware of that I think Pakistan is trying to nest its own independent interests set into I think we can't lose sight of. But any mediator or moderator that takes this position does what any skilled diplomat would do, which they call these things bridging proposals. where privately they took these two things, they tried to find the least common denominator, and then they present them And I think the Pakistanis will have quite a hard time if what is reported about the US 15 points and what is reported about the Iranian 10 points are what they are, you're gonna need a lot more than a bridge because the distance between these two things, even pre-war, not even politically, not even based on the facts on the ground, but philosophically, the distance was huge. That distance, in my view, had grown rather than was shrunk with six weeks of conflict and overt fighting. But there's some people who believe that the conflict actually raised the stakes and therefore increased the chances. I'm at this moment in time, not one of those people. So I would say the chances of an actual agreement based on a bridging proposal is slim to none unless you have a cave in the US position, unless you have the Iranian saying one thing publicly and doing another thing privately, you have a real surrender. I would say the chances of an actual agreement based on a bridging proposal is slim to none unless you have a cave in the US position, unless you have the Iranian saying one thing publicly and doing another thing privately, or you have a real surrender. by Tehran. by Tehran. Absent one of these three things, that which Pakistani diplomats or any real skilled diplomat may be able to do, vis-a-vis a bridging proposal, be politically impressive, but strategically dubious because there is so much distance and the in my view has magnified that. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Right. Iran has always shown real skill at the negotiating table. ⁓ It knows how to buy time, fragment pressure, and survive. When you look at these talks, what do you think Tehran is really trying to achieve right now? Behnam Ben Taleblu: I'm glad you mentioned the buying time and I want to allude to an analogy that you as an Iranian in the diaspora know all too well, which is the Islamic Republic is in so many ways a dichotomy. We talk about them being militarily weak, yet they have a missile force that continues to perform even six weeks into the war. We about them as being ⁓ these negotiators and deal makers and Basari types, but their maximalist demands and their method and their style tends to impede their substance. And if past is prologue, even at the negotiating table, the Iranians can overplay their hand. And we've seen that in the past as well. And the question is, if you're looking at Iran's diplomatic posture now, their negotiating position now, nevermind the fact that it's unclear how coordinated it is within this system at this moment in time, because this is a crisis. We have real questions over command and control. These are more personalist networks within institutions matter ⁓ very much at this moment. ⁓ Islamic Republic is a system of men, quite literally, so it's about understanding the men at the helm. It doesn't mean it's a personalist system. Khamenei indeed has institutionalized his power, and there's always a number two, three, four, and we've seen them rise up in the ranks. But their ability to talk and coordinate and intonate has really been strained by the conflict. So what kind of a strategy they can get off off the ground? is a real question here. How can they coordinate that? And you will see that already with reports of the IRGC commander and the IRGC aerospace force commander not wanting missiles to be included in these talks. Real concerns of could Ghalibaf go rogue given not that he's a pragmatist or moderate, but at least given that he's some ambitious guy. There's that there. There's the question of stylistically, what is Iraq going to be doing there representing the foreign ministry? Who's who's vested stake is that? the quote unquote civilian government, what's left of the quote unquote civilian government. So there's a lot more questions than answers here. But to bring it down to the heart of your question, traditionally Iran does indeed play for time and try to divide a consensus that is against it. But if either regime plays for time here, that is real proof that it will have lived up to the Talleyrand quotes, the famous French diplomat in the Napoleonic era who said about the Bourbon dynasty that They have neither forgotten anything nor learned anything. If the Islamic Republic thinks at this point in time that playing for time at the negotiating table is a wise strategy and that it will work against someone like president Donald Trump, They have neither forgotten anything nor learned anything. If the Islamic Republic thinks at this point in time that playing for time at the negotiating table is a wise strategy and not only is a wise strategy, but that it will work against someone like president Donald Trump, who clearly has limited patience for diplomacy and who even clearly has limited patience for military operations. If they think that he will be just okay with them running the clock on him, I think they really would not have learned the lessons of June last year and they really would not have learned the lessons of March, April this year. So yes, everything you said is the norm, is the past precedent about Iranian negotiating behavior. But now that trend line needs to meet reality. And the question is, how will it do that? Amir Golshani: Right. Right, yeah. Unfortunately, they have shown that they're really good at playing a bad hand, but hopefully this time is different. know that Tehran and Washington are really far apart. Which demands are negotiable and which ones are fundamentally incompatible? We know that Tehran and Washington are really far apart. Which demands are negotiable and which ones are fundamentally incompatible? Behnam Ben Taleblu: even those which might be negotiable, hypothetically, if there's a collapse in the Iranian position or, you know, they play this game of Mr. Inside says this, Mr. Outside says this, Ali Buff privately promises this, Araxi publicly dismisses this, but they have some sort of mutual arrangement, modus vivendi understanding with the Americans about thresholds and escalation and what they will do and what they won't do for a certain period of time, they come up with a a memorandum of understanding that governs any kind of agreement or any kind of framework that comes out of this. Well, ⁓ I again have real concerns about verifiability. You know, the Iranians can come tomorrow to Vance, Kushner and Witkoff and say, we will not support Hezbollah anymore. Done. Even though they're talking very much about linking the theater to Lebanon. My question is not how do you bridge this proposal? My question is how do you verify this concession in time? And is this concession worthwhile? So it's not to me the 10 points versus the 15 points. Some of them are philosophical. The US doesn't recognize countries' rights to enrich, even though some countries do enrich. We don't see that as an inherent right. But the Iranians want recognition of that inherent right. Those two things are politically incompatible. Some will want to square the enrichment debate, say, OK, Iran is not enriching now. Amir Golshani: Yeah. Behnam Ben Taleblu: So why don't we just give this as some sort of fake concession to America? The problem is, if you give this as a concession to America, America better not pay anything for it. America can say, ⁓ yes, I see, I detect that Iran is not enriching uranium, but I don't recognize that they have a future right to. But if Iran makes you pay to say this statement, then you will have paid for something at the negotiating table in 2026, which you militarily took away from them already in 2025. Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: So the skill the Iranians have is to pocket concessions that you give them and that they will make you pay for something that you got already. So we have to be aware of that too. And then are the big fears, the verifiability and the paying for something that you already got ⁓ not understanding that there is a philosophical divide. So there are some things that you can probably get a limited agreement on, ⁓ but only be for time, but that will replicate the criticisms. Amir Golshani: Fantastic points. Yeah. Behnam Ben Taleblu: that even candidate Trump had of an agreement like the JCPOA in 2015. Given how murky the 10 to 15 points are, I prefer not to get into more specifics, but just look at these things when we look at the news on Saturday. How will your audience know what matters? Did they philosophically cave on something? Did they end up paying for something that they already got previously? Or is this an Iranian move of pocketing a concession and pretending it never happened? Beware of these three things. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. is also a lot of talk right now about the tactical success, operational success, degraded capabilities, as we all know. But when you strip away the headlines, what has truly changed inside the Islamic Republic and what has not changed at all? Behnam Ben Taleblu: Well, the trend line is that the systems the regime has cared about only matter more rather than less for this regime, which means getting them at the negotiating table has actually become harder, not easier because they've seen and sensed the utility of it more than ever before. For example, get the uranium, you in so many weird ways, leaving the uranium underground in Iran and so so many ways ensures that the regime survives. So it's the reverse of the nuclear logic where you create a nuclear weapon as a deterrent for your survival. Now, if they leave the material in tombs, create the case to not have any further pressure against them. So, you know, we have to be aware of logic. Next is, you know, what has been degraded versus destroyed? I think there is still considerable work to do against Iran's ballistic missile program, given that there's a difference between sites that have been struck versus sites that have been destroyed. But that which has been struck, which matters very much, given that the US has done it this time rather than Israel being the one to do it in June 2025 and October 2024, is ballistic missile production. In particular, given reporting, given commercially available satellite imagery, which these days is not as good for political reasons and because there's delays in the passes. Hojir, Shahrood, Parchin, Semnan, Hakimiyeh, maybe even Esfahan, pay attention to these sites in that order and what the regime does in these places that could allow it to reconstitute over time. But the first few, particular Hojir Shahrud, for example, where motor production is happening, where there is assembly of actual physical components, that hardware has been taken offline more. So that reduces the ability of the post-war bounce back of the regime. And then when you marry that with strikes against You know, like Iran's steel industry strikes against Iranian metallurgy sites, strikes against the Ministry of Defense contractors like Shiraz Electronics Institute, for example. You look at this industrial assets that exist that support the national security deep state, but that also support these capabilities. That also puts time back on American Israel side in a post-conflict scenario because it makes the growth spurts less speedy. and with more distance in between them. So in essence, the striking of the defense industrial base, the striking of the production facilities may have mattered more terms of dealing a blow against Iran's ballistic missiles, which again have grown in importance for this regime after this conflict, than the bases that they're housed in or the launchers that fire them. Amir Golshani: Right. people are already trying to sell the idea of what could emerge from this is a more pragmatic or more manageable version of the Islamic Republic. Based on everything you know, do you buy that at all? Behnam Ben Taleblu: I would say with respect, I don't see it. And not because I have some ideological filter or disposition. I would tell you, like, Qalibov, the challenge with him is that the West will mistake ambition for pragmatism and moderation. And just because somebody is corrupt within one kind of context doesn't mean he can be corrupt across a host of other contexts. meaning the forces that enable his personal corruption inside a system like the Islamic Republic does not mean that you can translate him to become Delci Rodriguez of Iran. In particular, those same forces that enable corruption also limit his freewheeling on strategic issues. They may enable him to become a major rentier state beneficiary, a major ⁓ illicit financier. but those same dark networks also would box in someone even with the most pragmatic and opportunistic streaks and Ghalibov's career and certainly his rhetoric most recently have proven work to indicate the exact opposite, that he doesn't have those streaks, that he actually ⁓ is believer and a member of this hardline establishment, no matter of his personal ambition. So given that his name is the one most associated with the sign or the allegation of a potential pragmatic post-conflict ⁓ Islamic Republic of Iran. And that being his background, I don't see that, which is why me and a friend at this other organization at NUFTI, Andrew Ghadili, we had a piece in the Washington Post recently, basically saying that Iran is not Venezuela and that Delci Rodriguez and Mohammed Babar-Ghalibov is not Delci Rodriguez. And the Iranian state, Iranian society and the Iranian military capabilities. Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: are not Venezuela state, not Venezuela society, are not Venezuela's military capabilities. Amir Golshani: Right, Iranian version of Kim Jong-un is more probable, I believe. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Yeah, and I'm glad a lot of people are saying that. That's not meant to deny the impressive military achievements that America has had, but it should be. And I've actually been saying this since the conflict started because, you know, there is a start stop mentality to a lot of things President Trump does because he doesn't just do one thing because he wouldn't put all his, he never puts his political capital in one thing. He advances multiple lines of argumentation and effort at the same time. I mean, even that tweet that we saw, The morning before the ceasefire, the very deplorable thing about civilizational erasure, people forget, do you know how that tweet ended? ⁓ beginning of the tweet, people are saying, civilizational erasure. In the bottom, he's saying, God bless the people of Iran. So even within one tweet, there is a 180 degree difference. Talk about hedging, talk about keep your options open. And in the middle, what is he saying of that tweet? He said, we've already had regime change. So on the top, he's going maximalist hardcore. the beginning of the tweet, people are saying, civilizational erasure. In the bottom, he's saying, God bless the people of Iran. So within one tweet, there is a 180 degree difference. Talk about hedging, talk about keep your options open. the top, he's going maximalist hardcore. In the middle, he's going, Galibov, Venezuela. In the end, he's going regime change, liberate the people of Iran in one post. In the middle, he's going, Galibov, Venezuela. In the end, he's going regime change, liberate the people of Iran in one post. So this talk about the hyper, evident, hyper public definition of keep your options open. So I don't believe that the buys that anymore, that this is possible. I believe that's that they want because it's a lower cost. Amir Golshani: Just one post here. General Cain says 80 % of missiles industry is shattered, but that leaves 20 % dispersed and hidden ⁓ in a region as dense as the GCC. Isn't that 20 enough to still hold the global energy market hostage if the Islamabad talk fails? Behnam Ben Taleblu: It is and I fear what is holding the global energy sector hostage, which I'm very disappointed in two things. Markets and media. In particular, I'm going to butcher this line from Tom Schelling. So forgive me. I forget which book it was in. ⁓ It be Arms and Influence or Strategy of Conflict. But they talk about pain and deterrence and thresholds being two sided. There is the infliction of pain and there is the acceptance of pain. And the Islamic Republic Per Tom Schelling has been very good about that Willingness to accept pain as much as it's trying to inflict pain But what they sensed this time was that our risk tolerance not even in terms of casualties because yes 13 is way too many But we have to remember even the US had 19 casualties in a conflict like Grenada, which people have forgotten about here in Washington DC but You go down to the cost Just a one dollar price spike in oil domestically here the pump when you go to put gas in the car, that has changed a lot of things. In a world in which people forgot that there was a world under ⁓ Obama where we had oil at 140, where we had the last time oil go to triple digits in history was during the Ukraine War, which so many Americans, at least for the first year, seemed to support. But all a sudden when it comes to Iran, six weeks is too much. In a world in which people forgot that there was world under ⁓ Barack Obama where we had oil at 140, where we had the last time oil go to triple digits in recent history was during the Ukraine War, which so Americans, at least for the first year, seemed to support. But all of a sudden when it comes to six weeks is too much. And so the Islamic Republic was able to threaten those exact same forces, not only with the 20 % of what's left of the industry, which is very different than what's left of the arsenal, because I fear that so many deliberations about the size of the arsenal had actually been for the medium range systems capable of carrying a nuclear warhead capable of striking Israel or further afield bases from Iranian territory. But the strike, the GCC, three to 400 kilometers, max, max, max. Amir Golshani: Great. Behnam Ben Taleblu: particularly Iran's short-range single-stage precision strike ballistic missiles that among its most effective and among its most precise. No, ⁓ fear they have a lot more. I fear they have a lot more. I fear they're entombed and dispersed. And geography here absolutely is one of the things that is a weapon ⁓ the ⁓ of the Iranians. ⁓ talking about that geography with its limited military capability, the thing which spooked markets and the thing which spooked media was the reported 10 to 12 mines in the Strait of Hormuz. That's it. And that's why my real strategic indictment is not that America didn't plan or didn't know Hormuz, but that how the Islamic Republic could do so much with so little. Do you look at the previous examples, the tanker war in the 1980s, the regime threw so much out there. You look at the mid 2000s when the European oil boycott happened after the US ⁓ oil sanctions. The regime threatened to close the straits. ⁓ President Obama then brought a second carrier into the region. Everything was okay. you look at Trump, term one, max pressure, Iranian limpet mining, sticking them on the bottom of these tankers. That was huge. But none of these things had the market or media impact of today. And it's odd that the Islamic Republic has been able to generate that with so much less. Literally think 10 to 12 mines here, rather than, you know, hundreds if not thousands of short-range ballistic missiles. Amir Golshani: Right. Talking about the Strait of Hormuz, it remains one of the biggest pressure points in ⁓ whole story that we talking about. ⁓ Tehran keeps using it as a leverage, even short of full closure, how does that change the strategic picture for the U.S., the Gulf, and the wider world? Talking about the Strait of Hormuz, it remains one of the biggest pressure points If Tehran keeps it as a leverage, even short of closure, Behnam Ben Taleblu: Well, it means we need a real resolution here. It means that you're going to have to fight your way through the strait. It means that you're going to have to meaningfully destroy and degrade Iranian coastal or degrade Iranian coastal defenses. The difference is to degrade them. You have to stay there to make sure they don't reconstitute. Or it means that you pressure the regime in so many other ways that they choose to give up this IRGC toll booth situation. Because basically up with a tiered entry system. to enter and exit an international waterway, even though Iran and America, I believe it or not, are not signatories to the UN law of the sea, or this law of the sea, I forget the actual name of the convention on the law of the sea or whatever the full name is called. ⁓ Many other countries are. And the UAE, for example, just across the Persian Gulf has a pretty significant stake in this. they actually, think they're MFA or MOD tweeted something about to this effect, that you can't just hijack an international waterway. Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: and toll it and enforce commercial vessels that have to traverse through your territorial waters where they are at the hundred percent mercy of your coastal defenses and what's left of your Navy. So for Donald Trump, for markets, for media, for the international community, for the energy trade, we are going to have to find a real resolution to this challenge in the Strait of Hormuz. And that is the lifeline now that the Islamic Republic will trade, not necessarily for sanctions relief. but for its survival. And because it knows that we want this, it will ask for more things on top of it, which get to why the Iranian proposal, the 10 points is so heavy handed and why so much of it is about getting rid of US bases, these things that its foreign policy, its security policy had failed to achieve. And now that they sense there was an opportune moment with the war to nest those larger concerns into this problem and send it Washington's way and say, you're concerned about this. Well, you're going to have to address all of this. Amir Golshani: Right. Some people even believe that, you know, having control of Strait of Hormuz is more effective than having nuclear weapon. Behnam, you mentioned, you know, other ways of putting more pressure on Iran. Can the regime sustain itself financially and strategically through this kind of controlled pressure? Behnam Ben Taleblu: The regime ⁓ and it gets harder and harder and harder but so much depends on where will the Trump administration's maximum pressure policy be at time one, time two, time three. You know I'm working on an article right now, I simply haven't had enough time behind the computer physically ⁓ but where is Operation Economic Epic Fury? We just had Operation Epic Fury the military, where is the economic version of it? Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Why is the economic activities of the Treasury Department right now limited to giving waivers so that Iranian oil tankers, which are already loaded and out to sea, able to sell their oil without sanctions anyway? We need to think about an economic strategy that crunches that last capability that bounce back and build back better, that makes even tougher budgetary choices for a post-conflict Islamic Republic, and that learns the lessons of containing a system that is authoritarian, oil rich and missile laden, like Saddam's regime was after 91 and that Khamenei Jr's regime is after 2026, and learns the lessons of the 1990s containment without making the mistakes of the 1990s containment. And here I have a real question as to, well, what is that for the Trump administration? I have some ideas, but what is Uncle Sam's approach? What is the timeline they have for that? Because certainly you want to keep shrinking the pot. And the more you shrink the pie, yes, the more cohesive the elites become. But given that you've already put military pressure on these elites and now you're financially constricting them, they come together. But the more you financially constrict them and the more the prospect of a turned on war, these systems that don't bend, break. And that's where you have your real opportunity. And that's the question is, does the Trump administration know that? Is this part of their strategy? What is the timetable for this strategy and how much investment do they have in this approach? Amir Golshani: Right. Now let's talk about geography and GCC countries. What do you think the Gulf learned from war ⁓ and what does this moment to do their long-term view of Iran deterrence and self-protection? Behnam Ben Taleblu: Well, there's a great Napoleon quote that throughout some of the early images of this war kept coming to my mind, particularly the drone strike against the Burj Al Arab Hotel where the shrapnel fell into the bottom of the hotel, which was, when your enemy is making a mistake, don't interrupt him. And it really was a mistake for the Islamic Republic to internationalize the war and internationalize it so quickly. Now they believe it paid off because they went for the strait. Eventually they made a conflict about again, politics and security into energy and economics, but they may have lost the economic artery that they had for so many years. mean, don't forget UAE was a top sanctions buster during term one Trump max pressure, a top five importer of Iranian petrochemicals, which was a major non-oil in terms of us sanctions law, non-oil, but it's an oil derivative. ⁓ product supporting the running economy in supporting the islamic republic's illicit activities with his missile military nuclear anything else is the main revenue stream just like that's why the trump administration when after industrial metals and steel rather than the old school approach of the obama administration which was just precious metals worth things that the islamic republic had on its side basically regional trade non-dollar denominated trade bartering Amir Golshani: Alright. Behnam Ben Taleblu: money laundering, illicit networks through a whole host of countries, geographically where it was more permissible and easier to deal with this stuff. I think because of the war, those days are going to be gone. UAE will have changed. It will be a critical American national security prerogative to hold UAE's hand, to help them on the sanctions front, on the immigration front, on the defense front, become better and better and better, to identify illicit and illicit, abusive, and real immigration ⁓ their country, to identify what is a legitimate business, what ⁓ a sanctions-busting venture, and really spend time twisting the arm of the Islamic Republic in this place that has been for far too long a permissive jurisdiction for like Turkey, like Malaysia, like Hong Kong, like China, a permissive jurisdiction for some Western components, but also for trade and to touch the international economy, to touch the international financial system. So that is one big thing that I think will change and America will have to be on top of it. The second thing is just the nature of order. fact that the Islamic Republic struck Qatar and Oman, that tells you a lot. Washington now really does have to go to its friends in the region and hold them together and listen, ⁓ I'm for you. Even though there are concerns about America's staying power will force posture in the region post-conflict, they have to understand that one reason that they were able to shoot down so much was because of Western, in particular, American military technology, and that these are the ties that bind. China will be right there behind America trying to undermine that case and trying to talk about, this is the era of economic interdependence, and therefore you have to pay to play and get along, but America is really going to have to hold the line. The challenge is if the GCC zooms out, They will see a very turbulent relationship with America over regional security, such as the invasion of Iraq, such as the Syrian civil war, such as the JCPOA nuclear negotiations with Iran, such as the Yemen war, such as oil politics during the Ukraine war period, the Khashoggi affair, the GCC Qatar crisis, you name it. There has been a very turbulent relationship. And now is the time, given how overt and damaging this conflict has been for America to come and Rebuild the tent and bring those pieces together because if we leave them down on the field on the chessboard That's where the Islamic Republic bilaterally and a la carte I think that I don't know if the line is actually in Machiavelli or not, but people have described it to him They say politika del carcofo or the politics of the artichoke you take one at a time Sometimes in America, they call it salami slices salami tactics. That's where Iran that's where China will come to our friends and deal with them one at a time, play up their grievances and concerns, some of which are correct, given some of the foreign policy failures America had in the region over the past two decades, but some of which are unfounded. And so there is a real need, the blaring red light, is what will America do to build a better post-war order in the region? And that actually begins not with Israel. That relationship is clear. That relationship is stable. That actually begins with the GCC countries. And it is precisely because of geography. It is precisely because they are critical American partners, but they live closest to and they're on the front lines of the Iranian threat. Amir Golshani: Yeah, I love it. know, I personally believe they shoot themselves in the foot by attacking neighboring countries. Now let's talk about, you know, proxies. Hezbollah has always been one of the most important extensions of Iranian power. By Iranian power, mean Islamic regime, obviously, after everything that has happened. What do you think as well as future look like? Behnam Ben Taleblu: I think it's. Grim, can be grim and glib and doom gloom, but still survive. mean, ⁓ Hezbollah is a terrorist organization at the end ⁓ of just like the Islamic Republic is a terror regime. know, one reason where they can do more with less when you shrink the pie is because they simply, every time you put them to the choice of guns versus butter, they will pick guns. They will pick the thing that maximizes the pain. and maximizes also what they can get as terms of military capability or economic wherewithal or political wherewithal at that moment in time for the terror group rather than for the population. And in a world in which Lebanese society has seen the decline of the state towards failed state status because of Hezbollah and at the same time where Iranians have seen the decline of their state towards failed state status not because of military force by America or Israel but because of path dependent conscious choices. by Ali Khamenei and his clique over the past 37 years, you have a really dangerous phenomenon here where America, Israel, whoever may weaken Hezbollah, but that weakness entrenches it. We have to think more comprehensively now. And I know that's very, very hard because Hezbollah is so embedded and the desire and the will in the international community to deal with dislodging it is so high, let alone the capability to do that is so low. Same with the Lebanese government. You might hear really great things out of Beirut, but the capability to physically help the Israelis with that dislodging mission, which as you see is politically very precocious, and next week there will be negotiations, allegedly in DC, between the Lebanese government and Israel over the fate of what happens in that country. This jigsaw puzzle only offers the Islamic Republic the opportunity to press its advantage and to test how concerned is America and test how concerned is Israel. Certainly Prime Minister Netanyahu already said, we're not going to be stopping operations there anytime soon. But the Trump administration seemingly backtracked. because negotiations will be held next week in Lebanon, ⁓ in DC about Lebanon, and given the fact that it looks like the Islamic Republic Amir Golshani: All Behnam Ben Taleblu: won't settle for a ceasefire unless there's a way to save its most preferred proxy, one of its most successful proxies, Lebanese Hezbollah, this is going to be, again, a game of chicken. Both sides are going to play to the edge. Now, to me, just again, as an Iranian-American, but also as an analyst here, this is further proof that the Islamic Republic is a poor guardian of the Iranian national interest. Because at a time when it stands to potentially get so much from a ceasefire, it is not concerned about rebuilding its country. this is further proof that the Islamic Republic is a poor guardian of the Iranian national interest. Because at a time when it stands to potentially get so much from a ceasefire, it is not concerned about rebuilding its country. Remember the guns or butter analogy, it is concerned more about stabilizing its proxy than rebuilding itself. And again, that is the revolutionary ideology over the national interest. is even a Ghalibov is pushing for this. So this is at the heart of the problem of why these men will not change and why their ideology matters very much. So keep your eyes on America and will they try to do something substantively between Israel and Lebanon? it is concerned more about stabilizing its proxy than rebuilding itself. Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Or is it just stylistic to try to fool the Iranians to think that they will? We won't know until those negotiations happen next week, but certainly that means that military operations by Israel against Hezbollah is going to continue, which means the chances of Iran walking out of the ceasefire because of this ideological preference to save, as you rightly mentioned, that successful proxy is so high, even though the chance of resuming strikes against its own country are also so high. And don't take it from me, take it from Vice President Vance who just a few days ago said this. He think it would be a dumb idea to throw away the ceasefire to save Hezbollah, but that's their prerogative. That is the prerogative of the Islamic Republic to make these poor trade-offs, just like we've seen them make these poor trade-offs for the past 47 years. Amir Golshani: I love that. So Hezbollah is on one side, the other side, you know, we can talk about the Houthis. The Houthis have been disruptive, but not yet decisive in a way some feared. In your view, what role do they still play in this conflict, especially around maritime pressure and the Red Sea? Behnam Ben Taleblu: Well, the good news is that they did not function as the second horn of the Iranian maritime strategy at the same time. The fear here was when the Houthis were doing the Red Sea threat with the IRGC magnified in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and now that the IRGC has been doing it there, would the Houthis come online? Thus far, that threat, thank God, has not materialized. That would be a real body blow to markets and media who are already very skeptical about this kind of operation anyway. But the Houthis did, as you know, attempt to fire several times and attempt to strike Israel with medium range ballistic missiles during this conflict. To date, that seems more stylistic than substantive, a bit more performative, shall we say. And perhaps it is because of Saudi Arabia's quiet diplomacy with the Houthis or intelligence game vis-a-vis the Houthis. And as much as I may not like the pay to delay or the pay to play approach, keeping the Houthis offside right now is key. The question is, what will the strategy be towards the Houthis in a post-conflict scenario? And will the Houthis have the capability to turn that cycle of violence back on? Yes, they will. But what can we do meaningfully to impact their calculus, to get them offside, to weaken them, to deter them? That's the open question here. And I fear that America, Saudi, and Israel may not be on the same page as how to deal with this in the short term. Amir Golshani: Sure. So, Behnam, one of the things that I don't want to lose in this conversation is the Iranian people themselves. And I know that you always talk about Iranian people as well. In all of this military and diplomatic analysis, where do you think the human reality inside Iran is being missed most daily right now? one of the things that I don't want to lose in this conversation ⁓ is the people themselves. And I know that you always talk about Iranian people as well. Behnam Ben Taleblu: You know, I heard this on a call-in show because one of the few ways, just like in January, where you can get consistent information out of Iran is landline. You know, they have to spend the money to make the international call. Certainly the international call is monitored. So the regime both generates revenue and also, you know, gets to collect intel and monitor intel. But Iranians have been incredibly brave and Iranian Americans and others have let me sit in and listen on their calls without saying anything and with the permission of people back in Iran, obviously. And some of the things you hear is heartbreaking, but I'll just pivot to something that was said publicly on a call-in show on Iran International that had nothing to do with me, that had everything to do with the fear that this individual, his name was allegedly Hossein from Shiraz, had to do with the fear of America turning off the conflict too quickly, about being a fair-weather friend. You know, these are people who have made immense sacrifices freedom, ⁓ know people ⁓ were killed ⁓ January 2026. And when you hear an Iranian say something like, I'm willing to tolerate a missile to my house that kills me, that my compatriots in my country can be free, or when they say things like, I'm willing to tolerate a decade of blackouts for eight hours every single day so that I have a chance at life for the first time after 10 years, the problem is the West does not understand the desperation yet of the Iranian people. ⁓ Iranian say something I'm willing to tolerate a missile to my house that kills me, so that my compatriots in country can be free, or when they say things like, I'm willing to tolerate a decade of blackouts for eight hours every single day so that I have a chance at life for the first time after 10 years, the problem is the West does not understand the desperation yet of the Iranian people. the sense of desperation that could drive such a nationalist population to embrace and support foreign intervention. And then to have foreign intervention largely, but not entirely, largely miss that in terms of the targeting. The Israelis, yes, have done a lot of the striking the apparatus of oppression. The Basij, the law enforcement forces, these things. But very few political targets have been struck. It was the Supreme Leader, it was Ali Larijani, it was the intelligence minister. Otherwise, the majority of these things are military targets. And almost the majority of the personalities have been targeted by the Israelis, not by the Americans. And this gets to a bitter image for the minds of the Iranians as to where will the West be once the conflict stops and once the regime ⁓ can't win the war abroad but comes home to crack skulls. We know after the 12-day war, the regime arrested 21,000 people. We know after the protests in January, the regime arrested 55,000 people. We don't know yet. what the situation. Amir Golshani: And they are executing people, you know, amidst this war, it's horrible. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Absolutely. that the executions plot, the news of the executions plus the things that people are afraid about at night that they tell us about Basijis and the paramilitaries having little parades at night out with guns and armored personnel carriers at night designed to deter and intimidate the population so that in a post-conflict scenario, the population does not come out. I fear that that is working in a world where The US is talking about civilizational erasure in a world where a lot of the targets are these big, heavier targets in a world where we're kind of acclimated to some of these civilian infrastructural targets. And then you don't have this apparatus sufficiently taken down and you don't have the political elite targeted, but you do have all this commentary in support of the Iranian people. You're going to, the Iranian people are going to say when the rubber hits the road, what did you do? And the real sad thing, and I hate to say this, the real sad thing is even among you know, people I know and respect in DC and around not in the governments, but around who work in things related to US national security. They're now saying, well, it's up to the Iranians. I was like, it has been up to the Iranians. They have been trying. They haven't been able to go that far. And so people simply crassly say, well, they're supposed to get armed from, from where, from how, with what kind of training and what kind of success that American arms, arm shipments have to the region in Syria, or in Afghanistan in other parts. So ⁓ are coming to some very bitter truths that if we let these truths linger and ⁓ is no commensurate US policy to change these things, then that beneficiary is the Islamic Republic, where they will say, these were the people you wanted help from? The people who in the morning said, civilizational erasure, but at night made a ceasefire deal with me? These were the people you wanted? Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: help from? That is such a powerful weapon and not just, I'm not trying to be mean, not just inside Iran, but among the diaspora. Some in the diaspora, some who have only recently turned to become pro-regime after women life freedom, who attack their fellow Iranian Americans or Iranians in the diaspora for supporting armed interventions since January, February, March. People see it as usually one way, people usually see the Republican and the monarchist and the pro-Trump and the pro-Israel vector as being aggressive online. But I've seen my fair share of the exact opposite side. To be brutally honest with you, backbite and say things about the diaspora and be critical about supporting foreign intervention. And to that end, ⁓ worried about the tensions within the community, the finger pointing within the community that you did this, you got us there, you said this, you advocated for that. No, you did this first. No, you used to be like this. Then you changed. All of these things, all of these things benefit the Islamic Republic, which is why it is imperative that the wake up call, the alarm bell ring here in Washington, which is these are your partners, the Iranian people, the Israel especially. These are your partners on this planet. I don't know a population who has been through what they've been through like the Iranians who live in a region like they live like the Iranians, but who are still pro-Israel and pro-American. I was just at a school. I was speaking at a university in America. Amir Golshani: Right. Behnam Ben Taleblu: to do two, three hours from DC. And there was a table of Iranians. I didn't know they were Iranians. It was a public event. It was a debate, actually. And the guy got up, and I didn't know what he was going to say, but he did look Middle Eastern. I was like, oh, this is going to go very good or very bad. And God bless him, he agreed with everything I said. But he turned to the person I was debating, and he said, I never carried an American flag in my life before. But he's Iranian immigrant, a university student, graduate student. And he said, I have been carrying it every single day since January. You know, these are the people that Trump will lose. These are the immigrants you want. These are the people that can transform the Middle East. Give them a chance. Amir Golshani: Right. Absolutely. I appreciate that, Benham. That was really eye-opening, you know, and we cannot put more emphasis on this, I believe, arguably the most nation in the world, I always say let's keep it that way. Is there any... ⁓ Behnam Ben Taleblu: ⁓ the region where a lot of the interventions, ⁓ Americans are right to be skeptical of these interventions, and maybe we'll end with this, but in places where there was military force and there was an idea for regime change or democratization, there was a lot of built-in assumptions about social engineering, that we have to do something to this society to get it to want that. The difference with Iran is you don't need to social engineer. The people are already there. 47 years of the Islamic Republic has made this population secular, nationalist, pro-America and pro-Israel. You have a constituency. Now it's up to you to design the policy, not to lose it. Rather than work to get it, you have to work to keep it. Amir Golshani: And this job needs to be finished. really appreciate that. Benham, is there anything that we haven't talked about, but you think it's absolutely critical to pay attention at this moment as final work? Behnam Ben Taleblu: Yes. Maybe one last warning about the nuclear. Ironically, is where the biggest strategic challenge for America will come in the post-conflict situation. It is one where, yes, we have eyes and ears on the program, from what President Trump said, the satellite coverage. One would assume there's also some level of intelligence penetration based on what the Israelis have been able to do in the past. Who knows? The reason we talk about the North Korea analogy is not to make it to North Korea today, but to North Korea in the where after the Cold War, they lost their major patron. And the things North Korea was able to do in the ⁓ brought it to be the threat that it was today, which was North Korea moved towards nuclear weapons capability, especially after in the mid 2000s, the collapse of the agreed framework. And also North Korea began to develop longer range missiles and in particular move towards ICBMs later in the mid 2000s. So the path dependent political and military choices, a weak, poor North Korea in the made due to the hardened national security elite ⁓ it the threat that it is today. That's why I want to ring the alarm bell about, can the military win and there's no doubt Trump has that win. But what is the strategy that follows so that you can get a political win as well? The military, at I've said this before, is littered with military wins that have failed to be translated into political wins. Now is the test of what's the next step, what comes after. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. Benham, I really appreciate you coming back and sharing your insight with us. Behnam Ben Taleblu: Always a pleasure. Thank you for having me.