Latest / Defensive Line Shorts / The Defensive Line Shorts — Special Edition: The ConnectWise application-identity incident
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_00: Welcome to a special edition of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 0:03SPEAKER_00: Today, ConnectWise and how a supplier's application identity became a route
- 0:08SPEAKER_00: into customer environments.
- 0:10SPEAKER_00: In about 10 minutes, we'll unpack the evidence and the lessons.
- 0:13SPEAKER_00: My name is Carter and I'm an Intelligence Analyst.
- 0:16SPEAKER_00: I'm joined by Lizzie, our Blue Team Specialist.
- 0:19SPEAKER_01: Thanks, Carter.
- 0:20SPEAKER_01: My name is Lizzie and I'm a Blue Teamer.
- 0:23SPEAKER_01: I bring the practical perspective.
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: Which actions change the outcome and what it takes to put them into practice?
- 0:30SPEAKER_00: A quick note.
- 0:31SPEAKER_00: This briefing is drafted and read by AI, but reviewed and edited by humans.
- 0:36SPEAKER_00: We're drawing on The Defensive Line newsletter research,
- 0:39SPEAKER_00: updated with reporting checked on Monday, the 19th of October, 2026.
- 0:44SPEAKER_01: And the central distinction is this.
- 0:47SPEAKER_01: Protecting a person's login doesn't protect every application acting inside your organization.
- 0:53SPEAKER_00: On the 15th of October,
- 0:55SPEAKER_00: Huntress,
- 0:56SPEAKER_00: a managed detection and response provider,
- 0:58SPEAKER_00: and Total,
- 0:59SPEAKER_00: a security platform provider,
- 1:01SPEAKER_00: observed unauthorized application sign-ins in Microsoft 365 tenants.
- 1:06SPEAKER_00: The identity belonged to ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly Skykick.
- 1:11SPEAKER_00: ConnectWise supplies backup and management software to managed service providers
- 1:15SPEAKER_00: who use it across customer environments.
- 1:18SPEAKER_01: So this wasn't someone tricking an employee into approving a login?
- 1:23SPEAKER_00: No,
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: the attacker authenticated as the application and obtained Microsoft Graph Tokens,
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: credentials for calling Microsoft's service interfaces.
- 1:32SPEAKER_00: Huntress' updated findings describe almost 1,000 tenants
- 1:35SPEAKER_00: with associated sign-in activity, with successful sign-ins in more than 300.
- 1:41SPEAKER_00: Those aren't 300 confirmed data theft cases.
- 1:44SPEAKER_01: That matters.
- 1:45SPEAKER_01: Successful authentication,
- 1:47SPEAKER_01: the permissions available, and what someone actually did are different findings.
- 1:52SPEAKER_01: What evidence goes beyond signing in?
- 1:55SPEAKER_00: In one tenant,
- 1:57SPEAKER_00: Huntress separately observe a cloud management application for Teams,
- 2:00SPEAKER_00: grant itself global administrator, then add credentials to two other applications.
- 2:06SPEAKER_00: One was an application unique to that Huntress customer.
- 2:09SPEAKER_00: The changes took about five minutes.
- 2:12SPEAKER_00: Seven subsequent sign-ins used the unauthorized Huntress credential.
- 2:16SPEAKER_01: And that wasn't necessarily the backup application doing all of it?
- 2:20SPEAKER_00: Correct.
- 2:21SPEAKER_00: Different application, different observed activity.
- 2:24SPEAKER_00: Huntress hasn't conclusively tied the earlier credential planting and
- 2:28SPEAKER_00: the later authentication sweep to the same operator.
- 2:31SPEAKER_00: The original credential exposure method and attribution remain unresolved.
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: Total found no directory changes attributable to the backup app in its investigated tenants.
- 2:41SPEAKER_00: Neither observation cancels the other.
- 2:44SPEAKER_01: For listeners who don't live inside Microsoft Entra,
- 2:47SPEAKER_01: Microsoft's identity platform,
- 2:49SPEAKER_01: can you explain how separate customers shared this exposure?
- 2:53SPEAKER_00: The supplier registers a multi-tenant application in its own environment.
- 2:58SPEAKER_00: Each consenting customer gets a local enterprise application, called a service principle.
- 3:03SPEAKER_00: Those local objects represent the same supplier application.
- 3:07SPEAKER_00: The supplier's credential proves its identity.
- 3:10SPEAKER_00: Each customer's grants determine what that application can do there.
- 3:14SPEAKER_01: So separate local objects don't automatically mean separate customer credentials.
- 3:20SPEAKER_01: And application-only authentication has no person completing MFA.
- 3:25SPEAKER_01: I'd keep strong authentication for people,
- 3:27SPEAKER_01: but not mistake it for protection against this credential replay.
- 3:31SPEAKER_01: The portable lesson is to assess software identities separately from human logins.
- 3:36SPEAKER_00: Exactly.
- 3:38SPEAKER_00: Nor was this one universal access token.
- 3:40SPEAKER_00: The attacker requested tokens for individual tenants and resources.
- 3:45SPEAKER_00: Some attempts failed because the application wasn't present.
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: The architecture explains the potential reach of a stolen credential, not how it was stolen.
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: I'd also separate data permissions from directory roles.
- 3:58SPEAKER_01: A backup app may need broad data access without being global administrator.
- 4:03SPEAKER_01: Application management
- 4:04SPEAKER_01: or directory write permissions can allow credential additions subject
- 4:08SPEAKER_01: to authorization and target protections.
- 4:11SPEAKER_01: Their names don't tell you the full risk,
- 4:13SPEAKER_01: and they aren't synonyms for unrestricted administrator access.
- 4:17SPEAKER_00: That's the uncomfortable part.
- 4:19SPEAKER_00: Permission to modify another identity can become a route to that identity's existing authority.
- 4:25SPEAKER_00: But the exact original grants behind the observed self-elevation remain unconfirmed.
- 4:31SPEAKER_01: Where I'd start, if you use these services, is the vendor's affected application list.
- 4:37SPEAKER_01: I'd match application IDs,
- 4:39SPEAKER_01: not names,
- 4:40SPEAKER_01: and verify they're disabled in every customer tenant and the provider's own tenant,
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: including dormant Skykick connections.
- 4:48SPEAKER_01: I'd preserve configuration rather than delete the objects.
- 4:51SPEAKER_01: For other suppliers, I'd check the equivalent local disconnect control.
- 4:56SPEAKER_00: What has ConnectWise already done on its side?
- 4:59SPEAKER_01: It says it disabled seven application identities and revoked affected certificates on the 17th.
- 5:06SPEAKER_01: The affected shared credentials are no longer valid.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: I'd still follow its instruction
- 5:11SPEAKER_01: to keep local applications disabled pending formal restoration guidance.
- 5:16SPEAKER_01: Containment shouldn't wait for evidence exports,
- 5:19SPEAKER_01: but I'd preserve available records promptly alongside it.
- 5:23SPEAKER_00: And why isn't that the end of the investigation?
- 5:26SPEAKER_01: Because disabling the original app doesn't remove credentials planted elsewhere.
- 5:30SPEAKER_01: I'd have an authorized responder review credentials and role changes
- 5:34SPEAKER_01: on other applications touched during suspicious activity,
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: then remove confirmed unauthorized access and verify removal.
- 5:41SPEAKER_01: Across platforms, it's the same principle.
- 5:44SPEAKER_01: Close the access established after entry, not only the original door.
- 5:49SPEAKER_00: The planted secrets were set to expire in 2028.
- 5:53SPEAKER_00: Their expiry dates illustrate why supplier credential revocation
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: and customer recovery are separate tasks.
- 5:59SPEAKER_01: For an affected Microsoft tenant,
- 6:01SPEAKER_01: I'd preserve service principal sign-ins and directory audit records from
- 6:05SPEAKER_01: the 13th onwards, expanding where evidence leads.
- 6:10SPEAKER_01: User sign-ins alone miss this path.
- 6:12SPEAKER_01: EntraFree normally retains only seven days.
- 6:16SPEAKER_01: I'd involve the incident response provider if the team lacks that expertise.
- 6:20SPEAKER_01: This isn't a casual background monitoring task.
- 6:24SPEAKER_00: And a clean search doesn't necessarily mean nothing was accessed?
- 6:28SPEAKER_01: No.
- 6:29SPEAKER_01: I'd record the limits of the available logs.
- 6:32SPEAKER_01: Turning on richer logging today doesn't recreate yesterday's unrecorded activity.
- 6:38SPEAKER_01: Microsoft's workload conditional access also excludes these third-party multi-tenant
- 6:43SPEAKER_01: applications.
- 6:44SPEAKER_01: I'd avoid presenting it as the fix here.
- 6:47SPEAKER_01: Whatever your platform, I'd verify a proposed control covers the identity actually being abused.
- 6:53SPEAKER_00: As of ConnectWise's latest update on the 19th,
- 6:56SPEAKER_00: cloud backup,
- 6:57SPEAKER_00: SaaS security and cloud management remain suspended
- 7:01SPEAKER_00: with no confirmed restoration time.
- 7:03SPEAKER_00: Backups, archive access and restores are unavailable.
- 7:08SPEAKER_00: The vendor reports no evidence that stored archives were accessed.
- 7:12SPEAKER_00: That does not establish whether live customer data was accessed.
- 7:16SPEAKER_01: I'd treat recovery availability as a separate workstream.
- 7:20SPEAKER_01: Establish the last successful backup and what can be restored today.
- 7:24SPEAKER_01: Then, agree interim protection for critical data.
- 7:28SPEAKER_01: For anyone using cloud backup,
- 7:30SPEAKER_01: the general test is whether recovery still works when
- 7:33SPEAKER_01: the supplier's control service is unavailable.
- 7:36SPEAKER_01: Intact archives alone aren't that proof.
- 7:39SPEAKER_00: Beyond affected customers,
- 7:41SPEAKER_00: our assessment is that the wider issue is concentrated supplier authority,
- 7:46SPEAKER_00: not a newly discovered flaw in human authentication.
- 7:49SPEAKER_00: A compromised integration can connect many organizations' exposure
- 7:53SPEAKER_00: without their staff doing anything unusual.
- 7:56SPEAKER_00: What would you change longer term, Lizzie?
- 7:58SPEAKER_01: I'd start with existing high-privilege integrations.
- 8:02SPEAKER_01: Remove unused ones and challenge grants beyond their documented job.
- 8:06SPEAKER_01: Alongside that,
- 8:07SPEAKER_01: Useful supplier questions include how customers' identities
- 8:11SPEAKER_01: and credentials are isolated.
- 8:13SPEAKER_01: A different secret on the same shared application doesn't necessarily isolate customers.
- 8:19SPEAKER_01: Separate identities can reduce credential level reach,
- 8:22SPEAKER_01: but don't eliminate supplier control system risk.
- 8:26SPEAKER_00: What about AppInstance Property Lock, which Huntress says it's enabled?
- 8:30SPEAKER_01: I'd consider asking publishers about it.
- 8:33SPEAKER_01: It can prevent credential changes on protected enterprise app instances,
- 8:37SPEAKER_01: not protect credentials added to the app registration,
- 8:41SPEAKER_01: or stop use of the publisher's existing credential.
- 8:44SPEAKER_01: It's one layer, not a complete solution.
- 8:47SPEAKER_01: That's the lesson I'd leave with Defenders.
- 8:49SPEAKER_01: Carter, back to you for the closing.
- 8:52SPEAKER_00: This incident combines observed application access,
- 8:55SPEAKER_00: documented persistence in one tenant and a backup outage.
- 8:59SPEAKER_00: The scope of data access and the original credential theft remain unresolved.
- 9:04SPEAKER_01: I'd leave listeners with three priorities.
- 9:07SPEAKER_01: Contain affected application access,
- 9:09SPEAKER_01: investigate separate persistence and prove the recovery path.
- 9:14SPEAKER_01: Then revisit the standing authority you've granted suppliers.
- 9:18SPEAKER_00: The source links are in the show notes.
- 9:20SPEAKER_00: Subscribe to The Defensive Line on Substack and your podcast app
- 9:23SPEAKER_00: for weekly actionable security intelligence, reviewed and edited by Blue Teamers.
- 9:29SPEAKER_00: Until next time, stay defensive!