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042 - XI What the Beginning of Philosophy Is · Discourses of Epictetus

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  Speaker 1: Section forty one of Discourses of Epictetis by Epictetis, translated
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  Speaker 1: by George Long. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
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  Speaker 1: Read by Christine Rocker, January fourth, twenty twenty two, Westford, Massachusetts,
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  Speaker 1: Book two, Chapter eleven. What the beginning of philosophy is?
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  Speaker 1: The beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters
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  Speaker 1: on it in the right way and by the door,
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  Speaker 1: is a consciousness of his own weakness and inability about
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  Speaker 1: necessary things. For we come into the world with no
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  Speaker 1: natural notion of a right angled triangle, or of a
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  Speaker 1: dioces quarter tone, or of a half tone. But we
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  Speaker 1: learn each of these things by a certain transmission, according
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  Speaker 1: to art. And for this reason, those who do not
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  Speaker 1: know them do not think that they know them. But
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  Speaker 1: as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly and
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  Speaker 1: becoming an un becoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper
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  Speaker 1: and improper, and what we ought to do and what
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  Speaker 1: we ought not to do, whoever came into the world
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  Speaker 1: without having an innate idea of them. Wherefore we all
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  Speaker 1: use these names, and we endeavor to fit the preconceptions
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  Speaker 1: to the several cases things. Thus he has done well.
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  Speaker 1: He has not done well. He has done as he ought,
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  Speaker 1: not as he ought. He has been unfortunate, he has
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  Speaker 1: been fortunate. He is unjust, he is just. Who does
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  Speaker 1: not use these names? Who among us defers the use
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  Speaker 1: of them till he has learned them, as he defers
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  Speaker 1: the use of the words about lines, geometric figures, or sounds.
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  Speaker 1: And the cause of this is that we come into
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  Speaker 1: the world already taught, as it were, by nature some
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  Speaker 1: things on this manner topon, and proceeding from these we
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  Speaker 1: have added to them self. Conceit I mean, for why
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  Speaker 1: a man says, do I not know the beautiful and
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  Speaker 1: the ugly? Have I not the notion of it you have?
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  Speaker 1: Do I not adapt it to particulars you do? Do
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  Speaker 1: I not then adapt it properly? And that lies the
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  Speaker 1: whole question? And conceit is added here, for beginning from
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  Speaker 1: these things which are admitted, men proceed to that which
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  Speaker 1: is matter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation. For
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  Speaker 1: if they possess this power of adaptation in addition to
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  Speaker 1: those things, what would hinder them from being perfect? But now,
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  Speaker 1: since you think that you properly adapt these preconceptions to
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  Speaker 1: the particulars. Tell me whence you derive this? Assume that
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  Speaker 1: you do so because I think so, But it does
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  Speaker 1: not seem so to another. And he thinks that he
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  Speaker 1: also makes a proper adaptation, or does he not think
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  Speaker 1: so he does think so. Is it possible, then, that
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  Speaker 1: both of you can properly apply the preconceptions to things
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  Speaker 1: about which you have contrary opinions? It is not possible.
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  Speaker 1: Can you then show us anything better towards adapting the
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  Speaker 1: preconceptions beyond your thinking that you do? Does the madman
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  Speaker 1: do any other things than the things which seem to him? Right?
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  Speaker 1: Is then this criterion sufficient for him? Also it is
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  Speaker 1: not sufficient. Come then, to something which is superior to seeming?
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  Speaker 1: Ton de Kien. What is this? Observe? This is the
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  Speaker 1: beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men
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  Speaker 1: with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of
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  Speaker 1: the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which
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  Speaker 1: only seems, and a certain investigation of that which seems
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  Speaker 1: whether it seems right, and the discovery of some rule
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  Speaker 1: ken on us. As we have discovered a balance in
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  Speaker 1: the determination of weights and a Carpenter's rule or square
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  Speaker 1: in the case of straight and crooked things. This is
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  Speaker 1: the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all things
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  Speaker 1: are right? Which seemed so to all? And how is
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  Speaker 1: it possible that contradictions can be right? Not all, then,
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  Speaker 1: but all which seem to us to be right? How
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  Speaker 1: more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians?
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  Speaker 1: Why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? Why
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  Speaker 1: more than what seems right to me or to any
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  Speaker 1: other man? Not at all more, what then seems to
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  Speaker 1: every man is not sufficient for determining what is. For
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  Speaker 1: neither in the case of weights or measures are we
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  Speaker 1: satisfied with the bare appearance. But in each case we
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  Speaker 1: have discovered a certain rule. In this matter? Then is
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  Speaker 1: there no rule superior to what seems? And how is
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  Speaker 1: it possible that the most necessary things among men should
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  Speaker 1: have no sign mark and be incapable of being discovered?
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  Speaker 1: There is then some rule? And why then do we
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  Speaker 1: not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use
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  Speaker 1: it without varying from it, not even stretching out the
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  Speaker 1: finger without it. For this, I think, is that which,
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  Speaker 1: when it is discovered, cures of their madness. Those who
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  Speaker 1: use mere seeming as a measure and misuse it, so
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  Speaker 1: that for the future, proceeding from certain things, principles known
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  Speaker 1: and made clear, we may use, in the case of
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  Speaker 1: particular things, the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed. What is
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  Speaker 1: the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring pleasure?
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  Speaker 1: For example? Subject to the rule? Throw it into the balance?
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  Speaker 1: Ought the good to be such a thing that it
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  Speaker 1: is fit that we have confidence in it? Yes, and
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  Speaker 1: in which we ought to confide it ought to be?
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  Speaker 1: Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No?
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  Speaker 1: Is it then pleasure anything secure? No? Take it then,
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  Speaker 1: and throw it out of the scale, and drive it
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  Speaker 1: far away from the place of good things. But if
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  Speaker 1: you are not sharp sighted, and one balance is not
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  Speaker 1: enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be
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  Speaker 1: elated over what is good? Yes? Is it proper then
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  Speaker 1: to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do
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  Speaker 1: not say that it is proper? But if you do,
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  Speaker 1: I shall then not think you worthy even of the balance.
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  Speaker 1: Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready.
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  Speaker 1: And to philosophize is this. To examine and confirm the rules,
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  Speaker 1: and then to use them when they are known. Is
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  Speaker 1: the act of a wise and good man. End of
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  Speaker 1: Book two, Chapter eleven,