Latest / The Fourcast / Will ISIS return after Syrian forces push Kurds back?

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Will ISIS return after Syrian forces push Kurds back? · The Fourcast

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  ISIS will be looking at the situation and trying to identify
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  any possibilities for having some sort of a resurrection.
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  The. Kurds were doing, as it were,
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  The Dirty work for the worst, particularly the Americans.
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  The Kurds, they will see this as a huge blow.
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  Many of them do not want to be integrated completely into a
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  centralized Syrian state. I think there's a great danger
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  of continued guerrilla warfare. There isn't much of A call for
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  to improve conditions in these camps for people who are
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  regarded as terrorists, and without that, they have become a
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  breeding grounds for radicalization.
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  This has been a mistake repeated again and again, you know, in
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  our modern history. Hello and welcome to the
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  forecast. It was hoped the fall of Syria's
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  dictator Bashar al-Assad would usher in a period of stability,
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  unity and perhaps eventually democracy.
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  But now the country enters a new and unpredictable phase as
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  President Ahmed Al Sharah tightens his grip on power in
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  the North East. The Kurds were the West key ally
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  against Islamic State. Now their control in the region
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  is collapsing after days of fierce battles with government
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  forces. A tentative ceasefire is in
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  place but the fallout is far from clear, including the fate
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  of thousands of ISIS prisoners and their families who were in
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  Kurdish controlled camps. Regional players like Turkey and
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  Iran, as well as China, Russia and the West, are also jostling
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  for influence. Could these developments finally
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  bring a period of calm and stability in Syria or just open
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  the door to new dangers? I'm joined by our international
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  editor, Lindsay Hilsum, and by Lina Khatib, the principal
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  analyst at geopolitical foresight company Extrac.
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  Lina Khatib, First, that hope of a unified Syria.
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  How hopeless is that looking right now?
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  It's actually looking more likely than before.
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  For the longest time there was speculation that Syria could go
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  down the line of federalism, with, for example, a Kurdish
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  autonomous area in the North East becoming a permanent
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  feature of Syria. But since Ahmed Shara came to
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  power, there has been persistent messaging by the Syrian
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  government that decentralisation is not going to be acceptable,
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  that they want to centralise governance in Syria.
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  And now they are closer to that than ever.
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  And what has happened in the North East sends a message all
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  over Syria that the model for governance going forward is a
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  centralised 1. So, Lindsay, sum up for us, if
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  you would, the sort of military and political landscape right
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  now. Well, I think that Aslina says
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  the central government under Ahmad al Sharra is trying to
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  pull in everybody, the Alawites, the Druze and now the Kurds.
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  But from a Kurdish point of view, they held this area of
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  northeastern Syria called Rajava as a semi autonomous state in
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  the time of Bashar al-Assad. And that was something that they
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  wanted. And you look to Iraq and you
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  have Iraqi Kurdistan, which is semi autonomous and what has
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  been happening over the last few days, which is fierce fighting
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  between the Kurdish forces and the central Damascus forces and
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  which has resulted in most of that area, Rajava, being taken
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  over by the the central Syrian forces.
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  For many of the Kurds, they will see this is a huge blow.
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  Many of them do not want to be integrated completely into a
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  centralised Syrian state. They want to retain some
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  autonomy. And I think that they will see
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  this, as, you know, less and less possible.
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  And I'm not sure that they would all accept it.
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  I think there's a great danger of continued guerrilla warfare.
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  Exactly on that point lean, I mean, the idea of moving towards
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  unity doesn't actually happen if the Kurds don't accept this,
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  does it? It certainly will be difficult
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  because not everyone, as we heard, is on board.
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  And also the issue is not just about the Kurds.
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  There's other communities in Syria that we're hoping for
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  autonomy as well. And here we're mainly talking
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  about the Druze in the South, as well as perhaps some communities
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  are in coastal areas which come from the Alawite community.
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  So the Syrian governments way of handling the situation in the
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  northeast is meant to also be about those other communities
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  further down the line. And those communities in the
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  South, for example, food, also form groups that do not toe the
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  line of the government. And so there is the potential of
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  seeing not just guerrilla groups in the northeast, but guerrilla
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  groups and other areas in Syria as well.
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  And the challenge for the Syrian government here becomes twofold.
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  On the one hand, it's a security challenge.
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  When the security sector capacity of the new Syrian
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  government is quite reduced, it's still not very strong.
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  And 2nd, it's a political issue because solving all these issues
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  ultimately has to be through political inclusion.
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  And that is something that is not quite there in Syria at the
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  moment. There had been talk, you know,
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  with the the new government that there would be elections.
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  How likely is that now? Eventually there have to be
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  elections because this government is currently
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  presenting itself as legitimate on the basis that it's a
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  liberation government. But the Syrian people want to
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  see actual political representation going on with
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  genuine political participation by the people and we will see
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  whether President Sharia will deliver on his promises that in
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  few years time Syria will have elections.
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  Otherwise, I think masses of Syrians will be very
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  disappointed. Is that, you know, the latest
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  development sort of lightning move move movements over the
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  last couple of weeks that make elections less likely?
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  When it comes to the impact of what we've just seen in
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  northeast Syria on the political trajectory of Syria when it
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  comes to elections, I think the move towards centralisation
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  actually makes it more likely that elections will happen
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  further down the line. Because now you can say Syrians
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  more or less all over the country will be able to
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  participate in those elections. Whereas until not too long ago,
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  the government could argue that there is one area of Syria that
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  is outside of its remit and therefore elections cannot
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  happen. And so hopefully things should
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  actually become a bit more positive in that regard.
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  But then a lot of that then on the conduct that it depends on
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  whether the different Syrian groups, where it's the Kurds,
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  the group we're looking at, or the Druze or the allies and so
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  on, except the authority of the central state and everything
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  comes down to that. And if it came to elections,
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  whether they felt free to elect their own representatives who
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  would inevitably represent their own communities and whether they
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  felt that those representatives would actually have an influence
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  over the central authorities. And I think that all of that is
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  still unclear at the moment. And whether that would allow
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  them still to push for this sort of autonomous region?
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  I don't think they're going to get their autonomous region, but
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  there is still negotiations going on about what kind of, you
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  know what, how that could work out because it's perfectly
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  possible to have a semi autonomous region or a federal
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  system or whatever. Now that is not what the Syrian
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  government is looking at at the moment, but those things are
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  still to be discussed and that is also something which would
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  come up in elections. And Lindsay, the Kurds are
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  particularly interesting in a way, aren't they?
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  Because they were pivotal allies against ISIS.
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  Yet it seems now they're being effectively abandoned by the
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  West. The Kurds are relearning A
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  brutal lesson. Loyalty means nothing.
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  They have no permanent friends. Well, and this goes back to the
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  the history of of the Kurds. So as you know, Kurdish people
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  up to 45,000,000 spread across four countries, not just Syria,
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  but also Iran, Iraq and Turkey. And they don't have their own
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  states. They don't have a Kurdish
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  country as such. And over the years they have
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  teamed up with the Americans particularly many times.
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  They teamed up with the Americans to try and overthrow
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  Saddam Hussein several times in in Iraq.
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  What happened nearly every time the Americans abandoned them,
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  the CIA abandoned them to their fate.
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  And many Kurds will be seeing exactly the same Now.
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  The Kurds were doing, as it were, The Dirty work for the
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  West, particularly the Americans.
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  I was there in Rajava, which is this Kurdish area of Syria,
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  several times between 2016 and 2019.
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  They were there, the Kurdish forces fighting on the
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  frontline, killing and dying in order to defeat Islamic State,
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  partly because they wanted to do that themselves.
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  They have a very different ideology from Islamic State.
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  They have women with female brigades in their armies.
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  They live a, you know, many of them are quite secular, not all
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  of them. They're still Muslims.
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  And they have a very leftist way of looking at at the world.
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  But they were doing it also on behalf of America and on behalf
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  of the West. And most significantly, they
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  have been guarding the ISIS prisoners, prisoners, male
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  prisoners who are in in ordinary prisons, as it were, and female
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  prisoners in camps. And here I'll just mention
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  Shamima Begum because that may be her name that's familiar to
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  many British people. She was a a young woman, aged
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  15, a child really, who fled her home and went to join ISIS.
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  And she ended up becoming very embroiled in that and she's
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  overheld, we think in a camp called Al Raj at the moment.
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  Now the Kurds, they were looking after those people or keeping
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  those people prisoner while Western countries refused to
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  have their own nationals back. And now, well, suddenly they're
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  not useful anymore. The Americans have decided that
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  Al Sharar and that government they can more or less look
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  overlook after the the prisoners say Kurds sorry about that.
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  Can I just add that one key reason why the Kurds were
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  fighting ISIS is not just because of course ISIS posed a
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  real threat to them, but also because they thought that if
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  they play this role, then they can eventually get autonomy.
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  Then the West would back them in this political goal of theirs.
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  And unfortunately, the situation has been one in which they were
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  simply being instrumentalized by the international community in
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  the fight against ISIS. And now the US envoy, Tom
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  Barack, has basically said that their role has ended.
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  That's it. Their role in fighting ISIS has
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  ended, and therefore their role as custodians of security in the
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  Northeast is over. You go back to Henry Kissinger,
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  don't you? Who was the one who said that
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  America has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only
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  permanent interests? And so the Kurds acted in the
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  American interest. And now the Americans say, look
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  at it like that. And so you come back to another.
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  This is one, I'm afraid it's another cliche what the the
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  Kurds always say because they feel that they're always
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  betrayed. No friends but the mountains.
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  So Lena, what are what are the political, the geopolitical
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  consequences of the West in a sense letting down the Kurds
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  here? Well, one of the bigger issues
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  for the West, of course, is that of ISIS and what to do about
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  ISIS detainees. And what the US indicates doing
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  is moving reportedly 7000 of those ISIS detainees from the
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  prisons that the Kurds were overseeing to Iraq.
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  So these prisoners are being moved to Iraq.
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  Why is this happening? It's because now that area, the
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  northeast, is under the control of the Syrian government.
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  And as I was saying earlier, unfortunately the Syrian
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  government's security sector capacity is still quite weak.
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  So they will not be able to really hold that area
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  effectively, especially as ISIS will be looking at the situation
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  and trying to identify any possibilities for releasing some
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  of their prisoners and having some sort of a resurrection.
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  So the US is trying to play safe by moving these detainees to
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  Iraq. Now here, of course, we have
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  another situation, which is the presence now for the first time
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  of the Syrian government's forces at the Iraqi boulder.
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  Until very recently, it was the Kurds who were present in a
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  security capacity. So now the Iraqi authorities
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  will have to coordinate with this new government in Syria,
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  which is going to be also a bit of a delicate political
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  situation considering the varied political leanings that are
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  present in Iraq compared to Syria.
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  And here I'm talking mainly about the still very influential
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  role for Iran in the Iraq, influencing many of the militias
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  that are present in that area. And so they will also, these
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  Iraqi militias be seeing in this new movement in Syria a bit of a
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  threat to their own authority as well.
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  So, Lindsay on on how the Syrian government react to all of this,
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  I mean, how does Ahmed al Shara's government differ regime
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  differ from Bashar al Assad's? Well, look, it's hugely
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  different. I mean, obviously, he comes from
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  an Islamist background. And I think that that is one of
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  the reasons that many people look on his forces taking over
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  these camps and prisons and think, are they really seeing
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  themselves as the enemies of the men and women inside?
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  Or would they actually like to release some of them because
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  they could they could be partners in the future.
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  And that is that is an open question.
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  But clearly he represents, you know, ethnically, religiously, a
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  majority in Syria, which is Sunni Muslims, unlike Bashar
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  al-Assad who was an Alawite, which was a minority.
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  So arguably that gives him an advantage.
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  The other advantage that he has, I think, is that there is a lot
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  of goodwill towards Ahmed Al Sharah, and that primarily comes
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  from the Gulf countries. And one of the reasons, I think
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  that all the main reason that we've seen this big change in
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  American policy and this big support for him, even though he
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  does come from this Islamist background, is because the Gulf
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  country has said to, to President Trump, look, you've
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  got to support this man. This man has a chance of uniting
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  Syria, of pulling Syria together as one country, not as a broken,
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  fragmented state. You've got to lift sanctions,
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  which Donald Trump did, and you've got to give him all the
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  the backing you can. So that is the policy that the
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  Americans are following very much after the the lead of the
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  Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
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  And if I can add one key thing about Sharaf's political
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  positioning, which relates to my point earlier on Iran, is that
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  he is vehemently anti Iran. Obviously the Syria situation
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  under Bashar al-Assad was was really optimal for Iranian
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  influence in the Middle East. And with the fall of Assad, that
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  situation changed radically for Iran.
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  It lost a huge advantage when it comes to its strategic influence
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  in the region with the fall of Assad.
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  So now you have Sharia, who's anti Iran.
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  But another thing about him is obviously as the previous leader
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  of, he also fought with his factions against ISIS because
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  they were political rivals. So for a while you had rivalry
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  between, hey, Atahrid Sham under a shadow and he was known at the
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  time as Abu Muhammad al Julani and ISIS.
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  They were arguing over power and fighting bitterly and hey
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  Atahrid Sham prevailed. And so in this sense, Haiah
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  Pahri, the Sham, still sees ISIS as a threat and as a rival and
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  as an enemy and vice versa. And so this situation with the
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  prisoners, I don't think personally is going to lead to
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  more cooperation between the Syrian government and some of
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  the prisoners. I think it's the opposite.
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  I think they are concerned about their own security when the
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  situation might present openings for ISIS.
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  And Lindsay, of course, President Erdogan in Turkey, it
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  must be pretty delighted at how things are panning out for the
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  Kurds. Oh, he's crowing because
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  President Erdogan in Turkey is the Kurdish separatist movement
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  was see it was his biggest enemy.
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  Now he did a sort of deal with them, which is kind of stalling
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  at the moment. It's not completely clear what
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  exactly is happening on them. But to see their autonomous area
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  reduced and potentially crushed in Syria, that's a big advantage
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  to to President Erdogan. And that may be another reason
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  that the Americans have withdrawn their support for the
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  Kurds in order to, you know, to, to reinforce that connection
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  with, with Erdogan and Turkey, which is a which is a NATO
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  member. But can we just, I just want to
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  bring it for a moment back to the human side of this, because
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  I visited those camps. And one of the things I think is
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  really important is you have all these women in those camps and
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  all these children. And these children have been
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  brought up without an education and they have been radicalized
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  because many of the women in the camps a fanatical ISIS
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  supporters. It was extraordinary being
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  there. They were so angry and the fury
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  at me because I just wore a headscarf and didn't cover my
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  face. I mean, these kind of feelings
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  and beliefs are very prevalent in the camps.
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  And I wonder what is going to happen to those children now,
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  because now for many years, you know, sort of 5-6, what is it
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  7-8 years they've been brought up without an education.
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  And with this radicalization, how are they ever going to be
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  integrated into a new into a new Syria?
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  And what about, you know, the suffering of all those people?
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  And I think that one of the things is also worrying when you
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  look at the the Kurds, they have, there has been a certain
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  under the autonomous region, there has been a certain amount
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  of freedom for women. And many of them will fear that
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  despite Ahmed al Shahra's declaration that women are
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  equal. And so they will fear being
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  reintegrated into Syria because they will fear losing some of
• 19:51
  those freedoms. I don't know, Lena, whether you
• 19:53
  think that those those fears are justified or not.
• 19:58
  Well, I was in Syria in December and one thing I noticed and that
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  was my first visit since before the conflict, so 15 years, and I
• 20:08
  did not see explicit signs in Damascus regarding increased
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  Islamization, however. Behind closed doors there were
• 20:18
  quite a few concerns expressed by people that there were
• 20:22
  informal things happening that they saw as leading society down
• 20:27
  that particular route. So I think these concerns that
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  you are talking about are not baseless.
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  And, and the point is, I suppose, that there isn't much
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  of A call for to improve conditions in these camps for
• 20:40
  people who are regarded as terrorists, their families.
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  And without that, as Lindsay says, Lena, you know, they have
• 20:47
  become people say, breeding grounds for radicalization.
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  And unfortunately, this has been a mistake repeated again and and
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  again, you know, in our modern history that we in the
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  international community become so concerned with immediate
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  security measures and we don't think long term about causes of
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  instability. And right now I'm seeing, for
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  example, the movement of detainees, let's say, from Syria
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  to Iraq, but I'm not seeing plans for what to do about the
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  children and the women that Lindsay has been talking about.
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  Where is the solution to try to de radicalize these individuals?
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  This means that, yes, for now, we may be able to deal with the
• 21:36
  problem by keeping them locked up.
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  But this is not going to be a long term solution.
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  And unfortunately, we keep seeing the same mistakes
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  repeated. And this was one of the reasons
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  why ISIS rose, you know, around a decade or so ago.
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  It's because people at the time also did not pay enough
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  attention to the root causes and.
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  They're not small in number, the people being held, the women,
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  the children. Now, I don't know the exact
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  number, I don't know if you do need it, but just our whole camp
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  had 24,000 in it the last time I looked.
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  So we are talking about a lot of, we're talking about a lot of
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  people. And that's one of the is, it's
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  the worst because, you know, the Kurds dealt with them as best
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  they could with some money, but not a lot.
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  And, you know, Western countries refused to take back a lot of
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  their own nationals and didn't want to put money into the
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  education and upkeep of these of these people.
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  But whether they are being held by the Kurds or now by the
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  Syrian authorities and possibly again by the Iraqi authorities,
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  this is just passing the buck from one person to 1.
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  You know, organization or one place to another is not actually
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  looking at the root cause. And it's continuing to create
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  further anger amongst those people.
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  And one day, one day that's going to break out in some way
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  or another. And you know, as we look ahead,
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  I hesitate to say this, but all roads often lead to President
• 23:06
  Trump or certainly he he believes that the Americans role
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  in this. What key difference, if any,
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  might it make? Well, the US has shown that what
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  the US wants is basically what happens in the Middle East.
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  And we have seen a huge change in the region, partly as a
• 23:29
  result of changes under the Trump administration.
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  And here we have explicit support as well as implicit
• 23:38
  support for the administration of Ahmed El Shadda.
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  We are seeing increased partnership between the US and
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  Saudi Arabia. We are seeing close coordination
• 23:53
  between the US and Israel, which I expect will eventually lead to
• 23:58
  significant change in Iran as well.
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  So the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is changing,
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  partly because of the way the US is dealing with the region.
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  So I expect that ultimately no regime is going to be acceptable
• 24:16
  to the United States in the Middle East unless it's a regime
• 24:20
  that is find one way or another with US interests.
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  Lindsay, last word to you. Well, one of the things which
• 24:28
  the the Americas and the Israelis disagree on actually is
• 24:32
  Syria, because Israel is controlling a small section of
• 24:36
  Syria saying that they're there to support the Druze.
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  And that actually is a point of friction.
• 24:41
  But I agree with Lena, I think that the future of the region is
• 24:44
  very looks very different now from how it did say 2-3 years
• 24:48
  ago. And that is primarily because of
• 24:51
  Donald Trump's close association both with the Gulf monarchies
• 24:55
  and with Israel. And I think that as we look in
• 24:58
  the coming years, those are the places which are going to
• 25:01
  dictate what happens and we see declining power for Iran and for
• 25:06
  any countries which are allied with Iran.
• 25:09
  Lindsay Leena Khatib, thank you so much for joining us.
• 25:12
  That is it from this episode of THE FORECAST.
• 25:14
  Until next time, goodbye.