Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / The Illusion of Iranian Power: Why the Regime is Imploding | Jason Brodsky
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- Amir Golshani: Welcome back. Joining us today is Jason Brodsky, the Policy Director at United Against Nuclear Iran, a legal scholar by training and one of the world's foremost analysts on Iranian regime's internal power structure. Jason has become a definitive voice for those seeking to understand the intersection of revolutionary ideology and global security. Jason, it's a privilege to have you on the show. Jason Brodsky: Thank you, Amir. It's great to be with you. Amir Golshani: Fantastic. have spent your career decoding one of the most opaque and ideologically driven organizations in the world. Before we get into the geopolitics of today, what was the specific pivot point or curiosity that led a legal scholar to dedicate his life to analyzing the revolutionary dynamics of Iran? Jason Brodsky: Well, I started out as a lawyer. I'm now a recovery lawyer, as I like to call myself. And I, after law school, worked at the White House. And ⁓ in my extracurricular free time ⁓ in I used to attend think tank events ⁓ throughout ⁓ And I a very strong friendship with Haleh Asfandiari. who was the former Middle East program director at the Wilson Center. And as some of your listeners will know, Halle was held hostage in Iran. Halle turned into a real mentor ⁓ me. ⁓ she took me under her wing at the Wilson Center ⁓ ⁓ became immersed in Iran. And the rest is history. And I've been working at United Against Nuclear Iran for around 10 years now. Amir Golshani: Yeah, I really appreciate sharing that. as we speak, President Trump is meeting with ⁓ Xi Jinping in China. He has made it clear that Iran's current proposals are totally unacceptable. Given that China is primary lifeline for Iranian oil, do you believe President Xi will finally view Tehran's regional instability? as a net negative for Chinese energy security? Or is Iran too valuable a card for China to play against the West? Jason Brodsky: Well, I think China has a very complicated relationship with the Islamic Republic. China ⁓ has been a political supporter of the Islamic Republic and diplomatic fora. It has provided spare parts and components to fuel Iran's missile and drone program and other military programs. China has also provided an economic lifeline to the Islamic Republic in purchasing its oil exports in contravention of American sanctions. And there is an anti-West, anti-American ideological outlook that the Iranian regime shares with China. So there is a close partnership there. But China has other interests as well. China has very strong relationships with Gulf Arab states, particularly Arabia and United Arab Emirates ⁓ and as well. And so it has traditionally hedged and balanced its relationships between the Islamic Republic as well as those states. So I don't think you're going to see a situation where China goes all in for the Islamic Republic of Iran. know, I think a lot of people like to talk about that there's this axis ⁓ authoritarians, if you will. And China is very much part of that club, but it's not. a true axis in the sense that China would never directly intervene militarily to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran. There's mutual defense expectation there formally. And so I think you'll see China provide ⁓ discrete piecemeal assistance ⁓ as we've seen ⁓ here. There been some ⁓ intelligence sharing as well ⁓ during Operation Fury. China would never directly intervene militarily to defend the Islamic Republic of Iran. And so you're going to see China walk a careful balance in that dynamic. China also has an interest in the free flow and freedom of navigation as well. So that's how it characterized Chinese-Iranian relations. Amir Golshani: Right. Having said that, the blockade is obviously hurting everyone, China. If President Trump demands a total cessation of the blockade as a condition for trade stability with Beijing, how does the Islamic Republic react, in your opinion, when their primary customer starts tightening the leash? If President Trump demands a total cessation of the blockade a condition for trade stability with Beijing, how does the Islamic Republic react, Jason Brodsky: Well, I think that's going to put a lot of pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran if China decides to put pressure and stop its oil ⁓ imports the Islamic Republic. That's providing a lifeline to Tehran economically. And if that I think you may start to see a further softening of the Iranian diplomatic a position in negotiations with the United States. I believe there has been already a softening in the Islamic Republic's position diplomatically dating back to the beginning of the Trump administration and his authorization of Operation Midnight Hammer, which basically destroyed the Islamic Republic's nuclear enrichment program as we knew it. And that has resulted in a situation where what has been on the table has been a discussion of a suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment program for a number of years. If we were speaking a mere in 2024, that would not even be on the topic of conversation that was not even on the table. The Iranian regime would not have even considered it. But the fact that that nuclear program, enrichment program specifically, has been so badly damaged and eroded ⁓ you know, it has made, ⁓ putting this years long suspension on enrichment on the table. And that was not what was the original joint comprehensive plan of action that was inked during 2015 during the Obama administration that, ⁓ limited and capped enrichment to 3.67%. So that is a huge difference right now. And so I already believe there's been a softening, but it's going to take some more time and more pressure for that to bear fruit. Amir Golshani: Right. Talking about Iran's nuclear program, the conversation usually stops at high enriched uranium, but you often look deeper. If we see a resumption of kinetic action, what are the strategic targets left in Iran that would actually break the regimes back without triggering a full scale regional collapse? Jason Brodsky: Well, I think the president does have several options. He can engage in or work with the Israelis to ⁓ further degrade the Islamic Republic's leadership and do leadership to capitations, particularly ⁓ actors in Tehran who have been ⁓ and pushing for a hard line in these negotiations. I'm talking about the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, ⁓ Wahidi, and individuals like that. So that could be part of a U.S. military response as the president considers his next step given Iranian intransigence during the negotiations. Another option is to basically take Karghailand ⁓ and take that away from the Iranian regime. ⁓ And Karghailand plus the blockade would put a lot of pressure on Iranian regime decision making. And there were also other ⁓ targets as well. The U.S. still has some work to do in degrading the missile program of Iran, the drone program of Iran, and its nuclear program as well. Let's not forget that there's that stockpile of enriched uranium that's still on Iranian soil, and President Trump calls it nuclear dust. But that stockpile of enriched uranium is something the United States has a very strong objective of getting secured and taken out of the country. So there's that as well. So there are many options the president still has escalate militarily. Amir Golshani: So what do you think about the possibility of retaliation by IRGC? Jason Brodsky: the Iranian regime does still have capacities and capabilities to threaten the region and U.S. interests. There's no doubt about that. ⁓ But it's also true that the Iranian regime is a shell of its self ⁓ in terms of its military programs and its nuclear program. ⁓ And let's forget also its apparatus of terror has also been eroded because of a lot of the the Iranian regime is a shell of its former self ⁓ in terms of its military programs and its nuclear program. decapitations that the Israelis especially engaged in during Operation Epic Fury. ⁓ took out layers upon layers of management within the Iranian regime's intelligence ministry, within its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, its Quds Force. So that has eroded temporarily at least its operational capabilities. But ⁓ make no mistake, You know, I know that some U.S. officials like to say that the Iranian regime has no Navy. It still has the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Navy. And that relies on asymmetric tactics, particularly with fast attack craft, to try to challenge a larger power like the United States. And so ⁓ that is definitely still a threat. And the United States is going to have to factor that in with respect to any escalation. on its part militarily as it moves forward. Amir Golshani: There is an argument, Jason, any negotiations with Iran, regardless of the outcome, if there is an agreement, it guarantees the survival of this current system. What's read on that? any negotiations with Iran, regardless the outcome, if there is an agreement, it guarantees the survival of this current system. Jason Brodsky: I think it's a very strong argument, unfortunately. I believe that enriching regime will only allow it to rebuild its nuclear program, its missile program, its drone program, its architecture of terror, and let's not forget its repressive apparatus. The repressive apparatus of the Islamic Republic domestically, ⁓ I'm talking the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Sarela headquarters, ⁓ and the units. that would, they would be allowed to ⁓ reap the benefits of a lot of those sanctions relief. And so the IRGC and the coercive power of the state will stand to gain with any deal. And that's because sanctions relief is on the table. You know, the reality is, is that the problem at the end of the day is the regime. It's always been the regime and the nuclear program is a symptom. of a much larger issue, and that is the regime itself. And that's why I think it's really important to continue a pressure campaign to deprive the Iranian regime of this capability to do harm. You see what it's doing with the Strait of Hormuz now. Look at, if it ever got a nuclear weapon, look at the risks that that would entail. So I think that US fears of Iran getting a nuclear weapon have been vindicated even with its behavior at the Strait of Hormuz. Amir Golshani: Very well said. if you were advising US administration right now, how would you provide them solution for this rather than just negotiating, you know, and making an agreement with this regime? Because deep down, we all that it's ideology and tactically they may change from time to time, show some sort of so-called flexibility, but you so they never change. Jason Brodsky: They don't. And I have been a proponent of managing the Iranian regime problems, said if you will, without an agreement. So arms control without an agreement. You know, I think a lot of people speak about diplomacy with Iran in almost romantic terms, and as that's a silver bullet solution. There were no risks entailed with diplomacy with Iran. A lot of times people only speak about risks with respect to military action. And of course there are considerable, very huge risks involved in military action against ⁓ country. But there are also risks when it comes to diplomacy with Iran. And we have been in this situation for decades now, where there's been this endless diplomatic process that the Iranian regime has exploited to buy time for the regime while at the same time enriching itself and repressing its people and terrorizing the world. So I think that we should be more focused on there's been this endless diplomatic process that the Iranian regime has exploited to buy time the regime while at the same time enriching itself and repressing its people and terrorizing the world. really starving this regime of resources and legitimacy in order to create the conditions for the Iranian people to reclaim their country. Because I am a proponent, I believe the Iranian people are the greatest allies of the United States and have the potential to be a game changer ⁓ for advancing U.S. interests ⁓ the region if they are empowered to overtake ⁓ system. That would be the best case scenario. here for the United States. We are never going to be able to really durably solve the Iran issue unless this regime is gone. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. But at the same time, it's very sad to say that Iranian people, have been 47 years, they have been the silent victims of ⁓ policy failure. And this time, it will be finished ⁓ once and for Jason, you've noted before that regime often confuses survival with victory. Do you think it's ⁓ it's sad say that Iranian people, have been for 47 years, they have been the silent of ⁓ every policy failure. a propaganda by regime or just pure illusion. Jason Brodsky: think it's a little of both, if you will. I think that for the regime surviving is victory. And unfortunately, I see a lot of Western commentators and even US officials at times in Congress basically embracing the Islamic Republic's theory of victory, that it has survived. It is more powerful now. I don't know how you can make that argument given all of the losses that the Islamic Republic has suffered And if we're looking at the elements of state power, the economy is in crisis. There's a crisis between state and society. There's diplomatic crises. The Islamic Republic has angered its neighbors and done generational damage to its relationships with the GCC states. You ⁓ a country that has a water crisis, an energy crisis. The list goes on. So the fact that people are saying the Islamic Republic has the ⁓ ability to come out stronger. after this, that sounds like regime propaganda to me. I think it's unfortunate and we have to be careful in the way ⁓ think we express our ⁓ because that is seen ⁓ ⁓ you by the regime ⁓ really ⁓ advancing its arguments. The regime relies ⁓ it's been always a keen judge of US resolve. And has doubted that the US has the real resolve to ⁓ hold it accountable and to dismantle this regime. And so I think that we have a lot of these defeatist that we see in the press right now. ⁓ call, there's a group of people who are permanently deterred, defeated, deflated, dejected, and almost differential to the Islamic Republic of Iran. And they act like it's this, you know, it has all this capacity to survive, that there's this endless talent pool of people that this regime will survive in perpetuity. I don't think we have to be more cautious and humble in these kinds of predictions and acting like that. Actually, I fear risks furthering regime propaganda. And so when we hear, I hear people make arguments all the time in the media about how the US has had strategic failure in Iran. This is, this only started in February, on February 28th, 2026. It's now May. I don't know how you can make that argument right now without being premature. This story is far from over. So let's pump the brakes a little bit on these hyperbolic takes. Amir Golshani: So you mentioned a great point, but I'm really curious to know your opinion about the fact that Islamic regime's propaganda machine has been active ⁓ mainly in US in the form of scholars, think tanks, and people who are providing, the information for media. I don't want to say no one doing something, but they're taken care of in a way that they should in order to silence these propaganda Jason Brodsky: Look, I think in the United States, we have freedom of the press and freedom of speech. That's number one. Those are core values of the United States. But, but have been concerned for a number of years regarding what I view as unchecked Iranian regime influence operations ⁓ America and Europe. And you and your listeners will know what I'm talking about when I say this, because I, Amir, not to exaggerate, literally not a day goes by where I don't hear from an Iranian friend. complaining about the fact that you have people basically furthering the narrative of the Iranian regime and major media outlets all over the place. And there's no pushback ever. So that's been a real problem. think the Islamic Republic has mastered a way ⁓ getting its propaganda out in a variety of manners. So how I like to describe it is the Iranian Foreign Ministry likes to offer access to individuals who have very high media platforms. ⁓ who they feel are more receptive to putting out a lot of ⁓ the regime narratives that are basically regime sanctioned and sympathetic to the regime. So that, and there's no disclosure sometimes in those encounters. So that's number one. But ⁓ so foreign ministry, and we've seen reporting on this as well through the Iran Experts Initiative and others ⁓ over years. And that has been tremendously concerning to me. Amir Golshani: Right. Jason Brodsky: So that's number one. Number two is that the Iranian Intelligence Ministry and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also depend on, you know, ⁓ their cyber operations and, you know, their the bots and also the ⁓ sock puppet accounts on social media, which are promoting Iranian regime narratives. And then we have Iran, IRIB, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, which has channels like Press TV. ⁓ that cultivates fringe voices on the left and on the right to get out its sympathetic messaging as well. So we have a ⁓ robust propaganda ⁓ information operation apparatus for the Islamic Republic. The media war is as important for them as the actual war. ⁓ I think that they have for a very long period of time, decades, been able to get away with the media war and they've been quite effective at it. Quite effective. we a ⁓ very robust propaganda ⁓ and information operation apparatus for the Islamic Republic. The media war is as important for them as actual war. any real pushback from the United States. Amir Golshani: Absolutely, but there should be some solution for this because having freedom of speech is one thing. We all agree on that, especially in the US. But letting fake news and these propaganda to spread their words easily is another thing. I think it's a part of the bigger war that US is having right at the moment with Islamic regime. And it needs to be tackled at some point, once and for all, to stop it. And I don't see, ⁓ any end to ⁓ Jason Brodsky: You're right. think that, you know, let me give you an example. There have been this, there's been a series of videos that are based on Legos and created with ⁓ intelligence that's been formed by explosive media. This is the entity ⁓ Iran that's, you know, put out these videos. And they're ⁓ to be very compelling to the youth of America and those who may be disillusioned with U.S. policy. but I haven't really seen a US response to those videos. I think that that's really important in encountering the information and the media war. So like to see more proactive efforts on that part. Amir Golshani: Appreciate that. So following on President Trump's statement that the chance of is standing is 1 % or maybe less, ⁓ the US moves to ensure that the strait remains open by force, what are the unseen complications in YOUR OPINION? Jason Brodsky: Well, I think that there's the risk of the Islamic Republic attacking and retaliating against Gulf energy infrastructure, power infrastructure as well. You know, ⁓ have been sabotage attempts that we have seen in the press around the Gulf. There has been, ⁓ there's the risk of terrorism ⁓ that been ⁓ managed US allies and partners, but it is a very real risk. So these are all definite. ⁓ risks here and I think that the US is going to have to address that in their planning, should there be an escalation here. But I don't think President Trump is caught or stuck or, you know, I think that there's just a lot of this defeatist rhetoric out there making the Islamic Republic out to be an 800-pound gorilla when it's not. And, you know, never count out the United States. you know, those are all risks here. with respect to this kind of escalation. Amir Golshani: So talking about those risks, do you think the fear of Iranian direct hate forced GCC countries into a permanent state of neutrality or they will take more active role? Jason Brodsky: I don't think we can talk about the GCC as ⁓ a collective block in the sense that they all have the same foreign policy and outlook towards Iran. The reality is they don't. would say the ⁓ hawkish member of the GCC right now with respect to Iran is probably United Arab Emirates. And that's because they have had the brunt of missile and drone attacks even more than Israel. They have suffered. from the Iranian regime and and so that's really striking if you think about it This is a country the United Arab Emirates, which was a champion of diplomacy with Iran prior to Operation Epic Fury They were all about de-escalation, but now there's been a sea change You're looking at the way I'm listening the way Emirati officials are speaking about the Islamic Republic of Iran and It is biting it is direct And there is real anger there. So when I said that there's done generational damage to some of their ties with GCC countries, this is one example. Then you have Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, who have also been the recipients of tax. Kuwait has been the recipients of the tax. But there have been reports that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have engaged in retaliatory strikes against Iran. So you have those countries. also have at the same time like Qatar and Oman, which have traditionally been diplomatic pressure valves with Tehran. Qatar has been quite good to the Islamic Republic over the years. It has been there for them ⁓ at sensitive occasions ⁓ when needed to reduce pressure ⁓ on system. So has Oman, but guess what? The Islamic Republic still engaged in missile and drone attacks against Qatar and Oman, and that's how they repaid the favor over years. So I think that there has been, the trust there has been really ⁓ eroded to a very bad degree for the Islamic Republic. so to answer your question, it's going to depend on the country you're talking about. I don't think we can talk about the GCC collectively. ⁓ of them have different kinds of relations with Iran. Amir Golshani: Yeah, very, very important point that you mentioned. Absolutely. We often talk about Iran as a state, but you ⁓ it is a revolutionary, ideological revolutionary state. ⁓ a regime whose identity is built on death to America ever actually accept a deal that ensures its survival? Or is the conflict existential by definition? Can a regime whose identity is built on death to America ever actually accept a deal that ensures its survival? Jason Brodsky: Look, I believe the Islamic Republic has been at war with the United States since 1979. this, the characterizations here, the president Trump started a war. This is a war of choice. That's just wrong. That's, these are political arguments that are very convenient for those making them. But, know, Iran, the Islamic Republic, I should say, has been taking Americans hostage since 1979, has been killing Americans. has been engaging in transnational threats against Americans, been killed our American service members ⁓ the region for years. ⁓ you know, when you ask people who oppose the war, they'll say, I'm fan of the Islamic Republic. I hate the regime, but this is not the way to handle it. Well, my question is, well, what is the way to handle it? What would you do? How would handle a government? when you ask people who oppose the war, say, I'm no fan of the Islamic I hate the regime, but is not the way to handle it. Well, my question is, well, what the way to handle it? What would you do? that refuses to negotiate over its missile program, refuses to negotiate over its support for terrorists. How would you handle this issue, this problem set, without military action to protect the United States? Sanctions are critical, and I'm a huge proponent of sanctions, that's not, solely sanctions are not gonna get the job done. It deprives the regime of revenue and resources necessary, but not sufficient. You need a military, capacity and the military component to any successful pressure campaign of the Islamic Republic. And I think what President Trump has done has held the regime accountable for decades of terror. ⁓ a situation where the regime could attack everyone, everything, but the regime itself could never be attacked. And that was a situation that multiple US presidents were the authors of. Our allies in Europe were the authors of as well. and other countries around the world because they didn't do anything. They sat on their hands issuing statements after statements, expressing concern. And we never held the regime to account in a meaningful way apart from sanctions and statements and a lot of outrage. But we've never channeled that into militarily holding them accountable. And that's what made what President Trump has done over since 2025 so historic because he's the first president who has basically had brought consequences militarily on Iranian soil. The Iranian regime, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Khamenei, the late supreme leader, thought he could sit quietly in his chair spread chaos throughout the region, massacre his people, and no one would lift a finger. But President Trump overthrew that paradigm, ⁓ ⁓ we are seeing the results of that playing out in real time. And he's used to, he handles things in non-traditional ways. He challenges taboos, defies orthodoxy, and by doing that, I think he creates a lot of noise from a lot of people who have spent many years doing this ⁓ have been the authors ⁓ policies that really haven't addressed the issue and have only allowed the Iranian regime to rebuild, harden their assets, engage in transnational repression and terrorism without any consequence. And for the first time, we've had an American president who said no. And I think that that has been really powerful and long overdue. Amir Golshani: Yeah, absolutely. When I compare it with previous administration, famous word of don't and they did and the action of President Trump, there is a huge, huge gap of saying something and doing it. Jason Brodsky: Huge gap. Could you see, and I don't want to be political here, I'm not a partisan person, I'm really not, but you imagine the Biden administration authorizing operation to take out Iran's supreme leader? The answer is no. President Trump has been unwilling to absorb ⁓ a of risk that none of his predecessors were able to do. yes, it's a lot of noise, it's created a lot of pressure, but let's see where this ends up. I think that a lot of the story has yet to be written and I find that people who make knee-jerk reactions with these sweeping statements that this is a failure, this is a disaster, it's a quagmire, it's another Vietnam, let's see where we are in a year from now. Amir Golshani: Sure. So Jason, let's talk about the Iranian people. If the economy stays paralyzed and the IRGC is forced to choose between the revolution and their own business empire, what is the most probable scenario for how this ends? Is it a military coup, a popular collapse, or a slow change of a country to North Korea sort of nation? Jason Brodsky: I wish I had a crystal ball, Amir. wish I could tell you when it's going to happen, how it's going to happen, but I can't. And that's my honest answer. And I don't think anyone who's being truthful be able to say, I know exactly how this is going to happen. What I can say, and this is based on watching Iran very carefully ⁓ over the of years, there has been a protest movement that has been taking place in Iran from 2017 onward during the JCPOA years and after the JCPOA years that has remained constant in its rejection and repudiation of the Islamic Republic. And the Iranian people through this time period have made it quite clear they want the regime gone they view the regime as the primary author ⁓ the country's troubles. And they cannot, they it responsible. And it's because of the regime's foreign policy choices and their repression at home. And they view the regime as irreformable. And that is why they want it gone. They're not interested anymore. They don't speak in the language of reform anymore. Maybe in 2009 and in 1999, during those protest cycles, there was a language of reform happening. ⁓ was a hope that things could shift for the better. That has changed from 2017 onward. And if we're looking at all of the indicators, the economic and the social and the political indicators that have brought Iranians into the streets from 2017 onward, they've only intensified and gotten worse. And look at what happened during Operation Midnight Hammer last year. You had many people in the media saying, President Trump is going to ⁓ create a rally around the flag effect if people are going to defend the regime ⁓ only months later ⁓ jack said december and january sadly and tragically the iranian people came to the streets and seven tragically they were massacred so that shows you that just because the united states engages in military action that doesn't necessarily mean after the ⁓ that the bomb stopped falling, that the people of Iran won't start to express themselves and want to change the regime. I think that has the chance of happening now. It's not going to happen overnight. This is a long story. Again, we're not even finished with this operation, I believe. think that there's a very strong likelihood President Trump will continue military actions here. So let's see where we are a year from now before making these sweeping statements about strategic failure. Amir Golshani: I love your answer. So with the internal dynamics you track so closely, how does the looming question of succession change the way the regime calculates risk during this specific month of high-stake diplomacy? Jason Brodsky: Great question. Now, enjoy reading pieces describing how the hardliners are ascendant and how the only reason why Moshe Tabbath-Aminé is supreme leader is because of the United States and President Trump. But I wrote articles, many of them, for years that Moshe Tabbath-Aminé was a potential successor for his father. He was always considered a potential successor for his father. And so the idea that he just came out of nowhere was only in the position because of the United States is There has a concerted attempt by especially Ali Khamenei during the latter years of rule that ⁓ he wanted to prepare way for succession to make sure that the continuation of his legacy would be ensured. And Mojtaba Khamenei being in that ⁓ ⁓ the best way to continue and ensure that Ali Khamenei's legacy is there. Mojtaba Khamenei has a lot of things in common with his father in terms of how they both came into office. They both ⁓ are considered living martyrs. Ali Khamenei in 1989 came in, he was injured ⁓ in the 1980s after a attack and he was considered a living martyr then. Mojtaba comes in ⁓ in 2026. And he is also injured and has that same myth in the Islamic Republic. And, know, those overlaps are very important to note. I would also say that ⁓ both of started out as weak supreme leaders. Ali Khamenei, as you may recall, when he started out in 1989, was a weak leader. was ⁓ dependent especially on Ali Hashemi Rasanjani, who was one of the kingmakers in the 1989 succession process. for Ali Khamenei, who was considered head of the inferior religious credentials. And it took Ali Khamenei years to consolidate and centralize his authority. And I think that that's a very strong likelihood of what's going to happen with Mojtaba Khamenei, assuming he makes public appearances and comes gets out of the bunker and proves that he's alive and kicking. And I would difference, though, is that There is from there right now the balance of power between the office of the supreme leader and the IRGC has changed slightly. So power today in Iran is more diffuse. The ⁓ leader ⁓ ⁓ of the common a lacks the degree of standing and control within the system that his father had at the later part. of his rule, And that's because of the way he came into office. He's dependent on that ⁓ core who ⁓ pushed him into power. ⁓ so that has affected the balance of power between the leaders office and the IRGC. But if Moshtaba starts becoming more visible publicly, I think, and over time, you may see a situation where he starts dominating the guards as opposed to the other way around now, which is how the situation is perceived in the West, that he's basically a rubber stamp. And so it's going to take a long time for him to assert his authority. I think that Mojtaba Khamenei is definitely a huge, important player right now, of course, in decision-making. I also think that the commander in chief of the IRGC, Ahmad vahidi, he is a very important guy. Right now, obviously, Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed Bagher Ghalibah, is right up there, as well as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohammed Bagher Zulgadir, and you have others as well. But it's important that the IRGC has factions within it. It's not a monolith. And I think that there is still a lot of competition for power and spoils. Unfortunately, I think in the West, it's presented as we have moderates versus hardliners and we have to empower the moderates at the expense of the hardliners. I don't think that that's the way to look at it. I've always been viewed Iranian politics as a contest for spoils, as contest for power. And some individuals may have different styles, different tactics, different tones, but they all want the same end, which is the continuation of the Islamic Republic. Amir Golshani: Right. So that's very true if we assume that Mojtaba al-Khamenei is still alive, Jason personally and professionally, after everything you've in this field. What does freedom mean to you? Jason Brodsky: That's a great question. freedom means for me being able to express your opinions without fear, being able to participate in the political process, being able to live your life and marry who you love and without government and oversight. That is what freedom is for me. And I'd love that. to be freedom for the Iranian people as well. And so that's my great wish. think that the Iranian people have, as you've mentioned before, Amir the greatest victims of the Iranian regime since 1979. And my great wish is for them to be able to really take back their country because it would be a game changer for the world. would enrich the world in such profound ways. Amir Golshani: I really appreciate that. And lastly, is there anything that we haven't talked about but you think it's very important to talk about or to pay attention to right now? Jason Brodsky: Well, I think we have a few different clocks right now that are ticking and we have the Iranian regime's clock, which is suffering under a naval blockade and economic strangulation. And we want to see if they start blinking. I believe they've already started blinking because ⁓ if you'll recall ⁓ ⁓ at the beginning of the war, there was a discussion that the Iran would suspend. enrichment of uranium for five years. Now, apparently, the discussion is that it may be as many as 15 years. So that's a softening of their position. Their position is still completely unacceptable because of sequencing and them trying to achieve sanctions relief even before a discussion of the nuclear issue. So we're still not there yet, but I thought that that softening of the Iranian position was quite interesting. And that's something to watch as the time goes forward on the Iranian regime's clock. ⁓ how does that affect its position? That's something I'm paying very close attention to. I think there's also the global economy's clock. That's very critical in terms of US decision-making. US has a key role there. And there's also the American political clock. ⁓ also important with war powers, ⁓ Congress and politics here. And how of these clocks are aligning will be really important to watch in the days and weeks ahead. I think the Iranian regime, as I mentioned, are doubting American resolve. That has been the theory of their case for many decades. And I think we have to prove them wrong. That's ⁓ imperative. the president understands that. If you closely to his public remarks, ⁓ he's mentioned the Iranian regime thinks I'm going to be tired, I'm under pressure. He says he's not under pressure. And so that... The Americans are going to have to prove to the Iranians that they have the capacity to outlast Tehran. And it's going to take some fortitude. It's going to take some discipline. It's going to take some sacrifice. But ⁓ I believe that we have to do it because the Iranian regime is a clear and present danger to this country and our interests around the world. Amir Golshani: Jason, thank you for bringing such sharp clarity and insight to our podcast. Jason Brodsky: Thank you, it's great to join you, Amir. Amir Golshani: Thank you.