Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2005] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:062005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per share book
- 0:11value off both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%.
- 0:16Over the last 41 years, that is since present management took
- 0:20over, book value has grown from $19.00 to $59,377, a rate of
- 0:2621.5% compounded annually. Berkshire had a decent year in
- 0:312005. We initiated 5 acquisitions, 2
- 0:35of which have yet to close in. Most of our operating
- 0:37subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in
- 0:41its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted
- 0:44record losses on both Berkshire and the industry.
- 0:47We estimate our loss from Katrina at $2.5 billion and her
- 0:52ugly sisters Rita and Wilma cost us an additional dollars point 9
- 0:57billion credit GEICO and its brilliant CEO Tony Nicely for
- 1:01our stellar insurance results in a disaster written year one
- 1:05statistics stands out. In just two years, GEICO
- 1:09improved its productivity by 32%.
- 1:12Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by
- 1:1626% and more gains are in store. When we Dr. unit costs down in
- 1:21such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever greater value to our
- 1:26customers. The payoff?
- 1:28Last year, GEICO gained market share, earned commendable
- 1:31profits, and strengthened its brand.
- 1:34If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.
- 1:38My goal in writing this report is to give you the information
- 1:41you need to estimate Berkshire's intrinsic value.
- 1:45I say estimate because calculations of intrinsic value,
- 1:48though all important, are necessarily imprecise and often
- 1:52seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of
- 1:55a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation
- 1:59will be wildly off base. For an explanation of intrinsic
- 2:03value, see pages 7778 here. Berkshire has some advantages.
- 2:09A wide variety of relatively stable earnings streams combined
- 2:13with great liquidity and minimum debt.
- 2:15These factors mean that Berkshire's intrinsic value can
- 2:19be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of
- 2:22most companies. Yet if precision is aided by
- 2:25Berkshire's financial characteristics, the job of
- 2:28calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the
- 2:32mere presence of so many earnings streams.
- 2:35Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the
- 2:40task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap.
- 2:43Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate
- 2:47operating and financial characteristics.
- 2:50This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our
- 2:53massive investment holdings makes it impossible for you to
- 2:56simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive
- 3:01at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.
- 3:04We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our
- 3:06businesses into four logical groups, each of which we
- 3:10discussed later in this report. In these discussions, we will
- 3:13provide the key figures for both the group and it's important
- 3:17components. Of course, the value of
- 3:20Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these
- 3:23four parts. The outcome depends on whether
- 3:25our many units function better or worse by being part of a
- 3:29larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or
- 3:33deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding
- 3:36company. In other words, does Berkshire
- 3:39ownership bring anything to the party or would our shareholders
- 3:43be better off if they directly own shares in each of our 68
- 3:46businesses? These are important questions,
- 3:49but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.
- 3:52Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let's
- 3:56review 2 sets of figures that show where we've come from and
- 3:59where we are now. The first set is the amount of
- 4:02investments, including cash and cash equivalents we own on a per
- 4:06share basis. In making this calculation, we
- 4:09exclude investments held in our finance operation because these
- 4:12are largely offset by borrowings.
- 4:15All figures used in this report apply to Berkshires.
- 4:18A shares the successor to the only stock that the company had
- 4:22outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic
- 4:26interest equal to 130th that of the A.
- 4:30When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to
- 4:33be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years
- 4:36have been selected. If either year was aberrational,
- 4:39any calculation of growth will be distorted.
- 4:43In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can
- 4:46produce a breathtaking but meaningless growth rate.
- 4:49In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally
- 4:55good. Berkshire earned more money in
- 4:57that year than it did in all but one of the previous 10.
- 5:00As you can see from the 2 tables, the comparative growth
- 5:03rates of Berkshire's two elements of value have changed
- 5:06in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever increasing
- 5:10emphasis on business acquisitions.
- 5:13Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and
- 5:16my partner and I want to increase the figures in both
- 5:20tables. In this ambition we hope
- 5:22metaphorically to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had
- 5:26been romantically challenged for some time.
- 5:28As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the
- 5:32wife, stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight, felt a
- 5:36long, absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that
- 5:40they go upstairs and Make Love. He agonized for a moment and
- 5:44then replied. I can do one or the other, but
- 5:47not both. Acquisitions over the years.
- 5:50Our current businesses in aggregate should deliver modest
- 5:54growth in operating earnings, but they will not in themselves
- 5:57produce truly satisfactory gains.
- 6:00We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.
- 6:03In this quest, 2005 was encouraging.
- 6:06We agreed to five purchases, 2 that were completed last year,
- 6:11one that closed after year end and two others that we expect to
- 6:14close soon. None of the deals involve the
- 6:17issuance of Berkshire shares. That's a crucial but often
- 6:20ignored point. When a management proudly
- 6:24acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the
- 6:27acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest
- 6:30in everything they own. I've made this kind of deal a
- 6:33few times myself and on balance, my actions have cost you money.
- 6:37Here are last year's purchases. On June 30th we bought medical
- 6:41protective Company Medpro, a 106 year old medical malpractice
- 6:46insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough
- 6:49to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many
- 6:53insurers. Medpro, nevertheless, should do
- 6:56well. It will have the attitudinal
- 6:58advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein
- 7:01underwriting discipline Trump's all other goals.
- 7:05Additionally, as part of Berkshire, Medpro has financial
- 7:08strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality
- 7:12assuring doctors that long to settle claims will not end up
- 7:15back on their doorstep because their insurer failed.
- 7:18Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kennessy,
- 7:23who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.
- 7:26Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August
- 7:3031st. A couple of months earlier, on
- 7:32June 21, I received a two page fax telling me point by point Y
- 7:37Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25
- 7:42of this report. I had not before heard of the
- 7:45company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion
- 7:50of sales, nor of Pete Legal, its owner and manager, but the fax
- 7:55made sense and I immediately asked for more figures.
- 7:58These came the next morning and that afternoon I made Pete an
- 8:02offer. On June 28th we shook hands on a
- 8:05deal. Pete is a remarkable
- 8:07entrepreneur. Some years back he sold his
- 8:10business, then far smaller then today, to an LBO operator who
- 8:14promptly began telling him how to run the place.
- 8:17Before long Pete left and the business soon sunk into
- 8:21bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it.
- 8:23You can be sure that I won't be telling Pete how to manage his
- 8:26operation. Forest River has 60 plants, 5400
- 8:31employees, and has consistently gained share in the RV business
- 8:35while also expanding into other areas such as boats.
- 8:38Pete is 61 and definitely in an acceleration mode.
- 8:43Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report and
- 8:46you'll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each
- 8:49other. On November 12th, 2005, an
- 8:53article ran in the Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire's
- 8:56unusual acquisition and managerial practices.
- 8:59In it, Pete declared it was easier to sell my business than
- 9:03to renew my driver's license in New York.
- 9:06Kathy Baron, Tom Ross read the article and it struck a chord.
- 9:09On November 21st, she sent me a letter that began as President
- 9:14of Business Wire. I'd like to introduce you to my
- 9:17company as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway
- 9:21subsidiary companies as detailed in a recent Wall Street Journal
- 9:25article. By the time I finished Katha's
- 9:27two page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit.
- 9:31I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph.
- 9:34We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under
- 9:37wraps. No secretaries or management
- 9:40layers here, yet well invest big dollars to gain a technological
- 9:44advantage and move the business forward.
- 9:47I promptly gave Kathy a call and before long Berkshire had
- 9:50reached agreement with Business Wires controlling shareholder
- 9:54Lori Loki, who founded the company in 1961 and who had just
- 9:59made Kathy CEOI love success stories like Lori's Today 78, he
- 10:04has built a company that disseminates information in 150
- 10:08countries for 25,000 clients. His story, like those of many
- 10:13entrepreneurs who have selected Berkshire as a home for their
- 10:16lives work, is an example of what can happen when a good
- 10:19idea, a talented individual and hard work converge.
- 10:23In December, we agreed to buy 81% of Applied Underwriters, a
- 10:28company that offers a combination of payroll services
- 10:31and workers compensation insurance, to small businesses.
- 10:35A majority of Applied's customers are located in
- 10:37California. 5 In 1998, though, when the company had 12
- 10:43employees, it acquired an Omaha based operation with 24
- 10:47employees that offered a somewhat similar service, Said
- 10:50Ference. And Steve Menzies, who have
- 10:52built Applied's remarkable business, concluded that Omaha
- 10:56had many advantages as in operational base of brilliant
- 11:00insight, I might add, and today 400 of the company's 479
- 11:05employees are located here. Less than a year ago, Applied
- 11:08entered into a large reinsurance contract with Aji Jane, the
- 11:12extraordinary manager of National Indemnity's reinsurance
- 11:16division. Aji was impressed by Sid and
- 11:18Steve and they liked Berkshire's method of operation, so we
- 11:22decided to join forces. We are pleased that Sid and
- 11:25Steve retain 19% of applied. They started on a shoestring
- 11:29only 12 years ago and it will be fun to see what they can
- 11:32accomplish with Berkshire's backing.
- 11:34Last spring, Mid American Energy, our 80.5% owned
- 11:38subsidiary, agreed to buy Pacificorp, a major electric
- 11:43utility serving 6 western states.
- 11:45An acquisition of this sort requires many regulatory
- 11:49approvals, but we've now obtained these and expect to
- 11:52close this transaction soon. Berkshire will then buy $3.4
- 11:56billion of Mid Americans common stock, which Mid American will
- 12:00supplement with $1.7 billion of borrowing to complete the
- 12:04purchase. You can't expect to earn outsize
- 12:07profits and regulated utilities, but the industry offers owners
- 12:11the opportunity to deploy large some set fair returns and
- 12:15therefore it makes good sense for Berkshire.
- 12:18A few years back I said that we hope to make some very large
- 12:21purchases in the utility field. Note the plural well be looking
- 12:25for more. In addition to buying these new
- 12:27operations, we continue to make bolt on acquisitions.
- 12:31Some aren't so small. Shaw, our carpet operation,
- 12:35spent about $550 million last year on 2 purchases that
- 12:40furthered its vertical integration and should improve
- 12:43its profit margin in the future. XDRA and Clayton Holmes also
- 12:47made value enhancing acquisitions.
- 12:50Unlike many business buyers, Berkshire has no exit strategy.
- 12:54We buy to keep. We do though have an entrance
- 12:56strategy, looking for businesses in this country or abroad that
- 13:00meet our six criteria and are available at a price that will
- 13:04produce a reasonable return. If you have a business that
- 13:07fits, give me a call Like a hopeful teenage girl will be
- 13:11waiting by the phone. Insurance.
- 13:13Let's now talk about our 4 sectors and start with
- 13:16Insurance, our core business. What counts here is the amount
- 13:20of float and it's cost over time.
- 13:22For new readers, let me explain. Float is money that doesn't
- 13:25belong to us, but that we temporarily hold.
- 13:29Most of our float arises because one premiums are paid up front
- 13:33though the service we provide. Insurance protection is
- 13:35delivered over a period that usually covers a year and two
- 13:39loss events that occurred today do not always result in our
- 13:43immediately paying claims because it sometimes takes many
- 13:47years for losses to be reported. Asbestos losses would be an
- 13:50example. Negotiated and settled, the $20
- 13:54million of float that came with our 1967 entry into insurance
- 13:58has now increased both by way of internal growth and acquisitions
- 14:03to $49 billion. Float is wonderful if it doesn't
- 14:06come at a high price. It's cost is determined by
- 14:09underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we
- 14:13will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received.
- 14:17When an insurer earns an underwriting profit, as has been
- 14:20the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have
- 14:24been in the insurance business, float is better than free.
- 14:27In such years we are actually paid for holding other people's
- 14:30money. For most insurers, however, life
- 14:34has been far more difficult. In aggregate, the property
- 14:37casualty industry almost invariably operates at an
- 14:40underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float
- 14:44becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.
- 14:47Six. In 2004, our float cost us less
- 14:50than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance.
- 14:53Absent a mega catastrophe of no cost flowed in 2005.
- 14:57But we had the mega cat and as a specialist in that coverage,
- 15:01Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $3.4 billion.
- 15:05Nevertheless, our float was cost less in 2005 because of the
- 15:10superb results we had in our other insurance activities,
- 15:13particularly at GEICO. Auto policies in force grew by
- 15:1712.1% at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of
- 15:21US private passenger auto business from about 5.6% to
- 15:26about 6.1%. Auto insurance is a big
- 15:29business. Each SharePoint equates to $1.6
- 15:33billion in sales. While our brand strength is not
- 15:36quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly.
- 15:39When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual
- 15:44advertising expenditures were $31 million.
- 15:48Last year, we were up to $502,000,000 and I can't wait to
- 15:52spend more. Our advertising works because we
- 15:55have a great story to tell. More people can save money by
- 15:58insuring with us than is the case with any other national
- 16:01carrier offering policies to all comers.
- 16:04Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for
- 16:08applicants fitting into their niches.
- 16:10Also, because our national competitors use rating systems
- 16:14that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.
- 16:17Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate, the
- 16:21percentage of Internet and phone quotes turned into sales in our
- 16:25history. This is powerful evidence that
- 16:27our prices are more attractive relative to the competition than
- 16:31ever before. Test us by going to geico.com or
- 16:34by calling 800-847-7536. Be sure to indicate you are a
- 16:41shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a
- 16:44discount. I told you last year about
- 16:46Geico's entry into New Jersey in August 2004.
- 16:50Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new
- 16:54policyholders is running higher than in any other state.
- 16:57And by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to become the third
- 17:02largest auto insurer in New Jersey.
- 17:05There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead
- 17:09to steady gains in profitable business.
- 17:12That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I
- 17:16first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an
- 17:20article about the company. It's reproduced on page 24 when
- 17:24its market value was $7,000,000. As you can see, I called GEICO
- 17:29the security I like best, and that's what I still call it.
- 17:33We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and
- 17:36National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon
- 17:39and Tad Montrose, the latter by Oji Jiang.
- 17:42Both units performed well in 2005.
- 17:45Considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered
- 17:49the industry, it's an open question whether atmospheric,
- 17:52oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the
- 17:56frequency or intensity of hurricanes.
- 17:59Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in
- 18:03the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of category three
- 18:08strength or greater hit the southeastern and Gulf Coast
- 18:12states, and that only three of these were category fives.
- 18:15We further know that in 2004 there were three category three
- 18:19storms that hammered those areas, and that these were
- 18:22followed by four more in 2005, one of them Katrina, the most
- 18:27destructive hurricane in industry history.
- 18:30Moreover, there were three category fives near the coast
- 18:33last year that fortunately weakened before landfall.
- 18:36Was this onslaught of more frequent and more intense storms
- 18:39merely an anomaly, or was it caused by changes in climate,
- 18:43water temperature, or other variables we don't fully
- 18:46understand? And could these factors be
- 18:49developing in a manner that will soon produce disasters dwarfing
- 18:53Katrina? Joe, Ajit and I don't know the
- 18:55answer to these all important questions.
- 18:58What we do know is that our ignorance means we must follow
- 19:01the course prescribed by Pascal and his famous wager about the
- 19:05existence of God. As you may recall, he concluded
- 19:09that since he didn't know the answer, his personal gain loss
- 19:12ratio dictated an affirmative conclusion. 7 So guided, we've
- 19:17concluded that we should now write mega cap policies only at
- 19:20prices far higher than prevailed last year, and then only with an
- 19:24aggregate exposure that would not 'cause us to stress if
- 19:27shifts in some important variable produce far more costly
- 19:31storms in the near future. To a lesser degree, we felt this
- 19:35way after 2004 and cut back our writings when prices didn't
- 19:39move. Now, our caution has intensified
- 19:42if prices seem appropriate. However, we continue to have
- 19:45both the ability and the appetite to be the largest
- 19:49writer of megacat coverage in the world.
- 19:51Our smaller insurers with Medpro added to the fold delivered
- 19:55truly outstanding results last year.
- 19:58However, what you see in the table below does not do full
- 20:01justice to their performance. That's because we increased the
- 20:05loss reserves of Medpro by about $125 million immediately after
- 20:10our purchase. No one knows with any precision
- 20:13what amount will be required to pay the claims we inherited.
- 20:16Medical malpractice insurance is a long tail line, meaning that
- 20:20claims often take many years to settle.
- 20:23In addition, there are other losses that have occurred but
- 20:27that we won't even hear about for some time.
- 20:29One thing, though, we have learned the hard way after many
- 20:33years in the business, surprises and insurance are far from
- 20:36symmetrical. You are lucky if you get one
- 20:39that is pleasant for every 10 that go the other way.
- 20:42Too often, however, insurers react to looming loss problems
- 20:46with optimism. They behave like the fellow in a
- 20:49switchblade fight who, after his opponent has taken a mighty
- 20:52swipe at his throat, exclaimed, You never touched me, his
- 20:57adversary's reply? Just wait until you try to shake
- 20:59your head. Excluding the reserves we added
- 21:02for prior periods, Med Pro Rd. at an underwriting profit and
- 21:07our other primary companies in aggregate had an underwriting
- 21:10profit of $324 million on 1000, two $170 million off volume.
- 21:16This is an extraordinary result and our thanks go to Rod Eldred
- 21:20of Berkshire Hathaway Home State Companies, John Kaiser of
- 21:24Central States Indemnity, Tom Nerney of US Liability, Dontal
- 21:30of Kansas, Bankers Surety and Don Worster of National
- 21:33Indemnity Regulated utility Business.
- 21:36We have an 80.5% fully diluted interest in Mid American Energy
- 21:40Holdings which owns a wide variety of utility operations.
- 21:45The largest of these are One Yorkshire Electricity and
- 21:48Northern Electric Who's 3.7 million electric customers make
- 21:52it the third largest distributor of electricity in the UK to Mid
- 21:57American Energy which serves 706,000 electric customers
- 22:02primarily in Iowa and three Kern River and Northern Natural
- 22:06pipelines which carry 7.8% of the natural gas consumed in the
- 22:10US. When our Pacific Corp
- 22:13acquisition closes, we will add 1.6 million electric customers
- 22:17in six western states with Oregon and Utah providing us the
- 22:21most business. This transaction will increase
- 22:24Mid Americans revenues by $3.3 billion and its assets by $14.1
- 22:30billion. The Public Utility Holding
- 22:32Company Act PUKA was repealed on August 8th, 2005, a milestone
- 22:38that allowed Berkshire to convert its Mid American
- 22:40preferred stock into voting common shares on February 9th,
- 22:452006. This conversion ended a
- 22:47convoluted corporate arrangement that PUKA had forced upon us.
- 22:52Now we have 83.4% of both the common stock and the votes at
- 22:56Mid American, which allows us to consolidate.
- 22:59The company's income for financial, accounting and tax
- 23:02purposes are true. Economic interest, however, is
- 23:06the aforementioned 80.5% since there are options outstanding
- 23:11that are sure to be exercised within a few years and that upon
- 23:14exercise will dilute our ownership.
- 23:17Though our voting power has increased dramatically, the
- 23:20dynamics of our four party ownership have not changed at
- 23:23all. We view Mid American as a
- 23:25partnership among Berkshire. Walter Scott and two terrific
- 23:29managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel.
- 23:32It's unimportant how many votes each party has.
- 23:35We will make major moves only when we are unanimous and
- 23:38thinking them wise. Five years of working with Dave,
- 23:42Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief.
- 23:45Berkshire couldn't have better partners.
- 23:47You will notice that this year we have provided you with two
- 23:50balance sheets, one representing our actual figures per gap on
- 23:54December 31st, 2005, which does not consolidate Mid American and
- 23:59won that reflects the subsequent conversion of our preferred.
- 24:03All future financial reports of Berkshire will include Mid
- 24:07Americans figures. Somewhat incongruously, Mid
- 24:10American owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in
- 24:14the US and it's a gem. The parent company's name is
- 24:17Home Services of America, but our 19,200 agents operate
- 24:22through 18 locally branded firms.
- 24:25Aided by three small acquisitions, we participated in
- 24:28$64 billion of transactions last year, up 6.5% from 2004.
- 24:35Currently, the white hot market in residential real estate of
- 24:38recent years is cooling down and that should lead to additional
- 24:43acquisition possibilities for us.
- 24:45Both we and Ron Peltier, the company's CEO, expect Home
- 24:49Services to be far larger a decade from now.
- 24:52Finance and financial Products The star of our finance sector
- 24:55is Clayton Homes, masterfully run by Kevin Clayton.
- 24:59He does not owe his brilliant record to a rising tide.
- 25:03The manufactured housing business has been disappointing
- 25:06since Berkshire purchased Clayton in 2003.
- 25:09Industry sales have stagnated at 40 year lows and the recent
- 25:13uptick from Katrina related demand will almost certainly be
- 25:17short lived. In recent years, many industry
- 25:20participants have suffered losses and only Clayton has
- 25:23earned significant money in this brutal environment.
- 25:26Clayton has bought a large amount of manufactured housing
- 25:29loans from major banks that found them unprofitable and
- 25:32difficult to service. Clayton's operating expertise
- 25:36and Berkshire's financial resources have made this an
- 25:39excellent business for us and one in which we are preeminent.
- 25:43We presently service $17 billion of loans, compared to 5.4
- 25:48dollars billing at the time of our purchase.
- 25:50Moreover, Clayton now owns 9.6 billion dollars of its servicing
- 25:55portfolio, a position built up almost entirely since Berkshire
- 25:59entered the picture. To finance this portfolio,
- 26:02Clayton borrows money from Berkshire, which in turn borrows
- 26:05the same amount publicly. For the use of its credit,
- 26:09Berkshire charges Clayton A1 percentage point markup on its
- 26:13borrowing cost. In 2005, the cost to Clayton for
- 26:16this arrangement was $83 million.
- 26:20That amount is included in other income in the table on the
- 26:23facing page and Clayton's earnings of $416 million are
- 26:27after deducting this payment. On the manufacturing side,
- 26:31Clayton has also been active to its original base of 20 plants.
- 26:35It first added twelve more in 2004 by way of the bankruptcy
- 26:40purchase of Oakwood, which just a few years earlier was one of
- 26:43the largest companies in the business.
- 26:45Then in 2005, Clayton purchased Carsten A4 plant operation that
- 26:50greatly strengthens Clayton's position on the West Coast.
- 26:54Long ago, Mark Twain said a man who tries to carry a cat home by
- 26:58its tail will learn a lesson that can be learned in no other
- 27:01way. If Twain were around now, he
- 27:04might try winding up a derivatives business.
- 27:07After a few days, he would opt for CATS.
- 27:09We lost $104 million pre tax last year in our continuing
- 27:14attempt to exit gin residential derivative operation.
- 27:18Our aggregate losses since we began this endeavor total $404
- 27:23million. Originally we had 23,218
- 27:27contracts outstanding. By the start of 2005, we were
- 27:31down to 2890. You might expect that our losses
- 27:34would have been stemmed by this point, but the blood has kept
- 27:37flowing. Reducing our inventory to 741
- 27:40contracts last year cost us the $104 million mentioned above.
- 27:45Remember that the rationale for establishing this unit in 1990
- 27:49was gin residential wish to meet the needs of insurance clients.
- 27:53Yet one of the contracts we liquidated in 2005 had a term of
- 27:58100 years. It's difficult to imagine what
- 28:01needs such a contract could fulfill accet perhaps the need
- 28:05of a compensation conscious traitor to have a long dated
- 28:08contract on his books. Long contracts, or alternatively
- 28:12those with multiple variables are the most difficult to mark
- 28:16to market the standard procedure used in accounting for
- 28:19derivatives and provide the most opportunity for imagination when
- 28:23traders are estimating their value.
- 28:25Small wonder that traders promote them.
- 28:27A business in which huge amounts of compensation flow from
- 28:30assumed numbers is obviously fraught with danger.
- 28:34When 2 traders execute a transaction that has several,
- 28:37sometimes esoteric variables and a far off settlement date, their
- 28:42respective firms must subsequently value these
- 28:45contracts whenever they calculate their earnings.
- 28:48A given contract may be valued at 1 price by firm A and at
- 28:52another by firm B. You can bet that the valuation
- 28:55differences, and impersonally familiar with several that were
- 28:58huge, tend to be tilted in a direction favoring higher
- 29:01earnings at each firm. It's a strange world in which
- 29:05two parties can carry out a paper transaction that each can
- 29:08promptly report as profitable. I dwell on our experience and
- 29:12derivatives each year for two reasons.
- 29:15One is personal and unpleasant. The hard fact is that I have
- 29:19cost you a lot of money by not moving immediately to close down
- 29:2310 Gen. residential trading operation.
- 29:26Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the Gen. repurchase that
- 29:29it was a problem and told its management that we wanted to
- 29:32exit the business. It was my responsibility to make
- 29:35sure that happened rather than address the situation head on.
- 29:39However, I wasted several years while we attempted to sell the
- 29:43operation. That was a doomed endeavor
- 29:45because no realistic solution could have extricated us from
- 29:49the maze of liabilities that was going to exist for decades.
- 29:53Our obligations were particularly worrisome because
- 29:56their potential to explode could not be measured.
- 29:59Moreover, if severe trouble occurred, we knew it was likely
- 30:02to correlate with problems elsewhere in financial markets.
- 30:06So I failed in my attempt to exit painlessly, and in the
- 30:09meantime, more trades were put on the books.
- 30:12Fault me for dithering. Charlie calls it thumb sucking.
- 30:15When a problem exists, whether in personnel or in business
- 30:19operations, the time to act is now.
- 30:21The second reason I regularly describe our problems in this
- 30:24area lies in the hope that our experiences may prove
- 30:28instructive for managers, auditors and regulators.
- 30:32In a sense, we are a Canary in this business coal mine and
- 30:36should sing a song of warning as we expire.
- 30:39The number and value of derivative contracts outstanding
- 30:42in the world continues to mushroom and is now a multiple
- 30:46of what existed in 1998, the last time that financial chaos
- 30:50erupted. Our experience should be
- 30:52particularly sobering because we were a better than average
- 30:55candidate to exit gracefully. Gin Re was a relatively minor
- 30:59operator in the derivatives field.
- 31:01It has had the good fortune to unwind its supposedly liquid
- 31:05positions in a benign market, all the while free of financial
- 31:09or other pressures that might have forced it to conduct the
- 31:12liquidation in a less than efficient manner.
- 31:15Our accounting in the past was conventional and actually
- 31:18thought to be conservative. Additionally, we know of no bad
- 31:22behavior by anyone involved. It could be a different story
- 31:25for others in the future. Imagine, if you will, one or
- 31:29more firms. Troubles often spread with
- 31:32positions that are many multiples of ours attempting to
- 31:35liquidate in chaotic markets and under extreme and well
- 31:39publicized pressures. This is a scenario to which much
- 31:42attention should be given now rather than after the fact.
- 31:46The time to have considered and improved the reliability of New
- 31:49Orleans levies was before Katrina.
- 31:51When we finally wind up Gin re Securities, my feelings about
- 31:55its departure will be akin to those expressed in a country
- 31:58song. My wife ran away with my best
- 32:01friend, and I sure miss him a lot.
- 32:03Manufacturing, service and retailing operations.
- 32:06Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront.
- 32:10Let's look though, at a summary. This eclectic collection, which
- 32:13sells products ranging from dilly bars to fractional
- 32:16interests in Boeing 730 Sevens, earned a very respectable 22.2%
- 32:23on average tangible net worth last year.
- 32:26It's noteworthy also that these operations used only minor
- 32:29financial leverage in achieving that return.
- 32:32Clearly, we own some terrific businesses.
- 32:35We purchased many of them, however at substantial premiums
- 32:39to net worth, a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on
- 32:42the balance sheet. And that fact reduces the
- 32:45earnings on hour average carrying value to 10.1%.
- 32:49Here are the pre tax earnings for the larger categories or
- 32:52units in both our building products companies and at Shaw.
- 32:56We continue to be hit by rising costs for raw materials and
- 33:00energy. Most of these operations are
- 33:02significant users of oil or more specifically Petro chemicals and
- 33:07natural gas and prices for these commodities have soared.
- 33:11We likewise have raised prices on many products, but there are
- 33:15often lags before increases B come effective.
- 33:18Nevertheless, both are building products operations and Shaw
- 33:22delivered respect able results in 2005, a fact attributable to
- 33:27their strong business franchises and able managements.
- 33:31In apparel, our largest unit, Fruit of the Loom, again
- 33:34increased earnings and market share.
- 33:37You know of course of our leadership position in men's and
- 33:41boys underwear in which we account for about 48.7% of the
- 33:45sales recorded by mass marketers, Walmart, Target,
- 33:49etcetera. That's up from 44.2% in 2002
- 33:54when we acquired the company. Operating from a smaller base,
- 33:57we have made still greater gains in intimate apparel for women
- 34:01and girls that is sold by the mass marketers, climbing from
- 34:0413.7% of their sales in 2002 to 24.7% in 2005.
- 34:11A gain like that in a major category doesn't come easy.
- 34:15Thank John Holland, Fruit's extraordinary CEO, for making
- 34:18this happen. I told you last year that Ben
- 34:21Bridge Jewelry and RC Wiley Home Furnishings had same store sales
- 34:26gains far above the average of their industries.
- 34:29You might think that blowout figures in one you would make
- 34:32comparisons difficult in the following year, but Ed and John
- 34:35Bridget there operation and Scott Heimus at RC Wiley were
- 34:40more than up to this challenge. Ben Bridge had a 6.6% same store
- 34:44gain in 2005 and RC Wiley came in at 9.9%.
- 34:51Our Never on Sunday approach at RC Wiley continues to overwhelm
- 34:557 day competitors as we roll out stores in new markets.
- 35:00The Boise store, about which I was such a skeptic a few years
- 35:03back had a 21% gain in 2005 coming off a 10% gain in 2004.
- 35:10Our new Reno store opened in November broke out of the gate
- 35:13fast with sales that exceeded Boise's early pace.
- 35:17And we will begin business in Sacramento in June.
- 35:20If this store succeeds as I expect it to, Californians will
- 35:23see many more are see Wiley stores in the years to come.
- 35:28In Flight Services, earnings improved at flight safety as
- 35:31corporate aviation continued its rebound.
- 35:34To support growth, we invest heavily in new simulators.
- 35:38Our most recent expansion, bringing us to 42 training
- 35:42centers is a major facility at Farnborough, England that opened
- 35:46in September. When it is fully billed out in
- 35:482007, we will have invested more than $100 million in the
- 35:53building and it's 15 simulators. Bruce Whitman, Flight Safeties
- 35:57Able CEO make sure that no competitor comes close to
- 36:01offering the breadth and depth of services that we do.
- 36:04Operating results at Net Jets were a different story.
- 36:07I said last year that this business would earn money in
- 36:092005 and I was dead wrong. Our European operation it should
- 36:14be noted showed both excellent growth and a reduced loss.
- 36:18Customer contracts there increased by 37%.
- 36:21We are the only fractional ownership operation of any size
- 36:25in Europe and are now pervasive presence there is a key factor
- 36:29in making net jets the worldwide leader in this industry.
- 36:32Despite a large increase in customers, however, our US
- 36:36operation dipped far into the red.
- 36:39It's efficiency fell and costs soared.
- 36:42We believe that our three largest competitors suffered
- 36:45similar problems, but each is owned by aircraft manufacturers
- 36:49that may think differently than we do about the necessity of
- 36:52making adequate profits. The combined value of the fleets
- 36:55managed by these three competitors in any case,
- 36:59continues to be less valuable than the fleet that we operate.
- 37:03Rich Santouli, one of the most dynamic managers I've ever met
- 37:07will solve our revenue expense problem.
- 37:09He won't do it however, in a manner that impairs the quality
- 37:13of the net Jets experience. Both he and I are committed to a
- 37:17level of service security and safety that can't be matched by
- 37:21others. 13 Our retailing category includes See's Candies,
- 37:26a company we bought early in 1972, a date making in our
- 37:30oldest non insurance business at that time.
- 37:33Charlie and I immediately decided to put Chuck Huggins,
- 37:36then 46, in charge. Though we were new at the game
- 37:40of selecting managers, Charlie and I hit a home run with this
- 37:43appointment. Chuck's love for the customer
- 37:45and the brand permeated the organization, which in his 34
- 37:49year tenure produced a more than 10 fold increase in profits.
- 37:54This game was achieved in an industry growing at best, slowly
- 37:57and perhaps not at all. Volume figures in this industry
- 38:01are hard to pin down at your end.
- 38:03Chuck turned the reins at SEAS over to Brad Kinsler, who
- 38:06previously had served Berkshire well while running Cypress
- 38:09Insurance and Fetchheimer's. It's unusual for us to move
- 38:13managers around, but Brad's record made him an obvious
- 38:16choice for the SEAS job. I hope Chuck and his wife Donna
- 38:21are at the annual meeting. If they are, shareholders can
- 38:24join Charlie and me in giving America's number one candy maker
- 38:28a richly deserved round of applause.
- 38:30Every day, in countless ways, the competitive position of each
- 38:34of our businesses grows either weaker or stronger.
- 38:37If we are delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs
- 38:41and improving our products and services, we gain strength.
- 38:45But if we treat customers with indifference or tolerate bloat,
- 38:49our businesses will wither on a daily basis.
- 38:52The effects of our actions are imperceptible.
- 38:55Cumulatively, though, their consequences are enormous.
- 38:59When our long term competitive position improves as a result of
- 39:02these almost unnoticeable actions, we describe the
- 39:05phenomenon as widening the Moat, and doing that is essential if
- 39:09we are to have the kind of business we want a decade or two
- 39:12from now. We always of course hope to earn
- 39:16more money in the short term but when short term and long term
- 39:19conflict widening the Moat must take precedence.
- 39:22If a management makes bad decisions in order to hit short
- 39:26term earnings targets and consequently gets behind the 8
- 39:30ball in terms of costs, customer satisfaction or brand strength,
- 39:34no amount of subsequent brilliance will overcome the
- 39:37damage that has been inflicted. Take a look at the dilemmas of
- 39:40managers in the auto and airline industries today as they
- 39:44struggle with the huge problems handed them by their
- 39:47predecessors. Charlie is fond of quoting Ben
- 39:50Franklin's An ounce of prevention is worth a Pound of
- 39:53cure, but sometimes no amount of cure will overcome the mistakes
- 39:57of the past. Our managers focus on Moat
- 40:00widening and are brilliant at it.
- 40:02Quite simply, they are passionate about their
- 40:04businesses. Usually they were running those
- 40:07long before we came along. Our only function since has been
- 40:11to stay out of the way. If you see these heroes and our
- 40:14four heroines as well at the annual meeting.
- 40:16Thank them for the job they do for you.
- 40:18The attitude of our managers vividly contrast with that of
- 40:22the young man who married to tycoons only child, a decidedly
- 40:26homely and dull ass. Relieved, the father called in
- 40:29his new son-in-law after the wedding and began to discuss the
- 40:33future son. You're the boy I always wanted
- 40:36and never had. Hey race a stock certificate for
- 40:3950% of the company. You're my equal partner from now
- 40:42on. Thanks, Dad.
- 40:44Now, what would you like to run? How about sales?
- 40:47I'm afraid I couldn't sell water to a man crawling in the Sahara.
- 40:51Well, then how about heading human relations?
- 40:54I really don't care for people. No problem.
- 40:56We have lots of other spots in the business.
- 40:59What would you like to do? Actually, nothing appeals to me.
- 41:02Why don't you just buy me out? 14 investments.
- 41:05We show below our common stock investments.
- 41:08Those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the
- 41:12end of 2005 are itemized 123,105 percentage of shares.
- 41:19Company company owned cost market.
- 41:22This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
- 41:26Gap cost differs in a few cases because of write ups or write
- 41:29downs that have been required. A couple of last year's changes
- 41:32in our portfolio occurred because of corporate events.
- 41:35Gillette was merged into Procter and Gamble and American Express
- 41:40spun off Ameriprise. In addition, we substantially
- 41:44increased our holdings in Wells Fargo, a company that Dick
- 41:47Kovachevich runs brilliantly, and established positions in
- 41:51Anheuser Busch and Walmart. Expect no miracles from our
- 41:55equity portfolio. Though we own major interests in
- 41:58a number of strong, highly profitable businesses, they are
- 42:01not selling at anything like bargain prices.
- 42:04As a group, they may double in value in 10 years.
- 42:08The likelihood is that their per share earnings in aggregate will
- 42:12grow six, 8% per year over the decade and that their stock
- 42:15prices will more or less match that growth there.
- 42:19Managers of course think my expectations are too modest and
- 42:23I hope they're right. The P&G Gillette merger closing
- 42:27in the fourth quarter of 2005 required Berkshire to record a
- 42:31$5.0 billion pre tax capital gain.
- 42:35This bookkeeping entry dictated by GAP is meaningless from it
- 42:39economic standpoint and you should ignore it when you are
- 42:42evaluating Berkshire's 2005 earnings.
- 42:45We didn't intend to sell our Gillette shares before the
- 42:48merger. We don't intend to sell our P&G
- 42:51shares now and we incurred no tax when the merger took place.
- 42:56It's hard to over emphasize the importance of who is CEO of a
- 42:59company. Before Jim Kiltz arrived at
- 43:02Gillette in 2001, the company was struggling, having
- 43:06particularly suffered from capital allocation blunders.
- 43:09In the major example, Gillette's acquisition of Duracell cost
- 43:13Gillette shareholders billions of dollars, a loss never made
- 43:17visible by conventional accounting.
- 43:19Quite simply, what Gillette received in business value in
- 43:22this acquisition was not equivalent to what it gave up.
- 43:25Amazingly, this most fundamental of yardsticks is almost always
- 43:30ignored by both management's and their investment bankers when
- 43:33acquisitions are under discussion. 15 Upon taking
- 43:37office at Gillette, Jim quickly instilled fiscal discipline,
- 43:41tightened operations and energized marketing moves that
- 43:44dramatically increase the intrinsic value of the company.
- 43:48Gillette's merger with P&G then expanded the potential of both
- 43:52companies. For his accomplishments, Jim was
- 43:55paid very well, but he earned every penny.
- 43:59This is no academic evaluation, as a 9.7% owner of Gillette,
- 44:04Berkshire in effect paid that proportion of his compensation.
- 44:07Indeed, it's difficult to overpay the truly extraordinary
- 44:12CEO of a giant enterprise, but this species is rare.
- 44:15Too often executive compensation in the US is ridiculously out of
- 44:20line with performance. That won't change, moreover,
- 44:23because the deck is stacked against investors when it comes
- 44:26to the CE OS pay. The upshot is that a mediocre or
- 44:30CEO, aided by his handpicked VP of Human Relations and a
- 44:34consultant from the ever accommodating firm of Ratchet,
- 44:37Ratchet and Bingo, all too often receives gobs of money from an
- 44:41I'll designed compensation arrangement.
- 44:44Take for instance, 10 year fixed price options.
- 44:47And who wouldn't? If Fred, Feudal CEO of Stagnant
- 44:51Incorporated, receives a bundle of these, let's say enough to
- 44:54give him an option on 1% of the company, his self-interest is
- 44:58clear. He should skip dividends
- 45:00entirely and instead use all of the company's earnings to
- 45:04repurchase stock. Let's assume that under Fred's
- 45:07leadership, Stagnant lives up to its name.
- 45:09In each of the 10 years after the option grant, it earns $1
- 45:13billion on $10 billion of net worth, which initially comes to
- 45:17$10 per share on the 100 million shares then outstanding.
- 45:22Fred issues dividends and regularly uses all earnings to
- 45:26repurchase shares. If the stock constantly sells at
- 45:2910 times earnings per share, it will have appreciated 158% by
- 45:34the end of the option period. That's because repurchases would
- 45:37reduce the number of shares to 38.7 million by that time, and
- 45:42earnings per share would thereby increase to 25.80 dollars.
- 45:47Simply by withholding earnings from owners, Fred gets very
- 45:51rich, making a cool $158 million despite the business itself
- 45:56improving. Not at all.
- 45:58Astonishingly, Fred could have made more than $100 million of
- 46:02Stagnant's earnings had declined by 20% during the 10 year
- 46:05period. Fred can also get a splendid
- 46:08result for himself by paying no dividends and deploying the
- 46:11earnings he withholds from shareholders into a variety of
- 46:15disappointing projects and acquisitions.
- 46:18Even if these initiatives deliver a paltry 5% return, Fred
- 46:22will still make a bundle. Specifically, with Stagnant's PE
- 46:25ratio remaining unchanged at 10, Fred's option will deliver him
- 46:30$63 million. Meanwhile, his shareholders will
- 46:34wonder what happened to the alignment of interest that was
- 46:36supposed to occur when Fred was issued options.
- 46:40A normal dividend policy, of course. 1/3 of earnings paid
- 46:43out, for example, produces less extreme results but still can
- 46:47provide lush rewards for managers who achieve nothing.
- 46:51CEOs understand this math and know that every dime paid out in
- 46:55dividends reduces the value of all outstanding options.
- 46:59I've never, however, seeing this manager owner conflict
- 47:02referenced in proxy materials that request approval of a fixed
- 47:06priced option plan. Those CEOs invariably preach
- 47:09internally that capital comes at a cost.
- 47:12They somehow forget to tell shareholders that fixed price
- 47:15options give them capital that is free.
- 47:17It doesn't have to be this way. It's child's play for a board to
- 47:21design options that give effect to the automatic build up in
- 47:24value that occurs when earnings are retained.
- 47:27What surprise, surprise, options of that kind are almost never
- 47:31issued. Indeed, the very thought of
- 47:33options with strike prices that are adjusted for retained
- 47:36earnings seems foreign to compensation experts who are
- 47:40nevertheless encyclopedic about every management friendly plan
- 47:43that exists. Whose bread I eat, His song I
- 47:46sing. Getting fired can produce a
- 47:48particularly bountiful payday for Aceo.
- 47:51Indeed, he can earn more in that single day while cleaning out
- 47:55his desk than an American worker earns in a lifetime of cleaning
- 47:59toilets. Forget the old maxim about
- 48:02nothing succeeding like success today in the executive suite,
- 48:06the all too prevalent rule is that nothing succeeds like
- 48:09failure. 16. Huge severance payments, lavish
- 48:13perks, and outsized payments for ho hum performance often occur
- 48:17because comp committees have become slaves to comparative
- 48:20data. The drill is simple.
- 48:22Three or so directors not chosen by chance are bombarded for a
- 48:26few hours before a board meeting with pay statistics that
- 48:30perpetually ratchet upwards. Additionally, the committee is
- 48:33told about new perks that other managers are receiving.
- 48:37In this manner, outlandish goodies are showered upon CE OS
- 48:40simply because of a corporate version of the argument we all
- 48:44used when children but mom, all the other kids have one.
- 48:48When comp committees follow this logic, yesterday's most
- 48:51egregious excess becomes today's baseline.
- 48:54Comp committees should adopt the attitude of Hank Greenberg, the
- 48:58Detroit slugger and a boyhood hero of mine.
- 49:01Hank's son Steve at one time was a player's agent representing an
- 49:05outfielder in negotiations with a Major League club.
- 49:09Steve sounded out his dad about the size of the signing bonus he
- 49:13should ask for. Hank, a true pay for performance
- 49:16guy, got straight to the point. What did he hit last year?
- 49:19When Steve answered .246, Hank's comeback was immediate.
- 49:23Ask for a uniform. Let me pause for a brief
- 49:26confession. In criticizing comp committee
- 49:29behavior, I don't speak as a true insider.
- 49:32Though I have served as a director of 20 public companies,
- 49:35only one CEO has put me on his comp committee.
- 49:39My views on America's long term problem in respect to trade
- 49:42imbalances, which I have laid out in previous reports, remain
- 49:46unchanged. My conviction, however, cost
- 49:50Berkshire $955 million pre tax in 2005.
- 49:54That amount is included in our earnings statement, a fact that
- 49:58illustrates the differing ways in which Gap treats gains and
- 50:02losses when we have a long term position in stocks or bonds.
- 50:06Year to year changes in value are reflected in our balance
- 50:09sheet, but as long as the asset is not sold are rarely reflected
- 50:14in earnings. For example, our Coca-Cola
- 50:17holdings went from $1 billion in value early on to $13.4 billion
- 50:22at year end 1998 and have since declined to $8.1 billion with
- 50:27none of these moves affecting our earnings statement.
- 50:30Long term currency positions however, are daily marked to
- 50:34market and therefore have an effect on earnings.
- 50:37In every reporting period. From the date we first entered
- 50:40into currency contracts, we are $2.00 billion in the black.
- 50:44We reduced our direct position in currency somewhat during
- 50:472005. We partially offset this change,
- 50:51however, by purchasing equities whose prices are denominated in
- 50:55a variety of foreign currencies and that earn a large part of
- 50:58their profits internationally. Charlie and I prefer this method
- 51:02of acquiring non dollar exposure.
- 51:04That's largely because of changes in interest rates as US
- 51:08rates have risen relative to those of the rest of the world.
- 51:11Holding most foreign currencies now involves a significant
- 51:15negative carry. The carry aspect of our direct
- 51:17currency position indeed cost us money in 2005 and is likely to
- 51:22do so again in 2006. In contrast, the ownership of
- 51:27foreign equities is likely over time to create a positive carry,
- 51:31perhaps a substantial 1. The underlying factors affecting
- 51:35the US current account deficit continue to worsen and no let up
- 51:39is insight. Not only did our trade deficit,
- 51:42the largest and most familiar item in the current account,
- 51:45hidden all time high in 2005, but we also can expect a second
- 51:50item, the balance of investment income, to soon turn negative.
- 51:54As foreigners increase their ownership of US assets or of
- 51:57claims against us relative to US investments abroad, these
- 52:02investors will begin earning more on their holdings than we
- 52:04do on ours. Finally, the third component of
- 52:07the current account, unilateral transfers, is always negative.
- 52:11the US, it should be emphasized, is extraordinarily rich and will
- 52:16get richer as a result. The huge imbalances in its
- 52:20current account may continue for a long time without their having
- 52:23noticeable deleterious effects on the US economy or on markets.
- 52:28I doubt, however, that the situation will forever remain
- 52:32benign. Either Americans address the
- 52:34problem soon in a way we select, or at some point the problem
- 52:38will likely address us in an unpleasant way of its own. 17
- 52:43How to minimize investment Returns It's been an easy matter
- 52:46for Berkshire and other owners of American equities to prosper
- 52:50over the years. Between December 31st, 1899 and
- 52:55December 31st, 1999, to give a really long term example, the
- 53:00Dow rose from 66 to 11497 Guess what annual growth rate is
- 53:06required to produce this result? The surprising answer is at the
- 53:10end of this section. This huge rise came about for a
- 53:13simple reason. Over the century, American
- 53:16businesses did extraordinarily well and investors rode the wave
- 53:20of their prosperity. Businesses continue to do well,
- 53:23but now shareholders, through a series of self-inflicted wounds,
- 53:27are in a major way cutting the returns they will realize from
- 53:30their investments. The explanation of how this is
- 53:33happening begins with a fundamental truth.
- 53:36With unimportant exceptions, such as bankruptcies, in which
- 53:40some of the company's losses are borne by creditors, the most
- 53:43that owners in aggregate can earn between now and Judgement
- 53:46Day is what their businesses in aggregate earn.
- 53:49True, by buying and selling. That is clever or lucky.
- 53:53Investor A may take more than a share of the pie at the expense
- 53:57of Investor B. And yes, all investors feel
- 54:00richer when stocks soar. But an owner connects it only by
- 54:04having someone take his place. If one investor sells high,
- 54:07another must buy high. For owners as a whole, there is
- 54:10simply no magic, no shower of money from outer space that will
- 54:14enable them to extract wealth from their companies beyond that
- 54:18created by the companies themselves.
- 54:20Indeed, owners must earn less than their businesses earn
- 54:23because of frictional costs. And that's my point.
- 54:27These costs are now being incurred in amounts that will
- 54:30cost shareholders to earn far less than they historically
- 54:33have. To understand how this toll has
- 54:36ballooned, imagine for a moment that all American corporations
- 54:40are and always will be owned by a single family.
- 54:43We'll call them the Got rocks. After paying taxes on dividends,
- 54:48this family, generation after generation, becomes richer by
- 54:51the aggregate amount earned by its companies.
- 54:54Today, that amount is about $700 billion annually.
- 54:58Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars, but the
- 55:02portion it saves steadily compounds for its benefit.
- 55:05In the Gottrocks household, everyone grows wealthier at the
- 55:08same pace, and all is harmonious.
- 55:11But let's now assume that a few fast talking helpers approach
- 55:14the family and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart
- 55:18his relatives by buying certain of their holdings and selling
- 55:21them certain others. The helpers, for a fee of
- 55:24course, obligingly agree to handle these transactions.
- 55:28The Gottrocks still own all of corporate America.
- 55:31The trades just rearrange who owns what.
- 55:33So the family's annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the
- 55:38earnings of American business minus commissions paid.
- 55:41The more that family members trade, the smaller their share
- 55:44of the pie and the larger the slice received by the helpers.
- 55:48This fact is not lost upon these broker helpers.
- 55:52Activity is their friend and in a wide variety of ways they urge
- 55:56it on. After a while, most of the
- 55:58family members realize that they are not doing so well at this
- 56:01new Beat My Brother game. Enter another set of helpers.
- 56:05These newcomers explain to each member of the Gottrock's clan
- 56:09that by himself, hell never outsmart the rest of the family.
- 56:12The suggested cure? Hire a manager, yes us, and get
- 56:16the job done professionally. These manager helpers continue
- 56:20to use the broker helpers to execute trades.
- 56:23The managers may even increase their activity so as to permit
- 56:27the brokers to prosper still more Overall, a bigger slice of
- 56:31the pie now goes to the two classes of helpers.
- 56:34The family's disappointment grows.
- 56:36Each of its members is now employing professionals.
- 56:39Yet overall, the group's finances have taken a turn for
- 56:43the worse. The solution?
- 56:45More help? Of course it arrives in the form
- 56:48of financial planners and institutional consultants who
- 56:51weigh in to advise thee Gotrocks on selecting manager helpers.
- 56:55The befuddled family welcomes this assistance.
- 56:58By now it's members know they can pick neither the right
- 57:01stocks nor the right stock pickers.
- 57:03Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the
- 57:06right consultant? But this question does not occur
- 57:09to the Gotrocks, and the consultant helpers certainly
- 57:12don't suggest it to them. 18 The Got Rocks, now supporting 3
- 57:17classes of expensive helpers, find that their results get
- 57:20worse and they sink into despair.
- 57:23But just as hope seems lost, a fourth group will call them the
- 57:26Hyper Helpers. Appears these friendly folk
- 57:29explained to the Got Rocks that they're unsatisfactory.
- 57:32Results are occurring because the existing helpers, brokers,
- 57:36managers, consultants are not sufficiently motivated and are
- 57:40simply going through the motions.
- 57:42What, the new helpers ask, can you expect from such a bunch of
- 57:46zombies? The new arrivals offer a
- 57:48breathtakingly simple solution. Pay more money.
- 57:51Brimming with self-confidence, the hyper Helpers assert that
- 57:55huge contingent payments, in addition to stiff fixed fees,
- 57:58are what each family member must fork over in order to really
- 58:02outmaneuver his relatives. The more observant members of
- 58:05the family see that some of the Hyper helpers are really just
- 58:08manager helpers, wearing new uniforms bearing sewn on sexy
- 58:12names like hedge fund or private equity.
- 58:16The new helpers, however, assure the got rocks that this change
- 58:19of clothing is all important, bestowing on its wearer's
- 58:23magical powers similar to those acquired by mild mannered Clark
- 58:26Kent when he changed into his Superman costume.
- 58:30Calmed by this explanation, the family decides to pay up, and
- 58:33that's where we are today. A record portion of the earnings
- 58:36that would go in their entirety too owners if they all just
- 58:39stayed in their rocking chairs is now going to a swelling army
- 58:43of helpers. Particularly expensive is the
- 58:46recent pandemic of profit arrangements, under which
- 58:49helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are
- 58:52smart or lucky and leave family members with all of the losses
- 58:56and large fixed fees to boot. When the helpers are dumb or
- 58:59unlucky or occasionally crooked, A sufficient number of
- 59:03arrangements like this heads the helper, takes much of the
- 59:06winnings, tails the got rocks, lose and pay dearly for the
- 59:10privilege of doing so may make it more accurate to call them
- 59:13family. The had rocks today.
- 59:15In fact, the family's frictional costs of all sorts may well
- 59:19amount to 20% off the earnings of American business.
- 59:23In other words, the burden of paying helpers may cause
- 59:26American equity investors overall to earn only 80% or so
- 59:31of what they would earn if they just sat still and listened to
- 59:34no one. Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave
- 59:37us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius.
- 59:41But Sir Isaac's talents didn't extend to investing.
- 59:45He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later I
- 59:48can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness
- 59:53of men. If he had not been traumatized
- 59:55by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover
- 59:59the 4th law of motion for investors as a whole.
- 1:00:02Returns decrease as motion increases.
- 1:00:05Hey race. The answer to the question posed
- 1:00:07at the beginning of this section.
- 1:00:08To get very specific, the Dow increased from 65.73 to
- 1:00:1311,497.12 in the 20th century. And that amounts to a gain of
- 1:00:195.3% compounded annually. Investors would also have
- 1:00:24received dividends. Of course, to achieve an equal
- 1:00:27rate of gain in the 21st century, the Dow will have to
- 1:00:31rise by December 31st, 2099. To brace yourself, precisely
- 1:00:362,011,011.23. But I'm willing to settle For
- 1:00:402,000,006 years into this century, the Dow has gained not
- 1:00:44at all debt and risk as we consolidate Mid American.
- 1:00:49Our New Balance sheet may suggest that Berkshire has
- 1:00:52expanded its tolerance for borrowing, but that's not so.
- 1:00:56Except for token amounts. We shun debt, turning to it for
- 1:01:00only three purposes when we occasionally use repos as a part
- 1:01:04of certain short term investing strategies that incorporate
- 1:01:07ownership of U.S. government or agency securities.
- 1:01:10Purchases of this kind are highly opportunistic and involve
- 1:01:14only the most liquid of securities.
- 1:01:17A few years ago we entered into several interesting transactions
- 1:01:21that have since been unwound or a running off the offsetting
- 1:01:25that has likewise been cut substantially and before long
- 1:01:28may be gone. 19 Two, we borrow money against portfolios of
- 1:01:32interest bearing receivables whose risk characteristics we
- 1:01:36understand. We did this in 2001 when we
- 1:01:39guaranteed $5.6 billion of bank debt to take over in partnership
- 1:01:44with Lucadia, a bankrupt Finova, which held a broad range of
- 1:01:48receivables. All of that debt has been
- 1:01:51repaid. More recently, we have borrowed
- 1:01:53to finance a widely diversified, predictably performing portfolio
- 1:01:58of manufactured home receivables managed by Clayton.
- 1:02:01Alternatively, we could securitize, that is sell these
- 1:02:04receivables but retain the servicing of them.
- 1:02:08If we followed this procedure, which is common in the industry,
- 1:02:11we would not show the debt that we do on our balance sheet and
- 1:02:14we would also accelerate the earnings we report.
- 1:02:17In the end, however, we would earn less money or market
- 1:02:21variables to change so as to favor securitization and
- 1:02:25unlikely event we could sell part of our portfolio and
- 1:02:29eliminate the related debt. Until then, we prefer better
- 1:02:32profits to better Cosmetics. 3 At Mid American, we have
- 1:02:36substantial debt, but it is that company's obligation only.
- 1:02:40Though it will appear on our consolidated balance sheet,
- 1:02:43Berkshire does not guarantee it. Even so, this debt is
- 1:02:47unquestionably secure because it is serviced by Mid Americans
- 1:02:50diversified stream of highly stable utility earnings.
- 1:02:54If there were to be some bolt from the blue that hurt one of
- 1:02:57Mid Americans utility properties, earnings from the
- 1:03:00others would still be more than ample to cover all debt
- 1:03:03requirements. Moreover, Mid American retains
- 1:03:07all of its earnings and equity building practice that is rare
- 1:03:10in the utility field. From a risk standpoint, it is
- 1:03:14far safer to have earnings from 10 diverse and uncorrelated
- 1:03:17utility operations that cover interest charges by, say, a 2 to
- 1:03:22one ratio than it is to have far greater coverage provided by a
- 1:03:26single utility. A catastrophic event can render
- 1:03:29a single utility insolvent. Witness what Katrina did to the
- 1:03:33local electric utility in New Orleans.
- 1:03:35No matter how conservative its debt policy, a geographical
- 1:03:39disaster, say an earthquake in a western state, can't have the
- 1:03:43same effect on mid American. And even a warrior like Charlie
- 1:03:47can't think of an event that would systemically decrease
- 1:03:50utility earnings in any major way.
- 1:03:53Because of Mid Americans ever widening diversity of regulated
- 1:03:56earnings. It will always utilize major
- 1:03:59amounts of debt and that's about it.
- 1:04:01We are not interested in incurring any significant debt
- 1:04:04at Berkshire for acquisitions or operating purposes.
- 1:04:08Conventional business wisdom, of course, would argue that we are
- 1:04:12being too conservative and that there are added profits that
- 1:04:15could be safely earned if we injected moderate leverage into
- 1:04:19our balance sheet. Maybe so, but many of
- 1:04:22Berkshire's hundreds of thousands of investors have a
- 1:04:24large portion of their net worth in our stock.
- 1:04:26Among them, it should be emphasized, a large number of
- 1:04:30our board in key managers and a disaster for the company would
- 1:04:34be a disaster for them. Moreover, there are people who
- 1:04:37have been permanently injured to whom we owe insurance payments
- 1:04:40that stretch out for 50 years or more.
- 1:04:43To these and other constituencies, we have promised
- 1:04:46total security. Whatever comes financial panics,
- 1:04:49Stock Exchange closures and extended 1 occurred in 1914 or
- 1:04:53even domestic nuclear, chemical or biological attacks, we are
- 1:04:58quite willing to accept huge risks.
- 1:05:00Indeed, more than any other insurer, we write high limit
- 1:05:04policies that are tied to single catastrophic events.
- 1:05:07We also own a large investment portfolio whose market value
- 1:05:11could fall dramatically and quickly under certain
- 1:05:14conditions, as happened on October 19th, 1987.
- 1:05:18Whatever occurs though, Berkshire will have the net
- 1:05:21worth, the earnings streams and the liquidity to handle the
- 1:05:24problem with ease. Any other approach is dangerous.
- 1:05:28Over the years, a number of very smart people have learned that
- 1:05:31hard way that a long string of impressive numbers multiplied by
- 1:05:35a single zero always equals zero.
- 1:05:38That is not an equation whose effects I would like to
- 1:05:40experience personally, and I would like even less to be
- 1:05:44responsible for imposing its penalties upon others. 20
- 1:05:48Management succession. As owners, you are naturally
- 1:05:51concerned about whether I will insist on continuing as CEO
- 1:05:54after I begin to fade and if so, how the board will handle that
- 1:05:59problem. You also want to know what
- 1:06:01happens if I should die tonight? That second question is easy to
- 1:06:05answer. Most of our many businesses have
- 1:06:07strong market positions, significant momentum and
- 1:06:11terrific managers. The special Berkshire culture is
- 1:06:14deeply ingrained throughout our subsidiaries and these
- 1:06:17operations won't miss a beat when I die.
- 1:06:20Moreover, we have 3 managers at Berkshire who are reasonably
- 1:06:23young and fully capable of being CEO.
- 1:06:27Any of the three would be much better at certain management
- 1:06:30aspects of my job than I. On the minus side, none has my
- 1:06:34crossover experience that allows me to be comfortable making
- 1:06:37decisions in either the business arena or in investments.
- 1:06:41That problem will be solved by having another person in the
- 1:06:44organization handle marketable securities.
- 1:06:47That's an interesting job at Berkshire, and the new CEO will
- 1:06:51have no problem in hiring a talented individual to do it.
- 1:06:54Indeed, that's what we have done at GEICO for 26 years and our
- 1:06:59results have been terrific. Berkshire's board has fully
- 1:07:02discussed each of the three CEO candidates and has unanimously
- 1:07:06agreed on the person who should succeed me if a replacement were
- 1:07:09needed. Today.
- 1:07:10The directors stay updated on this subject and could alter
- 1:07:13their view as circumstances change.
- 1:07:15New managerial stars may emerge and present ones will age.
- 1:07:20The important point is that the directors know now, and will
- 1:07:23always know in the future, exactly what they will do when
- 1:07:26the need arises. The other question that must be
- 1:07:29addressed is whether the board will be prepared to make a
- 1:07:31change if that need should arise.
- 1:07:34Not from my death, but rather from my decay, particularly if
- 1:07:37this decay is accompanied by my delusionally thinking that I am
- 1:07:41reaching new peaks of managerial brilliance.
- 1:07:44That problem would not be unique to me.
- 1:07:47Charlie and I have faced this situation from time to time at
- 1:07:50Berkshire's subsidiaries. Humans age at greatly varying
- 1:07:54rates, but sooner or later their talents and vigor decline.
- 1:07:58Some managers remain effective well into their 80s, Charlie is
- 1:08:02a wonder at 82, and others noticeably fade in their 60s.
- 1:08:07When their abilities ebb, so usually do their powers of
- 1:08:10self-assessment. Someone else often needs to blow
- 1:08:12the whistle. When that time comes for me, our
- 1:08:15board will have to step up to the job.
- 1:08:17From a financial standpoint, its members are unusually motivated
- 1:08:21to do so. I know of no other board in the
- 1:08:24country in which the financial interests of directors are so
- 1:08:27completely aligned with those of shareholders.
- 1:08:30Few boards even come close. On a personal level, however, it
- 1:08:35is extraordinarily difficult for most people to tell someone,
- 1:08:38particularly a friend, that he or she is no longer capable.
- 1:08:42If I become a candidate for that message, however, our board will
- 1:08:46be doing me a favor by delivering it.
- 1:08:48Every share of Berkshire that I own is destined to go to
- 1:08:51philanthropies, and I want society to reap the maximum good
- 1:08:55from these gifts and bequests. It would be a tragedy if the
- 1:08:59philanthropic potential of my holdings was diminished because
- 1:09:02my associates shirked their responsibility to tenderly, I
- 1:09:05hope, show me the door. But don't worry about this, we
- 1:09:09have an outstanding group of directors and they will always
- 1:09:13do what's right for shareholders.
- 1:09:14And while we are on the subject, I feel terrific the annual
- 1:09:18meeting. Our meeting this year will be on
- 1:09:20Saturday, May 6th. As always, the doors will open
- 1:09:23at the quest center at 7:00 AM and the latest Berkshire movie
- 1:09:27will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to
- 1:09:32the question and answer period, which, with a break for lunch at
- 1:09:35the quest stands, will last until 3:00.
- 1:09:38Then after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the
- 1:09:42Annual meeting at 3:15. This schedule worked well last
- 1:09:46year because it let those who wanted to attend the formal
- 1:09:49session to do so while freeing others to shop. 21 You certainly
- 1:09:54did your share in this respect last year.
- 1:09:56The 194,300 square foot hall adjoining the meeting area was
- 1:10:02filled with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries and the
- 1:10:0521,000 people who came to the meeting allowed every location
- 1:10:09to rack up sales records. Kelly Bras NE Mutimore, the Flow
- 1:10:13Ziegfeld of Berkshire, orchestrates both this
- 1:10:16magnificent shopping extravaganza and the meeting
- 1:10:19itself. The exhibitors love her and so
- 1:10:23do I Kelly got married in October and I gave her away.
- 1:10:27She asked me how I wanted to be listed in the wedding program.
- 1:10:30I replied envious of the groom and that's the way it went to
- 1:10:34press. This year we will showcase 2
- 1:10:36Clayton homes featuring Acme Brick, Shaw carpet, Johns,
- 1:10:40Manville insulation, My Tech Fasteners, Carefree Awnings and
- 1:10:44NFM furniture. You will find that these homes
- 1:10:48priced at $79,000 and $89,000 deliver excellent value.
- 1:10:54In fact, 3 shareholders came so firmly to that conclusion last
- 1:10:58year that they bought the $119,000 model we then
- 1:11:01showcased. Flanking the Clayton homes on
- 1:11:04the exhibition floor will be RV's from Forest River.
- 1:11:07GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top
- 1:11:10counselors from around the country, all of them ready to
- 1:11:13supply you with auto insurance quotes.
- 1:11:16In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special
- 1:11:19shareholder discount, usually 8%.
- 1:11:22This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in
- 1:11:26which we operate. 1 Supplemental point, the discount is not
- 1:11:30additive if you qualify for another such as that given
- 1:11:33certain groups. Bring the details of your
- 1:11:36existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money
- 1:11:40for at least 50% of you. I believe we can.
- 1:11:43And while you're at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card.
- 1:11:47It's the one I now use. On Saturday at the Omaha
- 1:11:50Airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from Net Jets
- 1:11:54available for your inspection. Stop by the Net Jets booth at
- 1:11:57the Quest to learn about viewing these planes.
- 1:12:00Come to Omaha by bus, leaving your new plane.
- 1:12:03The Bookworm boutique at the Quest broke all records last
- 1:12:06year selling Berkshire related books.
- 1:12:08An amazing 3500 of these were Poor Charlie's Almanac, the
- 1:12:13collected wisdom of my partner. This means that a copy was sold
- 1:12:17every 9 seconds, and for good reason.
- 1:12:20You will never find a book with more useful ideas.
- 1:12:23Word of mouth recommendations have caused Charlie's first
- 1:12:26printing of 20,500 copies to sell out and we will therefore
- 1:12:31have a revised and expanded edition on sale at our meeting.
- 1:12:34Among the other 22 titles and DVDs available last year at the
- 1:12:39Bookworm for 1597, copies were sold for $84,746 hour.
- 1:12:46Shareholders are a bookseller's dream.
- 1:12:49An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with
- 1:12:52this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will
- 1:12:55need for admission to the meeting and other events.
- 1:12:58As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again
- 1:13:02signed up American Express 800-799-6634 to give you special
- 1:13:08help. Carol Peterson, who handles
- 1:13:11these matters, does a terrific job for us each year and I thank
- 1:13:15her for it. At Nebraska Furniture Mart,
- 1:13:17located on a 77 acre site on 72nd St. between Dodge and
- 1:13:22Pacific, we will again be having Berkshire Weekend pricing.
- 1:13:25We initiated this special event at NFM 9 years ago and sales
- 1:13:30during the weekend grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $27.4
- 1:13:36million in 2005, up 9% from a year earlier.
- 1:13:41I get goosebumps just thinking about this volume.
- 1:13:44To obtain the discount, you must make your purchases between
- 1:13:47Thursday, May 4th and Monday, May 8th, inclusive, and also
- 1:13:51present your meeting credential. The period special pricing will
- 1:13:54even apply to the products of several prestigious
- 1:13:58manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against
- 1:14:01discounting, but that in the spirit of our shareholder
- 1:14:04weekend, have made an exception for you.
- 1:14:07We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10:00 AM to
- 1:14:119:00 PM, Monday through Saturday and 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on
- 1:14:16Sunday. On Saturday this year from 5:30
- 1:14:19PM to 8:00 PM, we are having a special affair for shareholders
- 1:14:23only. They'll be there eating BBQ,
- 1:14:26drinking coke, and counting sales.
- 1:14:29Bor Shines Again will have two shareholder only events.
- 1:14:32The first will be a cocktail reception from 6:00 PM to 10:00
- 1:14:36PM on Friday, May 5th. The second, the main gala, will
- 1:14:40be from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM on Sunday, May 7th.
- 1:14:44On Saturday, we will be open until 6:00 PM 22.
- 1:14:48We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend
- 1:14:51For your convenience. Therefore, shareholder prices
- 1:14:54will be available from Monday, May 1st through Saturday, May
- 1:14:5813th. During that period, just
- 1:15:01identify yourself as a shareholder through your meeting
- 1:15:03credentials or a brokerage statement.
- 1:15:06Borsheims operates on a gross margin that, even before the
- 1:15:10shareholders discount, is fully 20 percentage points below that
- 1:15:14of its major rivals. Last year, our shareholder
- 1:15:17period business increased 9% from 2004, which came on top of
- 1:15:22a 73% gain the year before. The store sold 5000 Berkshire
- 1:15:27Monopoly games and then ran out. We've learned plenty will be in
- 1:15:31stock this year. In a tent outside of
- 1:15:33Borchheim's, Patrick Wolf, twice US chess champion, will take on
- 1:15:38all comers in groups of 6 blindfolded.
- 1:15:41Additionally, we will have Bob Hammond and Sharon Osberg, 2 of
- 1:15:45the world's top bridge experts, available to play with our
- 1:15:48shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
- 1:15:50They plan to keep their eyes open, but Bob never sorts his
- 1:15:54cards, even when playing for a national championship.
- 1:15:57Gore, it's my favorite steakhouse, will again be open
- 1:16:00exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7th,
- 1:16:04and we'll be serving from 4:00 PM until 10:00 PM.
- 1:16:08Please remember that to come to Gorretz on that day, you must
- 1:16:11have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733
- 1:16:18on April 1st, but not before. In this school year, about 35
- 1:16:22university classes will come to Omaha for sessions with me.
- 1:16:26I take almost all in aggregate, perhaps 2000 students to lunch
- 1:16:30at Gorretz and they love it. To learn why, come join us on
- 1:16:34Sunday. We will again have a special
- 1:16:36reception from 4:00 to 5:30 on Saturday afternoon for
- 1:16:39shareholders who have come from outside of North America.
- 1:16:43Every year our meeting draws many people from around the
- 1:16:46globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet
- 1:16:49those who have come so far. Last year, we enjoyed meeting
- 1:16:53more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries.
- 1:16:56Any shareholder who comes from other than the US or Canada will
- 1:17:00be given a special credential and instructions for attending
- 1:17:04this function. Charlie and I are
- 1:17:06extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America, had
- 1:17:09terrific parents who saw that we got good educations, have
- 1:17:13enjoyed wonderful families and great health, and came equipped
- 1:17:16with a business gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely
- 1:17:20disproportionate to other people Who contribute as much or more
- 1:17:25to our society's well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs
- 1:17:29that we love in which we are helped everyday in countless
- 1:17:32ways by talented and cheerful associates.
- 1:17:35No wonder we tap dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us
- 1:17:39than getting together with our shareholder partners at
- 1:17:42Berkshire's annual meeting. So join us on May 6th at the
- 1:17:45Quest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.
- 1:17:48We'll see you there. February 28th, 2006 Warren E
- 1:17:52Buffett, Chairman of the Board 23.