Latest / Trumponomics / How Trump’s Year of Disruption Has Only Helped China

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How Trump’s Year of Disruption Has Only Helped China · Trumponomics

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  Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news.
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  Speaker 2: President Trump is taking this economy in a different direction.
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  Speaker 2: He ran on that, he promised it, and now he's delivering.
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  Speaker 3: We're in the process of imposing reciprocal tariffs.
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  Speaker 4: This is going to hurt our economy before we get
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  Speaker 4: to any possible retaliation.
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  Speaker 2: The big promise was that he was going to bring
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  Speaker 2: down prices and make America affordable again. And everything he's
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  Speaker 2: done is the opposite of that.
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  Speaker 3: What's Plan B with Trump behaving like he is? And
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  Speaker 3: they say, well, at the end of the day, there's
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  Speaker 3: no Plan B because there's nobody who can really take
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  Speaker 3: the place of the United States.
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  Speaker 4: I'm Stephanie Flonds, head of Government Economics at Bloomberg, and
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  Speaker 4: this is trump Panomics, the podcast that looks at the
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  Speaker 4: economic world of Donald Trump, how he's already shaped the
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  Speaker 4: global economy and what on earth is going to happen next.
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  Speaker 4: This week, I'm in Hong Kong and it's making me
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  Speaker 4: think about how trump Andomics has changed the world for
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  Speaker 4: sieging ping in the past twelve months. Donald Trump came
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  Speaker 4: into office both times as a president who would stop
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  Speaker 4: China quotes free riding on the global trading system had
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  Speaker 4: to dial down its heavy dependence on exports and Chi
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  Speaker 4: Jinping's plan to dominate all the technologies and industries of
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  Speaker 4: the future. But it hasn't worked out like that. China's economy,
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  Speaker 4: if anything, is more dependent on exports than ever, with
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  Speaker 4: a record trade surplus last year, higher as a share
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  Speaker 4: of its economy than it's been in any year since
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  Speaker 4: two thousand and eight. And Tonald Trump has even made
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  Speaker 4: China's grand technological goals just a bit more attainable, potentially
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  Speaker 4: by granting access to advanced semiconductor chips that were off limb.
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  Speaker 4: It's under President Trump and President Biden before. Now, the EU,
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  Speaker 4: the UK and other so called middle powers are no
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  Speaker 4: happier about China's export led economic model than they would
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  Speaker 4: have been a year ago. It's actually more aggravating now
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  Speaker 4: because China has more than made up for lower exports
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  Speaker 4: to the US by exporting more to everybody else. But
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  Speaker 4: in these days most of the cars seem to be
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  Speaker 4: Chinese evs. But rather than responding to this new China
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  Speaker 4: shock with higher trade barriers of their own, these Western
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  Speaker 4: leaders in recent weeks have been reaching out to China
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  Speaker 4: as a hedge against the shocks coming from the.
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  Speaker 3: US visits, shall we So there we go. That's Mark Harney,
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  Speaker 3: Prime Minister Canada. He has arrived in China first state visits.
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  Speaker 3: Prime Minister Cure Starmer has met with Chinese President's Chooting
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  Speaker 3: being in Beijing and calling for a quote more sophisticated relationship.
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  Speaker 3: I'm sure Macron is do the meat with China's leader,
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  Speaker 3: she dident Ping in the next hour or so, as
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  Speaker 3: he begins.
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  Speaker 4: A witness Canada's recent trade deal, recent visits by President Macran,
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  Speaker 4: the European Commission president and Prime Minister Sekir Starmer. So
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  Speaker 4: is Donald Trump's diplomacy handed Shei Jinping the best of
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  Speaker 4: all possible worlds for the Middle Kingdom, The capacity to
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  Speaker 4: build influence and alliances around the world without changing China's
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  Speaker 4: internationally divisive economic model one job, and if so, can
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  Speaker 4: this sweet moment of opportunity possibly last? Well? I want
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  Speaker 4: to get into this and also just generally take stock
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  Speaker 4: of how things look for China and its economy in
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  Speaker 4: relation to the rest of the world. Since I am
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  Speaker 4: in Hong Kong with the man who runs all of
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  Speaker 4: our economics and politics coverage in Asia, our Bloomberg executive
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  Speaker 4: editor Dan ten Kate. He also recently published a weekend
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  Speaker 4: essay on this very topic entitled an Untethered Trump is
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  Speaker 4: Expanding's sphere of influence and from Sydney, Richard McGregor joins us.
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  Speaker 4: Richard's a senior fellow at the Loewe Institute and he's
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  Speaker 4: been a bureau chief for The Financial Times in Beijing,
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  Speaker 4: Shanghai and Washington and the author, most recently of Asia's Reckoning, China,
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  Speaker 4: Japan and the Fate of US Power in the Pacific Century.
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  Speaker 4: Richard Dan, very nice to have you, id. Dan, you
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  Speaker 4: sort of set the stage rather nicely in your essay
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  Speaker 4: how the world has moved in Chijingping's direction in a
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  Speaker 4: rather unexpected way over the past year or so. So,
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  Speaker 4: without regurgitating your entire essay, just give us a flavor
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  Speaker 4: of that. Well.
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  Speaker 2: I think if you start at the end of the
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  Speaker 2: Biden administration October twenty twenty four, you had Rama Manuel,
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  Speaker 2: the US envoy to Japan at the time, really rallying
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  Speaker 2: the world against economic coersion by China. That was the
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  Speaker 2: big issue from Biden the Biden White House to get
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  Speaker 2: the allies onside, and they really talked about this a lot.
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  Speaker 2: They made China out to be the bad person. Now
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  Speaker 2: about eighteen months later, that's completely flipped on its head,
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  Speaker 2: where you had the EU actually considering the first use
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  Speaker 2: of its new anti coercion tools, not against China but
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  Speaker 2: against the US and Trump, and that was in relation
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  Speaker 2: to Trump's threats to take Greenland and to raise tariffs
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  Speaker 2: on anyone who opposed that. Really, so this upside down
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  Speaker 2: type of world. It's kind of stunning just how quickly
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  Speaker 2: it all happened. But it goes back to this idea
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  Speaker 2: of can you trust the United States? I mean, this
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  Speaker 2: is something that the world hadn't even pondered. It was
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  Speaker 2: sort of taken as given for many years. And at Davos,
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  Speaker 2: which you were there, the Canadian Prime Minister Markcarney's speech
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  Speaker 2: was quite striking in that regard where you laid out
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  Speaker 2: a world in which you cannoctually say.
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  Speaker 1: Us, we're reminded that we live in an era of
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  Speaker 1: great power rivalry, so the rules based order is fading,
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  Speaker 1: that the strong can do what they can and the
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  Speaker 1: weak must suffer what they must.
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  Speaker 2: And Carnegie just laid out this idea of middle powers
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  Speaker 2: need to band together now and work together otherwise they're
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  Speaker 2: going to be on the menu. They're going to be
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  Speaker 2: in for lunch, including by the US. And this is
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  Speaker 2: a notion that a lot of countries in Asia have
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  Speaker 2: done for a long time, balancing the US and China.
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  Speaker 2: But it's fairly new for the Allies to get into
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  Speaker 2: that world.
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  Speaker 4: Just because some people may not be familiar with the
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  Speaker 4: anti Coersian instrument. But what you reminded us of in
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  Speaker 4: that essay was that that tool that was supposed to
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  Speaker 4: be this sort of great deterrent that Europeans had. You know,
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  Speaker 4: it's always been very slow for europe to respond to things,
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  Speaker 4: but it was going to have this economic equivalent of
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  Speaker 4: a nuclear weapon. It it's dispose or that it could
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  Speaker 4: just impose very sweeping constraints on countries and would hopefully
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  Speaker 4: never be used. And they introduced it in direct response
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  Speaker 4: to China's punishment of Lithuania for opening up a Taiwanese
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  Speaker 4: representative office and that kind of economic warfare that the
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  Speaker 4: Chinese had waged against countries when they did things they
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  Speaker 4: didn't like. They were directly trying to respond to that.
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  Speaker 4: So as obviously it is ironic that now it seems
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  Speaker 4: if you were going to guess the most likely use
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  Speaker 4: by Europe of that instrument will not be against China
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  Speaker 4: but against the US. Richard, You're sitting in Sydney and
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  Speaker 4: you've been looking at the Australian policy as well as
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  Speaker 4: being a close watcher of China. As Dan says, we've
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  Speaker 4: seen countries kind of play this dance before, and Australia
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  Speaker 4: in particular has been maybe ahead of the game in
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  Speaker 4: looking to come to a different kind of accommodation with China.
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  Speaker 3: Yeah. Well, one of the interesting things you were talking
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  Speaker 3: about the EU. It's just been reported in Australia that
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  Speaker 3: Missus vander Layan is coming to Australia in about two
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  Speaker 3: weeks to sign a free trade agreement with Australia. So classic,
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  Speaker 3: you know, middle power sort of agency if you like,
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  Speaker 3: looking for alternatives to the US. And it's certainly true
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  Speaker 3: that Australia had its own shock, the sort of shock
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  Speaker 3: that Canada's filling now at the hands of the United States.
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  Speaker 3: We had at the hands of China about five years ago.
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  Speaker 3: And in retrospect it was a very good thing for
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  Speaker 3: US because it means that the sort of middle power
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  Speaker 3: or hyper middle power relations Australia and Japan, Australia and India.
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  Speaker 3: Australia and Singapore have all been rapidly intensified and thickened
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  Speaker 3: in the past five years. But by the same token,
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  Speaker 3: I wouldn't overstate the impact of them. I travel a
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  Speaker 3: lot in Southeast Asia and North Asia, and particularly when
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  Speaker 3: you go to countries like Japan and Taiwan. I was
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  Speaker 3: in Taiwan late last year and you talked to people
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  Speaker 3: there and you say to them, all, what's Plan B
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  Speaker 3: with Trump behaving like he is? And they say, at
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  Speaker 3: the end of the day, there's no Plan B because
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  Speaker 3: there's nobody who can really take the place of the
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  Speaker 3: United States. And so, yes, we can do things. Middle
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  Speaker 3: power agreements are vanity projects, but you can't get around
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  Speaker 3: the destabilization of global politics basically wrought by the two
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  Speaker 3: superpowers in their own different fashions.
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  Speaker 4: And Dan, you were reminding me. One of the most
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  Speaker 4: sort of vivid demonstrations of this last year for many
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  Speaker 4: people was Moody actually going to China last summer for
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  Speaker 4: that summit, and they had previously not had those kind
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  Speaker 4: of relations for many years. But how is that translated
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  Speaker 4: into actual policies?
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  Speaker 2: Dan, India's probably one of the best examples of the
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  Speaker 2: incoherency of the Trump administration's foreign policy. For many years,
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  Speaker 2: they had quoted India the US multiple administrations quoted India
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  Speaker 2: as a counterweight to China, and Trump just sort of
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  Speaker 2: blew that up. So when he raised tariffs on India,
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  Speaker 2: Mody definitely wanted to send a message to Trump by
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  Speaker 2: heading to Beijing. Now we saw the limits of that
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  Speaker 2: right away, and in fact, we have a story out
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  Speaker 2: that talks about how right around that time, when Mody
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  Speaker 2: was in Beijing meeting she and meeting Putin, he was
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  Speaker 2: also dispatching his national security advisor to the US to
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  Speaker 2: try and men ties with America and come to a deal.
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  Speaker 2: Now that took several more months, and they finally cut
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  Speaker 2: a trade deal this week. But on my recent trip
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  Speaker 2: to Delhi, it was pretty evident that India didn't see
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  Speaker 2: China as a major alternative. Yes, they would lean toward
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  Speaker 2: Beijing more potentially you would see Buid open a factory,
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  Speaker 2: or they would do things that symbolically showed their strategic autonomy.
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  Speaker 2: But the message that I was getting, and that was
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  Speaker 2: pretty evident in discussions with officials, was that they still
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  Speaker 2: saw the US as a vital source of capital and
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  Speaker 2: technology and just that strategic partner. So this is a
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  Speaker 2: challenge that many countries in Asia face, particularly those with
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  Speaker 2: border disputes with China. Where you sit right on China's border,
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  Speaker 2: you need someone other than China with a big stick,
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  Speaker 2: preferably to kind of act as accounterway. So, yes, a
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  Speaker 2: lot of countries need to deal with China, will deal
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  Speaker 2: with China, but there is a limit to that reproach.
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  Speaker 4: Mark and Richard I sort of started off talking about
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  Speaker 4: the growth of China's exports last year. Just left on
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  Speaker 4: its own, we would have expected to be in a
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  Speaker 4: very different place. We would have had lots of talk
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  Speaker 4: around the China Shock, around countries needing to protect themselves
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  Speaker 4: from the massive sort of flood of exports that's happened
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  Speaker 4: in some countries. I would say it's in certain sectors
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  Speaker 4: in some countries, it's not all over, and instead we've
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  Speaker 4: had the opposite. But if China does continue to be
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  Speaker 4: so heavy reliant on exports, is that another reason why
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  Speaker 4: it becomes harder and harder for countries to really get
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  Speaker 4: close to China.
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  Speaker 3: Absolutely, you know the premise of this conversation, does Si
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  Speaker 3: Jinping have more room to move because of Trump. Absolutely,
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  Speaker 3: they're also very good at sort of running the narrative
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  Speaker 3: that they're at developing country helping out other developing countries,
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  Speaker 3: even though in fact they basically might be pulling up
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  Speaker 3: the ladder of industrialization from many countries because they simply
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  Speaker 3: can't cope with the surge of exports. But also, very quietly,
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  Speaker 3: China is threatening these countries. Don't take action against us.
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  Speaker 3: Perhaps we might do what Japan did in the nineteen
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  Speaker 3: eighties and have some export restraints and the like. But
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  Speaker 3: you know, the Chinese are struggling to turn off the
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  Speaker 3: tap because it means a complete remodeling of their domestic economy,
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  Speaker 3: and they have struggled to do that, and they don't
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  Speaker 3: want to take the decisions to do that. There's a
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  Speaker 3: narrative that China is going to take America's place in Asia. Now,
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  Speaker 3: let me tell you why that's so fanciful. If you
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  Speaker 3: think about the United States, it's a long way from Asia.
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  Speaker 3: The US has no territorial disputes in the region, the
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  Speaker 3: Asia Pacific region. Leaving aside India, let's look at maritime Asia.
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  Speaker 3: China has disputes of a different kind with South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia,
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  Speaker 3: the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and I haven't even mentioned Taiwan.
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  Speaker 3: So the idea that you know, China moves into, you know,
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  Speaker 3: as the new hedgemon and the US disappears into sort
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  Speaker 3: of bourgeois decline on the other side of the Pacific
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  Speaker 3: doesn't make sense. Plus, China is not a market for
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  Speaker 3: finished goods like the US is. China processes goods and
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  Speaker 3: send them, sends them out, or makes them all itself,
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  Speaker 3: so it simply can't play the role that the US played,
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  Speaker 3: which is why the idea that the US might step
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  Speaker 3: back in Asia is so destabilizing.
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  Speaker 4: The breathing room that we've talked about though, or does
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  Speaker 4: it make it easier for Ci Jinping to continue to
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  Speaker 4: go extremely slowly in the sort of what they now
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  Speaker 4: have as a formal goal, which is to increase the
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  Speaker 4: consumption share of the economy, but the measures being taken
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  Speaker 4: to achieve that have been pretty small scale.
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  Speaker 3: Yeah, I don't think Si Jinping's heart is really in
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  Speaker 3: that narrative, you know. I think he wants to build
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  Speaker 3: the most technologically dominant country. It's more focused on that
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  Speaker 3: than he is on lifting the incomes of Chinese and
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  Speaker 3: you know, in stilling the economy with the kind of
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  Speaker 3: confidence that would lift consumption in the way that is
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  Speaker 3: generally talked about. And I think the other interesting point
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  Speaker 3: is we're talking about how Shi Jinping has room to
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  Speaker 3: move with other Middle powers, other developing countries because of
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  Speaker 3: the you know, Trump craziness. But the most interesting thing
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  Speaker 3: is that the country that he has most room to
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  Speaker 3: move with that people didn't expect is the US. Because
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  Speaker 3: Trump is such a on China compared with the rest
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  Speaker 3: of the administration and Congress. Their calendar is full for
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  Speaker 3: this year. In theory, Trump is going to Beijing in April,
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  Speaker 3: she will go to America for APEC and also Washington
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  Speaker 3: in October. And if the Chinese can keep Trump on
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  Speaker 3: side flattery a few big soybeans deals, this, that and
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  Speaker 3: the other, then they get that's the real breathing room
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  Speaker 3: for China is keeping the US at bay.
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  Speaker 4: You mentioned it in passing Richard that it's not just
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  Speaker 4: that they're sending exports, but they're actually taking future development
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  Speaker 4: possibilities away from many countries. I mean, that has been
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  Speaker 4: one of the striking things about China over the last
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  Speaker 4: I think ten or fifteen years, but particularly in the
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  Speaker 4: last few years, that even as it's moved into these
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  Speaker 4: high tech sectors, and you might have expected it to
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  Speaker 4: then be like every other country that's so called kind
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  Speaker 4: of flying goose paradigm, you expect them to hand off
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  Speaker 4: to other countries for the lower value goods. You've actually
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  Speaker 4: had seemingly very committed to the sort of all industry
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  Speaker 4: model being able to make everything. All of these other countries,
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  Speaker 4: middle countries, but also the African economies they're trying to
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  Speaker 4: get onside. I mean that it is a real threat
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  Speaker 4: to any kind of future development that they might have had.
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  Speaker 3: Yes, and we have still had the flying geese model,
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  Speaker 3: but all the geese of Chinese, I'm afraid. So that's
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  Speaker 3: a big change. She's stated goal. He's trying to build
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  Speaker 3: a self reliant economy in many respects, and I'm sounding
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  Speaker 3: rather dramatic here. He's building a war economy, and he
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  Speaker 3: talks about a lot about war and the preparedness for war.
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  Speaker 3: I'm not saying he's about to go to war, by
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  Speaker 3: the way, nor does he want to, but he wants
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  Speaker 3: China to be ready for anything that might come his
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  Speaker 3: way if there is any kind of conflict over Taiwan.
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  Speaker 3: He wants self for lads, and if you're that big
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  Speaker 3: an economy, that's really difficult for the rest of the
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  Speaker 3: world to absorb.
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  Speaker 2: Yeah. I had one hundred percent agree there. I think
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  Speaker 2: it's the self reliance thing is necessary because she has
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  Speaker 2: seen what the US can do. It's seen the financial
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  Speaker 2: sanctions that could be put on, how it could restrict
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  Speaker 2: certain things. They've been subject to export controls on advanced chips,
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  Speaker 2: et cetera, et cetera. So she's goal is to build
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  Speaker 2: everything he can and just be in a position where
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  Speaker 2: the US can't push him around or deny his ability
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  Speaker 2: to maneuver. Even so that in Hong Kong when they
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  Speaker 2: were threatening sanctions and she was kind of stuck in
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  Speaker 2: a lot of ways.
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  Speaker 4: But I mean, one thing they haven't been able to
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  Speaker 4: be self reliant on is demand. I mean, they are
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  Speaker 4: getting a huge chunk of their demand from the rest
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  Speaker 4: of the world, and so you can't afford to have
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  Speaker 4: that go away.
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  Speaker 2: Yeah, that is true, and that's where Trump is helping
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  Speaker 2: him to a large degree and trying to is so
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  Speaker 2: efficient at manufacturing so many things that it is harder
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  Speaker 2: for countries to even step in there. The other piece
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  Speaker 2: of it is that, and this is something that officials
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  Speaker 2: in Beijing have told me, is that they've learned from
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  Speaker 2: the China shock that hit the rest belt in the
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  Speaker 2: United States, and so just from an employment perspective, they're
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  Speaker 2: very wary of technology going overseas and manufacturing going overseas,
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  Speaker 2: and they see this as the foundation of a strong country.
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  Speaker 1: You're able to.
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  Speaker 2: Make stuff and you could keep people employed. Now whether
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  Speaker 2: they keep making money doing that is the question. They're
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  Speaker 2: kind of at a point where profit margins are so
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  Speaker 2: low that they really do need to figure out how
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  Speaker 2: to consolidate and spread the wells and essentially shift to consumption.
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  Speaker 2: But as Richard pointed out, the feeling of this war
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  Speaker 2: economy is anything could make you a little bit vulnerable
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  Speaker 2: if you can make everything. So how they do that.
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  Speaker 2: There's just no incentive right now for them to shift
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  Speaker 2: until the world really starts to act coherently to cut
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  Speaker 2: off demand or to curb demand in the form of
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  Speaker 2: tariffs or other trade action. And what Trump is doing
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  Speaker 2: is kind of pushing countries to boost relations with China
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  Speaker 2: and increase economic tizes rather than go the other direction.
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  Speaker 4: I guess. I mean one question that one might have
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  Speaker 4: looking at China and some of the very dramatic demographics
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  Speaker 4: that it's facing, where you will have a shrinking population
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  Speaker 4: over the next decades, rapidly aging population, struggling to get
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  Speaker 4: birth rates up even you know, well having gone well
• 19:48
  Speaker 4: past the one child of policy, but actually struggling to
• 19:50
  Speaker 4: get people to have kids. I mean, that doesn't sound
• 19:53
  Speaker 4: like a war economy. It sounds like an economy that
• 19:55
  Speaker 4: needs a lot of things that are domestically based, whether
• 19:58
  Speaker 4: it's you know, social care, health Richard. It just that
• 20:03
  Speaker 4: seems like the one hole in what you've described is
• 20:07
  Speaker 4: that the actual the population is not going to look
• 20:09
  Speaker 4: like a very tough kind of warm angering economy, and
• 20:12
  Speaker 4: it also and will need a lot of this consumption
• 20:15
  Speaker 4: and services that at the moment it's not providing.
• 20:19
  Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean it's a good question. Certainly, demographics used
• 20:22
  Speaker 3: to provide at an extra point of GDP to China
• 20:25
  Speaker 3: and the eighties and nineties. Now it's the opposite the case,
• 20:28
  Speaker 3: and it's happening much much faster than the Chinese expected.
• 20:31
  Speaker 3: Chi Jinping is a very powerful leader. The one thing
• 20:34
  Speaker 3: he can't do is make women have more babies, and
• 20:37
  Speaker 3: China is facing the same challenge that many other countries,
• 20:40
  Speaker 3: including in Asia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan facing there. I
• 20:44
  Speaker 3: don't think it's an immediate challenge, though I'm not a
• 20:47
  Speaker 3: fan of the idea that, you know, demography is destiny
• 20:51
  Speaker 3: in this respect. But I think one of the interesting
• 20:54
  Speaker 3: points about that once again that's you know, doesn't get
• 20:57
  Speaker 3: much coverage. Is difficult to write about though, is the
• 21:00
  Speaker 3: point about the services you're talking about aged care? How
• 21:04
  Speaker 3: do you look after more and more elderly people with
• 21:06
  Speaker 3: fewer and fewer workers to support them. And you know,
• 21:10
  Speaker 3: Chinese people are very lightly taxed. Personal income tax is
• 21:14
  Speaker 3: very low. The tax take, federal tax take, central tax
• 21:18
  Speaker 3: take in China is very low. Let me give you
• 21:20
  Speaker 3: one figure. If you look at countries like mine in Australia,
• 21:24
  Speaker 3: I suspect the UK, the US, Europe is much the same.
• 21:28
  Speaker 3: If you look at personal income tax, that provides about
• 21:30
  Speaker 3: thirty forty percent of central government revenue. In China it's
• 21:34
  Speaker 3: about seven percent. So when the government starts to look
• 21:37
  Speaker 3: for extra tax, where are they going to find it.
• 21:40
  Speaker 3: Chinese people are used to not paying much, and they'll
• 21:42
  Speaker 3: be very, very angry. When the state comes to them
• 21:46
  Speaker 3: for more. So I'm not thinking it's so much the
• 21:50
  Speaker 3: fact the fewer people, but it's just the ability to
• 21:53
  Speaker 3: support fewer people in the way the budget operates right now,
• 21:57
  Speaker 3: so that it will be a tremendous challenge.
• 22:00
  Speaker 4: I mean, I'm just looking at the numbers of the
• 22:02
  Speaker 4: medium variant forecast is that the population of China war
• 22:05
  Speaker 4: four by roughly a third over the next fifty years.
• 22:08
  Speaker 3: That's true, but I guess we should be looking out
• 22:11
  Speaker 3: to about twenty thirty five. That's when Ci Jimping. I
• 22:14
  Speaker 3: think that's the real target date for Taiwan. C Jimping
• 22:18
  Speaker 3: is still aiming to be in power by then. He'll
• 22:21
  Speaker 3: be eighty one then, about the same age as Joe
• 22:23
  Speaker 3: Biden in his last year of office. He has excellent doctors.
• 22:27
  Speaker 3: The Chinese leaders have organic farms for their to grow
• 22:30
  Speaker 3: their vegetables. So I think that's why I'm not you
• 22:34
  Speaker 3: absolutely right. It's the you know, the slump in berths
• 22:37
  Speaker 3: in China is quite astounding, but I just figure that's
• 22:41
  Speaker 3: a longer term rather than a near term problem.
• 22:44
  Speaker 4: Fair enough, though, of course it's the Chinese that used
• 22:46
  Speaker 4: to thinking long term famously rather than short term, but
• 22:50
  Speaker 4: we have taken as way off topic, and I before
• 22:52
  Speaker 4: we end, I do want to be looking maybe just
• 22:55
  Speaker 4: to the next twelve months, which is nothing in a
• 22:58
  Speaker 4: view of a long term missed Chinese leader, but for
• 23:02
  Speaker 4: President Trump obviously will be his looking at the midterms.
• 23:05
  Speaker 4: We've already mentioned we're looking at several meetings, three or
• 23:08
  Speaker 4: four meetings potentially between President Trump and she Jinping. First, Dan,
• 23:15
  Speaker 4: how do you think how do you think Shejinping will
• 23:18
  Speaker 4: be looking at the next year and how to kind
• 23:21
  Speaker 4: of build on the kind of unexpected advantages that have
• 23:27
  Speaker 4: accrued from the first year of the Trump administration.
• 23:30
  Speaker 2: I think she, as Richard said, this stability is giving
• 23:34
  Speaker 2: him a window. So he'll want to keep that going
• 23:38
  Speaker 2: to charm Trump when he's over here and see how
• 23:41
  Speaker 2: far he can push things. We do see that the
• 23:45
  Speaker 2: national security restrictions that have tied up the US China
• 23:49
  Speaker 2: economic relationship for the past couple of years, Trump is
• 23:53
  Speaker 2: probably the best bet to roll them back, even if
• 23:56
  Speaker 2: the consensus and DC isn't quite there yet. You could
• 24:00
  Speaker 2: very well see Trump agreeing to allow investments in Chinese
• 24:05
  Speaker 2: TV factories into the US or do other things that
• 24:08
  Speaker 2: would be helpful for she ultimately, as he looks to
• 24:14
  Speaker 2: reduce trade tensions, increase markets for Chinese goods, and just
• 24:18
  Speaker 2: bring stability on the global stage. She has a lot
• 24:21
  Speaker 2: of problems at home, as we've noted. There's the economic
• 24:24
  Speaker 2: problems we didn't talk much, but there's also the military troubles.
• 24:28
  Speaker 2: He just got rid of his top general and most
• 24:30
  Speaker 2: of his top generals over the past twelve months, and
• 24:33
  Speaker 2: he's coming up in a big year. I mean, there's
• 24:35
  Speaker 2: the Party congresses next year. That's a once in five
• 24:39
  Speaker 2: year leadership reshuffle. So there's going to be a lot
• 24:41
  Speaker 2: going on domestically, and the more he can keep things
• 24:45
  Speaker 2: stable around the world, the better it is for him
• 24:49
  Speaker 2: at home. And a big part of that is just
• 24:51
  Speaker 2: keeping US China ties on an even keel.
• 24:55
  Speaker 4: Richard, what's on changing Ping's Bingo kand for twenty six.
• 25:00
  Speaker 3: I think that's right. The big question is whether he
• 25:03
  Speaker 3: can keep Trump at bay and the whole US system
• 25:06
  Speaker 3: at bay, because Trump in some respects has called off
• 25:09
  Speaker 3: the dogs because he's looking for some stability with China,
• 25:12
  Speaker 3: and frankly, he's also was cornered by China over the
• 25:16
  Speaker 3: critical minerals embargoes and he backed off. Remember, every other
• 25:20
  Speaker 3: country prostrated themselves before Trump. China stood up to him,
• 25:24
  Speaker 3: and in fact one in the short term obviously, So
• 25:28
  Speaker 3: I think China is that's a kind of global turning
• 25:31
  Speaker 3: point in some respect. It's a peer to peer competition now.
• 25:35
  Speaker 3: But the contest between these two countries I think is
• 25:38
  Speaker 3: baked into the cake. There's grand structural divide there. It's
• 25:42
  Speaker 3: only a matter of time before they start becoming more
• 25:46
  Speaker 3: competitive strategically, militarily, technologically, and politically. So I've got my
• 25:52
  Speaker 3: eye on how long that lasts for and whether Trump
• 25:54
  Speaker 3: might change his mind, which of course he could do tomorrow.
• 25:57
  Speaker 3: He doesn't really like China, He's just settled with them
• 26:01
  Speaker 3: for the moment. But when does that finish?
• 26:04
  Speaker 4: We will find out my own little predictions for the
• 26:07
  Speaker 4: summit in April that President Trump will threaten to call
• 26:10
  Speaker 4: it off at least once, if not multiple times. It
• 26:14
  Speaker 4: will be a triumph for the US according to Donald Trump.
• 26:16
  Speaker 4: And you can't help thinking China will get something very
• 26:20
  Speaker 4: quietly that it really wanted in the meantime, but there
• 26:23
  Speaker 4: will be very little paperwork attached. They see the small print.
• 26:28
  Speaker 4: Richard McGregor, Dan ten Kate Thank you so much, Thank you,
• 26:32
  Speaker 4: thank you, thanks for listening to trump Andomics from Bloomberg
• 26:37
  Speaker 4: this week in Hong Kong. It was hosted by me
• 26:39
  Speaker 4: Stephanie Flanders. I was joined by Bloomberg Executive editor Dan
• 26:43
  Speaker 4: Teng Kate and Richard McGregor, a senior fellow at the
• 26:46
  Speaker 4: Loewie Institute in Australia. Trump Andomics was produced by Samasadi
• 26:50
  Speaker 4: and Moses and Am, with special thanks to Yang Yang
• 26:53
  Speaker 4: and Naomi Ing and Malcolm Scott. Sound design is by
• 26:57
  Speaker 4: Blake Maples. To help others find the show, please rate
• 27:03
  Speaker 4: and review us highly wherever you listen to podcasts