Latest / Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge / Episode 66 - The Decision Making Process - Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

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Episode 66 - The Decision Making Process - Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge · Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

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  The decision making process. An understanding of the decision making process provides the pilot
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  with the foundation for developing ad M and SRM skills. While some situations such
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  as engine failure, require an immediate pilot response using established procedures, there is
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  usually time during a flight to analyze any changes that occur, gather information,
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  and assess risk before reaching a decision. Risk management and risk intervention is much
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  more than the simple definitions of the term might suggest. Risk management and risk
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  intervention are decision making processes designed to systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of
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  risk, and determine the best course of action. These processes involve the identification
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  of hazards, followed by assessments of the risks, analysis of the controls,
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  making control decisions using the controls, and monitoring the results. The steps leading
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  to this decision constitute a decision making process. Three models of a structured framework
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  for problem solving and decision making are the five P the three P, the
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  three with Care and Team, the O O, DA and Decide models.
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  They provide assistance in organizing the decision process. All these models have been identified
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  as helpful to the single pilot in organizing Critical Decisions sr M and the five
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  P Check. Sr M is about how to gather information, analyze it,
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  and make decisions. Learning how to identify problems, analyze the information, and
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  make informed and timely decisions is not as straightforward as the training involved in learning
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  specific maneuvers. Learning how to judge a situation and how to think in the
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  endless variety of situations encountered, while flying out in the real world, is
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  more difficult. There is no one right answer in ADM. Rather, each
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  pilot is expected to analyze each situation in light of experienced level, personal minimums,
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  and current physical and mental readiness level and make his or her own decision.
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  SRM sounds good on paper, but it requires a way for pilots to
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  understand and use it in their daily flights. One practical application is called the
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  five pas refer to Figure seventeen Dash seven. The five pis consists of the
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  plan, the plane, the pilot, the passengers, and the programming.
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  Each of these areas consists of a set of challenges and opportunities that face a
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  single pilot, and each can substantially increase or decrease the risk of successfully completing
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  the flight based on the pilot's ability to make informed and timely decisions. The
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  five p's are used to evaluate the pilot's current situation at key decision points during
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  the flight or when an emergency arises. These decision points include preflight, pre
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  takeoff, hourly or at the midpoint of the flight, predescent, and just
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  prior to the final approach fix or for visual Flight Rules v FR operations,
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  just prior to entering the traffic pattern. The five p's are based on the
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  idea that pilots have essentially five variables that impact his or her environment and that
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  can cause the pilot to make a single critical decision or several less critical decisions
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  that, when added together, can create a critical outcome. These variables are
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  the plan, the plane, the pilot, the passengers, and the programming.
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  This concept stems from the belief that current decision making models tended to be
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  reactionary in nature. A change has to occur and be detected to drive a
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  risk management decision by the pilot. For instance, many pilots use risk management
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  sheet that are filled out by the pilot prior to take off. These form
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  a catalog of risks that may be encountered that day and turn them into numerical
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  values. If the total exceeds a certain level, the flight is altered or
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  canceled. Informal research shows that while these are useful documents for teaching risk factors,
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  they are almost never used outside of formal training programs. The five P
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  concept is an attempt to take the information contained in those sheets and in other
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  available models and use it. The five P concept relies on the pilot to
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  adopt a scheduled review of the critical variables at points in the flight where decisions
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  are most likely to be effective. For instance, the easiest point to cancel
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  the flight due to bad weather is before the pilot and passengers walk out the
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  door and load the aircraft. So the first decision point is preflight in the
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  flight planning room, where all the information is readily ailable to make a sound
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  decision, and where communication and fixed base operator FBO services are readily available to
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  make alternate travel plans. The second easiest point in the flight to make a
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  critical safety decision is just prior to takeoff. Few pilots have ever had to
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  make an emergency takeoff. While the point of the five P check is to
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  help the pilot fly, the correct application of the five p before takeoff is
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  to assist in making a reason to go no go decision based on all the
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  information available. That decision will usually be to go with certain restrictions and changes,
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  but may also be a no go. The key point is that these
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  two points in the process of flying are critical go no go points on each
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  and every flight. The third place to review the five piece is at the
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  midpoint of the flight. Often pilots may wait until the Automated Terminal Information Service
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  ADIS is in range to check weather. Yet at this point in the flight,
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  many good options have already passed behind the aircraft and pilot. Additionally,
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  fatigue and low altitude hypoxia serve to rob the pilot of much of his or
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  her energy by the end of a long and tiring flight day. This leads
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  to a transition from a decision making mode to an acceptance mode on the part
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  of the pilot. If the flight is longer than two hours, the five
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  PEA checks should be conducted hourly. The last two decision points are just prior
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  to descent into the terminal area and just prior to the final approach fix or
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  at VFR just prior to entering the traffic pattern. As preparations for landing commence.
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  Most pilots execute approaches with the expectation that they will land out of the
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  approach every time. A healthier approach requires the pilot to assume that changing conditions
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  the five peas again will cause the pilot to divert or execute the mist approach
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  on every approach. This keeps the pile alert to all manner of conditions that
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  may increase risk and threaten the safe conduct of the flight. Diverting from cruise
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  altitude saves fuel, allows unhurried use of the autopilot, and is less reactive
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  in nature. Diverting from the final approach fix, while more difficult, still
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  allows the pilot to plan and coordinate better rather than executing a futile mist approach.
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  Let's look at a detailed discussion of each of the five pas. The
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  plan. The plan can also be called the mission or the task. It
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  contains the basic elements of cross country planning, weather, route, fuel publications,
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  currency, etc. The plan should be reviewed and updated several times during
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  the course of the flight. A delayed takeoff due to maintenance, fast moving
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  weather, and a short notice TFR may all radically alter the plan. The
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  plan is not only about the flight plan, but also all the events that
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  surround the flight and allow the pilot to accomplish the mission. The plan is
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  always being updated and modified, and is especially responsive to changes in the other
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  four remaining ps. If for no other reason, the five feet check reminds
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  the pilot that the day's flight plan is real life and subject to change at
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  any time. Obviously, weather is a huge part of any plan. The
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  addition of data link weather information gives the advanced avionics pilot a real advantage in
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  inclement weather, but only if the pilot is trained to retrieve and evaluate to
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  weather in real time without sacrificing situational awareness. And of course, weather information
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  should drive a decision, even if that decision is to continue on the current
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  plan. Pilots of aircraft without data link weather should get updated, whether in
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  flight through a Flight Service Station FSS and or flight watch the plane. Both
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  the plan and the plane are fairly familiar to most pilots. The plane consists
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  of the usual array of mechanical and cosmetic issues that every aircraft pilot, owner
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  or operator can identify. With the advent of advanced avionics, the plane has
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  expanded to include database currency, automation status and emergency backup systems that were unknown
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  a few years ago. Much has been written about single pilot IFR flight,
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  both with and without an autopilot. While this is a personal decision, it
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  is just that a decision low IFR in a non autopilot equipped aircraft may depend
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  on several of the other pas to be discussed. Pilot proficiency, currency,
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  and fatigue are among them. The pilot flying, especially when used for business
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  transportation, can expose the pilot to high altitude flying, long distance and endurance
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  and more challenging weather. An advanced avionics aircraft, simply due to their advanced
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  capabilities, can expose a pilot to even more of these stresses. The traditional
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  i M Safe checklist see page seventeen, Dash six is a good start.
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  The combination of late night pilot fatigue and the effects of sustained flight above five
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  thousand feet may cause pilots to become less discerning, less critical of information,
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  less decisive, and more compliant and accepting. Just as the most critical portion
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  of the flight approaches, for instance a night instrument approach in the weather after
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  a four hour flight, the pilot's guard is down the most the five p
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  process helps a pilot recognize the physiological situation at the end of the flight before
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  takeoff, and continues to update personal conditions as the flight progresses. Once risks
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  are identified, the pilot is in an infinitely better place to make alternate plans
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  that lessen the effect of these factors and provide a safer solution the passengers.
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  One of the key differences between CRM and sr M is the way passengers interact
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  with the pilot. The pilot of a highly capable single engine aircraft has entered
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  into a very personal relationship with the passengers. In fact, the pilot and
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  passengers sit within an arm's reach all of the time. The desire of the
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  passengers to make airline connections or important business meetings easily enters into this pilot's decision
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  making loop. Done in a healthy and open way, this can be a
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  positive factor. Consider a flight to Dullest Airport and the passengers, both close
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  friends and business partners, need to get to Washington, d C. For
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  an important meeting. The weather is fr all the way to southern Virginia then
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  turns to low I FR as the pilot approach is Dullest. A pilot employing
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  the five P approach might consider reserving a rental car at an airport in northern
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  North Carolina or southern Virginia to coincide with a refueling stop. Thus the passengers
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  have a way to get to Washington, and the pilot has an out to
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  avoid being pressured into continuing the flight if the conditions do not improve. Passengers
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  can also be pilots. If no one is designated as pilot in command PC
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  and unplanned circumstances arise, the decision making styles of several self confident pilots may
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  come into conflict. Pilots also need to understand that non pilots may not understand
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  the level of risk involved in the flight. There is an element of risk
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  in every flight. That is why SRM calls it risk management, not risk
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  elimination. While a pilot may feel comfortable with the risk present in a night
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  I FR flight, the passengers may not. A pilot employing SRM should ensure
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  the passengers are involved in the decision making and given tasks and duties to keep
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  them busy and involved. If upon factual description of the risk present, the
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  passengers decide to buy an airline ticket or rent a car, then a good
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  decision has generally been made. This discussion also allows the pilot to move past
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  what he or she thinks the passengers want to do and find out what they
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  actually want to do. This removes self induced pressure from the pilot. The
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  programming the advanced avionics aircraft adds an entirely new dimension to the way general aviation
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  aircraft are flown. The electronic instrument displays GPS and autopilot reduced pilot workload in
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  increased pilot situational awareness. While programming and operation of these devices are fairly simple
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  and straightforward, unlike the analog instruments they replace, they tend to capture the
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  pilot's attention and hold it for long periods of time. To avoid this phenomenon,
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  the pilot should plan in advance when and where the programming for approaches,
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  route changes, and airport information gathering should be accomplished as well as times it
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  should not. Pilot familiarity with the equipment, the route, the local air
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  traffic control environment, and personal capabilities vis vi the automation should drive when,
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  where and how the automation is programmed and used. The pilot should also consider
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  what his or her capabilities are In response, to last minute changes of the
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  approach and the reprogramming required an ability to make large scale changes a reroute,
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  for instance, while hand flying the aircraft. Since formats are not standardized,
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  simply moving from one manufacturer's equipment to another should give the pilot pause and require
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  more conservative planning and decisions. The SRM process is simple. At least five
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  times before and during the flight, the pilot should review and consider the plan,
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  the plane, the pilot, the passengers, and the programming and make
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  the appropriate decision required by the current situation. It is often said that failure
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  to make a decision is a decision under SRM and the five p's. Even
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  the decision to make no changes to the current plan is made through a careful
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  consideration of all the risk factors present. End of Part three of Chapter seventeen.