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Everyone Thinks the iPhone Killed Nokia. They're Wrong! · The Innovation Show

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Before we start, I want to thank our sponsor Kyndryl, who runs
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Welcome to part two of this deep dive into Nokia and the 2016 paper
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by our guests Quy Huy and Timo Vuori, welcome back to the show.
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Thank You.
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Thanks.
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It's great to have you back.
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I'm gonna give a little bit of context, so it's 2007, the game has
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switched from hardware to software.
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And don't forget Nokia 1 billion customers.
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Can anyone catch the cell phone king?
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That was the front cover of re Forbes article featuring the CEO at the time.
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Nokia who had pulled away owning half the market share of the mobile phone industry.
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But at this stage, Apple and Google had moved fast.
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Don't forget, they had built operating systems all the time, and now all of a
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sudden they were just gonna do it on a different device, a different form factor.
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Samsung had adopted Android and Nokia had doubled down on Symbian and Meego
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even as consumers turned against them, was happening inside Nokia that made
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the company clinging to a losing path.
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That is what our authors today reveal.
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I read through this research many times and looked at the methods and pulled
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out a few lines that were telling, and I'd love you to comment on these.
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In your interviews, top managers told you they pressurized middle managers.
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For faster performance and middle managers in turn told you how they
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felt pressured by the top managers.
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You say "Several middle managers shared additional examples of how they felt
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fear or how fear had prevented them from reporting negative information up to the
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top, even though they knew it would have been the right thing to do. And in your
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findings, you write. "Various types of fear experienced by Nokia's top managers
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and middle managers caused a decoupling interaction pattern between two groups
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that harmed Nokia's innovation process.
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Two factors influenced top managers and middle managers fears.
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Nokia's structural distribution of attention produced differences in
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appraisals and shared fears among top and middle managers and top
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managers' past aggressive behaviours and widely shared stories about those
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past aggressive behaviours triggered intuitive fear reactions in middle
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managers because they had a lower position in the organizational hierarchy.
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So let's share how the organizational structure and where people focus their
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attention caused this fear and how it spread across the entire organization.
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in Nokia's structure, the top management had a rather a good view of the
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competition, and they had their internal strategy team consisting of 200 strategy
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experts and mar market intelligence experts and external consultants.
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So the top management was very aware of the.
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Customer demand in terms of what the mobile operators wanted.
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And they felt a lot of pressure from the iPhone and Android, even though
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they weren't able to it out loud.
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So top management had external focus, a lot of fear and even small
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panic about the external threats.
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But internally the middle management in software development was quite
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disconnected from the customer interface.
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So from middle manager's point of view, the things were going
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fine, but top management suddenly started giving them stronger and
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stronger pressure and more demands.
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And meal management couldn't understand where this is coming from.
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So instead of fearing the iPhone, they feared the top management.
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Because they felt that the requests from top management
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are unrealistic, but irrelevant.
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So the logical way out from this is to lie to them or mislead them.
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I would like to, to elaborate what Timo just said because when we
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explained that case some executives ask us, so why didn't top managers.
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Minimize the truth, to tell them that, they know that the, plans by
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the iPhone, that , the real threat so that they can get the reality.
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So therefore they become less complacent, but that's is the practical reality
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organizations, it's they know the secret, but they cannot tell the secret to middle
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managers because it will be late, and then the competitors will change their plans.
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So that's point number one.
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Point number two is that if they set that they are concerned about the Apple
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threat, how would investors react?
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They said that they, are they going to lose market share?
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Are they expressing some type of weaknesses?
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So top managers in a way.
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You can understand them.
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There are some kind of dilemma they have to kept, they keep the
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secret, they cannot tell to middle managers everything they knew.
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And at the same time, middle managers feel quite powerful because
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they said, where is the threat?
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Even if something come up, we have most of the patents, we process mostly of
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the technical patents that Samsung and Apple have been using or will be using.
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So we have absolute technical superiority.
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So that's extent also why they feel a little bit, even filter to
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feel as much as they should have.
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Third point, why top management felt taken, not openly communicate.
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The threat was really about this sustaining the moral.
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So the top management, I think, mistakenly believe that if they speak
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about the threat, it will destroy the motivation inside the organization.
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But with the caveat that Quy mentioned about the kind of external responses.
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So if you say, as a leader that our products are inferior, of course the
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external reaction is negative, but even more fundamentally related to
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the distribution of attention is that top management didn't necessarily
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understand how different perception of the external competition they had
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compared to the middle management.
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So top management would see this.
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McKinsey reports about the iPhone and its future prospects.
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While middle
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they would only buy competitors phones from the store and compare
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what they were developing against the old products from competition.
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So the middle managers also lived in a different reality without
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top managers fully realizing that.
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One of the things you say there is really interesting.
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So it wasn't just, this wasn't just about the hardware, which was the phones,
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but it was also about the software.
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So Symbian, and maybe we'll elaborate a little bit on what that
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is, the Symbian operating system.
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But one of the things from the interviews that you took was one of the top managers
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you interviewed was saying, why did you not call out how inadequate Symbian was?
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And to your point about they didn't want to damage morale.
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He said, when this is the only weapon you have to believe in that gun,
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though the gun might be inadequate because you don't want to reveal it
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and going, we're going to war here with pea shooters when the others
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have dramatically advanced technology.
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Maybe we'll elaborate a little bit on that difference.
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Yeah, that was, I think, the most fascinating part.
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I dunno, paradox or dilemma in the study that the CEO knew that Symbian
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was inadequate, but he felt that he cannot speak about its problems because
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they didn't have options to symbian.
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But then because he didn't bring it up, no one there to bring it up, and so they
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didn't develop those options and they got stuck in this collective denial of
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not addressing the elephant in the room.
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Quy, I thought it'd bring you in because one of the things we
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talked about on air was I, and I want our audience to realize this.
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It's easy to look at the Nokia story and kind of go, oh, idiots.
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I can't believe they've done that.
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But this is a template that plays out in every organization, and I mean here,
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organizations such as governments, even where people are afraid of telling the
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truth because of the repercussions.
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One of the examples, for example, you give in here is that a very senior
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software developer didn't report the truth because he said, look, I
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should have had more courage 'cause you interviewed them afterwards
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and like, why didn't you speak up?
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And he is like, I should have had more courage.
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It was a collective lie.
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But also I had a young children and I needed to keep my job because Nokia was
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like the gold standard job in Finland.
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And also most , people tend to say that if we need one or two whistleblower, that
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would have fixed the situation, right?
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But like in the case of Boeing or the case that we later on, other, the disasters,
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or in the case of Volkswagen Dieselgate is certainly not what happens if we have
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two or three whistle blowers, right?
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But in the case of Nokia, two or three whistleblowers might not have worked
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for the following reasons, right?
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A is that top managers as a Timo has I said, we have to listen to the majority.
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And the majority of senior executives told us that, we can do it.
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They give us the good news, so we can do it, do it know there's always a
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negative naysayers no matter what you do.
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And those whistle players are naysayers, so who we trust, so that
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is a real dilemma in organization.
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And two, back to the point that Timo just said, when you go to war, you have
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to display optimism, so you cannot let a few naysayers, bring down the morale of
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the whole troops that we, you cannot win.
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So even if they were a few whistleblowers, it might not have worked, so it's not
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as easy as as people may have thought.
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there was
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years,a senior
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did
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yeah.
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That's true.
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And they really had kind of options to choose from the senior leaders.
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But I think we should be understanding and empathic also towards the senior
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leaders that they were not necessarily naive, but under huge pressure.
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Nokia was like one of the top brands in the world and really dominating
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company and suddenly huge threats.
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They were personally under major pressure, so that made it more difficult for them
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to evaluate the situation objectively.
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And then
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Yeah.
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A lot of uncertainty.
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So in retrospect, we know that Symbian failed, but when you had
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multiple people coming to you that, Hey, we can make it work.
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And look, we did a successful phone last year, so this one will also succeed.
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It's difficult not to believe that.
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And then there's a handful of naysayers.
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You want to believe that they are wrong.
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And to elaborate on Timo's point, we met and interview , uh, Olli-Pekka
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Kallasvuo, which on YouTube you may want, you know, to listen to it.
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And then, when a senior executives are shown this videotape, and, one of their
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first reaction, what a stupid guy, you know what incompetent guy, how can
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he become the CEO of Nokia like this?
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And I cautioned this people not to judge with the hindsight of history.
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That if you put yourself under the fog of war, after all, he as, as famous as Elon
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Musk or bill Gates or Jensen Huang today, and people will say that he's fantastic.
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Let's not forget, he was elected as the number one CEO of the world by
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fellow CEOs back in 2008 to 2009, no number one is such agility, showcase
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for the world in such agility, and now you say, this is stupid.
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So let's not let's not make the mistake of judging people of the hands have
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history, and be empathic with the person and senior management team.
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So it's not the judgment of their incompetence, but more a lesson for
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us of humility, that as leaders, you have to be very humble.
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. And today, thinking about companies making AI investments.
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So let's take an insurance company.
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You have your traditional business model and you're making huge profit.
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Then you have AI coming in and people saying then that in a couple of years
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AI is gonna destroy your business.
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There will be new companies, new processes.
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do you invest in developing the traditional model where you have
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for the past 10 years, always made profit from your investments?
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Or do you put all in AI and hope for the best without knowing what will happen?
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Especially with the current data on AI today, to put things perspective,
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the data reveal that 90% of more of the companies invest AI did
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not make a cent that is the fact.
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So should you invest more and more, to, to bank for the future or do
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less and keep the current business?
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So I think it's the same type of uncertainty about innovation, that
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all executives and companies face, and then I think we have to be more
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humble in and more, have more emotional empathy to really see the full picture.
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Yeah.
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in senior.
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I spoke with the market intelligence people and they were the ones who got
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the information from the corporate spies or wherever and they really had
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detailed report, and it was exactly like you said, the day that iPhone was
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introduced, Nokia shared internally this extremely detailed analysis, so
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they had full understanding of what it's like and what's, what it's going to
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be in, in future, where it can evolve.
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But I think there is two kind of emotional dynamics that even if people
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saw the slides and heard that it has a touch screen and you can pinch and
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squeeze and download apps, they didn't feel the pressure that it would ease.
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It was easy to say in Finland, for instance, that the touch screen
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will freeze in the winter, so no one wants to use it and or no one
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wants to type with touch screen.
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And so there was this emotional denial in that sense.
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And then second part was I think many of them believed that it's easier to build
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a competing product and in two senses.
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So from a technological and usability point, how difficult it is to create
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this extremely smooth product.
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From middle management point of view, it was challenging that they had
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a plan how to build a new version of the Symbian operating system
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that would support the, that screen technology in the best possible way.
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But the top management ended up sabotaging the development with short
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term pressures and cost pressures.
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So one example was that the cutting edge stat screen would have required
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a bit more expensive memory chip.
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But top management decided that let's take the less expensive one, so we
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make more profit from this model.
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And then they had to compromise on some features.
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And then another element was that when they changed the launch
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schedule and different products.
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They had to compromise on the cumulative development of the software platform
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to get the product out earlier.
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But that didn't only make the launch product worse, but all the subsequent
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products also, this also made the development ever more difficult.
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So it's both the understanding of how good the competition is.
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That was emotionally difficult to accept.
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then there was this double level overconfidence in own
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ability and top management ability to lead the development.
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So you have multiple uncertainties and you want to win, you end up
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believing all the optimistic versions.
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I think together all the groups have all the elements and all the
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technologies necessary to do anything to work right at the elemental level.
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But at the dialogue level, at the consensus coordination level, it was very
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weak because everybody has the piece, but nobody shared the whole element.
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So no, nobody has the full picture, right?
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So people working on part of the middle managers working on part of the, what
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they understood they got from top managers that also call the focused attention.
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The attention was there, but it was partial and limited.
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And so are top managers, they could have the whole picture but they
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chose not to for whatever, all the structural incentive reasons.
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So they have work with partial reality, and those two partial reality just clash.
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that one, the culture of fear, really complicated matters.
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'cause you remember the example they told how there was a meeting in front of top
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management, kind of several teams were presenting at top management at the same
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time and the first team knew that they are gonna be late in their part of the
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work and that probably all other groups are also gonna be late on their part.
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But no one wanted to be the first to say it out loud.
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So everyone pretended that things are on track and were waiting for the others
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to say it out first, like playing the game of chicken, that who will yield
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first and then it ended up in a crash.
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'cause no one did, but.
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But if they had this more open or less fearful culture, they could have in
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these moments, do this coordination that Quy mentioned that they could have set
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that because of these things and put all the pieces together, but this top
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management wasn't able to give this space for reflection 'cos they felt their own
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pressure that we need to deliver, that we need to get the results for this
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quarter, and we need to innovate faster.
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So don't give me problems, just tell me it's gonna work.
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Sales and strategy and business and strong kind of experience in
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the traditional radio technology.
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There were some people with PhD in the top management as well in, in
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at least partially relevant areas.
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But some of the top managers just didn't have the kind of depth, in
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depth knowledge of understanding that.
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And some of the rumors were like that.
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When a, some top manager got a new Nokia phone, the assistant would configure the
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email 'cause he wasn't able to do it.
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So I don't know if that was like really true, but in another book,
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there was an example of a board meeting where one of the board members
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phone started ringing and he didn't know how to switch off the sound.
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And those are extreme examples, but it's really about this ability to challenge
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employees on the technical aspects.
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But Nokia had never been a kind of a technology company, but a conglomerate
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with multiple different businesses.
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It divested everything else and focused on the phones, but the kind of
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management style remained from that era.
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I wish to cut the defense of Nokia senior executives in the following sense.
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It may be impractical, to expect top managers of a large organization
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to be technically highly competent.
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In inter products and I, and their defence I use the case of, let's say that people
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always compare OPK Kallasvuo to Steve jobs because Steve jobs apparently, he
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had a very deep understanding, at least from technical side, what can be done,
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what cannot be done unlike Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo or Nokia senior managers.
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But then they said, compare them against the senior managers
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of large pharmaceutical firms.
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Think of Pfizer, AstraZeneca, would you expect those CEOS to understand all the
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biomedical devices, all atoms of a hundred thousand research products that they are
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making, they are tens of thousands of PhDs working at different pharmaceutical
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products and drugs, treatments.
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Would you expect to see or understand any of those, let alone all of those, right?
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So it's not practical.
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So I think, if you're developing a single product then it may be it, it may be
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maybe it could be expected or maybe not.
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But if you're developing a lot of products, it's very difficult to
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expect the CEO to have a deep technical expertise, all these products, because
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none of the scientists in working ation, would have e even expertise.
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So that's my defense of Silk CO.
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I agree with you here in the sense that it's not possible to have deep expertise
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on all technologies, I guess in Nokia's case it was that they had been able to
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trust the radio engineers for 20 years.
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So they had learned that what they say is the truth.
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But when the technology moved to software and they hired a lot of new
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people the same kind of reliability of the knowledge was no longer there.
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So it would have required a bit different type of leadership.
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And I don't think it's always that you need to be inside the
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technology, but you need to have this sufficiently critical and curious
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attitude that how does it really work?
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And does, like now when we are taking an AI angle, so all the CEOs
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hear pitches about AI and how it's gonna replace something but they
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shouldn't naively believe that, okay, I trust you that let's go.
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But really double check that.
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Okay.
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What, how it'll replace the pros And what if this happens, what will happen?
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And maybe there is
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kind of curiosity, but even without deep technological expertise..
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Yeah.
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Just thought this was so important to say on this, that and I'll
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come back to a couple of things to build out this, because there's
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so much depth in this paper that you can see from doing two shows.
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We still won't get through it all, but you you talked about innovation
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under performance at Nokia.
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And as a result, they had an over optimistic capability perception.
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They thought they were better than they were.
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And this makes sense because you said that this had come from historically
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being the case inside Nokia, at Nokia pressure to introduce new phone models in
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the short term deprived the Symbian unit.
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So that's the software for those who don't know of the time they
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needed to make the OS more modular.
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And I wanted to point this out because this is the template
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that Quy talked about before.
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This is what happens everywhere.
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I suffered myself this, where you're talking to a leadership team or a
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board in some case who have no idea what's needed to create technology for
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those people who worked in digital.
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Say for example, in the late noughties, early, early 2010s, for
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example, building applications.
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Building websites that somebody looking at it thinks it's just a picture.
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And all you have to do is move that picture over there.
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And it's just like designing a picture.
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you have to keep dropping innovative work.
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And no one cares about that because they don't get rewarded for that exploration.
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Nokia top managers, they had no idea of what it took to change an operating
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system or even to build apps to build up that app store enough to get
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people to use those new smartphones.
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And in Nokia's context, you say Here another problem.
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Another element of the problem was no, because structural arrangements
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did not prevent product units immediate needs from overwhelming the
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long-term needs of Symbian software.
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And in ambidextrous organizations, which many of our audience are familiar with,
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this idea of exploit and explore the unit focusing on long-term development
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should not have short-term pressures.
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That's an absolutely key point here is it's keep delivering the phones,
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keep delivering the phones, and meanwhile, whatever scraps of time you
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have, deliver this massive project, which is a whole new software.
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This was the fundamental problem and.
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I think in all the interviews, that was the most puzzling things.
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'cause everyone was saying, describing some version of this problem that the
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long-term development was constantly compromised by the short-term pressure.
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So why you didn't separate it or why you didn't it.
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And that led to the fear recognition and then the financial oppressors.
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And and ultimately they did separate it, but then it was too late.
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And what they emphasized and what Quy also mentioned, that the structural
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separation doesn't always work when you have a very integrated product line.
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So if they have completely separated symbian, what would have sold during
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the, those one or two years that it takes to develop the new of the software?
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In retrospect, probably they would now be selling phones still but in the fog of
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war, , that would be a very bad decision.
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Quy, can I bring you in
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Yeah.
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you said that off air when we were talking to off air, you said about this idea that
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and this is often the challenge between, say the Clayton Christensen School of
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thought was like, you need to get it away from the sucking sound of the core.
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Get away your innovation team versus Tushman O'Reilly is like, no, no, you need
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to in integrate it because you need it to
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Yeah.
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and not rejected like some type of organizational bad liver transplant.
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So I'd love you to elaborate on that because it's a key point.
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Yeah.
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Because today, as you mentioned, Aidan, one of the kind of solutions that
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people propose, to deal with the tension in the short and long term is about
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the issue of structural separation.
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Structural separation means that you have one unit that focus on the short
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term exploitation, current business, and another long term, which is
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essentially r and d that developed for the long term, and focus innovation.
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Now, the my research later suggests that it's not as easy as
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people will make to say no one is that the long term stock units.
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Tend to be the the envy and attack of the of the short term units to said that we
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are the ones who have to make the sales and make the money, for you guys to engage
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in some kind of fluffy r and d, which you never see, what are you guys developing?
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We never sure what you are developing.
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You guys are consuming a whole lot of money that we have painfully earned,
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and, do you know what it takes?
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So it's just, that is a butt of envy, you know, what call notion
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of inter or envy and that's envy is not, just doesn't stop there, right?
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It results in all kinds of bad sayings, lack of cooperation and so forth.
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So I have, for example I, I have met some that's say, I don't want to mention
31:39
the industry but some hightech people who are in the, in, into the long term
31:44
who wants to develop some prototype.
31:46
And now they want to go and test it in the big banks and the financial industries.
31:51
But the short term units we are dealing with, the banks
31:53
will not allow them to do that.
31:55
We setting down, because what happens if you, your product doesn't work?
31:59
We will be jeopardizing our relationship with our customers, with the banks.
32:03
We cannot afford that, you know, because, no, you guys are doing r
32:05
and d, which you're not aware of, and we are not open the doors for you.
32:09
So that is a real tension between this in the same organization between the
32:14
short term sales unit and marketing and the long term engineers, r and d, right?
32:19
So that's only one example.
32:21
The other the other example is even if the product works, now, I think you, you
32:27
wish to reintegrate the working product inside the model organization because
32:32
make it into a core product, right?
32:34
In order to scale it up.
32:36
Because once you have the prototype that works.
32:39
You have to bring back to the core organization to scale that up.
32:43
And now, the organization who has never anything to do with it, do
32:46
not feel the pride of ownership.
32:48
They said, why should we take an orphan from somewhere, to integrate you.
32:52
It's like you're bringing an immigrant, a landed immigrant from somewhere,
32:55
which we never accepted anyway.
32:57
Look at all the issue we have with migrant today.
32:59
Said, why are we accepting some foreigners, a foreign product into our, in
33:03
our country, in doesn't fit our culture?
33:05
So all this anti-cultural, anti stuff very similar to the migrant anti
33:11
narrative would surface, and people would do anything to sabotage to
33:16
show that it doesn't work, so just from my real research, I constantly
33:20
see, it happened so many times.
33:22
It's not even funny.
33:22
So yes.
33:23
Yes, on the paper looks good.
33:26
In practice, it's much more challenging than you think.
33:29
And those are emotional treatment, right?
33:31
And it's
33:31
Yeah.
33:32
frustrating for the innovator.
33:33
So I worked in a team like that, and you get integrated
33:36
and you they butcher your ideas.
33:39
They try and they, that term again, Clayton Christensen used cramming.
33:43
They try and cram your idea into an existing solution that just doesn't work
33:47
for like we're seeing with AI today.
33:49
But speaking of Clayton Christensen, I was looking on the shelf there for the book on
33:53
the jacket in inside the cover jacket in the endorsements of Clayton Christensen's
33:59
and Michael Rayner's 2003 book.
34:00
The Innovator's Solution is an endorsement and it says have done a superb job of
34:08
creating a framework for helping to understand industry dynamics and for
34:11
planning your own growth alternatives.
34:14
And that comment was written in 2003 by Pekka Ala-Pietilä,
34:18
Hmm.
34:18
Timo, I'm probably butchering his name there, but From 1999 to 2005,
34:24
Pietilä, was the president of Nokia.
34:27
And point, it doesn't mean that he was a bad president.
34:32
It doesn't mean I, he was a bad CEO or anything like that.
34:35
But it's so difficult to read the label when you're inside the jar when it's
34:39
you who are the victim of disruption.
34:42
It's so hard to see that.
34:43
But I want to tie it to something else that's really important here.
34:47
The history of aggression inside Nokia, because we hear this from
34:51
the outside and other organizations.
34:53
Say for example, Microsoft pre Nadela, very much dog eat, dog culture.
34:58
And you say A second factor that triggered fear among Nokia's middle
35:02
managers was its TE top manager's history of aggressive behaviours
35:07
towards those middle managers, which was widely known inside the organization.
35:11
And when conducting your interviews, you were struck how often informants
35:15
referred to the aggressive behaviour of Nokia's top chairman, who
35:19
was also CEO from 1992 to 2006.
35:22
And he was described as extremely temperamental, shouting at people
35:26
at the top of his lungs so hard that it was very difficult to tell him
35:31
things that he did not want to hear.
35:33
And those same informants described several other top
35:36
managers as highly aggressive.
35:38
And one of the EVPs told you about how he pounded the table so hard that
35:43
pieces of fruit went flying everywhere and that same EVP had nothing but
35:47
poison running through his veins.
35:50
those type of characters used to do well.
35:52
That whole idea of Gordon Gecko in Wall Street greed is good . While we
35:57
hope it's gone, and we talked about this off air, that we hope younger
36:02
generations are changing that culture.
36:04
It still has echoes in many organizations today.
36:07
I.
36:08
Yeah, that, that's true.
36:10
And think there are at least three angles to that.
36:14
One is that it was those aggressive behaviours, but especially the
36:20
stories about the aggressions.
36:23
So the individuals, they were like most of the time very nice people.
36:29
But then there were these moments where they exploded and and those stories
36:35
spread really widely in the organization.
36:38
And that generated even this like unrealistic or completely irrational fear.
36:44
And even the new CEO who wasn't one of the aggressive people, he told how
36:50
whenever he goes to the lunchroom, everyone is watching for his every
36:54
expression that if he's not, which is a bit, there is immediately
36:59
huge rumors about what's happening.
37:02
as a CEO, you or top leader, it's huge impact.
37:07
Then the second part is the huge pressure that they are under.
37:11
So when, if you don't take care of yourself and manage your own stress
37:17
and all this then you easily misbehave even if you are a good person.
37:22
And then third, the young generation.
37:25
At least in Finland.
37:27
And we've been lucky in the sense that we have a lot of open discussion about
37:32
the emotions in management and it feels that the younger generation is able
37:38
to reflect on the emotions and accept that it's part of the leadership style.
37:44
And obviously since they're all doing cognitive work, they also
37:48
feel that impact more strongly.
37:51
I would like to, to add to what Timo just said as a reflection, right?
37:56
And I can see today, even today, even Nokia was 10 years ago now, but it's
38:01
almost as if, it just repeats itself every day today in the following sense.
38:07
There is a seeming paradox in society and in organizations.
38:13
On one hand people said, we have to be nice at each other, more civil,
38:18
more inclusive more respectful, right?
38:21
So that is the that is the narrative.
38:24
But there is a emerging narrative, that says that you cannot make omelette without
38:29
breaking eggs and sometimes to make changes you have to be tough, so there
38:33
is a very high cut of dictators, you know, either in nations, which I don't
38:39
want to get into politics, which, what, can talk about without getting that one
38:44
or, and it's situation of dictators in organizations, and although the stock
38:49
market, on one hand they say they, they like to have inclusion, respect.
38:54
On the other hand, they seem to reward equally well, those dictators
38:58
and those rough, you know, and those uncivil people, right?
39:02
So no wonder maybe that's why 40% of young people to 30 40, copped out, you said, I
39:08
not haKyndryle this double talk, because working in organization was too tough.
39:13
And in the end, we say one thing, but we reward, it's reward the
39:17
dictatorship and, and the rough people.
39:20
So I just want to say that you know that the not yesterday just present
39:23
us with the same macro paradox and the same tensions that we have leading
39:27
today, society and in organizations.
39:30
And that actually reminds me of Quy's 2002 paper on emotional
39:35
balancing people need both.
39:38
When you are in change moment, you need both kind of validation and empathy.
39:43
and you need direction and Quy found that in the best units.
39:47
You have middle managers who provide the kind of empathy
39:50
and others who push the chains.
39:53
But what I think is behind this paradox now is that some
39:57
people are really frustrated.
39:59
About the lack of progress and being very careful about not insulting anyone.
40:05
And then the counter reaction is that let's have someone who just
40:10
tells everyone what to do and we get something done type of thing.
40:15
so finding the balance between kind of hearing, listening on the
40:18
one hand and then like driving progress on the other, it's not easy
40:24
Yeah.
40:25
And then, we have that to reflect society.
40:26
You know, We have so-called extreme left and extreme right, you know, which has
40:30
the old echo chambers and all, you know, all that we are right, you know, you know.
40:36
So I think that that kind of uh, conflict in society and in
40:39
politics also reflect and reflect in organization in a smaller way..
40:44
That's a key point as a leadership team, , it's not just what you reward or
40:48
recognize, it's also what you reprimand when you stand up against behaviours
40:53
that you don't want in the organization.
40:54
And as you said, this is not gone away.
40:56
Even from my own perspective, I worked in an organization where I started the
41:01
innovation show and I essentially had to leave that organization to keep it
41:04
because they were like, going, we don't want you doing those type of things.
41:07
And in other organizations there were bullies.
41:10
And those bullies did well in the organization.
41:12
'cause while the organization said they didn't want.
41:15
Want those behaviours, those people got results, but they got results at
41:18
huge costs to people's health, mental health and the, second order and third
41:23
order effects of that where those people aren't present for their children.
41:27
Maybe they're pressurized at home, maybe they're sick.
41:31
There's so much that goes on behind this, which is why I
41:34
think this paper is so important.
41:37
Speaking of which, I thought about one of the important things in this paper
41:41
you said about the fact that constant change inside Nokia, and I found that
41:47
reflection really important because I know places like we mentioned, Satya
41:51
Nadella and and the book title, his book.
41:55
Hit refresh.
41:57
And inside Microsoft, by all accounts, it's a little bit like, you know when
42:01
you're trying to get an elevator door to close and you're in a rush and you start
42:05
hitting the button over and over, it's hit refresh to that extent where it's
42:09
constantly going and it's exhausting for people because there also must be so much
42:14
waste because they might be working on a initiative next thing they're assigned
42:19
to a different team or have a different team to put together and they are lose
42:24
all the progress that they've made.
42:25
It's like being a politician.
42:27
And then there's a change of government.
42:29
But you wrote of Nokia's tendency to change its organizational structure
42:33
frequently to ensure effective.
42:35
Resource allocation made middle managers and product unit managers and the
42:40
software organizations perceive heightened threats to their wellbeing inside the
42:44
organization and low ability to cope with such uncertainty and reorganization.
42:50
This is a quote from a manager, were difficult.
42:54
People had to reapply for their jobs at Nokia.
42:57
I sent my application, this is this middle manager speaking.
43:00
Then you got an invitation to an interview and it was quite tough.
43:04
He said at the po.
43:06
At that point you started to wonder whether you were working at Nokia or
43:09
not, and I felt like I wasn't because I didn't have a job or position.
43:13
That is such a key point and I'd love you to elaborate on it.
43:17
in theory, they wanted to be dynamic and assume that people are committed
43:23
and motivated and behave rationally, but that created a short term incentive to
43:33
only do stuff that will look good in the next job interview and don't care about
43:38
any of the risks that happen afterwards.
43:43
When it was done in such a huge scale, it really contributed to the
43:50
tendency to fear, , about telling bad news or flag the long-term risks.
43:58
And
44:00
Nokia had this
44:03
I idea that constant change is what keeps you going.
44:07
And I agree on the theory, but there is this human element that wasn't resolved.
44:14
And I think the management theory just swing from one extreme to the other one.
44:21
In the sense that, we have this all cliche statement that we need constant
44:25
change, and that's what Nokia was about.
44:28
After all, it held the first place in the world in terms of strategic agility.
44:33
We remember I said that, no, never forget that Nokia was held as the showcase, world
44:40
showcase for strategic agility for 10, 15 years, much as a general electorate.
44:45
Remember, Jack Welsh was the like business school case, for 10, 15
44:50
years in terms of conglomerate.
44:51
And, you have to be number one or number two or else, and
44:56
that kind of cliche statement.
44:57
And that was also went around for 15 years with G.E. then we have Nokia.
45:02
And so my point is that strategy, agility, constant change is good for
45:09
something and bad for other things.
45:11
Not as now constant change is good for incremental innovation.
45:15
Like in the case of Nokia, once you have a good product, a good paradigm,
45:19
then you can do all kinds of tweaking, which much like Apple is doing today,
45:23
by the way, you know you have iPhone 16, 15, more cameras, more memories, more
45:28
cameras, a little bit more application, but those are incremental innovation
45:33
and you can do a lot of incremental change and fast change this way.
45:37
But if you have to do a fundamental change, what would be Apple's Next
45:42
radical new product we have to see yet?
45:45
See, what is it?
45:46
We don't know yet, right?
45:48
But that's not something that you can do.
45:50
Fast change,
45:51
you've actually reminded me of a piece, and this is in the footnotes.
45:54
This is how in depth I read your work here, by the way.
45:57
you have a counterfactual situation where, we.
46:02
We talked about the fear inside.
46:05
Inside Nokia, but also some, to your point, some of the top managers had high
46:12
technological competence, but not all.
46:15
you say, here, consider Steve Jobs influence on Apple, which seemed
46:19
to have a somewhat similar, if, less extreme fear profile as Nokia.
46:23
So by all accounts, jobs ruled by fear and he felt high external fear
46:29
regarding Apple's long-term success.
46:31
So he was constantly on the hunt for threats to that change.
46:35
And he was very upset when Google announced Android and worried
46:39
that it would destroy the iPhone.
46:41
He even says that in his biography with Walter Isaacson, he was also notorious
46:46
for instilling fear among middle managers and jobs seemed reasonably
46:51
in touch with the technology he used, they used in the iPhone and was
46:56
closely involved in its development.
46:58
For example, he spent part of every day for six months
47:00
helping the refine the display.
47:03
Of the iPhone, according, again, to that biography, but was extremely
47:07
demanding about technological quality.
47:10
I thought that was an important contrast to show to Nokia.
47:13
People always ask me about this question to contrast, Steve Jobs.
47:19
And OPK (Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo) from Nokia.
47:21
I said the professor after all you said that fear was bad, but Steve Jobs ruled
47:26
by fear and he was quite successful.
47:29
So what do you make of it?
47:31
My answer was that Steve Jobs in, in fact, ruled by fear.
47:35
He was very authoritative, but he had something else which Nokia did not have.
47:41
And that's from emotional capital theory.
47:43
Back to emotional balancing, which Timo was referring to.
47:47
He was able to balance fear with thoughtful passion.
47:51
What I mean by that, he was able to instill thoughtful passion
47:55
among the engineers, the engineers.
47:57
The engineers, because that we are going to develop the most coolest
48:01
product, the game changing product.
48:03
And you know what?
48:04
You guys just bring you guys here.
48:06
I will pay you guys almost anything.
48:09
Everything you need to develop the product, you will have
48:13
it, it does not matter.
48:15
Go for excellence.
48:16
And that's the narrative that most eng most research
48:19
engineers would love to hear.
48:21
Said that I could tolerate your, I could tolerate, your harassment, so to speak.
48:27
Quote unquote.
48:27
As long as you give me all the money I need, to fulfill my hobby.
48:32
The engineers is the hobby, right?
48:33
So I could hack it, I could handle it.
48:35
So I think that's my hypothesis, he was able to balance the fear, the
48:40
pressure with the thoughtful passion that we have to achieve the best.
48:44
And, we give you all the resources to fulfill your passion.
48:48
That's a huge distinction in that Jobs had this passion for superior product quality.
48:55
While Nokia top management.
48:56
It was more about the financial performance.
48:59
And that reminds me of the N97 phone, which was NOKIA'S
49:05
first supposed iPhone killer.
49:09
it was thrust to the market it had serious bugs.
49:14
So sometimes you just couldn't answer a phone call with that phone
49:18
'cause the software is so glitchy.
49:21
But Nokia top management debated and decided to launch the product even though
49:26
they knew it had a lot of bugs, the short term financial result was more important
49:33
than the kind of perfect product.
49:36
I guess Steve Jobs, based on what I've read about him, would have really
49:41
gotten angry at the engineers and wanted a better product before launching.
49:46
But then second aspect is how close he was to the product development.
49:50
Also physically.
49:51
Apple's product development happened in the same building where jobs office
49:56
was, but in Finland, the closest R&D was like one and a half hour
50:01
drive away from the headquarters.
50:04
And when I interviewed the design engineers, they told a story
50:09
how someone asked them that.
50:11
How often do you think Steve Jobs visits the designers at Apple
50:15
and the Nokia designer was like maybe once a month, once a week.
50:20
And then the answer was four times per day.
50:23
So the kind of product organized sales and then closeness between
50:28
management and the product development was just very different.
50:32
And of course, apple had just one phone, so Nokia had 20 or 30, so the
50:38
whole structural setup was different.
50:41
And the CEO mentioned how Nokia was one of the first truly global
50:45
companies with development in 60 different countries versus Apple having
50:51
everything in one campus in California
50:55
There, there's another thing there.
50:56
And was it, was that in tamper?
50:58
that how you say it?
50:59
The r and d center.
51:01
Tamper
51:01
there was tempera is one,
51:03
the reason I say that is you reminded me of a piece from the
51:06
paper, and I'm gonna read this out.
51:07
You said The atmosphere of fear was created also through speech.
51:11
The worst one was the presentation by the chairman who gave this
51:15
presentation in Tampera a city in Finland, about R&D expenses.
51:19
He said that his only mistake had been to give us, this is
51:24
their R&D people too much money.
51:26
And that despite that our products were still not good enough and we
51:30
weren't making them fast enough.
51:31
And on top of that, he said if things continued as they were, 15% of the
51:35
people in the seminar hall would be gone.
51:38
By the time he came back next year, and that was this guy, this middle manager's
51:43
first encounter with the chairman.
51:45
I thought about that as a contrast to what you just said.
51:48
so what is it the case of, so you can think of a case of Steve Jobs and Apple,
51:53
very tight emotional coupling, emotional engagement with the developers, right.
51:59
You know, but through his behaviours, meeting very often, putting pressure on
52:03
them, but also taking care of them by giving you, how much help you need, how
52:06
much resources, how much money you need.
52:08
Money is flowing right, compared to the other behaviours, which
52:12
is more threatening and limiting and constraining and decoupling.
52:15
So you can see that a very different manager approach for
52:18
innovation, which, you can explain part of the success or failure.
52:23
I thought one last thing we might touch on was the
52:27
low
52:28
external threat.
52:29
So.
52:30
I have to counter this with the fact that we, we saw the document that
52:34
was passed around inside and it was extremely detailed and it predicted the
52:39
future very accurately about how the market would play out, price wars that
52:44
would play out, et cetera, et cetera.
52:46
But.
52:47
I had interviewed, I did a long term form series with Gary Hamill for the Innovation
52:52
Show, and Gary was also a consultant for Nokia, and he worked for with them on
52:57
an early prototype of the mobile phone.
52:59
But later on he said, guys, you know what?
53:01
We need to revisit this.
53:02
I don't think it's gonna carry you all the way through the future.
53:05
And they were like, at this stage, they were all multimillionaires
53:07
like, oh no, no, we're okay.
53:09
Thanks a million, Gary, you're just looking for more business.
53:12
But in your paper, you say Here, a senior strategy consultant explained that Nokia's
53:17
middle managers had little external fear, other firms were better because they
53:22
believed Nokia had superior capabilities relative to those other organizations.
53:26
They were overconfident in those abilities.
53:30
From a consultant's point of view, it showed in how they
53:33
treated the consultants, whatever function you were in at Nokia.
53:37
Talk about like, Hey, have you thought about this issue?
53:41
And you say, Nokia has always been one of the most arrogant
53:44
companies towards colleagues.
53:46
This is the person, the co consultants saying this, who were partners
53:49
back then, and it showed up in how everything was always perfect.
53:53
Nokians were the best in class, and they didn't even want to hear how
53:58
you thought about things differently because they felt that they were
54:01
inside a cocoon, and they were padded in some way from the external view.
54:06
I thought that was an interesting thing, given the contrast of there
54:10
were some people who were aware of the competitive threat, but at the
54:14
same time there was this internal confidence that was somewhat unfounded.
54:19
One of the people who wrote the report that you are mentioning, said
54:24
something like that where the number of people who really knew the pain
54:30
or felt the pain was way too small.
54:33
So it was this market intelligence unit where they really analyzed the iPhone
54:39
that felt the pain, and even some of them said that they only like truly felt
54:46
it after they started using the iPhone.
54:48
So even after writing the report, they didn't fully believe it emotionally,
54:54
but then people working in r and d or other areas in middle management where.
55:00
They were mainly looking at their own products and benchmarking them
55:04
against Ericson and Sony and other products, and seeing how they do better.
55:09
They just didn't see the difference.
55:13
And then, especially in Finland, Nokia was having a kind of way
55:19
disproportionate success and stages.
55:23
So at one point Nokia did don't remember the exact numbers, but like third of
55:28
the Finn exports and substantially contributed to the cross domestic product.
55:33
So if you worked in Nokia, you were treated as a hero in the grocery store
55:40
and that all contributed to the must have contributed to the arrogance.
55:46
I think I was told some story like that, even if you are the president
55:49
of China, Nokia at that time that the Nokia products of India account for a
55:55
significant percentage of the export of the country, not the Nokia product.
56:01
So you are, you are a big cheese even in those countries at tar time,
56:05
you know, because they have a huge manufacturing base out for Nokia.
56:08
So I guess that given that few success, it's it's difficult not to feel a
56:14
little bit complacent, isn't it?
56:15
And then on top of it, they to, again, to middle manage defense.
56:20
They believe that they had utmost technical superiority
56:24
in terms of the patents, right?
56:26
That the Samsung and Apple was used that time.
56:28
So I said, no matter what happens, we will have the the bottlenecks, quote
56:33
unquote, better use the patents anyway, so we'll be able to catch up fairly quickly.
56:38
So I think all of those perceptions contributed to
56:41
that sense of invincibility.
56:44
Yeah.
56:44
And it's really this kind of natural that had built this fantastic
56:51
technology and they had given like 1 billion phones to the world.
56:56
Like one fifth of the world population was using Nokia phone
57:02
and they had done that in 10 years.
57:05
So I think that's like almost like a miracle, like how fast they were able
57:11
to grow and natural that they got a bit overconfident or arrogant after that.
57:19
I think the lesson we can learn from that is that even if we have like successful
57:25
years as innovators, we should remain curious and keep learning , but it's
57:31
easy to just settle in your own success.
57:36
As I mentioned, to remain humble is easier said than done!
57:40
. Absolutely.
57:40
And Satya Nadella's things be a learn it all, not a know-it-all,
57:44
you know is very relevant.
57:45
A couple of just quotes here, this is from the CEO who downplayed Android
57:50
strategy publicly in 2008, November, 2008.
57:53
"We have had that and applications for 10 years. He said definitely we're
57:58
ahead. an EVP stated publicly that the iPhone is an interesting product, but
58:03
it is lacking a few essential features such as 3G, which would enable fast
58:08
data connections." So it, it's such an important point to actually go.
58:14
You as an organization, you as a leader, where are you not being humble?
58:18
Where are you saying these things about Some competitor, and this is
58:23
the thing about disruptive innovation, it always appears as a lesser product
58:27
and then they build up capability.
58:29
We see this a lot, say for example, a bank that a bank often relies on
58:34
regulation to protect it, to insulate it from the outside world, but there's
58:38
huge changes coming, and they'll dismiss those changes and dismiss the opportunity
58:43
to build capabilities for the future
58:45
I've also had very similar conversations about the role of regulation so it's
58:51
always easy to find some dimension where you are better than the other one.
58:56
As a teenager, I used to say that I'm stronger than Wayne Gretzky,
59:02
the ice hockey player, and more flexible than Arnold Schwarzenegger.
59:08
So I think we all do that.
59:10
But in Nokia, guys, the top management was also a huge dilemma.
59:13
So they had to keep speaking confidently to investors.
59:18
when they did that, they also, as a side effect, created arrogance and
59:24
lack of humility in the organization.
59:28
And we even have a counterfactual.
59:30
So when Nokia replaced the CEO in 2010, and he gave a new speech in 2000, early
59:36
2011, he said that our products are bad.
59:40
We are far behind from competition.
59:42
And the immediate stock market reaction was very negative, and all the orders
59:48
were canceled by all the customers.
59:50
So yeah, that case, the reality, but it also didn't work.
59:55
there's a quote I have to finish, but I'd love your finale, your final words
59:59
on this paper, and we're gonna come back 'cause there's a, an interesting
1:00:02
thing many of our audience won't know is that Nokia back, everybody,
1:00:05
they've reinvented themselves and they used all the lessons from this paper
1:00:10
to actually drive that reinvention.
1:00:12
It was the fuel for that reinvention.
1:00:14
But I love this quote, and it was towards the end of the paper, you
1:00:17
said top managers were not just passive recipients of information.
1:00:22
They actively shaped what would be communicated to them by influencing
1:00:26
their subordinates emotions, both directly through their directives and
1:00:30
indirectly through structural choices.
1:00:33
This suggests that one predictor of the accuracy of top managers mental models
1:00:38
could be their ability to influence the quality of their interaction with
1:00:41
middle managers by managing their own and middle managers emotions.
1:00:46
This goes to your point about you have to be able to control your emotions in a way.
1:00:51
Then you need to be a corporate athlete.
1:00:53
You need to be able to look after your stress levels so you don't bring them to
1:00:58
the organization, like you said, Timo, where they're not looking and going,
1:01:01
what kind of mood is Aiden in today?
1:01:04
as a result, behaving appropriately towards my emotions, where I'll
1:01:08
direct almost like a, a, an the of an organization, which
1:01:13
is a terrible place to be in.
1:01:15
I just thought that was a key point because that applies to everything.
1:01:18
That applies to being in a family, in a relationship, in an
1:01:21
organization no matter where you are.
1:01:23
But I'd love your final thoughts each gentleman on this paper before
1:01:28
we move on to the next paper.
1:01:30
My final thought is that it allows us to really go deep into how paying attention
1:01:38
to emotions or not paying attention to emotions and how you regulate emotions
1:01:44
can have significant consequences for the welfare of an organization.
1:01:48
I once I did research emotion even 30 years ago senior executives
1:01:53
always challenge me, said, Quy, how much money were we lost if we
1:01:59
didn't pay attention to emotion?
1:02:02
And I was little bit always dumbfounded.
1:02:04
It's almost like how much question that you can apply.
1:02:07
The same question about R&D, right?
1:02:08
How much question we lost, how have you quantified it?
1:02:11
And the case of Nokia, what allows me said, sir, it would
1:02:14
only cost you $100 billion.
1:02:18
Give or take.
1:02:19
I don't know whether the $1 billion give or take would
1:02:21
matter enough for you or not.
1:02:24
That's my answer.
1:02:25
it.
1:02:25
I love it.
1:02:26
It's a good point though, Quy, it's very hard to quantify this,
1:02:29
but you can feel it and there's a different energy in an organization
1:02:33
like that.
1:02:34
Timo.
1:02:34
Your closing thoughts.
1:02:35
When we make strategy, we are super comprehensive about
1:02:45
validating our assumptions.
1:02:48
But then when we, this paper shows that when we do the implementation
1:02:55
of the strategy we make overly simplistic assumptions about how
1:03:01
people in the organization feel and behave and therefore the.
1:03:07
All the work that went on that checking the external assumptions is irrelevant
1:03:12
because the bigger assumptions are the emotions that we completely ignore.
1:03:17
Beautiful think we've done a good job.
1:03:21
Yeah, I think you know, congratulations.
1:03:23
Aidan you really read our papers.
1:03:25
Great.
1:03:27
very careful.
1:03:28
I think you are the most careful reader I have ever come across.
1:03:31
Oh, you have no idea, man.
1:03:32
The rabbit holes I go down 'cause because I don't just read the paper,
1:03:35
then I start googling and reading paper.
1:03:38
I actually, anyway I'll finish this episode because I know
1:03:41
you guys need to head off.
1:03:42
It's been an absolute pleasure though, authors of this paper and Nokia, which is
1:03:46
an absolute brilliant read and I really hope people do take time to read it.
1:03:51
Get in touch if you want to copy of that.
1:03:53
The guys have kndly let me share that to people who really deal with strategy
1:03:57
and change inside organizations.
1:03:59
'cause they really want to make a big difference.
1:04:01
Quy Huy and Timo Vuori thank you for joining us.
1:04:09
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