Latest / KAJ Business & Money LIVE / Global Politics for Leaders 58: Ukraine, Israel & India with Irina Tsukerman
Transcript
- 0:19Speaker 1: Welcome to this episode of the world. According to irene
- 0:22Speaker 1: A Sugarman, our very special series on global politics on
- 0:25Speaker 1: the kJ Masterclass Live. Irene A Sugarman is a US
- 0:29Speaker 1: based national security and human rights lawyer as well as
- 0:32Speaker 1: a renowned geopolitical analyst. Our writings and commentary have appeared
- 0:37Speaker 1: in diverse US and international media and have been translated
- 0:41Speaker 1: to over a dozen languages. Every fortnight in the world.
- 0:44Speaker 1: According to iron A Sugarman, we traverse the geopolitical landscape
- 0:49Speaker 1: and telvin to international pressing international issues and gain insight
- 0:53Speaker 1: from IRENA's expert perspective. Welcome to the show once again.
- 0:58Speaker 1: This is the fifty eighth episode that we are doing
- 1:01Speaker 1: together on geopolitics side.
- 1:05Speaker 2: Great to be here, as always.
- 1:08Speaker 3: Welcome, welcome.
- 1:09Speaker 1: Several big topics today, but let's look at the big
- 1:12Speaker 1: picture today. This is the last episode of the year,
- 1:14Speaker 1: and so let's look at the world and understand it
- 1:17Speaker 1: from for our audience, you in the US.
- 1:20Speaker 3: And me in India.
- 1:21Speaker 1: One in the world's biggest democracy and one in the
- 1:24Speaker 1: world's largest democracy.
- 1:27Speaker 3: So how do you see? You know?
- 1:29Speaker 1: Twenty twenty five going away? Was it a year of peace?
- 1:32Speaker 1: Was it a year of war? How do you see
- 1:35Speaker 1: twenty twenty six coming up? Will it be much more
- 1:39Speaker 1: peaceful or will it be much more you know, towards
- 1:42Speaker 1: the warring side. How do you see our major powers
- 1:46Speaker 1: moving towards escalation management or wider conflict?
- 1:50Speaker 3: How do you see it all? And then we'll come
- 1:52Speaker 3: to the individual topics.
- 1:54Speaker 2: So regarding this year, I would say this was a
- 1:58Speaker 2: year of a lot of a lot of talk about peace.
- 2:01Speaker 2: There was more talk about peace than actual peace. Unfortunately,
- 2:06Speaker 2: in every other way it tended to trend in a
- 2:09Speaker 2: different direction. Ongoing ongoing tensions. The war with Ukraine between
- 2:18Speaker 2: Russia and Ukraine has not stopped. Russia has not withdrawn,
- 2:23Speaker 2: and it also has not stopped attacking civilians. The war
- 2:28Speaker 2: in Ghaza appears to be on pause, but in reality
- 2:33Speaker 2: this is more of a frozen conflict than a genuine
- 2:36Speaker 2: truth that would lead towards a long term, enduring solution.
- 2:40Speaker 2: The war in Sudan is proceeding very much a patient
- 2:43Speaker 2: the humanitarian disaster is not getting any better. Thailand and
- 2:50Speaker 2: are in a state of near constant tensions. Yet another
- 2:54Speaker 2: attempted cease for was concluded recently, but see how long
- 3:01Speaker 2: that will last. Randan and Congo to appear in a
- 3:06Speaker 2: state of tensions despite signing a recent A recent ceasfired
- 3:13Speaker 2: because the rebels that are part of the source of
- 3:16Speaker 2: tensions have not gone anywhere and they're not really subject
- 3:20Speaker 2: to official frameworks. So at least four major conflicts, plus
- 3:28Speaker 2: US escalation with Venezuela, plus Russia's hybrid warfare across Europe,
- 3:37Speaker 2: plus increasing tensions between China and its neighbors, all of
- 3:44Speaker 2: that has has brought in a very very tense time.
- 3:48Speaker 2: We also have very unrest and as sort of clashes
- 3:56Speaker 2: in throughout Syria that have escalated once again. More recently
- 4:03Speaker 2: US returning to a fight against ISIS in both Syria
- 4:08Speaker 2: and now Nigeria. A lot going on. So twenty twenty
- 4:13Speaker 2: six unfortunately, is not looking to be all the different
- 4:18Speaker 2: unless US and the other countries' policies change course, and
- 4:23Speaker 2: unless unless simone decides that, you know, to choose negotiation
- 4:32Speaker 2: and to choose compromises over hardline demands. The problem is
- 4:40Speaker 2: that's not looking good. We are actually on the world
- 4:42Speaker 2: to get another conflict. We are seeing that Saudi's just
- 4:46Speaker 2: attacked a m and port after after failure to get
- 4:53Speaker 2: the Southern traditional forces Council forces to dislodge from the
- 4:58Speaker 2: territories they over. The Yuye in response withdrew its own
- 5:06Speaker 2: counter terrorists and forces, leaving the future of the country
- 5:12Speaker 2: up in the air. Because the Hookies are looking at
- 5:15Speaker 2: all of this and thinking now it's a good time
- 5:17Speaker 2: to regroup. We've been dislodged from our positions that we've
- 5:22Speaker 2: been making in the south. But with the powers competing
- 5:26Speaker 2: over territory rather than focusing on fighting extremism, this is
- 5:31Speaker 2: a good time for us to make you know. So
- 5:35Speaker 2: this is very like we are likely to have to
- 5:38Speaker 2: see who is once again on the offensive in twenty
- 5:42Speaker 2: twenty six. Unless the situation changes, Russia Ukraine are probably
- 5:47Speaker 2: not going to stop fighting anytime soon, especially if US
- 5:52Speaker 2: keeps lifting sanctions of Russia's and kids, and Russia keeps
- 5:57Speaker 2: finding new partners for by its cheap oil and to
- 6:03Speaker 2: supply it with weapons, as China, North Korea, anyone have
- 6:07Speaker 2: all increased their support. But so you have other nations
- 6:13Speaker 2: in Central Asia providing Russia with dual use weapons. The
- 6:19Speaker 2: US policy too remains deeply conflicted, uneven, and inconsistent, and
- 6:25Speaker 2: more due to the tarf wars with various allies from
- 6:30Speaker 2: Europe to Africa. Today in the Pacific UH the Kturion
- 6:34Speaker 2: strategy for counter and threats has also been up in
- 6:37Speaker 2: the air and quite shaky. So once again, unless something changes,
- 6:42Speaker 2: unless some of the actors decide to reconsider their positions,
- 6:48Speaker 2: I don't I see a lot more of the same
- 6:52Speaker 2: with the same leaders in church, with the same geopolitical
- 6:56Speaker 2: factors at stake, and with an even greatest scramble for power,
- 7:01Speaker 2: for territory and financial resources, at least in part due
- 7:06Speaker 2: to US essentially moving away from being seen as a
- 7:11Speaker 2: world policeman. A lot of these things are now up
- 7:16Speaker 2: for grabs, and a lot of different players feel that
- 7:19Speaker 2: there is an opening to make a move that even
- 7:22Speaker 2: a year or two ago they probably have top twice.
- 7:27Speaker 3: Absolutely absolutely, thank you for that.
- 7:30Speaker 1: Let's look at this for the silver linings in all
- 7:34Speaker 1: these topics, so one by one will take them. First
- 7:37Speaker 1: is the Zelenski's visit to the White House. Natanie Alway
- 7:40Speaker 1: is also visiting there with talks of you know about
- 7:46Speaker 1: Iran re arming, but some people are talking about therea
- 7:49Speaker 1: his re election bit.
- 7:51Speaker 3: Also, how how do you see these visits?
- 7:54Speaker 1: Will it be bringing about you know, almost let's stop
- 7:57Speaker 1: that there will be some sort of a deal between Russia,
- 8:01Speaker 1: Ukraine and the US obviously helping helping them and in
- 8:05Speaker 1: the in the Middle East.
- 8:08Speaker 2: You know, the Zelensky and Tought meeting were setting up
- 8:12Speaker 2: to actually move into a fair favorable tone, nothing necessarily groundbreaking,
- 8:21Speaker 2: but at least positive in the sense of US and
- 8:24Speaker 2: Ukraine getting on the same page regarding division of the future,
- 8:28Speaker 2: until the Kremlin decided to make the completely outrageous kram,
- 8:34Speaker 2: which was nevertheless supported by several countries. By the way,
- 8:39Speaker 2: no necessarily access to any evidence that Ukraine supposedly targeted
- 8:46Speaker 2: putting Valdai residents with ninety one drones. That was denied
- 8:53Speaker 2: by Silansity, It was denied by various analysts and now
- 9:00Speaker 2: starting to be denied even by Russia's media, putting the
- 9:05Speaker 2: question of why anyone would have supported this claim to
- 9:08Speaker 2: begin with in a very in a very awkward diplomatic denouant.
- 9:18Speaker 2: But the most interesting part of all of this is
- 9:21Speaker 2: that Trump was actually asked twice about US during the
- 9:25Speaker 2: joint press conference that he felt with Zelenski. First time
- 9:29Speaker 2: he claimed not to know anything about the situation, and
- 9:33Speaker 2: the second time, when he was pressed on this, he
- 9:37Speaker 2: repeated almost worth a word what he claims Putting told
- 9:40Speaker 2: him about US, and consequently he essentially claimed that he
- 9:47Speaker 2: was angry at Ukraine for doing this and you know,
- 9:50Speaker 2: allegedly undermining the peace talks. But then he did not
- 9:56Speaker 2: demand any evidence from Russia that such an attack occurred,
- 10:00Speaker 2: that any damage was done, and there are now questions
- 10:04Speaker 2: about the feasibility of such an attack, even if Ukraine
- 10:08Speaker 2: wanted to attarget the residents, whether they even had the
- 10:11Speaker 2: means to accomplish this in the first place. So it
- 10:15Speaker 2: seems to me yet another diversion from the substance of
- 10:18Speaker 2: the discussion, the fact that Zelensky was insisting on clear
- 10:23Speaker 2: security guarantees by the United States that were tied to
- 10:27Speaker 2: specific actions and not nearly theoretical frameworks, and there are
- 10:33Speaker 2: questions whether these security guarantees are actionable, if any claim
- 10:39Speaker 2: by Putting is enough for the US to basically change
- 10:45Speaker 2: its possession on Ukraine, the if words alone are sufficient
- 10:50Speaker 2: to undermine the course of this conversation. Nevertheless, uh, the
- 10:58Speaker 2: interesting something into Shing happened, which is that Celensity indicated
- 11:03Speaker 2: that Trump could come and visit Ukraine, and that visit
- 11:07Speaker 2: could itself result in a cease fire. But if you
- 11:11Speaker 2: look at such an occurrence, if it's such a possibility,
- 11:16Speaker 2: if Trump worked visits Ukraine, it in itself would be
- 11:19Speaker 2: a ceasfire. I cannot imagine putting attacking Keys, at least
- 11:24Speaker 2: with the US president being there, because that would be
- 11:27Speaker 2: seen as an openly adversarial move against the United States
- 11:33Speaker 2: and not just Ukraine.
- 11:36Speaker 1: Absolutely, absolutely so can we expect peace here when one
- 11:41Speaker 1: party doesn't seem to be so willing as the ones
- 11:45Speaker 1: who are trying Russia has to also come forward, But
- 11:49Speaker 1: looks like every time there is some issue that crops
- 11:52Speaker 1: up well.
- 11:54Speaker 2: Interestingly enough, Russia is apparently losing its personnel it's soldiers
- 12:01Speaker 2: at a faster rate than at any time during during
- 12:05Speaker 2: the course of the war. According to the latest country
- 12:09Speaker 2: it lost over twelve over a million, two hundred thousand
- 12:13Speaker 2: people in the nearly four years of the since the
- 12:18Speaker 2: start of the full scale invasion. Nevertheless, with the years
- 12:22Speaker 2: lifting some of the economic as well as individual sanctions,
- 12:27Speaker 2: and despite the significant economic losses resulting from Western sanctions,
- 12:36Speaker 2: Russia is still managing to keep itself afflat enough to
- 12:40Speaker 2: at least subsidize this war for the time being. How
- 12:44Speaker 2: long that will last remains unclear just now. As a
- 12:47Speaker 2: result of Ukraine's attack on the power line, six hundred
- 12:51Speaker 2: thousand Moscow residents ended up without power, something that is
- 12:57Speaker 2: fairly common in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. I'm not
- 13:02Speaker 2: sure whether whether if this keeps happening, the Russian citizens
- 13:08Speaker 2: themselves will be quite as comfortable with the war as
- 13:12Speaker 2: they have been up until this point, where where the
- 13:16Speaker 2: losses appear to be fairly and distant from those who
- 13:19Speaker 2: remained inside the country and who are not actually serving.
- 13:24Speaker 1: Absolutely absolutely, so, let's and what about natan yaod visit?
- 13:29Speaker 3: Is it about it or or is it about the
- 13:31Speaker 3: election arena?
- 13:33Speaker 2: I mean it's both Jo and Trubs are facing political
- 13:43Speaker 2: obstacles this coming year. For Israel is facing its election
- 13:48Speaker 2: in October twenty twenty six if nothing happens before that.
- 13:52Speaker 2: And for the US the mid RUMs are coming and
- 13:54Speaker 2: they're not looking good for the Republican Party at all. Well,
- 13:57Speaker 2: that will not affect Trump's being in office unless the
- 14:03Speaker 2: unless uh the Democrats also take Senate, It's still will
- 14:09Speaker 2: be seen as essentially under cutting his power and it
- 14:14Speaker 2: will sortainly limit what he can do. So we have
- 14:22Speaker 2: to understand the context that the context is not near
- 14:25Speaker 2: normal regular political activity. Israel is still facing the situation
- 14:31Speaker 2: in Gaza that is not resolved. BOTHO and Trump are
- 14:38Speaker 2: facing scandals. The Epstein story that that is only growing
- 14:46Speaker 2: the more and know links implicating a sort of high
- 14:48Speaker 2: level functionaries and people close business people close to Trump
- 14:55Speaker 2: are on the one hand, and cutter data in Israel
- 14:58Speaker 2: implicating some of shops uh Nityako's closest advisors is also escalating,
- 15:08Speaker 2: with more and more revelations coming from some of these
- 15:12Speaker 2: people indicating the scale of the scandal was forwards than
- 15:18Speaker 2: what was original thought, and now also bringing in evidence
- 15:24Speaker 2: that there was a nactive effort to disrupt Israel's relationship
- 15:28Speaker 2: with Egypt. So both leaders are facing major, major obstacles
- 15:35Speaker 2: in their attempt to be seen as strong leaders for
- 15:39Speaker 2: leading the countries to success, victories and so forth. Amids
- 15:47Speaker 2: that you have ongoing threats such as Iran re arming
- 15:53Speaker 2: and threatening Israel once again, Trump basically indicated that he
- 15:57Speaker 2: would act quickly if the nuclear program were to relaunch
- 16:02Speaker 2: and US would strike the nuclear targets once again, and
- 16:06Speaker 2: he would He also seemed to indicate that he would
- 16:09Speaker 2: green light Israel's efforts to disrupt the conventional defense program
- 16:18Speaker 2: if Iran ends up in a seriously threatening position. But
- 16:25Speaker 2: while all of that is very much up for discussion,
- 16:29Speaker 2: what is far as clear is the future of Gaza
- 16:32Speaker 2: and where the two countries actually stand. Uh Trump seems
- 16:39Speaker 2: to be pushing to include Erdogan among uh An over
- 16:45Speaker 2: a peace effort to oversight Board that he is set
- 16:51Speaker 2: to announce. Israel is very much set against that. The
- 16:55Speaker 2: Gaza stabilization for US or the makeup of it, too
- 16:59Speaker 2: remains up in the air. Israel is excluded from a
- 17:03Speaker 2: Kutter based discussion of forty five countries invited to potential
- 17:09Speaker 2: to participate in this endeavor. Hamas by all accounts across
- 17:13Speaker 2: the board, is rearming and reconcile taking power and is
- 17:17Speaker 2: not going anywhere. Meanwhile, Israel is also stuck with escalation
- 17:22Speaker 2: in his Bolan. Despite promises to disarm, Lebanon has not
- 17:27Speaker 2: been able to put an end to his bullet's reign
- 17:30Speaker 2: of terror, and the organization has also been trying to
- 17:35Speaker 2: rearm as well. So Israel is conducting occasional strikes. It
- 17:42Speaker 2: has eliminated some additional leaders, but this is where the
- 17:49Speaker 2: rhetoric and the reality come to or grunging to a clash,
- 17:54Speaker 2: and where it's not clear whether the nahunrap on the
- 17:59Speaker 2: same page as to the future of the future direction
- 18:06Speaker 2: and the next steps. So far, it's not clear where
- 18:10Speaker 2: the whether Trump's reconstruction plan is really is more of
- 18:17Speaker 2: an aspiration, whether it's tied to specific timelines, deliverables and
- 18:23Speaker 2: concrete action items by Israel or by any other party.
- 18:29Speaker 2: And moreover, the financing for all of this remains unclear
- 18:34Speaker 2: because previously Trump claimed that no US dollars would go
- 18:39Speaker 2: towards reconstruction of Gaza. Now the Qushioner Whitko plan calls
- 18:44Speaker 2: for at least sixty billion dollars in the US funding,
- 18:48Speaker 2: and that would presumably only entail reconstructing the part of
- 18:52Speaker 2: Gaza that is currently on the Israel's control, and no
- 18:55Speaker 2: one knows how long Israel will link in that position.
- 18:59Speaker 2: They other sixty billion dollars of the proposed plan would
- 19:02Speaker 2: presumably be funded by the international community, but again SAIDI
- 19:07Speaker 2: Arabia respectively, one of the top donors to such a
- 19:12Speaker 2: development plan, refuses to donate opinion until Hamas is fully
- 19:18Speaker 2: outsted and as I mentioned, must has not gone anywhere.
- 19:21Speaker 2: A lot of very unclear mixed messaging from that meeting.
- 19:28Speaker 3: Absolutely absolutely, what about Venezuela.
- 19:31Speaker 1: Where are we on that multiple anchor seized US fortifying
- 19:36Speaker 1: positions in Puerto Rico? How does it look like land
- 19:39Speaker 1: strikes or is it all about pressure without war?
- 19:43Speaker 3: But then how far that strategy can go?
- 19:45Speaker 2: I know, Well, the latest strange thing that happened is
- 19:50Speaker 2: strump climing that years struck a production facility on land
- 19:55Speaker 2: inside in isuel And if true, this would be considered
- 19:59Speaker 2: a majeous coalatation indicated, indicating potential a future of other
- 20:04Speaker 2: lands strikes and potentially you know, a further, uh further
- 20:09Speaker 2: indication of US intentions to squeeze the regime until it collapses.
- 20:14Speaker 2: But so far, no one has confirmed this claim, not
- 20:18Speaker 2: anyone in the US and not on the Venezuelan side,
- 20:21Speaker 2: and certainly not any outside third party and service. So
- 20:25Speaker 2: whether Trump meant to say that this is something that's
- 20:28Speaker 2: under consideration, whether this was some covert action that is
- 20:32Speaker 2: still classified that he alluded to, or whether he s
- 20:36Speaker 2: imply made a mistake is also not clear. What is
- 20:40Speaker 2: what is obvious is that Yes has tried to be
- 20:44Speaker 2: somewhat consistent in intercepting oil tankers that are smuggling oil
- 20:49Speaker 2: to other countries, such as around in China. But despite that,
- 20:53Speaker 2: there is evidence that oil tankers are still reaching Venezuela,
- 20:58Speaker 2: and now they are flagging them painting Russian flanks or
- 21:01Speaker 2: the side to avoid being attacked and seized by the US.
- 21:08Speaker 2: And we are also seeing that the overall the pressure
- 21:11Speaker 2: compaign is moving from episodic sanctions enforcement into a more
- 21:15Speaker 2: sustained colors of pasture designed to compress the regime's options
- 21:20Speaker 2: across multiple domains simultaneously. So the reason for the seizure
- 21:26Speaker 2: of several oil tankers is not about just about deniging
- 21:31Speaker 2: revenue to the regime, although that is certainly an important reason.
- 21:37Speaker 2: It's also signaling in Venezuelans remaining economic arteries are fully
- 21:41Speaker 2: exposed and only conditionally tolerated. So this creates a climate
- 21:47Speaker 2: of permanent uncertainty for Caracas. Every shipment is now a
- 21:51Speaker 2: gamble rather than a reliable transaction, and of course that
- 21:54Speaker 2: puts pressure on the other side of the transactions, on
- 22:01Speaker 2: Venezuela's counterparts, who too do not necessarily wish to risk
- 22:07Speaker 2: their deliveries being seized The maritime focus is also deliberate
- 22:13Speaker 2: because the regime is dependent on all experts, not just
- 22:17Speaker 2: for state revenue, but also for patentage, loyalty within the military,
- 22:22Speaker 2: and basic regime survival. The fact that even in direct
- 22:27Speaker 2: or circuits expert are vulnerable, US basically is trying to
- 22:31Speaker 2: erode confidence among intermediaries, each US shipping companies and of
- 22:37Speaker 2: course those foreign partners. Over time, this kind of a
- 22:41Speaker 2: certainty can damage the regime as much as an outright
- 22:46Speaker 2: and barble, driving up costs and also reducing predictab building.
- 22:51Speaker 2: At the same time, US is building up around Puerto Rico,
- 22:54Speaker 2: which is also finally signaling that US is putting more
- 23:02Speaker 2: strategic foresight into the position of its forces. Nevertheless, it
- 23:08Speaker 2: should be for the time being at least less as
- 23:12Speaker 2: preparation for an even and invasion and more as a
- 23:15Speaker 2: platform for flexible escalation, which is what the administration has
- 23:20Speaker 2: been doing so far. Forward basing and enhanced surveillance capabilities
- 23:26Speaker 2: allow for rapid shifts between monitoring, introduction of vessels and
- 23:31Speaker 2: limited kinetic action without a political shock that can accompany
- 23:35Speaker 2: a sudden deployment. So what an even strategic terms, it
- 23:39Speaker 2: kind of normalizes pressure. It tells Caraccas that heightened readiness
- 23:43Speaker 2: is now the baseline and not the exceptional response. This
- 23:48Speaker 2: is important because coursion here is as much psychological as
- 23:53Speaker 2: it is you know, physical and material. Venezuela and leaders
- 23:57Speaker 2: are acutely sensitive to science that the US is lowering
- 24:03Speaker 2: its internal threshold for action. When you're pairing these maritime
- 24:09Speaker 2: seizures with visible regional military readiness, the implied message here
- 24:14Speaker 2: is that escalation letters are shortening what once required a
- 24:18Speaker 2: major provocation now can require any persistence or defiance. So
- 24:25Speaker 2: can we really expect land strikes or more lance strikes
- 24:29Speaker 2: depending on whether Trump's description was accurate or whether he
- 24:34Speaker 2: spoke limited, deniable, or narrowly framed. Strikes are now part
- 24:41Speaker 2: of the active option set, even if a broad campaign
- 24:45Speaker 2: is not the logic and a situation would not be
- 24:50Speaker 2: regime changed by force but selective punishment. You're talking about
- 24:54Speaker 2: hitting infrastructure, logistic notes, or assets such as factories and warehouses.
- 25:02Speaker 2: Frame that's connected to elicited activity, including drug trafficking, sanctions, evasion,
- 25:09Speaker 2: external adversaries, basically weapons, storages, things like that. This framing
- 25:14Speaker 2: is critical because it allows Washington to justify action as
- 25:19Speaker 2: law enforcement or regional security rather than war. From media's perspective,
- 25:24Speaker 2: such strikes could in theory serve multiple purposes at the
- 25:29Speaker 2: same time. They would reinforce the tourance, something that the
- 25:32Speaker 2: administration has been very keen on, quite openly demonstrate credibility
- 25:38Speaker 2: after repeated warnings, and similar to third parties that sanctions
- 25:42Speaker 2: enforcement has teeth beyond paperwork and by third parties and
- 25:46Speaker 2: in Russia, China, and Iran as well as assorted terrorist
- 25:51Speaker 2: organizations operating in and around Venezuela, they would also test
- 25:56Speaker 2: Venezuelan response thresholds, whether retaliates, absorbs the blow or escalates
- 26:03Speaker 2: through proxies and asymmetric channels, which case not yet really happened,
- 26:08Speaker 2: but could in theory. But there are also real risks
- 26:12Speaker 2: to something like that because even limited action could trigger
- 26:16Speaker 2: nationalist rally effects inside Venezuela and actually strengthen regime cohesion
- 26:22Speaker 2: rather than viginion. It could also lead to a fairly
- 26:26Speaker 2: serious asymmetrical retailiation, ranging from cyber attacks to regional destabilization
- 26:32Speaker 2: to even attacks on the US interests via non state
- 26:35Speaker 2: actors and US interests who would be diplomatic sites. They
- 26:41Speaker 2: could be military sites or economic sites, not just in
- 26:46Speaker 2: near Venezuela, but even elsewhere in the region. Just because
- 26:52Speaker 2: the region is weak doesn't mean that it's inert, but
- 26:56Speaker 2: on the contrary, it's actually unpredictable. Another issue is that
- 27:02Speaker 2: regional polities come into play. Some neighboring governments are welcoming
- 27:07Speaker 2: pressure on coroppos, but very few actually want open military
- 27:11Speaker 2: action in the region, So visible escalation could fracture regional
- 27:17Speaker 2: consensus and actually give critics ammunition to show that US
- 27:22Speaker 2: is heavyhanded or destabilizing. And that's been you know, a
- 27:26Speaker 2: major concern from the very beginning of this. Any land action,
- 27:30Speaker 2: if it occurs, is likely to be framed as discrete, justified,
- 27:35Speaker 2: non repeatable, rather than an opening phase of a campaign.
- 27:39Speaker 2: The more immediate objective would be internal erosion rather than
- 27:44Speaker 2: you know, some dramatic confrontation, despite the fact that there
- 27:48Speaker 2: are voices qualing for a dramatic confrontation within the administration
- 27:53Speaker 2: by that's being economic stress, amplifying wat insecurity, and demonstrating
- 27:58Speaker 2: operational which was should is betting that fractures within the
- 28:01Speaker 2: regime will actually give it the coup, is not that
- 28:05Speaker 2: it will collapse, you know, tomorrow or the day after,
- 28:09Speaker 2: but that accumulated dysfunction forces concessions, defections, or negotiations from
- 28:14Speaker 2: a position to week. Now. As I said, there are
- 28:18Speaker 2: more hokish voices within the administration that do want to
- 28:22Speaker 2: push for a fairly quick collapse. But I think there
- 28:26Speaker 2: is a tension inside the administration between this desire for
- 28:31Speaker 2: quick and visible win and you know they need to
- 28:34Speaker 2: plan carefully to avoid unpredictable and destabilizing outcomes that the
- 28:40Speaker 2: US will not be able to contain without a major
- 28:44Speaker 2: spillover effect. Soe So, in that sense, nothing is inevitable,
- 28:50Speaker 2: but the last tracks are no longer out of the question.
- 28:55Speaker 1: Absolutely absolutely. Let's wait and see for that what happens
- 28:59Speaker 1: in that. But let's move on to Yemen's s ST
- 29:04Speaker 1: has accused Saudis of launching strikes, So what does that
- 29:08Speaker 1: mean for that region, Saudi relations, and for red sea
- 29:12Speaker 1: security and also global shipping there.
- 29:16Speaker 2: I would say that what we seem to right now
- 29:19Speaker 2: is the most direct and the most serious confrontation between
- 29:24Speaker 2: Saudi Arabia and you in a very very long time.
- 29:28Speaker 2: There's been escalating intensions over this and other unrelated economic
- 29:34Speaker 2: issues for some time, and Saudi Arabian. You have also
- 29:38Speaker 2: had differences over you know, the war in Sudan, where
- 29:44Speaker 2: you have tried to keep some sort of plausible deniability.
- 29:49Speaker 2: But with the Yemen that's not a real question. Everyone
- 29:51Speaker 2: knows that URI is open the backing STC that and
- 29:56Speaker 2: there is a very clear geopolitical difference handling of Yemen,
- 30:01Speaker 2: the Cuchies and so forth. The Saujas are absolutely adamant
- 30:05Speaker 2: about keeping Yemen unified, even if it means working with cookies,
- 30:11Speaker 2: the Muslim Brotherhood and random pro Sagian delicious and tribes.
- 30:19Speaker 2: The UI is very hardline against the Muslim Brotherhood in particular,
- 30:25Speaker 2: but also against the Couchies. In the background is the
- 30:30Speaker 2: China backed reconciliation that took place between Iran and Saudi Arabia,
- 30:35Speaker 2: which more recently China has pursued throughout are relateral meeting
- 30:41Speaker 2: in Iran between the Saujis, the Chinese diplomats and military
- 30:45Speaker 2: officials and the Iranian counterparts. And of course, you know,
- 30:50Speaker 2: Iran would rather see Saudi Arabia line up with its
- 30:57Speaker 2: own priorities in Yemen and isolate any potential spoilers, including
- 31:03Speaker 2: the STC out of the picture. Ste is a major
- 31:08Speaker 2: problem for Iran at this point because they literally liberated
- 31:15Speaker 2: a huge tract of territory from the Houki hold their
- 31:19Speaker 2: intent on separating UH the South Yemen entirely from the north.
- 31:27Speaker 2: If the country were to separate, whether politically or nearly physically,
- 31:33Speaker 2: that would make it that would create could create serious
- 31:37Speaker 2: complications for future Hooki efforts to advance into the South,
- 31:44Speaker 2: and consequently it would also derail Iranian plan to spread
- 31:51Speaker 2: its influence throughout Yemen and closer to the borders, say
- 31:55Speaker 2: not from a from from a broader perspective, so uroader
- 32:00Speaker 2: should be very happy that somebody is literally doing their
- 32:03Speaker 2: job for them and protecting the Saudi borders from this
- 32:10Speaker 2: intervention by the proxy over their enemies, even if they
- 32:14Speaker 2: had normalized with their own in theory. But reality and
- 32:20Speaker 2: theory are two different things. In reality, UH, the Sagis
- 32:25Speaker 2: are far more concerned about potential regional stabilization, loss of
- 32:33Speaker 2: control of oil rich territories and also lots of control
- 32:41Speaker 2: of Yemen as a whole u UH. If Yemen were
- 32:47Speaker 2: to divide itself, the Saudi influence over the South could
- 32:52Speaker 2: diminish significantly, and the North would literally be in the
- 32:56Speaker 2: hands of the Fujis and would problem gravitate much more
- 33:00Speaker 2: towards Iran. The Saudis would not have even symbolic influence there,
- 33:06Speaker 2: so we are seeing fairly serious concerns. Unfortunately, they're playing
- 33:10Speaker 2: out in a way that the countries are very nearly
- 33:14Speaker 2: coming to blows attack AM in Newport after conducting other
- 33:19Speaker 2: air strakes against the STC positions. As a result, YU
- 33:25Speaker 2: withdrew its own counter terrorist and forces from Yemen, living
- 33:29Speaker 2: even less bulwark against Islamist and Huchi, a militant activity
- 33:39Speaker 2: that is likely to escalate in the near future. So
- 33:45Speaker 2: this is a very high stakes game and the REZI
- 33:49Speaker 2: security is at stakes here. Unfortunately, the differences between the
- 33:55Speaker 2: two countries are exasperate, baking and kind of reaching a
- 33:59Speaker 2: boiling point at this point. Despite being both members of
- 34:04Speaker 2: the g c c H, they're barely keeping up the
- 34:08Speaker 2: appearance of civility here. For now, Saga has not attacked
- 34:14Speaker 2: the EU positions directly, but this is the closest it
- 34:18Speaker 2: has come to to to this almost direct line of attack,
- 34:24Speaker 2: and this is something that other members of the g
- 34:28Speaker 2: c C and other states are watching very carefully. Uh
- 34:32Speaker 2: there's been several after school wanted to see nothing more
- 34:37Speaker 2: than these tensions between Real and Abu Dhabi to escalate,
- 34:41Speaker 2: and they're getting exactly what they want. Of course, Reality
- 34:47Speaker 2: is trying to get the Arab leak to block legitimization
- 34:54Speaker 2: campaigned for the disease, continued territorial consolidation in the East
- 34:59Speaker 2: and along key quor doors. SOUI will be is planning
- 35:02Speaker 2: to rally other states to basically indicate that separatism or
- 35:08Speaker 2: any sort of independen seeking will not be tolerated. But
- 35:11Speaker 2: nothing but even beyond this political moves, it will also
- 35:15Speaker 2: try to apply block the physical consolidation of control, despite
- 35:19Speaker 2: the fact that STC took the territory essentially through its
- 35:24Speaker 2: own commitment and through its superior military preparedness. If the
- 35:35Speaker 2: TC continues to expand into provinces and facilities that Reality
- 35:40Speaker 2: uses red lines, then uh these uh, these strikes that
- 35:51Speaker 2: so far have been framed as deterrents can be reframed
- 35:57Speaker 2: as aggression. STC can justify them as a refusal to
- 36:03Speaker 2: withdraw and essentially invite third parties including you need to
- 36:09Speaker 2: treats out the pressure as destabilizing. So far that has
- 36:13Speaker 2: not yet happened, but it.
- 36:15Speaker 1: Could absolutely now moving on coming on to the India
- 36:22Speaker 1: side of things. You know, Prime Minister Modes strips to Jordan,
- 36:25Speaker 1: Oman you know, Utopia and the India Oman Deal. And
- 36:30Speaker 1: in amidst all these things, Russia India defense reapproachment is
- 36:34Speaker 1: also gaining stream. How do you see India positioning itself
- 36:38Speaker 1: across competing power blocks without choosing size? How do you
- 36:42Speaker 1: see it all this visit and the India.
- 36:44Speaker 2: Russian Well, for now, a lot of these, a lot
- 36:49Speaker 2: of these moves are about expanding, which it's about diversifying
- 36:55Speaker 2: alliances at the time of uncertainty, where the US can
- 36:58Speaker 2: naturally be accounted as a reliable partner especial on economications,
- 37:03Speaker 2: but even in terms of security and defense, and also
- 37:09Speaker 2: building up India's own diplomatic clouds in the in the region.
- 37:18Speaker 2: But we should be looking at these three countries, Jordan
- 37:22Speaker 2: and Ethiopia has a single diplomatic gesture with multiple audiences
- 37:26Speaker 2: rather than three separate bilateral episodes. India is trying to
- 37:33Speaker 2: present themselves as a stagy non a geological partner, capable
- 37:37Speaker 2: of operating across rival blocks without importing other powers. Polarization
- 37:43Speaker 2: into the Middle East and the corner of Africa. So
- 37:46Speaker 2: we're talking about conductivity, we're talking about energy security, the
- 37:50Speaker 2: asper resilience and pragmatic development. The narrative is designed to
- 37:55Speaker 2: be legible both at home. Foreign post achievements are basically
- 38:01Speaker 2: framed as a direct extension of national capacity but also
- 38:05Speaker 2: a broad where partners want tangible deliverables and not just
- 38:09Speaker 2: simply rhetorical alignment. Jordan is often underappreciated in big power
- 38:16Speaker 2: readings of the region, but it's actually at the intersection
- 38:19Speaker 2: of security, cooperation, intelligence, liasian networks, and humanitarian logistics. Engagement
- 38:26Speaker 2: with them on is a way for utility to sign
- 38:29Speaker 2: that it values institutional stability and quiet professionalism over maximalist pasture,
- 38:35Speaker 2: and it also gives in an interact platform to engage
- 38:40Speaker 2: the Palestinian question to a channel that is not performative
- 38:44Speaker 2: and mostly operational and functional without getting trapped in binary
- 38:50Speaker 2: narratives and world words and getting a spillover effect in
- 38:56Speaker 2: its own domestic and communal politics. Jordan is basically in
- 39:02Speaker 2: many ways a reputational hege, not just a partner, and
- 39:06Speaker 2: it's a stabilizing optic complementing in Jias why they are
- 39:11Speaker 2: growing regional portfolio. Oman is actually the strategic centerpiece of
- 39:16Speaker 2: that trip because it's a Gulf state, a maritime gatekeeper
- 39:21Speaker 2: and also a diplomatic bridge. This is not just about
- 39:26Speaker 2: buying goodwill in Moscot, it's also investing in the geography.
- 39:32Speaker 2: We're talking about an intersection of the Strait of Hormuz,
- 39:35Speaker 2: the Arabian Sea Logistics art is connecting South Asia to
- 39:39Speaker 2: East Africa and the Mediterranean. And this relationship for India
- 39:44Speaker 2: is also easier to scale than many others because a
- 39:49Speaker 2: month foreign policy is focused on mediation and multilateralism, creating
- 39:55Speaker 2: space for cooperation where they are less like of narrative
- 40:01Speaker 2: shocks and makes it easier for India to plan long
- 40:05Speaker 2: term around shipping risk, insurance costs, energy flows and physical
- 40:11Speaker 2: security of Indian nationals in the region. So the guild
- 40:14Speaker 2: that we are talking about is not just a document
- 40:16Speaker 2: and it's it's actually a framework for the risk in
- 40:20Speaker 2: India's westward exposure. The operational logic is about optionalogy. India
- 40:27Speaker 2: wants diversified energy arrangements, if wants more reliable maritime access,
- 40:32Speaker 2: what's partnership mechanisms that construction during crisis without the need
- 40:37Speaker 2: for constant political improvisation. Among benefits from incomeing itself from
- 40:43Speaker 2: a rapidly rising Asian economy, which at the same time
- 40:47Speaker 2: does not antagonize its other relationship. And also it benefits
- 40:52Speaker 2: from converting its geographic location into a really you know,
- 40:58Speaker 2: durable economic lever The symmetry here is not a business
- 41:03Speaker 2: of course, AMON is tiny compared to India, but it
- 41:06Speaker 2: actually helps both sides monetize their unique, you know, the
- 41:12Speaker 2: unique qualities that they possess. There's also a defense and
- 41:15Speaker 2: security they mensied that is that's been somewhat understated in
- 41:20Speaker 2: public messaging from the strip, but it's central to the
- 41:23Speaker 2: strategic calculust. India is attentive to the risk that any
- 41:28Speaker 2: maritime disruption, grays on harassment orriginal escalation can turn commercial
- 41:34Speaker 2: roots into political chock points, and it has. We have
- 41:37Speaker 2: seen what happened at the height of the Hooki escalations
- 41:40Speaker 2: when India was drawn into having to defend its own
- 41:45Speaker 2: ships from from air strikes from Samall pirates and and
- 41:51Speaker 2: other you know, regional threats. A MOE offers not only
- 41:56Speaker 2: proximity to vital ceilings, but also a cooperative past sure
- 42:00Speaker 2: to support exercises for goals, logistical co ordination, and real
- 42:05Speaker 2: time maritime or garners without it being viewed as a
- 42:10Speaker 2: provocative to any particular regional actor. So India, with its
- 42:17Speaker 2: tradition of incremental institutionalization, is benefiting by building habits of
- 42:25Speaker 2: cooperation that are not dependent on any particular single crisis
- 42:30Speaker 2: to justify them, and that can persist even when the
- 42:34Speaker 2: regional temperature rises, which by the way, can happen at
- 42:37Speaker 2: any time. With the way things are going with the
- 42:40Speaker 2: hook Is Saudis and Marathis Iran and so forth. And
- 42:44Speaker 2: of course now shifting to Ethiopia, it broadens the picture
- 42:49Speaker 2: by shifting the lands from Golf to the corner of Africa,
- 42:52Speaker 2: and it's an ongoing internal transformation. It matters because it's
- 42:57Speaker 2: a demographic and political hardway, a hub for continental diplomacy
- 43:03Speaker 2: and a very critical node in the Red Sea region
- 43:07Speaker 2: despite being welllocked. India's engagement is you know, in part
- 43:13Speaker 2: about development there aretives, but also about strategic presence with
- 43:17Speaker 2: multiple external actors competing for influence in the same area
- 43:22Speaker 2: through infrastructu ports, security assistance and political alignment. So by
- 43:28Speaker 2: pairing Seopia with a one in the same diplomatic carp
- 43:33Speaker 2: India is basically mapping a corridor strategy. The sea LANs,
- 43:38Speaker 2: the coastal interfaces and the inland political centers, shaping regional stability,
- 43:44Speaker 2: and it also helps its own economic positioning. It does
- 43:49Speaker 2: not want to replicate any particular rival model. It's trying
- 43:53Speaker 2: to be the partner that can deliver feasible projects, training,
- 43:58Speaker 2: tax transfers and also targeted investment without demanding, you know,
- 44:03Speaker 2: ideological feelity the way China or the United States would.
- 44:07Speaker 2: That posture is attractive in regions that have already experienced
- 44:12Speaker 2: conditionality fatigue or are varying into being turned into arenas
- 44:17Speaker 2: for proxy competition. Narrative warfare, of course, is an almost
- 44:22Speaker 2: inevitable part of infrastructure competition. Whoever frames the project as exploitative, destabilizing,
- 44:29Speaker 2: or corpt can impose political course even if the engineering
- 44:32Speaker 2: is perfectly fine. But high level this is in this
- 44:37Speaker 2: context function as a narrative reinforcement, not just contact facilitation.
- 44:41Speaker 2: And of course domestic politics always benefits from these trips,
- 44:46Speaker 2: but in ways that are not just reducible to slogans.
- 44:50Speaker 2: The external partfolio supports an internal story of competence, stature,
- 44:55Speaker 2: protective capacity for the Indian diaspora. That's why prim Minister
- 44:59Speaker 2: Mogi visits with the Indian communities wherever he travels, as
- 45:04Speaker 2: long as when it's relevant. But of course the economic
- 45:10Speaker 2: fact of India's foreign policy is not far behind. We're
- 45:15Speaker 2: seeing that through the escalating cooperation between Russia and India,
- 45:22Speaker 2: which is exactly what probably prompted the statement in support
- 45:27Speaker 2: of the putting narrative about the alleged Ukrainian strike on
- 45:34Speaker 2: the World Dai residents. It was less about seriously believing
- 45:41Speaker 2: Kremlin's claims and more about preserving economic, uh and defense relations.
- 45:49Speaker 2: There are three pressure points that have resulted in this
- 45:52Speaker 2: recent optic in defense cooperation after a period of lull
- 45:58Speaker 2: and even distancing. These pressure points have actually been building
- 46:04Speaker 2: for years, but now there is a more explicit alignment. First,
- 46:08Speaker 2: India has a need to stabilize legacy force regulous. Second,
- 46:13Speaker 2: Russia has a need to preserve its most valuable defense
- 46:16Speaker 2: relationship amid a constrained expert environment and sanctions, And both
- 46:21Speaker 2: sides have an interest in frustrating a historically supplier client
- 46:26Speaker 2: than them into something that is more consistent with co
- 46:31Speaker 2: production co development partnership. Even though New Deli has diversity
- 46:36Speaker 2: significantly towards the US, friends Israel and also domestic production.
- 46:41Speaker 2: The operational reality is still the fact that large portions
- 46:46Speaker 2: of its own inventory are still Russian origin or Russian dependent,
- 46:53Speaker 2: creating a structural gravity that is hard to escape quickly
- 46:57Speaker 2: without reaguinous gaps that India can ill afford, as we
- 47:01Speaker 2: have seen from them and from this year's conflict that
- 47:06Speaker 2: Pakistan also helps explain why the relationship is not literally
- 47:11Speaker 2: persisting but also adapting to these challenges. So one driver
- 47:17Speaker 2: is maintenance of combat power. India's arm forces still rely
- 47:22Speaker 2: on Russian platforms across AirLand and air defense domains, and
- 47:27Speaker 2: the most origin requirement is not just about purchasing new
- 47:30Speaker 2: equipment but spares, upgrades and engine level fixes that keep
- 47:35Speaker 2: existing fleets credible. So this is where the relationship becomes
- 47:40Speaker 2: politically easier to defend inside India because sustaining reginace redis
- 47:45Speaker 2: prudence rather than ideological alignment. But this is also where
- 47:50Speaker 2: Moscow has leveraged because sustaining readiness ties India to Russian
- 47:55Speaker 2: technical ecosystems even when India is sourcing new flagships systems
- 48:01Speaker 2: from other places. So we are talking about most recent
- 48:08Speaker 2: and agreement which which has India tied to upgrading Key
- 48:14Speaker 2: seventy two tank engines. This partnership is very much anchored
- 48:19Speaker 2: in these upgrade packages and tech transfer arrangements, and they
- 48:26Speaker 2: can be framed as practical and indigenous enabling rather than
- 48:30Speaker 2: deep deepening indepens in the dependency. The second driver is
- 48:36Speaker 2: the shift towards joint production, localization and export oriented narratives.
- 48:41Speaker 2: For instance, the a K two or three rifle program
- 48:44Speaker 2: has become a symbol of that trend, allowing New Delity
- 48:47Speaker 2: to basically talk about import substitution and industrial growth even
- 48:53Speaker 2: while the design lineage is Russian. Now there were claims
- 48:58Speaker 2: about in yeah, going full fully indigenous by the end
- 49:03Speaker 2: of this year, but in the reality despite the fact
- 49:10Speaker 2: that that hasn't you know, fully come to fruition, but
- 49:15Speaker 2: has been a loose, partial and realized across up components.
- 49:19Speaker 2: UH India is trying to balance this this rhetoric of
- 49:24Speaker 2: making India compatible that its need to bring those components
- 49:31Speaker 2: from abroad, and of course there's external pressure from the
- 49:36Speaker 2: US and other Western artists, but it's also internal scrutiny
- 49:40Speaker 2: over the mastic capacity, but corruption concerns and objects of dependency. Finally,
- 49:46Speaker 2: there is the symbolism of summit level momentum the reason
- 49:50Speaker 2: putting visit to India. The annual summit Traming provided an
- 49:54Speaker 2: opportunity to affirm the special and privileged strategic partnership and
- 50:01Speaker 2: to advance further defense related corporation even when the public
- 50:06Speaker 2: language is broad and that basically sends a signal to
- 50:09Speaker 2: audiences in both countries. Amidst sanctions risk reputational course. These
- 50:18Speaker 2: top level political functions are seen as insurance for bureaucracies
- 50:24Speaker 2: and defense industries and signals commitment and the fact that
- 50:29Speaker 2: the leaders are prepared to absorb friction and to keep
- 50:32Speaker 2: channels open. And this is messaging not only to Indians
- 50:38Speaker 2: and Russians, but also to Washington turbiation and to keep
- 50:42Speaker 2: golf partners who are watching how India is balancing all
- 50:45Speaker 2: these relationships.
- 50:47Speaker 3: Absolutely absolutely arena.
- 50:49Speaker 1: I'm staying with South Asia and this is our last
- 50:52Speaker 1: topic of the day is domestic instability and its regional
- 50:55Speaker 1: and geopolitical consequences. Let's look at Banglady, what's happening there.
- 51:01Speaker 1: I thought that, you know, and a lot of people
- 51:03Speaker 1: thought that there will be some change. If the previous
- 51:08Speaker 1: previous administration did not last it miss new things will
- 51:11Speaker 1: come and give some respite to people. But it does
- 51:14Speaker 1: not look like more. Nobody knows what's happening there. Even
- 51:17Speaker 1: in Pakistan you see m Rankan and why they've got
- 51:20Speaker 1: additional prison terms. So I don't we don't know will Trump,
- 51:24Speaker 1: you know, interfere there. Also, how does it look like
- 51:27Speaker 1: for regional antiopolitical stability?
- 51:31Speaker 2: So what the unrest, the classes, the murders, the political
- 51:37Speaker 2: rewirelence that we've been seeing over the past you know,
- 51:40Speaker 2: days and weeks is not really a new wave, but
- 51:44Speaker 2: it could be considered a second phase of the twenty
- 51:47Speaker 2: twenty four crisis that never was actually resolved. For instance,
- 51:51Speaker 2: we are seeing that the Student Party is reallying itself
- 51:56Speaker 2: with the Easonist Party. But is it really a different
- 52:00Speaker 2: from what happened in twenty twenty four when the Islamis
- 52:03Speaker 2: literally infiltrated and took over the student led uprising. You know,
- 52:10Speaker 2: many observers made a strategic mistake in assuming that when
- 52:14Speaker 2: the twenty twenty four violence, that the twenty twenty four
- 52:18Speaker 2: violence subsided, ended, when street mobilization temporarily receded and the
- 52:23Speaker 2: state reasserted surface control. In reality, what we saw was
- 52:29Speaker 2: actually a wee configured power balance on the streets. The
- 52:32Speaker 2: recent outburst is showing how these actors, attesting the prominence
- 52:37Speaker 2: of that shift the old Deterrrens model broke Islamist networks,
- 52:43Speaker 2: especially those who were already embedded in student groups also
- 52:47Speaker 2: through masculine charities and neighborhood enforcement structures. Learned two critical
- 52:53Speaker 2: lessons from that experience, First, that mass disorder could be
- 52:57Speaker 2: generated quickly through narrative tiggers rather than formal calls to action. Second,
- 53:03Speaker 2: that the attribution could be blurred enough to prevent decisive repression.
- 53:08Speaker 2: Those lessons were not only not forgotten, they were actually
- 53:13Speaker 2: essentially repurposed. This year we see the deployment of that
- 53:18Speaker 2: stored capability. This was not as spontaneous outburst of anger.
- 53:23Speaker 2: This was something that was essentially channeled into being. Another
- 53:29Speaker 2: central continuity is the deliberate frame of violence is defensive
- 53:33Speaker 2: rather than offensive. Islamist actors have become more sophisticated in
- 53:38Speaker 2: presenting unrest as a reaction to provocation by secularist cultural
- 53:43Speaker 2: elites or alleged foreign backed forces last year, and this
- 53:47Speaker 2: took form the form of claims that secular protesters insulted
- 53:52Speaker 2: religion and destabilized society. More recently, similar naritives re appeared
- 53:58Speaker 2: almost immediately even for facts were established about exactly what
- 54:02Speaker 2: was happening, indicating pre prepared messaging rather than organic outrage.
- 54:09Speaker 2: What's changed this time around is that Islamist groups are
- 54:12Speaker 2: no longer primarily trying to topple the state or trigarusion
- 54:16Speaker 2: collapse because they essentially have at least some level of
- 54:21Speaker 2: control around the current government. Instead, they're contesting narrative sovereignty.
- 54:26Speaker 2: The violence is not about police or government size, but
- 54:31Speaker 2: also symbolic notes such as media outlets, cultural spaces, student hubs,
- 54:36Speaker 2: and minority neighborhoods. This mirrors the late twenty twenty four tactics,
- 54:42Speaker 2: when the objective was to shrink the space in which
- 54:45Speaker 2: secular identity could operate safely, rather than simply seizing formal
- 54:50Speaker 2: power outright. Another point of continuity from what we saw
- 54:55Speaker 2: last year is strategic ambiguity. Last year, the Islamist organizers
- 55:01Speaker 2: often operated through cutouts in formal youth groups so called
- 55:06Speaker 2: spontaneous mobs, or criminal adjacent actors who could plausibly deny
- 55:11Speaker 2: a geological coordination. Seeing the same pattern occur now, allowing
- 55:17Speaker 2: the Islamist leadership to distance itself rhetorically while benefiting operational
- 55:23Speaker 2: violence is deniable, diffuse, and difficult to attribute, which is
- 55:28Speaker 2: precisely why it keeps recurring now. It's also important to
- 55:32Speaker 2: note that this recent outburst of violence is tied to
- 55:36Speaker 2: some unfinished businessness regarding legitimacy. The question of who represents
- 55:42Speaker 2: the people has never really settled. Islamists have spent the
- 55:46Speaker 2: intervening months reframing last year as proof that secular governance
- 55:51Speaker 2: leads to chaos, world decay, and form manipulation. The renewed
- 55:56Speaker 2: violence is meant to reinforce that story. Is to ability
- 56:01Speaker 2: is demonstrated blamed on secular actors and minorities, even when
- 56:06Speaker 2: Islamist mobilization is the underlying driver most important in the
- 56:12Speaker 2: state response since last year has been inconsistent, and Islamist
- 56:16Speaker 2: networks are exploiting that inconsistency. Crackdowns on visible protesters who
- 56:21Speaker 2: exist with tolerance or hesitation towards religiously framed mobilization. Over time,
- 56:27Speaker 2: this teaches Islamist actors that religious frameer provides protection while
- 56:33Speaker 2: secular protest invites punishment. The last weeks and days reflect
- 56:39Speaker 2: a growing confidence that this symmetry still holds. Economic pressure
- 56:44Speaker 2: is also amplifying this dynamic, although it's not the most
- 56:48Speaker 2: important underlying factor. Use unemployment, inflation, and urban problems provide manpower,
- 56:55Speaker 2: but its ideology with directing the flow of of the
- 57:00Speaker 2: current response. Both last year and currently, the organizers driven
- 57:05Speaker 2: by Islamist motives are able to translate economic driven frustration
- 57:10Speaker 2: into targeted action, where while secular groups have remained fragmented,
- 57:15Speaker 2: reactive and easier to isolate, and the minorities are basically
- 57:21Speaker 2: escape goaded. The most dangerous element is normalization of all
- 57:26Speaker 2: of this. Each episode of violence passing that clear attribution
- 57:30Speaker 2: and accountability strengthens the Islamists claim that their inevitable power
- 57:35Speaker 2: brokers rather than destabilizers. This recent series of incidents is
- 57:42Speaker 2: less about meeking immediate demands and more about locking in
- 57:46Speaker 2: an equilibrium where street power belongs disproportionally to islonist religious actors.
- 57:53Speaker 2: In other words, the events today are the aftershock of
- 57:58Speaker 2: last year, not a laws. Islam is a real searching momentum,
- 58:03Speaker 2: testing red lines and reminding both the state and society
- 58:06Speaker 2: and that the contest over the country's identity is actually
- 58:10Speaker 2: still on the result unless the state confronts the narrative.
- 58:14Speaker 2: They mentioned this information and warfare directly and not just
- 58:19Speaker 2: through the use of physical force. For the such instances
- 58:24Speaker 2: can be expected and should not be tweeted as anomalies.
- 58:30Speaker 3: Right right. What about Pakistan? What's happening there, especially within
- 58:35Speaker 3: Grand Khan and all.
- 58:38Speaker 2: Well Immerant Khan's troubles seem to be deepening, not that
- 58:44Speaker 2: he was in particularly great place to begin with, but
- 58:48Speaker 2: most recently he and his wife Bush People receive additional
- 58:52Speaker 2: prison term. It's essentially this happened as a result of
- 58:58Speaker 2: a new corruption related case tied to the handling and
- 59:01Speaker 2: purchase of state gifts. The Pakistani court sentenced each of
- 59:05Speaker 2: them to seventeen years, framing the conduct as a breach
- 59:09Speaker 2: of trust and anti corruption violations. Hand's team argued that
- 59:14Speaker 2: procedural unfairness and injustice were resulted in an unfair verdict
- 59:23Speaker 2: and they're planning to appeal it. The timing in the
- 59:27Speaker 2: scale is not really a separate legal advents and more
- 59:31Speaker 2: like additional weight added to accumulative architecture of incopacitation. Cold
- 59:37Speaker 2: has been incarcerated since twenty twenty three in places multiple cases,
- 59:42Speaker 2: each additional conduction narrows his room to maneuver, complicates bargaining,
- 59:47Speaker 2: and keeps his leadership ecosystem on the defensive, alternating between
- 59:53Speaker 2: courts from triage and street mobilization. The immediate consequence is
- 59:58Speaker 2: of course anger among the PTI supporters, but also renewed
- 1:00:03Speaker 2: pressure on the state to manage public order. So we're
- 1:00:07Speaker 2: seeing a tising cycle legal escalation, protests or attempted protests,
- 1:00:11Speaker 2: administrative and policing responses that further construct the party's operational capacity.
- 1:00:18Speaker 2: In other words, this is kind of a managed repression
- 1:00:23Speaker 2: that's meant to essentially the legitimize the party itself and
- 1:00:27Speaker 2: not just even Hahn. So we hearing about massa restaurant
- 1:00:33Speaker 2: anticipated party activity, and it's shows that the states can
- 1:00:37Speaker 2: very quickly shift from legal theater to very much coursive containment. Also,
- 1:00:44Speaker 2: there's certainly a messaging contest. The core narrative of Haun's
- 1:00:48Speaker 2: party has portrayed Hahn as the victim of politicized persecution
- 1:00:53Speaker 2: the state in says the courts are acting entirely independently.
- 1:00:57Speaker 2: The New Center gives each side fresh match for the
- 1:01:01Speaker 2: government a headline that says accountability for corruption. For PGI,
- 1:01:06Speaker 2: it's an example of staffed processes delivered in the manner
- 1:01:10Speaker 2: they claim United full defense participation. Meanwhile, the wife's legal
- 1:01:15Speaker 2: exposure is especially sensitive because it expands the context from
- 1:01:20Speaker 2: politics into personal and moral symbolism, which in Pakistan can
- 1:01:24Speaker 2: be social and catalytic. Apparently, her appeal is based on
- 1:01:32Speaker 2: emphasizing her non office holding status and argues that the
- 1:01:36Speaker 2: verdict lacks lawful grounding. Regardless of the legal merriage, the
- 1:01:41Speaker 2: rhetorical claim is to present for as a collateral in
- 1:01:43Speaker 2: the campaign against Hran rather than a principal actor. At
- 1:01:48Speaker 2: the same time, there is a question whether Trump will
- 1:01:52Speaker 2: intercede decisively on Immoran's behalf. There's been already a stating
- 1:01:58Speaker 2: online ecosystem promoting the get the top allergically promise to
- 1:02:02Speaker 2: free in run harm. But there's a lot of this
- 1:02:07Speaker 2: messaging has been manipulated a deepid content rather than any
- 1:02:11Speaker 2: serious commitments by Trump or anyone from his administration. There
- 1:02:17Speaker 2: is of course a reputational cost of acting on the
- 1:02:20Speaker 2: narrative that is demonstrable polluted. Uh, there is very unlikely
- 1:02:27Speaker 2: to be very clear and open action from the Trump
- 1:02:31Speaker 2: team in the near future. Intercession may come in a
- 1:02:38Speaker 2: few forms, through quite diplomatic inquiry through public statements, conditionality
- 1:02:45Speaker 2: in aid or security cooperation, or private pressure through military
- 1:02:49Speaker 2: to military channels. The most plausible lane, if any of
- 1:02:52Speaker 2: it actually happens, would be quite signaling that US prefers
- 1:02:56Speaker 2: political discalation and new process over personalized intervention of the
- 1:03:02Speaker 2: sort Trump is somewhat infamous for, for a single politician
- 1:03:07Speaker 2: could be easily portrayed as foreign meddling, which would backfire
- 1:03:12Speaker 2: and even strengthen hardline position. Moreover, there's a question of incentives.
- 1:03:18Speaker 2: Washington's Pakistan policy, pragmatic often prioritizes regional stability, counter terror cooperation,
- 1:03:26Speaker 2: nuclear risk management, crisis control within Reddin, the fate of
- 1:03:30Speaker 2: a single political leader, no matter how appealing to Trump.
- 1:03:35Speaker 2: Add to this, the Trump is now pursuing economic opportunities
- 1:03:40Speaker 2: inside Pakistan on behalf of the Trump organization and possibly
- 1:03:45Speaker 2: in concurrence with several growth actors. If that actually goes
- 1:03:50Speaker 2: beyond headlines and materializes into a long term practical commitments,
- 1:03:56Speaker 2: there will be much less room for Trump to push
- 1:03:58Speaker 2: on behalf of a in a position actor. What that
- 1:04:06Speaker 2: basically means is that Trump could have been using promises
- 1:04:10Speaker 2: of intervention on Hunt's behalf as leveraged to pressure the
- 1:04:15Speaker 2: Pakistani government to acquiesce to his own economic interest inside
- 1:04:21Speaker 2: the country.
- 1:04:23Speaker 3: Absolutely, absolutely so.
- 1:04:25Speaker 1: In twenty twenty six, do you think Trump will be
- 1:04:28Speaker 1: able to find oil for Pakistan and lead them to prosperity?
- 1:04:33Speaker 3: How do you think that happening?
- 1:04:36Speaker 2: I think it will end for Pakistan the saying it
- 1:04:38Speaker 2: will as it ends for everybody else. A lot of bluster,
- 1:04:43Speaker 2: maybe a lot of signing of certain deals. You know,
- 1:04:48Speaker 2: some have finished projects, some money between private actors exchanging hands,
- 1:04:54Speaker 2: but not much for the country as a whole. In
- 1:04:57Speaker 2: any commitments, security or economic or all of us should
- 1:05:01Speaker 2: be from chunks should be taken with a huge grain
- 1:05:04Speaker 2: of salt.
- 1:05:06Speaker 1: Absolutely absolutely with this it's set up on this very
- 1:05:09Speaker 1: special edition of the World. According to Irena Sugarman on
- 1:05:13Speaker 1: the Cage Masterclass Life, thank you so much indeed for
- 1:05:16Speaker 1: joining us.
- 1:05:17Speaker 2: Thank you so much, and have a wonderful year you
- 1:05:21Speaker 2: two